Climate Act Implementation Components – Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York

Climate Act Status – June 2026

New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is now driving every major energy and climate decision in the state. I’ve grown increasingly concerned that the transition plan built around this law is not affordable, is risky for reliability, and will not deliver the environmental benefits people assume. This post provides an overview of my concerns.

As a retired air‑pollution meteorologist who has spent a career worrying about both the air people breathe and whether the lights stay on, I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.

Climate Act Requirements

The Climate Act is often described in broad, aspirational terms, but its mandates are very specific. Public Service Law Section 66‑p requires the Public Service Commission, by June 30, 2021, to establish a program ensuring that at least 70% of statewide electric generation secured by jurisdictional load-serving entities in 2030 comes from “renewable energy systems” and that by 2040 the statewide electrical demand system is zero emissions. These statutory “targets” are the Climate Act’s headline electric-sector mandates translated into binding obligations on utilities and other load-serving entities, rather than being left as generalized policy goals. On top of that, it sets a net‑zero statewide emissions target by mid‑century and directs a large share of climate and energy spending to “disadvantaged communities.”

To push enough wind, solar, and transmission projects through the pipeline to meet those dates, the state created new fast‑track siting regimes: first the Office of Renewable Energy Siting (ORES), and more recently the Renewable Action through Project Interconnection and Deployment (RAPID) Act, which folds big renewables and major transmission lines into a single accelerated process. In short, the law is not just a statement of long‑term goals; it has spawned a whole machinery of timelines, mandates, and permitting shortcuts to force the system in one direction.

My over-riding concern is that the Climate Act set very aggressive goals without a realistic, step-by-step plan to get there. We don’t have a plan; we have a wish list. The law sets big targets for cutting emissions, but there’s no practical roadmap that says who builds what, by when, and how we keep the lights on and bills affordable along the way. This is declaring we’ll rebuild the whole electric system in 15 years without a construction schedule or budget.”

The law assumes everything will work out—technology, costs, and reliability—without proving it. No conditions have been defined. There are no clear affordability limits, no defined reliability safeguards, and no trigger points where the state must slow down or change course if things start to go wrong. I’m used to testing assumptions. Here, the assumptions are treated as facts.

The law ignores permitting reality. We make it harder and slower to permit both existing plants and new infrastructure, while at the same time assuming we can build massive amounts of renewables, storage, and transmission on a tight deadline. The timelines and the permitting system just don’t match. It can take many years to permit a single transmission line. The law acts as if we can permit and build dozens on a political timetable.

Affordability: what it looks like at the household level

From the beginning, the Climate Act’s architects asserted that the transition would be cost‑effective and could be done using technologies available a decade ago. In practice, when I look at the numbers through the lens of a typical upstate household, that claim is hard to square with the evidence.[

NYSERDA’s modeling and public messaging emphasize long‑term fuel and operating savings from electrification, but I believe they understate or obscure the full capital and retrofit costs that real people will face. A gas‑heated home in upstate New York is not starting from a blank slate; to electrify heat it may need a heat pump, electric panel upgrades, new wiring, backup systems, and often building shell improvements. When those costs are levelized over realistic lifetimes and added to electric bills that must also carry the cost of massive new generation, storage, and transmission, NYSERDA’s own calculations show annual costs rising by thousands of dollars compared to staying on gas.

That’s before we talk about vehicle electrification and the additional load that puts on both household budgets and local distribution systems. For low‑ and middle‑income families, especially in older housing stock, the up‑front burden is steep, and the promised payback periods are long and uncertain. The latest budget language envisions a cap‑and‑invest system that would raise revenue and then “share” proceeds with New Yorkers to offset bills, but that still means raising the underlying cost of energy to generate those funds in the first place.

Previous energy transitions, for example, from coal town gas to natural gas, or from inefficient oil burners to modern gas boilers, succeeded because they saved consumers money and improved convenience. The Climate Act’s transition is different: it is enforced by law and regulation rather than emerging organically from better economics, and that is why I keep coming back to affordability as a core concern.

Reliability: weather‑dependent supply on a tight grid

My second major concern is reliability. The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) prepares an annual report on “forces shaping the electric grid and wholesale electricity markets.” NYISO’s Power Trends 2026 is a notable document because it acknowledges that Climate Act related initiatives such as electrification, retirement of conventional resources, and weather-dependent generation combined with large new energy-intensive loads are making the system more uncertain and more fragile. It also says reliability margins are shrinking and that winter conditions are becoming a defining challenge.

The Climate Act’s targets effectively assume that New York can completely revamp the electric system to run largely on wind, solar, and storage, with something called “Dispatchable Emissions‑Free Resources” (DEFRs) appearing down the road to back them up. In the Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan, those DEFRs are more of a placeholder than a commercially available option today.

As a meteorologist, I am very aware that wind and solar are controlled by the weather, not by grid operators. They are intermittent, they don’t work all the time; they are diffuse, they require large land areas and new transmission to deliver the same energy as a single conventional plant; and their output is correlated over large regions due to large‑scale weather systems. That means a cold, calm high‑pressure system can reduce wind output over the whole Northeast just when electric heating demand is highest, and clouds can reduce solar output across a broad swath of the state at the same time. The Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan acknowledge that DEFR is necessary for this situation but there is no proposal how to address this requirement.

Batteries are valuable for smoothing and short‑duration balancing, but they become very expensive very quickly if you try to size them to cover multi‑day or seasonal shortfalls. Studies that look at the cost of backing up long, widespread wind lulls strictly with storage point to staggering cost numbers and large amounts of capacity that would sit idle much of the time. Despite repeated warnings from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) about resource adequacy and the risks of retiring fossil capacity faster than firm replacements are available, I don’t see those concerns fully reflected in the state’s official transition roadmap.

My worry is that we are treating weather‑dependent megawatt‑hours as if they are interchangeable with firm capacity on peak and in worst‑case conditions and filling the gap with optimistic assumptions about future technologies. That may look fine in a model, but on a winter evening with a regional cold snap and limited imports, the real‑world consequences of getting it wrong would be very serious.

Environmental impact and local siting

People understandably assume that a climate law must be environmentally beneficial. My view, informed by decades of air‑quality work, is that the answer depends on how we define and measure “benefit,” and on the local impacts of the projects required to meet statewide targets.

On the accounting side, the statute originally used 20‑year global warming potentials (GWP20) and included out‑of‑state, upstream emissions from fossil fuel production in New York’s inventory. That approach gave very high weight to methane and made New York’s near‑term targets particularly difficult to meet compared to jurisdictions using 100‑year GWPs and more conventional boundaries. I have long argued that this approach magnified the appearance of urgency without changing global physics and raised the risk that New York would push expensive policies for relatively modest climate impact while encouraging emissions to “leak” to other regions.

The 2026 budget revisions change that accounting. They move to 100‑year GWPs, drop out‑of‑state upstream emissions, and exclude biogenic CO₂. Those moves align New York’s bookkeeping more closely with federal and international practice and immediately reduce reported statewide emissions—without any physical change in the atmosphere. The new law also softens the near‑term target, replacing the 40 percent‑below‑1990 mandate for 2030 with a 60 percent reduction by 2040, qualified by “to the maximum extent feasible and cost effective,” and pushes the deadline for DEC regulations out to the end of 2028. The changes simply push the inevitable reckoning down the road.

At the same time, ORES and the RAPID Act change how projects are sited on the ground. These frameworks centralize permitting for large renewables and major transmission in Albany, set tight timelines, and include “deemed complete” and “deemed approved” provisions if agencies miss deadlines. Town associations, landowners, and even some developers have flagged that combination as a problem: local governments lose leverage, procedural timelines are very tight, and the opportunity to raise and adjudicate substantive issues is narrow.

From an environmental perspective, I worry that we are trading thorough site‑specific review and local consent for speed, especially in rural upstate communities being asked to host industrial‑scale projects for benefits that are mostly diffuse and global. That doesn’t mean every project is harmful or that renewables have no place, but it does mean we should be honest about the trade‑offs and the cumulative impacts of covering large areas of the landscape with energy infrastructure.

In my opinion, the biggest flaw with ORES and the RAPID Act is that they do not include specific conditions for developers. Because there are no specific limitations for prime farmland protections, wildlife habitat, noise, or technology constraints, projects are being approved that will have long lasting adverse environmental impacts, health effects, and will require even more development. For example, utility-scale solar development should use tilting axis panels that maximize solar collection and should not be sited in areas severely affected by lake-effect snow.

The 2026 “Reset”

One reason I am skeptical that these trade‑offs are being weighed objectively is the way the Climate Action Council and Energy Planning Board were put together. A clear majority of Climate Action Council members were appointed by the Governor and legislative leaders, and only a minority have deep energy‑sector experience, particularly in utility operations and reliability. The Energy Planning Board had one non-voting industry expert. Given the obvious affordability problems, the 2026 budget revisions included a “blue-ribbon” commission on affordability that will have the same makeup. I think the most probable outcome is a final report that acknowledges bills are too high, recommends more rebates and cost‑shifting to taxpayers, proposes tougher oversight of utilities, and treats NYISO reliability concerns as justification for even more spending on renewables, storage, and transmission—not as a warning sign about the Climate Act transition.

In my comments and blog posts, I’ve argued that this structure makes it unlikely that the Council would squarely confront feasibility and cost issues raised by NYISO and others. Instead, the Scoping Plan tends to assume that technologies and projects will appear when needed, and that equity goals can be layered on top of mitigation without exploding costs.

The 2026 budget changes are, in a sense, an indirect admission that the original timelines and accounting structure were not realistic. They soften near‑term targets, adjust the emissions inventory in ways that make the numbers easier to hit, and give regulators several more years before binding rules must be in place. To me, that looks less like a fundamental reexamination of the transition plan and more like a political‑relief valve designed to avoid an imminent collision between statutory deadlines, litigation, and physical reality.

Discussion

I think we are at a crucial crossroads for New York energy policy. Advocates have demanded that the future energy system reduce GHG emissions to zero citing major co-benefits from improved air quality. Over my career I have seen enormous improvements in air quality, but there have not been corresponding health benefits that are consistent with the co-benefit claims in the Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan from the small incremental improvements from further reductions .

What I want from New York’s energy policy is something more pragmatic: a plan that starts from reliability and affordability constraints, acknowledges technology and permitting limits, and is transparent about both costs and benefits. That would mean putting independent technical experts, especially from NYISO and utility engineers—at the center of planning, not at the margins. It would mean evaluating wind, solar, storage, nuclear, and cleaner fossil technologies on a level playing field based on reliability contribution and life‑cycle cost, rather than committing in advance to a narrow renewable energy portfolio. And it would mean being honest with the public about what this transition will cost households, businesses, and communities, rather than leading with best‑case scenarios and hidden caveats.

Conclusion

The existing transition plan built around the Climate Act is not affordable, is risky for reliability, and will not deliver the environmental benefits people assume. I’m not saying, ‘do nothing.’ I’m saying: be honest with people. We need a realistic, engineering‑grade plan that respects reliability, affordability, and permitting realities, instead of pretending they’ll take care of themselves. We must concede that we are not ready to rely completely on zero-emission renewable resources today. We must act now to develop natural gas infrastructure to ensure that we have a reliable electric system that can be used as a bridge to the future. When full system costs and infrastructure life expectancy are considered I expect that nuclear power should be used as the backbone of the electric system.

Out of Control New York State Renewable Developers

Fred Stafford has put together a comprehensive look of the New York State (NYS) renewable development process administrated through the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA). He shows how the state’s renewables developers dumped their project risk onto the backs of ratepayers but without the open scrutiny that the state applies to utilities. He also provides a comprehensive look at renewable projects in New York.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.

Background

NYSERDA’s renewable procurement role looks like a neutral administrative function on paper, but it has turned into a highly centralized process that papers over the practical risks of New York’s climate agenda while shifting cost and execution risk onto ratepayers. The Clean Energy Standard and subsequent orders anoint NYSERDA as the “central clean energy procurement agency,” steadily increasing its annual targets even as an uncomfortable share of its contracted portfolio never makes it to commercial operation. That structure suits the Hochul Administration and activists because it allows big press releases about “nation‑leading” awards while the messy details of cancellations, repricing, and cost escalation disappear into a complex tangle of Renewable Energy Credits (REC) and Offshore Wind Renewable Energy Credits (OREC} contracts.

To its credit, NYSERDA is fairly candid in some filings and interviews about underlying structural problems. There can be a three‑ to six‑year lag between a bid and the start of a contract during which global cost conditions can swing wildly. A bid that looked “cheapest” in year one can be hopelessly underwater by the time a project is ready to build, at which point everyone faces an ugly choice between swallowing higher costs or losing the project. Instead of rethinking this model, the state has chosen to pile on larger annual procurement targets and give NYSERDA more discretion to tweak terms, hoping better central planning will overcome siting bottlenecks, NYISO interconnection constraints, and macroeconomic headwinds.

While NYSERDA has admitted in some instances that there are issues with renewable procurements, they have not provided a detailed assessment of the programs and their status. Fred Stafford details what has happened to renewable contracts over the last three years. In short the developers threatened to cancel their projects unless NYS coughed up more money. He also has compiled the first comprehensive look at what happened to each of the 86 projects that the renewables industry cited in its threat of cancellation.

Renewable Development Shakedown

Stafford describes what has happened in NYS:

Back in June 2023, the trade group representing New York renewables developers, Alliance for Clean Energy New York (ACE NY), warned the state that, due to post-COVID supply chain issues and inflation, their 86 wind and solar projects under development were facing cancellation. That amounted to about 7.5 GW of new power generation at risk.

Each of the projects held a contract with NYSERDA, the state’s energy procurement agency, to receive subsidies in the form of renewable energy certificates (RECs), a project revenue stream on top of the actual sales of power. Having all competed for, and won, these contracts in annual auctions between 2016 and 2021, the developers were concerned the subsidies wouldn’t yield enough return on investment for their shareholders. The developers of four offshore wind projects and the ill-fated Clean Path NY transmission project all followed suit: our competitively won subsidies need to be increased.

To remedy their financial predicament and to save the projects, ACE NY requested that the state renegotiate their contracts by adjusting the REC prices with an inflation index. If the state refused their request then many of the developers would be forced to terminate their projects. But without these projects, ACE NY argued, not only would the state’s statutory climate goals be in jeopardy, so too would its electric reliability. After all, the only significant new power generation winning investment in New York these days is renewable.

The ACE NY petition fleshes out the threat to reliability posed by the cancellation of their projects. Here’s an example: “… [D]elays in renewable energy development would only exacerbate the reliability risk already implicated in recent reports and undercut the State’s commitment to developing the resources necessary to effectively combat climate change.” NYPSC Case 15-E-0302, Petition of the Alliance for Clean Energy New York to Address Post COVID-19 Impacts on Renewable Development Economics and Contract Considerations (filed June 7, 2023, revised June 12, 2023), pp. 34-35.

New York needed the developers’ projects and therefore needed to increase their subsidies beyond the competitively determined contractual prices. The developers had the state under their thumbs and both sides knew it. Other trade groups and nonprofits that push renewable energy even backed them up in demanding inflation adjustments, as did labor unions, whose members’ livelihoods were predicated in part on building the projects.

In October 2023 the state’s Public Services Commission nonetheless voted unanimously to refuse the request for inflation adjustment to existing contracts. In a statement, ACE NY’s director Anne Reynolds painted a picture of doom and gloom. “Unfortunately, today’s action by New York is not a sign that our state is really committed to the climate change action mandates that exist in law, and it is not a day that has moved us forward in giving future generations of New Yorkers a healthier and safer environment,” she said.

But the state wanted to preserve competitive procurement as the way to develop new electricity resources at lowest cost to ratepayers. “By rejecting this relief, we signal to every vendor that our contracts, our commitments are worth the paper they are written on,” PSC Chair Rory Christian stated at the time. “We signal that ratepayer funds are not an unlimited piggy bank for anyone’s disposal.”

Instead, the PSC ordered a new, expedited 2023 auction for renewables subsidies, held shortly before the regularly scheduled 2024 auction. The new auctions also included an optional inflation adjustment index that would apply to the final strike price once the project was finished with construction. This was a major ask from the ACE NY petition, and they largely got it. Any of those 86 projects that wouldn’t pencil for their investors under existing contracts could be cancelled, and developers could simply re-bid for subsidies in the new auction. Since they’re organized politically into a trade group that presses the state on the need for higher subsidies, they could be sure that the subsidies in the new auctions, a result of all their competitive bids, would be higher.

And that’s exactly what happened: a majority of these projects’ developers ultimately cancelled their contracts, re-bid in the subsequent auctions, won even higher subsidies from ratepayers, and continued with the projects.

The fate of the offshore wind projects that issued the same demand is better understood, given the smaller count. Each of the four cancelled their contracts and two of them won contracts for higher prices than what they’d won back in the 2018 auction. Empire Wind 1 gained a 27% increase in its subsidy, while Sunrise Wind scored a 32% increase. See Table 5 in this research on offshore wind for a clear presentation of the New York offshore wind solicitations timeline and increase in strike prices. Hansen, Tyler A., et al. “Institutional learning in the energy transition: The case of offshore wind in the United States.”

Contract Tracking Analysis

As is the case with anything associated with NYSERDA documentation for the Climate Act there is NYSERDA data available but getting it all together is not straight forward. I cannot over-emphasize my admiration of the work Stafford did to put together a spreadsheet documenting the fate of the 86 projects. He explains:

Projects show up with slightly different names, perhaps different developers, in periodic reports. One must use their NYISO interconnection queue positions and their state siting cases, both of which are included in state data, to track their progression over time.

Even determining the actual list of 86 projects requires some footwork, as ACE NY’s petition didn’t list them out.⁴ ACE NY characterized the 86 projects as the subset of the 117 Tier 1 land-based wind and solar contracts, from 2016 to 2021 procurements, that were considered “Under Development” as of June 2023. See Table 14, NYPSC Case 15-E-0302, Petition of the Alliance for Clean Energy New York to Address Post COVID-19 Impacts on Renewable Development Economics and Contract Considerations (filed June 7, 2023, revised June 12, 2023), Attachment A, pp. 23.Because NYSERDA’s data hides earlier snapshots, I had to rely on lucky Archive.org snapshots of it to reconstruct that list. They’re all the land-based wine and solar Tier 1 projects from 2016 through 2021 auctions that were, at the time of the June 2023 petition, still listed as under development. See the “project roster” tab in my spreadsheet.

Results Overview

Stafford summarizes the results:

Of the 86 wind and solar projects that ACE NY demanded higher subsidies for, totaling 7.5 GW, a majority of that capacity, 4.1 GW, consisted of projects that eventually re-bid and won contracts in the subsequent auctions that NYSERDA ran.

20 of them (2.0 GW) won contracts, at much higher prices (see next section), in the late 2023 auction.

18 of them (2.1 GW) won contracts in the 2024 auction, whose price outcomes are not yet public.

8 of them (650 MW) submitted bids for contracts in the 2025 auction, which is still being evaluated.

6 of them (357 MW) continued to completion on their original NYSERDA contracts.

34 of them (2.4 GW) were simply abandoned by their developers, so far.

The ones that won contracts in 2023 scored subsidies that were 20 to 64% higher

He explains that the project status is still evolving:

Note that we can’t argue yet that a majority of the 86 projects won contracts after rebidding. The 2025 procurement auction is currently ongoing, so we don’t know which of the 8 projects from the petition set will actually win contracts based on their bids. In the 2023 auction, 48 of the 86 submitted bids but only 20 won, and in the 2024 auction, 25 of the remaining 86 submitted bids but only 18 won.

Discussion

The NYSERDA bidding process is rigged against consumers. While PSC Chair Rory Christian said that “We signal that ratepayer funds are not an unlimited piggy bank for anyone’s disposal.” The facts show that the renewable energy lobby led by ACE-NY blackmailed NYS into re-bidding renewable energy contracts and that when the contracts were re-bid the piggy bank was cracked open. The lawmaker advocates for the Climate Act did not require a feasibility analysis to determine whether an electric system that relies on wind, solar, and energy storage can maintain current reliability and affordability standards. Instead they opened up NYS to renewable developers to build as much as they can, as fast as they can and in the process documented By Stafford essentially guaranteed rates of return that represent a regressive tax on all utility bills.

NYSERDA’s procurement responsibilities are not a neutral back‑office function; they define how risk, cost, and accountability are distributed across the entire Climate Act build‑out. By keeping so much of the action behind the curtain of complex contracts, the current setup enables a steady stream of “bold” announcements about new renewable and offshore wind awards, even as the roster of operating projects grows more slowly and the affordability and reliability implications become harder to ignore. That gap between promises and projects is not a surprise failure of an otherwise sound system; it is an entirely predictable outcome of a procurement model that prioritizes optics and statutory compliance over realistic timelines, durable contracts, and transparent evaluation of costs and benefits.

Conclusion

Stafford concludes:

The whole point of moving from utility monopoly to competitive markets for electricity generation was to lower costs by putting project risk onto investors and not onto ratepayers. Here we have a fully competitive procurement system and yet the investors managed to collectively exert some political pressure and shift the project risk back onto ratepayers. All it took was canceling their contracts, waiting for later auction processes, and acting collectively to bid much higher prices for those subsidies.

That’s because New York’s electricity system is not some testbed of pure competition, pure price signals, and autonomous, uncoordinated agents. The state has a grid that desperately needs new generation and it has climate goals that desperately need new renewable projects. The renewables developers have demonstrated their capacity to work collectively, through ACE NY, to push a narrative about their common industrial and financial situation. Of course it’s in large part true: COVID did create major new supply chain snarls and inflationary pressures.

But unlike in the old electricity market, where investment in generation came from the state’s utilities, the New York Public Services Commission has no corporate books to look at, no ability to regulate profits to ensure that investors aren’t making out like bandits. Instead, they can only trust the developers and read the tea leaves of the market, and hope that these iterations of competitive procurement aren’t producing huge windfalls for the projects’ ultimate investors. Maybe there was something important lost in that old way of doing things.

NYISO 2026 Power Trends – Reality is Catching Up

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) prepares an annual report on “forces shaping the electric grid and wholesale electricity markets.” NYISO’s Power Trends 2026 is a notable document because it says many of the right things, even if it still does not say them quite as bluntly as the situation deserves. The report acknowledges that electrification, large new energy-intensive loads, retirement of conventional resources, and weather-dependent generation are combining to make the system more uncertain and more fragile. It also says reliability margins are shrinking and that winter conditions are becoming a defining challenge. That is an important step forward, but it is also an implicit admission that the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) implementation process has been pushing the grid toward a level of risk that the state has not honestly grappled with.

I have written over 650 articles about the Climate Act and I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this post and in my filing do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization with which I have been associated; these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to outline this post and draft the text used in this document.

Power Trends 2026

The Executive Summary states:

Power Trends explores the issues shaping New York’s electric system as it undergoes a historic transformation driven by simultaneous changes in supply, demand, and infrastructure.

The report highlights increasing and more uncertain electricity demand, a changing generation mix, and a system that is more geographically dispersed, weather‑dependent, and operationally complex. Maintaining reliability depends on disciplined planning, timely investment, and market structures that align investment with system needs and value operational performance during stressed conditions.

NYISO provides the report, a key trends fact sheet, a note from the NYISO president and CEO, and report figures and resources.

Key Findings

The report highlights five big trends: declining reliability margins, rapid and uncertain load growth, shifting seasonal risks, a changing resource mix, and expanding system uncertainty. That is a polite way of saying the grid is getting harder to run while the policy environment keeps adding complexity. NYISO is also explicit that the system needs generation, storage, transmission, and demand-side solutions that can perform during extended periods of high demand.

The press release makes one point especially clear: NYISO wants an “all-of-the-above” investment approach supported by competitive markets. In plain English, that means New York cannot afford to bet the system on a single preferred technology or an aspiration about how fast a transformation will happen. It needs resources that are available when needed, not just resources that look good in a policy presentation.

Where this fits my concerns

My long-running concern with Climate Act implementation has been that the process has treated emissions targets as if they were operational plans. The result has been an unfortunate habit of confusing policy preference with system capability. NYISO’s report does not use that language, but it does describe the consequences: less margin for error, greater weather dependence, more uncertainty, and increasing pressure on winter operations.

That is exactly the kind of caution that should have been part of the implementation process from the beginning. Instead, the state has often acted as though the answer to every reliability question was “more renewables, more quickly,” with insufficient attention to the timing and performance of the resources that keep the lights on. NYISO now says the system needs disciplined planning and timely investment, which is a far cry from the casual optimism that has often accompanied Climate Act roll-out discussions. I remain concerned that there still are unresolved differences between the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) implementation descriptions of the transition in the Scoping Plan and the State Energy Plan and NYISO planning reports.

The report also reinforces a point that has been obvious for years: load growth is not a static assumption anymore. Electrification, data centers, and other large projects are changing demand in ways that can swamp neat planning narratives. The idea that energy efficiency and energy conservation efforts will prevent load growth is also no longer valid. That means the state’s implementation process should be more conservative, not less, because uncertainty is rising on both the supply and demand sides.

Not so Independent NYISO

One reason NYISO’s documents are often carefully crafted to not contradict NYSERDA’s transition planning documents is that they must operate in a political environment where outright candor can be punished. That does not mean the report is wrong; it means the language is often muted. In my view, that restraint is not accidental. It reflects years of pressure on NYISO to avoid sounding too skeptical about the transition path the state has chosen.

“Energy Czar” Richard Kauffman’s role in that pressure campaign should not be forgotten. In 2016 NYISO filed comments with the state saying its goal to power the state with 50 percent renewable energy by 2030 was unrealistic unless a massive investment in new transmission lines were undertaken. Kauffman sent a letter saying it was misleading, incomplete, and grossly inaccurate. Even though the NYISO filing has since proven to be correct NYISO has every incentive to soften language that might be interpreted as resistance. I believe that dynamic has contributed to NYISO documents pulling their punches when discussing the risks of the zero-emissions transition and the practical limits of the Climate Act pathway.

That matters because the public needs more than carefully crafted phrases about “uncertainty” and “scenario-based planning.” It needs a frank explanation that the current policy path creates real reliability risks unless the state changes course on pace, technology assumptions, and resource adequacy. NYISO is getting closer to that point, but it is still speaking in institutional code.

What the report gets right

To NYISO’s credit, Power Trends 2026 is not a celebratory document. It acknowledges declining reliability margins and says retirements and performance problems are outpacing additions to supply. It recognizes that winter is becoming a defining reliability season. It also states that a diverse resource mix is necessary, including generation, storage, transmission, and demand-side measures.

That is a welcome correction to the oversimplified narrative that has dominated much of Albany’s energy policymaking. The report’s emphasis on competitive wholesale markets is also important because markets are where resource adequacy should be tested in practice, not in press releases. If policymakers want reliable electricity, they should listen carefully when the grid operator says performance under stress matters. It would also be appropriate for the press to qualify any transition story lauding renewables with the concerns described in this report.

What it leaves unsaid

Even so, the report still avoids saying the most uncomfortable thing plainly: Climate Act implementation has been moving faster in policy than in infrastructure. That gap is the heart of the problem. You can mandate a future, but you cannot mandate transmission buildout, generator construction, interconnection readiness, or seasonal fuel security on a slogan-driven schedule. This means that the transition schedule must be reconsidered.

The report also does not dwell on the institutional failure implied by repeated assurances that the transition is manageable without significant tradeoffs. NYISO is now warning that the system’s margin for error is shrinking. That should be read as a warning not just about the grid, but about the policy process that created these pressures in the first place.

A better reading of the outlook

The right takeaway from Power Trends 2026 is not that New York should abandon decarbonization. It is that the future electric system must be treated as an engineering problem, not a moral assertion. Reliability, affordability, and emissions all matter, but they do not obey the same timeline, and they certainly do not respond well to wishful thinking.

Nowhere is this more evident than the undeniable need for Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR). Power Trends 2026 defines this as:

A resource designed to provide reliable, on-demand electricity without emitting carbon. Unlike intermittent renewable sources like wind and solar, DEFRs can be dispatched as needed to meet demand. Many of the potential technologies are still in development and may face challenges in terms of economic viability and scalability

My concern is that DEFR is indispensable for a wind an solar dependent system, yet there is still no concrete plan to commercialize and deploy any DEFR technology at the scale required. Significant technical, economic, and regulatory uncertainties remain for all proposed DEFR options, so assuming a viable solution will simply emerge when needed amounts to taking an extraordinary reliability risk with the bulk power system. If nuclear ultimately proves to be the only practical DEFR candidate, then a grid architecture centered on wind, solar, and short duration storage cannot be implemented reliably without large scale nuclear generation. However, nuclear power is best suited to continuous, high-capacity factor operation, so holding it in reserve as an infrequently used DEFR “backup” misuses the technology and wastes its economic advantages. This problem should be resolved sooner than later.

If the Climate Act implementation process is to become credible, it needs a more honest accounting of resource availability, winter performance, the lead times for transmission and generation, and DEFR technology. NYISO’s latest outlook is useful because it points in that direction, even if cautiously. The report should be read as a signal that reality is asserting itself over rhetoric.

Conclusion

The most important thing about Power Trends 2026 is that it reflects a system under stress and a planning environment that has grown much more complicated than policymakers seem willing to admit. NYISO is telling us that New York needs a broad, reliable, market-based resource buildout, not a narrow ideology dressed up as planning. That is exactly the direction the state should have taken from the start. Instead, it is now being forced to catch up with the consequences of the flawed Climate Act and State Energy Plan implementation process. New York policy has talked as though ambitious emissions targets could be translated into real-world electric system performance simply by declaring them so. NYISO’s latest power trends report is a reminder that physics, infrastructure lead times, fuel availability, and operating reserves do not care about slogans.

Guest Post – Heat Pump Rate Carveouts

It has been my experience that every aspect of the green energy transition is more complicated than it appears at first. This is an example of the unintended consequences of a transition component. I recently met Scott Endler who provided this guest post describing a proposal to change the electric rate structure to support heat pumps. The proposed solution is not what it seems.

Scott is a self taught efficiency and energy analyst in Central New York.

I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to convert Endler’s study into this post.

Background

On May 5, 2026, “A coalition of environmental groups today filed a petition calling on the New York Public Service Commission to fix electric rate designs that unfairly overcharge households that switch to clean electric heating. The petition was filed by Alliance for a Green Economy, Building Decarbonization Coalition, Earthjustice, Environmental Defense Fund, New Yorkers for Clean Power, Rewiring America, and Sierra Club”.

The basis for the petition is a report conducted by Switchbox, “Heat Pump Rates in New York State: An Analysis of Cost-Based and Cost-Reflective Rates for Heat Pump Customers.” The report claims that when customers switch from gas heating to heat pumps they dramatically cut their energy use, however, most of these same customers see their bills go up due to outdated electric pricing policies. My initial impression is that if cost savings are only possible by changing policies then the proposed “solution” is not all it is cracked up to be. Endler explains why this is more complicated below.

Why heat pump carve‑outs are a dead‑end

Advocates like Earthjustice and Switchbox argue that New York utilities are overcharging heat pump customers for delivery service—on the order of hundreds of dollars per year—and propose a dedicated “heat pump rate” to fix the problem. Their basic case rests on two current facts about the New York grid.

The system is still summer‑peaking, so much of the winter distribution network is treated as “already paid for,” with plenty of headroom when heat pumps run on cold but not extreme days.
A customer who electrifies heat can see roughly a doubling of their kWh volume, so volumetric delivery charges go up even if the utility’s embedded winter distribution costs barely move.

From there, the coalition jumps to a political conclusion: create a boutique, technology‑specific discount so heat pump adopters pay less for winter delivery while everyone else stays on the old schedule. That might satisfy the coalition in this rate case, but it fails three basic tests: fairness, durability, and alignment with the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (CLCPA) long‑term grid trajectory.

The transition paradox: today’s spare winter capacity won’t last

The core problem with the carve‑out logic is that it freezes today’s grid snapshot and pretends it is permanent. CLCPA‑driven electrification of buildings and transportation all but guarantees that New York will flip from a summer‑peaking to a winter‑peaking system sometime in the 2030s, as electric heat and winter peak EV charging push load into the coldest hours.

Under that future paradigm, heat pumps are no longer opportunistic users of “free” winter capacity; they become the main driver of localized peak demand, transformer overloads, and the next round of capital projects. The very customers who are being framed today as victims of an unfair delivery rate will, in a decade or so, be the marginal cost causers when the system is strained on sub‑zero January mornings.

Designing a permanent special discount for a technology that is on track to become the dominant driver of winter peaks is a textbook example of a policy that works only as long as it doesn’t succeed.

Horizontal equity: same wires, same rules

If the wires are a shared public asset, then any consumer who pushes current through those wires at a constrained hour should face the same price signal regardless of what device is on the other end of the cord. I frame this as “horizontal equity”: identical structural rules for every ratepayer.

In a horizontal‑equity framework, a kilowatt‑hour is charged based on the physical state of the network and the prevailing supply price, not on whether it feeds a heat pump, a resistance heater, an EV, or a Bitcoin rig. That approach avoids cross‑subsidies from non‑adopters to relatively affluent early adopters of new technologies, a regressive pattern that is already visible in some rooftop solar and EV incentives.

By contrast, a bespoke “heat pump” class asks a single mom in a gas‑heated apartment to pay higher delivery charges so that a homeowner with a brand‑new variable‑speed HP and smart thermostat can enjoy a tailored discount in the name of climate justice.

A dynamic, capacity‑based delivery price

The counter‑proposal coming out of the feasibility study is a dynamic, capacity‑based delivery tariff that works much more like the wholesale energy market. Instead of a static cents‑per‑kWh delivery rate smeared over all hours, the distribution price would move up and down with remaining localized grid capacity.

When local transformers, feeders, and substation capacity are plentiful—say, on a quiet winter night—the marginal cost of using the network is low and the delivery price falls toward zero for everyone.
When capacity is tight—say, during a frigid morning when Winter Storm Fern pushed downstate resources to the brink—the delivery component spikes exactly when the system is most stressed.

This preserves cost‑recovery for the utilities over the year while sending a sharp, physics‑based price signal in the hours when grid use is genuinely expensive. Crucially, the signal is identical for any customer whose load shows up in that hour.

Why this beats Straight Fixed‑Variable (SFV)

Some utility economists default to Straight Fixed‑Variable designs—high fixed monthly charges and very low volumetric delivery rates—to stabilize revenue as electrification reshapes load. The problem is that SFV guts the conservation signal: once you’ve paid your hefty monthly fee, each extra kilowatt‑hour costs very little, so the customer’s incentive to invest in efficiency or to shift load out of peak hours is weak.

A capacity‑prorated volumetric charge keeps the usage‑based signal intact. Customers still save real money by using less energy over the billing period, and they get an additional incentive to avoid precisely those hours when both supply and wires are constrained. That is exactly what CLCPA‑era demand management is supposed to reward.

In other words, this is a way to modernize rate design without flattening everything into a subscription fee that severs the link between behavior and system cost.

Behavioral and planning benefits

Under a dynamic distribution price, a heat pump owner is not punished for having electrified; they are only penalized if they insist on running at full load in the same hour that everyone else is trying to do the same thing on a constrained circuit. The rational response is not to rip out the heat pump, but to invest in insulation, envelope upgrades, and smarter controls that quietly shave load exactly when the grid is tight.

This architecture also makes grid planning more honest. When the delivery price spikes repeatedly on a certain circuit, it is a market signal that the wires and transformers there are under‑sized relative to demand, justifying targeted capital upgrades instead of generalized rate hikes. Because every technology sees that same price shape, the planner’s data isn’t distorted by carve‑outs and exemptions.

You can think of it as bringing distributed marginal‑cost pricing down from the wholesale level into the distribution system, instead of trying to fine‑tune social policy via ever more fragmented rate classes.

How this plays out as CLCPA bites

Look at the CLCPA trajectory and the recent Winter Storm Fern emergency order for a preview of the stakes. As more load is pushed into winter mornings and evenings, the occasional near‑miss we saw in January 2026 becomes more common unless billions are poured into wires and flexible resources.

In a world of boutique heat pump discounts, those marginal infrastructure costs get socialized onto everyone else while the prime driver of the peak enjoys a protected class rate. In a capacity‑based, technology‑neutral regime, the households and businesses that draw power at the worst times pay the highest delivery price, regardless of whether they are doing the “right thing” in some broader climate narrative.

That may be politically uncomfortable, but it is honest—and if CLCPA is supposed to be about aligning economic signals with physical reality, it is hard to justify anything else.

Where advocates are right—and what regulators should do instead

The Earthjustice coalition is not wrong to say that current volumetric delivery tariffs can make early electrifiers look like suckers. But the fix should address the structural flaw in the rate design, not just the optics for one favored technology.

Regulators who genuinely care about affordability and equity should focus on:

Deploying interval‑capable meters fast enough to make capacity‑based delivery pricing administratively feasible.
Phasing in a simple, transparent distribution price that reflects localized capacity conditions, starting with the most constrained circuits.
Avoiding the temptation to endorse technology‑specific carve‑outs that will be impossible to unwind once the political beneficiaries are numerous and vocal.

That path doesn’t lend itself to a press release about “fixing heat pump delivery rates,” but it would actually modernize the tariff architecture for a high‑electrification, high‑constraint grid.

Conclusion

New York’s new “heat pump rates” campaign gets one thing right: today’s delivery tariffs are a blunt instrument that can punish electrification. But carving out a special rate class for heat pumps is the wrong fix; a capacity‑based, technology‑neutral delivery charge tied to real‑time grid conditions would be fairer, more durable, and far more honest about who actually drives system costs.

Public Power New York on NYPA Renewables Plans

Post updated on 5/21/2026 to revise quotes from Keith Schue

Public Power New York recently released a notice that the New York Power Authority (NYPA) is reviewing 5GW of new public renewables. However, when I tried to find a reference to a NYPA announcement I could not find anything. This post addresses some of the potshots included in their notice and the spin of the announcement.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because the energy density of wind and solar energy is too low and the resource intermittency too variable to ever support a reliable electric system relying on those resources. At the same time the environmental permitting for the renewables buildout has is causing unacceptable environmental impacts. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.

Background

Keith Schue sent me a copy of an email from Public Power NY. Information on the organization’s website reveals that Public Power NY is a coalition formed by several organizations including nine New York chapters of the Democratic Socialists of America. The group’s about page notes:

Public Power NY is a statewide, grassroots movement of New Yorkers who know the truth about our energy system: that to build a future we can be proud of, we must take our power back from corporate control, and put it in the hands of the people.

To make it happen, we passed the Build Public Renewables Act (BPRA), the biggest climate and green jobs bill in the nation. The BPRA unleashed the power of New York State to build publicly owned, 100% renewable energy, create a new era of green union jobs, slash rising energy bills for those who need it most, and make New York a national leader in the fight to build a future we’d be proud to pass on to those to come. Now we’re fighting to make sure our full vision for a Green New Deal in New York becomes a reality.

Our movement is made up of over 20 of New York’s most effective climate, community, and advocacy organizations, and thousands of volunteers who have taken action everywhere from Brooklyn to Buffalo. Our campaign is also endorsed by labor unions representing over one million members in New York, including 1199SEIU, NYSUT, UUP, PSC-CUNY, and UAW 9A.

Build Public Renewables Act

The BPRA requires NYPA to build renewables to backstop private developments. When it passed in May 2023 advocates claimed NYPA can build “more quickly, affordably, and democratically than private developers,” largely because it can issue low‑cost bonds and can tap into the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The IRA is no longer in play and Schue points that it now more about subsidizing the projects of private foreign and out-of-state solar/wind developers. The fact is that the same problems facing private developers also limit what NYPA can do. Those problems include:

Capital cost vs. total system cost: Low borrowing rates do not solve interconnection queues, supply chain constraints, transmission limitations, or local opposition, all of which dominate project timelines today.

Execution risk: Scaling up development is a problem for private developers because there are not that many people with appropriate backgrounds. NYPA has not been a greenfield utility‑scale developer on this scale; it is being asked to stand up a quasi‑developer arm while simultaneously managing its legacy hydro fleet and transmission assets.

Labor and procurement constraints: Strong prevailing wage, PLAs, buy‑American and just transition provisions may be politically desirable, but they also raise project costs and reduce vendor flexibility, which undermines claims that public projects will automatically be cheaper than private ones.

Academic work by Matthew Huber has argued that much of the BPRA rhetoric obscures the difficulty of actually organizing the existing utility workforce and overstates the extent to which a political win on statute translates into a practical Green New Deal‑style industrial program.

PPNY Criticisms of Nuclear

The email states “This is a hopeful step in a dark time for New York as Governor Kathy Hochul works hard to dismantle New York’s world-leading climate law in favor of deadly fracked gas and expensive nuclear.” Schue points out that this potshot at “expensive” nuclear in their materials is unwarranted:

This ignores the fact that system level costs actually make a predominantly solar/wind grid most expensive due to the need for massive amounts of battery storage, far more transmission infrastructure, grid-stabilizing equipment, and backup generation–plus the fact that those solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries require frequent replacement. DOE analysis supported by both the Trump and former Biden administrations confirm this. Even NYSERDA’s own analysis indicates that adding more nuclear capacity would save the state billions over attempting to do it all with a gargantuan amount of solar, wind, batteries, etc. Yes, a robust, reliable nuclear power plant that produces continuous electricity has a higher up-front cost than intermittent, sprawling weather-dependent solar panels made mostly in China where environmental and worker protections are miserable). But that plant will last eighty years or more, and does not force you to reinvent the entire grid.

There is an old adage that you get what you pay for. Nuclear is an investment in the future that conserves rural land. A grid without it destroys both.

Keith and I commiserated that this logical approach is being ignored by most climate advocates.

Huber’s article discussed the DSA focus on worker benefits of the transition. He explained that there is a disconnect between the DSA insistence on renewables and union worker preferences. He noted that “it’s worth noting that industrial/electricity unions also promote a much broader vision of decarbonization beyond just renewables and explicitly promote nuclear power (and this aligns with the state of the art models on what is required as well).” Huber concludes:

Even before such a transformation, public power advocates must stop basing their organizing and coalition building on Green NGOs and their narrow, infeasible technical visions of decarbonization, and start listening to what the actual skilled workers in this sector see as a viable path to good union jobs, reliable electricity, and decarbonization.

Announcement Spin

When I tried to find a reference to a NYPA announcement related to the PPNY claim “This week, the NYPA board met and discussed building 4.8GW of new public renewable projects in addition to the 5.5 GW they already have planned. I could not find anything. My initial search could not find any such announcement, so I asked Perplexity AI to look. The Perplexity response said nothing was released that matched that claim. then I asked Perplexity AI to comment on the PPNY notice relative to what was available. In the interest of time, I am just going to quote the response.

They’re spinning routine NYPA planning numbers into a political “we’re winning” story about BPRA-style public power, while glossing over how contingent and preliminary most of this capacity actually is.

What the 5 GW claim actually refers to

Public Power NY’s teaser text says NYPA is “reviewing nearly 5 GW of new public renewables as it implements the Build Public Renewables Act.” [publicpowerny](https://publicpowerny.org)
That number is basically NYPA’s internal *pipeline* of potential solar, wind, and storage projects under its Renewables Strategic Plan, not 5 GW of shovel‑ready, financed projects NYPA is about to build as a Soviet‑style green TVA. [nypa](https://www.nypa.gov/News/Press-Releases/2025/20250729-strategic-plan)
The updated NYPA Renewables Strategic Plan approved in December 2025 talks about a total of ~5.5 GW of capacity in its portfolio (39 solar, 3 wind, 149 storage, and associated low‑income/REACH projects), which lines up with the “nearly 5 GW” talking point once you account for rounding and how they slice “new” versus existing efforts.

How this fits with BPRA and NYPA’s legal mandate

Under the Build Public Renewables framework, NYPA was authorized and directed to plan, own, and operate large‑scale renewables to help meet CLCPA’s 70% by 2030 target, and to phase out its small fossil peaker fleet subject to NYISO reliability findings. [
NYPA responded first with a 3.3 GW draft renewables plan in early 2025, then—after a wave of criticism from BPRA advocates—came back with an updated plan that roughly doubled the target to 7 GW in drafts and ultimately landed at 5.5 GW in the approved version.
-The coalition is seizing on “nearly 5 GW of new public renewables under review” as evidence that their campaign forced NYPA to scale up, even though NYPA is still operating within conventional utility planning constraints (transmission, NYISO interconnection, capital limits, bond ratings, etc.).

What’s being glossed over

“Reviewing” means these projects are in various stages: some are just concepts or early‑stage site screens, some are contingent on developer responses to NYPA’s RFQ, and many will be pruned or delayed by NYISO studies, local opposition, or cost escalations.
NYPA must keep a majority stake in projects but is heavily reliant on private developers and EPCs from its RFQ list (about 90‑plus prequalified firms) – this is not a pure state‑builds‑everything model that BPRA rhetoric implies.
None of this solves the underlying NYISO reliability concerns around downstate gas plants, transmission bottlenecks, or the economics of long‑duration storage; the press‑release framing makes it sound like “5 GW of public renewables” is a done deal that will cleanly displace fossil capacity on a political timetable, which is very different from what NYISO and NYPA actually state in their own documents.

Conclusion

Reality is catching up the DSA BPRA vision, and its adherents have not figured that out yet. The BPRA is not going to accelerate the transition to renewables. The union workers that the PPNY claims to represent have figured out that the real decarbonization job jackpot would be nuclear development but their notice downplays the value of nuclear. Characterizing the NYPA planning process as evidence that there are substantial resources in the pipeline is flawed on every level. All those beliefs are incorrect.

Virtual Power Plant Misinformation

A recent article in New York Focus, How a More Flexible Grid Could Save New York Billions, received widespread New York media coverage. Unfortunately, the claims that VPP can provide reliable power falls apart under close examination. I believe it was misinformation because it presents false information that was not created or shared with intention of causing harm. I wrote this article because this kind of false information is leading New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) transition to net-zero efforts towards a false solution.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. Implementation plans have called for a cleaner, more distributed system that minimizes load variations consistent with the virtual power plant (VPP) approach.

VPP terminology was used in the predecessor Reforming the Energy Vision program. In the Climate Act Scoping Plan and last year’s State Energy Plan the concept has been repackaged as Distributed Energy Resources”. In draft Energy Plan comments, the New York Solar Energy Industries Association stated: “By doubling down on distributed energy resources, New York can lower costs, strengthen the grid, and sustain one of its most successful clean energy industries.”

This article describes errors that I think support my belief that this clean-energy industry promise is another miracle technology that will not support the system when needed most. All the promised savings and good intentions will vanish when people freeze or suffer in the dark.

How a ‘Flexible’ Grid Works

The New York Focus article was written by Jack Carroll and Colin Kinniburgh. Kinniburgh has a knack for explaining technical concepts well for the general public. The article describes VPP:

In a traditional electric grid, power flows essentially in one direction: from central power plants to homes and businesses. In a “flexible” grid, powered in part by virtual power plants, those homes and businesses take on a new role. Not only can they supply power back to the grid with rooftop solar and batteries, but their devices — smart thermostats and electric vehicles, for example — can communicate with each other and with grid operators to respond to the system’s demands.

Under the traditional model, utilities have to keep an army of power plants, substations, and wires on standby at all times, in preparation for peak times like hot summer days. The costs of maintaining that system show up on every energy bill, even when customers are using less energy.

“It’s built for the hottest couple of days or hours of the year, but customers are paying for it all year long,” said Richard Kauffman, who served as the state’s energy czar from 2013 to 2019 and chaired the board of the energy authority NYSERDA until last year.

The more you use technology to spread out demand and adapt to the grid’s needs, the less utilities rely on costly infrastructure to meet the peak — and the less utility spending shows up on customers’ bills.

I think this is a good description of the concept, but it contains a fundamental flaw. The electric system must be built around reliability during peak demand because that is when it is needed the most. That is why utilities must “keep an army of power plants, substations, and wires on standby at all times, in preparation for peak times”. While the “costs of maintaining that system show up on every energy bill” that is also why ratepayers are assured power is always available. This is the first mistake.

Many VPP advocates have the naïve belief that if there are enough distributed energy resources that peaks will be eliminated and there will be no need for peaking resources. Others know better but continue to argue otherwise. There is no better example of those who should know better than the politically connected former New York energy czar Richard Kaufmann. He parrots the talking point that building the system for peaks costs money and insinuates that there is a better way. In my opinion he cannot be trusted because he has a massive personal financial interest in this false information. I used Perplexity AI to research his connection to the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act “gold bars” controversy. The Perplexity AI report describing his connection includes the following quotes:

Richard Kauffman did join one of the organizations that received IRA “gold bars” funding. He became CEO of the Coalition for Green Capital (CGC) in January 2025 — a nonprofit that had been awarded $5 billion from the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund under the Inflation Reduction Act.

Kauffman’s career trajectory — from Obama DOE advisor, to New York energy czar under Cuomo, to NYSERDA board chair, to CGC board member, and finally to CEO of a $5 billion GGRF recipient — illustrates the tight interconnection between government clean energy policymakers and the nonprofit organizations that subsequently received billions in IRA-funded grants.

In April 2024, the EPA selected CGC as a recipient of $5 billion under the National Clean Investment Fund. Coalition for Green Capital (CGC) had originally requested $10 billion in its application. Career EPA reviewers flagged several concerns during the application process:

CGC had “only expended $1.42 million in 2023 before receiving a $5 billion award”

“Of the 71 expected hires, more than 20% would be making salaries more than approximately $450,000”

CGC’s “assumption of deploying $10 billion in the first fiscal year of performance seems unattainable”

“FY2022 and 2021 financials show a net loss with declining fees for service income”

In my opinion, the value of a reference from a crony capitalist with a salary of more than $450,000 is worthless because of his vested interest in a particular response. This quote is the second mistake in this article.

Pilot Study

Orange and Rockland (O&R) initiated the Innovative Storage Business Models (ISBM) pilot with Sunrun as a REV Demonstration Project approved by the Public Service Commission (PSC) that was referenced in the Carroll and Kinniburgh article. The goal of the pilot is to test an innovative residential solar-plus-storage VPP business model to “optimize and deliver clean energy, provide dispatchable grid services and reduce costs for customers.”

I used Perplexity AI to also document the technical specifications. It found that the program deploys residential solar-plus-storage systems across O&R’s service territory in Orange and Rockland counties, aggregating them into a dispatchable virtual power plant that provides grid services during peak demand periods. The ISBM Project’s design specifications, as established in O&R’s June 2020 Initial Filing Letter to the PSC, include:

Customer installations: Approximately 300 residential solar-plus-storage (Brightbox) systems
Solar capacity: Approximately 2.9 MW of distributed rooftop solar
Energy storage capacity: Approximately 2.1 MW / 4.7 MWh of distributed battery storage
Aggregate VPP size (after 3-year deployment): 2 MW / 4 MWh
Program duration: 10-year demonstration period with 25-year customer lease agreements
Target deployment locations: 15 distribution circuits identified by O&R as having distribution value

The solar array panel at each home was designed to provide 110 percent of the annual average and the battery was designed to provide between 8 and 12 hours of essential load for the homeowner. The battery energy more than the homeowner’s needs contributes to the 2.1 MW VPP that can provide 4.7 MWh. The VPP pilot could provide 2.1 MW for a little over two hours.

According to the Perplexity summary, the VPP achieved the following milestones in Summer 2024:

Enrolled systems: 325 O&R customers contributing approximately 2 MW of aggregated capacity
Dispatch events (summer 2024): Called on 18 times to provide electricity to the grid during peak demand events
Dispatch events (2025 heat wave): In June 2025, Sunrun completed its fourth dispatch event in a single week in New York, helping relieve stress on congested circuits
The VPP was described as having supported dozens of peak electricity demand events during the summer of 2024, with home batteries supplying stored solar energy to help stabilize the electric grid.

Carroll and Kinniburgh state that: “The 350 households participating can deliver close to 50 megawatts of power to the grid at peak times — about enough to supply Calderon’s entire small town of Warwick for a couple of hours.” This is the third mistake. The actual capacity is about 2 megawatts so the quotation is off by 25 times.

Virtual Power Plants Reliability Support

The third mistake is minor but the claims that VPP are a viable solution to reliability problems is serious. The following quote from the article claims that some experts have demonstrated that the VPP network can replace an average sized gas plant.

The New York Independent System Operator, the nonprofit that manages the state’s grid, has warned that New York may not have enough energy to meet demand over the next decade, as large energy users like data centers come online and the state electrifies homes and transportation. New York City, it said, could face a gap as soon as next summer. Even last summer, NYISO had to activate emergency protocols during a worse-than-expected heat wave.

In response (and to some controversy), NYISO recommended the state delay the retirement of multiple fossil fuel plants, including high-polluting peaker plants in New York City, and strongly consider the construction of new ones.

Some experts argue that virtual power plants offer a cheaper, cleaner way to close the gap. A 2023 Brattle analysis found that the networks can backstop the grid as reliably as an average-sized gas peaker plant, for about half the price.

Renewable advocates focus on energy production, but power systems are built around reliability during peak demand. If you look at the grid through the lens of accredited capacity, that is, capacity that can be relied upon during peak demand – instead of average energy, the resource allocations for different technologies look radically different.

Because I don’t have time to read and evaluate every article referenced, I again used Perplexity to review the Brattle Group’s 2023 analysis. The Executive Summary of the response states:

The Brattle Group’s May 2023 “Real Reliability: The Value of Virtual Power” report—prepared for Google—compared the cost and reliability of virtual power plants (VPPs), natural gas peakers, and utility-scale batteries in providing 400 MW of resource adequacy for an illustrative mid-sized utility. Rather than explicitly modeling extreme multi-day renewable droughts (sometimes called “Dunkelflaute” events), the analysis addressed low renewable availability indirectly through its net load methodology and deliberate selection of operationally challenging system conditions. This approach has significant implications for interpreting the study’s reliability conclusions

The fatal flaw in the Brattle analysis is that the approach used did not address the extreme events that affect peak demand adequately. The analysis focused on individual peak hours/days, not sustained multi-day low-output periods that are associated with peak demand. The inevitable problem can be illustrated using observations from the January 2026 winter storm.

January 2026 Winter Storm

I recently described the effects of this storm on the New York grid over the last ten days of January. Wind and solar resources during the January 24 to January 27, 2026 winter storm were impacted during the storm. The NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report includes a graph of net statewide wind and solar performance total daily production and capacity factors (Figure 1). The data clearly show that the snowstorm caused both the utility-scale and rooftop solar resources to go to essentially zero on January 25^th at the height of the storm. Utility-scale generation came back slowly but had not returned to before storm levels by the end of the month. Rooftop solar never exceeded more than 5% energy availability over the ten days and was only 2% the last four days of the month. The period of prolonged sub-freezing weather prevented snow covered rooftop solar panels from clearing and caused a peak in the electric load.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO JanuaryOperations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

VPP during the January 2026 Winter Storm

There is insufficient data available to quantitatively assess what would happen if New York were to rely on VPP technology. However, we can look at the energy production at the end of January 2026 and see serious problems both for the homeowners participating in the program and the grid.

Recall that the solar array panel at each home was designed to provide 110 percent of the annual average energy and the battery was designed to provide between 8 and 12 hours of essential load for the homeowner. The promise to homeowners is that these systems will provide essential support during outages. If there is an outage at the same time rooftop solar panels are covered with snow, then there will be no essential support for an outage greater than 12 hours. That is an admittedly a rate event but when it occurs the homeowner would be desperate for electric power.

There are also problems on the grid level. Table 1 lists the daily energy production by fuel-type documented in my first article about this event. VPP technology is supposed to smooth peak loads and eliminate the need for peaker power plants. Oil fired units are used almost exclusively as peaker unit in New York so we can assume that their load during this event is “peak” energy. The Brattle analysis only looks at individual peak days. The peak daily oil energy production was 18,252 MWh on 1/26. If New York expanded the O&R VPP pilot producing 2.1 MW VPP that can provide 4.7 MWh to a 9,000 MW system that would produce over 20,000 MWh. That would be sufficient for the maximum daily peak. However, looking at the entire episode, it is obvious that a VPP that relies on distributed rooftop solar would run out of energy on the day after the snowstorm. The sum of the solar resources is not greater than the oil generation for the remainder of the episode. The VPP would have no value to the system after the second day.

Table 1: Daily NYISO Energy Production (MWh) January 22 to January 31, 2026

Discussion

The January 2026 storm proves that VPP solar plus storage technology has no value during extended periods of light winds, low solar availability, and snow-covered solar panels. It simply cannot provide necessary power to replace an existing peaking power plant during these periods.

The VPP proposal introduces yet another threat to grid reliability. New York’s own agencies agree that Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFRs) must be developed to backstop wind and solar when those resources falter for days at a time. The January 2026 winter storm made that reality unmistakable. Every delay in pursuing DEFRs compounds the risk and economic burden of clinging to an unproven wind–solar–storage–VPP strategy.

I view nuclear generation as the only realistically viable DEFR backup option, despite its costs, because it is uniquely technologically mature, can be scaled as needed, and is not constrained by the thermodynamic limits that burden storage‑based approaches. However, nuclear plants are best suited to operate as baseload resources, so using them solely for DEFR backup duty would be an inappropriate application of the technology.

If the only viable DEFR technology is nuclear power that implies that large expenditures on wind, solar, battery storage, and VPPs that cannot reliably supply electricity during periods of greatest system stress are unnecessary. When the full lifecycle and system costs of the Scoping Plan’s wind‑, solar‑, and storage‑centric strategy are weighed against a nuclear‑based electric system, I believe that nuclear will be the lower‑cost option, particularly once asset lifetimes are taken into account.

Conclusion

Advocates for VPP claim one of the benefits is that it can replace an army of power plants. However, you can’t shut down the old power plants until you’re sure the new system actually works under all conditions. If it doesn’t, the lights go out, costs rise, and people get hurt. The NY Focus article on VPP misses the fundamental VPP flaw.

February 2026 Climate Act Issues

I was recently asked to give a briefing about Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) issues. The New York’s Legislature works on a two‑year term with annual sessions from January to (roughly) mid‑June, and the centerpiece of each year is enacting the state’s April 1 budget through an executive‑budget model. This is relevant because the Climate Act was enacted during this process and there are aspects of the law that should be considered this session.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. Among its interim 2030 targets is a reduction target of 40% less GHG emissions and a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” Since the Scoping Plan was finalized in 2022, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation. As part of the implementation, the State updated its Energy Plan in 2024.

Climate Act Issues

My Climate Act issues briefing described the following key issues that need to be addressed:

The schedule and affordability impacts of the Climate Act can no longer be ignored
DEC needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements
PSC must address safety valve provisions
Recent news stories suggest that Hochul may propose revising GHG accounting again

Climate Act Implementation Schedule

It is no longer debatable that New York has fallen behind on its Climate Act transition plan 2030 mandates. There is no question that the 70% renewable electricity by 2030 target will not be met because the percentage of renewable energy (28% of total generation) has stayed the same since 2019. The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) annual load and capacity data report universally known as the “Gold Book” data over the last six years is shown in Table 1. Note that the renewable percentage shown in the table is an overestimate because the NYISO references to renewable resources do not necessarily align with the New York State Clean Energy Standard definition.

Table 1: NYISO Gold Book Annual Total and Renewable Summer Capability and Generation

There is supposed to be a 40% reduction in economy‑wide GHG emissions by 2030. I reviewed the 2025 NYS GHG Emission Inventory Report in my article Implications of New York State 2025 GHG Emissions Inventory. I found that GHG emissions through 2023 are 14% less than the 1990 baseline and emissions have been basically unchanged since 2022. That makes meeting 2030 GHG emission reduction target of a 40% reduction impossible.

Affordability and Rate Impacts

New York currently has an energy affordability crisis because as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion. My recent status summary of Climate Act affordability referenced an article about the observed rate impacts to date. Kris Martin published a similar post that included a table ratepayer impacts. Table 2 summarizes recent electric rate cases (Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, O&R, NYSEG, and RG&E with an estimate of the Climate Act proportion.

Table 2: Typical 2024 Residential Electric Costs from What it costs

Department of Public Service (DPS) staff provides estimates of the impact of the Climate Act on electric rates. The Second Informational Report “includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.” According to the Summary of Ratepayer Impact for Electric Utilities table, residential impacts of the Climate Act range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 total monthly electric bills.

In my opinion, those estimates are conservative because there is immense pressure on agency staff to minimize the costs of the Climate Act. In addition, the costs necessary to implement the Climate Act were ramping up in 2023. I expect that these costs will continue to climb. Kris Martin also noted that the DPS estimates for future costs don’t include all the Renewable Energy Credits (REC) and OREC (offshore wind REC) costs that would be required to reach Climate Act targets—or even what they might realistically expect to complete.

Also note that the State Attorney General Office is on the record that the current implementation schedule has an affordability liability. Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted correspondence related to the litigation associated with Climate Act implementation that addressed affordability. The State’s submittal argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”. The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable: “Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.”

All these analyses have focused on utility rate case costs. The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSEDA) has not been forthcoming about total household costs but did offer a glimpse of those costs in the State Energy Plan as described in my post Energy Affordability Fact Sheet.

The Fact Sheet summarizes selected results in the Energy Plan Energy Affordability Impacts Analysis. NYERDA claimed that the use of “new, efficient equipment and electrification can cut energy spending by $100 to $300 every month for many New York households” in the Fact Sheet. However, these projections do not cover the costs of the equipment to make the reductions. Table 3 is derived from the NYSERDA supporting documentation and shows the monthly energy costs when equipment costs are included.

Table 3: Total Monthly Energy Costs Including Levelized Equipment Costs for an Upstate New York moderate income household that uses natural gas for heat projected monthly costs and hardware costs

NYSERDA modeled four household profiles ranging from doing nothing from the starting point to a 2031 “high efficient electrification” scenario that upgrades the building shell and electrifies conventional appliances, furnace and automobiles in an Upstate home that uses natural gas in 2025. The improvements in efficiency decreases monthly energy costs for all three journeys but when capital expenditures (CapEx) is considered that changes. The cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment. Row 10 shows this difference. It lists the $594 increase in costs necessary for Climate Act compliance and row 11 lists the percentage increase as 43%. The shortcomings of this analysis are described in my review of the Fact Sheet. It is even worse than shown here.

NYSERDA’s messaging for these results is that costs are going to go up anyway and that the increase in costs due to the Climate Act are small in comparison. I think that additional costs will add more households to the already unacceptable number living in energy poverty.

Cap‑and‑Invest and GHG Regulatory Architecture

There are two aspects of the Climate Act mandate to implement an economy-wide cap-and-invest program by January 1, 2024 that must be addressed by the Legislature and Governor Hochul. I have described the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations in many articles. Currently DEC has only finalized the Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule. There have been no suggestions when the two other regulations will be proposed. The Cap-and-Invest Rule defines affected sources, binding caps, and allowance allocations. DEC also needs an auction rule that implements the auction that will be used to distribute allowances.

This is problematic. On 3/31/25 a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 date. I explained that on 10/24/25 Supreme Court Judge Julian Schreibman’s decision stated that by 2/6/26 shall “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed. On 11/24/25 DEC appealed the decision. On 1/8/26 the Albany County judge rejected the request for “reargument or reconsideration” but that does end the process. The State has appealed to the Appellate Division. This means that the deadline of Feb 6 is suspended until the Appellate Division rules. Therefore, the State has no risk of being held in contempt and can safely ignore the deadline — which appears to be what is happening. However, kicking the can down the road ignores the responsibility to reconsider what is obviously a failed prescription for energy policy.

The other NYCI issue is the DEC regulations. The Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule was finalized December 1, 2025, but is so poorly written that I would be surprised if it gets litigated. The auction rule regulation should not be an issue. However, the Cap-and-Invest Rule will be controversial because there are non-trivial problems that have political consequences. The rule will set the price trajectory for the costs of an allowance, but what price will be chosen. There will be an increase in prices due to this rule that will have competitiveness impacts on industry. The provision that 35 to 40% of revenues are supposed to benefit disadvantaged communities needs to address implementation logistics. Will the funds be dispersed by direct rebates or targeted program spending? The biggest DEC NYCI issue is the timing. When will DEC propose these rules?

PSL 66-P Safety Valve

There is another important issue that must be resolved. Climate Act proponents constantly state that the mandates are required by law no matter what but ignore the other associated law that includes safety valve provisions. New York Public Service Law § 66-p “renewable energy systems” mandates define which generating sources are “renewable”. Section 66-p (4) “Establishment of a renewable energy program” states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.

Unfortunately, the PSC has not yet considered conducting a hearing. Two petitions have been filed calling for such a hearing. The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filing on 1/6/26 made a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service. On 8/12/25 the Independent Intervenors filing argued that there were affordability and reliability issues and that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded

On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.

Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26. Stay tuned to this space for more information on how readers can force the State to be accountable for the issues described.

GHG Emission Accounting

There is another issue in the news. In early February the Governor said that she is specifically interested in reconsidering the methodology by which the state tallies its emissions, explaining that New York’s unique 20-year metric puts the state at a disadvantage over other states that use a 100-year methodology to count their emissions. At the time the Climate Act was written it incorporated unique emissions accounting requirements that inflate the emission totals by increasing the effect of methane pollution. In my opinion, this irrational obsession with methane is misguided because, the higher impacts of methane are a laboratory artifact. In the atmosphere, methane has less of an effect than CO2 on global warming.

In the 2023 Budget Season changing the accounting methodology was proposed because it would reduce the total GHG emissions and when NYCI kicks in that will translate to lower costs to New Yorkers. In addition, using a unique methodology eliminates the possibility that the New York cap and invest program can be integrated into other jurisdictions’ programs. In theory that would increase market efficiency and reduce costs.

I applaud this pragmatic modification but shudder to think how climate advocates who got us into this mess will react. Moreover, this is a peripheral issue compared to the others described.

Discussion

I have previously noted that decisions about the future of the Climate Act must be addressed. The ideologues who fervently supported the promulgation of the Climate Act also zealously reject the possibility that changes are needed. However, reality can no longer be ignored. David Wojick recently described his report “Severe Climate Act impacts threaten New York State”. His analysis addresses these issues and provides additional support explaining why action is needed.

Conclusion

There are significant Climate Act issues that can no longer be ignored. Most targets are behind schedule, and the increased costs of the Climate Act will exacerbate the existing energy affordability crisis. DEC needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements and will have to eventually respond to the litigation. PSC must address safety valve provisions of PSL 66-P.

Unfortunately, to be resolved all these Climate Act issues require political accountability. The Climate Act has always been about political pandering to specific constituencies under the guise of saving the planet. Therefore, I expect that all the inconvenient issues described will be ignored until after the election in hopes that the electorate will not catch on that the reliability of the state’s energy system is at risk and the energy system crisis will be aggravated by the Climate Act for political gain. New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990. Implementing the Climate Act will have no effect on global warming and the purported co-benefits are illusory.

I doubt that the Legislature or Governor will act on these issues this year as they try to placate those who deny reality by demanding no changes to the Climate Act and the rest of us. It is time for the rest of us to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition.

New York Nuclear Renaissance

Governor Hochul plans to pursue “the most ambitious development of nuclear power in America, setting a new goal to build five gigawatts of new nuclear capacity”. I believe that nuclear power is the best option to reduce electric system GHG emissions but there are issues. This post includes Richard Ellenbogen’s description of practical deployment issues and my observations relative to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy. He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where it has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system. I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because the energy density of wind and solar energy is too low and the resource intermittency too variable to ever support a reliable electric system relying on those resources. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Hochul Proposal

Hochul’s State of the State Book describes the nuclear proposal in the following two sections:

Establishing a Nuclear Reliability Backbone for a Zero-Emission Grid

As New York transitions to a zero-emission electric grid, the State must ensure reliable and cost effective baseload power to keep homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure running at all hours. Governor Hochul will ensure that New York State leads in the race to harness safe and reliable advanced nuclear energy to power homes and businesses with zero-emission electricity for generations to come.

To catalyze progress towards those goals, the Governor will advance a new initiative, the Nuclear Reliability Backbone, directing state agencies to establish a clear pathway for additional advanced nuclear generation to support grid reliability. The Nuclear Reliability Backbone will be developed by a new Department of Public Service (DPS) process to consider, review, and facilitate a cost-effective pathway to four gigawatts of new nuclear energy that will combine with existing nuclear generation and the New York Power Authority’s (NYPA) previously announced one gigawatt project, to create an 8.4 gigawatt “backbone” of reliable energy for New Yorkers.

This effort will provide firm, clean power that complements renewable energy resources and reduces reliance on fossil fuel generation. By creating a stable foundation of always-on energy, the Backbone will allow renewable resources to operate more efficiently and flexibly. Together, these actions will support a resilient, flexible, and zero-emission grid that meets New York’s growing energy needs.

Ensuring New York’s Nuclear Power Future is Built By and For New Yorkers

As New York expands advanced nuclear energy, the State must ensure that New Yorkers benefit from these jobs and investments, including making sure New Yorkers are prepared to build, operate, and sustain this emerging industry. Governor Hochul will launch NextGen Nuclear New York to develop a skilled, in-state nuclear workforce through coordinated education and training pathways.

The initiative will expand partnerships across K–12 schools, higher education institutions, labor organizations, and training programs to align curricula, credentials, and career pathways with industry needs. It will also support workforce transitions for existing energy workers and increase public awareness of nuclear career opportunities. By investing in people and skills, New York will ensure its nuclear future is powered by New Yorkers, for New Yorkers.

Practical Deployment Issues – Ellenbogen

Ellenbogen recently sent an email that described his concerns about the proposal to add 5 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear to NY State’s generation fleet that forms the basis for this article. Because we are closely aligned on our thoughts I am not going to try to differentiate between his material and my supplemental information. However, I take responsibility for the contents of this article and accept that I may have misquoted or misrepresented Ellenbogen’s beliefs.

For background consider New York’s nuclear power plants (Table 1). Five gigawatts of nuclear is basically equivalent to building five new traditional reactors like Nine Mile 2, the last completed plant in New York. Note that Shoreham was completed, tested, and then shut down before it operated in the mid 1980’s.

Table 1: New York Nuclear Generating Plants

We agree on one thing completely: It’s a step in the right direction but it is too little, too late. Building this amount of capacity will take a long time. Nine Mile 2 construction took 13 years, and the most recent reactors built in the US at Vogtle, Georgia took 15 years from the start of initial site work.

According to a Perplexity AI query, The new Vogtle units are Westinghouse AP1000 designs with passive safety systems; The capacity of each unit is on the order of 1.1 GW. Construction went over schedule and budget “as the first new U.S. nuclear build in decades, became a protracted megaproject with schedule slips and cost growth to roughly the mid‑$30‑billion range, widely characterized as one of the most expensive infrastructure projects in U.S. history”. These issues were caused by a “combination of incomplete design and planning, contractor and supply‑chain problems, first‑of‑a‑kind AP1000 implementation issues, weak project management and oversight, and the 2017 Westinghouse bankruptcy, which disrupted construction and financing”.

Most of these underlying factors will be problems for New York State. If new technology is used the design and planning will have to evolve as the plants are built. There are contractor and supply-chain problems with existing infrastructure construction so this will be more of a problem for the new technology. If the deployment goes so far as to mandate that the facilities are “built by and for New Yorkers”, then there will be delays because there are insufficient skilled trade workers available today.

Climate Act Schedule and Reliability Issues – Ellenbogen

The Climate Act has a requirement for zero emissions electric generation by 2040. There is no possibility that all the nuclear capacity proposed by Hochul could be built by 2040 and there is a low probability that any new nuclear could be built by then. Last June Hochul ordered the New York Power Authority (NYPA) to develop at least on gigawatt of nuclear capacity. NYPA has not even announced where they might consider siting new nuclear capacity. In my experience with power plant permitting, it takes at least three years to secure permits for existing design equipment. There have been indications that New York would favor new designs which would slow down permitting substantially. Finally, “Nuclear” has been a four-letter word in New York State for about 45 years so we expect opponents to try to delay permitting in every way possible.

Last November the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) released its 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP). The report found that “the electric grid is at an inflection point driven by the convergence of three major trends: the rapid growth of large loads, (e.g.: microchip manufacturing and AI-related data centers); the aging generation fleet; and a lack of new dispatchable generation resources being added to the system.” The description of the CRP went on to say:

The CRP highlights that the future reliability of the grid depends on the development of flexible generation capable of performing during extended periods of high consumer demand and extreme weather. The report examines lessons-learned from the June 2025 heatwave and the need for a planning framework that better reflects present challenges of operating the grid while anticipating plausible future risks.

“The system requires additional dispatchable generation to serve forecasted increases in consumer demand,” said Zach Smith, Senior Vice President, System and Resource Planning. “We also need to refine and evolve our planning processes to better reflect this period of great change on the grid and a broader range of plausible future outcomes.”

The CRP demonstrates that due to emerging reliability challenges, traditional planning methods built around a single forecast are no longer sufficient. To maintain system reliability and protect public safety, the economy and quality of life, the CRP recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment before reliability margins disappear.

Our biggest concern is the reliability margin crisis described in the CRP. The NYISO plausible range of reliability margins illustrates the problem (Figure 1). The CRP doesn’t explain what is going to keep the lights on after 2033, and possibly as early as 2027 if replacement capacity does not keep up with retirements. My Perplexity AI search found that there are no new fossil-fired capacity proposed. While adding new nuclear capacity is appropriate, replacement of existing capacity must also be considered. The youngest of the 3.4 GW of existing nuclear in NY State will be reaching 60 years of age by 2040.

Figure 1: Plausible Range of Statewide System Margins NYISO 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan

Reason to Pause – Caiazza

Over the last year I have written many articles describing various reasons to pause implementation and reconsider the schedule and scope of the Climate Act. The State Energy Plan and the CRP both include multiple future energy projections that include estimates of capacity and grid infrastructure additions. The CRP “recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment”. The State Energy Plan advocates massive deployment of as much wind, solar, and energy storage capacity as possible as fast as possible hoping that it will work out.

Wind and solar energy resources are diffuse, intermittent, and correlated. Because they are diffuse, utilizing wind and solar means that transmission and distribution systems must be upgraded. Because they are intermittent, that means that energy storage is needed on daily to seasonal scales. Because wind and solar are correlated, new dispatchable emissions-free resources (DEFR) are needed to make the electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. I believe the only likely viable DEFR backup technology is nuclear generation because it is the only candidate resource that is technologically ready, can be expanded as needed, and does not suffer from limitations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Every day that the resolving the DEFR requirement is delayed the costs associated with what may be a false solution increase. If the only viable DEFR solution is nuclear, then the wind, solar, and energy storage approach cannot be implemented without nuclear power. Nuclear power works best as a baseload resource so using it solely as DEFR backup is inappropriate. Developing baseload nuclear eliminates the need for a huge DEFR backup resource and means that the “build as much as we can as fast as we can” wind and solar buildout currently in progress is unnecessary. Climate Act implementation should be paused until the most appropriate path forward is determined.

Discussion

Both Ellenbogen and I have been harping about reliability for years. Unfortunately, no one at the state level seems to be ready to confront the problem. It is absolutely necessary to come to grips with it. The state government keeps trying to defy physical law by pushing technologies that can’t keep the lights on. They need to get out of their bubble because the time frame required to fix what has become a massive problem is getting increasingly small. The rapidly decreasing margins and negative capacity margins appear likely before new generation of any type can be built.

One of the biggest takeaways from this latest political energy proposal is the danger of political interference in energy policy. New York politicians now claim that we need 5 GW of nuclear generating capacity. New York politicians shut down 3.1 GW of nuclear capacity since 1984. Hochul’s announcement is encouraging but until it must be accompanied by a pause in Climate Act implementation to be credible. If timely decarbonization using nuclear power is appropriate, then a restart at Indian Point should be considered because it is the cheapest and quickest option. However, that would be politically toxic so I cannot imagine that ever being proposed by the Hochul Administration.

Conclusion

In my opinion, nuclear power should be part of New York’s electric system future. However, Hochul’s proposal is too little, too late as part of the Climate Act implementation without revising the schedule. It is necessary first to pause implementation and reassess the schedule and ambition of the Act so that it can play a meaningful role.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy Petition

On January 6, 2026 the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filed a petition with the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting that “the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.” Last August I described a filing and supporting documentation that I prepared with Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (Independent Intervenors) submitted to the same PSC Proceeding (Case 22-M-0149). Our filing made a similar argument. This article compares the filings.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two electric sector targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040.

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue. Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources. The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable bounds and New York energy policy has not openly reassessed where we stand relative to acceptable affordability and reliability risk.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy

According to their petition the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) is “a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council”. Clearly, they have a vested interest in affordability because it affects their competitiveness. Coalition members include:

Buffalo Niagara Builders Association
Buffalo Niagara Manufacturing Alliance
Buffalo Niagara Partnership
Builders Exchange of the Southern Tier
Business Council of Westchester
Capitol Region Chamber of Commerce
Center for Economic Growth
Commercial Real Estate Development Association – Upstate Chapter
Construction Exchange of Buffalo and Western New York
Engineers Labor Employer Cooperative 825
Greater Binghamton Chamber of Commerce
Greater Rochester Association of REALTORS
Greater Rochester Chamber of Commerce
Manufacturers Alliance of New York
Manufacturers Association of Central New York
Manufacturers Association of the Southern Tier
Multiple Intervenors – An unincorporated association of approximately 55 large industrial, commercial, and institutional energy consumers with manufacturing and other facilities located throughout New York State
National Federation of Independent Businesses
New York State Association of Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors
New York State Builders Association
New York State Economic Development Council
Niagara USA Chamber of Commerce
North Country Chamber of Commerce
Northeastern Retail Lumber Association
Northeast Hearth, Patio and Barbecue Association
Power for Economic Prosperity – An active coalition of manufacturing companies that depend on low-cost hydropower from the New York Power Authority in order to maintain their operations in the Buffalo/Niagara Region.
Rochester Technology and Manufacturing Association
The Business Council of New York State – The leading business organization in New York State, representing the interests of large and small firms throughout the state. Its membership is made up of approximately 3,500 member companies, local chambers of commerce and professional and trade associations.
The Council of Industry, Manufacturers Association of the Hudson Valley
The Manufacturers Alliance of New York
Western New York Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors
Also included in the Coalition are Donna L. DeCarolis and Dennis W. Elsenbeck, both members of the state’s Climate Action Council established by the CLCPA.

The Coalition petition provides a description of each of its members

Independent Intervenor Filing

For comparison purposes I will describe the Independent Intervenor filing submitted on August 12, 2025, first. My first post described our main argument and the second post described the supporting exhibits. In brief, Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. We argued the hearing was necessary because of the significant increase in arrears threshold has been exceeded.

Independent Intervenors – Affordability

Exhibit 3 – Affordability-Focused Recommendations documents references to affordability and reliability recommendations in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) Document and Matter Management (DMM) System. Rather than wading through the system I acknowledge the use of Perplexity (https://www.perplexity.ai/) to generate summaries and references included in the document.

The Perplexity summary provided the following key takeaway:

Since 2022, at least six concrete safeguards have been proposed in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) record to keep the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act affordable for households and businesses. They call for (1) rigorous public cost reporting, (2) objective “safety-valve” triggers under Public Service Law §66-p(4), (3) systematic pursuit of alternative funding, (4) expansion of low-income bill-protection programs, (5) transparent data dashboards, and (6) stricter benefit-cost and rate-design standards.

In my opinion, these safeguards haven’t been implemented well enough to ensure affordability. There has been no DPS staff response to any of the calls to develop affordability triggers.

Independent Intervenors – Reliability

The biggest unresolved reliability risk associated with Climate Act implementation is addressed in Case 15-E-0302 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Implement a Large-Scale Renewable Program and Clean Energy Standard. Responsible New York agencies all agree that new Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR) technologies are needed to make a solar and wind-reliant electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability.

Two exhibits addressed these reliability concerns. To adequately address the amount of DEFR required it is necessary to determine how much is needed. Exhibit 4 – Resource Gap Characterization describes the challenges of defining the frequency, duration, and intensity of low wind and solar resource availability (known as dark doldrums) events. One fundamental flaw in the Climate Act is the mistaken belief by the authors of the law that existing wind, solar, and energy storage resources would be sufficient and that no new technology would be required. Exhibit 5 – Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources explains that this presumption is not correct. There is a need for a resource that is not currently commercially available. This reliance on unknown solutions risks investments in false solutions and poses significant reliability risks.

Coalition Filing

The Coalition petition states:

The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council (hereinafter referred to as the “Coalition”), hereby petitions the New York State Public Service Commission to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.

The preceding statement includes a footnote referencing the Independent Intervenor filing and another regulatory action that argued a heating was appropriate. The Coalition lays out the basic argument:

This Petition seeks Commission action authorized by the CLCPA. Recent evidence suggests that the Renewable Energy Program, and its associated renewable energy targets, may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service and upset the necessary balance of reliable, economic and sustainable energy in New York State. This evidence justifies commencement of the hearing process in PSL § 66-p (4), which will allow the Commission to determine whether the temporary suspension or modification of the Renewable Energy Program obligations is necessary to ensure the continued provision of safe and adequate electric service. Further, the Coalition believes that any hearing held pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) should examine the relationship between Renewable Energy Program costs and customer arrears.

The Executive Summary provides an excellent overview of the status of Climate Act implementation.

The CLCPA set extraordinarily ambitious targets for renewable energy generation in New York State, requiring that by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems and that by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. Recent data from the Commission demonstrates that New York will not achieve – or even come close to achieving – the 70% target by 2030. In addition, recent developments at the federal level impacting clean energy are likely to have a negative impact on renewable energy in the near term. With respect to the target of zero emissions by 2040, the necessary emission-free generation resources are not currently available at commercial scale. The inability of New York to develop the amount of renewable energy generation necessary to meet the 70% target by 2030, the increasing retirement of aging fossil-fuel generators due to the CLCPA, and the uncertainty surrounding the development of resources necessary to meet the zero emissions target by 2040, presents a reliability concern.

This concern is exacerbated by the fact that it may take more than two times the amount of certain forms of renewable generation to make up for the loss of one megawatt of fossil-fuel generation, and by expected increases in electric demand driven by the combination of new large loads and electrification.

Pursuant to the PSL, the Commission is required to ensure the provision of “safe and adequate” electric service. Renewable energy development has not kept pace with generator retirements, which has resulted in declining reliability margins across New York, jeopardizing electric reliability and safe and adequate service. In recognition that the Renewable Energy Program might negatively impact electric reliability, the CLCPA includes a safeguard that allows the Commission to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the program, after a hearing, if it makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service. Given recent evidence regarding delayed renewable energy generation and risks to reliability, the Commission should hold a hearing pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) to determine whether safe and adequate electric service in New York is impeded by the Renewable Energy Program and, if so, to appropriately modify or suspend the program’s obligations.

Discussion

Both filings argue that the PSC should convene a hearing to determine whether it is appropriate to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the Climate Act. The Independent Intervenors argued that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded. The Coalition makes a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.

The other difference is that the Independent Intervenors represent the views of four individuals whose credibility lies in our technical expertise. The Coalition consists primarily of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state whose credibility is based on its political and economic clout.

Hopefully, the Coalition filing for a hearing will engender a response from the PSC. There has been no hint of a response to the Independent Intervenor filing. Perhaps the Coalition represents too big a constituency to ignore.

Some may say that the Coalition position is economically self-interested and therefore should be discounted. They could also argue that the Independent Intervenors are not qualified to speak. I think I can speak for both parties when I say we believe our concerns have never been openly discussed and addressed by the Hochul Administration. All we want is the chance to make our case for the need to define affordability and reliability metrics that ensure safe, affordable, and adequate service.

Conclusion

I am encouraged that there is another group making similar arguments that the time has come to convene a hearing. All my attempts have failed but maybe the Coalition will succeed in getting the PSC to convene a hearing.

Shortcomings of RGGI Caps and GHG Emissions Reporting in the Electric Sector

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a market-based program to reduce CO2 emissions from electric generating units. On July 3, 2025, RGGI announced that results of the Third Program Review. On December 10, 2025 the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) announced amendments to their CO2 Budget Trading Program that would change the rules to be consistent with the RGGI Third Program Review. This post describes two shortcomings of New York’s GHG emission reduction regulations for the electric sector.

Dealing with the RGGI regulatory and political landscapes is challenging enough that affected entities seldom see value in speaking out about fundamental issues associated with the program. I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program. I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs, since the inception of those programs. I also participated in RGGI Auction 41 successfully winning allowances and holding them for several years. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

6 NYCRR Part 242 – CO2 Budget Trading Program

The DEC Recently Proposed Regulations web page included the following description (accessed on 1/1/26) of the rulemaking:

The proposed amendments to 6 NYCRR Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program would reduce the annual budget of CO2 allowances through 2037, add a second tier of Cost Containment allowances, remove the emissions containment reserve, remove offset projects, remove eligible biomass provisions, increase the minimum reserve price, reduce the number of allowances set-aside for long term contracts and voluntary renewable energy purchases while still maintaining enough allowances to accommodate anticipated demand, and make other improvements and clarifications to the program. The Department is also proposing complementary amendments to listings of related reference material in 6 NYCRR Part 200 General Provisions. Additionally, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority is proposing to amend 21 NYCRR Part 507 CO2 Allowance Auction Program to align with the proposed amendments to 6 NYCRR Part 242. Comments on these proposed revisions must be received by February 17, 2026.

This web page also includes the following links to elements of the regulatory package:

Part 242 Express Terms (PDF) – CO2 Budget Trading Program, Underlines indicate new material: bracket indicate deleted material.

Part 200 Express Terms (PDF) – General Provisions, Underlines indicate new material: bracket indicate deleted material.

Part 507 Express Terms (PDF) (NYSERDA Regulation) – CO2 Allowance Auction Program, Underlines indicate new material: bracket indicate deleted material.

Part 242, 200, and 507 Express Terms Summary (PDF)

Part 242, 200, and 507 Regulatory Impact Statement (PDF)

Part 242, 200, and 507 Regulatory Impact Statement Summary (PDF)

Part 242, 200, and 507 Jobs Impact Statement (PDF)

Part 242, 200, and 507 Rural Area Flexibility Analysis (PDF)

Part 242, 200, and 507 Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for Small Businesses and Local Governments (PDF)

I am only going to address emissions contradictions and the proposed reduction in the annual budget of CO2 allowances through 2037 in this post. Eventually I will describe my comments on the proposed amendments.

NYS Electric Utility Emissions

In a recent post I described the emission reduction performance of RGGI. In that post I compared New York’s electric generating unit emissions during RGGI to historical information using data from the Clean Air Markets Program Data (CAMPD) database. For consistency across the entire period, I used the CO2 emissions from all programs in CAMPD. Table 1 shows that there is an inconsequential difference between that total and emissions from just units affected by RGGI. RGGI does not include some units that are report for NOx Budget programs and RGGI has a size limitation that excluded small units over much of the program.

Table 1: Comparison of New York State EPA CAMPD CO2 Emissions (Short Tons) for All Programs and RGGI Program

Climate Act Emissions

One point that I want to make in this post is that the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) emissions accounting methodology complicates assessment of the RGGI emission cap and appears to be biased. A recent post described the latest New York State (NYS) GHG emission inventory report based on Climate Act methodology. The Climate Act authors mandated that emissions must use a Global Warming Potential (GWP) accounting over 20 years instead of the 100 year accounting used in RGGI.

Emission Inventory Table ES.2 in the Summary Report presents emissions for different sectors and different greenhouse gases. There are four Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sectors and there are four sectoral reports for energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, forestry and land use, and waste. The table also includes United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) totals that use the “conventional accounting used by other governments, applies a 100-year GWP, omits biogenic CO2, and does not include emissions outside of New York State.”

For this analysis, Table 2 extracts relevant information for the IPCC Electric Energy Sector from Table ES.2. The table compares the CLCPA emissions that use GWP-20, includes other GHG gases, and adds non-RGGI stack emissions as well as three additional sources: imported electricity, transmission & distribution, and upstream fuel extraction. There are two columns added that compare UNFCCC and CLCPA emission. In 2023, the UNFCC emissions were 26.1 million metric tons (MMT) and the CLCPA emissions were 49.02 MMT. The table clearly shows that increased emissions were the result of adding CH4 and N2O (0.18 MMT), Electricity T&D (0.12 MMT) and Imported Electricity (9.54 MMT). The table does not explicitly address upstream fuel extraction emissions, but I estimated that they were 13.09 MMT. That is approximately half the direct emissions total.

Table 2: ES.2: 2023 New York State GHG Energy Sector Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by IPCC Sector with Comparison of CLCPA and UNFCCC Electric Power Emissions

In my opinion, the claim that fuel extraction emissions are around 50% of the direct stack emissions is extraordinary. Table ES.2 does not explicitly list the fuel extraction component of electric power emissions. I assumed that it would be equal to the percentage of electric power emissions to the total fuel combustion emissions. That seems like a reasonable assumption, but the result is unrealistic.

Projected Emissions and the RGGI Proposed Cap

The New York State Energy Plan provides the “official” emissions projections for the electric sector. I have provided background information on my Energy Plan page. For our purposes the thing to remember is that the Plan projects emissions for five different scenarios. Table 3 lists projections starting in 2027 that range from 49.3 to 40.3 MMT. The 2023 observed emissions from RGGI sources was 28.7 MMT. Table 3 lists the proposed RGGI cap or limit on tons of CO2 permitted. There is a big difference between the Pathways Analysis projection and the RGGI numbers. I believe that those differences are explained by the factors affecting emissions in Table 2.

Table 3: Comparison of RGGI Proposed Part 242 Cap and State Energy Plan Pathways Analysis Electric Power Scenario Projections

In my review of the RGGI Third Program Review I explained that the RGGI states determined the proposed cap levels based on state laws like the Climate Act that mandate zero emissions by 2040. The observed reduction trajectory simply is an extrapolation to zero. On the other hand, the State Energy Plan modeling represents a fundamental change in official New York projection methodology. Previously, projections assumed that emissions would get to zero no matter what. The State Energy Plan is consistent with the estimates of the New York independent System Operator (NYISO) that do not assume zero emissions by 2040. These estimates clearly show that the RGGI emission caps are unrealistic.

Discussion

This post describes two shortcomings of this component of New York’s GHG emission reduction regulations for the electric sector. The emissions estimates using the Climate Act accounting fails a common-sense plausibility check. There is simply no way that New York electric generating units affected by RGGI will be able to achieve the proposed revisions to Part 242.

I do not think that the emissions estimates for the electric sector are credible. These are indirect estimates of emissions using emission factors that project emissions based on fuel use and activity factors. Emission factor estimates are fundamentally mass balance calculations. I do not think it is reasonable to assume that extracting natural gas and oil would produce emissions equal to half the direct emissions. Note that CH4 is the largest component pollutant and, given New York’s irrational obsession with it, that makes me suspect the emission factors used for methane are biased high.

The 2025 GHG Energy Sectoral Report notes that “DEC has conducted a recalculation of upstream, out-of-state emissions from natural gas imports using a recently released updated methodology” which suggests that they recognize that there is an issue. The report also states that “DEC continues to welcome feedback on this and any part of the current analysis.” Given that they blew off my comments about the methane methodology that I submitted in October 2020, I believe that it this is only a gesture and while comments are welcomed making changes based on comments is not on the table.

The second issue discussed is the gap between the RGGI allowance cap trajectory and the State Energy Plan. It is just not reasonable to think that electric generating unit emissions will be able to achieve those caps in that timeframe. The RGGI cap on emissions essentially rations energy use because if there are insufficient permits to emit (aka allowances) affected generating units have no other options to reduce emissions so they can only shutdown to comply with the law. If replacement zero emissions generating resources are unavailable, then the electric grid would be placed in an artificial energy shortage that would lead to blackouts. This point will be emphasized when I comment on the DEC Part 242 amendments.

Conclusion

This is my first post of 2026. Sadly, there is nothing new here. New York State agencies generate analyses and propose regulations that comply with the Climate Act narrative without considering the real world. Reality bats last. Is 2026 the last inning?