Category: Climate Act Cap & Invest

The Poll Says Don’t Raise Prices. RGGI Already Has.

The Empire Center for Public Policy recently released results from a statewide poll of 600 likely 2026 general-election voters, conducted by Cygnal, on New Yorkers’ energy and climate priorities.  The headline finding will not surprise anyone who has followed this blog: New Yorkers want lower emissions, but not if it costs them more money, and on that condition a plurality will not budge. I recently documented the RGGI allowance price and consumer cost history under Governor Hochul, and it is worth putting the survey and the numbers side by side, because they describe the same problem from two different directions — one is what New Yorkers say they want, and the other is what the RGGI program has actually been doing to their electric bills.

I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York, including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs, since those programs began. I have been writing about problems with the RGGI program here for years.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with. These comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to help research and draft this post.

What the poll found

The Empire Center summary lays out five findings from the survey:

  • When forced to choose between lower energy prices and lower greenhouse gas emissions, 24 percent of respondents prioritize price, 24 percent prioritize emissions, and the largest group — 42 percent — will only support emissions reductions if they do not raise energy prices.
  • Home-heating electrification is opposed by 63 percent of respondents and supported by just 30 percent, with opposition exceeding support in nearly every demographic group tested, including New York City Democrats.
  • Opinion on the state’s proposed New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program is closely divided, and about one in five respondents statewide say they are simply unsure — in some subgroups the “unsure” share approaches 30 percent.
  • Sixty percent of respondents oppose allowing lawsuits against oil companies over climate damages, versus 21 percent in support.
  • On data centers, 59 percent want new facilities required to either build their own power or invest in local grid upgrades before drawing on the shared grid, and a third would bar new data centers outright — a sign that New Yorkers are already worried about who absorbs the cost of new electric demand.

The response across every question is the same: New Yorkers will tolerate climate policy, but only on the condition that it does not show up as a bigger number on their utility bill. That is precisely the condition that the RGGI program, as currently administered, does not meet.  It is also clear that the cap-and-invest plan is something most simply do not understand.

RGGI is already failing the poll’s own test.

The 42 percent plurality unwilling to pay higher energy prices for emission reductions in the Empire Center poll is not a hypothetical group waiting to render a verdict on some future policy. RGGI has been operating in New York since 2009, and I have tracked its price and cost trajectory in detail. When Governor Hochul took office in late August 2021, the most recent completed RGGI auction — Auction 52, on June 2, 2021 — had cleared at $7.60 per allowance. The first auction of her tenure, Auction 53 that September, cleared at $9.30. The most recent completed auction as of this writing, Auction 72 on June 3, 2026, cleared at $35.00, with all 18,349,699 allowances offered selling for total regional proceeds of about $642.2 million; New York’s share was $194.7 million on 5,563,451 allowances sold. The secondary market is currently trading above that $35.00 clearing price.

That is a $25.70 increase, or 276 percent, in the space of five years, and it happened with the direct participation of the state agencies the Governor oversees — the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA), and the Department of Public Service — all of which take part in RGGI program design, auction administration, and the cap-tightening decisions that determine how scarce allowances become. The recently finalized RGGI Third Program Review amendments, approved on August 5, 2026, lock in further reductions to the regional cap through 2037, with the steepest annual cuts scheduled from 2027 through 2033 — precisely the mechanism that has already pushed the allowance price up 40 percent in a single quarter this year.

Where the money actually goes

DEC and NYSERDA’s press release on the final amendments touts “nearly $12 billion in net ratepayer savings” against roughly $2 billion invested — a “nearly 6-to-1” return. I went through the Technical Support Document behind that number, and the qualifications matter enormously. The $12.334 billion figure is not verified, realized net ratepayer savings; NYSERDA itself labels it “Energy Bill Savings to Participating Customers,” a modeled, expected-lifetime estimate that includes projects still in the pipeline, has generally not been adjusted through evaluation, measurement, and verification, and is compared only against historical program expenditures — not against the full cost RGGI imposes on all ratepayers.

That full cost is larger than the Administration’s messaging acknowledges, because RGGI requires fossil-fueled generators to hold an allowance for every ton of CO2 emitted, and that allowance price becomes part of the generator’s bid into New York’s marginal-price wholesale electricity market. When an emitting generator sets the clearing price for an interval, its RGGI cost is embedded in the price paid to every accepted resource in that interval — not just reimbursed to the unit that bought the allowance. Non-emitting and even imported resources collect the higher clearing price while bearing little or none of the underlying RGGI cost themselves.  That markedly increases consumer costs.

When I include that market-wide effect rather than just the direct cost of allowances sold at auction, the total annual RGGI cost roughly doubles, and it is rising steeply. Between 2021 and 2024 — the most recent year with complete data — the total annual RGGI cost rose $233 million, or 37 percent. Pro-rating 2026 by the Auction 72 price of $35, the annual cost rises a further $1,317 million, more than 2.7 times the 2021 level.

For a typical residential customer using about 570 kWh a month (roughly 6.9 MWh a year), the same pattern holds at the household level. Counting only direct allowance costs, RGGI added about $24 a year in 2024; counting the full wholesale-market effect, the total was $70 — nearly triple. Between 2021 and 2024, the residential RGGI cost more than doubled. Pro-rated to the Auction 72 price, the 2026 residential cost rises to roughly $121 a year, more than 2.5 times the 2021 level and about 7 percent of a typical residential electric bill, up from 4.2 percent in 2024.

None of that disappears because the state calls the auction proceeds an “investment.” Consumers pay the higher embedded cost first, in every kilowatt-hour they buy. Only a portion of the proceeds comes back later, and only to selected programs or selected bill-credit recipients. A household that does not qualify for a program, cannot front the money for an efficiency upgrade, or does not live in a service territory where a credit applies still pays the RGGI-driven cost in full, with nothing returned.

There is also a time-value-of-money problem a colleague of mine, who prefers to remain anonymous, framed better than I have seen it framed elsewhere: RGGI takes a dollar from the consumer now and, through delayed, partially administered programs, returns a fraction of that dollar’s value later — with people who fall short of program eligibility, or who simply do not navigate the application process, absorbing the difference in full, indefinitely. Discount that delayed, diminished return to present value, and the “6-to-1” ratio looks considerably less generous than advertised. And a meaningful share of the RGGI-driven cost — the wholesale market cost adder — is never captured by any investment program at all. It simply flows through as a cost, full stop.

Why the Cap-and-Invest “unsure” number should worry the Administration

The Empire Center poll found that NYCI support is closely divided with roughly one in five voters unsure, and the unsure share approaches 30 percent in some groups. I read that as evidence that most New Yorkers have not yet connected the dots between the state’s climate programs and their own utility bills. RGGI is the perfect case study for what happens if they make that connection. It is a smaller, narrower program than the proposed economy-wide NYCI, it has been running for over 15 years, and it has already produced a documented, multiplying cost to residential ratepayers with a benefit accounting that does not hold up to scrutiny. If NYCI is layered on top of a wholesale market that already embeds a RGGI-driven price adder, the affordability math the 42-percent plurality is implicitly demanding gets harder to satisfy, not easier.

My review of NYSERDA’s reported results also raises a separate, more basic question about whether RGGI is even accomplishing its stated purpose efficiently. Using the state’s own reported cumulative annualized program benefits, I estimate a cost of approximately $583 per ton of CO2 reduced, and the RGGI investment-related savings account for only about 4.7 percent of the electric-sector emissions reductions observed since the program began. Most of the historic reduction is instead associated with fuel switching from coal and oil to lower-emitting natural gas — a transition that offers little room for further reductions going forward.  It is unlikely that RGGI proceed investment in emission reductions necessary to meet the recently approved RGGI amendments will reduce emissions enough to insure compliance.

Discussion

Put the two pieces together and the picture is straightforward. The Empire Center poll shows New Yorkers will support emissions reductions on one condition: that they not raise energy prices. RGGI, the state’s longest-running carbon-pricing program and the direct model for the emissions math the Administration cites to defend Cap-and-Invest, has raised the allowance price 276 percent since Hochul took office and now adds roughly 7 percent to a typical residential electric bill when the full wholesale-market effect is counted — a cost the Administration’s own messaging does not disclose. New Yorkers do not have detailed RGGI cost breakdowns in front of them when they answer a pollster’s question, but the plurality’s instinct — reduce emissions, but do not raise my bill — is exactly the standard RGGI is failing to meet.

Conclusion

Governor Hochul has said affordability comes first. An affordability agenda should not rest on a rising RGGI charge today, defended by a “nearly 6-to-1” ratio that is not demonstrated, realized, or verified. If the Administration wants to prove a real net benefit, it should ask NYISO to calculate the wholesale-market impact using the hourly data only NYISO has, count only realized and verified bill savings against the full cost including the market-clearing-price effect, and publish that accounting for public review. Until that happens, the polling makes plain that New Yorkers are not being given what they say they want, and the RGGI cost record makes plain why.

New York State’s Short-Sighted Approval of RGGI Amendments

A couple of months ago I wrote that the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) needs to be revised. Unfortunately, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) approved amendments to Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program that is consistent with the RGGI Third Program Review but are at odds to changes since the completion of the amendment implementation process. This post explains why I think this action was short-sighted and incorrect.

Dealing with the RGGI regulatory and political landscapes is challenging enough and agency retribution is enough of a threat that affected entities seldom see value in speaking out about fundamental issues associated with the program. I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the about problems with the RGGI program. I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs, since the inception of those programs. I also participated in RGGI Auction 41 successfully winning allowances and holding them for several years. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Factsheet). It has been a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector since 2008. New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021, withdrew in 2024, and rejoined effective July 1, 2026, and Pennsylvania considered joining but has since decided not to join. RGGI includes a provision for regular reviews. The Third Program Review was completed in July 2025. It strengthened the regional CO₂ emissions cap through 2037, with steeper reductions from 2027 to 2033 and a lower rate thereafter. New York was required to align their regulations with the updated Model Rule by January 1, 2027.

It appears that DEC approved amendments that made the NY carbon trading rule consistent with the Model Rule to meet this alignment requirement. However, I believe that there were significant changes to the RGGI and New York landscape that should have been considered. As a result DEC should push for an immediate start to a Fourth Program Review.

Timeline

The public comment period for the proposed revisions to 6 NYCRR Part 242 and associated regulations began on December 10, 2025, and closed on February 17, 2026. DEC held two virtual public hearings in February 2026 to take testimony on the proposal. On June 23, 2026, the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) Board approved companion revisions to its 21 NYCRR Part 507 CO2 Allowance Auction Program regulation so that the auction rule would align with the Part 242 amendments. On August 5, 2026, DEC and NYSERDA jointly announced that they had finalized the regulations, with the amendments taking effect January 1, 2027.

In other words, over the eight months between the close of the comment period and final adoption, DEC had every opportunity to reconsider the proposal in light of events that undercut the analytical basis it had relied on. Instead, the final rule that emerged in August is, in every respect that matters, the same rule that was proposed in December – a rule based on modeling and assumptions that had already been superseded by the time it was finalized. That is my problem with this rulemaking. It is not that DEC failed to follow the Model Rule. It is that DEC treated an evolving policy and market landscape as if it did not exist.

Factors not Considered

Since the draft amendments were finalized, there have been several significant changes to the NYS regulatory landscape that DEC’s response to comments does not meaningfully grapple with.

The State Energy Plan was finalized after the close of the comment period. DEC’s responses to comments repeatedly lean on the State Energy Plan (SEP) Additional Action case as evidence that the proposed cap trajectory is “consistent” with the SEP and is “on a pathway to zero emissions by 2040.” IPPNY comments noted that the SEP’s Additional Action case assumed the Climate Act’s zero-emissions target would be reached by 2045, not 2040 – a five-year gap that DEC’s response does not reconcile, beyond restating that the cap trajectory is “on a pathway to zero emissions by 2040.” That raises an obvious problem: the SEP itself was still being finalized while this rulemaking was underway, and DEC cannot simultaneously treat the SEP as settled, authoritative support for its cap trajectory while the SEP was not yet final policy. You cannot borrow credibility from a document that was still being written.

The May 2026 budget bill changed New York’s underlying emission reduction requirements. In Part VV of the budget bill, the Legislature substantially rewrote the Climate Act’s statutory GHG accounting and planning provisions. As I described in more detail when the bill passed, the budget bill revisions to the CLCPA replaced the hard 40% by 2030 reduction requirement with a directive that DEC adopt regulations by December 31, 2028 to achieve a 60% by 2040 reduction “to the maximum extent feasible and cost effective.” That relaxes the statutory pressure to adopt an allowance allocation trajectory consistent with “zero emissions” by 2040. The Sabin Center’s white paper on the 2026 climate law changes reached a similar conclusion, describing the amendments as a retreat from the original Climate Act framework. I had made this same point in 2023 when the cap-and-invest program first showed up in a budget bill – the Legislature has repeatedly used the budget process to quietly rewrite the Climate Act’s substance rather than debate it as standalone legislation. The Part 242 amendments adopted in August, however, do not reflect any of this. DEC finalized a New York-specific allowance budget as though the emission reduction requirement that supposedly justifies it had not changed at all.

Second quarter 2026 auction prices jumped significantly, making consumer impacts a real and immediate problem, not a hypothetical one. The RGGI allowance clearing price jumped 40%, from $24.99 in the March 11, 2026 auction to $35.00 in the June 3, 2026 auction.  All the original containment reserve allowances available for 2026 had already been exhausted by the March auction. I laid out the consumer cost implications of that price jump when the results came out.  Direct allowance purchase costs to New York consumers were already running around $700 million a year at 2025 average prices, and would rise to well over $1.1 billion a year if the $35 price persists.  DEC has not acknowledged that when the wholesale electric market cost adder created by RGGI-obligated generators bidding in their allowance costs is included, the plausible statewide consumer burden runs into the $1.8 to $3.2 billion range depending on which generating technology sets the marginal price. A meaningful share of that embedded cost becomes windfall revenue for generators that have no RGGI compliance obligation of their own and never flows back to ratepayers through any investment program. None of that was reflected in the cost impact analysis DEC relied on to finalize this rule, because that analysis predates the price spike. DEC’s responses to comments statd that “the average residential, commercial, and industrial consumer of electricity is anticipated to see no significant change in their bills as a result of this rule making” – a conclusion drawn from modeling that has already been overtaken by events on the ground. (See my RGGI Quarter 2 2026 Auction Results post for the full analysis.)

Taken together, these three developments describe a rulemaking that was adopted on autopilot. The SEP that DEC cites as validation was not yet final when the comment period closed. The statutory emission reduction targets that supposedly justify the cap trajectory were rewritten by the Legislature while the rule was pending. And the auction market that DEC’s affordability conclusions depend on moved sharply against ratepayers before the ink was dry. Any one of those developments would be reason enough to pause and take another look. All three together are as close to a mandate for reconsideration as a rulemaking record is ever going to hand you, and DEC did not take it.

Bottom Line

DEC had a genuine opportunity, between the close of the comment period in February and final adoption in August, to reconsider a rule whose analytical foundation had visibly eroded out from under it. The State Energy Plan it cites as validation was not final when the rule was proposed. The statutory emission reduction requirements the cap trajectory is supposed to serve were rewritten by the Legislature in May. The auction market whose stability underpins DEC’s “no significant change in bills” conclusion jumped 40% in June. And three separate, technically sophisticated stakeholders – EEANY, IPPNY, and NYISO – laid out in detail why the cap trajectory, the reliability safeguards, and the affordability assumptions in this rule do not hold up, all before DEC finalized it anyway. DEC’s answer to all of it, in substance, is that the Cost Containment Reserve and the allowance bank will probably be enough, and that a Fourth Program Review will start by 2028. That is not a rebuttal. It is an acknowledgment, buried in the response-to-comments document, that the critics are right and the fix has been deferred to a review that has not even started yet. DEC should have paused this rulemaking and pushed for the Fourth Program Review immediately. Instead, New York is locked into a cap trajectory built on a foundation that DEC’s own record shows was already out of date the day it was adopted.

Compliance Impacts of Virginia Joining RGGI – When will the Allowances Run Out

On April 29, 2026, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) states released a statement that Virginia was rejoining the program. On May 8, the RGGI states issued a notice that they were monitoring the allowance market in response to a sharp increase in the secondary futures market price. In a recent article I described the financial impact.  This article addresses compliance.

Dealing with the RGGI regulatory and political landscapes is challenging enough that affected entities seldom see value in speaking out about fundamental issues associated with the program.  I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs, since the inception of those programs. I also participated in RGGI Auction 41 successfully winning allowances and holding them for several years.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector. It has been a cooperative effort among Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont since 2008, with New Jersey rejoining in 2020 and Virginia scheduled to rejoin beginning July 1, 2026; Pennsylvania recently decided not to join.

According to the RGGI program description, the states issue permits to emit a ton of CO₂ or allowances that are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, and the proceeds are then reinvested in strategic energy and consumer programs. Those investments include energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy, beneficial electrification, greenhouse gas abatement and climate adaptation, and direct bill assistance, with energy efficiency receiving the largest share.

In a recent article I explained that the cost of RGGI allowances obtained at auction is not the only cost to consumers.  In New York’s de-regulated market, the cost to purchase the allowances is embedded in the  price bid by RGGI program fossil-fired power plants in the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) energy auction.  The NYISO chooses the power plants that will run based on the economic dispatch clearing price.  When a RGGI-affected generating unit sets the price, all the generating units providing power get paid for the added cost of RGGI even though many do not have compliance obligations.  I showed that this more than doubles the cost of compliance or more depending on the cost of allowances, making the cost an important affordability consideration.

RGGI allowance costs are driven by basic economic considerations. When there is scarcity, prices increase; when there is uncertainty about scarcity, costs also go up. The difference is that price increases associated with uncertainty can drop when more information is available, whereas if the RGGI plans for reducing the emission cap are unrealistic that bakes in scarcity so prices will increase structurally. When RGGI announced that Virginia was going to rejoin the program there was a market price spike based on a lack of information. 

RGGI Cap Trajectory

The RGGI webpage describing last summer’s changes to the program included a graph that compares the current regional base cap (light blue) with the updated cap trajectory (dark blue). The orange and yellow lines display the total updated regional cap if all allowances are released from the updated first and second Cost Containment Reserve (CCR)  tiers, respectively.  The CCR tiers were added to reduce allowance costs.  The bottom line is that the changes reduce the regional emissions cap in 2027 to 69,806,919 tons of CO2 from 75,717,784 tons under the previous Model Rule and then reduces allowances  Allowances decline by approximately 10.5% of the 2025 budget, thereafter through 2033.

The RGGI emission cap trajectory was designed to be consistent with state net-zero targets.  However, that trajectory is unrealistic.  Figure 2 plots CO₂ emissions by fuel type across all eleven states from 2006 to 2025.  What you see is fuel switching caused the reductions and that there are only minor opportunities for future fuel switching.  When I analyzed the 2023 RGGI investment proceeds report, I estimated that only about 7.6% of observed emission reductions could be attributed to RGGI‑funded projects despite RGGI auction proceeds of over $7 billion since 2021.  Changes to Federal policy, supply chain issues, and inflation coupled with load growth all indicate that reductions from other programs are unlikely as well.  The cap trajectory is simply incompatible with reality.

Figure 2: Eleven State RGGI CO₂ Emissions (short tons) for all Programs 2006–2025

To determine when the allowances will run out it is necessary to consider emissions and the allowance trajectory.  For this analysis I assume that future emissions equal the average of the last three years.  In Figure 3, I plotted the updated cap trajectory (orange), total updated regional cap if all allowances are released from CCR Tier 1 (purple), CCR Tier 2 (green) and emissions in grey.  I assume that allowance prices will exceed the trigger for the CCR allowance release every year.  Note that in 2028 the emissions become greater than the allowances added to the market without Virginia in RGGI.

Figure 3: RGGI Emissions and Cap Trajectories for RGGI States Without Virginia

Figure 4 provides similar information with Virginia added to RGGI.  There is no appreciable change to the time when the allowance allocations are less than the emissions so I believe that the addition of Virginia will not affect impacts.

Figure 4: RGGI Emissions and Cap Trajectories for RGGI States With Virginia

Allowance Bank

Comparing the allowance allocations to the emissions does not consider the allowances already in the system.  The “allowance bank” is the aggregate number of allowances in circulation that have been issued but not yet surrendered for compliance (i.e., held in accounts or set‑asides). The original distribution of  RGGI allowances was before the fracking revolution made natural gas a cost-effective substitute for replacing oil and coal generating units.  When power plants switched to lower-emitting  natural gas, much larger reductions in emissions than expected occurred and the allowance bank grew so large that the RGGI States implemented several adjustments to the allowances allocated to reduce the bank.  These adjustments ended in 2025.

To refine when emissions could exceed the allowances available it is necessary to account for the allowance bank.  RGGI does not provide a report that describes the status of the allowance bank, so I had to develop my own estimate.

Potomac Economics provides independent market monitoring analysis of RGGI that provide the information needed to estimate the bank.  The Quarterly Reports on the Secondary Market are released several week after the end of a quarter.  The Quarter 4 2025 report includes a description of CO2 allowance holdings:

CO2 Allowance Holdings – At the end of the fourth quarter of 2025:

  • There were 175 million CO2 allowances in circulation.
  • Compliance-oriented entities held approximately 125 million of the allowances in circulation (71 percent).
  • Approximately 142 million of the allowances in circulation (81 percent) are believed to be held for compliance purposes.

Quarterly Allowance Status

The allowance bank is simply the difference between allowances being added and emissions that subtract allowances.  Allowance transactions occur on a quarterly basis.  Allowances are added at each auction and the annual true-up when allowances are surrendered to account for emissions occurs in the first quarter following the end of the year.

Emissions are used to reduce the allowance bank.  Historical quarterly emissions are available on the RGGI COATS platform.  Table 1 lists historical and projected CO2 emissions by state starting in quarter 4 2021 and ending in 2029.  Historical emissions are not highlighted.  For the second quarter of 2026 (highlighted in blue) I assumed that emissions would equal the average of the last two years.  Starting in the third quarter of 2026 I assumed that emissions would equal the average of the three years when Virginia was part of RGGI.  This is supported by Figure 2 that shows emissions have been relatively level since 2019 for the eleven states now in RGGI.  The annual emissions are simply the sum of the four quarters.  The 2026 total highlighted because it represents a mix of observed and projected emissions.

Table 1: RGGI Quarterly CO2 Mass Emissions (short tons)

The allowance bank is the balance of allowances awarded and surrendered.  Figure 4 described the projected allowance distribution that was used to project future annual allowance distributions.  I assume that all the CCR Tier 1 and Tier 2 allocations will be awarded in the first quarter and the remaining allowances distributed by the same amount each quarter.  The Virginia allowance distribution has not been announced so I assume that they will be awarded in proportion to the control period when Virginia was a member. 

The purpose of this analysis is to determine when the allowances in circulation are less than the emissions.  The quarterly number of  allowances in circulation is equal to the sum of the previous quarter allowances in circulation and the allowances awarded with allowances surrendered subtracted.  Allowances are surrendered annually but I subtracted the emissions on a quarterly basis to get finer resolution.

Figure 5 plots the quarterly emissions (green), allowance cap (dark blue), added allowances (light blue) and allowance balance (orange).  This analysis assumes that emissions remain constant and shows that as the allowance cap is reduced the bank of allowances eventually is exhausted.  When the allowance balance is less than zero there are no longer sufficient permits to emit CO2 and affected units must shut down or end up out of compliance.  Table 2 lists the balances and shows that during the third quarter of 2032 there are insufficient allowances. 

Figure 5:  Quarterly RGGI Allowance Balance, Emissions and Allowance Cap

Table 2: Quarterly RGGI Allowance Balance, Added Allowances and Emissions

Discussion

To sum up, RGGI allowances necessary for facilities to operate will run out in the third quarter of 2033 if emissions remain constant and that the share of Virginia allowance allocations remains proportional to the period when Virginia was in RGGI.  Note, however, that the market will be so tight in 2033 that some facilities will run out sooner.  I would like to think that Virginia will remain consistent, but it is worrisome that Virginia decided to rejoin before the end of the current compliance period that ends this year.  In the past states entered and left the program consistent with the three-year compliance period.  If that decision was driven by an ideological desire to save the planet there is the possibility that a different allowance allotment will be used.  If the Virginia allocations are proportional to the past the addition of the state will not markedly affect when the allowances run out.

This analysis does not try to distinguish between allowances held by compliance entities and those without compliance obligations.  At the end of the fourth quarter of 2025 the Quarter 4 2025 report on the secondary market stated that “Approximately 142 million of the allowances in circulation (81 percent) are believed to be held for compliance purposes.”  There are two implications.  RGGI states have always assumed that the remaining 19% of the allowances are held for investment purposes and would eventually be used for compliance.  Given that facilities need those allowances to operate it will be a seller’s market and prices should skyrocket when they are needed.  There is another possibility.  Some of those allowances could be held by organizations that want to prevent CO2 emissions and may not sell them at any price.  In that case, the market will run out of allowances sooner.

On May 8, the RGGI states announced that they were aware of the short-term volatility associated with the announcement that Virginia would rejoin RGGI:

Recent futures prices are above thresholds established to automatically mitigate price growth by releasing additional allowances at auctions for cost containment. RGGI has a long history of stability. Regular program reviews have made adjustments to align the program with policy objectives of a reliable, affordable, and clean electricity supply. A sustained period of elevated auction prices would not meet these objectives and may require renewed consideration of improvements.

These results indicate that renewed consideration of the program design is necessary now to prevent sustained elevated auction prices. 

Conclusion

For years the sources affected by RGGI and me have been warning that RGGI is headed to the point where there are  insufficient allowances to enable sources to run and remain in compliance.  If left unchecked this will lead to an artificial energy storage,  The allowance cap trajectory is simply incompatible with observed and likely generating resource development that can displace existing resources.  When RGGI announced that Virginia would rejoin the program, futures prices nearly doubled and the spot market price also spiked.  Cost impacts will be evident before the allowances run out because scarcity will drive allowance prices higher because the present regulations bake in scarcity.

All politicians in RGGI states who are worried about energy affordability should seriously consider dropping out of the program because it is simply unaffordable and risky without major changes.

Hochul Claims the Climate Act Can Be Affordable

On March 20, 2026 Governor Hochul claimed in an exclusive opinion piece in New York Empire Report that the climate action and affordability “can and must” go hand in hand. She did not provide substantive evidence to support that claim and her claims do not address many other Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) affordability issues.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for approving the Scoping Plan prepared by New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” NYSERDA also prepared the recent State Energy Plan that was approved by Energy Planning Board (EPB).  Both the CAC and the EPB were composed of Governor Cuomo and Hochul appointees who believed that implementation of the Climate Act was only a matter of political will. 

Status

Progress  on the Climate Act is at an inflection point.  I recently described two affordability aspects of the implementation process that are causing confusion for almost everyone.  Hochul’s administration has recognized two aspects but has covered up a third component.

I think the primary reason for Hochul’s announcement is related to the first issue: New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations.  In February the Hochul Administration “leaked” a New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that said that “full compliance with New York’s 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act could cost upstate households more than $4,000 a year – on top of what they are already paying today”.  Note that these costs are only for this component of the Climate Act.  Last fall a decision regarding an environmentalist petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleged that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 implementation date was rendered.  The decision stated that DEC shall “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines” and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits or request the Legislature amend the law.  As we will see, Hochul is advocating changes to the law so that NYCI can be revised and the projected costs do not become an election issue.

The second issue is a PSC request for comments related to New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p “renewable energy systems” that includes an indirect affordability mandate and the potential for suspension or modification of obligations if certain conditions are met and a hearing is held to determine if changes are needed.  Even though New York has seen a significant increase in arrears since the Climate Act was enacted the PSC has not address this provision.  The Commission has finally acknowledged the possible need for a hearing and asked for comments.  Rory Christian, Chair and CEO of the Public Service Commission (PSC) recently posted a brief status update regarding the PSC’s ability to make changes to the Climate Act even if there is a hearing.  Clearly, they can address aspects of the PSL 66-P renewable energy systems targets in 2030 and 2040 but little else.

Hochul’s Administration is trying to deflect attention away from the third affordability aspect of Climate Act – all the other costs not included in NYCI and utility rates.   NYCI is simply an economy-wide carbon tax and will affect the cost of energy that anyone uses in New York.  The Climate Act mandates also will require reductions in the building, transportation, industrial sectors, agricultural, forestry, and waste sectors that include aspects beside fuel.  Those costs have received very little attention.

Late last year the Hochul Administration completed the New York State Energy Plan.  Plan reports included an Affordability Analysis Overview Fact Sheet that describes affordability impacts of household costs related to energy used and the need for electric vehicles to meet the Climate Act mandates for those sectors.  I summarized the contents of the fact sheet, the Energy Affordability Data Annex spreadsheet (Annex Spreadsheet)  and the Energy Affordability Impacts Analysis (Impact Analysis last December.  The results show that the Hochul Administration is not providing transparent and comprehensive costs for expected residential costs.  When the appliances, electric vehicles, and building shell upgrades necessary are included then costs increase as shown in the Figure 1.

Figure 1: NYS Energy Planning Board Meeting Presentation Slide 43

The Hochul Administration has covered up the costs buried in this figure.  The equipment cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment. The difference for an upstate moderate‑income gas‑heated household is roughly a 43% increase in levelized monthly energy‑related costs—about $7,000 per year.

Hochul’s Proposal

Governor Hochul’s Empire Report op‑ed presents New York as a national leader on climate, highlighting offshore wind contracts, large-scale renewables, Champlain Hudson Power Express, and continued participation in RGGI as evidence that the State is on track and that affordability concerns are primarily the product of federal “headwinds” and local opposition. She argues that the Climate Act is “not the driver of the high energy prices we are experiencing,” and that limited, “common‑sense” adjustments to timelines and accounting will preserve ambition while avoiding “crushing costs” for households and businesses.

The op‑ed also shifts blame outward: to the Trump administration for hostility to renewables and tax incentives, to global events like the war in Iran for high fuel prices, and to local NIMBYism and siting barriers for delays in renewable deployment. What it does not do is confront the extent to which the design of the Climate Act itself, and the implementation choices made since 2019, hardwire higher costs and reliability risks into New York’s energy system.

Hochul’s opinion piece outlined revisions to NYCI but ignored the ramifications of PSL 66-P and the State Energy Plan.   The following is a copy of the recommendations in her opinion piece.  She introduces her revisions with some general recommendations:

It’s why I am pushing a Ratepayer Protection Plan that will hold utilities accountable, reform the process by which regulators consider rate hike requests, and make it easier for working families to learn about and access the state’s Energy Affordability Programs.

And to make sure we keep the lights and heat on and costs down for New Yorkers, I have adopted an all-of-the-above approach to energy that includes more renewables, emission-free, reliable round-the-clock nuclear, and other needed power sources.

The remainder of her recommendations are sure to infuriate the zealots who advocated for the law and demand that there be no changes.  The only question is whether the Democratic lawmakers who have supported the Climate Act so far will acknowledge reality or double down on the current law. 

It’s also why, despite supporting the intentions of the Climate Act, I am pushing changes to the law as part of our budget discussions with the Legislature. This is solely out of necessity – to protect New Yorkers’ pocketbooks and economy.  Despite all the headwinds and obstacles that could not have been foreseen when the law was enacted in 2019, advocates still took the extreme step of suing the state to force it to issue regulations to meet the Climate Act’s 2030 emission reductions targets.

A judge agreed and ruled that the state must swiftly issue regulations to achieve what now would be costly and unattainable targets, unless the law is changed.

This refers to the NYCI economy-wide lawsuit and lays out the challenge to the Legislature who should change the law.  Next ,she lays out the cost of NYCI compliance while ignoring the State Energy Plan costs for equipment needed to comply with the Climate Act.

I have repeatedly said that utility rates in our state are too high. And while the Climate Act is not the driver of the high energy prices we are experiencing, the undeniable fact is we cannot meet the Climate Act’s 2030 targets without imposing new and additional crushing costs on New York businesses and residents.

Absent changes to the law, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority found the impact of meeting the Climate Act’s 2030 targets would be staggering—more than $4,000 a year for upstate oil and natural gas households, and $2,300 more for New York City natural gas households. And gas prices at the pump would jump an additional $2.23 per gallon above where it would otherwise be.

In the next paragraphs she piously claims that costs are too high. 

As Governor, I can’t let that happen. While I am still committed to working toward our targets, with all the stress our residents are under, New Yorkers expect their elected officials to prioritize affordability.  They are suffering from high costs every single day and I for one will not ignore their cries for relief.

This is utter hypocrisy given that she knows about the levelized costs to purchase equipment. In addition, it long past time that NYSERDA admit their analyses compare mitigation scenarios to a Reference Case that already embeds zero‑emission vehicle mandates and other policies, excluding large chunks of Climate Act cost from the “action” side while still counting their benefits.  This biases cost low.  We simply do not know how much this will cost.  Hochul goes on to discuss schedule problems.

The fact is, we will be dealing with a White House outright hostile toward renewable energy for at least another three years, making it impossible for us to meet our targets without imposing higher costs on homeowners, renters, and businesses.

We need more time, and so I am proposing we amend the law to require regulations to reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions to be issued at the end of 2030. We are seeking to change what emission limits the regulations are tied to – including a new 2040 target as well as the existing 2050 statewide emission limits. Nothing else in the CLCPA is changing regarding the existing statewide emission limit targets and these new regulations would still require the state to make timely progress, ensuring long-term policy stability.

The schedule targets mentioned must be changed because they cannot be achieved.  The politicians who arbitrarily set deadlines must recognize that the energy system is more complicated than they thought in 2019.  However, the bigger question is whether extending the deadlines will enable cost-effective implementation at any time.

Conclusion

The Climate Act has always been about politics.  New York has a woeful history of legislative mandates on the energy system, but this has never stopped Albany lawmakers from trying again.  Hochul’s pragmatic proposal is sure to infuriate the political constituency that advocated for the law and do not want changes.  The changes proposed are unquestionably needed but they only address portions of the Climate Act. 

PSC Commissioner Christian Note Implications

Rory Christian, Chair and CEO of the Public Service Commission recently posted a brief status update regarding the Commission’s ability to make changes to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  He explained that they can only make changes to the electric sector targets established in the Public Service Law section of the Climate Act. This is an important distinction that has ramifications to the hints that Governor Hochul wants to make changes to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for approving the Scoping Plan prepared by New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” NYSERDA also prepared the recent State Energy Plan that was approved by Energy Planning Board (EPB).  Both the CAC and the EPB were composed of political appointees . 

On February 26, 2026 the Hochul Administration “leaked” a New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that said that “full compliance with New York’s 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act could cost upstate households more than $4,000 a year – on top of what they are already paying today”. On March 5, 2026, a group of 29 New York Democratic state senators responded with a letter (“Democratic Letter”) to Governor Hochul saying they “categorically oppose any effort to roll back New York’s nation leading climate law” and urging Hochul to “stand strong in the face of misinformation” about affordability.  The letter insists that any pushback on the Climate Act amounts to “climate denial” and that only their “bold” agenda will save New Yorkers money, clean the air, and protect a livable climate for our grandchildren. That framing gets the politics right, but the facts are wrong.  Hochul’s suggestion that lawmakers need to delay emission mandates in NYCI.

Christian Linkedin Note

Christian recently posted the following on Linkedin:

A recent Times Union article highlighted a provision in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) that provides the Public Service Commission with discretion to modify certain aspects of the law.

This is a reference to New York Public Service Law § 66-p “renewable energy systems”.  Section 66-p (4) “Establishment of a renewable energy program” states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  Christian went on:

It is important to clarify the scope of that authority. The Commission’s ability to make changes is limited to the electric sector targets established in the Public Service Law section of the Climate Act. The Commission does not have authority to amend the Climate Act’s economy-wide emissions reduction targets. Only the Legislature can amend those targets.

The distinction between Section 66-p (4) and the Climate Act’s economy-wide emissions reduction targets has caused confusion.  The economy-wide emissions reductions target refers to the mandate for New York to implement  New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations.  I described these regulations  in a summary of Climate Act issues.  DEC was supposed to implement NYCI regulations by 1/1/2024 but has only finalized the Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule.  There have been no suggestions when the two other implementing regulations will be proposed.  A year ago a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 implementation date.  Supreme Court Judge Julian Schreibman’s decision stated that DEC shall “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines” and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.  DEC appealed the decision which means that the deadline is suspended until the Appellate Division rules.  

The February 26, 2026 New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that was “leaked” refers to NYCI and not PSL 66-P.  Christian’s note is all about PSL 66-P.  He explains:

Specifically, the statute provides that the Commission may temporarily suspend or modify obligations under New York State’s renewable energy program — the Clean Energy Standard — if the Commission finds that the program:

  • Impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; 
  • Is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or
  • Significantly increases arrears or service disconnections determined to be related to the program.

Even though New York has seen a significant increase in arrears since the Climate Act was enacted, The Commission did not hold a hearing to address their safe, adequate, and affordable obligations to New Yorkers.  Christian notes that the Commission has finally acknowledged the possible need for a hearing:

Relatedly, a third party recently petitioned the Commission requesting adjustments to the electric sector targets. The Commission has posted the petition for public comment and will be accepting comments through the end of the month.

You can read the petition here: https://lnkd.in/edE92bhF
You can submit comments here: https://lnkd.in/eVeaJA5Y

Ramifications

Recent developments paint a consistent picture that it is appropriate to reconsider the Climate Act. NYSERDA’s cap‑and‑invest memo admits that hitting statutory targets on the current schedule requires fuel price shocks and thousands of dollars per year in added household energy costs. The PSC’s request for comments shows that the state’s own regulator is now weighing whether renewable mandates under the Climate Act have crossed the line into threatening safe, adequate, and affordable service—the core mission it cannot ignore. As a result, I encourage everyone to submit comments demanding a hearing to consider adjustments to the electric sector targets.

The important point made by Christian is that the Commission has limited powers to address the myriad implementation issues observed.  It is up to the Legislature to address those other issues.  Unfortunately, this would require many lawmkers to admit that their “nation-leading” law to save the planet needs to be reconsidered.  I previously noted that 29 of the 41 Democratic senators went on the record saying they “categorically oppose any effort to roll back New York’s nation leading climate law”.  However, there are 63 seats in the Senate, so this represents a minority.  It is time to convince those 29 senators and the Assembly members that they need to step up and support the State’s obligation to provide safe, adequate, and affordable energy for all New Yorkers by addressing the observed problems.

Fundamental Implementation Issues

The Climate Act, Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan presumptions rest on a cluster of unrealistic assumptions that ignore engineering, economic, and scale realities. Lawmakers set legally binding “net‑zero” and renewable mandates without first demonstrating that they can be achieved on the required timetable while keeping electric service safe, adequate, and affordable, effectively turning the state into a live experiment.

Reliability is largely treated as a legal requirement rather than an engineering constraint: the Council assumes that a system dominated by wind, solar, and storage will work because the statute says it must, even though NYISO and others warn that needed dispatchable emissions‑free resources do not yet exist commercially on the required schedule. Costs are downplayed through modeling choices that embed major policies in the “reference” case and lean heavily on inflated “costs of inaction,” while NYSERDA’s own affordability work shows on the order of 40‑plus percent higher levelized monthly costs for a representative upstate household once capital costs are counted.

Climate Act environmental review assumes that large‑scale wind, solar, and storage build‑outs are benign, even though the cumulative impact statement has not been updated to match Scoping Plan build‑out levels or to define thresholds for wildlife loss, land conversion, or local impacts.  Subsequent revisions to permitting requirements have turned project environmental assessments into unconscionable parodies of ecological protection.

Finally, the state behaves as if its actions will meaningfully change the climate experienced by New Yorkers, despite emitting less than one‑half of one percent of global greenhouse gases, so any reductions are quickly overwhelmed by growth elsewhere.

What is Needed

There is no question that the Commission needs to hold a hearing to address the Public Service Law mandates.  Anyone who argues otherwise is not paying attention or does not want to admit that real‑world constraints in offshore wind, onshore wind, transmission, supply chains, and inflation that were not anticipated when the law passed in 2019 preclude achievement of the Climate Act 2030 targets.  The hearing will undoubtedly find that the targets need to be delayed.

A cap-and-and invest program for carbon is not the magical solution that the Climate Action Council thought it was when they recommended an “economy-wide program” to cost‑effectively meet Climate Act targets. Hochul’s concerns about NYCI affordability are legitimate, but she does not recognize New York’s experience with the similar Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative indicate that the touted benefits of dividend investments did not include substantive emission reductions.  Because GHG emissions and energy production are closely related, the cap on GHG emissions this means that setting the caps based on the artificial Climate Act schedule will likely lead to limits on energy production.

Most of the other issues are beyond the scope of the PSL 66-P hearing or NYCI. The Legislature needs to address the other issues openly and rely on the input of subject matter experts who are responsible for energy system reliability, not just a selected few academics who agree with their preconceived notions.  First, and foremost a plan must be developed that demonstrates legally binding “net‑zero” and renewable mandates can be achieved on the required timetable while keeping electric service safe, adequate, and affordable. 

The Legislature must define acceptable safe, adequate, and affordable metrics for electric service and energy resources.  it is long past time that Legislators stop pretending to be energy experts and listen to and act on the existing reliability experts and standards of the NYISO and New York State Reliability Council.  The Legislature must demand that NYSERDA transparently provide all the costs to achieve the Climate Act mandates, not just costs for the law itself, to provide guidance for an acceptable affordability criterion. In my opinion a key component of safe electrical service is environmentally responsible generation.  The Office of Renewable Energy Siting and RAPID Act permitting guidance must establish thresholds for wildlife loss, land conversion, and local impacts. 

Conclusion

There are reasons to be optimistic that the inevitable Climate Act disaster that will occur if there are no changes might be averted before real damage is done.  The admission by Hochul that NYCI will be unaffordable and needs to be revised suggests that the Administration recognizes the affordability implications.  The Commission is accepting comments on the need for a hearing regarding the Public Service Law component of the Climate Act is also encouraging.  However, Commission Chair Christian’s note makes an important point that there are limitations on what the .Commission can do.  Ultimately, the fundamental shortcomings of the Climate Act can only be changed by the Legislature.  It is not clear whether New York lawmakers will cling  to the current timetable in the face of reality or step up and resolve the problems. I recommend that readers contact your legislators and demand that they resolve the identified problems.

Cap and Invest to Meet New Yorker’s Needs Lobbying Document

The February 2026 report Cap and Invest to Meet New Yorkers’ Needs, (Needs Report)  published by Spring Street Climate Fund and New Yorkers for Clean Air, is the latest in a series of advocacy documents designed to sell the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program to legislators and the public.  This article explains why this article misinforms New Yorkers about the supposed benefits of NYCI.

I have extensive experience with market-based pollution control programs.  I have been involved in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program process since its inception and have frequently written about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I have also been following the NYCI program and other similar programs in New York   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated

Overview

I have described the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) NYCI regulations in many articles.  DEC was supposed to promulgate three implementing regulations by 1/1/2024.  Currently DEC has only finalized the Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule.  There have been no suggestions when the two other necessary regulations will be proposed.  The Cap-and-Invest Rule will define affected sources, binding caps, and allowance allocations.  DEC also needs an auction rule that implements the auction that will be used to distribute allowances.

The lack of regulations is a problem.  On 3/31/25 a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 date.  I explained that the decision on the petition stated: DEC must “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.”  On 11/24/25 DEC appealed the decision to the Appellate Division.   This means that the deadline of Feb 6 is suspended until the Appellate Division rules.  Therefore, the State has no risk of being held in contempt and can safely ignore the deadline.  However, the decision was clear – promulgate the regulations or change the law. 

On February 26, 2026 the Hochul Administration “leaked” a New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that said that “full compliance with New York’s 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act could cost upstate households more than $4,000 a year – on top of what they are already paying today and gas prices could jump over $2 a gallon.”  David Catalfamo explains what is going on:

Hochul wants to roll back parts of the CLCPA. She knows it’s politically complicated. So rather than saying so plainly, she lets her budget director hint at it, lets a NYSERDA memo circulate through the press, and then steps in front of a camera to say she’s just responding to the data. It’s Albany smoke-signaling at its finest.

City and State recently published Activists dispute Hochul’s claims about cost of complying with climate law by Rebecca Lewis that describes the Needs Report.  It “highlights potential benefits of a cap-and-invest program, including energy rebates for millions of households.”  She notes that  the “new report from New Yorkers for Clean Air and Spring Street Climate Fund aims to balance out conversations on the potential impacts of hitting climate goals by illustrating the benefits, rather than the costs, of implementation.”  This article looks into these claims.

Follow the Money

Last January I reviewed a report from Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights that claimed New Yorkers will “realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative” based on an evaluation of all aspects of NYCI.  (Clean Air Initiative is a rebranding of NYCI – it is the same thing.)  The Needs Report only addresses the investment benefits.  Appendix A: Methodology describes three methodology steps: use one of the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) price ceiling scenarios to determine the amount of money available, assume “average operational costs of 4% across the board to implement and operate the cap-and-invest program”, and then propose how the remaining 96% could be spent on affordability measures and direct investments. 

This is not a serious analysis.  It assumes 4% average operational costs.  There is an existing cap-and-invest program for the utility industry called RGGI.  A serious analysis would have checked the most recent RGGI Operating Plan Amendment to determine what the operating costs were for that program.  I found that operating costs in the latest budget for RGGI investments was 8%.  I think being off by a factor of two is substantive.

The organizations behind the Needs Report are advocacy groups with a vested interest in NYCI implementation, not independent analysts. Spring Street Climate Fund is characterized as “a left-of-center advocacy group that supports environmentalist legislation within New York State,” funded by the Park Foundation and the Lily Auchincloss Foundation. Evergreen Action “donate now” link features the statement “leading an all-out national mobilization to defeat the climate crisis”.

Revenues

Environmental activists are pushing back against the NYSERDA memo because it argues that NYCI is unaffordable.  The activists are missing a fundamental point.  The memo calculates the costs necessary to “fully comply with CLCPA’s current emissions targets with a cap-and-invest program”.  To do that the  regulation must omit limits on potential allowance prices and will allocate allowances based on the trajectory required to meet the Climate Act mandates.  This causes a sharp uptick in projected costs compared to previous analysts.

Appendix A: Methodology notes that the analysis used Scenario C from a NYSERDA analysis in 2024.  The ten-year revenue stream is $57.4 billion and includes limits on allowance prices.  The NYSERDA memo assumed higher allowance prices would occur if there were no limits on prices and that it would be necessary to implement NYCI consistent with the Judge’s ruling.  Using their assumptions, I estimate that the ten-year revenue stream would be five times higher at $295 billion over ten years.

The Needs Report frames $57.4 billion as revenue the state can “invest,” but this is money taken from households and businesses through higher energy costs, higher fuel prices, and higher costs for goods and services.  The NYSERDA memo states:

Absent changes, by 2031, the impact of CLCPA on the price of gasoline could reach or exceed $2.23/gallon on top of current prices at that time; the cost for an MMBtu of natural gas $16.96; and comparable increases to other fuels. Upstate oil and natural gas households would see costs in excess of $4,000 a year and New York City natural gas households could anticipate annual gross costs of $2,300. Only a portion of these costs could be offset by current policy design.

One of the flaws of the Needs Report is that it ignores opportunity costs.  Even a non-economist like me understands that if an analysis does not consider how the money raised by NYCI might have been used elsewhere is not considered, then their economic benefits claims are biased.  My article on the report from Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights included a discussion of this flaw so I will not repeat it here.

Benefits

The Needs Report simply lists how $57.4 billion could be spent. Listing spending categories is not the same as demonstrating net economic benefits.  It describes beneficial spending on energy rebates ($270/yr for 6.5 million households), weatherization (500,000 homes), rooftop solar (400,000 homes), heat pumps (250,000 homes), grid expansion ($3 billion), schools ($5.8 billion), and other categories.

I am not going to address each of these recommendations because the choices and options listed seem to me more tailored to drumming up support for NYCI than anything else.  Anyway, these are proposed expenditures, not demonstrated results that do not reflect lessons learned from the investment of RGGI proceeds.  It is also flawed because it assumes idle resources—that workers and capital redirected to clean energy would not otherwise have been productively employed. With New York at record employment levels, this assumption is untenable.

Past Performance

Past performance does not guarantee future success, but a record of failure often predicts continued trouble. I have two concerns that are not addressed by either report that are evident in the RGGI program.

A cap-and-invest program has two overarching goals: emission reductions using a declining cap that limits emissions and provide funds for investments in programs that drive emission reductions.  However, these goals are often overlooked.  Governor Hochul’s core principles for NYCI are affordability, climate leadership, creating jobs and preserving competitiveness, investing in disadvantaged communities, and funding a sustainable future.  Only the last principle addresses the overarching goals.  The other principles provide guidance for how the money should be spent on political objectives.

The second problem is that the Needs Report cites RGGI as proof that “similar policies have been humming in our state for years.” NYCI supporters note that since the start of RGGI in 2009 emissions for units in that program are down 33%.  However, I have shown that the reason emissions have dropped is because NY power plants switched from using coal and oil to using natural gas because it was cheaper. Moreover, New York does not have a good emission-reduction track record when it comes to investment results from the existing RGGI cap-and-invest program.  Investments of RGGI auction proceeds only reduced emissions 4.2% and there should be no expectation that NYCI investments will fare much better.  The sources affected by NYCI do not have any cost-effective fuel switching alternatives that can provide reductions like those observed in the utility sector.  Unless NYCI emphasizes investments in programs that produce cost effective reductions then emissions will not fall as needed.  The NYCI cap on emissions means that energy will be rationed, if it appears that emissions will exceed the cap.

Rebates

The Needs Report explains that NYCI will dedicate at least 30% of its revenue, the largest slice of the program’s pie, to lowering energy costs for working families. The report claims that “these direct rebates are a central feature of the Clean Air Initiative and stand to lower the skyrocketing cost of living for millions of New Yorkers.”

However, the math shows that NYCI makes energy more expensive and only gives back a fraction of the increased costs. The Needs Report states that the 10-year revenues are $57.4 billion, the annual 30% set-aside for rebates is $1.72 billion and the annual rebates are $270 per household.  Using the NYSERDA memo projections I estimate that the 10-year revenues are $295 billion, the annual 30% set-aside for rebates is $8.84 billion and the annual rebates will be $1,360 per household. The NYSERDA memo projects household cost increases of $3,000–$4,100 per year. A $1,360 rebate offsets roughly 33-45% of those increased costs.  This is the textbook definition of a shell game: raise costs by thousands, rebate a fraction of the costs, and claim it as a “benefit.” 

Overall, if cap-and-invest revenues are projected at $295 billion over a decade, that is approximately $29.5 billion per year extracted from the economy. Giving back $1,360/per household to 6.5 million households costs roughly $8.85 billion—less than one-third of what is taken.  I remain unimpressed. 

Electrification Support

There is another unacknowledged issue.  The report assumes massive electrification (heat pumps, EVs, building retrofits) without addressing whether the electric grid can support the added load.  NYISO projects significant increases in electric load going forward, with electrification strategies and large load facilities (including data centers) adding substantial demand.  The State Energy Plan found that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient to meet statutory targets” and that the necessary acceleration in clean energy deployment is “infeasible today” due to “lack of market capacity”.  This all puts pressure on the ability to meet the NYCI cap on emissions which in turn increases the need for effective emission reduction investments.

Discussion

The  Needs Report follows the same formula documented in the earlier EDF/Greenline Insights report that I found had problems: benefits were overstated, costs were minimized or ignored, and the methodology was designed to produce a predetermined conclusion.  It looks like the report was released as a political counter to the NYSERDA memo documenting the real costs of CLCPA compliance. It was produced by advocacy organizations with a financial and institutional stake in the program’s implementation. It only addresses investment priorities and could not even come up with a reasonable estimate of operational costs.  This is not credible support for NYCI.

Conclusion

New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.  New York actions are not going to affect global warming.  There is a fundamental question that the report refuses to answer: if New Yorkers are going to see $295 billion extracted from their wallets over the next decade, would they be better off keeping that money and spending it according to their own priorities?  Until advocates can answer that question honestly, reports like this deserve to be recognized for what they are—lobbying documents, not economic analysis.

February 2026 Climate Act Issues

I was recently asked to give a briefing about Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) issues. The New York’s Legislature works on a two‑year term with annual sessions from January to (roughly) mid‑June, and the centerpiece of each year is enacting the state’s April 1 budget through an executive‑budget model.  This is relevant because the Climate Act was enacted during this process and there are aspects of the law that should be considered this session.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a reduction target of 40% less GHG emissions and a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”   Since the Scoping Plan was finalized in 2022, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.  As part of the implementation, the State updated its Energy Plan in 2024.

Climate Act Issues

My Climate Act issues briefing described the following key issues that need to be addressed:

  • The schedule and affordability impacts of the Climate Act can no longer be ignored
  • DEC needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements
  • PSC must address safety valve provisions
  • Recent news stories suggest that Hochul may propose revising GHG accounting again

Climate Act Implementation Schedule

It is no longer debatable that New York has fallen behind on its Climate Act transition plan 2030 mandates.  There is no question that the 70% renewable electricity by 2030 target will not be met because the percentage of renewable energy (28% of total generation) has stayed the same since 2019.  The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) annual load and capacity data report universally known as the “Gold Book” data over the last six years is shown in Table 1.  Note that the renewable percentage shown in the table is an overestimate because the NYISO references to renewable resources do not necessarily align with the New York State Clean Energy Standard definition. 

Table 1: NYISO Gold Book Annual Total and Renewable Summer Capability  and Generation

There is supposed to be a 40% reduction in economy‑wide GHG emissions by 2030.  I reviewed the 2025 NYS GHG Emission Inventory Report in my article Implications of New York State 2025 GHG Emissions Inventory.  I found that GHG emissions through 2023 are 14% less than the 1990 baseline and emissions have been basically unchanged since 2022. That makes meeting 2030 GHG emission reduction target of a 40% reduction impossible. 

Affordability and Rate Impacts

New York currently has an energy affordability crisis because as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.  My recent status summary of Climate Act affordability referenced an article about the observed rate impacts to date.  Kris Martin published a similar post that included a table ratepayer impacts. Table 2 summarizes recent electric rate cases (Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, O&R, NYSEG, and RG&E with an estimate of the Climate Act proportion.

Table 2: Typical 2024 Residential Electric Costs from What it costs

Department of Public Service (DPS) staff provides estimates of the impact of the Climate Act on electric rates.  The Second Informational Report “includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.”  According to the Summary of Ratepayer Impact for Electric Utilities table, residential impacts of the Climate Act range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 total monthly electric bills. 

In my opinion, those estimates are conservative because there is immense pressure on agency staff to minimize the costs of the Climate Act.  In addition, the costs necessary to implement the Climate Act were ramping up in 2023.  I expect that these costs will continue to climb.  Kris Martin also noted that the DPS estimates for future costs don’t include all the Renewable Energy Credits (REC) and OREC (offshore wind REC) costs that would be required to reach Climate Act targets—or even what they might realistically expect to complete. 

Also note that the State Attorney General Office is on the record that the current implementation schedule has an affordability liability.  Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted correspondence related to the litigation associated with Climate Act implementation that addressed affordability.  The State’s submittal  argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.  The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable: “Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.”

All these analyses have focused on utility rate case costs. The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSEDA) has not been forthcoming about total household costs but did offer a glimpse of those costs in the State Energy Plan as described in my post Energy Affordability Fact Sheet. 

The Fact Sheet summarizes selected results in the Energy Plan Energy Affordability Impacts Analysis.   NYERDA claimed that the use of “new, efficient equipment and electrification can cut energy spending by $100 to $300 every month for many New York households” in the Fact Sheet.  However, these projections do not cover the costs of the equipment to make the reductions.  Table 3 is derived from the NYSERDA supporting documentation and shows the monthly energy costs when equipment costs are included.

Table 3: Total Monthly Energy Costs Including Levelized Equipment Costs for an Upstate New York moderate income household that uses natural gas for heat projected monthly costs and hardware costs

NYSERDA modeled four household profiles ranging from doing nothing from the starting point to a 2031 “high efficient electrification” scenario that upgrades the building shell and electrifies conventional appliances, furnace and automobiles in an Upstate home that uses natural gas in 2025. The improvements in efficiency decreases monthly energy costs for all three journeys but when capital expenditures (CapEx) is considered that changes.  The cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment.  Row 10 shows this difference.  It lists the $594 increase in costs necessary for Climate Act compliance and row 11 lists the percentage increase as 43%.  The shortcomings of this analysis are described in my review of the Fact Sheet. It is even worse than shown here.

NYSERDA’s messaging for these results is that costs are going to go up anyway and that the increase in costs due to the Climate Act are small in comparison.  I think that additional costs will add more households to the already unacceptable number living in energy poverty.

Cap‑and‑Invest and GHG Regulatory Architecture

There are two aspects of the Climate Act mandate to implement an economy-wide cap-and-invest program by January 1, 2024 that must be addressed by the Legislature and Governor Hochul.   I have described the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations in many articles.  Currently DEC has only finalized the Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule.  There have been no suggestions when the two other regulations will be proposed.  The Cap-and-Invest Rule defines affected sources, binding caps, and allowance allocations.  DEC also needs an auction rule that implements the auction that will be used to distribute allowances.

This is problematic.  On 3/31/25 a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 date.  I explained that on 10/24/25 Supreme Court Judge Julian Schreibman’s decision stated that by 2/6/26 shall “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.  On 11/24/25 DEC appealed the decision.  On 1/8/26  the Albany County judge rejected the request for “reargument or reconsideration” but that does end the process.   The State has appealed to the Appellate Division.   This means that the deadline of Feb 6 is suspended until the Appellate Division rules.  Therefore, the State has no risk of being held in contempt and can safely ignore the deadline — which appears to be what is happening.   However, kicking the can down the road ignores the responsibility to reconsider what is obviously a failed prescription for energy policy.

The other NYCI issue is the DEC regulations.  The Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule was finalized December 1, 2025, but is so poorly written that I would be surprised if it gets litigated.  The auction rule regulation should not be an issue.  However, the Cap-and-Invest Rule will be controversial because there are non-trivial problems that have political consequences.  The rule will set the price trajectory for the costs of an allowance, but what price will be chosen.  There will be an increase in prices due to this rule that will have competitiveness impacts on industry.  The provision that 35 to 40% of revenues are supposed to benefit disadvantaged communities needs to address implementation logistics.  Will the funds be dispersed by direct rebates or targeted program spending?  The biggest DEC NYCI issue is the timing.  When will DEC propose these rules?

PSL 66-P Safety Valve

There is another important issue that must be resolved.  Climate Act proponents constantly state that the mandates are required by law no matter what but ignore the other associated law that includes safety valve provisions.  New York Public Service Law § 66-p “renewable energy systems” mandates define which generating sources are “renewable”.  Section 66-p (4) “Establishment of a renewable energy program” states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. 

Unfortunately, the PSC has not yet considered conducting a hearing.  Two petitions have been filed calling for such a hearing.  The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filing on 1/6/26 made a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.  On 8/12/25 the Independent Intervenors filing argued that there were affordability and reliability issues and that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded

On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.

Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  Stay tuned to this space for more information on how readers can force the State to be accountable for the issues described.

GHG Emission Accounting

There is another issue in the news.  In early February the Governor said that she is specifically interested in reconsidering the methodology by which the state tallies its emissions, explaining that New York’s unique 20-year metric puts the state at a disadvantage over other states that use a 100-year methodology to count their emissions. At the time the Climate Act was written it incorporated unique emissions accounting requirements that inflate the emission totals by increasing the effect of methane pollution. In my opinion, this irrational obsession with methane is misguided because, the higher impacts of methane are a laboratory artifact.  In the atmosphere, methane has less of an effect than CO2 on global warming.

In the 2023 Budget Season changing the accounting methodology was proposed because it would reduce the total GHG emissions and when NYCI kicks in that will translate to lower costs to New Yorkers.  In addition, using a unique methodology eliminates the possibility that the New York cap and invest program can be integrated into other jurisdictions’ programs.  In theory that would increase market efficiency and reduce costs. 

I applaud this pragmatic modification but shudder to think how climate advocates who got us into this mess will react.  Moreover, this is a peripheral issue compared to the others described.

Discussion

I have previously noted that decisions about the future of the Climate Act must be addressed.  The ideologues who fervently supported the promulgation of the Climate Act also zealously reject the possibility that changes are needed.  However, reality can no longer be ignored.  David Wojick recently described his report “Severe Climate Act impacts threaten New York State”.  His analysis addresses these issues and provides additional support explaining why action is needed.

Conclusion

There are significant Climate Act issues that can no longer be ignored.  Most targets are behind schedule, and the increased costs of the Climate Act will exacerbate the existing energy affordability crisis.  DEC needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements and will have to eventually respond to the litigation.  PSC must address safety valve provisions of PSL 66-P. 

Unfortunately, to be resolved all these Climate Act issues require political accountability.  The Climate Act has always been about political pandering to specific constituencies under the guise of saving the planet.  Therefore, I expect that all the inconvenient issues described will be ignored until after the election in hopes that the electorate will not catch on that the reliability of the state’s energy system is at risk and the energy system crisis will be aggravated by the Climate Act  for political gain. New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.  Implementing the Climate Act will have no effect on global warming and the purported co-benefits are illusory. 

I doubt that the Legislature or Governor will act on these issues this year as they try to placate those who deny reality by demanding no changes to the Climate Act and the rest of us. It is time for the rest of us to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

Investments for New York’s Future

According to a new report from Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, New Yorkers will “realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative.”  This article explains why this report is bogus on multiple levels.

I have extensive experience with market-based pollution control programs.  I have been involved in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I have also been following the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program and other similar programs in New York   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated

Clean Air Initiative

My first thought when I read this was what is the Clean Air Initiative?   The report states: “state agencies have developed proposals for an economy-wide cap-and-invest program – known as the Clean Air Initiative (CAI).”  I have been following the economy-wide cap-and-invest program and I was unaware of any agency calling the economy-wide program anything other than the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program.  So, I used Perplexity AI to ask if any New York agencies used CAI instead of NYCI.    The response stated:

No New York State agency officially refers to the cap-and-invest program as the “Clean Air Initiative.” Throughout all Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) official documentation, press releases, regulatory proposals, and public communications from 2023 through early 2026, the program is consistently designated as:

  • New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) – the primary official name
  • Cap-and-Invest Program – the standard reference

I believe the answer to why these organizations use this nomenclature is directly related to the mission of the organizations. Greenline Insights “provides non-partisan research to drive smart decision-making. We specialize in modeling, analysis, and policy design to maximize positive outcomes for local workforces, businesses, and communities.” Their description of services provided states: “We work with clients to develop compelling research questions and build the right mix of tools to answer them.”  Reading between that line I think it means that if a client wants a particular answer, they will get that result.

EDF claims “Guided by science and economics, and committed to climate justice, we work in the places, on the projects and with the people that can make the biggest difference.”  According to another Perplexity AI query EDF has “strongly supported the economy-wide cap and invest program proposal included in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) Scoping Plan” finalized in 2022 and since then “has engaged in extensive and sustained lobbying and advocacy efforts to advance New York’s economy-wide cap-and-invest program since early 2023.”  EDF has a vested interest in the success of an economy-wide program.

The Perplexity AI “Deep Research” response to my query about the use of CAI the AI program concluded “The Environmental Defense Fund and allied advocacy organizations strategically adopted “Clean Air Initiative” as alternative branding to frame the program around air quality and public health benefits in their campaigns to pressure Governor Hochul to finalize and implement the regulations.”

In other words, the Clean Air Initiative terminology  is all about the messaging.

Clean Air Initiative Claims

The January 8, 2026 CAI  report announcement states:

NEW YORK — New Yorkers will realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative, a new report from Environmental Defense Fund and Greenline Insights finds.  

The report comes as New Yorkers continue to await the launch of the Clean Air Initiative: an economywide cap-and-invest program that works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.” At the same time, energy affordability remains an issue that’s top of mind for New York voters.  

“Our analysis shows that the vast majority of New Yorkers are missing out on savings and economic opportunities across the state due to delays in implementing the Clean Air Initiative,” said Kate Courtin, Senior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy. “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.” 

The report finds that, over its first decade, the Clean Air Initiative would deliver: 

$6.9 billion in net savings, or an average of $1,060 per household earning $200k per year or less — about 85% of households in the state.  

Over 300,000 new jobs, with job growth strongest in fields like construction and transit as a result of investments in clean transportation services, decarbonization of buildings, and the build-out of clean energy infrastructure.

$48 billion in economic growth supported by program investments across the state. 

“The data is clear that the Clean Air Initiative is a potent job creator and economic development tool.” said Jonah Kurman-Faber, Founder and Principal at Greenline Insights. “The program’s investments play to the state’s economic strengths and provide meaningful financial benefits to an overwhelming majority of the population.” 

Pollution Control

EDF claims without any evidence that setting a cap ensures compliance with the arbitrary limits of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  The report claims that the “economywide cap-and-invest program works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.”  That is the theory.

I recently published several articles about RGGI, the existing New York cap-and-invest program for electric utility generating units that shows reality is different.  I showed that the reason NY utility emissions have dropped is because NY power plants switched from using coal and oil to using natural gas.  Natural gas emits less CO2 and was cheaper, so the observed reductions are mostly because of economic fuel switching not RGGI.  I compared the observed reductions and RGGI investment emission savings and found that the total cumulative annual emission savings represents a reduction of only 4.2% from the pre-RGGI baseline.  That comparison also found that the observed cost per ton of emissions removed is $583.  None of these results suggest that the CAI will work as claimed.

GHG emissions are directly related to energy generation.  When a GHG pollution control program caps emissions it caps energy use so capping emissions essentially rations energy use.   Combined with the RGGI results, that means that compliance with the cap can only occur if energy use is rationed

Economic Benefits

According to the announcement, Kate Courtin, Senior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy said that “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.”   I am not an economist so I submitted another Perplexity AI query asking about opportunity costs and the Greenline Insights analysis.  The summary notes:

The “Investments for New York’s Future” report by Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, released in January 2026, projects that New York’s Clean Air Initiative (cap-and-invest program) would generate $6.9 billion in household savings, create over 300,000 jobs, and support $48 billion in economic growth over the program’s first decade (2026-2035). While the specific methodological details of this report remain inaccessible through the provided URL, extensive research into Greenline Insights’ comparable analyses, standard input-output (I-O) modeling practices, and economic impact assessment literature reveals fundamental concerns about the treatment—or more precisely, the omission—of opportunity costs in such economic analyses.

Even a non-economist like me understands that if an analysis does not consider how the money raised by NYCI might have been used elsewhere is not considered, then that is a problem: 

Opportunity cost represents “the value of the alternative foregone by choosing a particular activity”—the benefits that could have been realized if the same resources were deployed differently. In climate policy analysis, this concept is essential because government spending and regulatory mandates redirect capital, labor, and productive resources from alternative uses. A comprehensive economic evaluation must compare not just the projected benefits of a policy against its direct costs, but also assess what economic activity would have occurred absent the intervention—the counterfactual baseline.

The response to my query raised the following issues with the Greenline Insights methodology:

1. The “Missing Peter” Problem

As economists from the Beacon Hill Institute articulated in critiquing renewable energy economic impact studies: “They are robbing Peter [existing economic activities] to pay Paul [the supported sector], and claiming the program increased total spending because now Paul spends more, but they ignore accounting for Peter”.

​

Every dollar collected through allowance auctions or allocated to climate investments is a dollar unavailable for alternative economic uses—whether private consumption, business investment in other sectors, or different government priorities. Standard I-O models “cannot compute possible reductions in output and jobs elsewhere in the economy, due to the reallocation of resources towards the supported project”.

2. Assumption of Idle Resources

The typical economic impact study assumes “that the dollar that flows through the industries identified by model’s I-O tables, and the resources that they are commanding, would not otherwise be used”. This assumption may be defensible during severe recessions with high unemployment and underutilized productive capacity, but becomes increasingly problematic as economies approach full employment.

New York State added over 1 million private sector jobs since April 2020 and reached record employment levels as of September 2024. In this context, labor and capital redirected to clean energy investments necessarily displace activity in other sectors. One analysis noted explicitly: “IMPLAN cannot be used to model nonresidential sector opportunity costs, so those were not included”—a tacit acknowledgment of the methodology’s inherent limitation.

3. No Counterfactual Baseline

Rigorous policy evaluation requires comparing outcomes under the policy scenario against a well-specified counterfactual: what would have happened in the policy’s absence. This counterfactual must account for:

  • Alternative deployment of capital: If the $61-126 billion in projected cap-and-invest revenues were instead left with households and businesses, what consumption and investment would occur?
  • Baseline economic trajectories: What job growth, wage increases, and economic output would materialize under business-as-usual conditions?
  • Displaced economic activity: Which sectors contract as resources shift toward clean energy, and what are the productivity implications?

Standard I-O models do not construct this counterfactual. They measure gross economic activity associated with program spending but do not subtract the economic activity that would have occurred with alternative resource allocation.

4. The Economist’s Critique

The academic economics community has long criticized the misapplication of I-O analysis for policy advocacy. As one prominent critique states: “There’s a joke among economists who look at economic impact studies, and we say ‘Define all costs as benefits, and double them'”. This captures the tendency of such analyses to:

  • Present gross job creation without netting out job displacement
  • Calculate multiplier effects on program spending without comparable analysis of opportunity cost multipliers
  • Report total economic output without addressing whether this represents additional output or reallocated output

The response to my query concludes:

For policymakers and stakeholders evaluating the economic case for New York’s Clean Air Initiative, this means:

  • The reported economic benefits are overstated to the extent they represent reallocation of economic activity rather than net additions
  • The true net economic impact depends on the relative productivity of clean energy investments versus displaced alternatives—a comparison the analysis does not make
  • The strongest case for the policy rests on climate and health benefits, not the economic multiplier effects emphasized in the report’s communications
  • More rigorous analysis following a similar Resources for the Future approach or comprehensive cost-benefit frameworks would provide better-informed decision-making

Conclusion

This report is simply a lobbying presentation that was commissioned by EDF to support their arguments that NYCI is a good idea.  One common aspect of all these analyses is that the benefits are overstated, the costs are minimized if not ignored, and the methodology is sketchy.  I do not think that any of the job estimates and economic projections are credible.

December 2025 New York Cap and Invest Program Update

There have been a couple of developments since my last status update on June 13, 2025 regarding the New York Cap and Invest (NYCI) Program. I previously described the decision issued on Oct. 24, 2025 by the Albany New York Supreme Court.  Last week the Hochul Administration appealed the ruling.  Last June I described the draft regulation that establishes mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reporting requirements.  The final rule has been released.  This post describes these items.

I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  I have worked on every market-based program that affected electric generating facilities in New York including the Acid Rain Program, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I follow and write about the RGGI and New York carbon pricing initiatives so my background is particularly suited for NYCI.   The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan that outlines how to achieve the targets was finalized at the end of 2022.  Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation. 

The CAC’s Scoping Plan recommended a market-based economywide cap-and-invest program.  NYCI is supposed to work by setting an annual cap on the amount of greenhouse gas pollution that is permitted to be emitted in New York: “The declining cap ensures annual emissions are reduced, setting the state on a trajectory to meet our greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements of 40% by 2030, and at least 85% from 1990 levels by 2050, as mandated by the Climate Act.”  Affected sources purchase permits to emit a ton (also known as allowances) and then surrender them at the end of the year to comply with the rule.  As is the case with all aspects of the Climate Act, this approach is not simple and is riddled with complications that make it unlikely that it will work as advocates expect.  I have explained  that proponent claims that the program will simultaneously raise money, ensure compliance, and be affordable are wishful thinking and have described other concerns on my Carbon Pricing Initiatives page.

To implement the carbon pricing initiative, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) has proposed three regulations: mandatory GHG emissions reporting, a cap-and-invest rule that sets the cap or limit on emissions, and an auction rulemaking that establishes how the allowances will be allocated.  The only regulation that was formally proposed this year was the reporting rule.

Court Decision and Order

On Oct. 24, 2025, the New York Supreme Court issued a decision and order in a case pitting environmental organizations against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC).  The decision explained that the Climate Act implementation plan has three steps:

  1. DEC was required to set emission limits for the reduction targets;
  2. The Climate Action Council, “an advisory group made up of 22 members with relevant expertise”, was given two years to prepare a Scoping Plan containing recommendations for “attaining statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits”; and
  3. The DEC was required to issue regulations that would achieve the mandated emissions reductions following the findings of the Scoping Plan.

The State met the first two requirements but the regulations that were supposed to be released by January 1, 2024, were not promulgated.  On March 31, 2025, a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging, among other things, that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe.

The Attorney General Office submitted a supplemental letter during the trial stated that argued that promulgating regulations for the Climate Act target would cause “undue harm”.  Nonetheless,  the judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed. 

The latest update is that DEC appealed the decision on November 25, 2025.  The table of contents of the argument gives three reasons: mandamus to compel applies only to ministerial acts, promulgation of regulations by the court’s deadline is impossible, and publication of proposed rulemaking by the court’s deadline is impossible.  The appeal concludes that “it is impossible for the Department to simultaneously comply with both the Court’s order and its substantive statutory obligations.”

I agree with the claim that it is impossible to comply with the regulation for the reasons given.  However, the Judge already ruled that DEC does not have the authority, however persuasive its arguments, not to comply with the law.  The law must be changed. 

Cap-and-Invest

The press release announcing the finalization of the proposed rule claimed that the data collected will “inform future strategies to reduce pollution”.

New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Amanda Lefton today announced the finalization of regulations establishing a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program. This rule will improve New York State’s understanding of the sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As a result of the rule and reporting mechanism, New York State will know more about the largest polluters in the State, including those affecting disadvantaged communities and other sensitive populations, and will be able to more effectively monitor the State’s progress toward pollution reduction goals. This effort also supports the production of the annual GHG Emissions Report and will protect against anticipated federal rollbacks to ensure New York’s essential air pollution information remains accessible.

As part of the 2025 State of the State Address, Governor Kathy Hochul directed DEC to advance a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program. DEC released draft regulations in March 2025 and received more than 3,000 public comments through July 1, 2025. DEC also offered informational webinars in May to better inform stakeholders’ public comments on the proposal and held hearings in June to collect feedback

.  

DEC made some changes to the proposal based on comments received that will include additional flexibility for the regulated community. The final regulation extends the verification reporting deadline for the first two years, changed the requirement from three years to one year for reporting from facilities that closed or ceased operations, and clarifies some terms and definitions and better aligns with federal reporting. 

DEC’s Mandatory GHG Reporting Program is for data collection only. It does not impose requirements for facilities to reduce GHG pollution or to obtain emission allowances. A facility required to report emissions will annually provide certain GHG emission data and information to DEC starting in June 2027 to reflect the previous year’s emissions. Certain large emission sources will also be required to verify their emissions data report annually using DEC-accredited third-party verification services. 

The rule also helps minimize potential reporting requirement costs by utilizing data already required to be reported under existing State and federal requirements and other mandatory reporting programs. In light of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s reconsideration of key federal air quality and GHG regulations, including the U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, DEC’s regulation will also serve as a backstop to ensure the ongoing availability of critical GHG information. 

I will follow up with another post on the details of the final rule and the responses to the comments I submitted.

Part 253 Schedule

The rulemaking documents for the adopted regulation is Part 253 – Mandatory GHG Reporting Program are available here.  There are so many issues associated with this plan I am going to have to do another post.  For this summary just consider one aspect of the schedule.  These observations are based on my personal experience reporting emissions in Environmental Protection Agency and DEC market-based programs starting in 1993.

A universal component of reporting requirements is the monitoring Plan. In this regulation the definition states:  

Part 253-1.7 Record Keeping (e) GHG Monitoring Plan

(1) The GHG monitoring plan shall include these elements:

(i) identification of positions of responsibility (i.e., job titles) for collection of the emissions data;

(ii) explanation of the processes and methods used to collect the necessary data for the GHG calculations; and

(iii) description of the procedures and methods that are used for quality assurance, maintenance, and repair of all continuous monitoring systems, flow meters, and other instrumentation used to provide data for the GHGs reported under this Part.

The description of the monitoring plan states that affected entities “must submit to the department a GHG monitoring plan by December 31, 2026.  Basically this document just describes how the data will be collected and submitted.

However, according to DEC’s Mandatory GHG Reporting website the first Emissions Data Report is due to the Department. Annual emissions reports are due June 1, 2027, and it states that emission data reports and verification statements for the 2026 emissions data year would be due in 2027.  For all previous market-based program emission reporting requirements iI have worked on, there was a phase-in period before required reporting started.  I did not see any mention of the obvious need for DEC to review and approve the monitoring plans. Part 253-1.7 Record Keeping (e) GHG Monitoring Plan states “Each facility operator or supplier that meets the thresholds in section 1.2(f) of this Part must submit to the department a GHG monitoring plan by December 31, 2026”.  Clearly, requiring emission data starting one month after the regulation was finalized, before affected sources can figure out how they will collect the data consistent with the regulation, before they are required to submit a monitoring plan, and before the DEC approves the monitoring plan is inappropriate and very likely subject to litigation.

Discussion

Even though the Court decision said DEC does not have the authority to not follow the law, the Hochul Administration is appealing the decision.  This is a transparent ploy to prevent the costs of NYCI affecting the regulation.

The first of three implementing regulations has been promulgated.  I will follow up with another post describing the implementation issues that are common throughout the regulation.  As I noted in my last NYCI update stakeholders have had trouble interpreting the proposed rules and have found inconsistencies with past practices that will make this program unnecessarily more complicated and time-consuming than necessary.  The comments from stakeholders who have the most experience with these programs appear to have been ignored.

Also note that this is the easiest of the three regulations.  There are few impactful components of the reporting requirements for the affected sources and almost no impact on the public.  All the tough decisions that will be controversial have been delayed until after the next gubernatorial election.

Conclusion

Activists continue to agitate for implementing NYCI faster in the hopes that this magical solution will work as advertised. However, it is not moving quickly despite litigation designed to quicken the pace.  The first of the three implementing regulations is out, and the results do not inspire confidence that the other rules will be well written.

New York Cap and Invest Litigation

Last March environmental activists sued the State of New York because the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) was not promulgating the regulations for the  New York Cap and Invest (NYCI) Program on schedule.  Last Friday, an Albany County judge heard arguments from the activists and the DEC.  A report suggests that the judge “will likely rule that New York is breaking its climate law.”

I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 550 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  My background is particularly suited for NYCI evaluation.  I have worked on every market-based program that affected electric generating facilities in New York including the Acid Rain Program, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I follow and write about the RGGI and New York carbon pricing initiatives. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan that outlines how to achieve the targets was finalized at the end of 2022.  Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.  NYCI is but one example of that effort.

Cap-and-Invest

The CAC’s Scoping Plan recommended a market-based economywide cap-and-invest program.  NYCI is supposed to work by setting an annual cap on the amount of greenhouse gas pollution that is permitted to be emitted in New York: “The declining cap ensures annual emissions are reduced, setting the state on a trajectory to meet our greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements of 40% by 2030, and at least 85% from 1990 levels by 2050, as mandated by the Climate Act.”  Affected sources purchase permits to emit a ton (also known as allowances) and then surrender them at the end of the year to comply with the rule.  Colin Kinniburgh’s description at New York Focus describes the activist’s theory of a cap-and-invest program as a program that will kill two birds with one stone.  “It simultaneously puts a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — ‘cap’ — while making them pay for each ton, funding projects to help move the state away from polluting energy sources — ‘invest.'” 

As is the case with all aspects of the Climate Act, this approach is not simple and is riddled with complications that make it unlikely that it will work as advocates expect.  I have summarized my concerns on my Carbon Pricing Initiatives page.  Furthermore, the implementation timetable promulgated by politicians mandated a schedule at odds to the scope and challenge of an economy-wide market-based program.  Even if a direct charge on fossil emissions was not a politically charged issue, it is no surprise that DEC implementation is late.

NYCI Lawsuit

Colin Kinniburgh, writing at NY Focus, published a series of articles describing the background of this issue.  After Governor Hochul’s State of the State address in January he explained that Hochul promised to release NYCI regulations but back-tracked on that promise.

In March he summarized the lawsuit:

Four environmental and climate justice groups filed a lawsuit Monday in a state court, claiming that New York is “stonewalling necessary climate action in outright violation” of its legal obligations. By not releasing economy-wide emissions rules, the suit alleges, the state Department of Environmental Conservation, or DEC, is “defying the Legislature’s clear directive” and “prolonging New Yorkers’ exposure to air pollution … especially in disadvantaged communities.”

It’s the first lawsuit to charge the state with failing to enforce the core mandate of its 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, or CLCPA: eliminating nearly all of New York’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The law tasks DEC with crafting rules to get there and to reach an interim target of 40 percent emissions cuts by 2030.

The state’s deadline to release those rules was Jan. 1, 2024 — a date the agency blew past. More than a year later, New York has yet to issue even draft rules, and it’s becoming less and less clear that it intends to do so, even though, throughout last year, Governor Kathy Hochul’s administration promised that it was working on them as quickly as possible.

Kinniburgh described the hearing as follows:

Ulster County Supreme Court Justice Julian Schreibman on Friday skewered a lawyer for the state Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) who argued that the state could not issue required regulations to cut greenhouse gases any time soon.

“It seems to me that the core of your argument is that we’re living in a time of change and uncertainty, and DEC needs to be given some leeway to accommodate that,” Schreibman said.

“That’s correct, your honor,” replied Meredith Lee-Clark, of the New York State Attorney General’s office, who was representing DEC.

“I don’t know that I’ve ever lived in a time that wasn’t one of change and uncertainty, so I don’t know how that is a governable standard,” the judge continued.

Schreibman went on to say that the most relevant cases in the record “almost compel” him to side with the plaintiffs: four climate justice groups who sued the state for violating its climate law by failing to issue regulations needed to meet it.

However, he suggested that he is unlikely to force the state to take action on the kind of timeline the plaintiffs’ lawyer suggested in the hearing — as little as 30 days to issue draft regulations and 100 days to finalize them.

I am no lawyer, but it does not seem that the DEC has much of an argument.  They are not meeting the timetable.  Whether that is a “governable standard” is another issue because there have never been a demonstration that the schedule and ambition of the Climate Act has never been shown to be feasible.  It is not clear if that issue can be addressed in this case.

NYCI Implications

In my most recent post discussing NYCI I addressed the first of the three implanting regulations for NYCI.  The regulation establishes reporting requirements necessary to determine how much affected sources will have to pay for the right to emit carbon dioxide emissions.  I made a general point for the uninitiated, that implementing a rule like others already in place elsewhere seemingly should be simple and straightforward.  The reasoning goes something like this: California has a similar program in place, so all New York needs to do is to convert their rules for use in New York.  It is not that easy.  For starters, California took upwards of ten years with a large staff to develop their rules.  NYCI implementation started in early January 2023 and DEC has many fewer staff.  Furthermore, the Climate Act has unique emissions definitions which makes simple substitution impossible. Finally, there are significant differences between the energy system nomenclature in the states.  In my opinion, DEC did a remarkable job getting something out.  Unfortunately, the proposed rule shows signs of haste and lack of understanding of the nuances of emission reporting.

The “30 days to issue draft regulations and 100 days to finalize them” timeline suggested by the plaintiffs’ lawyer is absurd.  It is inconsistent with the New York Administrative Procedure Act timing requirements for starters.  They could argue that it should be subject to an emergency rulemaking, but the implementation regulations are all complex and there is very weak rationale for this as an emergency.   

Unfortunately, there will likely be pressure now on DEC to accelerate a process that already shows signs of poor rulemaking.  Poorly designed regulations will have unintended consequences that will further weaken what I believe is a doomed policy.

Discussion

I have made this point before, but it bears repeating.  I am convinced that no GHG emission reduction cap-and-invest program like NYCI can successfully put a constraining limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit while making them pay to fund projects to help move the state away from polluting energy sources.  Danny Cullenward and David Victor’s book Making Climate Policy Work explains why.    They note that the level of expenditures needed to implement the net-zero transition vastly exceeds the “funds that can be readily appropriated from market mechanisms”. 

The indications are that NYCI regulations will be based on political considerations.  The prices for allowances will be based on what the Hochul Administration expects will be politically feasible not what is needed to fund needed reductions.  In any event, the plan for allocating the proceeds does not set a priority on funding emission reduction programs and includes several set asides to politically connected constituencies.  The politically designed reduction targets are inconsistent with the observed deployment of the control strategies.  NYCI will set a cap that will inevitably be too difficult to achieve, triggering an artificial energy shortage.  This will also exacerbate the designed increase in energy costs.  The end result will be increased costs and increased reliability risks.

Conclusion

I don’t think this lawsuit will have much of an impact on NYCI.  You cannot speed up implementation by issuing an order.  Throw in the political reluctance to speed up the process and I see minimal schedule changes.  In the meantime, the impending energy affordability crisis hopefully will trigger reconsideration of the whole transition.

This lawsuit is the first of many.  When the politicians set emission reduction targets without considering feasibility it was inevitable that they could not be achieved.  Political will is a great slogan but a poor driver for energy policy.