Featured

Calling Questions “Climate Denial” Won’t Keep the Lights On

On February 26, 2026 the Hochul Administration “leaked” a New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that said that “full compliance with New York’s 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act could cost upstate households more than $4,000 a year – on top of what they are already paying today”. On March 5, 2026, a group of 29 New York Democratic state senators responded with a letter (“Democratic Letter”) to Governor Hochul saying they “categorically oppose any effort to roll back New York’s nation leading climate law” and urging Hochul to “stand strong in the face of misinformation” about affordability.  The letter insists that any pushback on the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) amounts to “climate denial” and that only their “bold” agenda will save New Yorkers money, clean the air, and protect a livable climate for our grandchildren. That framing gets the politics right, but the facts are wrong.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for approving the Scoping Plan prepared by New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” NYSERDA also prepared the recent State Energy Plan that was approved by Energy Planning Board (EPB).  Both the CAC and the EPB were composed of political appointees . 

I am not a climate denier.  The climate is always changing, and greenhouse gases affect climate, but the authors of the Democratic Letter do not acknowledge that climate uncertainty, natural variability, or observational constraints call for a realistic response. . I spent my 50-year career as an air pollution meteorologist working with real emissions, real regulations, and real power plants. The most disappointing aspect of the letter is that there is no recognition that as Dr. Matthew Wielcki has said  “energy is not merely an input to the economy, but the foundation of human flourishing”.  The question before New York is not whether climate change exists, but whether the package of mandates in the Climate Act is feasible, affordable, and effective. When it comes to those practical issues, the facts don’t sit well with the people throwing around the “denier” accusation.

Costs

Start with costs. When the Climate Act was passed, there was no honest, front‑end feasibility and cost analysis. Only after the targets were locked into law did agencies begin publishing scenarios showing the scale of spending required. Those scenarios all assume massive expansion of the electric grid, rapid electrification of heating and transportation, and large‑scale deployment of wind, solar, and batteries. None of this comes free. We are already seeing rising bills, growing arrears, and households struggling with basic energy costs, even before the most aggressive requirements take hold.

These lawmakers do not understand that NYSERDA’s cost estimates for the Climate Act Scoping Plan and the State Energy Plan are built on modeling choices that systematically understate the burden on New Yorkers: they embed Climate Act programs inside opaque “system” totals, use a “No Action” baseline that already includes other greenhouse‑gas policies, and present small percentage changes instead of the several‑hundred‑dollar‑per‑month increases that households will actually face. 

For example, the NYSERDA memo notes “absent changes, by 2031” that “Upstate oil and natural gas households would see costs in excess of $4,000 a year”.  I believe that these costs are underestimated.  Using State Energy Plan December 2025 data I determined costs to buy the equipment to meet the Climate Act household mandates for an Upstate New York moderate income household that uses natural gas for heat.  NYSERDA’s Affordability Analysis Overview Fact Sheet claims that the use of new, efficient equipment can cut energy spending by $100 to over $300 per month, but those estimates do not include the costs of equipment.  When equipment costs are included, the difference in monthly energy costs and levelized equipment costs between replacement with conventional equipment and electrification equipment consistent with Climate Act goals is $594 a month or $7,200 per year. For the only scenario where NYSERDA included equipment costs sum of those costs and those in the NYSERDA memo total compliance costs are $11,200 a year.

If these policies truly “saved New Yorkers money,” we would not need to hide behind slogans and carefully worded “average household savings” claims that depend on subsidies and optimistic modeling assumptions. We would see transparent accounting of rate impacts, program costs, and who pays when things go wrong. Instead, we get talking points and attacks on anyone who asks for a balance sheet.

Pollution

The pollution story is similarly oversold. New York dramatically cleaned up its air decades ago. We now live in one of the cleanest air basins in the country by traditional criteria pollutants. Additional greenhouse gas reductions here may be desirable, but they do not magically translate into big local health improvements when we are already near the floor. On climate itself, New York’s emissions are a tiny fraction of the global total. Even if we somehow hit every target in the Climate Act on time, the effect on global temperature would be too small to measure.

That does not mean “do nothing.” It does mean we should stop pretending that blowing up our energy system on an unrealistic timeline is a gift to the world’s climate and will have sufficient societal co-benefits to offset the actual costs. New York can and should reduce emissions, but it must do so in ways that maintain reliability, preserve affordability, and respect the limits of what one state can accomplish.

Reliability

The biggest gap in the “bold policy” rhetoric is reliability. A livable climate for our children and grandchildren does not include routine blackouts, shuttered industries, and a grid that fails under stress. Yet the very same politicians who decry “denial” are remarkably casual about the technical challenge of running a winter‑peaking system in a cold climate on weather‑dependent generation backed by storage that does not yet exist at the necessary scale.

Many lawmakers do not understand the electric system and advocate for a flexible electric grid.  They don’t understand that the electric system must be built around reliability during peak demand because that is when it is needed the most.  That is why utilities must invest so much in preparation for peak times.   While that adds to costs it  is also why ratepayers are assured power is always available.

The Climate Act proposes a weather-dependent electric system.  We already know what happens when extended periods of low wind and sun line up with high demand. Europe has experienced it and this winter’s weather showed what will happen in New York when there is a dark doldrum period where both wind and solar underperform for days. NYISO data clearly shows that the January 24-27 snowstorm caused both the utility-scale and rooftop solar resources to go to essentially zero on January 25th at the height of the storm.  The subsequent period of cold weather prevented melting of the snow covered panels through the end of the month.  On January 31, the winds tailed off and the total renewable energy resources only provided 2% of the total energy.  The current plans still have no proven, affordable solution for these worst‑case conditions, even as dispatchable fossil units are pushed toward early retirement. That is not bold; it is reckless.

Discussion

Calling anyone who raises these concerns a “denier” is a way of avoiding the hard work of fixing the plan. It flips reality on its head. The truly irresponsible position is to insist that the laws of politics can overrule the laws of physics and economics, and to dismiss the engineers, grid operators, and analysts who point out the contradictions.

New Yorkers deserve better than this false choice between blind faith in an untested transition and caricatures of anyone who dissents. A responsible path forward would:

  • Admit that the current schedule and mandates are not aligned with demonstrated technology and cost.
  • Use existing safety‑valve and review provisions to pause, reevaluate, and correct course where needed.
  • Prioritize reliability and affordability as co‑equal goals with emissions reduction, not afterthoughts.
  • Be honest about New York’s tiny share of global emissions and focus on scalable innovations that others might actually adopt.

You can call that pragmatism, skepticism, or just basic due diligence. What it is not, under any honest definition, is “climate denial.” If New York’s climate agenda is as strong as its supporters claim, it should be able to survive tough questions from people who pay the bills and rely on the grid. If it cannot, the problem is not the questions.

Cap and Invest to Meet New Yorker’s Needs Lobbying Document

The February 2026 report Cap and Invest to Meet New Yorkers’ Needs, (Needs Report)  published by Spring Street Climate Fund and New Yorkers for Clean Air, is the latest in a series of advocacy documents designed to sell the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program to legislators and the public.  This article explains why this article misinforms New Yorkers about the supposed benefits of NYCI.

I have extensive experience with market-based pollution control programs.  I have been involved in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program process since its inception and have frequently written about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I have also been following the NYCI program and other similar programs in New York   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated

Overview

I have described the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) NYCI regulations in many articles.  DEC was supposed to promulgate three implementing regulations by 1/1/2024.  Currently DEC has only finalized the Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule.  There have been no suggestions when the two other necessary regulations will be proposed.  The Cap-and-Invest Rule will define affected sources, binding caps, and allowance allocations.  DEC also needs an auction rule that implements the auction that will be used to distribute allowances.

The lack of regulations is a problem.  On 3/31/25 a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 date.  I explained that the decision on the petition stated: DEC must “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.”  On 11/24/25 DEC appealed the decision to the Appellate Division.   This means that the deadline of Feb 6 is suspended until the Appellate Division rules.  Therefore, the State has no risk of being held in contempt and can safely ignore the deadline.  However, the decision was clear – promulgate the regulations or change the law. 

On February 26, 2026 the Hochul Administration “leaked” a New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that said that “full compliance with New York’s 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act could cost upstate households more than $4,000 a year – on top of what they are already paying today and gas prices could jump over $2 a gallon.”  David Catalfamo explains what is going on:

Hochul wants to roll back parts of the CLCPA. She knows it’s politically complicated. So rather than saying so plainly, she lets her budget director hint at it, lets a NYSERDA memo circulate through the press, and then steps in front of a camera to say she’s just responding to the data. It’s Albany smoke-signaling at its finest.

City and State recently published Activists dispute Hochul’s claims about cost of complying with climate law by Rebecca Lewis that describes the Needs Report.  It “highlights potential benefits of a cap-and-invest program, including energy rebates for millions of households.”  She notes that  the “new report from New Yorkers for Clean Air and Spring Street Climate Fund aims to balance out conversations on the potential impacts of hitting climate goals by illustrating the benefits, rather than the costs, of implementation.”  This article looks into these claims.

Follow the Money

Last January I reviewed a report from Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights that claimed New Yorkers will “realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative” based on an evaluation of all aspects of NYCI.  (Clean Air Initiative is a rebranding of NYCI – it is the same thing.)  The Needs Report only addresses the investment benefits.  Appendix A: Methodology describes three methodology steps: use one of the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) price ceiling scenarios to determine the amount of money available, assume “average operational costs of 4% across the board to implement and operate the cap-and-invest program”, and then propose how the remaining 96% could be spent on affordability measures and direct investments. 

This is not a serious analysis.  It assumes 4% average operational costs.  There is an existing cap-and-invest program for the utility industry called RGGI.  A serious analysis would have checked the most recent RGGI Operating Plan Amendment to determine what the operating costs were for that program.  I found that operating costs in the latest budget for RGGI investments was 8%.  I think being off by a factor of two is substantive.

The organizations behind the Needs Report are advocacy groups with a vested interest in NYCI implementation, not independent analysts. Spring Street Climate Fund is characterized as “a left-of-center advocacy group that supports environmentalist legislation within New York State,” funded by the Park Foundation and the Lily Auchincloss Foundation. Evergreen Action “donate now” link features the statement “leading an all-out national mobilization to defeat the climate crisis”.

Revenues

Environmental activists are pushing back against the NYSERDA memo because it argues that NYCI is unaffordable.  The activists are missing a fundamental point.  The memo calculates the costs necessary to “fully comply with CLCPA’s current emissions targets with a cap-and-invest program”.  To do that the  regulation must omit limits on potential allowance prices and will allocate allowances based on the trajectory required to meet the Climate Act mandates.  This causes a sharp uptick in projected costs compared to previous analysts.

Appendix A: Methodology notes that the analysis used Scenario C from a NYSERDA analysis in 2024.  The ten-year revenue stream is $57.4 billion and includes limits on allowance prices.  The NYSERDA memo assumed higher allowance prices would occur if there were no limits on prices and that it would be necessary to implement NYCI consistent with the Judge’s ruling.  Using their assumptions, I estimate that the ten-year revenue stream would be five times higher at $295 billion over ten years.

The Needs Report frames $57.4 billion as revenue the state can “invest,” but this is money taken from households and businesses through higher energy costs, higher fuel prices, and higher costs for goods and services.  The NYSERDA memo states:

Absent changes, by 2031, the impact of CLCPA on the price of gasoline could reach or exceed $2.23/gallon on top of current prices at that time; the cost for an MMBtu of natural gas $16.96; and comparable increases to other fuels. Upstate oil and natural gas households would see costs in excess of $4,000 a year and New York City natural gas households could anticipate annual gross costs of $2,300. Only a portion of these costs could be offset by current policy design.

One of the flaws of the Needs Report is that it ignores opportunity costs.  Even a non-economist like me understands that if an analysis does not consider how the money raised by NYCI might have been used elsewhere is not considered, then their economic benefits claims are biased.  My article on the report from Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights included a discussion of this flaw so I will not repeat it here.

Benefits

The Needs Report simply lists how $57.4 billion could be spent. Listing spending categories is not the same as demonstrating net economic benefits.  It describes beneficial spending on energy rebates ($270/yr for 6.5 million households), weatherization (500,000 homes), rooftop solar (400,000 homes), heat pumps (250,000 homes), grid expansion ($3 billion), schools ($5.8 billion), and other categories.

I am not going to address each of these recommendations because the choices and options listed seem to me more tailored to drumming up support for NYCI than anything else.  Anyway, these are proposed expenditures, not demonstrated results that do not reflect lessons learned from the investment of RGGI proceeds.  It is also flawed because it assumes idle resources—that workers and capital redirected to clean energy would not otherwise have been productively employed. With New York at record employment levels, this assumption is untenable.

Past Performance

Past performance does not guarantee future success, but a record of failure often predicts continued trouble. I have two concerns that are not addressed by either report that are evident in the RGGI program.

A cap-and-invest program has two overarching goals: emission reductions using a declining cap that limits emissions and provide funds for investments in programs that drive emission reductions.  However, these goals are often overlooked.  Governor Hochul’s core principles for NYCI are affordability, climate leadership, creating jobs and preserving competitiveness, investing in disadvantaged communities, and funding a sustainable future.  Only the last principle addresses the overarching goals.  The other principles provide guidance for how the money should be spent on political objectives.

The second problem is that the Needs Report cites RGGI as proof that “similar policies have been humming in our state for years.” NYCI supporters note that since the start of RGGI in 2009 emissions for units in that program are down 33%.  However, I have shown that the reason emissions have dropped is because NY power plants switched from using coal and oil to using natural gas because it was cheaper. Moreover, New York does not have a good emission-reduction track record when it comes to investment results from the existing RGGI cap-and-invest program.  Investments of RGGI auction proceeds only reduced emissions 4.2% and there should be no expectation that NYCI investments will fare much better.  The sources affected by NYCI do not have any cost-effective fuel switching alternatives that can provide reductions like those observed in the utility sector.  Unless NYCI emphasizes investments in programs that produce cost effective reductions then emissions will not fall as needed.  The NYCI cap on emissions means that energy will be rationed, if it appears that emissions will exceed the cap.

Rebates

The Needs Report explains that NYCI will dedicate at least 30% of its revenue, the largest slice of the program’s pie, to lowering energy costs for working families. The report claims that “these direct rebates are a central feature of the Clean Air Initiative and stand to lower the skyrocketing cost of living for millions of New Yorkers.”

However, the math shows that NYCI makes energy more expensive and only gives back a fraction of the increased costs. The Needs Report states that the 10-year revenues are $57.4 billion, the annual 30% set-aside for rebates is $1.72 billion and the annual rebates are $270 per household.  Using the NYSERDA memo projections I estimate that the 10-year revenues are $295 billion, the annual 30% set-aside for rebates is $8.84 billion and the annual rebates will be $1,360 per household. The NYSERDA memo projects household cost increases of $3,000–$4,100 per year. A $1,360 rebate offsets roughly 33-45% of those increased costs.  This is the textbook definition of a shell game: raise costs by thousands, rebate a fraction of the costs, and claim it as a “benefit.” 

Overall, if cap-and-invest revenues are projected at $295 billion over a decade, that is approximately $29.5 billion per year extracted from the economy. Giving back $1,360/per household to 6.5 million households costs roughly $8.85 billion—less than one-third of what is taken.  I remain unimpressed. 

Electrification Support

There is another unacknowledged issue.  The report assumes massive electrification (heat pumps, EVs, building retrofits) without addressing whether the electric grid can support the added load.  NYISO projects significant increases in electric load going forward, with electrification strategies and large load facilities (including data centers) adding substantial demand.  The State Energy Plan found that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient to meet statutory targets” and that the necessary acceleration in clean energy deployment is “infeasible today” due to “lack of market capacity”.  This all puts pressure on the ability to meet the NYCI cap on emissions which in turn increases the need for effective emission reduction investments.

Discussion

The  Needs Report follows the same formula documented in the earlier EDF/Greenline Insights report that I found had problems: benefits were overstated, costs were minimized or ignored, and the methodology was designed to produce a predetermined conclusion.  It looks like the report was released as a political counter to the NYSERDA memo documenting the real costs of CLCPA compliance. It was produced by advocacy organizations with a financial and institutional stake in the program’s implementation. It only addresses investment priorities and could not even come up with a reasonable estimate of operational costs.  This is not credible support for NYCI.

Conclusion

New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.  New York actions are not going to affect global warming.  There is a fundamental question that the report refuses to answer: if New Yorkers are going to see $295 billion extracted from their wallets over the next decade, would they be better off keeping that money and spending it according to their own priorities?  Until advocates can answer that question honestly, reports like this deserve to be recognized for what they are—lobbying documents, not economic analysis.

Virtual Power Plant Misinformation

A recent article in New York Focus, How a More Flexible Grid Could Save New York Billions, received widespread New York media coverage.  Unfortunately, the claims that VPP can provide reliable power falls apart under close examination.  I believe it was misinformation because it presents false information that was not created or shared with intention of causing harm.  I wrote this article because this kind of false information is leading New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) transition to net-zero efforts towards a false solution.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Implementation plans have called for a cleaner, more distributed system that minimizes load variations consistent with the virtual power plant (VPP) approach.

VPP terminology was used in the predecessor Reforming the Energy Vision program.  In the Climate Act Scoping Plan and last year’s State Energy Plan the concept has been repackaged as Distributed Energy Resources”.  In draft Energy Plan comments, the New York Solar Energy Industries Association stated:  “By doubling down on distributed energy resources, New York can lower costs, strengthen the grid, and sustain one of its most successful clean energy industries.”

This article describes errors that I think support my belief that this clean-energy industry promise is another miracle technology that will not support the system when needed most.  All the promised savings and good intentions will vanish when people freeze or suffer in the dark.

How a ‘Flexible’ Grid Works

The New York Focus article was written by Jack Carroll and Colin Kinniburgh.  Kinniburgh has a knack for explaining technical concepts well for the general public.  The article describes VPP:

In a traditional electric grid, power flows essentially in one direction: from central power plants to homes and businesses. In a “flexible” grid, powered in part by virtual power plants, those homes and businesses take on a new role. Not only can they supply power back to the grid with rooftop solar and batteries, but their devices — smart thermostats and electric vehicles, for example — can communicate with each other and with grid operators to respond to the system’s demands.

Under the traditional model, utilities have to keep an army of power plants, substations, and wires on standby at all times, in preparation for peak times like hot summer days. The costs of maintaining that system show up on every energy bill, even when customers are using less energy.

“It’s built for the hottest couple of days or hours of the year, but customers are paying for it all year long,” said Richard Kauffman, who served as the state’s energy czar from 2013 to 2019 and chaired the board of the energy authority NYSERDA until last year.

The more you use technology to spread out demand and adapt to the grid’s needs, the less utilities rely on costly infrastructure to meet the peak — and the less utility spending shows up on customers’ bills.

I think this is a good description of the concept, but it contains a fundamental flaw.  The electric system must be built around reliability during peak demand because that is when it is needed the most.  That is why utilities must “keep an army of power plants, substations, and wires on standby at all times, in preparation for peak times”.   While the “costs of maintaining that system show up on every energy bill” that is also why ratepayers are assured power is always available.  This is the first mistake.

Many VPP advocates have the naïve belief that if there are enough distributed energy resources that peaks will be eliminated and there will be no need for peaking resources.  Others know better but continue to argue otherwise.  There is no better example of those who should know better than the politically connected former New York energy czar Richard Kaufmann.  He parrots the talking point that building the system for peaks costs money and insinuates that there is a better way.  In my opinion he cannot be trusted because he has a massive personal financial interest in this false information.  I used Perplexity AI to research his connection to the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act “gold bars” controversy.  The Perplexity AI report describing his connection includes the following quotes:

Richard Kauffman did join one of the organizations that received IRA “gold bars” funding. He became CEO of the Coalition for Green Capital (CGC) in January 2025 — a nonprofit that had been awarded $5 billion from the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund under the Inflation Reduction Act.

Kauffman’s career trajectory — from Obama DOE advisor, to New York energy czar under Cuomo, to NYSERDA board chair, to CGC board member, and finally to CEO of a $5 billion GGRF recipient — illustrates the tight interconnection between government clean energy policymakers and the nonprofit organizations that subsequently received billions in IRA-funded grants.

In April 2024, the EPA selected CGC as a recipient of $5 billion under the National Clean Investment Fund. Coalition for Green Capital (CGC) had originally requested $10 billion in its application. Career EPA reviewers flagged several concerns during the application process:

  • CGC had “only expended $1.42 million in 2023 before receiving a $5 billion award”
  • “Of the 71 expected hires, more than 20% would be making salaries more than approximately $450,000”
  • CGC’s “assumption of deploying $10 billion in the first fiscal year of performance seems unattainable”
  • “FY2022 and 2021 financials show a net loss with declining fees for service income”

In my opinion, the value of a reference from a crony capitalist with a salary of more than $450,000 is worthless because of his vested interest in a particular response.  This quote is the second mistake in this article.

Pilot Study

Orange and Rockland (O&R) initiated the Innovative Storage Business Models (ISBM) pilot with Sunrun as a REV Demonstration Project approved by the Public Service Commission (PSC) that was referenced in the Carroll and Kinniburgh article.  The goal of the pilot is to test an innovative residential solar-plus-storage VPP business model to “optimize and deliver clean energy, provide dispatchable grid services and reduce costs for customers.”

I used Perplexity AI to also document the technical specifications. It found that the program deploys residential solar-plus-storage systems across O&R’s service territory in Orange and Rockland counties, aggregating them into a dispatchable virtual power plant that provides grid services during peak demand periods.  The ISBM Project’s design specifications, as established in O&R’s June 2020 Initial Filing Letter to the PSC, include:

  • Customer installations: Approximately 300 residential solar-plus-storage (Brightbox) systems
  • Solar capacity: Approximately 2.9 MW of distributed rooftop solar
  • Energy storage capacity: Approximately 2.1 MW / 4.7 MWh of distributed battery storage
  • Aggregate VPP size (after 3-year deployment): 2 MW / 4 MWh
  • Program duration: 10-year demonstration period with 25-year customer lease agreements
  • Target deployment locations: 15 distribution circuits identified by O&R as having distribution value

The solar array panel at each home was designed to provide 110 percent of the annual average and the battery was designed to provide between 8 and 12 hours of essential load for the homeowner. The battery energy more than the homeowner’s needs contributes to the 2.1 MW VPP that can provide 4.7 MWh.  The VPP pilot could provide 2.1 MW for a little over two hours. 

According to the Perplexity summary, the VPP achieved the following milestones in Summer 2024:

  • Enrolled systems: 325 O&R customers contributing approximately 2 MW of aggregated capacity
  • Dispatch events (summer 2024): Called on 18 times to provide electricity to the grid during peak demand events
  • Dispatch events (2025 heat wave): In June 2025, Sunrun completed its fourth dispatch event in a single week in New York, helping relieve stress on congested circuits
  • The VPP was described as having supported dozens of peak electricity demand events during the summer of 2024, with home batteries supplying stored solar energy to help stabilize the electric grid.

Carroll and Kinniburgh state that: “The 350 households participating can deliver close to 50 megawatts of power to the grid at peak times — about enough to supply Calderon’s entire small town of Warwick for a couple of hours.”  This is the third mistake.  The actual capacity is about 2 megawatts so the quotation is off by 25 times.

Virtual Power Plants Reliability Support

The third mistake is minor but the claims that VPP are a viable solution to reliability problems is serious.  The following quote from the article claims that some experts have demonstrated that the VPP network can replace an average sized gas plant.

The New York Independent System Operator, the nonprofit that manages the state’s grid, has warned that New York may not have enough energy to meet demand over the next decade, as large energy users like data centers come online and the state electrifies homes and transportation. New York City, it said, could face a gap as soon as next summer. Even last summer, NYISO had to activate emergency protocols during a worse-than-expected heat wave. 

In response (and to some controversy), NYISO recommended the state delay the retirement of multiple fossil fuel plants, including high-polluting peaker plants in New York City, and strongly consider the construction of new ones.

Some experts argue that virtual power plants offer a cheaper, cleaner way to close the gap. A 2023 Brattle analysis found that the networks can backstop the grid as reliably as an average-sized gas peaker plant, for about half the price.

Renewable advocates focus on energy production, but power systems are built around reliability during peak demand. If you look at the grid through the lens of accredited capacity, that is, capacity that can be relied upon during peak demand – instead of average energy, the resource allocations for different technologies look radically different. 

Because I don’t have time to read and evaluate every article referenced, I again used Perplexity to review the Brattle Group’s 2023 analysis.  The Executive Summary of the response states:

The Brattle Group’s May 2023 “Real Reliability: The Value of Virtual Power” report—prepared for Google—compared the cost and reliability of virtual power plants (VPPs), natural gas peakers, and utility-scale batteries in providing 400 MW of resource adequacy for an illustrative mid-sized utility. Rather than explicitly modeling extreme multi-day renewable droughts (sometimes called “Dunkelflaute” events), the analysis addressed low renewable availability indirectly through its net load methodology and deliberate selection of operationally challenging system conditions. This approach has significant implications for interpreting the study’s reliability conclusions

The fatal flaw in the Brattle analysis is that the approach used did not address the extreme events that affect peak demand adequately.  The analysis focused on individual peak hours/days, not sustained multi-day low-output periods that are associated with peak demand.  The inevitable problem can be illustrated using observations from the January 2026 winter storm.

January 2026 Winter Storm

I recently described the effects of this storm on the New York grid over the last ten days of January.  Wind and solar resources during the January 24 to January 27, 2026 winter storm were impacted during the storm.   The NYISO January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report includes a graph of net statewide wind and solar performance total daily production and capacity factors (Figure 1).  The data clearly show that the snowstorm caused both the utility-scale and rooftop solar resources to go to essentially zero on January 25th at the height of the storm.  Utility-scale generation came back slowly but had not returned to before storm levels by the end of the month.  Rooftop solar never exceeded more than 5% energy availability over the ten days and was only 2% the last four days of the month.  The period of prolonged sub-freezing weather prevented snow covered rooftop solar panels from clearing and caused a peak in the electric load.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO JanuaryOperations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

VPP during the January 2026 Winter Storm

There is insufficient data available to quantitatively assess what would happen if New York were to rely on VPP technology.  However, we can look at the energy production at the end of January 2026 and see serious problems both for the homeowners participating in the program and the grid.

Recall that the solar array panel at each home was designed to provide 110 percent of the annual average energy and the battery was designed to provide between 8 and 12 hours of essential load for the homeowner.  The promise to homeowners is that these systems will provide essential support during outages.  If there is an outage at the same time rooftop solar panels are covered with snow, then there will be no essential support for an outage greater than 12 hours.  That is an admittedly a rate event but when it occurs the homeowner would be desperate for electric power.

There are also problems on the grid level.  Table 1 lists the daily energy production by fuel-type documented in my first article about this event.  VPP technology is supposed to smooth peak loads and eliminate the need for peaker power plants.  Oil fired units are used almost exclusively as peaker unit in New York so we can assume that their load during this event is “peak” energy.  The Brattle analysis only looks at individual peak days.  The peak daily oil energy production was 18,252 MWh on 1/26.  If New York expanded the O&R VPP pilot producing 2.1 MW VPP that can provide 4.7 MWh to a 9,000 MW system that would produce over 20,000 MWh.  That would be sufficient for the maximum daily peak.  However, looking at the entire episode, it is obvious that a VPP that relies on distributed rooftop solar would run out of energy on the day after the snowstorm.  The sum of the solar resources is not greater than the oil generation for the remainder of the episode.  The VPP would have no value to the system after the second day.

Table 1: Daily NYISO Energy Production (MWh) January 22 to January 31, 2026

Discussion

The January 2026 storm proves that VPP solar plus storage technology has no value during extended periods of light winds, low solar availability, and snow-covered solar panels.   It simply cannot provide necessary power to replace an existing peaking power plant during these periods. 

The VPP proposal introduces yet another threat to grid reliability. New York’s own agencies agree that Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFRs) must be developed to backstop wind and solar when those resources falter for days at a time. The January 2026 winter storm made that reality unmistakable. Every delay in pursuing DEFRs compounds the risk and economic burden of clinging to an unproven wind–solar–storage–VPP strategy.

I view nuclear generation as the only realistically viable DEFR backup option, despite its costs, because it is uniquely technologically mature, can be scaled as needed, and is not constrained by the thermodynamic limits that burden storage‑based approaches. However, nuclear plants are best suited to operate as baseload resources, so using them solely for DEFR backup duty would be an inappropriate application of the technology.

If the only viable DEFR technology is nuclear power that implies that large expenditures on wind, solar, battery storage, and VPPs that cannot reliably supply electricity during periods of greatest system stress are unnecessary. When the full lifecycle and system costs of the Scoping Plan’s wind‑, solar‑, and storage‑centric strategy are weighed against a nuclear‑based electric system, I believe that nuclear will be the lower‑cost option, particularly once asset lifetimes are taken into account.

Conclusion

Advocates for VPP claim one of the benefits is that it can replace an army of power plants.  However, you can’t shut down the old power plants until you’re sure the new system actually works under all conditions. If it doesn’t, the lights go out, costs rise, and people get hurt.  The NY Focus article on VPP misses the fundamental VPP flaw. 

NYSERDA Climate Act Cost Estimate Bombshell

Rebecca Lewis has posted two City and State articles that found that the Hochul Administration recognizes that the  Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is so expensive that the Governor will propose changes to the Climate Act to reduce the costly clean energy transition. 

In the first article she explains that state budget director Blake Washington described the cost burdens of the green energy requirements on average New Yorkers as “own goals” at the Citizens Budget Commission breakfast on 2/25/26.  This apparently precipitated an update on the “likely costs of CLCPA compliance” documented in a memo dated Feb. 26 that Lewis notes “lays out average costs to New Yorkers by 2031 under a hypothetical cap-and-invest system that would be necessary to meet the emissions benchmarks laid out in the Climate Act.”  This memo references my work that suggests that even these costs are underestimated.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a reduction target of 40% less GHG emissions and a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate. 

My recent article describing current Climate Act issues described some of the issues raised.  I explained that there are significant Climate Act issues that can no longer be ignored.  Most targets are behind schedule, and the increased costs of the Climate Act will exacerbate the existing energy affordability crisis.  DEC needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements and will have to eventually respond to the litigation saying that the State must implement the regulations or amend the law.  PSC must also address the safety valve provisions of Publc Service Law 66-P. 

These latest revelations are nothing more than acknowledgement of reality.

Budget Director Remarks

In the first article, Lewis describes remarks made by Hochul’s Budget Director at the Citizens Budget Commission breakfast on 2/25/26.  Her article states:

Blake Washington called the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act “well-intentioned,” but said circumstances had changed since former Gov. Andrew Cuomo signed the law in 2019. “Sometimes you can change governmental rules to just fit the times and actually adapt to the realities, the realities before us, not how we wish them to be,” Washington said. He added that the estimated average cost to New Yorkers of the energy transition under current rules comes to roughly $3,000, a number the governor finds “unacceptable.”

Lewis noted:

Speaking to City & State after the CBC breakfast, Washington said state officials must have “honest conversations” about the goals currently in place the state must meet. “It’s important that we highlight the inequities that are before us,” Washington said. “If you were to follow the current law … follow the goals, you’re looking at upwards of $1.90 extra at the pump, which is not something the governor’s willing to tolerate.”

Washington strongly implied the governor wants to include changes to the climate law as part of the budget, though he stopped short of stating so explicitly and didn’t say when she would release her proposal. The executive chamber didn’t include the potential policy reforms as part of Hochul’s 30-day budget amendments, which are typically where a governor introduces new items they wish to negotiate. 

Clearly, the Hochul administration is going to do something regarding the Climate Act.

NYSERDA Cost Memo

In the second article Lewis described the contents of a NYSERDA memo from President and CEO of the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority Doreen Harris to Jackie Bray, Director of State Operations.  This appears to update some of the numbers that Washington quoted the day before.  Lewis notes also that Hochul commented on the cost issues in an unrelated press conference at the same time the memo was released.

Gov. Kathy Hochul suggested on Thursday that the cost of fully complying to the state’s climate law could cost average New Yorkers up to $3,500 each. A new memo shared with City & State from the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority places the estimated cost for upstate gas and oil households even higher. 

Lewis also notes that the memo emphasizes affordability concerns:

“If fully implemented with regulations to meet the 2030 targets, CLCPA’s original design – differing accounting standards from the internationally-accepted approach and inflexible near-term targets – would combine to yield high costs to New York households and businesses,” the memo reads. “Addressing this cost escalation is essential to deliver a policy that supports affordability and economic competitiveness and is necessary to ensure continued progress on decarbonization policy.”

She explains the ramifications and hints that there will be changes in the law:

“If fully implemented with regulations to meet the 2030 targets, CLCPA’s original design – differing accounting standards from the internationally-accepted approach and inflexible near-term targets – would combine to yield high costs to New York households and businesses,” the memo reads. “Addressing this cost escalation is essential to deliver a policy that supports affordability and economic competitiveness and is necessary to ensure continued progress on decarbonization policy.”

I was particularly interested in the cost impacts described.

Absent changes, by 2031, the impact of CLCPA on the price of gasoline could reach or exceed $2.23/gallon on top of current prices at that time; the cost for an MMBtu of natural gas $16.96; and comparable increases to other fuels. Upstate oil and natural gas households would see costs in excess of $4,000 a year and New York City natural gas households could anticipate annual gross costs of $2,300. Only a portion of these costs could be offset by current policy design.

The assumptions are not available.  However, the memo states “The estimated allowance price would begin in the neighborhood of $120/ton and rise to $179.80/ton by 2031 in real terms.”  I believe that the analysis assumes that NYCI is implemented such that the modeling forces compliance with the 2030 emission reduction target by not putting limits on the cost of allowances. (As an aside, that presumption assumes that high allowance prices will force emission reductions which is a stretch and topic for another post.)

The memo concludes

Current CLCPA targets escalate costs for New Yorkers as a result of a combination of factors. Primarily, the greenhouse gas accounting approach incorporated in statute and regulation, in combination with current emission reduction targets, mean that current law attributes higher emissions to New York than other leading jurisdictions do for the same activity, as well as higher emissions than under accepted science. This includes emissions from out-of-state fossil fuel production, which is not incorporated in jurisdictional inventories by the IPCC; attributing to bioenergy its combustion emissions and thus ignoring the treatment of the short carbon cycle by scientists and the IPCC; and the use of Global Warming Potential 20 (GWP-20), which the IPCC states is not standard practice in the scientific community and doesn’t comport with the Paris Agreement Rulebook. In addition, the targets as adopted in 2019 could not have foreseen the substantial reversal in the federal policy landscape, the disruptive and lingering impacts of COVID-19 and the subsequent supply chain crisis, the return of an inflationary economy, and the influence of geopolitical events on energy costs generally.

All this is fodder for arguments that Hochul will apparently use to claim that the Climate Act must be modified because of the expected costs.

NYSERDA Cost Underestimates

As high as these numbers are, I believe that the admitted costs in the memo are underestimated.  The State Energy Plan December 2025 Energy Affordability Data Annex spreadsheet (Annex Spreadsheet)  and the Energy Affordability Impacts Analysis (Impact Analysis) document provide the supporting documentation for the Fact Sheet. Using that data I compared costs for an Upstate New York moderate income household that uses natural gas for heat for replacement with conventional equipment and electrification equipment consistent with Climate Act goals.  The difference in monthly energy costs and levelized equipment costs necessary to comply with the Climate Act would be $594 a month greater as shown in Table 1. Details of the table contents are available here.  I believe that the cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment.  Row 10 shows this difference.  It lists the $594 increase in costs necessary for Climate Act compliance.  On an annual basis this is about $7,200.

Table 1: Upstate New York Moderate Income Household That Uses Natural Gas for Heat Projected Monthly Costs and Costs Necessary to Comply with the Climate Act

The articles and memo cost estimates are inconsistent with my evaluated cost of $7,200 per household.  Budget Director Davidson said that “the estimated average cost to New Yorkers of the energy transition under current rules comes to roughly $3,000.”  Lewis says that Gov. Kathy Hochul suggested that “the cost of fully complying to the state’s climate law could cost average New Yorkers up to $3,500 each.”  The memo states “Upstate oil and natural gas households would see costs in excess of $4,000 a year and New York City natural gas households could anticipate annual gross costs of $2,300.”  My costs are by household and the other numbers may be by person or household so that is a confounding factor.

A Perplexity AI search of the “entire Energy Affordability Impacts Analysis section of the adopted 2025 Energy Plan confirms zero mentions of cap-and-invest, carbon pricing, allowance costs, or the Clean Air Initiative anywhere in the affordability chapter.”  This means that my estimate of Climate Act costs do not include the cap-and-invest costs described in the NYSERDA memo.  For the Upstate natural gas household in the NYSERDA State Energy Plan analysis that included the costs of equipment necessary for Climate Act compliance the costs would be $11,200 a year.

Discussion

NYSERDA has never been upfront about Climate Act costs.  The NYSERDA CLCPA costs estimates use a “no action” baseline that excludes programs in place before the CLCPA was enacted but are necessary to achieve the CLCPA mandates.  That means that their analyses underestimate the costs of compliance even more than described here.  I described this misleading approach used in the State Energy Plan here and here.

Lewis described the initial response from the ideologues who unequivocally support Climate Act implementation:

Washington’s new comments also drew immediate condemnation from climate activists, who have criticized Hochul for delays in releasing key climate regulations and her willingness to expand natural gas use. Liz Moran, New York policy advocate for Earthjustice, said targeting the climate law isn’t the way to address the real utility squeeze residents are feeling. “The main driver of those increases is the cost of gas and gas pipes – not our climate law,” she said in a statement. “Failing to address gas as the problem is the actual ‘own goal.’ With the federal government decimating science-based climate protections every day, now is not the time for New York to do the same to our nation-leading climate law.”

With regards to the memo Lewis noted an even more unhinged response:

Environmental advocates immediately blasted the memo. Justin Balik, Evergreen Action’s vice president for states, said rather than running away from clean energy, Hochul should expand initiatives and programs she has already deployed, and seek opportunities for innovative clean energy solutions. “The answer here is, again, leaning into clean energy and not buying into some of these false claims from the fossil fuel community and the business lobby that somehow renewables are why people’s bills are going up,” Balik said. “And it’s troubling that those assertions are being entertained by the state right now.”

Most troubling to me is this Democratic lawmaker’s response:

“Yes we can address climate change, reduce costs for ratepayers, increase generation and create tens of thousands of good-pay jobs in the process,” state Sen. Pete Harckham, chair of the Senate Environmental Conservation Committee, said in a statement. “What we need is the political courage to do so.”

This is so wrong on so many levels that it beggars the mind.

Conclusion

Richard Ellenbogen summed this up well when he told me: “When you try to execute policies that defy physical law, costs are going to spiral out of control which is what has happened.  He concluded that “The entire CLCPA is fatally flawed, and that’s what you get when you turn energy planning over to ideologues with no knowledge of energy systems or economics.”

I have been advocating for an implementation pause for months.  Clearly the PSC must conduct a hearing to suspend or temporarily modify the Renewable Energy Program in Public Service Law 66-P.

South Fork Wind Malinformation

Christopher Walsh’s latest article in the Easthampton Star, South Fork Wind’s Electricity Generation Proves Reliable repeats claims from the developer that the facility provides reliable energy.  An infographic prepared for the U.S. Department of War’s Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency, defines malinformation as  sabotage because it is based on fact but is used out of context to mislead, harm, or manipulate.  Walsh’s article is based on fact but the information presented is used out of context to mislead readers into believing that the South Fork offshore wind facility provided reliable electric generation to the grid during this winter’s extreme period. 

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes a specific target for 9,000 MW of offshore wind capacity by 2035.   

Ørsted’s South Fork Wind is the only New York operational offshore wind facility.  It has 12 turbines with 132 MW of capacity.  There are two other New York offshore wind facilities under construction but both had work suspended in December when the Trump administration issued a stop-work order suspending the lease. A federal judge issued a temporary injunction in January 2026 allowing construction to resume while the legal case proceeds.

​Empire Wind 1 (810 MW), developed by Equinor, is the first offshore wind project that will deliver power directly into New York City.  The project was approximately 60% complete when work was suspended. Empire Wind aims to deliver first electricity by late 2026 and reach commercial operation by 2027.  Supporting transmission support is proceeding.  As of late 2025, export cable installation was actively underway. Equinor reported that trenching, cable-laying, and cable pulling were ongoing on the outer continental shelf, and the export cable was brought onshore in 2025. The onshore substation at SBMT was under construction with transformer delivery completed in early 2025. An offshore substation was scheduled for installation in early 2026.

Sunrise Wind (924 MW), developed by Ørsted, also suspended work in December but work was cleared to resume in early February.  Approximately 44 of 84 monopile foundations were installed, and the HVDC offshore substation arrived from Norway and was installed in September 2025. The project is expected to be completed and operational in 2027. It is the first U.S. offshore wind project to use High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission, which reduces the number of cables needed and improves efficiency.  As of December 2025, onshore transmission work — including the converter station and duct bank — was over 90% complete. Offshore, the export cable was being tunneled through the surf zone (at 11–60 ft deep), with nearshore installation to follow.

The prices for offshore wind are significantly higher than land-based renewables.  Empire Wind 1 and Sunrise Wind contracts were repriced by the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSEDA) in early 2024 to prevent cancellation.  Their combined weighted average price is $150.15/MWh.  The 2024 NYSERDA Tier 1 solicitation average strike price was $94.73 for 23 projects totaling ~3.5GW.  That makes the offshore wind costs 59% higher.

Clearly, the Climate Act mandate for 9,000 MW of offshore wind is in jeopardy.  The question is whether that is a bad thing or not.  Walsh’s article argues that it is a bad thing.

“Reliable” South Fork Wind

Christopher Walsh’s article in the Easthampton Star, South Fork Wind’s Electricity Generation Proves Reliable is quoted below with my annotations.  

As the Trump administration pledges to appeal all five court rulings that sided with offshore wind farms under construction on the Eastern Seaboard, and Canadian officials call on the industry to shun the United States in favor of the ocean off its shores, developers of South Fork Wind, the nation’s first commercial-scale offshore wind farm, are pointing to its reliable generation of electricity in its second year of operation and during this winter’s extreme cold.

Renewable advocates focus on energy production, but power systems are built around reliability during peak demand. If you look at the grid through the lens of accredited capacity, that is, capacity that can be relied upon during peak demand – instead of average energy, the resource allocations for different technologies look radically different.  This is the energy vs. power capacity distinction that Walsh ignored.

The 12-turbine, 132-megawatt farm, electricity from which makes landfall in Wainscott, achieved a 46.3-percent capacity factor in 2025. “Capacity factor” refers to real-world performance, or the ratio of energy generated versus the maximum theoretical output of an installation running at its full rated capacity around the clock. For offshore wind, typical values are between 20 and 40 percent, reflecting intermittent wind speeds, maintenance downtime, and site efficiency.

In January of this year, South Fork Wind delivered a 52-percent capacity factor, comparable to New York State’s most efficient gas plants. Output at offshore wind farms in the Northeast — South Fork Wind, the smaller Block Island Wind, and Vineyard Wind 1, which is still under construction — is typically at its strongest during winter months, when energy supplies on Long Island are often constrained.

I take exception to the claim that the 52% capacity factor is comparable to gas plants.  If a gas plant was only limited by maintenance downtime  it can easily achieve an 85-percent annual capacity factor but more importantly they can be dispatched by the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) as necessary to match loads including peak load conditions.

The NYISO January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report includes a graph of net statewide wind and solar performance total monthly production and capacity factors (Figure 1).  These data show that the January 2026 monthly capacity factors for all New York State wind facilities was 38%, Behind the Meter (BTM) rooftop solar was 3% and  the Front of the Meter (FTM) utility-scale solar was 6%.  Offshore wind facilities are expected to perform better than onshore wind facilities and this is clearly shown by the South Fork Wind performance.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Monthly Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

The article goes on:

Over the course of 2025, South Fork Wind generated electricity on 99 percent of all days and across 90 percent of all hours, according to its developers, the Danish energy company Orsted and the German company Skyborn Renewables. The developers assert that the wind farm generates electricity sufficient to power 70,000 average-size residences.

These claims have the reliability challenge exactly backwards.  South Fork Wind did not generate electricity on 1 percent of all days or at least 3 whole days and across 10 percent or 876 of all hours.  The problem is that peak loads are commonly associated with high-pressure systems that suppress wind generation.  As a result South Fork Wind was likely unavailable when needed most.

This effect was seen during the January 24 to January 27, 2026 winter storm.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather that caused a peak in the electric load.  Table 1 lists daily extrapolated statewide capacity factors from Figure 2.  Consider January 31 when the statewide capacity factors were BTM solar 2%, FTM solar 9%, and wind 12%.  The total daily renewable energy capacity factor was 10% and only provided 2% of the system’s daily load.  Data from individual facilities are not available but the hourly statewide data indicate that wind capacity was less than 10% for 13 hours including the morning and evening peak loads.

Table 1: Renewable Resource Capacity Factors

Figure 2: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Wind Farm Status

The remainder of the article goes on:

Earlier this month, a federal judge handed the Trump administration a fifth consecutive loss in court challenges to its December 2025 order pausing construction of five wind farms along the East Coast. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction sought by Sunrise Wind L.L.C., another Orsted project, regarding the suspension order issued by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. The move allows the construction of Sunrise Wind in federal waters about 30 miles east of Montauk Point to resume immediately while the underlying lawsuit challenging the administration’s order progresses.

The 924-megawatt wind farm’s export cable is to make landfall at Smith Point County Park in Shirley and is to generate electricity sufficient to power nearly 600,000 residences.

The decision follows successful challenges to the administration’s order by the developers of Empire Wind 1, a 54-turbine, 810-megawatt project being built by the Norwegian company Equinor and which is to send electricity to New York City; Revolution Wind, a joint venture between Orsted and Skyborn that is to send electricity sufficient to power 350,000 residences in Connecticut and Rhode Island; Vineyard Wind 1, jointly developed by Avangrid Renewables and Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, which is nearly complete and has already sent electricity to Massachusetts, and Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind, under development by Dominion Energy.

An Orsted official delivered the statistics on the South Fork Wind farm at the advocacy organization Oceantic Network’s annual International Partnering Forum in Manhattan. It was there that Tim Houston, the premier of Nova Scotia, made a pitch to business executives to invest in offshore wind projects off his province rather than in the United States, where the federal government has repeatedly attempted to kill the nascent offshore wind industry while promoting fossil fuel-derived energy, which scientists say is causing dangerous and accelerating warming of the atmosphere.

“We are a predictable and reliable regulatory jurisdiction,” David MacGregor, associate deputy minister of the Nova Scotia Department of Energy, said at the conference, as quoted in The New Bedford Light, a Massachusetts digital news outlet.

Perhaps demonstrating that the United States under the Trump administration is equally predictable, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum told Bloomberg News that the administration will appeal the five court rulings that thwarted its effort to halt construction of the five offshore wind farms. The administration had cited vague national security concerns, and its December order pausing the wind farms’ construction prompted Gov. Kathy Hochul and the governors of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts to demand that the federal government rescind the order, and prompted the wind farms’ developers to sue the government.

Construction has since resumed on all five wind farms.

In my opinion, the rest of the article is a marketing plea by an offshore wind advocate. I don’t want to waste my time responding.

Discussion

If the New York electric system were to rely primarily on wind, solar, and energy storage then this extended period of light winds, low solar availability, and snow-covered solar panels simply cannot provide the power when needed the most.  State agencies responsible for electric system reliability agree that a new dispatchable, emissions free resource is needed for these periods but admit that there isn’t any such resource available today.  Given that there is no such technology available, proceeding under the assumption that one will magically appear is an enormous risk for reliability. 

New York currently has an energy affordability crisis because as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.  Climate Act costs are already between 8.5 and 13.7% of monthly electric bills. The combined weighted average price revised contracts for the offshore wind projects under construction is $150.15/MWh.  NYISO reports that the average New York wholesale electric price in 2025 was about 74.40 dollars per MWh, up from 41.81 dollars per MWh in 2024.  Those costs do not include the price of dedicated transmission lines to get the energy to where it is needed.  Adding offshore wind at costs double the current cost of electricity will only exacerbate the energy crisis.

Conclusion

Claiming that South Fork Wind is a reliable source of electricity is based on fact but is used out of context to manipulate readers into believing that offshore wind is a viable generating resource for New York’s future.  Offshore wind is the most expensive source of electricity. Continued funding for a resource that cannot provide energy when needed most is a poor investment.

Reasons to Hold a PSL 66-P Hearing – Transmission Needs

On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission (PSC) issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.  This post describes issues related to transmission planning that I think impede the Public Service law 66-P provision for safe and adequate service.  I will submit comments arguing  that these findings obligate the PSC to hold a public hearing to determine if these transmission issues impede safe and adequate service.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are reliability risk limits for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are imprecise criteria for acceptable affordability bounds or reliability limits.

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates regardless of affordability or reliability constraints because it is the law.  However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations but includes bounds.  PSL 66-P (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. 

Two petitions have been filed calling for such a hearing.  On 8/12/25 the Independent Intervenors filing argued that there were affordability and reliability issues and that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded.  The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filing on 1/6/26 made a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.  On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition which are due on 3/30/26.

Onshore Transmission Requirements

A  grid relying on wind and solar cannot be implemented without significant transmission upgrades.  The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) has noted that New York’s Climate Act renewable energy projects depend heavily on transmission because “most new renewable capacity is being built where the wind, sun, and land are available, not where the loads are, and the existing grid cannot move that energy to the major demand centers without large curtailments and reliability problems.” 

NYISO noted that dependence on a few critical transmission projects has risks. The 2024 RNA Report notes that the base case assumes timely completion of Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) and Clean Path NY (CPNY) by 2027-2028.  The status of these projects could impede safe and adequate service.

CHPE is in late-stage construction and the developer is still targeting an in-service date of May 2026.  CHPE is a 1,250 MW HVDC line delivering clean hydropower into Astoria, New York City.  The contracted delivery is on the order of 10.4 TWh per year, corresponding to a high assumed capacity factor (around 95%) and 1,250 MW of firm capacity sales.  Hydro‑Québec has stated that deliveries will be split roughly half in winter and half in summer (10.4 TWh total, 5.2 TWh per season), with an incentive to use the full line capability.  ​However, the Hydro‑Québec bid “includes summer‑only unforced delivery rights,” with “no specific delivery obligations during the winter peak.”  NYISO’s Short‑Term Reliability Process Report states that while CHPE is expected to contribute to reliability in the summer, “the facility is not expected to provide any capacity in the winter.”  The future of energy availability on this transmission line is foreshadowed by the New England Clean Energy Connect (NECEC) HVDC line that had been energized only about a week when the January 23-27 winter storm hit. Power flows from Québec to New England from this line and others largely collapsed during the cold snap.

At least it will be operating in the summer.  The Clean Path New York project has been terminated.  It was initially selected and approved as part of the Tier 4 program in Case 15‑E‑0302 (Order Approving Contracts for the Purchase and Sale of Tier 4 Renewable Energy Credits, issued April 14, 2022. The associated 178‑mile HVDC transmission facility from Delhi to Queens was advanced in Case 22‑T‑0558, Application of NYPA and Clean Path New York LLC for a Certificate of Environmental Compatibility and Public Need.  NYSERDA and the Clean Path NY developers (NYPA plus the Forward Power JV of energyRe and Invenergy) “mutually agreed to terminate” the Tier 4 REC Purchase and Sale Agreement in late November 2024.  The termination reflected cost escalation after the original 2021 award; developers sought higher subsidies, but the state declined, leading to cancellation of the underpinning contract for the 175‑mile, ~1,300 MW HVDC line and associated renewables.  NYPA later sought Priority Transmission Project (PTP) designation for the ‘Clean Path Transmission Project’ in Case 20‑E‑0197; but the Commission denied that petition in its Order Denying Petition (issued August 14, 2025).  The PSC denied NYPA’s petition because the project did not meet criteria for PTP designation, in part because NYISO studies showed relatively low projected utilization compared with CHPE and concern about ratepayer cost recovery for a line whose major flows might not materialize for decades.

The NYISO 2025 Power Trends report transmission section states that without major transmission (CHPE, CPNY) project completion that NYC reliability margins will become deficient which could impede safe and adequate electric service.  The PSC must address in a heating whether the transmission line status will impede the ability to provide safe and adequate service.

Offshore Transmission Requirements

The Climate Act includes a requirement for 9,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035.  According to a Perplexity AI query response: “New York’s offshore wind transmission situation is defined by two contrasting realities: the projects already under construction are advancing their dedicated transmission lines despite federal disruptions, while the broader coordinated transmission planning effort for future projects has been shelved due to the Trump administration’s hostility toward offshore wind.”

There are two transmission lines under construction.

Empire Wind 1 (810 MW), developed by Equinor, is the first offshore wind project that will deliver power directly into New York City.  As of late 2025, export cable installation was actively underway. Equinor reported that trenching, cable-laying, and cable pulling were ongoing on the outer continental shelf, and the export cable was brought onshore in 2025. The onshore substation at SBMT was under construction with transformer delivery completed in early 2025. An offshore substation was scheduled for installation in early 2026. The project was approximately 60% complete as of late December 2025 when the Trump administration issued a stop-work order suspending the lease. A federal judge issued a temporary injunction in January 2026 allowing construction to resume while the legal case proceeds. Empire Wind aims to deliver first electricity by late 2026 and reach commercial operation by 2027.

Sunrise Wind (924 MW), developed by Ørsted, is the first U.S. offshore wind project to use High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission, which reduces the number of cables needed and improves efficiency.  As of December 2025, onshore transmission work — including the converter station and duct bank — was over 90% complete. Offshore, the export cable was being tunneled through the surf zone (at 11–60 ft deep), with nearshore installation to follow. Approximately 44 of 84 monopile foundations were installed, and the HVDC offshore substation arrived from Norway and was installed in September 2025. Like Empire Wind, Sunrise Wind’s lease was suspended by the Interior Department on December 22, 2025. A federal judge cleared the project to resume construction in early February 2026. The project is expected to be completed and operational in 2027.

Additional transmission would be needed to service the remaining 9,000 MW of mandated offshore wind.  This was supposed to be provided by the NYC Public Policy Transmission Need (PPTN) program. 

In June 2023, the PSC identified a Public Policy Requirement for new transmission facilities to deliver at least 4,770 MW — and up to 8 GW — of offshore wind energy into New York City by 2033. The NYISO launched a solicitation in April 2024 and received 28 proposals from four developers, with estimated costs ranging from $7.9 billion to $23.9 billion.

On July 17, 2025, the PSC voted to withdraw the PPTN determination, effectively cancelling the process. The Commission stated it could not responsibly commit ratepayers to billions in transmission costs when the federal government had halted offshore wind permitting and leasing, making it impossible to predict when new generation projects would move forward. PSC Chair Rory Christian emphasized that this was about timing and ratepayer protection, not abandoning offshore wind, stating “it is a matter of when, and not whether, offshore wind generation projects will move forward”.

The PSC must address in a heating whether these decisions about offshore wind will impede the ability to provide safe and adequate service.

Conclusion

The NYISO 2025 Power Trends conclusion states that there is a risk that cumulative factors (retirements, electrification, delays) will create reliability metric violations.  It is clear from the transmission status described here that there will be a lack of sufficient transmission to get the wind and solar energy from where it is collected to where it is needed to achieve the Climate Act schedule.  This will create reliability metric violations that are incompatible with safe and adequate electric service. In my comments on the petition request, I will argue that the PSC should hold a PSL 66-P hearing to determine whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the Renewable Energy Program is therefore appropriate.

January 23-27 Winter Storm NY Grid Impacts Prove DEFR is Necessary

My last post took an  initial look at the impact of the January 23-27 winter storm on wind and solar energy production.  This post shows that this type of weather event shows  dispatchable  emissions free  resources (DEFR) are necessary to achieve net-zero in New York.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.. 

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

I relied on two sources of New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data for this analysis.  New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  The second source of data is the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report prepared by the NYISO Operating Committee.  I looked at data from January 22-31, 2026 to bound conditions before the storm and after.  Note that the cold weather went into February but the Metrics Report data for February are not available yet.

NYISO Daily Energy Production

As noted in my previous post, the dashboard real-time fuel mix data includes links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State that I used to calculate daily energy use (MWh).  I also used the NYISO  January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  Figure 1 from that document breaks out the wind, utility-scale solar, also known as Front of the Meter (FTM) solar, and the rooftop top solar, also known as Behind the Meter (BTM) solar total daily production and capacity factors.  Multiplying the capacity factor by the current capacity determines the daily energy production.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Table 1 combines data from the two NYISO sources to list daily energy production.  The generator types include real-time fuel mix data base “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil. Two renewables are shown. “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind from the NYISO real-time fuel mix data base.  That source is also used for “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood.  However,  in this table, I subtracted the FTM solar data from the January Performance Metric Report.  Both the BTM solar and FTM solar are derived from that report.  As an aside, I contacted NYISO to get the actual data for these parameters but did not get a response so I extractoplated values from Figure 1.

Table 1: Daily NYISO Energy Production (MWh) January 22 to January 31, 2026

Table 2 consists of three smaller tables.  On the left,  capacity factors obtained from Figure 1 are listed for each day of the episode.  At the top, resource capacity (MW) from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report are listed for solar and wind resources.  The main body of the table lists the calculated renewable daily energy (MWh) for each parameter and the renewable percentage of the total system energy that I calculated using the real-time fuel mix data.  The most notable finding in this table is the observation that there were eight consecutive days when the total wind and solar production was 6% or less than maximum possible energy production.

Table 2: Capacity Factors Derived from Figure 5, Resource Capacity (MW) from Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report, and Calculated Renewable Daily Energy (MWh)

Note the differences in wind production in these tables.  Table 1 uses the estimated real-time fuel mix data and Table 2 the Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  The differences are due to my real-time averaging assumptions and crude interpolation of values from Figure 1.  While these energy production values are not precise, using the correct values will not change the conclusions.

Projections

These results can be used to evaluate projections made for the generating resources necessary to meet the 2040 100% zero emissions electric generation mandate. Table 3 lists the projected 2040 capacity (MW) for four scenarios.  I have included one from the NYISO, the primary projection from the Scoping Plan, and two “Net Zero” scenarios from the draft Energy Plan last summer.  These scenarios represent four ways to achieve the 2040 mandate.

Table 3: Projected Electric Resource Capacity in 2040.

I estimated the daily energy production for the projected generating resources in Table 3. Daily production equals the capacity in MW times the capacity factor times 24 hours in the day. Capacity factors were derived from the real-time fuel mix or taken from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report data in Table 2.  I estimated the 2040 daily energy production for each scenario by multiplying those factors by the Table 3 resource capacities.

Table 4 is an example of the daily production for January 22, 2026.  Note that consistent with the zero-emissions mandate there are no fossil fuel (Gas and Fuel Oil) emissions.  Consistent with the NYISO projection for the winter peak no imported hydro generation is included.  I calculated the battery storage energy production by multiplying the projected capacity times four hours (the current default discharge time).  This assumption is included every day but note that if the batteries need to be charged using renewables there are instances where there would not be insufficient energy to recharge the batteries.  This is a good example of the nuances that a NYISO detailed analysis can include.

Table 4: Daily Production (MWh) for January 22, 2026

The goal was to compare the observed daily observed energy load in Table 1 against the projected energy projection in Table 4 to see if the resources provided enough energy to cover the observed generation load from the real-time fuel mix data during the conditions of the January 2026 storm.  I did not have ready access to imports and exports so could not calculate the total system load.  The results are presented in the following three tables.  Each table lists the estimated total daily production minus the observed daily energy load for each scenario.  If there is a deficit, then the results are highlighted in red.  That means there would be a resource availability crisis which would require imports beyond what occurred on those days and load shedding to prevent a blackout.  

Table 5 lists daily projected energy production minus the observed load on each day during this episode.  Because there are no existing dispatchable emissions free resources (DEFR) the methodology assumes no production from those resources.  There are five days when none of the projected resource scenarios prevent a deficit.

Table 5: Projected Daily Energy Production Minus Current Energy Load (MWh) – Without DEFR Capacity

Table 6 lists daily projected energy production minus the estimated 2040 load on each day during this episode. The 2025 Load & Capacity Data Report aka Gold Book states that:

The New York electric system is projected to become a winter peaking system in future decades due to electrification, primarily from space heating and EVs. The timing of a crossover to a dual-peaking or winter peaking system is uncertain, and mainly influenced by the timing and composition of heating electrification.

 I estimated the 2040 future load by prorating the observed load by the 2025-26 baseline winter coincident peak demand forecast and the 2040-41 forecast loads using Table I-1d: Summary of NYCA Baseline Winter Coincident Peak Demand Forecasts in the Gold Book.  Because there are no existing dispatchable emissions free resources (DEFR) the methodology assumes no production from those resources.  Not surprisingly, after the storm hit on January 24 none of the projected resource scenarios prevent a deficit of energy production without DEFR resources..

Table 6: Projected Daily Energy Production Minus 2040 Projected Energy Load (MWh) – Without DEFR Capacity

This preliminary analysis shows that DEFR is necessary. Table 7 lists daily projected energy production with the projected DEFR capacity operating minus the estimated 2040 load on each day during this episode. For the results shown, I assumed the capacity factor was 85%.  Because no DEFR technology has been identified the capacity factor value is arbitrary.  I found that if the capacity factor was equal or greater than 85% all the emissions-free mandate scenarios except “Net Zero B” shows a surplus of energy production.  Net Zero B never shows a surplus even with a 100% capacity factor.

Table 7: Projected Capacity Daily Energy Totals (MWh) – Projected 2040 Loads with DEFR Capacity at 85%

Dark Doldrum and DEFR

The most notable finding in Table 2 is the observation that there were eight consecutive days when the total New York wind and solar production was 6% or less than maximum possible energy production.  This is a perfect example of what the Germans call “Dunkelflaute”.  That term refers to dark doldrums period when solar is reduced due to the length of day or clouds and there are light winds.  This event was exacerbated by the snowstorm that covered solar panels with enough snow to eliminate production (Figure 1).  Note that most rooftop solar in New York City is essentially flat so snow cover is a significant issue.  In this case the episode was exacerbated by the snow depth, a crust of ice from a glaze of freezing rain that occurred at the end of the storm ,and the subsequent period of prolonged sub-freezing weather. Perhaps we should amend the worst weather label to “snowy dark doldrums”.

These conditions are the fundamental driver of the need for DEFR.  It is disappointing that the clean energy advocates have continued to argue that the size of the DEFR gap has been overstated even after all the agencies responsible for electric system reliability argue otherwise.  These results should put those arguments to rest.

Discussion

Isaac Orr and Mitch Rolling explain that there is another planning issue besides DEFR:

Most public discussions about renewables focus on energy production, but power systems are built around reliability during peak demand. Once you look at the grid through the lens of accredited capacity, that is, capacity that can be relied upon during peak demand—instead of annual energy, the resource allocations for different technologies look radically different.  This is the energy vs. capacity distinction that most renewable resource debates miss.

The large projected wind and solar capacities do no good when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow.  This period exemplifies a period where that situation is evident even in this preliminary assessment.  I have no doubt that NYISO staff will eventually evaluate these data in a more refined analysis because of its importance to planning policy.  Their results will only differ in degree but I believe will conclusively show that DEFR is necessary.  They may also show when DEFR is necessary as more renewables come online and existing dispatchable resources are shut down.

Conclusion

On January 31, 2026, the total renewable energy production was 2% of the potential amount available because of the weather conditions and there were at least eight consecutive days when the production was less than 6%.  These are the conditions that require DEFR.  Without that resource, intermittent, diffuse, and correlated electric generating resources are not viable.

January 23-27 Winter Storm NY Grid Impacts

The recent winter storm stressed electric systems across the country. It also offers electric resource planners an opportunity to examine the impacts of future increased use of renewable energy during high-load conditions.  This article takes an initial look at the potential impact of such a weather event on the existing New York renewable resources.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.. 

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

This is a good case study for a New York extreme event that must be addressed by electric system planners.  Although the data are for New York, this is a universal problem.  It is only a matter of degree.

I relied on two sources of New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data for this analysis.  New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  The second source of data is the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report prepared by the NYISO Operating Committee.  I looked at data from January 22-31, 2026 to bound conditions before the storm and after.  Note that the cold weather went into February but the Metrics Report data for February are not available yet.

NYISO Real-Time Fuel Mix

The dashboard real-time fuel mix data includes links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State.  I processed that data to calculate hourly averages.  The generator types include “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind; “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil.

Figure 1 graphs all the fuel mix hourly data and Table 1 summarizes the data. The relative average fuel mix energy provided over these ten days was nuclear 18%, hydro 14%, and fossil fuels 61%.  New York’s efforts to transition to renewables yielded only 7% of the total.  In addition, the wind capacity ranged from 6% of the possible production to 96%, but 25% of the time the production was less than a quarter of possible production.

Figure 1: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix January 22 to January 31, 2026

Table 1: Summary of Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Data Mix January 22 to January 31, 2026

These data do not show the contribution of wind and solar well.  “Other Renewables” includes solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood. The methane, refuse and wood facilities show up as the relatively constant base in Figure 3.  Making the assumption that the 63 MW of energy storage is too small to show up on this graph, that means that the utility-scale “front-of-the-meter” solar shows up as the daily peaks on the first three days.  The snow arrived in New York on the night of 24 January and continued through the next day.  Note that utility solar was essentially zero on the 25th and did not return to the level of the 22nd until the 31st.

Figure 3: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix Other Renewables and Wind January 22 to January 31, 2026

Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

I used the January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report for this analysis.  There is a lot of information in these reports that is relative to the prospects for a successful Climate Act transition.  So much that I am going to defer that discussion for a later post.  For this post I am only going to highlight a couple of results presented in the report.

The report includes a graph of net wind and solar performance total monthly production and capacity factors (Figure 4).  On average the higher solar output in the summer balances out the lower wind resources in the summer.  Winter total renewable resources are lower, and wind does somewhat offset the low solar output. 

Figure 4: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Monthly Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Figure 5 is most important for this analysis because it breaks out the wind, utility-scale solar, also known as Front of the Meter (FTM) solar, and the rooftop top solar, also known as Behind the Meter (BTM) solar total daily production and capacity factors.  Note that these data support the assumption that the daily peaks represent utility-scale production output in Figure 3.  These data show that FTM solar has a higher output than the BTM solar.  There is no question that the January snowstorm severely impacted solar output for days. 

Figure 5: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Table 2 consists of three smaller tables.  On the left,  capacity factors derived from Figure 5 are listed for each day of the episode.  At the top, resource capacity (MW) from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report are listed for solar and wind resources.  The main body of the table lists the calculated renewable daily energy (MWh) for each parameter and the renewable percentage of the total system energy that I calculated using the real-time fuel mix data. 

Table 2: Capacity Factors Derived from Figure 5, Resource Capacity (MW) from Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report, and Calculated Renewable Daily Energy (MWh)

The total renewable output in Table 2 is an important finding.  On average, wind resources counterbalance low winter solar resource availability.  However, during dark doldrums when the wind fails renewable resources plummet.  This storm also shows that the critical renewable resource period is best described as snowy dark doldrums.

Discussion

I contacted NYISO to get the actual data for these parameters but did not get a response.  I have no doubt that NYISO staff will eventually evaluate these data in a similar fashion because of its importance to planning policy.  Their results will only differ in degree but will conclusively show that DEFR is necessary.  They may also show when DEFR is necessary as more renewables come on line and existing dispatchable resources are shut down.

The NYISIO “Gold Book” has noted that New York will become a winter peaking system depending upon the timing and composition of heating electrification.  This will exacerbate the correlation problem between peak loads and dark doldrum low renewable resource availability.  There has not been a similar snowstorm since the deployment of significant amounts of BTM solar in New York City so this is the first unsurprising confirmation that snow can severely impact solar production when the solar panels are installed on flat roofs.

Figure 6: View of BTM Solar in New York City

Conclusion

On January 31, 2026 the total renewable energy production was 2% of the potential amount available.  That was because of the weather conditions.  No amount of additional capacity is going to be able to substantively improve that percentage.  Intermittent, diffuse, and correlated electric generating resources are incompatible with electric system reliability when needed most.

On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.  Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  These results are another indication that it is time to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

NYISO Climate Act Concerns

I was recently asked to give a briefing about Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) issues. While preparing my presentation I used Perplexity AI to generate a review of the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) concerns with the Climate Act.  This article provides background documentation based on the response to that query.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim targets is a 2030 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and a 2040 zero emissions requirement that are of particular concern to the NYISO.

I prepared a power point presentation for the briefing with supporting documentation that discussed Climate Act issues that need to be addressed.  The New York’s Legislative annual session revolves around  enacting the state’s April 1 budget.  The budget is an executive‑budget model which means that the Governor can stick in policy legislation like the Climate Act.  In my last post I described issues that the legislature should address this session.  This article describes concerns that the NYISO has with the Climate Act that supports my belief that the Public Service Commission (PSC) should conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act because there are observed threats to reliability that threaten safe and adequate service.

Perplexity Summary

I used Perplexity AI to generate the following summaries of NYISO concerns.

Tightening reliability margins and resource adequacy

NYISO’s long‑term reliability and resource adequacy studies show that reserve margins are thinning as fossil units retire faster than new, firm replacement capacity and transmission arrive.

They point to:

  • A net loss of dispatchable capacity since the CLCPA was passed: several gigawatts of fossil capacity have retired while additions are largely intermittent renewables and limited-duration storage.
  • Projections in their Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP) and Reliability Needs Assessments that show:
    • Declining reliability margins in New York City and downstate.
    • Potential statewide shortfalls later in the 2020s/early 2030s if retirements continue at the current pace and clean resources, storage, and transmission are delayed.
  • Concern that the system is increasingly reliant on emergency procedures (demand response, voltage reductions, etc.) to meet resource adequacy criteria on peak days, which is not a sustainable operating strategy.

In short, CLCPA‑driven retirements and environmental constraints (e.g., peaker rule) are moving faster than the build‑out of firm, deliverable alternatives, tightening margins to what NYISO characterizes as “concerning” levels.

Coordination of fossil retirements with new entry

NYISO has repeatedly emphasized that fossil generator retirements must be carefully coordinated with the timing and performance of new resources:

  • They support the CLCPA recommendation to “retire fossil resources gradually and safely,” but warn that mandatory retirement schedules or environmental rules that force large blocks of capacity off the system by fixed dates, without assured replacement, can create reliability violations.
  • In New York City in particular, they highlight that:
    • Peaker rule and other environmental closures remove capacity that is both local and fast‑responding.
    • Replacement capacity must satisfy local transmission security and deliverability constraints, not just nameplate MW.
  • NYISO worries that policy and permitting processes affecting existing plants are often decided without a concrete, tested replacement portfolio in place, leaving them to fill gaps reactively through backstop reliability arrangements.

Their concern is not simply “don’t retire fossil,” but “do not retire fossil faster than the system can absorb given actual, not theoretical, replacements.”

Dependence on a few critical transmission projects

CLCPA strategies assume large amounts of new clean generation, including upstate renewables and Canadian hydro, will be deliverable to downstate load via specific major transmission projects. NYISO’s reliability plans highlight:

  • Heavy reliance on timely completion of projects like Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) and other major bulk upgrades.
  • Findings that, without these projects in service on schedule, New York City’s reliability margins become extremely small or turn deficient for much of the 10‑year planning horizon.
  • Concern that delays or cancellations of such projects (or of offshore wind transmission solutions) leave the state with policy commitments that cannot be supported by the physical grid.

So one core concern is that the CLCPA architecture implicitly assumes a best‑case transmission build‑out path; NYISO’s studies are essentially saying, “If those assumptions slip, reliability breaks.”

Operational challenges from high levels of intermittent renewables

NYISO accepts that the CLCPA implies a massive increase in weather‑dependent resources, but highlights that:

  • High penetrations of wind and solar increase uncertainty in net load forecasts, requiring:
    • More operating reserves.
    • New reserve products (e.g., “uncertainty” or “dynamic” reserves) to cover forecast error and fast ramps.
  • Studies of high‑renewables scenarios show:
    • Substantial increases in required installed reserve margins to maintain the same loss‑of‑load expectation.
    • Need for significant quantities of flexible, fast‑ramping resources, including storage and responsive demand, to manage multi‑hour ramps and multi‑day low‑renewables events.
  • The system will be more exposed to extreme weather—heat waves and cold snaps—at the same time that dispatchable fossil capacity is reduced, increasing the risk that the system crosses a “tipping point” where it cannot serve load during stress events.

In other words, the CLCPA’s heavy reliance on intermittent resources forces a fundamental redesign of operating reserve and capacity constructs; NYISO’s concern is that policy timelines assume this redesign and the necessary resources will be ready and deliverable in time.

Need for “firm, zero‑emissions” and long‑duration solutions (technology gap)

NYISO has started to stress that, to meet CLCPA’s 2040 zero‑emissions grid requirement while staying reliable, New York will need:

  • Significant quantities of “firm, zero‑emission” capacity (e.g., hydrogen‑capable turbines, advanced nuclear, long‑duration storage, carbon capture, or other technologies that can run through multi‑day renewable droughts).
  • Far more total installed capacity by 2040 than today—often characterized as roughly three times current capacity—once electrification (buildings, transport, industry) and higher reserve needs are included.

Their concern is that:

  • The CLCPA and Scoping Plan implicitly assume large volumes of such technologies will be available, cost‑effective, and sited in New York by 2040, but there is no clear, concrete procurement or market framework yet that ensures they appear.
  • Current market designs and state programs are heavily tuned to 20‑year REC‑backed wind and solar, not to capital‑intensive firm resources with different risk profiles.

So NYISO is effectively warning of a technology and market design gap between what CLCPA requires in the 2030s–2040s and what is actually under contract or in queues today.

Documentation for NYISO Issues

The Perplexity AI response to my concerns of NYISO about Climate Act goals also generated a spreadsheet table of specific issues that lists the Issue Area, NYISO Document, Specific NYISO Finding/Concern, CLCPA Statutory Provision, CAC Scoping Plan Assumption/Strategy, Gap/Disconnect, and Talking Point for identified problems.  The following sections describe the NYISO documents that address specific NYISO findings and concerns listed in the spreadsheet.

NYISO has identified issues with resource adequacy associated with declining margins in multiple reports.  The 2025 Power Trends noted that there has been a net loss of 2,041 MW since the Climate Act was enacted (4,315 MW retired, 2,274 MW added).  The Executive Summary in the 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) Report explains that statewide resource margins are declining so fast that by 2034 there will be no surplus power without further development.  The 2025 Q3 Short-Term Assessment of Reliability (STAR) Report identified a New York City (NYC) Zone J reliability need beginning in summer 2027 that requires peaker units that have been scheduled for retirement to be retained.

The timing of fossil retirements vs new entry timing is also an NYISO concern.  The 2025 Power Trends document noted that fossil retirements are outpacing new supply additions since 2021.

The 2024 RNA Report notes that the NYC reliability need in 2033 is driven by faster generator retirements than replacement resource development.  The 2025 Q3 STAR Report noted that the NYC Peaker Rule that forces retirement by 2027-2029 is impossible unless local replacement resources are developed.

NYISO also noted that dependence on a few critical transmission projects has risks. The 2024 RNA Report notes that the base case assumes timely completion of Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) and Clean Path NY (CPNY) by 2027-2028.  The 2025 Power Trends report transmission section states that without major transmission (CHPE, CPNY) project completion that NYC reliability margins will become deficient.  The NYISO submitted comments on the Scoping Plan also noted that there will be a heavy dependence on specific transmission projects that may not get built as scheduled.

NYISO has raised intermittency and operating reserves concerns.  The 2024 RNA Report resource adequacy study explains that a high penetration of intermittent renewables requires new reserve products.  The 2025 Power Trends includes an intermittency discussion that notes that wind/solar variability will increase reserve requirements and ramp capability needs.  The

NYISO Uncertainty Reserve Requirement filing defines FERC approved Uncertainty Reserve Requirement for the forecast error from renewables.

There is a clear need for a new dispatchable emissions free resource (DEFR).  NYISO has addressed this requirement in its reports.  The 2024 RNA Report, scenarios analysis states that meeting 2040 zero-emissions requires “firm zero-emission” resources not yet identified. 

The 2025 Power Trends describes this technology gap explaining that the grid needs three times current capacity by 2040 with electrification and higher reserve margins.  NYISO comments on the Scoping Plan also described the technology gap stating that long-duration storage, hydrogen, advanced nuclear are not yet commercial at scale.

New York electric load is increasing and will increase more as Climate Act electrification programs progress.  NYISO addressed load trends in several reports.  The 2025 Power Trends, load forecast section notes that large loads (data centers  and semiconductors) will add 2,567 MW demand by 2035.  The 2024 RNA Report includes large loads assumptions that predict peak demand growth accelerating due to electrification and economic development.  The 2025 Load & Capacity Data Report aka Gold Book load forecast notes that load forecast uncertainty is higher than historical due to policy-driven electrification driven by the Climate Act.

New York City presents special challenges to the grid and for the Climate Act mandates.  NYISO found in the 2025 Q3 STAR Report, Zone J findings that the Zone J (NYC) summer 2027 reliability need is driven by load growth and retirements.  The 2024 RNA Report discussion of

NYC reliability needs 2033 found that the reliability need requires compensatory MW because there are limited local alternatives.  The 2025 Q2 STAR Report Peaker Rule analysis notes that the DEC Peaker Rule removes capacity exactly when NYC needs an increase.  This means that NYISO must delay the rule’s retirement dates.

The NYISO has also noted that there are market design and investment signals that affect their response to the Climate Act mandates.  The 2025 Power Trends, market design section explains that State procurement (ORECs, Tier 1 RECs) policies reduces market price signals. 

NYISO FERC filings on the capacity market notes that capacity market suppression from state-contracted resources undermines flexibility value. 

The political manipulation of the electric market mandated by the Climate Act creates issues with planning process coordination.  The NYISO comments on the Scoping Plan noted that the

State’s Climate Act Policy planning (NYSERDA Integration Analysis) uses different assumptions than NYISO reliability planning.  The 2024 RNA Report planning assumptions notes the lack of alignment between the Scoping Plan scenarios and NYISO base case reliability studies.

The Climate Act and Department of Environmental Conservation interpretation of it have eliminated the backlog of new fossil generating units. As a result the fossil fleet is aging.  The 2025 Power Trends notes that 11% of 2024 energy production is from generators greater than 50 years old.  The existing fleet analysis in the 2024 RNA Report states that 10,000+ MW (25% of total capacity) has been in operation  greater than 50 years.

There are risks related to the implementation pace required to meet the arbitrary Climate Act targets.  The 2024 RNA Report Executive Summary notes the narrowing margins driven by statewide resource shortfalls and the rapid change pace.  The 2025 Power Trends conclusion states that there is a risk that cumulative factors (retirements, electrification, delays) will create reliability metric violations.

The NYSERDA projections do not incorporate the reliability requirements that the NYISO must address.  The 2024 RNA Report capacity accreditation description notes that the NYSERDA Climate Act analyses focus on energy (MWh) but NYISO projections must ensure resource adequacy (MW capacity available).  The 2025 Power Trends description of reliability margin metrics notes that Intermittent resources have low capacity value and the NYISO must account for reliability contribution

Discussion

Please excuse the structure of this document.  If I had time, I would have combined the two sections into a single referenced description of NYISO concerns.

This article is intended to be a resource documenting NYISO concerns with Climate Act implementation.  It demonstrates that there are real problems that Climate Act apologists ignore..  Per Public Service Law 66-P two petitions have been filed calling for a hearing that stated that NYISO’s concerns are persuasive arguments that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.  On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.  Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  This information will be useful to document the NYISO concerns.

Conclusion

These concerns about electric system reliability and resource adequacy are another indication that it is time to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

February 2026 Climate Act Issues

I was recently asked to give a briefing about Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) issues. The New York’s Legislature works on a two‑year term with annual sessions from January to (roughly) mid‑June, and the centerpiece of each year is enacting the state’s April 1 budget through an executive‑budget model.  This is relevant because the Climate Act was enacted during this process and there are aspects of the law that should be considered this session.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a reduction target of 40% less GHG emissions and a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”   Since the Scoping Plan was finalized in 2022, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.  As part of the implementation, the State updated its Energy Plan in 2024.

Climate Act Issues

My Climate Act issues briefing described the following key issues that need to be addressed:

  • The schedule and affordability impacts of the Climate Act can no longer be ignored
  • DEC needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements
  • PSC must address safety valve provisions
  • Recent news stories suggest that Hochul may propose revising GHG accounting again

Climate Act Implementation Schedule

It is no longer debatable that New York has fallen behind on its Climate Act transition plan 2030 mandates.  There is no question that the 70% renewable electricity by 2030 target will not be met because the percentage of renewable energy (28% of total generation) has stayed the same since 2019.  The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) annual load and capacity data report universally known as the “Gold Book” data over the last six years is shown in Table 1.  Note that the renewable percentage shown in the table is an overestimate because the NYISO references to renewable resources do not necessarily align with the New York State Clean Energy Standard definition. 

Table 1: NYISO Gold Book Annual Total and Renewable Summer Capability  and Generation

There is supposed to be a 40% reduction in economy‑wide GHG emissions by 2030.  I reviewed the 2025 NYS GHG Emission Inventory Report in my article Implications of New York State 2025 GHG Emissions Inventory.  I found that GHG emissions through 2023 are 14% less than the 1990 baseline and emissions have been basically unchanged since 2022. That makes meeting 2030 GHG emission reduction target of a 40% reduction impossible. 

Affordability and Rate Impacts

New York currently has an energy affordability crisis because as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.  My recent status summary of Climate Act affordability referenced an article about the observed rate impacts to date.  Kris Martin published a similar post that included a table ratepayer impacts. Table 2 summarizes recent electric rate cases (Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, O&R, NYSEG, and RG&E with an estimate of the Climate Act proportion.

Table 2: Typical 2024 Residential Electric Costs from What it costs

Department of Public Service (DPS) staff provides estimates of the impact of the Climate Act on electric rates.  The Second Informational Report “includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.”  According to the Summary of Ratepayer Impact for Electric Utilities table, residential impacts of the Climate Act range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 total monthly electric bills. 

In my opinion, those estimates are conservative because there is immense pressure on agency staff to minimize the costs of the Climate Act.  In addition, the costs necessary to implement the Climate Act were ramping up in 2023.  I expect that these costs will continue to climb.  Kris Martin also noted that the DPS estimates for future costs don’t include all the Renewable Energy Credits (REC) and OREC (offshore wind REC) costs that would be required to reach Climate Act targets—or even what they might realistically expect to complete. 

Also note that the State Attorney General Office is on the record that the current implementation schedule has an affordability liability.  Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted correspondence related to the litigation associated with Climate Act implementation that addressed affordability.  The State’s submittal  argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.  The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable: “Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.”

All these analyses have focused on utility rate case costs. The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSEDA) has not been forthcoming about total household costs but did offer a glimpse of those costs in the State Energy Plan as described in my post Energy Affordability Fact Sheet. 

The Fact Sheet summarizes selected results in the Energy Plan Energy Affordability Impacts Analysis.   NYERDA claimed that the use of “new, efficient equipment and electrification can cut energy spending by $100 to $300 every month for many New York households” in the Fact Sheet.  However, these projections do not cover the costs of the equipment to make the reductions.  Table 3 is derived from the NYSERDA supporting documentation and shows the monthly energy costs when equipment costs are included.

Table 3: Total Monthly Energy Costs Including Levelized Equipment Costs for an Upstate New York moderate income household that uses natural gas for heat projected monthly costs and hardware costs

NYSERDA modeled four household profiles ranging from doing nothing from the starting point to a 2031 “high efficient electrification” scenario that upgrades the building shell and electrifies conventional appliances, furnace and automobiles in an Upstate home that uses natural gas in 2025. The improvements in efficiency decreases monthly energy costs for all three journeys but when capital expenditures (CapEx) is considered that changes.  The cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment.  Row 10 shows this difference.  It lists the $594 increase in costs necessary for Climate Act compliance and row 11 lists the percentage increase as 43%.  The shortcomings of this analysis are described in my review of the Fact Sheet. It is even worse than shown here.

NYSERDA’s messaging for these results is that costs are going to go up anyway and that the increase in costs due to the Climate Act are small in comparison.  I think that additional costs will add more households to the already unacceptable number living in energy poverty.

Cap‑and‑Invest and GHG Regulatory Architecture

There are two aspects of the Climate Act mandate to implement an economy-wide cap-and-invest program by January 1, 2024 that must be addressed by the Legislature and Governor Hochul.   I have described the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations in many articles.  Currently DEC has only finalized the Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule.  There have been no suggestions when the two other regulations will be proposed.  The Cap-and-Invest Rule defines affected sources, binding caps, and allowance allocations.  DEC also needs an auction rule that implements the auction that will be used to distribute allowances.

This is problematic.  On 3/31/25 a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 date.  I explained that on 10/24/25 Supreme Court Judge Julian Schreibman’s decision stated that by 2/6/26 shall “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.  On 11/24/25 DEC appealed the decision.  On 1/8/26  the Albany County judge rejected the request for “reargument or reconsideration” but that does end the process.   The State has appealed to the Appellate Division.   This means that the deadline of Feb 6 is suspended until the Appellate Division rules.  Therefore, the State has no risk of being held in contempt and can safely ignore the deadline — which appears to be what is happening.   However, kicking the can down the road ignores the responsibility to reconsider what is obviously a failed prescription for energy policy.

The other NYCI issue is the DEC regulations.  The Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule was finalized December 1, 2025, but is so poorly written that I would be surprised if it gets litigated.  The auction rule regulation should not be an issue.  However, the Cap-and-Invest Rule will be controversial because there are non-trivial problems that have political consequences.  The rule will set the price trajectory for the costs of an allowance, but what price will be chosen.  There will be an increase in prices due to this rule that will have competitiveness impacts on industry.  The provision that 35 to 40% of revenues are supposed to benefit disadvantaged communities needs to address implementation logistics.  Will the funds be dispersed by direct rebates or targeted program spending?  The biggest DEC NYCI issue is the timing.  When will DEC propose these rules?

PSL 66-P Safety Valve

There is another important issue that must be resolved.  Climate Act proponents constantly state that the mandates are required by law no matter what but ignore the other associated law that includes safety valve provisions.  New York Public Service Law § 66-p “renewable energy systems” mandates define which generating sources are “renewable”.  Section 66-p (4) “Establishment of a renewable energy program” states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. 

Unfortunately, the PSC has not yet considered conducting a hearing.  Two petitions have been filed calling for such a hearing.  The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filing on 1/6/26 made a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.  On 8/12/25 the Independent Intervenors filing argued that there were affordability and reliability issues and that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded

On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.

Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  Stay tuned to this space for more information on how readers can force the State to be accountable for the issues described.

GHG Emission Accounting

There is another issue in the news.  In early February the Governor said that she is specifically interested in reconsidering the methodology by which the state tallies its emissions, explaining that New York’s unique 20-year metric puts the state at a disadvantage over other states that use a 100-year methodology to count their emissions. At the time the Climate Act was written it incorporated unique emissions accounting requirements that inflate the emission totals by increasing the effect of methane pollution. In my opinion, this irrational obsession with methane is misguided because, the higher impacts of methane are a laboratory artifact.  In the atmosphere, methane has less of an effect than CO2 on global warming.

In the 2023 Budget Season changing the accounting methodology was proposed because it would reduce the total GHG emissions and when NYCI kicks in that will translate to lower costs to New Yorkers.  In addition, using a unique methodology eliminates the possibility that the New York cap and invest program can be integrated into other jurisdictions’ programs.  In theory that would increase market efficiency and reduce costs. 

I applaud this pragmatic modification but shudder to think how climate advocates who got us into this mess will react.  Moreover, this is a peripheral issue compared to the others described.

Discussion

I have previously noted that decisions about the future of the Climate Act must be addressed.  The ideologues who fervently supported the promulgation of the Climate Act also zealously reject the possibility that changes are needed.  However, reality can no longer be ignored.  David Wojick recently described his report “Severe Climate Act impacts threaten New York State”.  His analysis addresses these issues and provides additional support explaining why action is needed.

Conclusion

There are significant Climate Act issues that can no longer be ignored.  Most targets are behind schedule, and the increased costs of the Climate Act will exacerbate the existing energy affordability crisis.  DEC needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements and will have to eventually respond to the litigation.  PSC must address safety valve provisions of PSL 66-P. 

Unfortunately, to be resolved all these Climate Act issues require political accountability.  The Climate Act has always been about political pandering to specific constituencies under the guise of saving the planet.  Therefore, I expect that all the inconvenient issues described will be ignored until after the election in hopes that the electorate will not catch on that the reliability of the state’s energy system is at risk and the energy system crisis will be aggravated by the Climate Act  for political gain. New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.  Implementing the Climate Act will have no effect on global warming and the purported co-benefits are illusory. 

I doubt that the Legislature or Governor will act on these issues this year as they try to placate those who deny reality by demanding no changes to the Climate Act and the rest of us. It is time for the rest of us to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition.