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Time to Reconsider the Climate Act Press Release

UPDATE: Two weeks after this was published I can safely now say that nobody I contacted responded. I thought that showing that $593 per month in added energy expenses would have prompted some kind of response.

A recent court decision and findings presented at the 1 December 2025 State Energy Planning (SEP) Board meeting present overwhelming evidence that implementing the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act)  as mandated will be unaffordable and the 2030 CLCPA 40% emission reduction target and 70% renewable energy in the electric system mandate will not be achieved.  I don’t think that most New Yorkers are aware of the Climate Act much less its potential impacts, so I prepared a press release that I distributed to various New York press outlets explaining why it is time to reconsider the Climate Act.   This article documents the findings included in the press release and refers to recent articles published on this blog.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two interim 2030 targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy and GHG emissions must be reduced 40%.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantified the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation. 

Note there is a second implementation law.  Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a renewable energy program, that requires the Public Service Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 electric system Climate Act requirements.  

Energy Plan Overview

In 2025 another overarching evaluation of the energy system was initiated.  According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) released the Draft Energy Plan last summer.  Stakeholder comments were accepted until early October.  The Energy Planning Board has the responsibility to approve the document. At the November 13, 2025 Board meeting there was a perfunctory description of the comments received.  There was another meeting on December 1 that presented results from additional analyses.  During the wrap up for the latest meeting Chair Doreen Harris said the Board will meet later this month to approve the plan. I have provided background information and a list of relevant articles on my Energy Plan page. 

Court Decision

On Oct. 24, 2025, there was an Albany County New York Supreme Court decision ordering the Department of Environmental Conservation to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.   On November 3, I published an article providing detailed information about the decision. 

In another article I explained that during the legal process the State submitted a letter that addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Act.”  The letter argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”. 

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

The Judge acknowledged that this information was relevant but ruled that DEC must promulgate regulations implementing a law however persuasive their arguments it is inappropriate are. The Hochul Administration and DEC appealed the decision on November 25, 2025 claiming that “it is impossible for the Department to simultaneously comply with both the Court’s order and its substantive statutory obligations.” 

Energy Affordability

In addition to the Attorney General’s supplemental letter arguing that the Climate Act is unaffordable, there were findings presented at the State Energy Planning (SEP) Board meeting on December 1, 2025 that present extraordinary cost estimates.  My article on the Energy Affordability presentation at the meeting documents the projections for a moderate-income household in Upstate New York that uses natural gas.  My article found the difference between replacement of conventional existing equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment necessary for CLCPA compliance increases monthly average energy expenditures $593 when capital costs are considered. That number was in a slide but there was only passing mention of the cost.

I derived explanatory numbers from information presented at the SEP Board meeting.  The following energy affordability analysis slide summarizes the projection approach.  It explains that for eleven household profiles, NYSERDA evaluated future household and transportation energy expenditures for four cases involving different technology mixes and fuel types.  These “Illustrative Household Journeys” include:

  • Starting Point: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with average existing equipment
  • Conventional Replacement: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with new, more efficient equipment
  • Moderate Efficient Electrification: Some electrification of heating and transportation, with basic building envelope efficiency measures
  • High Efficient Electrification: More electrification of heating and transportation, with basic or medium building envelope efficiency measures, and efficient electric appliances

Slides were presented that describe the four journeys for several profiles.   My numbers were derived from the typical Upstate moderate-income household that uses natural gas for heat household profile.  This was the only profile that included all the information needed to project total cost.  In the following slide,  three projected “household journeys” reduce monthly energy expenditures relative to the current starting point.  However, buried at the bottom of the page is the notation that these values are “Average monthly expenditures. Does not include equipment costs”. 

It turns out that including equipment costs makes a difference as shown in the next slide.

I extracted information from these slides to prepare Table 1.  Rows 1-4 list the monthly energy expenditures with the total in row 5 from the first slide.  The increase in efficiency decreases monthly energy costs for all three journeys but that changes when CapEx is considered.  The CapEx monthly total cost in row 6 is available on the second slide.  However, the breakdown between the costs of a new plugin hybrid electric vehicle (moderate electrification) in row 7 and a battery electric vehicle (high efficiency electrification) relative to home energy electrification row 8 is not listed on the included slides.  I estimated the percentage of home electrification from the size of the blue bars on the right side of the second slide. (Row 10). When the CapEx costs are included all the projected alternative journeys are more expensive.  Row 9 lists the total monthly energy costs including the costs of equipment from the second slide.  The cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment.  Row 12 lists the $593 difference  necessary for Climate Act compliance and row 11 lists the 43% increase in energy costs. 

Table 1: Upstate New York Moderate Income Household That Uses Natural Gas for Heat Projected Monthly Costs and Costs Necessary to Comply with the Climate Act

The affordability messaging is embedded in this table.  I prepared an annotated transcript for this presentation that includes a heading for questions made during the meeting with a link to each person who commented or asked a question. I believe that this presentation and the questions asked was scripted to further the messaging of the Administration.  Chair Doreen Harris of the Energy Planning Board asked NYSERDA presenter James Wilcox about energy price uncertainty.  He admitted that the key driver of change over the next five years is “change in energy price”.  The modeling shows that this could increase household energy spending 3% to 8% in the starting point base case but could go up to as much as 14% to 19% even if they do nothing.  Chair Harris elicited a response from him that summarizes the public messaging: “That is what I was trying to elicit: What does doing nothing get you?”  Even if you do nothing costs could rise as much as 19%.  That is misleading because the equipment costs are the main causes of future cost not changes in energy prices.

The presentations emphasized that Climate Act costs are not the primary energy cost increase driver and that multiple factors beyond climate policy contribute to expected costs.  The other implementation cost message in the NYSERDA presentations is that the additional costs to meet the Climate Act mandates are smaller than expected cost increases.  This table quantifies that claim.  If this example household replaces its internal combustion car with another one and replaces household appliances with natural gas appliances total costs will go up $868 from $506 to $1,374.  The cost to meet the Climate Act mandates beyond conventional replacement is “only”  $593 more which is less than the cost of conventional replacement. 

I think the magnitude of these impacts are being downplayed as much as possible.  After I published my analysis I went to the Draft Energy Plan supporting documentation page and reviewed the Energy Affordability Outputs and Input Data spreadsheet.  The equipment costs are only provided as a sensitivity for one household. I think that this is by design because these costs are so extraordinary.  I believe these numbers indicate a serious energy affordability crisis is coming.  In my opinion, including an additional 43% cost increase is unconscionable.  New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.  New York cannot solve global warming by itself. 

Implementation Timing

I summarized my initial thoughts about the Pathways Analysis presentation at the December SEP Planning Board meeting.  The presentation found that neither the CLCPA 40% GHG emission reduction target nor the electric system 70% renewable energy mandate would be achieved on time.  The “Key Takeaways (3/3)” Slide (#31) in the meeting presentation states that “the state is currently not on track to meet the 2030 emission limit – Current Policies is estimated to hit 40% reduction in 2038 while Additional Action is estimated to hit 40% reduction in 2037.” 

The Electric Sector Results: Additional Action slide (#21) states that “Pace of additions leads to delayed achievement of 70% renewable to 2036-2040”.

Discussion

The Court Decision and the Energy Plan findings are not the only reasons given by state agencies that it would be appropriate to reconsider the Climate Act.  I described three other findings in an article last month. The New York State Comptroller Office audit of the NYSERDA and PSC  implementation efforts for the Climate Act was an early acknowledgement that the implementation plan needs to be revised.  The Public Service Commission (PSC) compared the renewable energy deployment progress relative to the Climate Act goal to obtain 70% of New York’s electricity from renewable sources by 2030. The final Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review Report document found that 2030 goal will likely not be achieved until 2033.  Finally, The Second Informational Report prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff described four feasibility concerns: the 2030 renewable energy target is “likely unattainable”, offshore wind faces major obstacles, transmission remains a “critical bottleneck”, and grid reliability challenges are mounting

There have been other recent articles arguing that New York has impossible targets.  David Wojick recently published an article explaining implementation issues that I backed up with observed data.  Tom Shepstone describes a New York Post editorial that cites a Progressive Policy Institute article that calls the Climate Act an “undeniable” failure.

These findings should inspire the Hochul Administration to amend the  Climate Act.  It is troubling that the SEP Board meeting presentations did not mention these ramifications in the presentation.  Furthermore, there has been no sign that the Hochul Administration or the majority leadership in the Legislature are amenable to considering amendments to the Climate Act.

Conclusion

I was motivated to publish this and distribute it to the media because these findings have significant implications for the future New York energy system.  In the near term, something must be done to reconcile the reality that the CLCPA schedule is too ambitious to have any hope of compliance.  More importantly, the findings described should become the basis for a discussion of more New Yorkers.  As it stands now New York energy policy is being guided by a small but extremely vocal and motivated constituency that does not understand the physics of the energy system.  Thomas Sowell has been quoted as saying: “It is hard to imagine a more stupid or more dangerous way of making decisions than by putting those decisions in the hands of people who pay no price for being wrong”.  In this instance, there is nothing more stupid or dangerous than ignoring the people who will pay the price if there are problems with the energy system.

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Climate Act Fork in the Road

I recently described the Oct. 24, 2025,  New York Albany Supreme Court decision pitting environmental organizations against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC).  The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed.  I have argued for months that there are so many issues coming up with the schedule and ambition of the Climate Act that it is obvious that we need to pause implementation and consider modifications to the Climate Act.  This post summarizes the findings by the State of New York that support that position.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

For this overview of New York State findings, I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.

Court Decision

The most important reason that the Legislature should consider revisions to the Climate Act is the recent court case.  Environmental organizations initiated this lawsuit because the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) did not promulgate regulations as mandated by the Climate Act.  The State agued that regulations were inappropriate but Judge Schreibman’s decision stated that:

DEC does not have the discretion to say no or to decide that it has the authority to choose not to follow the express legislative directive at issue. Under our system of separation of powers, upon concluding, based on its subject-matter expertise, that achieving the goals of the Climate Act might be “infeasible” for the reasons stated, DEC had two options. One, it could issue compliant regulations anyway, and let the chips fall where they may for the State’s political actors. Or, two, it could raise its concerns to the Legislature so that the State’s elected representatives could make a determination about what costs their constituents can or cannot bear in the pursuit of reining in climate change.

This decision should prompt the Legislature to address the concerns raised by DEC.  Furthermore, there are other State analyses that indicate that changes are in order as described below.

State Supplemental Letter

As part of the legal wrangling associated with the trial Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted further correspondence related to the litigation.  The State’s submittal  addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’s (the Climate Act) goals in a timely manner.” 

The State of New York argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.  The following paragraph concedes that there are significant upfront cost issues that out-weigh other benefits.

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

Comptroller Audit

The New York State Comptroller Office audit of the NYSERDA and PSC  implementation efforts for the Climate Act was an early acknowledgement that the implementation plan needs to be revised.  The report titled Climate Act Goals – Planning, Procurements, and Progress Tracking (“Comptroller Report”) found issues that question the current plan.  The Perplexity AI summary concludes that “the audit reveals critical deficiencies in planning, cost assessment, risk management, and progress tracking” and notes that “With outdated data, calculation errors, project cancellations, technology limitations, transmission constraints, and escalating costs all threatening goal achievement, the audit calls for immediate action to improve planning and transparency.”

Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review

The Public Service Commission (PSC) released the draft  Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review Report (“Biennial Report”) in July 2024.  It compares the renewable energy deployment progress relative to the Climate Act goal to obtain 70% of New York’s electricity from renewable sources by 2030 (the 70% goal). The final document found that 2030 goal will likely not be achieved until 2033. The Perplexity AI summary describes seven key factors impeding progress.

  1. Global economic pressures,
  2. Transmission system inadequacies,
  3. Interconnection delays,
  4. Capacity accreditation changes,
  5. Federal policy uncertainty,
  6. Siting and permitting complexity, and
  7. Increasing electric load.

All these factors are part of the lessons learned since the implementation of the Climate Act that began five years ago.  I think this shows that the Legislature needs to address the schedule and ambition of the law.

Second Informational Report

The Climate Act requires the Department of Public Service (DPS) to prepare an annual report as described in the following slide from the presentation that summarizes the report. 

The Second Informational Report (Report) prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff “focuses on Commission actions from January 2023 through August 2025, and includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.”  According to the Perplexity AI summary there are four feasibility concerns: the 2030 renewable energy target is “likely unattainable”, offshore wind faces major obstacles, transmission remains a “critical bottleneck”, and grid reliability challenges are mounting.  There also are cost trajectory concerns.  Despite the report’s careful messaging—”emphasizing that CLCPA costs are not the primary bill driver and that multiple factors beyond climate policy contribute to rate increases” – it cannot hide the magnitude of the challenges to meet the Climate Act requirements schedule. 

Draft State Energy Plan

The Energy Plan process is currently underway.  The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) is processing stakeholder comments on the draft document for the Energy Planning Board to consider when it decides whether to approve the draft.  I recently highlighted New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) comments on the Draft Energy Plan recommendations.  There are six extensive quotations from the Draft Energy Plan that NYISO supports that represent previously unacknowledged concerns about the Climate Act ambition and schedule:

  1. The State will need to be strategic about the pace of combustion unit retirements and/or replacement
  2. Combustion generating units will remain essential parts of electric grid reliability and affordability. Retirement of these units will not be able to occur until resources that provide the same grid reliability attributes are put in place.
  3. A primary challenge for New York’s energy system is its advancing age, which creates unique risks for reliability.
  4. The State will need to be strategic in identifying and integrating clean firm technologies that have the attributes necessary to support the achievement of a zero emissions electric grid by 2040.
  5. For the electricity system, continue to incorporate the impacts of climate change into future reliability planning scenarios.
  6. Consider whether the current reliability-related metrics should be supplemented given the evolving nature of the grid and increased risks of high-impact reliability events

The Perplexity AI summary concludes that:

The 2025 Draft State Energy Plan represents New York’s effort to reconcile the CLCPA’s statutory mandates with economic, technical, and political realities that have emerged since 2019. By acknowledging that key deadlines will be missed while maintaining long-term decarbonization objectives, the plan shifts from aspirational targets to pragmatic pathways.

Discussion

Judge Schreibman’s decision is very straightforward.  The law says that regulations must be promulgated to meet the Climate Act mandates so DEC must either do that or get the Legislature to modify the law.  If the Hochul Administration cynically appeals the decision, it is simply a politically-motivated delaying tactic to kick the resolution off until after the gubernatorial primary and state-wide election in late 2026.  Because there is so much evidence that the schedule and ambition of the law are infeasible, the Legislature should address the law, however unpopular lessons learned reality will be to the environmentalist community.

Bill Gates recently argued that climate change is not going to wipe out humanity and that we need to “put human welfare at the center of our climate strategies.”.   That is another argument for modifying the Climate Act.  Even if the premise of the Climate Act that human emissions of greenhouse gases is a primary driver of observed warming is true, New York cannot solve climate change by itself.  New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.

In my opinion, the best way to proceed is to modify the law.  Revisions should couple a revised Climate Act schedule with clearly defined standards for affordability, reliability, and environmental impacts.  A trackable metric for each should be developed and a tracking system put in place.  The key point is that the law should be modified so that there are requirements to modify the mandates when those metrics are exceeded.  In short, the safety valve provisions of Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P should be modified and incorporated into the Climate Act. 

The process to establish these metrics should incorporate extensive public participation.  New Yorkers need to understand the range of costs, impacts on personal choice, and changes to lifestyles that are buried in the Scoping Plan and Energy Plan.  If the safety valve metrics have reasonable limits, I expect that affordability, reliability, and environmental impact targets will be exceeded as soon as tracking begins.   That is the point.  Eliminating fossil fuels sounds has been portrayed as simple and cheap but the reality is very different.  Accepting that and developing a new way forward is necessary.

Conclusion

There is overwhelming evidence that something must give in the energy transition.  The Climate Act has always been about politics and money. The authors of the Climate Act mistakenly believed that the energy transition would be simple and cheap.  Experience shows otherwise.  It is long past time for the politicians to revisit the Climate Act and make the proposed energy transition accountable.  Unfortunately, there is a politically connected constituency that is dependent upon the status quo for their business plans.

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Attention New Visitors

The articles on this blog reflect my background as an environmental and energy analyst in the electric utility business.  Writing on behalf of industry requires documentation and backup for anything submitted as part of a regulatory proceeding.  Articles here provide that information so that readers have enough information to decide whether what I say is and is not true. .  However, it also means the posts can be dense, long, and include technical jargon. 

If you are interested in the material but do not want to wade everything in the posts, there is an alternative.  I prepare a fortnightly summary of posts that describes my recent posts with minimal technical jargon and includes links if you want to read the entire post.

If that is of interest there are two options.  For an email edition you can sign up by contacting me via the contact link at the top of this page or by sending an email to NYpragmaticenvironmentalist@gmail.com . The other option is to subscribe to my Substack where I publish a copy of the summary.  Click on this summary and there is an option to subscribe to future summaries.  

Investments for New York’s Future

According to a new report from Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, New Yorkers will “realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative.”  This article explains why this report is bogus on multiple levels.

I have extensive experience with market-based pollution control programs.  I have been involved in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I have also been following the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program and other similar programs in New York   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated

Clean Air Initiative

My first thought when I read this was what is the Clean Air Initiative?   The report states: “state agencies have developed proposals for an economy-wide cap-and-invest program – known as the Clean Air Initiative (CAI).”  I have been following the economy-wide cap-and-invest program and I was unaware of any agency calling the economy-wide program anything other than the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program.  So, I used Perplexity AI to ask if any New York agencies used CAI instead of NYCI.    The response stated:

No New York State agency officially refers to the cap-and-invest program as the “Clean Air Initiative.” Throughout all Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) official documentation, press releases, regulatory proposals, and public communications from 2023 through early 2026, the program is consistently designated as:

  • New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) – the primary official name
  • Cap-and-Invest Program – the standard reference

I believe the answer to why these organizations use this nomenclature is directly related to the mission of the organizations. Greenline Insights “provides non-partisan research to drive smart decision-making. We specialize in modeling, analysis, and policy design to maximize positive outcomes for local workforces, businesses, and communities.” Their description of services provided states: “We work with clients to develop compelling research questions and build the right mix of tools to answer them.”  Reading between that line I think it means that if a client wants a particular answer, they will get that result.

EDF claims “Guided by science and economics, and committed to climate justice, we work in the places, on the projects and with the people that can make the biggest difference.”  According to another Perplexity AI query EDF has “strongly supported the economy-wide cap and invest program proposal included in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) Scoping Plan” finalized in 2022 and since then “has engaged in extensive and sustained lobbying and advocacy efforts to advance New York’s economy-wide cap-and-invest program since early 2023.”  EDF has a vested interest in the success of an economy-wide program.

The Perplexity AI “Deep Research” response to my query about the use of CAI the AI program concluded “The Environmental Defense Fund and allied advocacy organizations strategically adopted “Clean Air Initiative” as alternative branding to frame the program around air quality and public health benefits in their campaigns to pressure Governor Hochul to finalize and implement the regulations.”

In other words, the Clean Air Initiative terminology  is all about the messaging.

Clean Air Initiative Claims

The January 8, 2026 CAI  report announcement states:

NEW YORK — New Yorkers will realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative, a new report from Environmental Defense Fund and Greenline Insights finds.  

The report comes as New Yorkers continue to await the launch of the Clean Air Initiative: an economywide cap-and-invest program that works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.” At the same time, energy affordability remains an issue that’s top of mind for New York voters.  

“Our analysis shows that the vast majority of New Yorkers are missing out on savings and economic opportunities across the state due to delays in implementing the Clean Air Initiative,” said Kate Courtin, Senior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy. “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.” 

The report finds that, over its first decade, the Clean Air Initiative would deliver: 

$6.9 billion in net savings, or an average of $1,060 per household earning $200k per year or less — about 85% of households in the state.  

Over 300,000 new jobs, with job growth strongest in fields like construction and transit as a result of investments in clean transportation services, decarbonization of buildings, and the build-out of clean energy infrastructure.

$48 billion in economic growth supported by program investments across the state. 

“The data is clear that the Clean Air Initiative is a potent job creator and economic development tool.” said Jonah Kurman-Faber, Founder and Principal at Greenline Insights. “The program’s investments play to the state’s economic strengths and provide meaningful financial benefits to an overwhelming majority of the population.” 

Pollution Control

EDF claims without any evidence that setting a cap ensures compliance with the arbitrary limits of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  The report claims that the “economywide cap-and-invest program works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.”  That is the theory.

I recently published several articles about RGGI, the existing New York cap-and-invest program for electric utility generating units that shows reality is different.  I showed that the reason NY utility emissions have dropped is because NY power plants switched from using coal and oil to using natural gas.  Natural gas emits less CO2 and was cheaper, so the observed reductions are mostly because of economic fuel switching not RGGI.  I compared the observed reductions and RGGI investment emission savings and found that the total cumulative annual emission savings represents a reduction of only 4.2% from the pre-RGGI baseline.  That comparison also found that the observed cost per ton of emissions removed is $583.  None of these results suggest that the CAI will work as claimed.

GHG emissions are directly related to energy generation.  When a GHG pollution control program caps emissions it caps energy use so capping emissions essentially rations energy use.   Combined with the RGGI results, that means that compliance with the cap can only occur if energy use is rationed

Economic Benefits

According to the announcement, Kate Courtin, Senior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy said that “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.”   I am not an economist so I submitted another Perplexity AI query asking about opportunity costs and the Greenline Insights analysis.  The summary notes:

The “Investments for New York’s Future” report by Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, released in January 2026, projects that New York’s Clean Air Initiative (cap-and-invest program) would generate $6.9 billion in household savings, create over 300,000 jobs, and support $48 billion in economic growth over the program’s first decade (2026-2035). While the specific methodological details of this report remain inaccessible through the provided URL, extensive research into Greenline Insights’ comparable analyses, standard input-output (I-O) modeling practices, and economic impact assessment literature reveals fundamental concerns about the treatment—or more precisely, the omission—of opportunity costs in such economic analyses.

Even a non-economist like me understands that if an analysis does not consider how the money raised by NYCI might have been used elsewhere is not considered, then that is a problem: 

Opportunity cost represents “the value of the alternative foregone by choosing a particular activity”—the benefits that could have been realized if the same resources were deployed differently. In climate policy analysis, this concept is essential because government spending and regulatory mandates redirect capital, labor, and productive resources from alternative uses. A comprehensive economic evaluation must compare not just the projected benefits of a policy against its direct costs, but also assess what economic activity would have occurred absent the intervention—the counterfactual baseline.

The response to my query raised the following issues with the Greenline Insights methodology:

1. The “Missing Peter” Problem

As economists from the Beacon Hill Institute articulated in critiquing renewable energy economic impact studies: “They are robbing Peter [existing economic activities] to pay Paul [the supported sector], and claiming the program increased total spending because now Paul spends more, but they ignore accounting for Peter”.

​

Every dollar collected through allowance auctions or allocated to climate investments is a dollar unavailable for alternative economic uses—whether private consumption, business investment in other sectors, or different government priorities. Standard I-O models “cannot compute possible reductions in output and jobs elsewhere in the economy, due to the reallocation of resources towards the supported project”.

2. Assumption of Idle Resources

The typical economic impact study assumes “that the dollar that flows through the industries identified by model’s I-O tables, and the resources that they are commanding, would not otherwise be used”. This assumption may be defensible during severe recessions with high unemployment and underutilized productive capacity, but becomes increasingly problematic as economies approach full employment.

New York State added over 1 million private sector jobs since April 2020 and reached record employment levels as of September 2024. In this context, labor and capital redirected to clean energy investments necessarily displace activity in other sectors. One analysis noted explicitly: “IMPLAN cannot be used to model nonresidential sector opportunity costs, so those were not included”—a tacit acknowledgment of the methodology’s inherent limitation.

3. No Counterfactual Baseline

Rigorous policy evaluation requires comparing outcomes under the policy scenario against a well-specified counterfactual: what would have happened in the policy’s absence. This counterfactual must account for:

  • Alternative deployment of capital: If the $61-126 billion in projected cap-and-invest revenues were instead left with households and businesses, what consumption and investment would occur?
  • Baseline economic trajectories: What job growth, wage increases, and economic output would materialize under business-as-usual conditions?
  • Displaced economic activity: Which sectors contract as resources shift toward clean energy, and what are the productivity implications?

Standard I-O models do not construct this counterfactual. They measure gross economic activity associated with program spending but do not subtract the economic activity that would have occurred with alternative resource allocation.

4. The Economist’s Critique

The academic economics community has long criticized the misapplication of I-O analysis for policy advocacy. As one prominent critique states: “There’s a joke among economists who look at economic impact studies, and we say ‘Define all costs as benefits, and double them'”. This captures the tendency of such analyses to:

  • Present gross job creation without netting out job displacement
  • Calculate multiplier effects on program spending without comparable analysis of opportunity cost multipliers
  • Report total economic output without addressing whether this represents additional output or reallocated output

The response to my query concludes:

For policymakers and stakeholders evaluating the economic case for New York’s Clean Air Initiative, this means:

  • The reported economic benefits are overstated to the extent they represent reallocation of economic activity rather than net additions
  • The true net economic impact depends on the relative productivity of clean energy investments versus displaced alternatives—a comparison the analysis does not make
  • The strongest case for the policy rests on climate and health benefits, not the economic multiplier effects emphasized in the report’s communications
  • More rigorous analysis following a similar Resources for the Future approach or comprehensive cost-benefit frameworks would provide better-informed decision-making

Conclusion

This report is simply a lobbying presentation that was commissioned by EDF to support their arguments that NYCI is a good idea.  One common aspect of all these analyses is that the benefits are overstated, the costs are minimized if not ignored, and the methodology is sketchy.  I do not think that any of the job estimates and economic projections are credible.

Recommended Reading – Dr. Matthew Wielicki

Dr. Matthew authors the Irrational Fear blog.  He frequently writes about issues that I think are important relative to the ultimate need for transitioning off fossil fuels and other aspects of the response to the “climate crisis” that I think are important for everyone to understand.  This recommendation to read his work was prompted by several recent articles.

Background

According to Wielicki’s website:

With a Ph.D. in earth science from UCLA and as a professor-in-exile, he bravely challenges the norms that many in the scientific community only whisper about. Fear of losing positions and research funds keeps many silent, but not Dr. Wielicki. He boldly addresses the unfounded fears surrounding climate change, culture, and politics on his Substack, offering a perspective rooted in solid scientific understanding.

I did a search of his background.  He resigned from the University of Alabama citing personal family matters but also a frustration with the politicization at the school.  The article states:

Wielicki told The Fix via email he takes issue with the narrow scope that the sciences are constricted by with university and government funding priorities.

“The majority of funding within the earth sciences is climate-focused,” he said. “This means that those that don’t do climate science have to compete for fewer and fewer resources as so much is being funneled to climate science.”

Since leaving academia he has positioned himself as an independent geoscientist and commentator, speaking and writing about Earth science and climate issues, including through media appearances and his “Irrational Fear” Substack.

I will briefly describe several recent articles.  I only subscribe to his Substack as a free basis.  I have limitations on the number of paid subscriptions that I can afford and his free subscriptions generally provide enough information for my purposes.

Climate “Solutions” Are the Real Danger

I have been leery about plans to counter act global warming directly by modifying the atmosphere to “cool” the planet but haven’t spent the time to research an article about the dangers.  This post by Wielicki is a great introduction to the plans and the risks.  He explains:

For decades, we were told that climate change itself was the looming threat… rising temperatures, extreme weather, catastrophe just over the horizon. But quietly, almost without public debate, the conversation has shifted. The danger is no longer climate change alone. The danger, increasingly, is what powerful institutions now propose to do about it.

What were once fringe, crackpot “solutions” whispered in obscure academic circles are breaking into the mainstream, published in reputable journals and pushed as serious policy ideas. These aren’t just bad ideas… they’re dangerous, hubristic experiments that could cause real harm, all in the name of fighting a crisis that’s more hype than reality.

I’ve been warning about this for years on Irrational Fear. In “Geoengineering Madness,” I exposed how companies like Make Sunsets are proposing to inject sulfur into the atmosphere to “cool” the planet, conveniently ignoring the trillions we’ve already spent scrubbing sulfur from fuels to combat acid rain. In “Exposing the Waste in Climate Solutions,” I detailed how $2 trillion has been flushed down the drain on unproven tech like carbon capture and blue hydrogen, while real environmental issues get ignored. And don’t get me started on Bovaer… the methane-busting additive for cows that sterilizes lab rats and comes with a laundry list of side effects, as I covered in “Follow The Money, And You’ll Find The Science”. The pattern is clear: climate change itself has never directly killed anyone or posed an existential threat, but the so-called “solutions” could unleash environmental, health, and economic disasters on a massive scale.

He goes on to describe two new chilling examples of proposals in mainstream publications for his paid subscribers: one proposing we weaponize a tick-borne disease to force people off meat, and another suggesting we pump sulfur into the skies using jumbo jets.”  These are the antithesis of pragmatic solutions to the alleged problems.

Greenland’s Ancient Melt: The Bombshell Study That Buries Climate Alarmism

I recently did a post pointing out all the unknown factors affecting natural climate change.  I pointed out that there are numerous poorly understood oceanic and atmospheric cycles that are ignored by the Global Climate Models that predict gloom and doom from global warming due to greenhouse gas emissions.  The observations of global temperatures correlate well with certain oscillations.

Wielicki describes another inconvenient truth.  He describes a new paper that is inconsistent with the existential threat claims.  He points out:

This ties directly into what I’ve called the “Greenland Warming Paradox,” which I detailed in a previous article. In short, Greenland has been dramatically warmer in the past… like during the Holocene Thermal Maximum 9,000 to 5,000 years ago, when temperatures were 4–8.5°C higher than today, yet sea levels were lower. This challenges the alarmist claims that modest modern warming will drown the world.

The new paper reveals that Prudhoe Dome, a key part of northwestern Greenland’s ice sheet, was completely ice-free around 7,000 years ago during the early Holocene. This happened at pre-industrial CO2 levels, under natural warming of just 3–5°C above today’s temperatures. If CO2 is the supposed driver of today’s melting, why was Greenland deglaciating back then without any human emissions?

This is the kind of bombshell that should make headlines for debunking the narrative, but instead, it’s being spun as a warning for future warming.

I doubt that this kind of information will ever get covered by the mainstream media.  They wonder why many do not trust them.

Hunga Tonga–Hunga Haʻapai Volcanic Eruption

This is another example of an inconvenient truth.  Charles Rotter describes the eruption:

When the Hunga Tonga–Hunga Haʻapai volcano erupted in January 2022, it immediately posed a problem—not merely scientific, but institutional. The eruption was the most explosive in the satellite era, injected an unprecedented quantity of water vapor into the stratosphere, and did so with a chemical signature unlike the canonical climate-cooling eruptions of the late twentieth century. It was followed, inconveniently, by a pronounced surge in global surface temperatures. The timing alone guaranteed scrutiny. What mattered was how that scrutiny would be framed.

The thing to remember is that water vapor is that it is the dominant contributor to the natural greenhouse gas effect.  It is ignored by climate activists because it does not accumulate like other greenhouse gases.  Wielicki published an article addressing the framing in the response by the climate science activists.  He describes the consensus response to the eruption:

This 382-page volume from the Atmospheric Processes and their Role in Climate (APARC) project, involving over 100 scientists worldwide, dissects the atmospheric aftermath of this massive submarine blast. I’ve tackled Hunga before in my article “The Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai Volcanic Eruption and the Stochastic Nature of Climate Variability,” where I explained how this event – a relatively common geologic occurrence – pumped an astonishing ~146 Tg (teragrams, or millions of metric tons) of water vapor into the stratosphere. That’s equivalent to a sudden 10% increase in the stratosphere’s total water content. Water vapor is Earth’s most powerful greenhouse gas (GHG), trapping far more heat than CO2 ever could.

In that piece, I highlighted how such natural events underscore the chaotic, unpredictable side of our climate system – the “stochastic” nature, meaning random and hard-to-model fluctuations that can override human influences overnight. I also critiqued global mean temperature (GMT) as a metric in “The Absurdity of Global Mean Temperature and Mean Sea Level Metrics,” noting it’s a statistically contrived number based on extrapolating from tiny fractions of actual measurements (just 0.01% of Earth’s surface is directly gauged), masking huge regional differences and uncertainties.

Now, this fresh APARC report claims Hunga’s effects were mostly “minor” on surface climate, despite that massive water injection. But here’s the kicker: If a instantaneous 10% spike in the strongest GHG has negligible warming impact, why the hysteria over CO2’s slow creep upward at about 0.5% per year? Are we witnessing scientific contortions to keep CO2 as the villain, even if it undermines the very case for GHG sensitivity? After all, when careers and funding depend on seeing CO2 everywhere, that’s exactly what you’ll find – ignoring how natural variability like Hunga could explain recent warming spikes without any CO2 surge. And let’s not forget: For years, the climate community has downplayed water vapor as merely a “feedback” to CO2-driven warming, but Hunga injected it independently – exposing that as an oversimplification that inflates CO2’s role.

What Politicians Should Say About Climate and Energy

2026 is going to be a pivotal year for New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act.  Wielicki offers recommendations about messaging for politicians.

Bill McKibben recently published an essay titled “Pretend you’re running for Congress,” offering guidance on how candidates should talk about climate and energy heading into the 2026 midterm elections. His central claim is that elections will hinge on affordability, that energy prices will be decisive, and that candidates should keep the message simple: Republicans are driving demand, blocking clean energy, and raising prices… while renewable energy is cheap, abundant, and inevitable.

On the surface, this sounds pragmatic. But beneath the rhetoric is a familiar problem: the same slogans, the same moral framing, and the same absence of scientific or economic nuance that have defined climate politics for decades.

McKibben tells candidates to keep it simple because energy systems are “intricate and abstruse.” What he really means is that complexity gets in the way of the story. And the story must remain intact.

What’s missing from his essay is striking. There is almost no discussion of climate science itself… no mention of uncertainty, natural variability, or observational constraints. There is no acknowledgment that climate concern has already peaked politically. And there is no recognition that energy is not merely an input to the economy, but the foundation of human flourishing.

That omission matters because voters, especially younger ones, are no longer responding to fear the way they once did.

The uncertainty issue extends to the purported “solutions”.  The narrative is that there is no question that wind and solar energy are cheaper but the reality is that the only question is just how much more an energy system that depends upon those resources would cost. It is a lot.

Conclusion

In order to fully appreciate his work a paid subscription is a good investment.  However, even the free subscription is useful insight into the climate community’s biases and inconvenient truths.  I recommend going to his Substack and subscribing.

New York Nuclear Renaissance

Governor Hochul plans to pursue “the most ambitious development of nuclear power in America, setting a new goal to build five gigawatts of new nuclear capacity”.  I believe that nuclear power is the best option to reduce electric system GHG emissions but there are issues.  This post includes Richard Ellenbogen’s description of practical deployment issues and my observations relative to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy.  He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where it has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system.  I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because the energy density of wind and solar energy is too low and the resource intermittency too variable to ever support a reliable electric system relying on those resources. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Hochul Proposal

Hochul’s State of the State Book describes the nuclear proposal in the following two sections:

Establishing a Nuclear Reliability Backbone for a Zero-Emission Grid

As New York transitions to a zero-emission electric grid, the State must ensure reliable and cost effective baseload power to keep homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure running at all hours.  Governor Hochul will ensure that New York State leads in the race to harness safe and reliable advanced nuclear energy to power homes and businesses with zero-emission electricity for generations to come.

To catalyze progress towards those goals, the Governor will advance a new initiative, the Nuclear Reliability Backbone, directing state agencies to establish a clear pathway for additional advanced nuclear generation to support grid reliability. The Nuclear Reliability Backbone will be developed by a new Department of Public Service (DPS) process to consider, review, and facilitate a cost-effective pathway to four gigawatts of new nuclear energy that will combine with existing nuclear generation and the New York Power Authority’s (NYPA) previously announced one gigawatt project, to create an 8.4 gigawatt “backbone” of reliable energy for New Yorkers.

This effort will provide firm, clean power that complements renewable energy resources and reduces reliance on fossil fuel generation. By creating a stable foundation of always-on energy, the Backbone will allow renewable resources to operate more efficiently and flexibly. Together, these actions will support a resilient, flexible, and zero-emission grid that meets New York’s growing energy needs.

Ensuring New York’s Nuclear Power Future is Built By and For New Yorkers

As New York expands advanced nuclear energy, the State must ensure that New Yorkers benefit from these jobs and investments, including making sure New Yorkers are prepared to build, operate, and sustain this emerging industry. Governor Hochul will launch NextGen Nuclear New York to develop a skilled, in-state nuclear workforce through coordinated education and training pathways.

The initiative will expand partnerships across K–12 schools, higher education institutions, labor organizations, and training programs to align curricula, credentials, and career pathways with industry needs. It will also support workforce transitions for existing energy workers and increase public awareness of nuclear career opportunities. By investing in people and skills, New York will ensure its nuclear future is powered by New Yorkers, for New Yorkers.

Practical Deployment Issues – Ellenbogen

Ellenbogen recently sent an email that described his concerns about the proposal to add 5 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear to NY State’s generation fleet that forms the basis for this article.  Because we are closely aligned on our thoughts I am not going to try to differentiate between his material and my supplemental information.  However, I take responsibility for the contents of this article and accept that I may have misquoted or misrepresented Ellenbogen’s beliefs.

For background consider New York’s nuclear power plants (Table 1).  Five gigawatts of nuclear is basically equivalent to building five new traditional reactors like Nine Mile 2, the last completed plant in New York. Note that Shoreham was completed, tested, and then shut down before it operated in the mid 1980’s.

Table 1: New York Nuclear Generating Plants

We agree on one thing completely: It’s a step in the right direction but it is too little, too late.  Building this amount of capacity will take a long time.  Nine Mile 2 construction took 13 years, and the most recent reactors built in the US at Vogtle, Georgia took 15 years from the start of initial site work.

According to a Perplexity AI query, The new Vogtle units are Westinghouse AP1000 designs with passive safety systems; The capacity of each unit is on the order of 1.1 GW.  Construction went over schedule and budget “as the first new U.S. nuclear build in decades, became a protracted megaproject with schedule slips and cost growth to roughly the mid‑$30‑billion range, widely characterized as one of the most expensive infrastructure projects in U.S. history”. These issues were caused by a “combination of incomplete design and planning, contractor and supply‑chain problems, first‑of‑a‑kind AP1000 implementation issues, weak project management and oversight, and the 2017 Westinghouse bankruptcy, which disrupted construction and financing”. 

Most of these underlying factors will be problems for New York State.  If new technology is used the design and planning will have to evolve as the plants are built.  There are contractor and supply-chain problems with existing infrastructure construction so this will be more of a problem for the new technology.  If the deployment goes so far as to mandate that the facilities are “built by and for New Yorkers”, then there will be delays because there are insufficient skilled trade workers available today.

Climate Act Schedule and Reliability Issues – Ellenbogen

The Climate Act has a requirement for zero emissions electric generation by 2040.  There is no possibility that all the nuclear capacity proposed by Hochul could be built by 2040 and there is a low probability that any new nuclear could be built by then.  Last June Hochul ordered the New York Power Authority (NYPA) to develop at least on gigawatt of nuclear capacity.  NYPA has not even announced where they might consider siting new nuclear capacity.  In my experience with power plant permitting, it takes at least three years to secure permits for existing design equipment.  There have been indications that New York would favor new designs which would slow down permitting substantially.  Finally, “Nuclear” has been a four-letter word in New York State for about 45 years so we expect opponents to try to delay permitting in every way possible.

Last November the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) released its 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP).  The report found that “the electric grid is at an inflection point driven by the convergence of three major trends: the rapid growth of large loads, (e.g.: microchip manufacturing and AI-related data centers); the aging generation fleet; and a lack of new dispatchable generation resources being added to the system.”   The description of the CRP went on to say:

The CRP highlights that the future reliability of the grid depends on the development of flexible generation capable of performing during extended periods of high consumer demand and extreme weather. The report examines lessons-learned from the June 2025 heatwave and the need for a planning framework that better reflects present challenges of operating the grid while anticipating plausible future risks.

“The system requires additional dispatchable generation to serve forecasted increases in consumer demand,” said Zach Smith, Senior Vice President, System and Resource Planning. “We also need to refine and evolve our planning processes to better reflect this period of great change on the grid and a broader range of plausible future outcomes.”

The CRP demonstrates that due to emerging reliability challenges, traditional planning methods built around a single forecast are no longer sufficient. To maintain system reliability and protect public safety, the economy and quality of life, the CRP recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment before reliability margins disappear.

Our biggest concern is the reliability margin crisis described in the CRP.  The NYISO plausible range of reliability margins illustrates the problem (Figure 1).  The CRP doesn’t explain what is going to keep the lights on after 2033, and possibly as early as 2027 if replacement capacity does not keep up with retirements.  My Perplexity AI search found that there are no new fossil-fired capacity proposed.  While adding new nuclear capacity is appropriate, replacement of existing capacity must also be considered.  The youngest of the 3.4 GW of existing nuclear in NY State will be reaching 60 years of age by 2040.

Figure 1: Plausible Range of Statewide System Margins NYISO 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan     

Reason to Pause – Caiazza

Over the last year I have written many articles describing various reasons to pause implementation and reconsider the schedule and scope of the Climate Act.  The State Energy Plan and the CRP both include multiple future energy projections that include estimates of capacity and grid infrastructure additions.  The CRP “recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment”. The State Energy Plan advocates massive deployment of as much wind, solar, and energy storage capacity as possible as fast as possible hoping that it will work out.

Wind and solar energy resources are diffuse, intermittent, and correlated.  Because they are diffuse, utilizing wind and solar means that transmission and distribution systems must be upgraded.  Because they are intermittent, that means that energy storage is needed on daily to seasonal scales.  Because wind and solar are correlated, new dispatchable emissions-free resources (DEFR) are needed to make the electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability.  I believe the only likely viable DEFR backup technology is nuclear generation because it is the only candidate resource that is technologically ready, can be expanded as needed, and does not suffer from limitations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Every day that the resolving the DEFR requirement is delayed the costs associated with what may be a false solution increase.  If the only viable DEFR solution is nuclear, then the wind, solar, and energy storage approach cannot be implemented without nuclear power.  Nuclear power works best as a baseload resource so using it solely as DEFR backup is inappropriate.  Developing baseload nuclear eliminates the need for a huge DEFR backup resource and means that the “build as much as we can as fast as we can” wind and solar buildout currently in progress is unnecessary.  Climate Act implementation should be paused until the most appropriate path forward is determined.

Discussion

Both Ellenbogen and I have been harping about reliability for years.  Unfortunately, no one at the state level seems to be ready to confront the problem.  It is absolutely necessary to come to grips with it.  The state government keeps trying to defy physical law by pushing technologies that can’t keep the lights on.  They need to get out of their bubble because the time frame required to fix what has become a massive problem is getting increasingly small.  The rapidly decreasing margins and negative capacity margins appear likely before new generation of any type can be built.

One of the biggest takeaways from this latest political energy proposal is the danger of political interference in energy policy.  New York politicians now claim that we need 5 GW of nuclear generating capacity.  New York politicians shut down 3.1 GW of nuclear capacity since 1984.  Hochul’s announcement is encouraging but until it must be accompanied by a pause in Climate Act implementation to be credible.  If timely decarbonization using nuclear power is appropriate, then a restart at Indian Point should be considered because it is the cheapest and quickest option.  However, that would be politically toxic so I cannot imagine that ever being proposed by the Hochul Administration. 

Conclusion

In my opinion, nuclear power should be part of New York’s electric system future.  However, Hochul’s proposal is too little, too late as part of the Climate Act implementation without revising the schedule.  It is necessary first to pause implementation and reassess the schedule and ambition of the Act so that it can play a meaningful role.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy Petition

On January 6, 2026 the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filed a petition with the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting that “the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.”  Last August I described a filing and supporting documentation that I prepared with Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (Independent Intervenors) submitted to the same PSC Proceeding (Case 22-M-0149).  Our filing made a similar argument.  This article compares the filings.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two electric sector targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040.

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable bounds and New York energy policy has not openly reassessed where we stand relative to acceptable affordability and reliability risk.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy

According to their petition the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) is “a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council”. Clearly, they have a vested interest in affordability because it affects their competitiveness.  Coalition members include:

  • Buffalo Niagara Builders Association
  • Buffalo Niagara Manufacturing Alliance
  • Buffalo Niagara Partnership
  • Builders Exchange of the Southern Tier
  • Business Council of Westchester
  • Capitol Region Chamber of Commerce
  • Center for Economic Growth
  • Commercial Real Estate Development Association – Upstate Chapter
  • Construction Exchange of Buffalo and Western New York
  • Engineers Labor Employer Cooperative 825
  • Greater Binghamton Chamber of Commerce
  • Greater Rochester Association of REALTORS
  • Greater Rochester Chamber of Commerce
  • Manufacturers Alliance of New York
  • Manufacturers Association of Central New York
  • Manufacturers Association of the Southern Tier
  • Multiple Intervenors – An unincorporated association of approximately 55 large industrial, commercial, and institutional energy consumers with manufacturing and other facilities located throughout New York State
  • National Federation of Independent Businesses
  • New York State Association of Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors
  • New York State Builders Association
  • New York State Economic Development Council
  • Niagara USA Chamber of Commerce
  • North Country Chamber of Commerce
  • Northeastern Retail Lumber Association
  • Northeast Hearth, Patio and Barbecue Association
  • Power for Economic Prosperity – An active coalition of manufacturing companies that depend on low-cost hydropower from the New York Power Authority in order to maintain their operations in the Buffalo/Niagara Region.
  • Rochester Technology and Manufacturing Association
  • The Business Council of New York State – The leading business organization in New York State, representing the interests of large and small firms throughout the state. Its membership is made up of approximately 3,500 member companies, local chambers of commerce and professional and trade associations.
  • The Council of Industry, Manufacturers Association of the Hudson Valley
  • The Manufacturers Alliance of New York
  • Western New York Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors
  • Also included in the Coalition are Donna L. DeCarolis and Dennis W. Elsenbeck, both members of the state’s Climate Action Council established by the CLCPA. 

The Coalition petition provides a description of each of its members

Independent Intervenor Filing

For comparison purposes I will describe the Independent Intervenor filing submitted on August 12, 2025, first.  My first post described our main argument and the second post described the supporting exhibits.  In brief, Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  We argued the hearing was necessary because of the significant increase in arrears threshold has been exceeded.

Independent Intervenors – Affordability 

Exhibit 3 – Affordability-Focused Recommendations documents references to affordability and reliability recommendations in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) Document and Matter Management (DMM) System.  Rather than wading through the system I acknowledge the use of Perplexity (https://www.perplexity.ai/) to generate summaries and references included in the document.

The Perplexity summary provided the following key takeaway:

Since 2022, at least six concrete safeguards have been proposed in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) record to keep the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act affordable for households and businesses. They call for (1) rigorous public cost reporting, (2) objective “safety-valve” triggers under Public Service Law §66-p(4), (3) systematic pursuit of alternative funding, (4) expansion of low-income bill-protection programs, (5) transparent data dashboards, and (6) stricter benefit-cost and rate-design standards.

In my opinion, these safeguards haven’t been implemented well enough to ensure affordability.  There has been no DPS staff response to any of the calls to develop affordability triggers.

Independent Intervenors – Reliability

The biggest unresolved reliability risk associated with Climate Act implementation is addressed in Case 15-E-0302 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Implement a Large-Scale Renewable Program and Clean Energy Standard.  Responsible New York agencies all agree that new Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR) technologies are needed to make a solar and wind-reliant electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. 

Two exhibits addressed these reliability concerns.  To adequately address the amount of DEFR required it is necessary to determine how much is needed. Exhibit 4 – Resource Gap Characterization describes the challenges of defining the frequency, duration, and intensity of low wind and solar resource availability (known as dark doldrums) events.  One fundamental flaw in the Climate Act is the mistaken belief by the authors of the law that existing wind, solar, and energy storage resources would be sufficient and that no new technology would be required.  Exhibit 5 – Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources explains that this presumption is not correct. There is a need for a resource that is not currently commercially available.  This reliance on unknown solutions risks investments in false solutions and poses significant reliability risks. 

Coalition Filing

The Coalition petition states:

The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council (hereinafter referred to as the “Coalition”), hereby petitions the New York State Public Service Commission to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.

The preceding statement includes a footnote referencing the Independent Intervenor filing and another regulatory action that argued a heating was appropriate.  The Coalition lays out the basic argument:

 This Petition seeks Commission action authorized by the CLCPA. Recent evidence suggests that the Renewable Energy Program, and its associated renewable energy targets, may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service and upset the necessary balance of reliable, economic and sustainable energy in New York State. This evidence justifies commencement of the hearing process in PSL § 66-p (4), which will allow the Commission to determine whether the temporary suspension or modification of the Renewable Energy Program obligations is necessary to ensure the continued provision of safe and adequate electric service. Further, the Coalition believes that any hearing held pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) should examine the relationship between Renewable Energy Program costs and customer arrears.

The Executive Summary provides an excellent overview of the status of Climate Act implementation.

The CLCPA set extraordinarily ambitious targets for renewable energy generation in New York State, requiring that by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems and that by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. Recent data from the Commission demonstrates that New York will not achieve – or even come close to achieving – the 70% target by 2030. In addition, recent developments at the federal level impacting clean energy are likely to have a negative impact on renewable energy in the near term. With respect to the target of zero emissions by 2040, the necessary emission-free generation resources are not currently available at commercial scale. The inability of New York to develop the amount of renewable energy generation necessary to meet the 70% target by 2030, the increasing retirement of aging fossil-fuel generators due to the CLCPA, and the uncertainty surrounding the development of resources necessary to meet the zero emissions target by 2040, presents a reliability concern.

This concern is exacerbated by the fact that it may take more than two times the amount of certain forms of renewable generation to make up for the loss of one megawatt of fossil-fuel generation, and by expected increases in electric demand driven by the combination of new large loads and electrification.

Pursuant to the PSL, the Commission is required to ensure the provision of “safe and adequate” electric service. Renewable energy development has not kept pace with generator retirements, which has resulted in declining reliability margins across New York, jeopardizing electric reliability and safe and adequate service. In recognition that the Renewable Energy Program might negatively impact electric reliability, the CLCPA includes a safeguard that allows the Commission to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the program, after a hearing, if it makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service. Given recent evidence regarding delayed renewable energy generation and risks to reliability, the Commission should hold a hearing pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) to determine whether safe and adequate electric service in New York is impeded by the Renewable Energy Program and, if so, to appropriately modify or suspend the program’s obligations.

Discussion

Both filings argue that the PSC should convene a hearing to determine whether it is appropriate to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the Climate Act.  The Independent Intervenors argued that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded.  The Coalition makes a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.

The other difference is that the Independent Intervenors represent the views of four individuals whose credibility lies in our technical expertise. The Coalition consists primarily of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state whose credibility is based on its political and economic clout. 

Hopefully, the Coalition filing for a hearing will engender a response from the PSC.  There has been no hint of a response to the Independent Intervenor filing.  Perhaps the Coalition represents too big a constituency to ignore.

Some may say that the Coalition position is economically self-interested and therefore should be discounted.  They could also argue that the Independent Intervenors are not qualified to speak.  I think I can speak for both parties when I say we believe our concerns have never been openly discussed and addressed by the Hochul Administration.  All we want is the chance to make our case for the need to define affordability and reliability metrics that ensure safe, affordable, and adequate service.

Conclusion

I am encouraged that there is another group making similar arguments that the time has come to convene a hearing.  All my attempts have failed but maybe the Coalition will succeed in getting the PSC to convene a hearing.

My New York State 2026 RGGI Operating Plan Amendment Comments

I submitted comments on the 2025 Operating Plan Amendment (“Amendment”) for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).  This is the sixth time I have comments on Operating Plan amendments and this post summarizes my latest submittal.

Dealing with the RGGI regulatory and political landscapes is challenging enough that affected entities seldom see value in speaking out about fundamental issues associated with the program.  I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs, since the inception of those programs. I also participated in RGGI Auction 41 successfully winning allowances and holding them for several years.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Factsheet). It has been a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector since 2008.  New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021 but has since withdrawn, and Pennsylvania recently decided not to join. According to a RGGI website:

The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances that are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs.

Proceeds were invested in programs including energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy, beneficial electrification, greenhouse gas abatement and climate change adaptation, and direct bill assistance. Energy efficiency continued to receive the largest share of investments.

NYSERDA Operating Plan

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) designed and implemented a process to develop and annually update an Operating Plan which summarizes and describes the initiatives to be supported by RGGI auction proceeds.  The latest Draft RGGI Operating Plan Amendment explains that

 New York State uses RGGI proceeds to promote and implement programs for energy efficiency, renewable or non-carbon emitting technologies, and innovative carbon emissions abatement technologies with significant carbon reduction potential, in accordance with 21 NYCRR Part 507 and in compliance with the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).

This year, consistent with authorized RGGI uses, and to highlight the link between RGGI programmatic investments and core state priorities, we have organized our RGGI programmatic investments in terms of four themes, which are the following:

  • Affordability: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on creating affordable, efficient, healthy, and comfortable homes and workplaces by deploying commercially available energy efficiency, building electrification, and renewable energy technologies.
  • Energy abundance, diversity, and reliability: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on understanding and building out diverse energy options, including responsible renewable generation and storage, as well as modernizing energy system infrastructure, planning, and markets.
  • Energy innovation and economic development: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on supporting economic growth and competitiveness, including enabling job, tax revenue, and supply chain growth; stimulating entrepreneurship and company growth in New York; and expanding public-private partnerships and investments.
  • Thriving communities and environments: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on helping New Yorkers equitably participate and share in the benefits of the clean energy future; ensuring the energy transition provides meaningful benefits to local communities and disadvantaged communities; and improving climate resiliency and adaptation and public and environmental health.

Investment Priorities and RGGI Compliance

As far as I can tell I have submitted comments on six amendments to the Operating Plan.  Given my decades-long emission and allowance reporting responsibilities in the electric sector, it is not surprising that the primary concern in all my comments has been related to compliance obligations.  In my opinion, NYSERDA ignores the fact that RGGI is not just a pot of money to exploit but is at its core a pollution control program that includes compliance obligations for electric generating units in the program.   This year is particularly important because of the more stringent RGGI caps proposed in the 6 NYCRR Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program amendments that I discussed recently.

The compliance challenge is illustrated in Figure 1.  Relative to the three baseline years before RGGI started New York RGGI emission are down 33%.  The primary reason for the observed reduction is due to fuel switching from coal and oil to natural gas.  I believe that the fuel price differential for natural gas use was much greater than the added cost of RGGI allowances, so the main driver of the observed reductions was economic fuel switching.   Also note that this option is not available anymore.

Figure 1: New York State Emissions by Fuel Type

NYSERDA RGGI Funding Emission Savings

The estimated emission savings from historical NYSERDA investments are described in the Semi-Annual Status Report through December 2024.  The description states that:

This report is prepared pursuant to the State’s RGGI Investment Plan (2024 Operating Plan) and provides an update on the progress of programs through the quarter ending December 31, 2024. It contains an accounting of program spending; an estimate of program benefits; and a summary description of program activities, implementation, and evaluation. An amendment providing updated program descriptions and funding levels for the 2024 version of the Operating Plan was approved by NYSERDA’s Board in January 2025.

Table 1 is a copy of Table 1 in the latest full-year Semi-Annual Status Report.  It summarizes the effectiveness of the NYSERDA investments and lists expected cumulative portfolio benefits including emissions savings.

Table 1. Summary of Expected Cumulative Portfolio Benefits through December 31, 2024

Comparison of NYSERDA Cumulative Emissions Savings to Observed Emission Reductions

Table 2 presents the relevant data to compare the observed reductions and NYSERDA RGGI investment emission savings.  I list the last five years of data starting in 2019 when the emissions went up because of the closure of Indian Point.  Reductions from the 2006-2008 average baseline are listed.  The emissions savings listed are cumulative annual emissions.  If the RGGI proceeds were invested, then the total emissions would be higher by the amount of the savings.  The total cumulative annual emission savings through the end of 2023 is only 1,976,101 tons and that represents a reduction of 4.2% from the pre-RGGI baseline.  Emission reductions by fuel type clearly show that fuel switching is the primary cause of reductions.

Table 2: NY Electric Generating Unit Emissions, NYSERDA GHG Emission Savings from RGGI Investments, and Emissions by Fuel Type

New York RGGI Program Investment Reductions

Another finding that has been ignored or possibly covered up by NYSERDA is the poor emission reduction cost effectiveness of NYSERDA investments.  Table 3 lists data from Semi-Annual Status Report through December 2024 Table 2.  The report presents “expected quantifiable benefits related to carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) reductions, energy savings, and participant energy bill savings with expended and encumbered funds” but I only considered the CO2e reductions.  Note that the emission savings evaluated in the report include carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide that are not included in RGGI.  I did not use “lifetime” savings data because I am trying to compare the RGGI program benefits emission savings reductions to the RGGI compliance metric of an annual emission cap.  Lifetime reductions are clearly irrelevant.  The observed cost per ton of emissions savings is $583.

Table 3: RGGI Funding Status Report Table 2: Summary of Total Expected Cumulative Annual Program Benefits

Program Benefit Impacts on RGGI

I categorized programs relative to RGGI compliance obligation support based on the Semi-Annual Status Report through December 2024.  The table breaks down the program allocations and expected annualized CO2 savings for three categories: direct reductions to RGGI sources, indirect reductions, and those programs that will increase electric generating emissions. An example of a program that increases RGGI emissions is NYSERDA’s Clean Transportation Program that “has been pursuing five strategies to promote EV adoption by consumers and fleets across New York”.   The emission reductions claimed are from decreased internal combustion engine vehicles, so the reductions do not reflect reductions in RGGI electric generating units.  In addition, increased electricity for charging will require RGGI facilities to operate more thus increasing their emissions.

The results in the Funding Status reports summarized in Table 4 show that since the start of the program NYSERDA has allocated $101.6 million to programs that directly reduce utility emissions achieving emission savings of 202,422 tons, $1,007.6 million for programs that indirectly reduce utility emissions savings by 1,634,000 tons, and $178.5 million for programs that will increase utility emissions by 395,152 tons.  When emissions savings from non-RGGI sources are removed, total savings are 1,827,575 tons instead of 2,221,757.

Table 4: Summary of Expected Cumulative Annualized Program Benefits through 31 December 2024 for Programs that Directly, Indirectly, or Do Not Affect RGGI CO2 Emissions

Reduction Potentials

I evaluated the potential effectiveness of the proposed funding allocations relative to RGGI compliance support.  I reviewed each proposed program and classified each program into six categories of potential RGGI source emission reductions.  The first three categories covered programs that directly, indirectly or could potentially decrease RGGI-affected source emissions.  I also included a category for programs that will add load that could potentially increase RGGI source emissions such as programs to incentivize electrification.  The two other categories considered programs that do not affect emissions and administrative costs respectively.

The results are in Table 5.  The first three categories cover programs that directly, indirectly, or could potentially decrease RGGI-affected source emissions and account for 53% of investments which is up sharply from the 2025 Amendment which only allotted 31% of the investments. This positive development occurred because Empower+ funding doubled and the Retrofit Challenges Programs funding increased sharply.  Programs that will add load that could potentially increase RGGI source emissions and whose emissions savings are unrelated to the electric sector total 20% of the investments.  Programs that do not affect emissions are funded with 18% of the proceeds and administrative costs total another 9%.  The increased preference for funding that could reduce RGGI emissions is a good development.  On the other hand, Administration costs are 8.8% of the total and programs that have nothing to do with emissions total 18%.  In my opinion, those are programs that should be funded from other sources.

Table 5: Potential for RGGI Reductions for Funding Allocations for 2025 Operating Plan Amendments

RGGI Compliance Summary

Figure 1 shows that no further fuel switching emission reductions are available.  Affected sources have no remaining options to comply with RGGI mandates other than limiting operations.  Future emission reductions are only possible if zero-emission resources displace the generation of RGGI-affected sources.  However, there is a complicating factor that makes emphasis on reducing RGGI-affected emissions more important.  The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) recently announced revisions to 6 NYCRR Part 242 – CO2 Budget Trading Program the regulation that sets the New York RGGI allowance cap. 

Comparison of the revised cap starting in 2027 with the New York State Energy Plan shows that in 2029 projected emissions are double the RGGI cap.  Table 10 lists projections starting in 2027 that range from 49.3 to 40.3 MMT.  The 2023 observed emissions from RGGI sources was 28.7 MMT.  Table 6 lists the proposed RGGI cap or limit on tons of CO2 permitted.  There is a big difference between the Pathways Analysis projection and the RGGI cap.  There are some mitigating factors because of the Climate Act accounting methodology, but I believe that the Pathways Analysis emissions are well more than the cap.

Table 6: Comparison of RGGI Proposed Part 242 Cap and State Energy Plan Pathways Analysis Electric Power Scenario Projections

Discussion

My primary concern is that RGGI is an electric sector emissions reduction program.  I have shown that the observed electric sector emission trends indicate that the observed reductions occurred because of fuel switching from coal and oil to natural gas and that there are no more fuel switching opportunities. Therefore, programs that materially decrease electric sector emissions directly or indirectly through energy use reductions should be a priority because affected sources have no other compliance options. There are programs in the amendment that do not meet these criteria.  It is only appropriate to fund the non-priority programs if sufficient funding has been allocated to make the emission reductions necessary to meet RGGI compliance mandates.  

These results should be used to determine funding priorities.  There are significant differences in the expected emission reductions for different programs and that should also be considered when allocating revenues.  While the fraction of funding allocations that could potentially decrease RGGI source emissions has gone up I think that more emphasis is needed to assure compliance and avert compliance problems.

Conclusion

NYSERDA has treated RGGI allowance auction revenues as a convenient slush fund totaling 18% of total funding for whatever politically connected program needs money.  As a result, investments that reduce emissions and support those most impacted by increased costs received less funding.

Economic Justification for Installing Rooftop Solar Arrays in Downstate New York

Richard Ellenbogen has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County.  His factory has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system.   This post describes  his recent report: “An Economic Justification for Installing Rooftop Solar Arrays in The Con Ed Service Area – Even Without The Investment Tax Credit” (“Economic Justification”).

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy.  I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen.  He has no financial interest in any solar fabrication or installation company, so has no monetary interest in the results.

Caveat:  I acknowledge that the following article includes section plagiarized from the Economic Justification document.

Overview

Richard Ellenbogen is President of Allied Converters, a plastic packaging converter that manufactures flexible plastic bags, sheets, rolls, and related film products, primarily for food and gift packaging markets.  Allied installed one of the first commercial solar arrays in the downstate region in 2007 with a 50-Kilowatt (KW) DC rated array being activated on September 29, 2007.  When the system was installed, he added monitoring and data collection systems so that he has 18 years of operational data.

Based on that information he has prepared a comprehensive Economic Justification showing how installing rooftop solar arrays on medium and large buildings operated in New York City and Long Island will be cost effective, even after the recent cancellation of the investment tax credit for solar arrays.  He shows that “Returns on Investment (ROI) comparable to the 10% – 12% ROI promised by Bernie Madoff are achievable, except it is legal.”  He explains that the justification works for customers in downstate New York because the rate increases

have been so egregious over the past 18 years.

The analysis is based on a few assumptions.  The analysis assumes a $3.00 per watt installed cost for the array, minimal shading of the solar array, and the ability to use all the energy within the location where it is generated or have solar net metering so retail cost is applied to all electric energy generated. The calculations also are based upon no government monetary support for the installation beyond solar net metering and a tax rate of 30% to calculate depreciation of the asset. However, the numbers show that the installations will be cost effective even for entities that cannot depreciate the assets.

The document includes a twelve page economic justification description and four appendices. 

Appendix 1 provides the depreciation schedule for a $150,000 solar array for a business with a 30% tax rate.  Appendix 2 explains Line Loss.  Appendix 3 – documents the 2008 Allied Converter Solar Net Metering Tariff Petition for a Declaratory Ruling on the administration of solar net metering provisions at locations where multiple (hybrid) energy efficient generation technologies are installed.  Finally, Appendix 4  provides the data for Figure 8

Allied Solar Array

Allied Converters is in New Rochelle, NY in the Consolidate Edison (Con Ed) service area, about 17 miles from Times Square. It is a 55,000 square foot building with a 23,000 Square foot upper roof. Allied installed a 50 KW DC rated array in 2007 (Figure 1).  Ellenbogen explains:

When the solar array was installed, the cost ($10/watt) made the total array cost $500,000 before rebates and tax credits. NYSERDA (NY State Energy Research and Development Authority) rebates at that time were very generous as were Federal and State Tax Credits. If they hadn’t been, no one would have installed an array and NYSERDA wanted data on the arrays. 18 years ago, NYSERDA actually did cutting edge energy research, as its name implies, and did not do science devoid energy proselytizing. The net cost of arrays installed on commercial facilities can be depreciated, after subtracting the tax credits and rebates. The depreciated cost of the 50 KW array at the factory was approximately $180,000.

Figure 1: Allied Factory and Solar Array

As a business owner Ellenbogen recognized that installing the array was not a good business decision but as an engineer he was curious about capability of the technology.   Under normal circumstances, the investment would not have been a positive investment until this year 18 years after it was installed. However, Ellenbogen took advantage of a Washington D.C. Solar Renewable Energy Credit (SREC) program for out of District solar arrays.  He applied as soon as the offer opened and became one of five out of District arrays with access to the SREC payments. Even though this source of income is no longer available the situation has changed.   Array costs have decreased by 70% and utility costs per KWh in the Con Ed service area have increased by 66% since 2007 from 14.9 cents to 24.75 cents for commercial entities.

The analysis described below is based on data recorded since the installation of the array.  This is not a theoretical assessment because it uses data that reflects weather conditions and maintenance issues.

Responsible Solar Development

I am publicizing this report because I think it represents responsible solar development.  Ellenbogen describes several advantages of this type of development.  Rooftop solar arrays on  medium and large buildings use the energy where it is generated which eliminates line loss.  Line loss occurs because wires are not perfect conductors.  As is the case with many aspects of the energy transition, line loss becomes more of a problem when energy is needed most because when wire gets hotter the resistance that causes line loss increases.  Appendix 2 in the Economic Justification explains line loss in detail.  He points out that summer peak loads occur when temperatures are highest making on-site generation more advantageous.

He describes three other advantages.  There is no need to build additional transmission infrastructure.  Medium and large buildings can use all the power produced so there is no need for storage to provide usable energy.  Finally, using rooftops means that there is no loss of farmland or environmentally sensitive land for solar development.

I would add another advantage.  In areas with a lot of solar generation, output at peak times is frequently large enough that it stresses grid operations, can force renewable curtailment at midday, and complicates economics for dispatchable plants needed when solar is unavailable.  These installations will typically not cause negative net-metering impacts because they use the power generated and displace load from the grid. 

Array Degradation and Utility Costs

Ellenbogen’s justification is based on his observed solar array data and utility costs.  I found the solar array data interesting:

It is well known that solar arrays lose their effectiveness as they age. During its first year of operation in 2008, the array produced 60,000 KWh. This past year, 18 years after it was installed, the annual output has dropped to 46,500 KWh. That is an average decrease of 1.5% per year, or 760 KWh/year. The graph in Figure 3 shows the 365-day output over time. It starts in September 2008, 365 days after the array was turned on. Each data point is the sum of the prior 365 days of solar output. The steep vertical lines are either snow on the array, a period of high cloud cover (falling), or the effect of normal array operation a year later with no snow or cloud cover (rising).

Ellenbogen provides detailed utility cost information.  In brief, he notes:

Just the opposite of falling solar array output has been the increase in utility costs over the same period. Commercial utility bills have two components. There is a “Demand” charge that reflects the maximum Kilowatt Usage over two 15-minute periods during the billing month. Then there is a “Usage” charge that is based upon how many Kilowatt-Hours (KWh) are used in a given month. Many of the surcharges are based upon KWh usage also. Because solar arrays are intermittent, they do not affect the demand charge. They only reduce the KWh usage. In 2009, subtracting the demand charge from the total electric bill yielded a KWh cost of $0,149 per KWh, including surcharges and related taxes. Doing the same calculation in 2025 resulted in a per KWh cost of $0.2475. That is an average increase in the KWh cost of 3% annually each year for the past 17 years. Because the array output is dropping by 1.5% annually and the utility rates are increasing by 3% annually, the dollar energy savings per year from the array’s output is actually increasing.

Solar Array Cost Justification

I am not going to discuss the details of the economic justification.  I don’t have the appropriate economic background to provide any insight, but the numbers seem to speak for themselves.  I will note that he mentions that his original intent was only to demonstrate the analysis for taxable corporations but later determined that the utility rate increases have been so high that the deploying solar arrays will be “cost effective for anyone in the downstate area that can use the full energy output of their solar array or benefit from solar net metering and can install the array for $3.00/watt.” 

Discussion

Ellenbogen found that “Over a period of 28 years, a 13% annual return on investment is possible in the Con Ed Service Area from installing rooftop solar and if energy costs increase as they have for the past five years, higher returns than that will be likely. “  His analysis assumed no Investment Tax Credit and no government financial assistance of any kind beyond solar net metering.

There are couple of implications of this conclusion.  I am not a fan of solar net metering because of its negative effects on the grid and the fact that ratepayers who do not have their own arrays subsidize the resources necessary to keep the grid operating.  Buildings with sufficient load will typically not cause negative net-metering impacts because they use the power generated.  They save money by displacing the energy that they would have had to purchase from the utility equivalent to the net-metering price. 

The second implication is that it is no longer necessary to provide installation subsidies in Downstate New York.  Ellenbogen’s justification is based on actual data.  The calculations err on the conservative side based upon a higher rate of array degradation than is likely to occur with a new array. The results clearly show that “without government assistance of any kind, those that can install a rooftop solar array under conditions near those used for the model will see a significant annual return on investment.”  I must emphasize the point that this works for “conditions near those used for the model”.  I can assure you that solar availability is significantly better than anywhere Upstate that is influenced by lake-effect clouds and snow.  I doubt that same cost-effectiveness results in the lake-effect cloud belt.

Ellenbogen makes the case for solar deployment as investments.  He explains:

Past performance is no guarantee of future results; however NY State policy makers have proven to be reliably bad in this regard which will likely guarantee the higher utility rates.  As a comparison, the S&P has returned 10% – 10.5% over the past 30 years and the Dow Jones has had an ROI of between 9.3% and 10.4% over that time frame. NY State’s predictability at implementing policies that will increase energy costs makes the solar arrays a more risk-free investment than the financial markets for anyone that has a shade free roof.

Conclusion

On one hand rooftop solar proponents could be encouraged that the Economic Justification demonstrates a strong case for deploying rooftop solar on large Downstate roofs that are not shaded.  This helps the electric grid because these installations will shave peak loads because these facilities will require last energy.  On the other hand, the primary driver of cost effectiveness is what I think are unsustainable electric rates now and increasing in the future. Ellenbogen’s concludes: “The models should also be a warning to state policy makers to show how their regulations are driving utility rates to a point where they will be entirely unaffordable within two decades.”

Shortcomings of RGGI Caps and GHG Emissions Reporting in the Electric Sector

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a market-based program to reduce CO2 emissions from electric generating units.  On July 3, 2025, RGGI announced that results of the Third Program Review.  On December 10, 2025 the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) announced amendments to their CO2 Budget Trading Program that would change the rules to be consistent with the RGGI Third Program Review.  This post describes two shortcomings of New York’s GHG emission reduction regulations for the electric sector. 

Dealing with the RGGI regulatory and political landscapes is challenging enough that affected entities seldom see value in speaking out about fundamental issues associated with the program.  I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs, since the inception of those programs. I also participated in RGGI Auction 41 successfully winning allowances and holding them for several years.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

6 NYCRR Part 242 – CO2 Budget Trading Program

The DEC Recently Proposed Regulations web page included the following description (accessed on 1/1/26) of the rulemaking:

The proposed amendments to 6 NYCRR Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program would reduce the annual budget of CO2 allowances through 2037, add a second tier of Cost Containment allowances, remove the emissions containment reserve, remove offset projects, remove eligible biomass provisions, increase the minimum reserve price, reduce the number of allowances set-aside for long term contracts and voluntary renewable energy purchases while still maintaining enough allowances to accommodate anticipated demand, and make other improvements and clarifications to the program. The Department is also proposing complementary amendments to listings of related reference material in 6 NYCRR Part 200 General Provisions. Additionally, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority is proposing to amend 21 NYCRR Part 507 CO2 Allowance Auction Program to align with the proposed amendments to 6 NYCRR Part 242. Comments on these proposed revisions must be received by February 17, 2026.

This web page also includes the following links to elements of the regulatory package:

I am only going to address emissions contradictions and the proposed reduction in the annual budget of CO2 allowances through 2037 in this post.  Eventually I will describe my comments on the proposed amendments.

NYS Electric Utility Emissions

In a recent post I described the emission reduction performance of RGGI.  In that post I compared New York’s electric generating unit emissions during RGGI to historical information using data from the Clean Air Markets Program Data (CAMPD) database.  For consistency across the entire period, I used the CO2 emissions from all programs in CAMPD.  Table 1 shows that there is an inconsequential difference between that total and emissions from just units affected by RGGI.  RGGI does not include some units that are report for NOx Budget programs and RGGI has a size limitation that excluded small units over much of the program.

Table 1: Comparison of New York State EPA CAMPD CO2 Emissions (Short Tons) for All Programs and RGGI Program

Climate Act Emissions

One point that I want to make in this post is that the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) emissions accounting methodology complicates assessment of the RGGI emission cap and appears to be biased.  A recent post described the latest New York State (NYS) GHG emission inventory report based on Climate Act methodology.  The Climate Act authors mandated that emissions must use a Global Warming Potential (GWP) accounting over 20 years instead of the 100 year accounting used in RGGI.

Emission Inventory Table ES.2 in the Summary Report presents emissions for different sectors and different greenhouse gases.  There are four Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sectors and there are four  sectoral reports for energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, forestry and land use, and waste.  The table also includes United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) totals that use the “conventional accounting used by other governments, applies a 100-year GWP, omits biogenic CO2, and does not include emissions outside of New York State.” 

For this analysis, Table 2 extracts relevant information for the IPCC Electric Energy Sector from Table ES.2.  The table compares the CLCPA emissions that use GWP-20, includes other GHG gases, and adds non-RGGI stack emissions as well as three additional sources: imported electricity, transmission & distribution, and upstream fuel extraction.  There are two columns added that compare UNFCCC and CLCPA emission.  In 2023, the UNFCC emissions were 26.1 million metric tons (MMT) and the CLCPA emissions were 49.02 MMT.  The table clearly shows that increased emissions were the result of adding CH4 and N2O (0.18 MMT), Electricity T&D (0.12 MMT) and Imported Electricity (9.54 MMT).  The table does not explicitly address upstream fuel extraction emissions, but I estimated that they were 13.09 MMT.  That is approximately half the direct emissions total.

Table 2: ES.2: 2023 New York State GHG Energy Sector Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by IPCC Sector with Comparison of CLCPA and UNFCCC Electric Power Emissions

In my opinion, the claim that fuel extraction emissions are around 50% of the direct stack emissions is extraordinary.  Table ES.2 does not explicitly list the fuel extraction component of electric power emissions.  I assumed that it would be equal to the percentage of electric power emissions to the total fuel combustion emissions.   That seems like a reasonable assumption, but the result is unrealistic. 

Projected Emissions and the RGGI Proposed Cap

The New York State Energy Plan provides the “official” emissions projections for the electric sector.  I have provided background information on my Energy Plan page.  For our purposes the thing to remember is that the Plan projects emissions for five different scenarios.  Table 3 lists projections starting in 2027 that range from 49.3 to 40.3 MMT.  The 2023 observed emissions from RGGI sources was 28.7 MMT.  Table 3 lists the proposed RGGI cap or limit on tons of CO2 permitted.  There is a big difference between the Pathways Analysis projection and the RGGI numbers.  I believe that those differences are explained by the factors affecting emissions in Table 2.

Table 3: Comparison of RGGI Proposed Part 242 Cap and State Energy Plan Pathways Analysis Electric Power Scenario Projections

In my review of the RGGI Third Program Review I explained that the RGGI states determined the proposed cap levels based on state laws like the Climate Act that mandate zero emissions by 2040.  The observed reduction trajectory simply is an extrapolation to zero.  On the other hand, the State Energy Plan modeling represents a fundamental change in official New York projection methodology.  Previously, projections assumed that emissions would get to zero no matter what.  The State Energy Plan is consistent with the estimates of the New York independent System Operator (NYISO) that do not assume zero emissions by 2040.  These estimates clearly show that the RGGI emission caps are unrealistic.

Discussion

This post describes two shortcomings of this component of New York’s GHG emission reduction regulations for the electric sector.  The emissions estimates using the Climate Act accounting fails a common-sense plausibility check.  There is simply no way that New York electric generating units affected by RGGI will be able to achieve the proposed revisions to Part 242.

I do not think that the emissions estimates for the electric sector are credible. These are indirect estimates of emissions using emission factors that project emissions based on fuel use and activity factors.  Emission factor estimates are fundamentally mass balance calculations.  I do not think it is reasonable to assume that extracting natural gas and oil would produce emissions equal to half the direct emissions.  Note that CH4 is the largest component pollutant and, given New York’s irrational obsession with it, that makes me suspect the emission factors used for methane are biased high. 

The 2025 GHG Energy Sectoral Report notes that “DEC has conducted a recalculation of upstream, out-of-state emissions from natural gas imports using a recently released updated methodology” which suggests that they recognize that there is an issue.  The report also states that “DEC continues to welcome feedback on this and any part of the current analysis.”   Given that they blew off my comments about the methane methodology that I submitted in October 2020, I believe that it this is only a gesture and while comments are welcomed making changes based on comments is not on the table.

The second issue discussed is the gap between the RGGI allowance cap trajectory and the State Energy Plan.  It is just not reasonable to think that electric generating unit emissions will be able to achieve those caps in that timeframe.  The RGGI cap on emissions essentially rations energy use because if there are insufficient permits to emit (aka allowances) affected generating units have no other options to reduce emissions so they can only shutdown to comply with the law.  If replacement zero emissions generating resources are unavailable, then the electric grid would be placed in an artificial energy shortage that would lead to blackouts.  This point will be emphasized  when I comment on the DEC Part 242 amendments.

Conclusion

This is my first post of 2026.  Sadly, there is nothing new here.  New York State agencies generate analyses and propose regulations that comply with the Climate Act narrative without considering the real world.  Reality bats last.  Is 2026 the last inning?

RGGI Cap-and-Invest Emission Reduction Performance in New York

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a market-based program to reduce emissions from electric generating units.  On December 18, 2025, New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) hosted a meeting (agenda, recording) to present proposed changes to the RGGI Operating Plan Amendment (“Amendment”) for 2026.  This post describes the trend of New York’s RGGI emissions that I will use as part of my comments on the draft Amendment.

I have been involved in the RGGI program process since it was first proposed prior to 2008.  I blog about the details of the RGGI program because very few provide any criticisms of the program.   There is no upside for companies affected by RGGI to disparage the program because it has become a sacred cow initiative that is treated as beyond criticism by agencies and activists. I have extensive experience with market-based programs because I have worked on analysis, implementation, and evaluation of every  program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI and several Nitrogen Oxide programs.  The opinions expressed in these comments do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Factsheet). It has been a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector since 2008.  New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021 but has since withdrawn and Pennsylvania recently withdrew completely.

According to a RGGI website:

The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances that are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs.

Proceeds were invested in programs including energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy, beneficial electrification, greenhouse gas abatement and climate change adaptation, and direct bill assistance. Energy efficiency continued to receive the largest share of investments.

Proponents of RGGI claim the program has “successfully lowered CO2 emissions intensity and absolute emissions”.  This post will show that this conclusion is not reflected in the New York emissions trends.  In a subsequent post I will explain that ignoring the lessons of the observed reductions is leading to investment strategy decisions in the NY RGGI Operating Plan that will eventually cause serious problems.  Proposed investment descriptions include beneficial electrification, climate change adaptation, and direct bill assistance that do not reduce electric sector emissions.

New York RGGI Emissions

This analysis of annual New York CO2 emissions from electric generating units uses data from the EPA Clean Air Markets Program Data (CAMPD) database.  I downloaded unit-level data for all pollution control programs so that I can compare emissions from the start of RGGI in 2009 to a baseline before the program started.  The data include a record describing the primary fuel type These records are not standardized and include more categories than I need so I consolidated the labels as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Consolidated Primary Fuel Type Labels

Table 2 lists the annual emissions since 2000 through 2024.  Claims that the program has “successfully lowered CO2 emissions intensity and absolute emissions” are debunked in the following table and figure.   This table lists mass CO2 emissions by fuel type along with the emission rate or intensity.  Both absolute and emissions intensity do go down.

Table 2: New York Clean Air Markets Program Data Emissions Data for All Regulatory Programs

Figure 1 clearly shows the role of fuel switching away from coal and oil and the increasing use of natural gas.  I believe that the fuel price differential for natural gas use was much greater than the added cost of RGGI allowances and thus the main driver of the observed reductions is economic fuel switching.   This figure labels the 2006 to 2008 period that I use as the baseline for “before RGGI”, the start of RGGI, and when the possibility of additional fuel switching became impossible.  If RGGI were the primary driver of emission reductions, then emission reductions would have continued to decrease after the lowest emissions in 2019, and they certainly would not have been increasing since then.  The other big takeaway from this is that 2019 was the year that the inane premature retirement of the Indian Point nuclear station began.  New York has not managed to replace generation from this zero emissions resource as emissions continue to rise.

Figure 1: New York Clean Air Markets Program Data Emissions Trend by Fuel Type

Table 3 lists the emissions reductions since the start of the RGGI program.  I included this because it shows that in 2024 CO2 emissions since the start of RGGI are 33% lower.  Also note that in 2019 emissions were 47% lower.  I included the gross load to show that gross load also decreased.  In theory this could represent displacement of fossil fired units because of RGGI investments. In my next post I will update last year’s analysis of the effect of RGGI investments that shows that is not the reason.  NYSERDA program funding status reports estimate the emission savings from their program investments.  Last year I showed that the total cumulative annual emission savings due to NYSERDA program investments through the end of 2023 that directly or indirectly affect electric generating source emissions  is 1,405,513 tons.  That means that emissions from RGGI sources in New York would have been only 3% higher if the NYSERDA program investments did not occur.  I do not expect that this will change using the 2024 data.

Table 3: New York RGGI Emissions and Gross Load Reductions Since Start of RGGI

Discussion

I have two overarching concerns about the implications of RGGI emission reduction performance.  Firstly, the RGGI cap on emissions essentially rations energy use because if there are insufficient permits to emit (aka allowances) affected generating units have no other options to reduce emissions so they can only shutdown to comply with the law.  If replacement zero emissions generating resources are unavailable, then the electric grid would be placed in an artificial energy shortage that would lead to blackouts.  Therefore, in my comments on the NYSERDA operating plan I will argue that programs that lead to emission reductions should be prioritized to prevent energy rationing.

My second concern is that idolatry of the RGGI as a program that should be replicated because of its success was a primary driver of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act’s Scoping Plan recommendation for an economy wide cap-and-invest program.  In my last update on the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program I explained that there is potential for a judge to order that NYCI be implemented.  These data show that this magical solution will not work as advertised.

Finally, I want to put the historical and projected generating load in perspective relative to RGGI and NYCI.  The New York Independent System Operator(NYISO) annual load and capacity data report universally known as the “Gold Book” provides input for a couple of relevant graphs in NYISO 2025 Gold Book Forecast Graphs.

Figure 2 lists historical and weather normalized annual loads from 2015 to 2024.  These observed loads closely track the RGGI electric generating unit loads.  The scary issue is that NYISO is projecting significant increases in load going forward without the addition of large load facilities.  The load increases are associated with electrification strategies associated with the Climate Act.

Figure 2: NYISO Historical New York Control Area (NYCA) Annual Energy and 10-Year Forecasts (GWh)

Figure 3 also lists historical and weather normalized annual loads from 2015 to 2024 but includes “additional load growth from large loads”.  This increases the 2035 baseline around 17,000 GWh or another 10%.  This would make it all the more difficult to provide sufficient zero-emission generating resources to comply with the Climate Act mandate to have a 100% zero-emission electric grid by 2040.

Figure 3: NYISO Historical New York Control Area (NYCA) Annual Energy and 10-Year Forecasts (GWh)

Conclusion

This analysis clearly shows that the primary driver of observed emission reductions from RGGI electric generating units was fuel switching.  These results are consistent with similar analyses that I have prepared regarding RGGI emission reductions.  I will incorporate these findings in my comments on the 2026 RGGI Operating Plan Amendment stating that this observations should be reflected in the Operating Plan just like I have for the last several years.  I fully expect that NYSERDA will ignore my comments again and will continue to make investments to appease political constituencies.  Political interference in energy policy will eventually fail, it is only a matter of time.

Climate Change Perceptions

I have been meaning to write this post for a long time because I think there is an important distinction about climate change that could potentially be affected by reducing GHG emissions that is not generally recognized.  I have postponed this article because I did not want to try to explain the driving factor for my concern – ocean and atmospheric oscillations.  Andy May is a petrophysicist who has a climate blog that recently published 14 articles about atmospheric oscillations that I have used in this post.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  Moreover, I take the heretical position that our understanding of the causes of climate change are not understood well enough to support the idea that reducing GHG emissions represents sound policy.  I have been a practicing meteorologist for nearly 50 years, was a Certified Consulting Meteorologist, and have B.S. and M.S. degrees in meteorology.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

Weather and climate are often confused.  According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Ocean Service “Weather reflects short-term conditions of the atmosphere while climate is the average daily weather for an extended period of time at a certain location.”  They go on to say: “Climate is what you expect, weather is what you get.” 

The standard climatological average is 30 years.  It is important to understand that programs like the Climate Act’s GHG emission reduction targets are intended to reduce global warming over longer time scales than 30 years.  Statements suggesting that even if aggressive mitigation reduces greenhouse gases  that temperature will still increase for 20-30 years due to inertia in the climate system are based on the premise that CO2 is the control knob for the climate.

I often hear and have noticed myself that “winters aren’t what they used to be” and that leaves are turning color later than the past.  The goal of this article is to show that there are climatic oscillations with time periods greater than 30 years that are likely causing these perceived examples of climate change.  However, I will show there is no connection between those observations and the value of the Climate Act as a potential reason to reduce GHG emissions in hopes of changing those observations.

Climate Oscillation Analysis

Earlier this year Andy May published 14 articles about climate oscillations in the oceans and atmosphere. I think his analysis is notable because it is data driven.  The basis of his analysis is articles describing observed oceanic and atmospheric changes, not modeled simulations.  Given the complexity of the interactions between oceans and the atmosphere and the poor understanding of their relationships, assuming that modeled simulations are credible is not reasonable. 

His articles provide compelling evidence that each of the 14 oscillations is natural.  I believe his work provides sufficient evidence proving that “each oscillation is natural and has been around since the pre-industrial period, or even earlier, and thus is natural and not random variability.”  This is important relative to claims that reducing the GHG emissions will affect global temperatures. 

May’s work consists of a statistical regression analysis of observed features in the oceans and atmospheres that have occurred over many years.  He uses the HadCRUT5  global average temperature data set used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to track global warming in his analyses.  May offers the following caveat about his work.

Finally, this is a regression analysis to predict HadCRUT5 with climate oscillations to try and detect the climate oscillations that best correlate to “global warming.” This is not a climate model, it is not an attempt to make a climate model, it is only a statistical exercise. Statistics and statistical analysis are not proof of anything, it isn’t even scientific analysis, they are just useful tools to sort through datasets. Just as AI is not intelligent, statistics is not science, both are useful tools.

Climate Oscillations

May’s work consisted of the following posts:

In Climate Oscillations 1: The Regression May provides the following table that lists the oceanic and atmospheric oscillations considered in his series of articles.  For each of these oscillations he did a statistical regression analysis.  The first seven of the oscillations correlated with the GMST measured using HadCRUT5.  May points out that “HadCRUT5 is not representative of global climate, it is just an average temperature”.  Nonetheless, it is the primary climate change parameter.  The rationale for the Climate Act uses climate change and global warming interchangeably.

May Table 1. A list of the climate oscillations discussed and analyzed in this series. The first eight oscillations are listed in order of importance in modeling HadCRUT5, the remaining six did not add to the model. The links in this table will not work, to see the list in a spreadsheet with working links, download it here.

I am not going to review each post in this article but will describe several of the oscillations. If you want to review the articles and are content with a summary using Perplexity AI I did get a review of his work.    It notes:

The series begins with a foundational regression analysis that ranks fourteen major climate oscillations by their statistical correlation with HadCRUT5 global surface temperature. May’s analysis reveals that the top three oscillations—the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO), Western Hemisphere Warm Pool (WHWP) area, and Southern Annular Mode (SAM)—together explain 77% of HadCRUT5 variability since 1950. This finding directly contradicts the IPCC’s characterization of these oscillations as unpredictable “internal variability” with minimal influence beyond a few years.

The Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) has the most significant relationship with global mean surface temperature (GMST).  There are several definitions based on different measurements.  For example, Gray, et al. use detrended raw tree-ring measurements to demonstrate “a strong and regular 60-100 year variability in basin-wide (0-70°N) North Atlantic sea surface temperatures (SSTs) that has been persistent for the past five centuries.”

The general approach used by May is simple.  Figure 4 plots GMST using the HadCRUT 5 data and the AMO parameter using the HadSST 4.1 data.  It is obvious that the two parameters track well.  May used regression analysis to show the strength of the relationship. Note the variation in global temperature since 1850 shown in this graph.  The first challenge for proponents of the idea that CO2 is the driver of climate change is that it is acknowledged that it is only since 1950 that CO2 has affected global warming.  So, what happened in the past to cause the observed variations?   I do not think it is reasonable to claim that all the natural drivers that caused variations before 1950 stopped and global warming became entirely dependent upon CO2 since, but that is the argument used by Climate Act proponents.

May Figure 4. HadSST and HadCRUT detrended temperature anomalies plotted together. Both anomalies are from 1961-1990 originally but are from their respective linear least squares trends. This is updated from figure 2 in (May & Crok, 2024).

May points out:

The reason for the AMO SST 60-70-year pattern is unknown, but according to Gray et al. it extends back to 1567AD, so it is a natural oscillation of some kind. Some have speculated that it is a result of the thermohaline circulation in the North Atlantic or a “combination of natural and anthropogenic forcing during the historical era.” (Mann, Steinman, & Miller, 2020). But while interesting these ideas are speculative. Further if the oscillation has existed since 1567, it seems unlikely that it is caused by human CO2 and aerosol emissions.

The AMO has the best correlation with GMST in all the statistical analyses.  Combined with two other oscillations –  Western Hemisphere Warm Pool (WHWP) area, and Southern Annular Mode (SAM) these three  explain 77% of HadCRUT5 variability since 1950.

The Western Hemisphere Warm Pool Area (WHWP) is an area of abnormally warm ocean that extends from the eastern North Pacific (west of Mexico, Central America, and Columbia) to the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and well into the Atlantic during the WHWP peak in August and September.  Because this area is important to hurricane formation, the strength and extent of the warm pool is important.  May points out that the WHWP  combined with the Antarctic Oscillation or Southern Annular Mode and the AMO predict GMST well.  He concludes that “This suggests that The North Atlantic and the Southern Hemisphere circulation patterns correlate very well with global climate trends, CO2 may fit in there somewhere, but it must share the spotlight with these natural oscillations.”

The Southern Annular Mode/Antarctic Oscillation (AAO) is defined as the difference between the zonal (meaning east-west or circumpolar) sea level air pressure between 40°S and 65°S.  This parameter has a powerful influence on global climate and can affect weather in the Northern Hemisphere (Lin, Yu, & Hall, 2025), in particular the Warm Arctic-Cold Eurasian weather pattern that causes a lot of extreme winter weather. The AAO also affects the Indian summer monsoon and other eastern Asia weather phenomena.

Synthesis

The final article in the series, Climate Oscillations 12: The Causes & Significance, addressed the claim by proponents of the Climate Act that “ocean and atmospheric oscillations are random internal variability, except for volcanic eruptions and human emissions, at climatic time scales.”  May explains:

This is a claim made by the IPCC when they renamed the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) to the Atlantic Multidecadal Variability (AMV) and the PDO to PDV, and so on. AR6 (IPCC, 2021) explicitly states that the AMO (or AMV) and PDO (or PDV) are “unpredictable on time scales longer than a few years” (IPCC, 2021, p. 197). Their main reason for stating this and concluding that these oscillations are not influenced by external “forcings,” other than a small influence from humans and volcanic eruptions, is that they cannot model these oscillations, with the possible exceptions of the NAM and SAM (IPCC, 2021, pp. 113-115). This is, of course, a circular argument since the IPCC models have never been validated by predicting future climate accurately, and they also make some fundamental assumptions that simply aren’t true.

This is a good point to remind readers that little fluctuations in incoming radiation have big impacts on the climate.  The Milankovitch theory is the most widely accepted cause of glaciation.  It states  that variations in earth’s orbit and tilt cause changes in the amount of sunlight that cause climate fluctuations strong enough to trigger continental glaciers. 

May’s analysis finds relationships between similarly small external variations that correlate with global surface temperatures.  Note however that proponents of CO2 as the control knob disregard all climate drivers but the greenhouse effect.    May explains:

Finally, oscillations are inconsistent with anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions as a dominant forcing of climate change. Greenhouse gas emissions do not oscillate; recently they have only increased with time. So, we will examine the relationship between solar and orbital cycles and the climate oscillations. As Scafetta and Bianchini (2022) have noted, there are some very interesting correlations between solar activity and planetary orbits, and climate changes on Earth.

May’s final article describes multiple observed oscillations including a period of about ~64 years, ±5 years (Wyatt, et al., 2012), Nathan Mantua and colleagues (Mantua, et al., 1997) identified 20th century “climate shifts” which results in a major multidecadal climate oscillation of 22 to 30 years and there are shorter 2-, 5-, 5-, and 9-year observed oscillations.  Note that there also are other cycles that are longer than these.

The ~64 year oscillation is of particular interest.  Marcia Wyatt’s “stadium wave” hypothesis shows that a suite of global and regional climate indicators vary over roughly the same 64-year period.  Wyatt explains:

“Stadium wave” is an allusive term for a hypothesis of multidecadal climate variability. Sequential propagation of an “audience wave” from one section of sports fans to another in a sports arena – i.e. a “stadium wave” – is analogous to the premise of the climate stadium-wave hypothesis. It, too, involves sequential propagation of a signal. In the case of the climate stadium wave, propagation proceeds sequentially through ocean, ice, and atmospheric systems. Key to signal propagation is network, or collective behavior – a feature ubiquitous throughout natural and man-made systems, a product of time and self-organization.

I think of climate as a product primarily of the climate stadium wave cycle plus contributions from other oscillations.  May explains:

If we define “global climate change” as the observed changes in HadCRUT5 or BEST global mean surface temperature (GMST) as the IPCC does, then the oscillations that correlate best are the AMO and the global mean sea surface temperature (SST) as shown in figure 2. None of the other oscillations correlate well with GMST.

In figure 2, the gray curve is a 64-year cosine function. It fits the 20th century data but departs significantly around 2005 and before 1878. The early departure could be due to poor data, the 19th century temperature data is very bad, see figure 11 in (Kennedy, et al., 2011b & 2011). Data quality problems still exist today, but are much less of a factor and the departure after 2005 is likely real and could be caused by any combination of the of the two following factors:

  1. Human-emitted greenhouse gases.
  2. The full AMO/world SST/GMST period is longer and/or more complex than we can see with only 170 years of data.

It is probably a combination of the two. As discussed by Scafetta and Stefani, climate, orbital, and solar cycles are known to exist that are longer than 170 years. The fact that I had to detrend all the records shown in figure 2 testifies to that. It is also noteworthy that the ENSO ONI trend since 2005 is trending down; as shown in the last post. So is the current PDO trend. All the notable oscillations are not synchronized, teleconnections or not, climate change is not simple. The trends in figure 2 result from complex combinations of gravitational forces and teleconnections (Scafetta, 2010), (Ghil, et al., 2002), and (Stefani, et al., 2021).

Discussion

May gives a concise summary of the potential human influence that has never been considered by the State of New York:

Whether global warming is a problem or not is in dispute, but it is a fact that the world is warming, and some are concerned about it. What is the cause of the warming? Is it natural warming after the cold winters of the Little Ice Age? Is it caused by human emissions of CO2? Most of the natural ocean and atmospheric circulation oscillations examined in this post are not modeled properly (some say not modeled at all) in current global climate models (Eade, et al., 2022). The IPCC AR6 report admits that the AMO (they call it the “AMV”) signal in the CMIP6 climate models is very weak, specifically on page 506:

“However, there is low confidence in the estimated magnitude of the human influence. The limited level of confidence is primarily explained by difficulties in accurately evaluating model performance in simulating AMV.” (IPCC, 2021, p. 504)

In other words, the models that predict gloom and doom that are used as the rationale that we must reduce New York GHG emissions don’t accurately predict the oscillation that correlates best with global temperatures.  If you cannot model this relationship, then the likelihood that future temperature projections are accurate is zero.

In addition, NYSERDA presentations at meetings consistently attribute the latest extreme weather events to climate change.  Maybe someday I will explain why I think that is completely divorced from reality and only serves to support the narrative that there is an existential threat.  In the meantime Roger Pielke, Jr. recently eviscerated this line of reasoning and those that continually use it.  He points out that this approach is “counter to the terminology, frameworks, and assessments of the IPCC and the broad base of research on which the work of the IPCC is based upon.”  I strongly recommend his article as definitive proof that the Hochul Administration picks and chooses the “science” to fit their narrative.

Conclusion

The intent of this article was to explain why anecdotal “evidence” of climate change is no more than recognition that there are weather pattern cycles that currently show warming.  It does not mean that there is conclusive evidence that continued GHG emissions will inevitably increase global temperatures.  There is overwhelming evidence that the current warming cycle will eventually reverse.  This does not mean that GHG emissions are not a factor but does mean they are a tweak not the primary driver.  This combined with the fact that New York GHG emissions are so small relative to global emissions that we cannot meaningfully affect global emissions means that GHG emission reductions for the sake of the climate is a useless endeavor.

Observations about the Con Ed Rate Case

Over the last six months I have been working with several colleagues to intervene in New York rate cases in an attempt to get someone to listen to us regarding the futility of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero transition.  In our current effort we intervened in the Consolidated Edison of New York (Con Ed) rate case.  Francis Menton recently described our latest objection that provides an overview of this effort.  This article reproduces Richard Ellenbogen’s long and detailed explanation of why the system is broken.

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy.  He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where it has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system.  I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

The following is a lightly edited copy of an email Ellenbogen sent on 15 December 2025.

Overview

I have just spent the past six months as a party to the Con Ed rate case (25-E-0072 and 25-G-0073) as part of a group called the Independent Intervenors that also includes Roger Caiazza and Francis Menton.  It is six months of my life that I will never get back.

I say that because the system is fatally flawed and skewed against the rate payer and towards special interests.  The DPS (Department of Public Services) is supposed to protect the interests of the rate payer but from what I saw, their primary goal was expediency and trying to avoid angering special interest groups to avoid political blowback.

Four months during the middle of the rate case is done in forced confidentiality.  All the parties get into a “room” in forced secrecy to negotiate except no one was negotiating on behalf of the rate payers despite claims to the contrary.  I compare this period to an incident that occurred when I was nine and playing ball inside the house.  I chipped a glass lampshade.  To keep from having to explain what happened, I turned the chipped part towards the wall and hoped that my mother wouldn’t see it.  That is no different than what occurred during this rate case.  Just as I did with the lampshade, they are hiding things from the rate payers and hoping that they won’t notice except the ramifications of this are far more impactful than a broken lamp.  They are deluding themselves because just as I told state officials regarding the Climate Act almost seven years ago, the political pork serving no engineering purpose built into this case is going to negatively impact the ratepayers of both NY City and Westchester.  It is tangentially related to the Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY) analysis which I will address later in this document.  It highlights only one negative aspect of the hearings and state and city policy but the impact on city residents will be crippling.

The result of the negotiations is called the Joint Proposal (JP) and parties either accept it or reject it and those objections can be resolved at a Post Settlement Hearing which occurred on Wednesday December 3.  The Joint Proposal runs 379 pages.

Our Objections

We chose to object to the settlement and were offered the opportunity to question witnesses from DPS and Con Ed.  Part of me thinks that if I had been a better litigator, I might have accomplished more during the hearing but part of me realizes that the sole purpose of the accepting parties was to object to every document that we submitted.   References to the documents are included.  I take no issue with the judges as they did their jobs according to the limits of court procedure, however the reality of the process does not work in the ratepayer’s favor for several reasons.  I only took issue with two statements made by the judges, but I bit my tongue to avoid drawing their ire.  I will elaborate on those two incidents below.  

First, despite the judges being there, the hearing is controlled by attorneys and staff that clearly have absolutely no understanding about how the utility system works.  I learned that in 2008 when I beat up Con Ed’s lawyers during a tariff hearing before the DPS. Things have not improved over the past 17 years.  Their sole purpose in these hearings, along with NY City’s Lawyers, EDF’s (Environmental Defense Fund) lawyers, and DPS lawyers,  was to try to disallow anything that might contradict the accepted JP.  The attorneys may understand the law but they don’t understand energy distribution systems, nor do they apparently care to.  Further, using the term, “Environmental Defense”, anywhere near this rate case is an oxymoron.  This JP is an affront to the environment along with being an affront to ratepayers.  The impact of math and physics on energy systems, the acknowledgement of which was so lacking in this settlement process, dictated that.

Second, we were allowed to ask questions of the DPS and Con Ed staff, but I quickly learned that all they had to say was that they were unfamiliar with any document that we presented and then they didn’t have to answer any questions about the document. Several of these were state documents published by the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) that we would hope that people responsible for the utility system would be aware of.  Their ignorance or willful ignorance of critical aspects of utility system operations and published reports don’t bode well and goes a long way to explaining the rapidly rising utility rates and impending energy shortages that the NYISO has stated will impact the downstate region within the next few years.  This highlights one issue that I had with a judge’s statement where he said, “Staff can’t be expected to know everything.”  Except they are being paid to know things.  Why was it that three unpaid volunteers knew more about what was wrong with this than people that are being paid to run the system?

Third, Con Ed staff could not pass Electrical Engineering 101, which is a problem for a company that is operating the electric utility system for nine million people.  That was highlighted by a judge’s statement after we asked about Local Law 97.  The judge stated that (paraphrased) “Local Law 97 is the law and it wasn’t a matter for discussion.”  I almost stood up and said, “But there is a higher law, and it can’t be negotiated with.”  But I didn’t feel that would have had any effect despite being true.  The problem with all of NY State energy policy is that it defies the physics and math of “Natural Law” and those don’t care about the Climate Act, Local Law 97, or this Joint Proposal.  These people seem to believe that if they state their positions loudly enough and shut down dissent, they will prevail.  As I said to Roger Caiazza on the phone the other day, we will eventually prevail because physical law says that we have to.  It’s only a question of how much damage will be done by these laws and to NY residents in the process.  NY State is learning that firsthand as they have now realized that their precious Climate Act is driving up utility rates to a level where it is breaking the backs of rate payers and that they can’t hit their emission targets.    That is something that was obvious seven years ago and they were told that this would happen.

As Roger Caiazza noted recently, the State Energy Plan analysis of total monthly energy costs expects the cost of capital to install replacement appliances and vehicles that can meet the Climate Act zero-emissions mandate is nearly $600 a month more than replacement with conventional household appliances and vehicles even after the savings of more efficient equipment are factored in.  Beyond the high rates, the state’s renewable percentage relative to load is projected to drop by 2% over the next 5 years.  A document that we tried to present during the December 3 hearing clearly showing that, based upon an analysis of a state report, was objected to by the attorneys in the room and was disallowed as irrelevant.

Our issues with state policy in general and this rate case in particular can be explained by the following analogy.  As you may or may not remember from high school physics, the acceleration due to earth’s gravity is 9.8 meters/second2.   Imagine if Boeing or Airbus arbitrarily declared that the acceleration due to gravity was not 9.8 meters/second2 but was instead 47% lower than that at 5.2 meters/second2   and then invested hundreds of millions of dollars designing planes to that standard.  It would allow them to build planes with smaller engines, reducing their costs, and also declare that their planes had a much longer range reducing fuel costs for the airlines.  However, if they ever built a plane to those specifications and tried to fly it, it would drop like a stone because as I mentioned previously, the laws of physics are not negotiable.  Additionally, all the money spent engineering, developing, and building the planes to the false metric would be wasted.   NY City has essentially done the same thing to the generation metrics in its Local Law 97 as was shown in the prior analogy and the system is going to drop like a stone if they try to implement it.  The Con Ed JP is working to support this policy that defies natural law and ratepayers are going to suffer as a result, left holding the bag with enormous amounts of money being wasted on a futile effort.

Our position in this case was simple.  Don’t spend money on unnecessary electrical equipment that won’t help the ratepayer during the three year period covered by this case.  That seemed to be too difficult of a concept for DPS staff, Con Ed staff, and all of the lawyers in the room to comprehend.  Keep in mind that if parties to the case push their pet projects, even though the math says that they won’t work, if those projects are in the JP, then Con Ed gets to build more stuff and make their percentage profit on it.  There is about $838 million worth of construction projects (New Business Capital) in the JP.  We wanted to present a fully accurate figure of how much of that is related to unnecessary projects to support building electrification in support of Local Law 97 that the state has now started to roll back elsewhere because the process will be crippling to rate payers.  However, Con Ed stated that they couldn’t break out those figures although NY State was able to do that for the state system.  By our estimate, about one third of that $838 million could be eliminated, or about $270 million – $300 million.  However, removing that would reduce Con Ed’s profits by $27 – $30 million and NY City would lose the property taxes imposed on that $270 million – $300 million of infrastructure.  For those in Westchester that think that this doesn’t impact them, electrification costs across the entire Con Ed system are distributed proportionally across all Con Ed ratepayers.  So even though no one in Westchester voted for the City Council that passed Local Law 97, residents of Westchester will be paying for both the additional electrification and the NY City taxes applied to it.  About 250 years ago, a bunch of tea was thrown into a harbor regarding a similar situation.

Beyond replacing aging infrastructure, there is one project in particular that would greatly improve the downstate energy system and that is to replace 75% of the train cars in the NY City Subway system that don’t currently have regenerative braking systems.  Calculations indicate that peak system load could be reduced by 500 Megawatts of peak load and thousands of Gigawatt-hours of energy use annually simply by buying new train cars.  That would also greatly decrease emissions and reduce car maintenance.   However, we were told that this was outside the scope of the rates case even though it is the fastest, simplest, and least expensive way to harden the downstate energy system.  It would also help to reduce transit costs.

Objection Rationale Facts

The balance of this email will include a detailed discussion of why the JP is not in the interests of the rate payers using documents and math that we tried to introduce during the hearing, but which were objected to, or the staff plead ignorance so we couldn’t question them on it.  Understanding the documents requires nothing more than a knowledge of simple arithmetic and the following facts. 

  • A BTU is a British Thermal Unit.  A KBtu is 1000 BTU’s.  A Therm (Unit of gas billing done by the utility) is 100,000 BTU’s or 100 KBTU’s.
  •        A Kilowatt-Hour (KWh) equates to the energy used by a load of 1000 watts for one hour or alternatively that of a 100 watt light bulb for 10 hours.  The utility bills for KWh used during a one month period.
  •        There are 29.3 KWh in a Therm (100,000 BTU).  That is an energy equivalence. 
  •        Carbon Emissions are measured in Metric Tons ( t or mt in the documents) which are 2204 pounds in Imperial units.
  •        Power (P) = Current (I) x Voltage (V).  P=I xV.   As the system voltage is constant, as loads increase, power demand increases and current increases proportionally.  This is taught in high school physics and Electrical Engineering 101 but is part of what was objected to by the parties in the case.
  •        Wires are not perfect conductors.  They have a resistance (R) and the energy losses are measured in watts (W).  Losses on the wires equal I2 xR.  So as the power demands increase, the current increases and the line loss increases.  Line loss appears as heat in the wires and components of the utility system, such as transformers. If the load doubles, P doubles, I doubles and the line loss increases by a factor of four.  Line loss costs are paid for by the ratepayers as part of the “Delivery” portion of the bill.
  •        As wires get hotter, their resistance increases.  One of the documents shows the equation for this but simply put, for every 18 degree increase in temperature above 70 degrees-F, the resistance of aluminum or copper (the primary conductors used on the utility system) will increase by 4% and line loss for those components will increase by 4%.  When I received a grant from the state in 2010 to analyze line losses and mitigate them, Con Ed mounted power monitors I built onto their poles that measured the before and after of the process.  However, these monitors also measured the temperature of the transformers  that they were connected to.    On a 90-degree summer day, the metal shell of the  transformers reached over 140  degrees-F, indicating at least a 16% increase of resistance.  If the exterior of the transformer in the open air was 140 degrees, the interior was likely substantially hotter.

 A July 2008 presentation by Con Ed at a DPS session on line losses (Case 08-E-0751) that was initiated based upon a paper I wrote showed that the average line loss over the course of a year was 7%.  That included an average of 3% losses during the winter when loads are lower and wires and equipment are cooler and 11% losses during the summer when loads are higher and wires and equipment are hotter.  I tried to use a slide from their presentation, but they objected to their own documents because they said that it was 17 years old and not applicable.  The following will show how ridiculous that objection was.  Con Ed has not publicly released line loss data since 2008 but it can be clearly shown that the 7% is the low end of line loss and it is going to get worse, not better.  The NYISO has predicted that loads are going to increase and if state policies are followed, NY State’s loads will peak during the winter by 2033 instead of during the summer as they do now.  As a result, winter line losses will approach the 11% of summer line losses and the average line loss will increase from 7% to 11%..  Despite the colder winter temperatures, the even higher pending winter loads will raise the losses to near those encountered during the summer.  Further, Con Ed has not replaced a lot of the equipment on the system since 2007 so there is no reason to believe that line loss has decreased.  The image below is from the project that I did in 2010 and both of those transformers were not new then and are still in use 15 years later.  The small grey electrical boxes below the transformers are the power monitors I built and if you look at the Monitor 11 photo, you will see a small beige patch with a wire connected to the power monitor halfway up the transformer.  That is the temperature sensor.  There were four monitors located on transformers in various locations in New Rochelle and they communicated via Zigbee and ethernet to a computer in my home that collected data every few seconds. 

If someone needs to wonder about how old the infrastructure in the Con Ed system is,  EIOP  23441915 Ed Koch Queensboro Bridge 13kV Riser Replacement in the JP is to replace an extremely old transmission cable on one of the East River bridges.  We didn’t object to that as it is a necessary expense, and it is those types of projects that need to be executed.  Throughout the list of EIOP’s are statements saying that equipment shortages may complicate their ability to be executed.  That raises the question, “Why are we building unnecessary projects that are very likely to compromise supply chains and the ability to build necessary projects?”  I copied the first two pages of an article from the IEEE Spectrum Magazine, February, 2025 (Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers) that documents the acute transformer shortage facing the entire world.  It is a large document and it is behind a firewall so if anyone wants the full copy, feel free to ask me for it.  Transformer shortages are affecting energy projects everywhere.

Another example of the age of the downstate system is made clearly evident by this caption copied from page 30 of the NYISO 2025-2034 Reliability Analysis documenting the age of NY City’s generation fleet.  The rest of the downstate system isn’t much newer.  The caption speaks for itself.

New York’s generation fleet is among the oldest in the country. Compared to generation in other Independent System Operator (ISO)/Regional Transmission Operator (RTO) regions in the United States, NYCA generation ranks among the oldest or second oldest in each of the natural gas steam turbine, combustion turbine, and combined cycle technology types. This is particularly apparent in New York City where the average age of a steam turbine is 65 years.

Objection Rationale

With knowledge of the facts listed and the associated information, the balance of the discussion will be understandable. 

Why is line loss important in a discussion about electric heat?  Emissions data for on-site gas combustion is based upon emissions at the building level.  However, emissions data for the generators is based upon looking at the source which is the generating plant.  But heat pumps use the electrical energy at the building level so energy lost on the wires adds to their carbon footprint unless the system is 100% renewable or carbon free.  The heating caused by line loss also contributes to wear and tear on the system components leading to earlier failures.   The recent NYISO 2025 – 2034 reliability study clearly showed that the downstate system is only 5% carbon free and 95% fossil fuel supported.  This means that every heat pump is going to eventually be 10% more carbon intensive than what they are calculating.  Complicating that fact is the state’s inability to build sufficient renewables reflected in the cancellation of the CleanPath renewable project and the cancellation of several offshore wind bids over a year prior to Trump taking office.  All of that was due to excessive costs so expecting that the system will get less carbon intensive is not realistic.  Exhibit 14 is a copy of the state’s 2024 draft biennial review.  It has since been finalized.  Exhibit 12 is an analysis of data in the review done by Roger Caiazza that clearly shows that the state’s carbon free generation relative to load is going to DECREASE by 2% by 2030 so despite the Climate Act being in effect for 11 years by that time, emissions are increasing.  The baseline was done after the closure of Indian Point, so the loss of that carbon free energy is not a factor in the calculations.

Why is Local Law 97 such an albatross?  It is an ideological document that is designed to remove gas combustion from the city and electrify all onsite heating.  It is going to impose penalties on every building that can’t meet certain emission metrics.  The problem is that the math to support that concept doesn’t work so the city embedded fake metrics into the law to support the concept so that it would look like it is working.  There are several issues with that and documents that we tried to introduce into the case to document these issues were objected to by the attorneys as irrelevant even though they clearly showed why the JP would be wasting taxpayer and ratepayer money.  To get around the fact that the numbers didn’t support their policies, the city arbitrarily decreased the emissions metric for downstate generation to 630 pounds per Megawatt-Hour (MWh).  They will begin fining buildings based upon that in the near future.  But a document published by the US EPA states that the downstate NY emissions are 865 pounds per MWh.  If line loss is figured in, the energy to run building electrification will emit 930 pounds per MWh, 47% higher. Then they state that in 2030, the emissions will magically be reduced to 315 pounds per Megawatt-Hour, 50% of the fake 2025 value despite NY State documenting a 2% increase in emissions by 2030.  All of this is being done to make their policies look feasible and environmentally friendly.  They are as feasible as the airplanes designed to the wrong gravity constant.   The line loss calculations are in Exhibit 13 and the Local Law 97 information is in Exhibit 10.  The analysis of why heat pumps run less efficiently than gas boilers on the Con Ed system and will cost more is in Exhibit 9.  That fact is confirmed by a NYSERDA report released in 2019.  In the Abstract of the document on page ii, it states the following.  Note the text in bold font.

This Report describes NYSERDA’s analysis of the costs, benefits, and adoption opportunities for small-scale residential heat pumps in New York State over the period to 2025. The Report concludes that, based on a conservative application of constraint assumptions, heat pumps could serve approximately  half of the thermal energy load in the small residential sector, with potential to increase this estimate as barriers such as landlord-tenant constraints or availability of hydronic heat pump systems are overcome. Achievable adoption potential for small-scale residential heat pumps is assessed to be around 7.5 TBtu   of incremental site energy savings from oil and resistance heating replacements by 2025.

It was not promoting gas heat replacements, just oil and resistance heat replacements.  Tables within the document clearly show higher costs for ASHP’s when compared to gas combustion.  The reason for that appears in the two charts below that were shown to NYSERDA in May of 2019 and they agreed that the numbers matched theirs.  Notice that the air source heat pumps have higher emissions on the downstate system than gas but they have lower emissions than oil and radiant heat. 

DPS Staff and Con Ed staff said that they were unaware of the NYSERDA document so we weren’t allowed to question them on it.  However, that fact didn’t stop NY City or Con Ed from misrepresenting the conclusions of the NYSERDA document and attempting to replace gas units to the detriment of NY City and Westchester residents.  The costs were originally presented to NYSERDA in 2019 as well.  They were updated in 2023.  The analysis in Exhibit 9 clearly shows that dependent on the outdoor winter temperature, it will cost 40% more to heat with an air source heat pump at 30 degrees-F and 118% more at 5 degrees-F (2.18 times the cost) based upon utility rates this past February when gas costs were highest.   It was objected to by the parties because they couldn’t establish provenance, although I took ownership in a sworn document presented to the judges.  We even offered to have me testify to explain the documents but that was objected to at a pre-trial conference.  I was one of the last people that they wanted to have testify.  DPS asked me to go to Albany in 2008 for the 08-E-0751 conference to “embarrass the utilities” because they should have been providing the information to DPS that I provided but they failed to.  While they may not be aware of that event, they are aware of my writings.  During the confidential portion of the hearing I was called “Inflammatory, Unprofessional, and anti-electrification” because I mentioned that some of the parties should go back and take high school physics and math.  They ignored the fact that I was one of the earliest adopters of renewable and geo-thermal technologies in the state over twenty years ago.  I am not against electrification.  I am against electrification that math and physics dictates will not work and will simultaneously cause more environmental damage in the process.

As a gift to certain parties, Con Ed is offering a new/modified tariff rate SC1-IV for heat pump users.  It will give them a special rate for a period of one year if they switch to electric heating.  After the year is up, the heat pump user may end up back on the regular SC-1 rate that will have the costs mentioned previously and the special tariff rate is being subsidized by the non-heat pump users on the regular rate (SC-1) because the money has to come from somewhere. On Page 54 of the JP (page 63 of the JP pdf) it specifically states the following:

The Company will make the following modifications to special provision (H) of SC 1 in the tariff. First, a customer who takes service under Rate III or Rate IV of SC 1 for the first time during the term of the rate plan in Case 25-E-0072 may be eligible to receive a price guarantee for one year. This represents an extension of the existing price guarantee for Rate IV and adds Rate III to the list of eligible rate classes for which the price guarantee applies.

Second, the Company will remove the language that limits the number of customers eligible for the price guarantee to no more than 500 ground source heat pump customers and no more than 500 air source heat pump customers during the term of the rate plan. The price guarantee will now be available to all new or existing residential customers operating air source heat pumps or ground source heat pumps commencing billing for the first time under SC 1 Rate III or Rate IV during the term of the rate plan.

Finally, a customer that leaves SC1 Rate III or Rate IV prior to the conclusion of the first twelve-month period will receive a credit, if applicable, based on the period during which the customer took service under SC1 Rate III or Rate IV.

It does not document what happens to those customers after the twelve month period expires.  It’s great for Con Ed because they will be charging the poor fools that switched to ASHP’s double to heat their homes after a year.  If anyone is on the SC-1 electric rate, you will be paying for people to switch to heat pumps, raising their rates and yours, while also raising carbon emissions in the name of Environmental Defense.

Beyond the costs of operating the equipment is the cost of the conversion which was highlighted by the $600 additional per month for the state plan.  Exhibit H is attached which is an article about a Brooklyn co-op that converted from oil heat to electrification at a cost of $50,000 per unit ($40,000 after rebate but the rebate money will quickly run out).  Also attached is a snapshot of a Loan Calculation for what a $50,000 mortgage would cost at 6% amortized over 30 years.  It is $300 additional  per month that a resident will have to pay every month for the next 30 years and $50,000 is the low end of electrification conversions.  Estimates for Co-Op City’s cost of compliance for Local Law 97 have approached $2 billion for its 15,732 units in 35 buildings.  That averages out to $130,000 per apartment and would add $780 per month to the carrying cost of every unit in the complex.  These are the concerns highlighted in the REBNY report, attached.  There is absolutely no way to make these policies work because they defy natural law.

Adding to the issues, there is a NYSERDA PowerPoint from August 2022.  The slide from page 19 of the report is shown below.  Note that it says that the Energy Use Intensity for an Air Source Heat Pump (ASHP) is almost 10 times higher in heating mode than in cooling mode.  Except our utility system has difficulties now on a hot day in the summer.  This past June, the NYISO declared an emergency during a heat wave.  How is that going to translate to a heating technology that could magnify that figure by a factor of TEN on a very cold day during the winter? 

The additional carrying costs mentioned previously and the 40% – 118% higher operational costs don’t include Con Ed’s costs for upgrading their system to deliver the higher energy load needed to run the ASHP’s.  This rate case with its $270 million additional is the tip of the iceberg.  This is going to be the norm for decades to come. 

They are also promoting these policies while the NYISO is stating that NY State’s generation margins are critically low so what is going to power the heat pump use intensity.  The following graph, copied from page 30 of the NYISO 2025-2034 Reliability Document, shows the declining generation margins on the NY State System with potential for blackouts starting in 2027.  This will be weather dependent.

Concluding Remarks

I could present another ten pages of arguments that would just show more of the inane policies that NY State and NY City are proposing with several more pages of documentation, but after a while it just gets redundant. 

The bottom line is that they are not looking out for the ratepayer.  Special interests have overlaid an ideology devoid of reality onto the utility system either because they drank the Kool-Aid or they are exploiting those that did to make a buck from it and we are all going to pay for it.  The policy is inevitably going to fail but how much damage will be done to the ratepayers in the process?

The Independent intervenors have done what we can.  It is now up to anyone reading this to stand up and protest against what is about to happen to your utility costs and the utility system.  If people don’t, they will get what they deserve along with a high probability of not having any electricity at all.  Feel free to forward this.  I finish with the following observation.

In May 2025, the designer of the Hydrogen Bomb, Richard Garwin, died.  He spent the last 70 years of his life arguing against the use of the device he designed and he advised several Presidents.  In his obituary, he was quoted as having said, “I don’t go after stupidity in general, just stupidity that is expensive or dangerous.”  NY State’s Energy plans and Con Ed’s JP in support of it are exactly what he would have argued against. Stupid because it tries to defy natural law and as a result it is both Expensive and Dangerous.

Postscript After I completed this post Rich sent a note. 

The timing of this release is interesting.  We may be having an impact even if it isn’t everything that we want.  We forced the NYISO document into their record and mentioning people dying in their rate case transcript may have tied their hands and forced them to act.