Skeptical Overview of the Climate Act Presentation 2

This is a summary of the presentation I am giving to the Mohawk Valley Environmental Information Exchange on March 8, 2023 explaining why I believe that the risks, costs, and impacts of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) exceed the protections, savings, and benefits.  It is very similar to a presentation I made last December.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted 23 comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have published over 250 blog posts on  New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that this supposed cure will be worse than the disease.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Introduction

I explained that given the time constraints it was only possible to give sound bites to describe why I am skeptical of the ultimate impacts of the Climate Act.  This blog post gives an overview of the presentation and, more importantly, a link to detailed information supporting my arguments.  Everything presented draws on my blog posts and Draft Scoping Plan comments.

I discussed three primary concerns: reliability, affordability and environmental impacts.  In every instance, my evaluation of the components of the transition plan has found that issues are more complicated, uncertain, and costly than portrayed by the State.   Moreover, they have not provided a feasibility analysis to document whether their list of control strategies could work.  In addition there is no implementation plan.  The Climate Act is simply too fast and too far.

Overview of the Climate Act

I described the transition plan for New York’s Climate Act “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  The Climate Action Council developed an outline of plans to implement the Act in 2022.  The 22 members of the Council were chosen for their ideology and not their expertise. As a result of the lack of clear direction by the Hochul Administration their plan misplaced priorities.  Instead of focusing on overarching policy issues there was  inordinate attention to personal concerns of Council members. 

Over the summer of 2021 the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultant Energy + Environmental Economics (E3) prepared an Integration Analysis to “estimate the economy-wide benefits, costs, and GHG emissions reductions associated with pathways that achieve the Climate Act GHG emission limits and carbon neutrality goal”.  Integration Analysis quantitative implementation strategies were incorporated into the Draft Scoping Plan when it was released at the end of 2021.  After an extended comment period and ostensible review of the comments the Council released the Final Scoping Plan at the end of 2022.

I expressed my disappointment with the public stakeholder process associated with the Draft Scoping Plan comments. Seven hundred people spoke at Climate Act Public Hearings and around 35,000 comments were received.  However, on the order of 25,000 comments were “potentially the same or substantially similar”, i.e., form letters.  That still left 10,000 unique comments that the Council promised would be “acknowledged”.  In my opinion, the comment process was treated as an obligation not as an opportunity to improve, correct, or clarify the scoping plan.

Of course it is unreasonable to expect that the Council members could be expected to review all the comments themselves.  Agency staff categorized the comments and then filtered them in presentations to the Climate Action Council that described themes with very little specificity.  I think there was a clear bias in the presentations.  Anything inconsistent with Administration’s narrative was disparaged, downplayed, or ignored.  I was most disappointed that no comments on the fundamental basis of the Draft Scoping Plan, that is to say, the Integration Analysis, were mentioned, much less discussed.

I also addressed the Climate Act mandates for 2023.  The expectation is that the regulations that implement policies that force the transition away from fossil fuels will be implemented by the end of 2023.  However, the Climate Act also mandates a public comment and consultation process before promulgating regulations.  It requires the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to complete a public comment and consultation process before it can promulgate the 2024 Implementing Regulations.  This process includes public workshops and consultation with the Climate Action Council, the Environmental Justice Advisory Group, the Climate Justice Working Group, representatives of regulated entities, community organizations, environmental groups, health professionals, labor unions, municipal corporations, trade associations and other stakeholders. At least two public hearings and a 120-day public comment period must be provided. Only after this extensive stakeholder process concludes is DEC authorized to propose the implementing regulations.  When the regulations are formally proposed the State Administrative Procedures Act requires a 60 day public comment period, public hearings, and that the agency respond to all comments.  I think this is a very ambitious plan.

Electric Grid Risks

Many of the most vocal supporters of the Climate Act believe that existing renewable technology is sufficient to transition the New York electric grid to zero-emissions resources by 2040 and that suggestions that may not be true are misinformation.  In order to address that fallacy my presentation concentrated on my concerns about the reliability risks of an electric grid that is dependent upon intermittent and diffuse renewable resources.  The electric grid is crucial to New York’s energy future because the primary de-carbonization strategy is to electrify everything possible using those resources.  I described the existing grid, generation resource planning, the current New York State system, and the projected New York State system.  Electric grid reliability requires that generation resources match electric load at all times and the challenges associated with wind and solar in this regard are ignored by those who believe that existing technology is sufficient.

I made the point that failure to adequately plan will mean an inevitable catastrophic blackout like the

Texas February 2021 blackout.  In short, weather related issues due to freezing rain, snow and then an extended period of cold weather led to periods when the generating resources did not match the load necessary.  The storm was the worst energy infrastructure failure in Texas history.  Over 4.5 million homes and residences were without power, at least 246 people died, and total damages were at least $195 billion. 

In order to illustrate the basic electric grid I included the following diagram.  It shows that generating station provide power using turbine generators that convert mechanical energy into electric energy using water, steam, or other means to spin the turbines.  I have heard the argument that the grid is inefficient because there are power losses between the generating station and the users but the fact is that New York will always be dependent upon a transmission system because there is insufficient space in New York City for sufficient renewable resources to provide the energy needed to keep the lights on.  Power output from generating plants is stepped up at substation transformers for long distance transmission and then substation transformers step down the power for the distribution system for use by consumers.

I included the following diagram to make the point that New York is in the Eastern Interconnection which is the largest machine in the world.  Incredibly all the fossil, hydro, and nuclear generating stations in the Eastern Interconnection work together.  In order to provide 60 Hz power the generating turbines are synchronized to run at 3600 revolutions per minute.  Operators keeps the voltages as constant as possible in the entire area but have the advantage that those turbines provide inertia and they can dispatch generating resources as necessary.  Unfortunately, wind and solar resources are inverter based and cannot be dispatched as needed.

New York State has its own regional operator – the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO).  Within Power the Eastern Interconnection system operators match the load with the generation in smaller regional systems. Regional system operators manage imports and exports between neighboring systems.  New York has unique system constraints related to New York City and Long Island that warrant its own system operator.

NYISO operates the electric grid for New York State.  There are 11 control areas with specific load, interconnection, and generation characteristics that must be addressed on a six-second basis to keep the lights on.  New York State’s major challenge is that there are limits to transmission to the highly populated New York City and Long Island control areas.  The NYISO has to address different time scales for load management

  • Sub-minute fluctuations are addressed automatically
  • Hourly and daily fluctuations are handled by operators
  • Annual peaks require planning so that operators can respond

New York’s high reliability performance standards are the result of decades of experience working with dispatchable resources and implementation of specific metrics developed after blackouts in 1965 and 1977.

In order to educate those who believe that existing renewable resources are sufficient for maintaining current reliability standards I described generation resource planning.  The following load duration curve is a key concern of load management planning.  There are three general resources.  Baseline resources ideally are dispatched so they can run at a constant rate which enables the resource owners to tune the units to run as efficiently as possible.  Daily load variations require some resources to follow load during the day.   The biggest planning challenge is capacity and energy for peak loads that occur when temperatures are highest or lowest.  Before deregulation, each utility was responsible for meeting all these resource needs.  In New York City the solution for the peak load problem was a fleet of simple-cycle turbines dedicated for use to provide peaking power when and where needed.

The problem with existing renewable resource technology is matching load when the system is dependent upon renewable resources that cannot be dispatched and provide variable energy.  This is a new and difficult challenge.  It is exacerbated by intermittent renewable energy availability associated with peak loads. Load peaks with the coldest and hottest weather but those conditions typically are low wind resource periods.  Wind lulls in the winter when solar is low availability is the critical reliability issue.

The NYISO 2022 Power Trends Report  includes this description of the capacity (power available in MW) for the existing system.  It shows that 70% of installed capacity is fossil fueled and 25% is zero emissions.

Wind and other renewables (solar energy, energy storage resources, methane, refuse, or wood) account for only 6% of installed capacity.  Note that NYISO does not measure distributed solar directly.  In their accounting it reduces the load so less generation is needed.

The NYISO 2022 Power Trends Report  includes this description of Energy Production (MWh).  Note that 50% of New York’s generated electricity is zero-emissions.  There is a Climate Act target to “Increase renewable sources to 70 percent by 2030” that does not include zero-emissions nuclear. One reason that I am skeptical of the Climate Act is because 24% of renewable source energy produced is hydro and hydro pumped storage.  Wind and other renewables (solar energy, energy storage resources, methane, refuse, or wood) account for 5% of energy produced.  The 29% of the energy produced  from renewable sources is far less than the 70% by 2030 target. I don’t think that it is feasible to develop over 29GW of renewable resources between now and 2030 with supply chain issues, constraints on permitting, procurement, and construction when development of supporting infrastructure is also needed for off-shore wind development.

The capacity factor is a useful metric to understand electric generation resources.  The annual capacity factor equals the actual observed generation (MWh) divided by maximum possible generation (capacity (MW) times the 8,760 hours.  In New York nuclear is a key contributor but the Administration recently shut down 2,000 MW at Indian Point.  As a result, CO2 emissions from the electric sector increased by 23% since the phased-in shutdown of Indian Point started.  At this time the simple-cycle peaking turbines are being phased out and peaking power is produced by oil-fired units and spare capacity in the gas and dual fuel units.  Oil burning is a unique New York resource.  Imagine the difficulty replacing that capacity with a resource that would only need to run 1% of the time.  Note that in 2021 New York land-based wind only had a 22% capacity factor.

It is commonly argued that renewables are the cheapest type of new electric generating resources.  For example, that was the claim in a Dave Davies interview on National Public Radio Fresh Air: “A new climate reality is taking shape as renewables become widespread” with New York Times staff writer David Wallace-Wells.  Wallace-Wells said: “In fact, according to one study, 90% of the world now lives in places where building new renewable capacity would be cheaper than building new dirty capacity. And indeed, in a lot of places, it’s already cheaper to build new renewables than even to continue running old fossil fuel plants.” He went on to say “…we should be going all in on renewables here. We shouldn’t be building new coal or new oil or new gas capacity.”

The key to this claim is the reference to capacity.  If that were the only factor involved in getting the electricity when and where it is needed 24-7, 365 days a year without losing load due to extreme (one in ten year) conditions then his argument that we shouldn’t be building new coal, oil, or natural gas capacity” would be valid.  It is not.  Obviously electric users want power even when the wind is not blowing at night.  Electric system innumerates under-estimate the challenge of the energy storage requirements for extreme renewable resource lulls which correlate well with weather events that are safety threats because of extreme cold and heat. 

Given time restraints I could not fully describe all the NYISO’s planning responsibilities.  I did not include the following slide and made the point that their modeling analyses incorporate all of the complexities of the New York electric system.  I did not describe the three primary components of their responsibilities: comprehensive system planning which examines near-term and longer-term issues impacting reliability, economic, and public policy transmission planning; interconnection planning to evaluate the reliability implications of resources interconnecting and deactivating from the grid; and

Inter-regional planning with neighboring grid operators. One of the primary functions of the NYISO is electric system planning.  NYISO modeling incorporates all the complexities of the eleven control areas in the New York energy system.

I included the following summary of the NYISO Comprehensive System Planning Process to show all the components and to highlight the recent addition of a new component.  In order to address the Climate Act NYISO added “Develop the System & Resource Outlook” component that looks at a longer planning horizon that was included previously. 

The first report for the resource outlook component was released a couple of months ago.  The 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook can be downloaded from NYISO and a datasheet summary of key takeaways of the Outlook report is also available.  The summary describes the four key findings: an unprecedented buildout of new generation is needed, load will increase when we electrify everything, transmission is necessary and must be expended to get diffuse renewables to New York City and a new resource has been identified: Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR).  That resource is essentially a fossil-fueled turbine without any emissions. 

I compared the NYISO Resource Outlook modeling analysis with the Integration Analysis modeling.  The Outlook analysis was based on three scenarios.  In order to evaluate the effects of different policy options, this kind of modeling analysis projects future conditions for a baseline or business-as-usual case.  The evaluation analysis makes projections for different policy options, and then the results are compared relative to the business-as-usual case.  NYISO ran two policy scenarios: one based on their estimates of future demand and one that tried to simulate the Integration Analysis projections.  I compared their scenario 1 to the Integration Analysis in the presentation.

I compared the NYISO Resource Outlook modeling analysis with the Integration Analysis modeling.  The Outlook analysis was based on three scenarios.  In order to evaluate the effects of different policy options, this kind of modeling analysis projects future conditions for a baseline or business-as-usual case.  The evaluation analysis makes projections for different policy options, and then the results are compared relative to the business-as-usual case.  NYISO ran two policy scenarios: one based on their estimates of future demand and one that tried to simulate the Integration Analysis projections.  I compared their scenario 1 to the Integration Analysis in the presentation.

The Integration Analysis modeling was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan.  It is important to note that contrary to usual practice the Integration Analysis baseline was a reference case that included “already implemented” programs.  In other words there are some programs incorporated into the Reference Case that only exist to reduce GHG emissions.  This definition of the Reference Case instead of a Business-As-Usual case is different practice and motivated to get a specific answer.

The Integration Analysis considered four different policy projections.  The first considered the Advisory Panel recommendations for control measures, but the modeling showed that they did not meet the Climate Act targets.  The Integration Analysis came up with three mitigation scenarios that did meet the targets.  The model used for the analysis is not as sophisticated as the NYISO model.  Modelers plugged in a set of control measures at varying efficiencies until they met the targets.  Note, however, they have not claimed that the scenario measures as scoped out will provide electricity that meets current reliability standards.  In my opinion this approach gave the impression to the Council that meeting the targets would be relatively easy.  Council members requested scenarios that considered a faster implementation schedule and more reductions that the 85% target.   The cost/benefit results claim that those more stringent scenarios provide more benefits primarily because of reduced costs.  I think that is a counter-intuitive result so my comparison was against Scenario 2: Strategic Use of Low-Carbon Fuels.

I compared the installed capacity for the two models in the next table.  As noted by the NYISO, an extraordinary development of renewables by 2030 is required and both models agree on that.  There also are some key differences.  The NYISO modeling projects more onshore wind, less offshore wind, less solar, and more DEFR.  The NYISO model simultaneously optimizes resource capabilities and costs to come up with a least-cost solution. I think the wind differences are due to cost and availability differences.  The two modeling approaches handle distributed solar differently.  NYISO does not measure generation from distributed sources and only considers it as a way to reduce the load needed.  The Integration Analysis explicitly includes distributed solar capacity and generation as an output.  Note that existing storage is pumped hydro but any new storage will be batteries.  Finally, it is notable that both modeling analyses project that 2040 DEFR will be comparable to existing fossil capacity albeit NYISO projects significantly more and Integration Analysis a little less.

I compared the energy produced (GWh) for the two models in the next table.  The largest difference between the models is that NYISO projects that DEFR generates ten times more energy.  It turns out that NYISO has DEFR generating 14% of the total energy in 2040 but Integration Analysis projects only 1%.  NYISO projects more onshore wind than offshore wind and the Integration Analysis projects the opposite.  There is huge difference between solar but I believe that is related to the fact that NYISO does not explicitly include distributed solar.   Clearly the two models handle storage differently.

I noted earlier that I was disappointed that the Hochul Administration ignored my comments on the Integration Analysis.  The capacity factor table shows one of the points I made in my comments.  I pointed out that the Integration Analysis land-based wind capacity factors were unrealistically high.  The model projected the 2020 generation with a capacity factor of 29% but the 2021 observed capacity factor was only 22%.  The model could not even get the starting year correct.  As a result the Integration Analysis projections for the land-based wind needed to meet the load is too low.  For all renewable resources the Integration Analysis capacity factors are higher than the NYISO projections.  I prefer the projections from the organization responsible for New York reliability to those from the unelected bureaucrats who have no such responsibilities. 

There is one other point in this table.  The DEFR capacity factors are different.  To this point the extra capacity needed to keep the lights on during peaking periods was provided by relatively cheap sources of energy.  When new peaking resources were needed, cheap simple-cycle turbines were installed.  Currently peak energy resources are primarily from existing old, amortized facilities.  As we shall see, the new DEFR required to keep the system working will use much more expensive resources.  In our deregulated system the NYISO will have to develop a market payment scheme to cover those increased costs.

As noted earlier, I believe that the NYISO projections based on more sophisticated modeling has a much better chance than the Integration Analysis to describe a mix or resources that will maintain current reliability standards.  Nonetheless, I have reservations about any projections because the future electric grid will depend on unprecedented amounts of renewable energy resources.  The following slide lists six of concerns for an electric system dependent upon renewable resources.  For my presentation I only mentioned the first three.  Because wind and solar are intermittent that means you have to have storage for daily, seasonal, and peak load requirements.  The lack of an implementation plan ignores that wind and solar success is location specific.  New York needs a plan that encourages development where the resource is better during the winter lulls.  Specifically, it is not a good idea to offer the same incentives to utility-scale developments on the Tug Hill plateau where over 200” of snow are common as areas where snowfall amounts are lower.  The third concern is reliability services and they are a reason that wind and solar are far more expensive for deliverable energy than fossil.

I found a good summary of the essential reliability services in a paper by National Renewable Energy Laboratory authors entitled Getting to 100%: Six strategies for the challenging last 10%.   It describes ancillary services that must be provided to keep the transmission system going.    Wind and solar do not provide those services so someone, somewhere else has to provide them at some additional cost.

The ultimate reliability problem is illustrated in the following figure.  This graph illustrates the long-duration wind lull problem from an early presentation to the Climate Action Council.  It explicitly points out that firm capacity (DEFR) is needed to meet multi-day periods of low wind and solar resource availability.  The Council has known about the problem all along but have basically pushed it aside as inconvenient.  The thing to remember is that in order to prevent catastrophic blackouts caused because intermittent wind and solar are unavailable NYISO and the Integration Analysis are both banking on DEFR capacity.  Using wind, solar and storage exclusively makes meeting the worst-case renewable resource gap much more difficult.

There is no doubt that the fate of future reliability is inextricably tied to DEFR success.  The next slide discusses DEFR options.  The Scoping Plan acknowledges the need for DEFR and proposes seasonal hydrogen storage as a placeholder technology.  NYISO, while explaining that the resource is necessary, has offered no recommendations what technology could fill the need.  The NREL authors of Getting to 100%: Six strategies for the challenging last 10% described six DEFR strategies

  • Seasonal storage which could be hydrogen or some other kind of long term storage solution
  • Renewable energy is basically overbuilding with battery energy storage.  I believe this represents the preferred approach of those who claim existing technology is sufficient.
  • Existing technology adherents also claim that demand side resources can flatten the load peaks so much that less DEFR is needed
  • The problem with other renewables (e.g. hydro) in New York is that they cannot be scaled up enough to meet identified needs
  • Nuclear is the only proven and scalable DEFR technology currently available but it is a toxic option for NY politicians
  • Carbon capture is unacceptable to the activists and has technological challenges that make it an unlikely a DEFR option.
  • Because of the challenges of carbon sequestration to net out the 15% net-zero emissions, the Scoping plan mentions the CO2 removal strategy but in my opinion it is unlikely.

There are two approaches advocated by those who believe that existing technology is sufficient to maintain electric system reliability in a zero-emissions electric grid.  Some claim that only minimal storage is needed because renewables are available somewhere else, that is to say, the wind is always blowing somewhere.  Others claim that overbuilding renewables supplemented with battery energy storage systems is a viable solution.

While the concept that the wind is always blowing somewhere else is indisputably true, the issue is that in order to keep the lights on we need power at specific times and places from a dedicated source.  New York City’s peaking turbines were located in specific locations to maintain reliability and they were dedicated to that application.  New York’s reliability standards were developed based on decades of experience that showed that a certain installed reserve margin would guarantee that New York reliability standards could be maintained.   Against that backdrop consider the following weather map on February 17, 2021.  The Texas energy debacle was associated with this intensely cold polar vortex huge high pressure system.  Remember that winds are higher when the isobars are close together.  On this day there are light winds from New York to the southeast, west, and north including the proposed New York offshore wind development area.  There are packed isobars in northeastern New England, in the western Great Plains, and central Gulf Coast.  In order for New York to guarantee wind energy availability from those locations, wind turbines and the transmission lines between New York and those locations would have to be dedicated for our use.  Otherwise I think it is obvious that jurisdictions in between would claim those resources for their own use during these high energy demand days.  It is unreasonable to expect that this could possibly be an economic solution.

Another way of looking at this issue is to consider the NYISO fuel mix data available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  I downloaded four days of February 2021 data to generate the following table.  It shows that a high pressure system reduces wind resource availability across the state.  The data show that less than a quarter of the daily wind capacity is available for this period. Note that the worst-case hour on 2/18/21 at 7:00 AM wind production was only 138 MW out of a New York total of 1,985 MW for a capacity factor of 7%.  If we were to overbuild wind resources to replace fossil capacity 7,191 MW on that hour you would need 102,729 MW.   

Clearly, overbuilding alone is not a viable solution.  You have to have new energy storage and the currently available technology is battery energy storage systems.  Both the Integration Analysis and NYISO Resource Outlook optimized the balance between renewables and storage but still found that DEFR was needed.  Existing-technology proponents claim that over-building wind, solar, and storage is viable but have not countered the NYISO or Integration Analysis modeling results.  I am concerned about the risks associated with the current preferred technology: lithium-ion storage battery systems.  The first risk is logistical inasmuch as battery storage footprints are larger than the existing peaking turbine sites so finding space for the batteries is an issue.  Worse is the fact that lithium-ion storage batteries have the risk of thermal runaway fires and explosions that trade an acute health risk for chronic, and speculative in my opinion, risks.  Paul Christensen, Professor of Pure and Applied Electrochemistry at Newcastle University in the United Kingdom gave a presentation at PV magazine’s Insight Australia event in 2021 that describes the risks. His videos of thermal runaway tests are terrifying.  He is one of the world’s leading experts on battery fires and safety and said global uptake of lithium-ion battery technology has “outstripped” our knowledge of the risks.  He also stated that he is “astounded and appalled that if there is no appreciation of the safety issues involved” with large battery energy storage systems.  This is another feasibility issue that is unaddressed by the Scoping Plan.

Hydrogen storage is the Scoping Plan DEFR placeholder technology.  The plan is to use wind and solar electrolysis to produce “green” hydrogen from water.  The stored hydrogen would either be combusted to power turbines or used in fuel cells.  There are fundamental issues associated with the use of hydrogen that I detail on my blog.  Hydrogen generation, storage and use loses much more energy than alternatives and may not even have a net energy benefit so it is unlikely to be sustainable.  In order for it to provide the necessary peaking power in New York City a colorless, odorless, hard to store explosive gas will have to be stored and used.  I don’t think that the technology will be embraced in the City.  All the infrastructure necessary to produce, store, and use will have to be built and paid for to meet a projected capacity factor of 2%.  I doubt that makes economic sense.

I concluded my discussion of the risks to electric system reliability by summing up the NYISO Resource Outlook Key Findings Datasheet.  According to the organization that is responsible for keeping the lights on, DEFR is necessary for future reliability.  Because a politically acceptable DEFR that can be scaled up to meet the levels needed for reliability is not currently available, a new technology has to be developed, tested, and put on line well before 2040.  The NYISO makes the point that until you have the necessary DEFR technology on line shutting down existing fossil generation is inappropriate.  I am disappointed that the NYISO Resource Outlook has not mentioned any costs.  This is likely to be a particular issue relative to DEFR.  Clearly conditional implementation dependent upon the availability of DEFR would be a rational approach.

There is no documentation that lists the specific costs of control strategies, the expected benefits, or the expected emission reductions making it impossible to estimate the total costs of the Climate Act.  That information is necessary to determine whether the Integration Analysis projections are feasible. The Scoping Plan claims that the cost of inaction is more than the cost of action but a variation of this graph is the only documentation for that claim.  I directly addressed this misleading and inaccurate statement in my comments at the Syracuse public hearing but there was no response or mention of the issues I raised at any Climate Action Council meeting or in the Final Scoping Plan documentation. 

The statement is misleading because costs are given relative to the Reference Case and not a business-as-usual case as explained earlier.  In other words, the Hochul Administration is not presenting all the costs to make the transition to net-zero by 2050.   The Reference Case described as “Business as usual plus implemented policies” includes the costs of the following policies:

  • Growth in housing units, population, commercial square footage, and GDP
  • Federal appliance standards
  • Economic fuel switching
  • New York State bioheat mandate
  • Estimate of New Efficiency, New York Energy Efficiency achieved by funded programs: HCR+NYPA, DPS (IOUs), LIPA, NYSERDA CEF (assumes market transformation maintains level of efficiency and electrification post-2025)
  • Funded building electrification (4% HP stock share by 2030)
  • Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards
  • Zero-emission vehicle mandate (8% LDV ZEV stock share by 2030)
  • Clean Energy Standard (70×30), including technology carveouts: (6 GW of behind-the-meter solar by 2025, 3 GW of battery storage by 2030, 9 GW of offshore wind by 2035, 1.25 GW of Tier 4 renewables by 2030)

Note that the costs for electric vehicles, charging infrastructure, and distribution system upgrades necessary for electric vehicle charging are excluded from the cost of action.  Correcting that “trick” alone would undoubtedly show the costs of action are more than the costs of inaction. 

There is another egregious cheat that further undermines the claim.  It is inaccurate because the Scoping Plan counts the societal benefits of avoided greenhouse gas emissions multiple times.  My Draft Scoping Plan comments on benefits documents why I believe that their claim for $235 billion in societal benefits should only be $60 billion.  Their approach is equivalent to me saying that because I lost 10 pounds five years ago, I can say that I lost 50 pounds.  Correcting that error would also by itself invalidate their benefits claim.  Bottom line is that I estimate that the real costs are at least $760 billion more than the imaginary claimed benefits.

I wrote a post on this shell game description of costs and benefits.  I concluded that a shell game is defined as “A fraud or deception perpetrated by shifting conspicuous things to hide something else.”  In the Scoping Plan shell game, the authors argue that energy costs in New York are needed to maintain business as usual infrastructure even without decarbonization policies but then include decarbonization costs for “already implemented” programs in the Reference Case baseline contrary to standard operating procedure to use a status quo baseline for this kind of modeling.  The documentation for Reference Case assumptions was missing in the draft documents. Shifting legitimate decarbonization costs to the Reference Case because they are already implemented and hiding the documentation fits the shifting condition of the shell game deception definition perfectly. 

In my opinion one of the biggest environmental success stories in my lifetime is the reintroduction of Bald Eagles to New York State.  When I moved to Syracuse in 1981 it was inconceivable that it would be possible to see a Bald Eagle from my home but I have seen several in the last few years.  One of the missing pieces of the Climate Act implementation plan is an update of the Cumulative Environmental Impact Statement to reflect the latest estimates of the number of wind turbines and areal extent of solar panels. I worry that the combined effect of all that development will threaten Bald Eagles.

The following table was not included in the presentation but shows the capacity of the resources not considered in the cumulative impact statements. Clearly, much more renewable capacity will be required than has been evaluated.

Comparison of Integrated Analysis Projected Capacity and Cumulative Environmental Impact Statements (MW)

The following table used in the presentation shows the number of wind turbines and areal extent considered in the completed cumulative impact statements relative to the projected numbers in the Integration Analysis.  The Scoping Plan calls for at least 497 more onshore wind turbines, 493 more offshore wind turbines and 602 more square miles covered with solar equipment than has been evaluated in cumulative analysis.

I have considered the avian impact of the Bluestone Wind Project in Broome County New York to show impacts for a single facility. It will have up to 33 turbines and have a capability of up to 124 MW covering 5,652 acres. Over the 30-year expected lifetime of the facility the analysis estimates that 85 Bald Eagles and 21 federally protected Eastern Golden Eagles will be killed. A first-order approximation1 is to scale those numbers to the total capacity projected for the Scoping Plan. This back of the envelope approximation suggests that at least 216 Bald Eagles could be killed every year when there are 9,445 MW of on-shore wind. There were 426 occupied bald eagle nest sites in New York in 2017. In my comments on this topic I stated that the Final Scoping Plan must include proposed thresholds for unacceptable environmental impacts like this.  There has been no response whatsoever to my comment.

When New York’s GHG emissions are considered relative to global emissions I conclude that New York only action is pointless.  In the presentation I compared New York emissions to global emissions in two graphs.  I used CO2 and GHG emissions data for the world’s countries and consolidated the data in a spreadsheet.  I used the New York State GHG data set CO2e AR4 100 year global warming potential GHG values for consistency.   Plotted on the same graph New York GHG and CO2 emissions cannot be differentiated from zero.

When the New York emissions are plotted relative to global emission increases the futility of New York affecting global emissions is shown.  The trend results indicate that the year-to-year trend in GHG emissions was positive 21 of 26 years and for CO2 emissions was positive 24 of 30 years.  In order to show this information graphically I calculated the rolling 3-year average change in emissions by year.  New York’s emissions are only 0.45% of global emissions and the average change in three-year rolling average emissions is greater than 1%.  In other words, whatever New York does to reduce emissions will be supplanted by global emissions increases in less than a year.

Climate Act advocates frequently argue that New York needs to take action because our economy is large.  I analyzed that claim recently and summarized the data here.  The 2020 Gross State Product (GSP) ranks ninth if compared to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of countries in the world.  However, when New York’s GHG 2016 emissions are compared to emissions from other countries, New York ranks 35th.  More importantly, a country’s emissions divided by its GDP is a measure of GHG emission efficiency.  New York ranks third in this category trailing only Switzerland and Sweden.

Despite the fact that the ostensible rationale for GHG emission reduction policies is to reduce global warming impacts, the Scoping Plan continues an unbroken string of the Administration analyses not reporting the effects of a policy proposal on global warming.   The reason is simple.  The change to global warming from eliminating New York GHG emissions are simply too small to be measured much less have an effect on any of the purported damages of greenhouse gas emissions.  I have calculated the expected impact on global warming as only 0.01°C by the year 2100 if New York’s GHG emissions are eliminated.

Conclusion

My presentation explained why I am skeptical of the value of the Climate Act.  Attempting to get to zero emissions is an extraordinary challenge that is downplayed by the Climate Act, the Council and the Scoping Plan so most people are unaware of the likelihood of success.  The experts say we need DEFR but it has to be developed for New York in less than a decade which I believe is unlikely.  There is no reason to expect that the costs won’t be huge and the Hochul Administration has covered up of costs and benefits.  The cumulative impacts of the required renewable developments have not been evaluated and could be unacceptable. 

The fact that our emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing by more than one half of one percent per year may not mean that we should not do something but it does mean that we have time to make sure we don’t do more harm than good.  Before any implementing legislation or regulations are even considered a feasibility analysis that asks “what if” questions should be completed to prove current standards of reliability and safety can be maintained.  In the meantime the state should develop an implementation plan to make sure that renewable resource development is consistent with the Scoping Plan.

Finally, what is going to happen when we have electrified everything and there is an ice storm?  Extreme weather events can have devastating consequences on a more fragile wind and solar electricity network.  I am particularly worried about ice storms.  On a local level it is not clear how the public will be able to survive a multi-day power outage caused by an ice storm when the Climate Act mandates electric heat and electric vehicles but the bigger reliability concern is that fact that ice storms can take out transmission lines.  The January 1998 North American ice storm struck the St Lawrence valley causing massive damage and required weeks to reconstruct the electric grid.  When everything is electrified how will it be possible to rebuild?

Following the Climate Crisis Money

I have been helping provide research support to readers of my blog when they have questions about the implementation of Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act  (Climate Act).  In this instance a question came up about an organization that is helping the New York Columbia County Climate Smart Task Force.  Every time I look into any aspect of the Climate Act, I find support for my conviction that the primary driver is all about the money.

This is another article about the Climate Act implementation plan that I have written because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  Moreover, the costs will be enormous and hurt those least able to afford increased costs the most.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

The Money

I have been meaning to document the fact that major new organizations are getting funding to provide climate change coverage and this seems to be a good time to explain.  The Associated Press has assigned more than two dozen journalists to cover climate issues paid for through philanthropic grants of $8 million.  Last fall National Public Radio launched a “climate desk”:

NPR’s climate expansion has also been made possible by the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, whose funding is helping NPR to add a new Climate Solutions reporter, as well as The Rockefeller Foundation, whose support will allow for more local and regional reporting on how climate change affects the most vulnerable populations.

There is no plausible reason to expect that these organizations will not provide coverage that suits their funding sources. If evidence surfaces that contradicts the narrative, how long will they ignore it?

In my post about the New York plans for a gas stove ban I referenced a post by Robert Bryce titled  The billionaires behind the gas bans.  He explained that “despite numerous claims about how nefarious actors are blocking the much-hyped ‘energy transition’” that the non-governmental organization-corporate-industrial-climate complex has far more money than the pro-hydrocarbon and pro-nuclear groups. He showed that the five biggest anti-hydrocarbon NGOs are now collecting about $1.5 billion per year from their donors and that is roughly three times more than the amount being collected by the top five non-profit associations that are either pro-hydrocarbon or pro-nuclear.

It is not just the news organizations and NGOs that plan to cash in on the climate change crisis narrative.  Now the State is lobbying local communities to pledge to fight the battle with the lure of funding for “green and clean” infrastructure.

New York Climate is a Crisis Money

The Climate Act has prompted an enormous private industry to implement the net-zero transition that has a vested interest in spending as much money as possible as soon as possible all in the name of saving the planet.  In addition, local governments are eyeing the gravy train.  As part of the transition, the Climate Act Scoping Plan Chapter 20 strategy for Local Government recommended:

Support capacity-building for local governments and related public entities: The State should provide educational materials and training to local governments and related public entities, so that they understand what resources are available to them and are prepared to receive funding.

The lure of this pot of money has led to a rush for the cash.  For example, on January 30 2023, newly elected Ulster County executive Jen Metzger presented the first executive order of her four-year term.  Metzger’s order aims to bring county operations into alignment with the Climate Act.  According to Hudson Valley One:

All government buildings will be assessed for on-site solar and battery storage, with the goal of fulfilling the electricity needs of the government by 2030. All major renovations of county buildings will require electric-only power sources and be equipped with EV charging as well. All new construction will require solar systems.  “We’re setting a goal,” said Metzger, “of diverting 100 percent countywide organic waste and incinerators by 2030.”

A key part of the executive order are efforts to attract more state and federal assistance and incentives.” Metzger sees “tremendous opportunity coming down the pipe from the Inflation Reduction Act, and she intends that Ulster County will be ready for it.”

There already is a state program in place that addresses the recommended strategy in the Scoping Plan. The Climate Smart Communities (CSC) program helps local governments take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a changing climate. In fact, Ulster County was the first county in New York to be silver-certified as a climate-smart community.   According to the CSC fact sheet:

Climate Smart Communities (CSC) is a New York State program that supports local governments in leading their communities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, adapt to the effects of climate change, and thrive in a green economy. The benefits of participating include leadership recognition, free technical assistance, and access to grants. Local governments participate by signing a voluntary pledge and using the CSC framework to guide progress toward creating attractive, healthy, and equitable places to live, work, and play.

The State claims a few CSC Benefits:

  • Receive funding for climate change mitigation and adaption projects via the DEC CSC Grant program.
  • Reduce the cost of clean vehicles and associated charging/fueling stations via the DEC Municipal Zero emission Vehicle Rebate program.
  • Receive free technical assistance for clean energy and climate change initiatives from regional
  • coordinators.
  • Discover online guidance and decision-support tools via webpages.
  • Learn about best practices through CSC webinars.
  • Network with like-minded community leaders at CSC events and workshops.

The fact sheet describes how communities participate:

Columbia County Climate Smart Communities

One of my readers has attended meetings of the Columbia County Climate Smart Communities Task Force.  That organization has a coordinator who organizes the county’s response to the CSC program.  The goal of local communities is to become certified as “climate smart” community. To date five towns have achieved bronze certification in Columbia County.  A friend who is more attuned to this program explained there are climate committees in every village all chasing money for charging stations and many of the same people are pushing back against fossil infrastructure projects.

I was asked to provide some information about an organization that was present at a recent Task Force meeting.  In particular, the question was about the ICLEI. According to their website:

ICLEI is the first and largest global network of local governments devoted to solving the world’s most intractable sustainability challenges. Our standards, tools, and programs credibly, transparently, and robustly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve lives and livelihoods and protect natural resources in the communities we serve. 

I spent a long time trying to figure out the acronym but ended using Wikipedia:

ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability (or simply ICLEI) is an international non-governmental organization that promotes sustainable development. ICLEI provides technical consulting to local governments to meet sustainability objectives.

Founded in 1990 and formerly known as the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, the international association was established when more than 200 local governments from 43 countries convened at its inaugural conference, the World Congress of Local Governments for a Sustainable Future, at the United Nations in New York in September 1990.

As of 2020, more than 1,750 cities, towns, counties, and their associations in 126 countries are a part of the ICLEI network.

As of 2021, ICLEI has more than 20 offices around the world.

ICLEI’s role in the CSC process is support to help communities prepare components of their certification program. I believe but did not confirm that the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority provides funding for communities that need their services.  ICLEI has developed an online program for the GHG inventory, forecasts, climate action plans, and monitoring of communities.  Another aspect of the CSC plan is preparing a contribution plan and ICLEI has a toolkit for that.  They have other tools and resources. 

Discussion

From the top to the bottom of the “climate change is a crisis” NGO-corporate-industrial-climate complex  there is an enormous pot of money available for those who adhere to the party line.  In New York any community willing to adopt the CSC Pledge has access to resources and funding.  The pledge is interesting:

I offer a challenge to the local governments that have made this pledge.  Go for it, but not just this virtue-signaling public relations gesture to get some money.  Francis Menton writing at the Manhattan Contrarian blog wrote that a demonstration project of a mainly renewables-based electrical grid is a common sense prerequisite before there are any more plans or pledges.  Climate Smart Communities of New York should prove their bona fides and develop a demonstration project for their community to address the issues he raised:

Could anybody possibly be stupid enough to believe the line that wind and solar generators can provide reliable electricity to consumers that is cheaper than electricity generated by fossil fuels? It takes hardly any thought about the matter to realize that wind and solar don’t work when it is calm and dark, as it often is, and particularly so in the winter, when it is also generally cold. Thus a wind/solar electricity system needs full backup, or alternatively storage — things that add to and multiply costs. Surely, our political leaders and top energy gurus are fully aware of these things, and would not try to mislead the public about the cost of electricity from a predominantly wind/solar system.

……………..

Nobody would be happier than me to see a demonstration project built that showed that wind and solar could provide reliable electricity at low cost. Unfortunately, I know too much about the subject to think that that is likely, or even remotely possible. But at least the rest of us need to demand a demonstration project from the promoters of these fantasies.

Conclusion

I wanted to make a few points about the climate crisis money trail so this response to one small component of New York’s Climate Act gave me the opportunity.  The world is filled with seemingly authoritative voices asserting with complete confidence that wind and solar generators are the answer to providing consumers with cheaper electricity and solving the climate crisis.  Their arguments are long on emotion and short on facts.  It is particularly troubling to me that major news organizations are funded by organizations that ascribe to that narrative.  No wonder that few if any of the practical considerations are mentioned by those organizations.

Given the constant drumbeat of climate doom and fantastical energy solutions that are clean and cheap, it is no wonder that communities across New York are signing the CSC pledge to reduce GHG emissions.  If I ever run short of topics to address the pledge itself certainly deserves a response.  It is a perfect example of the politically correct narrative that climate change is an existential threat.  Most of the articles posted on this blog address and dispute that story.  I will stand corrected if any jurisdiction develops a system to always provide reliable electricity at low cost that relies on intermittent wind and solar.

In the absence of a demonstration project it is all about the money.  Climate Smart Communities are at the top of the list for electric vehicle chargers that are considered a marketing advantage.  They also get support developing plans that are supposed to attract the clean energy jobs that are a selling point for the Climate Act.  I cannot help but wonder why if all these plans have so many advantages, why they depend upon direct subsidies.

Finally, the answer to the original question.  ICLEI is an organization that provides technical support to local communities who want to “solve” climate change by reducing GHG emissions, in this case, the New York Climate Smart Communities.  It would be a good question to ask County legislators whether the costs for ICLEI are covered by NYSERDA or there is some cost-sharing agreement.  If NYSERDA picks up the entire tab localities that is one thing.  However, if Columbia County does have to contribute funding for ICLEI services I think it is appropriate to ask what benefits accrue to county residents.

Empire Center Ten Reasons Climate Act May Cost More Than It Is Worth

James Hanley from the Empire Center published Ten Reasons the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act May Cost More than It’s Worth (“Ten Reasons”) that explains why massive political promises like the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) often cost more than they’re worth, wasting taxpayers’ money.  While I agree with his ten reasons, this post explains why the costs are even worse than he describes.

I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 275 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Climate Act established a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric gride with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was revised in 2022 and the Final Scoping Plan  was approved on  December 19, 2022.  In 2023 the plan is to develop regulations and legislation to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations.

In the following section I reproduce Hanley’s post with my bold italicized comments.

Ten Reasons

Over budget, over time, over and over – that’s the iron law of megaprojects.  

Megaprojects are transformational, multi-billion-dollar, multi-year projects involving numerous public and private stakeholders. 90 percent come in over budget, often two, three or even more times over, and they often underdeliver on the promised benefits.  

In short, despite political promises to the contrary, they often cost more than they’re worth, wasting taxpayers’ money. 

Some notable examples of megaproject cost overruns include California’s high speed rail (years behind schedule and at least three times over budget), Boston’s Big Dig (completed five years late and more than five times over budget) and New York’s own Long Island Railroad East Side Access (12 years behind schedule and – with a budget that’s grown from $3.5 billion to between $11 and $15 billion – three to four times over budget). And that’s not New York’s only over-budget transit project

Those are all small potatoes compared to New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA). The overall benefit-cost analysis for the CLCPA predicts a cost of $280-$340 billion – around 20 times the cost of the East Side Access project – to radically transform New York to a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions economy. The benefit is supposed to be $420-$430 billion, for a net gain of $80-$150 billion.  

The Scoping Plan benefit-cost analysis is a shell game disguising misleading and inaccurate information.  In short, the $280-$340 billion costs only represent the costs of the Climate Act itself and not the total costs to meet the net-zero by 2050 target.  The Scoping Plan costs specifically exclude the costs of “Already Implemented” programs including the following:

  • Growth in housing units, population, commercial square footage, and GDP
  • Federal appliance standards
  • Economic fuel switching
  • New York State bioheat mandate
  • Estimate of New Efficiency, New York Energy Efficiency achieved by funded programs: HCR+NYPA, DPS (IOUs), LIPA, NYSERDA CEF (assumes market transformation maintains level of efficiency and electrification post-2025)
  • Funded building electrification (4% HP stock share by 2030)
  • Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards
  • Zero-emission vehicle mandate (8% LDV ZEV stock share by 2030)
  • Clean Energy Standard (70×30), including technology carveouts: (6 GW of behind-the-meter solar by 2025, 3 GW of battery storage by 2030, 9 GW of offshore wind by 2035, 1.25 GW of Tier 4 renewables by 2030)

The Scoping Plan documentation is not sufficiently detailed to determine the expected costs of these programs or to determine if the benefits calculations included the benefits of the emission reductions from these programs.  I have not doubt, however, that if these costs are included that the total would be greater than the benefits and I suspect very strongly that the benefits from these programs were included even if the costs were not. The shell game definition: “A fraud or deception perpetrated by shifting conspicuous things to hide something else”  is certainly an apt description of the Scoping Plan benefit-cost analysis.

That’s a good deal, if it really works out that way. Unfortunately, based on the history of megaprojects, it’s unlikely to provide so much benefit.  

Based on my evaluation it is not a good deal from the get go.  All of Hanley’s discussion of megaprojects below is in addition to the inaccurate starting point.

If we take the lower end cost estimate and assume the policy only costs half again as much – which would make it a rare megaproject success story – the cost would rise to $420 billion, exactly wiping out the lower end estimate of the gains.  

If it came in at twice the low-end cost estimate – which is common for such big and complex programs – it would cost $560 billion, resulting in a net loss of at least $220 billion. Three times over budget would mean a net loss of at least $410 billion – closing in on half a trillion dollars wasted. 

And if the benefits are less than predicted – which is also common – the outcome gets even worse. 

The issue is not that there aren’t any benefits. At least some of the claimed benefits are real. But just like buying a car or a meal, it’s possible to overpay for what we’re getting.  

Part of the general reason for the predictable cost overruns is that these projects tend to be exceptionally complex and innovative, novel ideas which nobody really knows how to execute well due to lack of experience. New York’s CLCPA-supporting politicians and advocates love to boast about the CLCPA being a nation-leading policy, which is to say it’s something nobody has experience doing. 

Another reason – known both from research and from the mouth of a famous politician – is that advocates sometimes intentionally mislead the public about the costs and benefits of megaprojects. Perhaps no CLCPA supporters are consciously lying about its costs, but it seems evident that it would be uncomfortable for them to dig deeply into the issue of megaproject cost, and whatever doubts they may have they are not voicing them.  

Ultimately the Climate Act is a political initiative designed to appeal to specific constituencies within the state.  In that context the Scoping Plan itself is just a tool to cater to those constituencies.  Authors of the Scoping Plan may not have lied but they did intentionally mislead the public as I have explained in posts and comments.  The response to comments submitted did not address any of the issues I raised.

But we shouldn’t look at the CLCPA as just a single megaproject. It’s actually a large group of them. Among the projects within the CLCPA that are, or may ultimately scale up to the size of, megaprojects are:  

  1. The build-out of electric vehicle charging infrastructure; 
  2. Transitioning the state’s school buses to all electric; 
  3. Transitioning the state’s public transit buses to all-electric; 
  4. Promotion of smart-growth for mobility-oriented (biking and walking) development. 
  5. Electrifying 85 percent of residential/commercial space by 2050; 
  6. Achieving 70 percent renewable electricity by 2030; 
  7. Developing 6 megawatts of battery storage; 
  8. Building 9,000–18,000 megawatts of offshore wind; 
  9. Building the grid for renewable energy transmission; 
  10. The overall agricultural and forestry portion of the CLCPA Scoping Plan
  11. Achieving dramatic reductions in the amount of solid waste being produced and disposed of; 
  12. Decarbonizing the statewide natural gas distribution system. 


That comes to at least 12 distinct policy areas within the CLCPA that are each likely to be multi-billion dollar projects on their own. Depending on how one analyzes the Act and its Scoping Plan, this may be an incomplete list. 

Keep in mind the “already implemented program” costs in the $280-$340 billion costs of the Scoping Plan.  Those programs at least include: The build-out of electric vehicle charging infrastructure; transitioning the state’s school buses to all electric; transitioning the state’s public transit buses to all-electric; developing 3 MW of the 6MW of battery storage; and building 9,000 MW of the 18,000 MW of offshore wind.

This means at least 12 opportunities for mega-failure in the CLCPA. And with 90 percent of megaprojects coming in over budget, we should expect at least 10 or 11 of these to experience substantial cost overruns. 

But saying that megaprojects tend to come in over budget and short on benefits is not enough. It’s fair to ask why this particular set of megaprojects that collectively make up the CLCPA are likely to do so. So, in addition to the sheer innovative complexity of the CLCPA’s bid to transition New York to a net zero economy, here are 10 reasons why the Climate Act’s costs may be understated, and its benefits overstated. 

  1. Inflation Bites   
    Projects that take multiple years to complete face the risk of inflation. When the CLCPA’s benefit-cost analysis was conducted, the analysts could not have anticipated that inflation would surge, pushing up the cost of materials and labor. Particularly hard hit so far have been offshore wind projects. 

    Inflation has moderated somewhat lately, but on-going large federal deficits could cause it to remain at higher levels than anticipated.
  1. Cap-and-Invest May Cause Business Flight
    Policies that cap emissions of particular chemicals, then reduce those caps over time and allow trading of emissions allowances, can be the most cost-effective way of reducing emissions when done at the national or multi-national level. Even if businesses move their operations to another country, a tariff on their emissions can be levied to either make businesses pay for those emissions or incentivize firms to reduce them.

    But cap-and-invest is ill-suited to the state level. First, it is easier for businesses to move out of state – or refuse to move into the state – than to move out of country. It is likely that other states competing for business investment will use the Empire State’s emissions cap as a way to leverage firms to look to their states for investment rather than to New York.

    This means a state-level cap-and-invest scheme is likely to diminish business investment, reducing the state’s economic growth and therefore tax revenues.

    Second, a state cannot enact an emissions tariff because it would violate the U.S. Constitution’s interstate commerce clause, so there is no cudgel to force emissions reductions on businesses that move operations out of state.  This means less overall reduction in greenhouse gas emissions because those emissions just occur elsewhere.

    This emissions “leakage,” and loss of tax revenue, can also occur if GHG-emitting in-state businesses become less competitive due to compliance costs and lose market share to out-of-state competitors.

    This kind of leakage has long plagued California’s cap-and-trade program. In New York’s case, because a majority of the CLCPA’s claimed benefits come from greenhouse gas reductions, it means a potentially very large reduction in the benefits of the policy.

    To minimize business flight and emissions leakage, the Climate Action Council proposes giving away emissions allowances to emissions-intensive and trade-exposed businesses – those that are most likely to find it more cost-effective to leave than to buy emissions allowances. But this may only be a temporary reprieve for these industries, as the number of emissions allowances is required to decline over time, and some businesses may never find it more cost-effective to reduce their emissions than to move operations out of state.

    Giving away emissions allowances also means the state will take in less revenue from auctions of emissions permits, having given away many for free, and so will have less money to invest in CLCPA policies, further reducing the law’s benefits.
  1. Union Job Requirements Drive Up Costs
    The Climate Action Council’s Scoping Plan – the roadmap for Climate Act implementation – calls for the use of union labor and project-labor agreements. But jobs go on the cost side of the ledger rather than the benefits side, so anything that increases the cost of labor increases the overall cost of the policy.

    How much this will drive up the total cost of the Climate Act has not been analyzed, but past reporting by the Empire Center shows that prevailing wage requirements can add 13 to 25 percent to project costs. And it’s not as though there aren’t New Yorkers willing to give the public a better deal – around two-thirds of workers in New York’s construction sector are non-unionized, but they will be locked out of CLCPA projects.
  2. Overbuilding of Renewable Energy and Building Energy Backup Is Costly
    The most undeniable truth about wind and solar power is that they are unreliable – the wind can fail, the sky can become clouded or night can fall, just when you need the electricity most. According to the New York Independent System Operator, New York must develop 15-45 GW of dispatchable zero-emission electricity generation resources. That’s in comparison to a total of roughly 40 gigawatts of total installed capacity today, and it must be in addition to any new wind and solar power developments.

    At a minimum, this means we have to overbuild solar and wind resources in the hopes that somewhere in the state the wind will be blowing and the sun shining. But because New York is too geographically small to ensure that the wind is always blowing, or the sun always shining, somewhere in the state, New York will also need to build backup energy sources.

    What these greenhouse gas emission-free resources will be – and how much they will cost – is currently unknown, because none are yet commercially available or competitively priced. Hydrogen is a possibility, but the cost will have to fall dramatically and quickly to keep backup power affordable.

    Batteries are also intended to be part of the backup system, although they are only good for meeting peak demand for a few hours. They are currently very expensive, even though – like all technologies – the learning curve continues to push down their price. However, materials costs for batteries may remain high for years, because demand is growing rapidly while supply chains are hindered both by political opposition to minerals mining and geopolitical constraints on mining and refining.
  3. The Cost of Redeveloping the Grid Is Unpredictable
    New York currently has, in effect, two largely – although not completely – separate power grids. One is upstate and draws heavily on hydroelectric and nuclear power. The other is mostly downstate and based on natural gas and dual-fuel power plants. Both are based on controllable and dispatchable forms of electricity production.

    To eliminate fossil fuel electricity generation and rely much more heavily on variable, uncontrollable, sources like wind and solar, New York must expand its transmission grid to move electricity from where it will be produced – primarily upstate and off-shore – to where it is needed. But this grid will have to be built so that energy can be delivered from whichever sources happen to be producing at a given time, which means more miles of high voltage transmission lines than ever before.

    Experts can make a first-pass estimate of the cost of building out all this new transmission, but the complexity of working through multiple political jurisdictions and satisfying numerous stakeholders is one of the leading causes of megaproject cost overruns. Few people want high-voltage transmission lines near their homes, and merely fighting the political battles to site these lines across numerous municipalities and counties could drive up the end cost significantly.

There is another aspect of the transmission system that the Scoping Plan glossed over.  Because wind and solar resources are inverter-based they do not provide ancillary services necessary to keep the transmission system stable.  As far as I can tell this issue was not addressed by the Scoping Plan and that means there are unaddressed technological and cost issues.

  1. The Jones Act Increases Offshore Windpower Costs
    The Jones Act is a law requiring ships moving cargo between U.S. ports to be U.S. built, owned, crewed, and flagged. There are no Jones Act compliant off-shore wind turbine building vessels in the U.S., although at least one is under construction (at an inflated cost because it has to be U.S. built). Because of the Jones Act, the available ships have to operate out of Canada or rely on the more expensive and dangerous process of having Jones Act compliant “feeder barges” bring materials out to the work site.
  2. The True Social Cost of Carbon Is Unknown
    Most of the benefit of the Climate Act doesn’t go to New Yorkers but is a world-wide benefit from the reduction of CO2 emissions. To estimate this benefit, a social cost per ton of CO2 has to be estimated. New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) set the cost at $124 per ton for 2022, rising each year.

    But nobody truly knows the social cost of CO2. The number varies wildly between different models used to estimate it. The Biden administration has tentatively set the social cost of CO2 at $51 per ton, while it works to develop a new official estimate. Even if their estimate comes in higher than the tentative setting, it may be considerably lower than what the DEC estimates.

    Even the DEC’s own estimates diverge dependent on the discount rate used, and they chose to use only low discount rates that mathematically increase the social cost of CO2 emissions. There is no expert agreement on what discount rate should be used, and if a higher discount rate was used the social cost of CO2 would be much lower, and therefore the benefit from eliminating it would be much lower.

    While it’s not impossible that the DEC has underestimated the social cost of carbon – which would make the benefits of the CLCPA even larger than estimated – it’s at least as, if not more, likely that they’ve overestimated the social cost for political reasons, meaning the benefits could be far lower than predicted.

The primary driver of the benefits is the social cost of carbon and Hanley’s description of these issues is spot on.  There are other issues associated with social cost of carbon that I discussed in my Draft Scoping Plan comments.  The biggest inaccuracy is that it is inappropriate to claim social cost of carbon benefits of an annual reduction of a ton of greenhouse gas over any lifetime or to compare it with avoided emissions. The Value of Carbon guidance incorrectly calculates benefits by applying the value of an emission reduction multiple times.  Using that trick and the other manipulations results in New York societal benefits more than 21 times higher than benefits using everybody else’s methodology. When just the over-counting error is corrected, the total societal benefits range between negative $74.5 billion and negative $49.5 billion. 

  1. Some Alleged Benefits Are Dubious
    Not all of the claimed benefits in the benefit-cost analysis pass the sniff test. The most dubious of these is the assumption that indoor trip-and-fall hazards will be mitigated while weatherizing homes, producing almost $2 billion in health improvements. But there is no inherent connection between weatherization – replacing old windows adding insulation, sealing drafts – and removing interior trip hazards. It could happen, but to say it will is purely speculative.

    Another dubious assumption is that people will walk and bike significantly more, creating a claimed $40 billion health benefit – nearly 10 percent of all estimated benefits. But this requires major reconstruction of cities and reduced suburbanization, all in less than three decades. If that doesn’t happen and people fail to change their behavior, this benefit will be drastically reduced at best, and quite possibly come in at close to zero.

My comments on Scoping Plan benefit claims agreed with these dubious claims and also noted that the if the claims related to air quality improvements were accurate then we should be able to observe improvements due to the sixteen times greater observed air quality improvements than the projected improvements due to the Climate Act.  Until their projections are verified, I do not accept their projections.

  1. Subsidies Will Need to Increase, Creating Deadweight Economic Losses
    The Scoping Plan proposes transitioning most homes to heat pumps. Currently the only subsidies are $5,000 for geothermal systems, which is too small an amount to enable moderate- to low-income homeowners to afford them. To accomplish this goal, subsidies will have to increase substantially. Most likely this subsidy will be paid for by increases in utility rates, a de facto tax increase on ratepayers.

    But both taxes and subsidies create deadweight economic losses, increasing the cost of the policy in ways that were probably not accounted for in the benefit-cost model.

    The loss caused by the subsidy will be at least partially offset by the positive externality of reduced carbon emissions, but how much so is challenging to determine (in part because we don’t know the social cost of CO2). Ultimately, the size of these deadweight costs is unknown – and may remain so – but they are real and potentially significant.
  2. There Is No Focused Benefit-Cost Analysis of Individual Projects
    The benefit-cost analysis is a global analysis of the whole Climate Act, produced before the consultants even knew what specific policies would be proposed. None of the individual policies proposed have received a focused benefit-cost analysis.

    Even getting those right might be challenging, given that so many of these individual projects are megaprojects all on their own. But by focusing on specific policies, there is at least a better chance of achieving accuracy.

    An example of a missed opportunity is the requirement that all school districts shift to electric school buses. This will cost at least $8 – $15 billion – a broad estimate that needs to be narrowed down – but the value of the benefits is unknown. While benefits such as reductions in air pollution and improvements in student health are real, we have no dollar amount estimate of them.

    We do know that much of the benefit could be gained less expensively by shifting to clean fuel vehicles or buying newer – cleaner burning – diesel buses. Which of these approaches would provide the best benefit to cost ratio, making for the best use of taxpayer dollars? We don’t know because no analysis was conducted before creating the policy. 

Conclusion  

Perhaps not all these problems will come to pass. Inflation could moderate and remain low. Business flight and avoidance of New York due to cap-and-invest might be reduced if other states join a regional plan. Supply chain challenges for battery materials might be overcome. But others are sure to play a role, such as unionization of green jobs, the effect of the Jones Act, and the deadweight economic loss from subsidies and taxation. In addition, there could be other issues not addressed here that could cause CLCPA costs to increase. This is not intended to be a complete list.  

For these reasons, as well as the dismal history of such gigantic public ventures, it’s virtually certain that at least some, if not most, of the individual megaprojects within the CLCPA will be over budget. By how much is anyone’s guess, but it takes an unwarranted leap of faith to be confident that this time will be different. And as noted above, all it would take is for the cumulative effect of budget overruns to push the CLCPA’s cost up by half – a far better performance than most megaprojects – to completely wipe out any gains.

When the fact that the Scoping Plan costs do not include the “already implemented” programs are considered this analysis is overly optimistic.  Even without considering all the problems described in this analysis the total costs of all the programs necessart to meet the net-zero by 2050 target are greater than the alleged and impossibly optimistic benefits cited in the Scoping Plan.  Any claims that the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of inaction by proponents of the Climate Act are simply wrong.

Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act Zero Risk Motivations

The last several years I have spent an inordinate amount of time evaluating the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) and its legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050.  As the implementation outline for the transition to a net-zero evolves I have been struck by the number of people involved with the transition that insist on reducing their perceived priority risks to zero.  That is the antithesis of a pragmatic approach and I have tried to understand where those folks are coming from.  This post describes some recent articles at the Risk Monger blog that address the motivations of those who want zero risks.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background and Risk Management

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council states that it will finalize the Scoping Plan by the end of the year.  Climate Action Council meetings have included discussions about revisions to the Draft Scoping Plan that emphasize the need for zero risk that is the opposite of a pragmatic approach to the risks of climate change.

I addressed risk management for the Climate Act in August 2020.  That article and this one relies on work done the Risk Monger, a blog “meant to challenge simplistic solutions to hard problems on environmental-health risks”. The author of the blog, David Zaruk, is an EU risk and science communications specialist since 2000, active in European Union (EU) policy events and science in society questions of the use of the Precautionary Principle. He is a professor at Odisee University College where he lectures on Communications, Marketing, EU Lobbying and Public Relations. In my opinion, he clearly explains the complexities of risk management and I recommend his work highly. 

Zero Risk Motivations

Zaruk has argued that the Precautionary Principle, a strategy to cope with possible risks where scientific understanding is incomplete, has led many to rely on the idea that to be safe we have to eliminate all risks as a precaution.  Zaruk explains that the problem is that policy-makers and politicians have confused this uncertainty management tool with risk management.  In the August 2020 article I described his analysis and conclusion of the failures of risk management of the COVID-19 response.  While fascinating on its own, it also provides a cautionary tale relative to New York’s energy policy and implementation of the Climate Act. 

This article describes some of his recent work and its relevance to the Climate Act implementation process.  Over the last couple of months, he has published four relevant articles that I will summarize below:

THE Science, THE Environment, THE Climate… Abusing the “The” in Risk Issues

This article makes the point that the definite article has been “abused by activists needing definite truths to win policy debates on complex problems.” When someone describes, for example, “The” science they are claiming certainty on issues that are anything but certain. Zaruck writes:

Improperly using “the” in front of an abstract noun is part of a game to claim authority, isolate dissenters, simplify an issue and close dialogue. In declaring: “This is the science on XYZ” an activist is attempting to own the issue and shut down any discussion or analysis. In a policy framework where there may be uncertainty or grey areas, imposing a “the” provides a wedge between others’ false opinions and “the” truth. It is staking a claim to colonise a debate. Interestingly, it cannot be applied to issues that don’t allow for simplification or are too broad and complex. We do not speak of “the” food or “the” health without qualifications.

In reality, science is a continuous process where hypotheses are constantly challenged and confirmed.  Zaruk notes that it refers to “a process – a method – not some body of truth”.  When Climate Act proponents invoke “the” science, they are referring to is a consensus view.  Zaruk notes that arguing consensus is “a politicized pronouncement of the state of scientific research” and points out that “A consensus abhors sceptics (ostracizing them as deniers)”.  In reality a scientist must always be skeptical.

Zaruk addresses the definite article related to the environment:

When it is used with a definite article, it implies that the environment is a place … perhaps where biodiversity is being “stored”.  Is it in some location, outside of urban areas, in “nature”? But nature is a proper noun (personified in Mother Nature). As a construct, “the” environment appears to be in peril since we are being told how we can save it by polluting less, using natural products, having fewer children… Saving “the” environment means we all get to go to some Shangri-La, living longer and more harmoniously with nature. With simple views comes simplistic polarisation: natural = good (part of “the” environment); synthetic = bad (part of man).

Oversimplifying humankind in the world relative to nature turns issues into a simple dichotomy. Good vs. bad. safe or unsafe, or us-vs-them. He notes that: “For them, industry, corporations, conventional farmers… are against the environment and they are for it.”  In reality, however the environment is everywhere and affects everything in a complex, unpredictable manner. He explains that activists are playing a divide and conquer approach for their own interests.  He notes that:

Worse, hard-core activists have separated the environment from humanity and potentially beneficial technological solutions. In other words, the only way to “save” the environment is to keep humans away from “it”, to stop doing what we have been doing and let it heal itself (see Charles Mann’s The Wizard and the Prophet). These misanthropes welcome any environmental events as fuel for their hatred but their anti-technology solutions are simply “failure by design”.

He also addresses the climate consensus:

But what is a consensus and what does it mean? Formally, a consensus is anything above 50% but that lacks political impact. 100% agreement is impossible but as close to 100% is desirable. Certain scientific facts are rarely disputed and widely accepted (Newton’s laws are not considered theories, certain human limitations are self-evident…) but it is not so much whether a position has been tested and retested, but that the scientific method is a mindset: Always be prepared to question and re-evaluate. By arguing for a consensus – “the” science – the scientific method is being suppressed by some political interest.

If we spoke outside of the definite article – not of “the” science, “the” environment or “the” climate but of scientific issues on environmental concerns and climate evolutions, such transcendence would not be possible. Our discourse would shift from the dogmatic beliefs to pragmatic solutions and ridiculous conclusions would be rightfully challenged. This is not something that activists would want and we have not taken much notice of their linguistic deception.

Zaruk concludes:

I suppose what gets to me the most about these manipulative ideologues making claims on behalf of “the” truth (on subject matters which most science-minded people are struggling to find pragmatic solutions to complex problems) is their sanctimonious moral elitism. That their righteous condemnations were built on an illegitimate consensus, arbitrary divisions, linguistic deceptions and simplification just adds to their hypocrisy. They are pompous zealots cloaked and choked in their own false piety and any respect or trust they will have manufactured from their manipulative wordplay will be short-lived.

The Industry Complex (Part 1): The Tobacconisation of Industry

This essay is the first chapter of his analysis of the vilification of industry by activists that don’t want to weigh the benefits, risks, and costs of alternatives.  He notes that in Europe industry lobbyists are just going through the motions and have given up on the policy process.  This is also evident in New York.  All of the electric generating companies and delivery companies know that there are major challenges associated with the net-zero transition but have not stood up and publicly rebuked the current plans.  The New York Independent System Operator and the New York State Reliability Council have carefully fashioned their comments and reports to not offend the Hochul Administration’s pursuit of what the experts know very likely won’t work on the schedule proposed. 

Zaruk explains that the tactic of not strongly engaging in the policy process will only work for so long before it is too late to salvage their business.  The electric utility companies are going along with all the risks hoping someone will speak up and demand accountability.  For their part they continue their public sustainability campaigns supporting doing something about climate change and keep their concerns about the transition buried in industry comments that no one reads and the Climate Action Council ignores.  The ultimate question is will be anyone be willing to be the bad guy?

This essay explains how the policy process that has been corrupted by activists demonizing industry will eventually cause problems. Zaruk notes that corporations “do not consider the ramifications – that the constant media assault, reputation, and trust destruction and political denormalization of industry are an existential threat.”  In New York the utility companies publicize their sustainability programs and their own net-zero plans and seem to think that the public will embrace their actions and not treat them like Big Tobacco pariahs.  Unfortunately, Zaruk argues that is not the case.

In Europe Zaruk points that that:

The last decade has seen a rather audacious move by activist NGOs (and some policymakers particularly in Brussels) to ostracise most industries from the public policy dialogue process, create public revulsion and denormalise companies as stakeholders and social actors. This proved to be a successful strategy during the war on tobacco and many of their campaign tools are now simply being copy-pasted to other industries. Some, particularly in the financial industry, have bought into the activist campaigns and are courting public favour by considering a degrowth strategy or a capitalism reset. But can such a beast seriously hide its stripes?

This is exactly what has happened with the Climate Action Council.  Of the 22 members on the Council only two represent industry interests and their input is constantly disparaged.  More importantly, the Hochul Administration has ignored industry expert concerns about all the technical challenges of the net-zero transition.  The Scoping Plan drafts may refer to reliability a lot but there hasn’t been any suggestion that reliability concerns might slow the schedule.

Zaruk describes the concept of industry vilification:

I came across the word “tobacconisation” while reading an American activist conference report, Establishing Accountability for Climate Change Damages: Lessons from Tobacco Control, masterminded by Naomi Oreskes, the Union for Concerned Scientists and the Climate Accountability Institute in 2012 in La Jolla, California. This meeting of lawyers, activists and scientists argued that the tobacco industry lobby did not capitulate in the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement because of the science, regulatory restrictions or public outrage. They gave in because of the insurmountable financial costs of endless waves of tort litigation that threatened to wipe out the industry. So the La Jolla Plaintiff Playbook was to take that same strategy and apply it to the petroleum industry – to destroy public trust and then litigate the hell out of oil companies for damages due to climate change until they either go bankrupt or change their business model.

Zaruk describes three key activist tobacconisation strategies being applied against most industries.  The first is adversarial regulation.  This is a strategy where regulatory scientists effect change not through the democratic policy process but through the courts. With respect to the Climate Act at least the legislation was passed by the state legislature, albeit it was written by activists and I doubt that very few supporters understood the risks, costs, and challenges. 

The second strategy is to limit communications and ban advertising.  Activists have a key role in this playbook to raise public outrage against targeted companies.  With respect to the Climate Act, they are aided by a compliant media that parrots the main talking points without any challenges.  If anyone dares to suggest anything that does not hew to the narrative then the activists demean those remarks and smear the speaker.  Zaruk explains that “they need to ostracise the company or industry and exclude them from any role as a societal actor.”

The final strategy is public outrage trumps bad science.  Zaruk describes it as follows:

Public outrage against Big Tobacco meant that poor science (on the health risks of second-hand smoke or vaping) could be glanced over with little scrutiny in the policy process. People were fed up with the industry and just wanted to believe the research claims were accurate.

Opportunistic public officials wanting to play to the loud activist mobs need simply reach for the precautionary safety pin to gain favour without any risk of data or evidence interfering with this strategy. For policymakers, it is a no-brainer to play the precaution card (demanding that the substance is proven with certainty to be 100% safe prior to acting) rather than lock horns with angry activist groups with friends in the media.

Zaruk describes three approaches to fight the zero-risk mentality.  He suggests: “demand a White Paper articulating a rational strategy on the use of the precautionary principle within a clear risk management process.”  His primary concern is the EU policies but New York is following the same approach.  He states that “the hazard-based policy approach has to branded for what it is: irrational.”

His second approach is to call out the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that drive much of this policy.  They “break rules, act without respect for moral principles (unlike industry, very few NGOs have an ethical code of conduct that guides their behaviour) and ignore evidence and data in their campaigns.”  This is problematic with respect to the Climate Act because there are members of the Climate Action Council and the advisory panels who are from prominent climate activist NGOs.

Finally, he points out that the rules of engagement need to apply to all. There is evidence that the NGOs actively supporting the Climate Act have had access to material not available to all.  In no small part that is probably because some Council members are from these NGOs.  The end result is that the regulatory process has become biased.

The Industry Complex (Part 2): The Hate Industry

Zaruk’s second essay on the industry complex describes the business of demonizing industry.  He says:

The last two decades of relentless anti-industry attacks in the media, cinema and policy arenas have taught industry actors to be quiet in public, but they should not be ashamed of what their innovations and technologies have brought to humanity. We are living longer with a better quality of life, direct access to better food while feeding a growing global population, enjoying amazing personal communications devices, travelling faster and safer and accessing information in seconds. But all we hear about industry in the public sphere is resentment and animosity. This is the “Industry Complex.”

Zaruk describes one of the ironies of the professional hatred of industry.  He notes that:

Most of the people throwing brown beans at artwork or spray painting corporate offices are from a privileged class that have never experienced want. The tragic consequence of such “altruistic” zealot demonstrations is that the victims from the policy decisions they are forcing through are the most vulnerable in society, and will never be heard.

In New York primary funding for the ideological war on natural gas comes from trust funds controlled by the ultra-rich who have never experienced work.  I think one of the problems with the privileged and ultra-rich classes is that they have very little experience dealing with real-world problems associated with making things work.  For example, people who have not done much gardening may want to ban pesticides but they haven’t had a bug infestation wipe out a crop.  They have no experience with the fact that reality bats last.

Zaruk points out that the definition of industry has expanded beyond manufacturing.  In particular:

 “Industry” is now an umbrella term referring to any capitalist venture that may involve risk, inequity, and unequal access to markets. This definition makes targets because of shared social justice tenets of anyone associated taking risks. All perceived problems are blamed on “industry” all the while ignoring all the benefits derived from their activities.  The vilification of fossil fuels is a perfect example.  Despite the fact that all metrics show improvements in all quality-of-life metrics with increased use of fossil fuels, their continued use is attacked.

Zaruk gives an example of violence in France related to farming practices and states:

We can’t simply brush these people off as confused and frightened Luddites. Opportunistic activists have twisted reality, converting fear and uncertainty into a dangerously powerful political force. As one commentator on BFM decried: “This is the collapse of rationality “. Not only do they believe their hateful bullshit, they are relentlessly spreading it with a missionary zeal via an unaccountable social media propaganda tool (while the rest of us remain tolerant or uninformed).

This is entirely apropos of the ideologues pushing the net-zero transition in New York.  They can say just about anything and get away with it.  Activist organizations claim that the public is in favor of net-zero but the question is whether that support is limited to a loud minority of activist ideologues? Will the majority be heard when they lose their jobs while their energy and food costs go through the roof?  I have always thought that would be inevitable conclusion but as long as people only listen to what they want to, then they will likely not speak up or place blame incorrectly.

Zaruk explains that many irrational policy decisions are justified by activist anti-industry objectives.  For example, consider the European decisions to shut nuclear reactors even though there is an energy crisis looming.  Zaruk notes that:

In the face of an energy crisis, ecologists are holding firm in Germany and Belgium against keeping some nuclear reactors from being decommissioned arguing that such a move would be supporting big business. Greenpeace claimed shutting down these reactors would give energy production back to the people. Renewables like wind and solar have the image of small, locally produced energy (from nature), enjoying a virtuous halo that belies the big companies making these technologies or managing the big wind parks and solar farms.

I believe that Zaruk’s conclusions of the European solution is consistent with what is happening in New York relative to the net-zero transition.  He notes:

These decisions are not based on issues of cost, efficiency, and benefits, but only on an ideology built on the hatred of industry. Thus, the pro-renewables and pro-organic policies dominating the European Commission Green Deal strategy are not based on facts or research but ideology. They are, in a word, irrational.

The Industry Complex (Part 3): A Return to Realpolitik

In this essay Zaruk argues that it is time for regulators to “start doing their job: making the hard decisions and managing risks rather than promising a world of zero risk to a public that has come to expect simple solutions to complex problems.”  He argues that it is time for a return to Realpolitik: “making the best choices from a finite list of options and circumstances rather than continuing the current approach of false promises that someone else will have to pay for”.

Zaruk explains the concept of Realpolitik:

It is not a new concept. The term “Realpolitik” was in use several decades before Bismarck (commonly referred to as the father of Realpolitik). It was developed by Ludwig von Rochau who tried to introduce Enlightened, liberal ideas, post 1848, into a political world that was embedded in less rational cultural, nationalistic and religious power dynamics (much like the green dogma pushing many Western political spheres today). Realpolitik is often best understood by what it is not: it refers to decisions not made solely on issues of ideology and morality. In other words, Realpolitik refers to pragmatic decisions based on best possible outcomes and compromises (something done when leaders have to face unpleasant realities). Ideologues can easily ignore scientific facts when imposing their power but Realpolitikers will follow the best available science while appealing to reason.

He explains that in Europe as in New York, politicians shutdown nuclear facilities to placate the loud, activist minority but did not consider “pragmatic alternatives or a rational transition plan.” He said “a Realpolitiker would not have shut down the nuclear power stations until the energy transition was safely achieved.”  It gets worse in New York because the Department of Environmental Conservation is proposing regulations that require existing fossil-fired generating plants to consider compliance with the Climate Act as part of their operating permit extensions.  It is possible that they could shut down those facilities before alternatives consistent with the Climate Act are operating.

Zaruk argues that “we should aim for safer rather than safe.”  He points out:

Safer is something risk managers in industry measure and continually strive for while safe is an emotional ideal that cannot be measured or, for that matter, reached. We will never have safe, but we can always strive for safer. This is where a more pragmatic, Realpolitik approach would be more successful than any arbitrary risk aversion.

Realpolitik accepts that a perfect world is a pipe dream. Freed from the shackles of seeking the totally safe, they get to work on risk management, reducing exposures to as low as reasonably possible (achievable) and making the world (products, substances, systems…) better – safer. They seek a world with lower risks for more people, not zero risks for all people. We need to turn away from the fundamentalist activist mindset and adopt a more industrial, scientific approach (as seen in product stewardship): of continuous improvement, constant iteration, and technological refinement.

Conclusion

Zaruk provided a good summary of his work and if you replace Brussels with Albany, it is apropos to New York:

It is patently clear industry actors in Brussels cannot continue to do what they have been doing. Brussels has far too many activists with special interests solely dedicated to seeing industry and capitalism fail. They have money, passion and limited ethical constraints as they execute their objectives with missionary zeal. This series on the Industry Complex has tried to show how anti-industry militants have worked to destroy trust in all industries (excluding them from the policy process and equating the word “industry” with some immoral interpretation of lobbying) and using the same tactics that worked with the decline of the tobacco industry. Using the emerging communications tools to create an atmosphere of fear and hate, these activists have successfully generated a narrative that the only solution to our problems is to remove industry, their innovations and their technologies. And their solutions are getting even more extreme (with, for example, 6000 environmental militants recently attacking an irrigation pond project on a farm in France for being too “industrial”). Policymakers, perceiving these loud voices as representative, have adopted the path of virtue politics rather than Realpolitik (of policy by aspiration and ideology rather than practical solutions relying on the best available evidence).

The Climate Act and the transition plan embodied in the Draft Scoping Plan is full of examples where the perceived risks of fossil fuels are comprehensively addressed but none of the risks of the proposed alternatives are addressed.  The most glaring Climate Act example is the requirement that the full life cycle and upstream emissions associated with fossil fuels must be considered to eliminate those risks.  Those considerations are not applied to wind, solar, and battery technologies.  The benefits of the current energy system are ignored and the risks of the net-zero future system minimized.  This approach will not work out in the best interests of New York.

Skeptical Overview of the Climate Act Presentation

This is a summary of the presentation I gave to the Central New York Chapter Air & Waste Management Association on November 29, 2022 explaining why I believe that the risks, costs, and impacts of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) exceed the protections, savings, and benefits.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted 23 comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have published over 250 blog posts on  New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that this supposed cure will be worse than the disease.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Introduction

I explained that given the time constraints it was only possible to give sound bites to describe why I am skeptical of the ultimate impacts of the Climate Act.  This blog post gives an overview of the presentation and, more importantly, a link to detailed information supporting my arguments.  Everything presented draws on my blog posts and Draft Scoping Plan comments.

I discussed three primary concerns: reliability, affordability and environmental impacts.  In every instance, my evaluation of the components of the transition plan has found that issues are more complicated, uncertain, and costly than portrayed by the State.   Moreover, they have not provided a feasibility analysis to document whether their list of control strategies could work.  In addition there is no implementation plan.  The Climate Act is simply too fast and too far.

Overview of the Climate Act

I described the transition plan for New York’s Climate Act “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  The Climate Action Council has been working to develop plans to implement the Act.  The 22 members of the Council were chosen for their ideology and not their expertise and the lack of clear direction by the Hochul Administration led to misplaced priorities.  Instead of focusing on overarching policy issues there has been inordinate attention to personal concerns of Council members. 

Over the summer of 2021 the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultant Energy + Environmental Economics (E3) prepared an Integration Analysis to “estimate the economy-wide benefits, costs, and GHG emissions reductions associated with pathways that achieve the Climate Act GHG emission limits and carbon neutrality goal”.  Integration Analysis quantitative implementation strategies were incorporated into the Draft Scoping Plan when it was released at the end of 2021.  Since the end of the public comment period in early July 2022 the Climate Action Council has been addressing the comments received as part of the development of the Final Scoping Plan.  Most recently they have been revising the Scoping Plan to come up with a final document.  The intention is to release the Final Scoping Plan by the end of the year.

I expressed my disappointment with the public stakeholder process associated with the Draft Scoping Plan comments. Seven hundred people spoke at Climate Act Public Hearings and around 35,000 comments were received.  However, on the order of 25,000 comments were “potentially the same or substantially similar”, i.e., form letters.  That still left 10,000 unique comments that the Council promised would be “acknowledged”.  In my opinion, the comment process was treated as an obligation not as an opportunity to improve, correct, or clarify the scoping plan.

Of course it is unreasonable to expect that the Council members could be expected to review all the comments themselves.  Agency staff categorized the comments and then filtered them in presentations to the Climate Action Council that described themes with very little specificity.  I think there was a clear bias in the presentations.  Anything inconsistent with Administration’s narrative was disparaged, downplayed, or ignored.  I was most disappointed that no comments on the fundamental basis of the Draft Scoping Plan, that is to say the Integration Analysis, were mentioned, much less discussed.

I also addressed the Climate Act mandates for 2023.  The expectation is that the regulations that implement policies that force the transition away from fossil fuels will be implemented by the end of 2023.  However, the Climate Act also mandates a public comment and consultation process before promulgating regulations.  It requires the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to complete a public comment and consultation process before it can promulgate the 2024 Implementing Regulations.  This process includes public workshops and consultation with the Climate Action Council, the Environmental Justice Advisory Group, the Climate Justice Working Group, representatives of regulated entities, community organizations, environmental groups, health professionals, labor unions, municipal corporations, trade associations and other stakeholders. At least two public hearings and a 120-day public comment period must be provided. Only after this extensive stakeholder process concludes is DEC authorized to propose the implementing regulations.  When the regulations are formally proposed the State Administrative Procedures Act requires a 60 day public comment period, public hearings, and that the agency respond to all comments.  I think this is a very ambitious plan.

Electric Grid Risks

Many of the most vocal supporters of the Climate Act believe that existing renewable technology is sufficient to transition the New York electric grid to zero-emissions resources by 2040 and that suggestions that may not be true are misinformation.  In order to address that fallacy my presentation concentrated on my concerns about the reliability risks of an electric grid that is dependent upon intermittent and diffuse renewable resources.  The electric grid is crucial to New York’s energy future because the primary de-carbonization strategy is to electrify everything possible using those resources.  I described the existing grid, generation resource planning, the current New York State system, and the projected New York State system.  Electric grid reliability requires that generation resources match electric load at all times and the challenges associated with wind and solar in this regard are ignored by those who believe that existing technology is sufficient.

I made the point that failure to adequately plan will mean an inevitable catastrophic blackout like the Texas February 2021 blackout.  In short, weather related issues due to freezing rain, snow and then an extended period of cold weather led to periods when the generating resources did not match the load necessary.  The storm was the worst energy infrastructure failure in Texas history.  Over 4.5 million homes and residences were without power, at least 246 people died, and total damages were at least $195 billion. 

In order to illustrate the basic electric grid I included the following diagram.  It shows that generating station provide power using turbine generators that convert mechanical energy into electric energy using water, steam, or other means to spin the turbines.  I have heard the argument that the grid is inefficient because there are power losses between the generating station and the users but the fact is that New York will always be dependent upon a transmission system because there is insufficient space in New York City for sufficient renewable resources to provide the energy needed to keep the lights on.  Power output from generating plants is stepped up at substation transformers for long distance transmission and then substation transformers step down the power for the distribution system for use by consumers.

I included the following diagram to make the point that New York is in the Eastern Interconnection which is the largest machine in the world.  Incredibly all the fossil, hydro, and nuclear generating stations in the Eastern Interconnection work together.  In order to provide 60 Hz power the generating turbines are synchronized to run at 3600 revolutions per minute.  Operators keeps the voltages as constant as possible in the entire area but have the advantage that those turbines provide inertia and they can dispatch generating resources as necessary.  Unfortunately, wind and solar resources are inverter based and cannot be dispatched as needed.

New York State has its own regional operator – the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO).  Within Power the Eastern Interconnection system operators match the load with the generation in smaller regional systems. Regional system operators manage imports and exports between neighboring systems.  New York has unique system constraints related to New York City and Long Island that warrant its own system operator.

NYISO operates the electric grid for New York State.  There are 11 control areas with specific load, interconnection, and generation characteristics that must be addressed on a six-second basis to keep the lights on.  New York State’s major challenge is that there are limits to transmission to the highly populated New York City and Long Island control areas.  The NYISO has to address different time scales for load management:

  • Sub-minute fluctuations are addressed automatically
  • Hourly and daily fluctuations are handled by operators
  • Annual peaks require planning so that operators can respond

New York’s high reliability performance standards are the result of decades of experience working with dispatchable resources and implementation of specific metrics developed after blackouts in 1965 and 1977.

In order to educate those who believe that existing renewable resources are sufficient for maintaining current reliability standards I described generation resource planning.  The following load duration curve is a key concern of load management planning.  There are three general resources.  Baseline resources ideally are dispatched so they can run at a constant rate which enables the resource owners to tune the units to run as efficiently as possible.  Daily load variations require some resources to follow load during the day.   The biggest planning challenge is capacity and energy for peak loads that occur when temperatures are highest or lowest.  Before deregulation, each utility was responsible for meeting all these resource needs.  In New York City the solution for the peak load problem was a fleet of simple-cycle turbines dedicated for use to provide peaking power when and where needed.

The problem with existing renewable resource technology is matching load when the system is dependent upon renewable resources that cannot be dispatched and provide variable energy.  This is a new and difficult challenge.  It is exacerbated by intermittent renewable energy availability associated with peak loads. Load peaks with the coldest and hottest weather but those conditions typically are low wind resource periods.  Wind lulls in the winter when solar is low availability is the critical reliability issue.

The NYISO 2022 Power Trends Report  includes this description of the capacity (power available in MW) for the existing system.  It shows that 70% of installed capacity is fossil fueled and 25% is zero emissions. Wind and other renewables (solar energy, energy storage resources, methane, refuse, or wood) account for only 6% of installed capacity.  Note that NYISO does not measure distributed solar directly.  In their accounting it reduces the load so less generation is needed.

The NYISO 2022 Power Trends Report  includes this description of Energy Production (MWh).  Note that 50% of New York’s generated electricity is zero-emissions.  There is a Climate Act target to “Increase renewable sources to 70 percent by 2030” that does not include zero-emissions nuclear. One reason that I am skeptical of the Climate Act is because 24% of renewable source energy produced is hydro and hydro pumped storage.  Wind and other renewables (solar energy, energy storage resources, methane, refuse, or wood) account for 5% of energy produced.  The 29% of the energy produced  from renewable sources is far less than the 70% by 2030 target. I don’t think that it is feasible to develop over 29GW of renewable resources between now and 2030 with supply chain issues, constraints on permitting, procurement, and construction when development of supporting infrastructure is also needed for off-shore wind development.

The capacity factor is a useful metric to understand electric generation resources.  The annual capacity factor equals the actual observed generation (MWh) divided by maximum possible generation (capacity (MW) times the 8,760 hours.  In New York nuclear is a key contributor but the Administration recently shut down 2,000 MW at Indian Point.  At this time the simple-cycle peaking turbines are being phased out and peaking power is produced by oil-fired units and spare capacity in the gas and dual fuel units.  Note that oil is a unique New York resource.  Imagine the difficulty replacing that capacity with a resource that would only need to run 1% of the time.  Note that in 2021 New York land-based wind only had a 22% capacity factor.

It is commonly argued that renewables are the cheapest type of new electric generating resources.  For example, that was the claim in a Dave Davies interview on National Public Radio Fresh Air: “A new climate reality is taking shape as renewables become widespread” with New York Times staff writer David Wallace-Wells.  Wallace-Wells said: “In fact, according to one study, 90% of the world now lives in places where building new renewable capacity would be cheaper than building new dirty capacity. And indeed, in a lot of places, it’s already cheaper to build new renewables than even to continue running old fossil fuel plants.” He went on to say “…we should be going all in on renewables here. We shouldn’t be building new coal or new oil or new gas capacity.”

The key to this claim is the reference to capacity.  If that were the only factor involved in getting the electricity when and where it is needed 24-7, 365 days a year without losing load due to extreme (one in ten year) conditions then his argument that we shouldn’t be building new coal, oil, or natural gas capacity” would be valid.  It is not.  Obviously electric users want power even when the wind is not blowing at night.  Electric system innumerates under-estimate the challenge of the energy storage requirements for extreme renewable resource lulls which correlate well with weather events that are safety threats because of extreme cold and heat. 

Given time restraints I could not fully describe all the NYISO’s planning responsibilities.  I did not include the following slide but made the point that their modeling analyses incorporate all of the complexities of the New York electric system.  I did not describe the three primary components of their responsibilities: comprehensive system planning which examines near-term and longer-term issues impacting reliability, economic, and public policy transmission planning; interconnection planning to evaluate the reliability implications of resources interconnecting and deactivating from the grid; and inter-regional planning with neighboring grid operators. One of the primary functions of the NYISO is electric system planning.  NYISO modeling incorporates all the complexities of the eleven control areas in the New York energy system.

I included the following summary of the NYISO Comprehensive System Planning Process to show all the components and to highlight the recent addition of a new component.  In order to address the Climate Act NYISO added “Develop the System & Resource Outlook” component that looks at a longer planning horizon that was included previously. 

The first report for the resource outlook component was released a couple of months ago.  The 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook can be downloaded from NYISO and a datasheet summary of key takeaways of the Outlook report is also available.  The summary describes the four key findings: an unprecedented buildout of new generation is needed, load will increase when we electrify everything, transmission is necessary and must be expended to get diffuse renewables to New York City and a new resource has been identified: Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR).  That resource is essentially a fossil-fueled turbine without any emissions. 

I compared the NYISO Resource Outlook modeling analysis with the Integration Analysis modeling.  The Outlook analysis was based on three scenarios.  In order to evaluate the effects of different policy options, this kind of modeling analysis projects future conditions for a baseline or business-as-usual case.  The evaluation analysis makes projections for different policy options, and then the results are compared relative to the business-as-usual case.  NYISO ran two policy scenarios: one based on their estimates of future demand and one that tried to simulate the Integration Analysis projections.  I compared their scenario 1 to the Integration Analysis in the presentation.

The Integration Analysis modeling was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan.  It is important to note that contrary to usual practice the Integration Analysis baseline was a reference case that included “already implemented” programs.  In other words there are some programs incorporated into the Reference Case that only exist to reduce GHG emissions.  This definition of the Reference Case instead of a Business-As-Usual case is different practice and motivated to get a specific answer. The Integration Analysis considered four different policy projections.  The first considered the Advisory Panel recommendations for control measures, but the modeling showed that they did not meet the Climate Act targets.  The Integration Analysis came up with three mitigation scenarios that did meet the targets.  The model used for the analysis is not as sophisticated as the NYISO model.  Modelers plugged in a set of control measures at varying efficiencies until they met the targets.  Note, however, they have not claimed that the scenario measures as scoped out will provide electricity that meets current reliability standards.  In my opinion this approach gave the impression to the Council that meeting the targets would be relatively easy.  Council members requested scenarios that considered a faster implementation schedule and more reductions that the 85% target.   The cost/benefit results claim that those more stringent scenarios provide more benefits primarily because of reduced costs.  I think that is a counter-intuitive result so my comparison was against Scenario 2: Strategic Use of Low-Carbon Fuels.

I compare the installed capacity for the two models in the next table.  As noted by the NYISO, an extraordinary development of renewables by 2030 is required and both models agree on that.  There also are some key differences.  The NYISO modeling projects more onshore wind, less offshore wind, less solar, and more DEFR.  The NYISO model simultaneously optimizes resource capabilities and costs to come up with a least-cost solution. I think the wind differences are due to cost and availability differences.  The two modeling approaches handle distributed solar differently.  NYISO does not measure generation from distributed sources and only considers it as a way to reduce the load needed.  The Integration Analysis explicitly includes distributed solar capacity and generation as an output.  Note that existing storage is pumped hydro but any new storage will be batteries.  Finally, it is notable that both modeling analyses project that 2040 DEFR will be comparable to existing fossil capacity albeit NYISO projects significantly more and Integration Analysis a little less.

I compare the energy produced (GWh) for the two models in the next table.  The largest difference between the models is that NYISO projects that DEFR generates ten times more energy.  It turns out that NYISO has DEFR generating 14% of the total energy in 2040 but Integration Analysis projects only 1%.  NYISO projects more onshore wind than offshore wind and the Integration Analysis projects the opposite.  There is huge difference between solar but I believe that is related to the fact that NYISO does not explicitly include distributed solar.   Clearly the two models handle storage differently.

I noted earlier that I was disappointed that the Hochul Administration ignored my comments on the Integration Analysis.  The capacity factor table shows one of the points I made in my comments.  I pointed out that the Integration Analysis land-based wind capacity factors were unrealistically high.  The model projected the 2020 generation with a capacity factor of 29% but the 2021 observed capacity factor was only 22%.  As a result the Integration Analysis projections for the land-based wind needed to meet the load is too low.  For all renewable resources the Integration Analysis capacity factors are higher than the NYISO projections.  I prefer the projections from the organization responsible for New York reliability to those from the unelected bureaucrats who have no such responsibilities. 

There is one other point in this table.  The DEFR capacity factors are different.  To this point the extra capacity needed to keep the lights on during peaking periods was provided by relatively cheap sources of energy.  When new peaking resources were needed, cheap simple-cycle turbines were installed.  Currently peak energy resources are primarily from existing old, amortized facilities.  As we shall see, the new DEFR required to keep the system working will use much more expensive resources.  In our deregulated system the NYISO will have to develop a market payment scheme to cover those increased costs.

As noted earlier, I believe that the NYISO projections based on more sophisticated modeling has a much better chance than the Integration Analysis to describe a mix or resources that will maintain current reliability standards.  Nonetheless, I have reservations about any projections because the future electric grid will depend on unprecedented amounts of renewable energy resources.  The following slide lists six of concerns for an electric system dependent upon renewable resources.  For my presentation I only mentioned the first three.  Because wind and solar are intermittent that means you have to have storage for daily, seasonal, and peak load requirements.  The lack of an implementation plan ignores that wind and solar success is location specific.  New York needs a plan that encourages development where the resource is better during the winter lulls.  Specifically, it is not a good idea to offer the same incentives to utility-scale developments on the Tug Hill plateau where over 200” of snow are common as areas where snowfall amounts are lower.  The third concern is reliability services and they are a reason that wind and solar are far more expensive for deliverable energy than fossil.

I found a good summary of the essential reliability services in a paper by National Renewable Energy Laboratory authors entitled Getting to 100%: Six strategies for the challenging last 10%.   It describes ancillary services that must be provided to keep the transmission system going.    Wind and solar do not provide those services so someone, somewhere else has to provide them at some additional cost.

The ultimate reliability problem is illustrated in the following figure.  This graph illustrates the long-duration wind lull problem from an early presentation to the Climate Action Council.  It explicitly points out that firm capacity (DEFR) is needed to meet multi-day periods of low wind and solar resource availability.  The Council has known about the problem all along but have basically pushed it aside as inconvenient.  The thing to remember is that in order to prevent catastrophic blackouts caused because intermittent wind and solar are unavailable, NYISO and the Integration Analysis are both banking on DEFR capacity.  Using wind, solar and storage exclusively makes meeting the worst-case renewable resource gap much more difficult.

There is no doubt that the fate of future reliability is inextricably tied to DEFR success.  The next slide discusses DEFR options.  The Draft Scoping Plan acknowledges the need for DEFR and proposes seasonal hydrogen storage as a placeholder technology.  NYISO, while explaining that the resource is necessary, has offered no recommendations what technology could fill the need.  The NREL authors of Getting to 100%: Six strategies for the challenging last 10% described six DEFR strategies

  • Seasonal storage which could be hydrogen or some other kind of long term storage solution
  • Renewable energy is basically overbuilding with battery energy storage.  I believe this represents the preferred approach of those who claim existing technology is sufficient.
  • Existing technology adherents also claim that demand side resources can flatten the load peaks so much that less DEFR is needed
  • The problem with other renewables (e.g. hydro) in New York is that they cannot be scaled up enough to meet identified needs
  • Nuclear is the only proven and scalable DEFR technology currently available but it is a toxic option for NY politicians
  • Carbon capture is unacceptable to the activists and has technological challenges that make it an unlikely a DEFR option.
  • Because of the challenges of carbon sequestration to net out the 15% net-zero emissions, the Draft Scoping plan mentions the CO2 removal strategy but in my opinion it is unlikely.

There are two approaches advocated by those who believe that existing technology is sufficient to maintain electric system reliability in a zero-emissions electric grid.  Some claim that only minimal storage is needed because renewables are available somewhere else, that is to say, the wind is always blowing somewhere.  Others claim that overbuilding renewables supplemented with battery energy storage systems is a viable solution.

While the concept that the wind is always blowing somewhere else is indisputably true the issue is that in order to keep the lights on we need power at specific times and places from a dedicated source.  New York City’s peaking turbines were located in specific locations to maintain reliability and they were dedicated to that application.  New York’s reliability standards were developed based on decades of experience that showed that a certain installed reserve margin would guarantee that New York reliability standards could be maintained.   Against that backdrop consider the following weather map on February 17, 2021.  The Texas energy debacle was associated with this intensely cold polar vortex huge high pressure system.  Remember that winds are higher when the isobars are close together.  On this day there are light winds from New York to the southeast, west, and north including the proposed New York offshore wind development area.  There are packed isobars in northeastern New England, in the western Great Plains, and central Gulf Coast.  In order for New York to guarantee wind energy availability from those locations, wind turbines and the transmission lines between New York and those locations would have to be dedicated for our use.  Otherwise I think it is obvious that jurisdictions in between would claim those resources for their own use during these high energy demand days.  It is unreasonable to expect that building those resources for a once in a few years situation could possibly be an economic solution.

Another way of looking at this issue is to consider the NYISO fuel mix data available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  I downloaded four days of February 2021 data to generate the following table.  It shows that a high pressure system reduces wind resource availability across the state.  The data show that less than a quarter of the daily wind capacity is available for this period. Note that the worst-case hour on 2/18/21 at 7:00 AM wind production was only 138 MW out of a New York total of 1,985 MW for a capacity factor of 7%.  If we were to overbuild wind resources to replace the fossil capacity of 7,191 MW on that hour you would need 102,729 MW of wind resources.

Clearly, overbuilding alone is not a viable solution.  You have to have new energy storage and the currently available technology is battery energy storage systems.  Both the Integration Analysis and NYISO Resource Outlook optimized the balance between renewables and storage but still found that DEFR was needed.  Existing technology proponents claim that over-building wind, solar, and storage is viable but have not countered the NYISO or Integration Analysis modeling results.  I am concerned about the risks associated with the current preferred technology: lithium-ion storage battery systems.  The first risk is logistical inasmuch as battery storage footprints are larger than the existing peaking turbine sites so finding space for the batteries is an issue.  Worse is the fact that lithium-ion storage batteries have the risk of thermal runaway fires and explosions that trade an acute health risk for chronic, and speculative, in my opinion, risks.  Paul Christensen, Professor of Pure and Applied Electrochemistry at Newcastle University in the United Kingdom gave a presentation at PV magazine’s Insight Australia event in 2021 that describes the risks. His videos of thermal runaway tests are terrifying.  He is one of the world’s leading experts on battery fires and safety and said global uptake of lithium-ion battery technology has “outstripped” our knowledge of the risks.  He also stated that he is “astounded and appalled that if there is no appreciation of the safety issues involved” with large battery energy storage systems.  This is another feasibility issue that is unaddressed by the Draft Scoping Plan.

Hydrogen storage is the Draft Scoping Plan DEFR placeholder technology.  The plan is to use wind and solar electrolysis to produce “green” hydrogen from water.  The stored hydrogen would either be combusted to power turbines or used in fuel cells.  There are fundamental issues associated with the use of hydrogen that I detail on my blog.  Hydrogen generation, storage and use loses much more energy than alternatives and may not even have a net energy benefit so it is unlikely to be sustainable.  In order for it to provide the necessary peaking power in New York City a colorless, odorless, hard to store explosive gas will have to be stored and used.  I don’t think that the technology will be embraced in the City.  All the infrastructure necessary to produce, store, and use will have to be built and paid for to meet a projected capacity factor of 2%.  I doubt that makes economic sense.

I concluded my discussion of the risks to electric system reliability by summing up the NYISO Resource Outlook Key Findings Datasheet.  According to the organization that is responsible for keeping the lights on, DEFR is necessary for future reliability.  Because a politically acceptable DEFR that can be scaled up to meet the levels needed for reliability is not currently available, a new technology has to be developed, tested, and put on line well before 2040.  The NYISO makes the point that until you have the necessary DEFR technology on line shutting down existing fossil generation is inappropriate.  I am disappointed that the NYISO Resource Outlook has not mentioned any costs.  This is likely to be a particular issue relative to DEFR.  Clearly conditional implementation dependent upon the availability of DEFR would be a rational approach.

There is no documentation that lists the specific costs of control strategies, the expected benefits, or the expected emission reductions making it impossible to estimate the total costs of the Climate Act.  That information is necessary to determine whether the Integration Analysis projections are feasible. The Draft Scoping Plan claims that the cost of inaction is more than the cost of action but a variation of this graph is the only documentation for that claim.  I directly addressed this misleading and inaccurate statement in my comments at the Syracuse public hearing but there has been no response or mention of the issues I raised at any Climate Action Council meeting.  The statement is misleading because costs are given relative to the Reference Case and not a business-as-usual case as explained earlier.  I believe that the Reference Case includes at least the cost of the “already implemented” electric vehicle mandate.  That means that all of the costs for electric vehicles, charging infrastructure, and distribution system upgrades necessary for electric vehicle charging are excluded from the cost of action.  Correcting that “trick” would mean the costs of action are more than the costs of inaction. 

There is another egregious cheat that further undermines the claim.  It is inaccurate because the Draft Scoping Plan counts the societal benefits of avoided greenhouse gas emissions multiple times.  My Draft Scoping Plan comments on benefits documents why I believe that their claim for $235 billion in societal benefits should only be $60 billion.  Their approach is equivalent to me saying that because I lost 10 pounds five years ago, I can say that I lost 50 pounds.  Correcting that error would also by itself invalidate their benefits claim.  Bottom line is that I estimate that the real costs are at least $760 billion more than the imaginary claimed benefits.

In my opinion one of the biggest environmental success stories in my lifetime is the reintroduction of Bald Eagles.  When I moved to Syracuse in 1981 it was inconceivable that it would be possible to see a Bald Eagle from my home but I have seen several in the last few years.  One of the missing pieces of the Climate Act implementation plan is an update of the Cumulative Environmental Impact Statement to reflect the latest estimates of the number of wind turbines and areal extent of solar panels. I worry that the combined effect of all that development will threaten Bald Eagles.

The following table was not included in the presentation but shows the capacity of the resources not considered in the cumulative impact statements. Clearly, much more renewable capacity will be required than has been evaluated.

Comparison of Integrated Analysis Projected Capacity and Cumulative Environmental Impact Statements (MW)

The following table used in the presentation shows the number of wind turbines and areal extent considered in the completed cumulative impact statements relative to the projected numbers in the Integration Analysis.  The Draft Scoping Plan calls for at least 497 more onshore wind turbines, 493 more offshore wind turbines and 602 more square miles covered with solar equipment than has been evaluated in cumulative analysis.

I have considered the avian impact of the Bluestone Wind Project in Broome County New York to show impacts for a single facility. It will have up to 33 turbines and have a capability of up to 124 MW covering 5,652 acres. Over the 30-year expected lifetime of the facility the analysis estimates that 85 Bald Eagles and 21 federally protected Eastern Golden Eagles will be killed. A first-order approximation1 is to scale those numbers to the total capacity projected for the Draft Scoping Plan. This back of the envelope approximation suggests that at least 216 Bald Eagles could be killed every year when there are 9,445 MW of on-shore wind. There were 426 occupied bald eagle nest sites in New York in 2017. In my comments on this topic I stated that the Final Scoping Plan must include proposed thresholds for unacceptable environmental impacts like this.  There has been no response whatsoever to my comment.

When New York’s GHG emissions are considered relative to global emissions I conclude that New York only action is pointless.  In the presentation I compared New York emissions to global emissions in two graphs.  I used CO2 and GHG emissions data for the world’s countries and consolidated the data in a spreadsheet.  I used the New York State GHG data set CO2e AR4 100 year global warming potential GHG values for consistency.   Plotted on the same graph New York GHG and CO2 emissions cannot be differentiated from zero.

When the New York emissions are plotted relative to global emission increases the futility of New York affecting global emissions is shown.  The trend results indicate that the year-to-year trend in GHG emissions was positive 21 of 26 years and for CO2 emissions was positive 24 of 30 years.  In order to show this information graphically I calculated the rolling 3-year average change in emissions by year.  New York’s emissions are only 0.45% of global emissions and the average change in three-year rolling average emissions is greater than 1%.  In other words, whatever New York does to reduce emissions will be supplanted by global emissions increases in less than a year.

Climate Act advocates frequently argue that New York needs to take action because our economy is large.  I analyzed that claim recently and summarized the data here.  The 2020 Gross State Product (GSP) ranks ninth if compared to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of countries in the world.  However, when New York’s GHG 2016 emissions are compared to emissions from other countries, New York ranks 35th.  More importantly, a country’s emissions divided by its GDP is a measure of GHG emission efficiency.  New York ranks third in this category trailing only Switzerland and Sweden.

Despite the fact that the ostensible rationale for GHG emission reduction policies is to reduce global warming impacts, the Draft Scoping Plan continues an unbroken string of the Administration not reporting the effects of a policy proposal on global warming.   The reason is simple.  The change to global warming from eliminating New York GHG emissions are simply too small to be measured much less have an effect on any of the purported damages of greenhouse gas emissions.  I have calculated the expected impact on global warming as only 0.01°C by the year 2100 if New York’s GHG emissions are eliminated.

Conclusion

My presentation explained why I am skeptical of the value of the Climate Act.  Attempting to get to zero emissions is an extraordinary challenge that is downplayed by the Climate Act, the Council and the Draft Scoping Plan so most people are unaware of the likelihood of success.  The experts say we need DEFR but it has to be developed for New York in less than a decade which I believe is unlikely.  There is no reason to expect that the costs won’t be huge despite the Hochul Administration’s cover up of costs and benefits.  The cumulative impacts of the required renewable developments have not been evaluated and could be unacceptable.  There is no plan for implementation so there are going to be problems. Finally, what is going to happen when we have electrified everything and there is an ice storm?  Extreme weather events can have devastating consequences on a more fragile wind and solar electricity network.  I am particularly worried about ice storms.  On a local level it is not clear how the public will be able to survive a multi-day power outage caused by an ice storm when the Climate Act mandates electric heat and electric vehicles but the bigger reliability concern is that fact that ice storms can take out transmission lines.  The January 1998 North American ice storm struck the St Lawrence valley causing massive damage and required weeks to reconstruct the electric grid.  When everything is electrified how will it be possible to rebuild?

Climate Act Emissions in Graphical Context

This post was updated on 10/24/22 to replace the second graph included and include data to 2019

The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Draft Scoping Plan defines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda” and claims that there are significant direct and indirect benefits if New York’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) are reduced to net-zero but there is no mention of New York’s emissions relative to the rest of the world.  I explained that any claim of benefits is illusory because in the context of global impacts New York’s contribution is miniscule.  This short post puts the numbers into a couple of graphs.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written extensively on New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that this supposed cure will be worse than the disease.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

New York and Global GHG Emissions

The purpose of this post is to illustrate how New York GHG relate to global emission increases.  I found CO2 and GHG emissions data for the world’s countries and consolidated the data in a spreadsheet earlier this year.  I downloaded the data again for this post and found data out to 2019.  The following graph shows global and CO2 emissions for the world and New York plotted on the same graph.  New York emissions are essentially zero.

The trend results indicate that the year-to-year trend in GHG emissions was positive 21 of 26 years and for CO2 emissions was positive 24 of 30 years.  In order to show this information graphically I calculated the rolling 3-year average change in emissions by year.  The following graph shows that rate of change in emissions has been consistently higher than New York emissions since 1990.

Conclusion

By any measure New York’s complete elimination of GHG emissions is so small that there will not be any effect on the state’s climate and global climate change impacts to New York.  I previously showed that although New York’s economy would be ranked ninth relative to other countries, New York’s emissions are only 0.45% of global emissions which ranks 35th.  This post graphically shows New York emissions are negligible compared to global emissions.  The change to global warming from eliminating New York GHG emissions is only 0.01°C by the year 2100 which is too small to be measured much less have an effect on any of the purported damages of greenhouse gas emissions.  Finally, this post shows global emissions have increased more than New York’s total share of global emissions consistently since 1990.  In other words, whatever New York does to reduce emissions will be supplanted by global emissions increases in a year.

The only possible conclusion is that the Climate Act emissions reduction program is nothing more than virtue-signaling.  Given the likely significant costs, risks to reliability, and other impacts to New York society, I think that the schedule and ambition of the Climate Act targets needs to be re-assessed for such an empty gesture.

Lights Out: The CLCPA and New York’s Energy Future

On May 3, 2022 the Empire Center for Public Policy hosted a panel of climate and energy experts from across the state to explore economic and energy impacts of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act.  This post describes my impression of Lights Out: The CLCPA and New York’s Energy Future.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I have written extensively on implementation of New York’s response to climate change risk because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability, impact affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, and will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York.  New York’s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions are less than one half one percent of global emissions and since 1990 global GHG emissions have increased by more than one half a percent per year.  Moreover, the reductions cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  They were assisted by Advisory Panels who developed and presented strategies to the meet the goals to the Council.  Those strategies were used to develop the integration analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants that quantified the impact of the strategies.  That analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021. The public can comment until June 10, 2022. 

The overall question for the speakers was whether the state can meet its energy needs under the new law and what will be the cost to New Yorkers?  Six speakers made brief presentations followed by questions and answers addressing those questions.  I have described my impressions of the speaker presentations below.  If a recording of the meeting is provided, I will update this post.

Introductory remarks

James Hanley, Senior Policy Analyst, Empire Center for Public Policy gave some brief introductory remarks but focused on his new research.  Hanley recently completed an analysis he did for the Empire Center titled Cold and Dark? New York’s Risky Energy Future.  It is a good summary of the essential problem that the Climate Act will increase demand at the same time New York is retiring existing nuclear and natural gas-fired generation.  He shows that the state is on track for an energy shortage equal to “almost three New York Cities without power”.  He explains that wind and solar cannot make up the gap because of their variable output.  The Draft Scoping Plan notes that 15 to 25 GW of installed dispatchable emissions-free generation capacity is “needed in 2040 to meet demand and maintain reliability”.  However, as Hanley points out, the Plan does not identify a source for this generation capacity.  The report is well-researched and gives a good overview of the problems inherent in the net-zero transition.

Panel Discussion: Meeting New York’s Energy Needs Under Climate Act. 

Three speakers addressed the question: How do we deliver what’s needed and how soon can we get there?

Donald Chahbazpour, Director of Policy and Regulator Strategy, National Grid talked up the National Grid plan that was recently announced.  He explained that there are three components of their plan: energy efficiency, hybrid heat pumps, and a fossil free gas network.  Among the benefits expected are that it is more cost-effective and will require 60 GW less electric generation capacity.  At some point I will try to do a post on the plan but want to point out a couple of points he made about the natural gas system.  The gas peak load is 3 to 4 times higher than the size of the electric peak load.  That makes sense because heating makes up such a large proportion of natural gas load.  He also said that heating with natural gas is cheaper: thirty cents on the dollar cheaper than electric with natural gas.  Part of the National Grid plan is to use renewable natural gas and he admitted that will be more expensive than natural gas.  The last statistic that I wanted to mention is that he gave a number for the daily conversion rates necessary to meet the Scoping Plan for just New York City.  I did not get the exact number but it was so large that it was clearly unreasonable.

Gavin Donohue, President of the Independent Power Producers of New York is a member of the Climate Action Council.  He said his top issue with Climate Act was that there was no funding mechanism.  He also made the point that there is no dispatchable emissions-free resource available today so the schedule is ambitious.  Gavin has been arguing since the beginning that reliability is critical but he pointed out that it still has not received adequate attention.  He made another point that is often overlooked.  New York City has special considerations that have not been addressed.  He claimed that one hidden cost is that 25% of homes will require electric service upgrades.  Donohue also made the point that the Climate Action Council does not make the final decision on the strategies.  At the end of the year the Scoping Plan goes to the Governor and legislature for them to pick policies for implementation in 2023.

Ken Pokalsky, Vice President of the Business Council of New York, was the third speaker on the panel.  He pointed out that most business owners are unaware of implications.  When told about it they go through the five stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance.  He explained that New York businesses are finally starting to get involved.

Panel Discussion: Consumer Effects Of Climate Act;

The second panel discussion addressed costs, benefits and consumer impacts.  Due to a scheduling problem, there were only two speakers.

Michael Butler, Mid-Atlantic Regional Director of the Consumer Energy Alliance discussed consumer effects.  His presentation is available.    He made the point that the reason that emissions have gone down so much is because of natural gas. Therefore, he argued that it is inappropriate to ban natural gas at this time.  He also commented on Pennsylvania’s recently joining the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative by executive decree.  He thinks that the Pennsylvania governorship will flip Republican next election and that will end the state’s membership in RGGI

Commissioner John Howard, New York State Public Service Commission, made some interesting points and his answers to questions were very illuminating.  If there is a recording, I will do a post just on his remarks.  One of the great mysteries to me has been how this will affect rate payer costs.  He said that he thought the existing REC, ZEC, OREC programs and possibly some other similar programs currently add 10% to consumer bills.  He emphasized the four tenets of Public Service Commission concern are safe, reliable, just and reasonable electricity for all rate payers.  He noted that New Yorkers are intolerant of blackouts for any reason.  After claiming that peaking power plants have significant health impact, he said he thought that they would be needed much longer than many want.  By the way I am working on a post about that issue to follow up my latest post describing the New York City peaking power plant controversy.  One of his best comments was that he said that unelected bureaucrats should not be in control of the scoping plan.  He clearly he has figured out that there are issues with the ambition and schedule of the Plan.

I asked the penultimate question.   

We have heard a lot about costs today and the large number of pages in the scoping plan and appendices.  I am a numbers guy and want to point out that in addition of the upwards of 600 pages in the text documentation there are two spreadsheets with over 100 tables provided.  Based on my analysis of those spreadsheets there are no control measure cost numbers provided.  I think the Scoping Plan should describe, list the costs, and estimate the emissions reductions for all the control measures.  What do you think should be provided?

Commissioner Howard responded.  He basically said that it does seem that they are obfuscating the costs.  He also said that people should be outraged that those numbers are not available.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, attendance was light so there was not a lot of coverage.  That is too bad because the speakers made some excellent points that deserve wider coverage.  If a recording is provided I will update this post with more information.

New Climate Act Related Pragmatic Principle

The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has a legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050. I recently used my pragmatic environmentalist principles to show that there are very few aspects of the Climate Act that represent a pragmatic approach to climate change mitigation. I recently read an article about green hydrogen that described it as a process that is technically feasible, but highly undesirable.  I am going to add the description of that type of process to my list of pragmatic principles.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  Unfortunately,  I have written extensively on implementation of New York’s response to that risk because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability, impact affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, and will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York.  New York’s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions are less than one half one percent of global emissions and since 1990 global GHG emissions have increased by more than one half a percent per year.  Moreover, the reductions cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  They were assisted by Advisory Panels who developed and presented strategies to the meet the goals to the Council.  Those strategies were used to develop the integration analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants that quantified the impact of the strategies.  That analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021. Comments on the draft can be submitted until June 10, 2022.

My primary concern is that the Climate Act over-simplifies the problem and the solution.  There are serious challenges for the transition to a zero-carbon grid that have not been adequately addressed by the Draft Scoping Plan.  In my opinion the biggest issue is intermittency of wind and solar.  In order to address those times when the wind is not blowing at night, for example, energy storage is required.  The ultimate problem is that there are multi-day renewable resource drought periods when the wind resource is low and, especially in the winter, solar resources also can be reduced.  It is especially concerning because those periods can coincide with the highest expected future loads after homes and cars are electrified.  In order to help meet these requirements a generating type called Dispatchable Emission-Free Resource (DEFR) has been identified.  The Draft Scoping Plan proposes the use of “green hydrogen”, that is to say produced by wind and solar hydrolysis,  as a placeholder for this technology.

Green Hydrogen Swindle

A recent article in the Telegraph by Andrew Orlowski describes the United Kingdom’s hydrogen initiatives and the issues surrounding the use of hydrogen as has been proposed there.  The introduction described a principle that I hadn’t heard before, “Kicking a dead whale down the beach”:

Engineers will rarely tell you something is impossible, even when your proposal is a very bad idea. Computer scientists at Stanford and MIT in the 1970s came up with a wonderful expression for this, an assignment that was technically feasible, but highly undesirable. They called it “kicking a dead whale down a beach”. The folklore compendium The Hacker’s Dictionary defines this as a “slow, difficult, and disgusting process”. Yes, you can do it like that. But you really don’t want to.

The article continues on to describe two big problems with hydrogen that turn any project into a dead whale exercise.

The first is that pure hydrogen doesn’t exist – it’s both everywhere and nowhere. We must generate all the hydrogen we can then use, and this requires a lot of energy. This is fine when the output of the process is something very valuable to us, such as fertiliser. But less so when the output of the process must compete with much cheaper commodities, as it must in an energy market.

Secondly, hydrogen’s intrinsic physical properties create a whole range of unique problems. It’s a tiny atom that easily escapes confinement. Keeping it captive for storage is expensive, and moving it around safely even more so, because in liquid form it must be very cold.

Hydrogen advocates tend to shrug off these issues – solving them will be someone else’s problem, they reckon. Individually, none of these factors make hydrogen as an energy carrier or storer impossible, but the whale-like properties are becoming harder to ignore.

The rest of the article is a highly recommended summary of the many issues that make a hydrogen economy technically feasible but highly undesirable.

Conclusion

All of the issues that are being raised in the United Kingdom related to the hydrogen economy envisioned there will inevitably also come up in New York as the Climate Act transition unfolds.  Orlowski describes our fate well:

In its efforts to show the world how keenly it is embracing CO2 emission targets, our Government has left a lot of dead whales on the beach for us, and as consumers, we’ll be the ones doing the kicking.

The “dead whale on the beach” principle is a great example of pragmatic environmentalism.  Just because a so-called solution is technically feasible it may not be desirable for a whole host of reasons.

Failure of the Climate Change Scoping Plan to Meet the Requirements of the Climate Act

This post describes the comments submitted on the Draft Scoping Plan by Herschel Specter. If I knew how to do guest posts on this site, I would have made this a guest post.  My apologies but I am going to have to wing it.

Herschel Specter is the President of Micro-Utilities, Inc. and holds a BS in Applied Mathematics from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn and a MS from MIT in Nuclear Engineering. He is a Licensed Professional Engineer in the New York.  He is a passionate supporter of nuclear power.  While I don’t agree with everything in his comments there are many great points.  I asked Herschel if I could make his comment letter into a post and he agreed.  The following text is from his cover letter.  I have posted his comments here.

Overall Conclusions

(A) The largest challenge facing the CAC and NY State is to regain the confidence of the people of New York that its energy plan is fact-based, technically agnostic and sound, and is forward looking, free of any past political or ideological influences. The Scoping Plan does not convey such confidence-building characteristics, and 

(B) The scoping plan fails to implement the Community Protection (CP) portion of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA), detailed below. Even if this NYSERDA scoping plan could work, what good is it if most people cannot afford the electricity this scheme would produce, and,

(C) The claim in Section 3.1 of the scoping plan that NY State is a leader in dealing with climate change is unsupported by the facts. For years NY State has favored imported fracked gas over building renewable energy infrastructure, while also opposing further expansion of clean nuclear power. (See Appendix C, page 43, of the attached critique). It is not convincing that NY is a leader in climate change when a major state agency, NYISO, recently reported that the State, and especially New York City, face dangerous shortages this decade in electricity generation and in electricity transmission. (See Reference 2 of the attached critique).

Specific Comments

1.High Costs. Electricity is a critical commodity, but its cost is regressive. High electricity prices disproportionately burden LIM (low income-to-middle income) families. The scoping plan places near exclusive reliance on renewable energy (solar and wind). Yet other studies have shown a mix of variable energy sources (solar and wind) joined with firm energy sources (nuclear and/or fossil fuels with no net carbon) are far less expensive. In one study a mix of energy sources reduced the electricity costs of a proposed all renewable electricity future from 15 cents/kilowatt hour to 9 cents per kilowatt hour. (See Table A4, page 20, of the attached critique). NYSERDA should have investigated which combinations of variable and firm energy sources are the least burdensome for low and middle income families. High electricity costs can cause businesses to relocate outside of New York, causing job losses.

2.Jobs-1. How many jobs will actually be created in New York when developing offshore wind capacity compared to jobs outside of New York? The Empire Wind Project is instructive. Two huge oil companies, British Petroleum (UK) and Equinor (Norway), have secured a contract from NY State to build the Empire Wind Project.  Not being in the wind turbine business, these oil companies turned to Vestas, a Danish wind turbine company, to build a huge (600 to 700 feet tall) wind turbine off of NYC. This assumes that the conditions of the Jones Act can be met. British Petroleum and Equinor recently filed a request with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for a one and a half year delay. Delays do not produce jobs. Importing wind turbines produces  jobs, overseas.

3. Jobs-2. It takes a special type of ship, called a jack ship, to lift the very heavy offshore wind turbine hub (the nacelle) and football field length turbine blades into place while at sea. New York does not make or own such jack ships. There is only one jack ship under construction, for a different state in the USA, large enough to install the huge 15 MW Vestas design. This specialized ship has a cost of $500 million dollars and requires three years to construct. However China makes such huge specialized ships with the latest one deployed off of the east coast of England. It takes an enormous crane to lift the nacelle and turbine blades. New York does not manufacture such huge cranes, but many overseas companies do. What is the NYSERDA plan to install these very large offshore wind turbines? How many MWs/year can be installed considering the limited number of jack ships? Per NY taxpayer dollar, how many pennies go to New York workers to build and install this mammoth offshore project and how much money goes out of state?

4.Jobs-3/ land use. According to the Daily News [“State reaffirms Alle-Catt wind farm”, Matt Surtel, September 30,2020] the 30,000 acre Alle-Cat wind farm will employ 182 jobs during construction, but this will decrease to just 13 permanent jobs to operate the facility. At that rate, a million acres of onshore wind farms would only create 400 permanent jobs, less than half the number of jobs lost when Indian Point was closed. This 340 megawatt wind farm will need 125 times the area of the Indian Point site to produce less than 5% of the electricity that was generated  at Indian Point.

5.Public anger-1 Upstate communities have taken NY State to court because they were stripped of  Home Rule protection while solar and  wind farms are being imposed on them. This hardly seems like implementing the Community  Protection portion of the CLCPA. Fishermen off of Long Island are similarly aggravated with the State’s offshore wind  program and complain of being ignored by the State. Where is consent-based siting? About 1,000 high paying jobs were lost, as well as substantial tax revenue, as a result of NY State’s actions to press for the closure of Indian Point nuclear plants and replace these two nuclear units with gas. Citizens of New York have not forgotten that they were told by former Governor Andrew Cuomo that Indian Point would be replaced by non-carbon sources. That never happened. Such actions are not confidence building. After years of reducing the carbon intensity per KWh of NY’s electricity, it is on the rise again because clean electricity from Indian Point was replaced by gas. The price  for electricity and home heating and making hot water with gas has skyrocketed. This is partly due to world conditions, but as  newspapers in the Hudson Valley point out, it is also due to the closure of Indian Point which did not burn fossil fuels, but rather produced 80% of the carbon-free electricity in downstate New York..

6. Public anger-2  The Danskammer plant in  Newburgh, NY, originally was an old coal burning plant that  was shutdown. It was refurbished to run on gas, but a special regional surtax on people was set up to pay for this refurbishment. If the people are paying  for new gas infrastructure, why don’t they own this gas infrastructure? Moreover, people were told that this refurbished plant would only be used infrequently; during times of peak demand. Later there was an effort to allow Danskammer to run full time, which angered local people, many of whom live in nearby environmental justice areas. Thanks to Governor Hochul and the DEC, this expansion of Danskammer use was not permitted, nor was a large new gas plant in Astoria, Queens approved. But as NYISO makes clear, this compounds the dangerous electricity reliability issue. No State agency has come forward with a plausible plan to provide clean electricity while reducing greenhouse gases in a time frame that would avert the potential blackouts this decade that NYISO has warned about. How does NY State simultaneously deal with climate change and continue to meet reliability requirements using realistic renewable energy manufacturing and installation capacities? This emerging crisis NYISO identified would not be pending if the Indian Point units were still operating.

7. Still more public anger-3. It appears that the CPV gas plant has been allowed to operate without all required permits and this plant has EJ areas nearby. If this lack of all necessary permits is still true, the DEC should require full compliance or shut CPV down.

8. Security issues. Increased use of natural gas for electricity production, home heating, and in making hot water has prompted gas delivery utilities to seek additional pipeline infrastructure. The former Governor was opposed to this, which led to open conflict between the former Governor and these gas utilities. This has been temporarily resolved by allowing some gas to be delivered by trucks, even though pipelines are safer and less expensive. This compromise has created a new class of terrorist targets; “truck bombs” that drive on our neighborhood streets.

9. Land use. In order to implement the NYSERDA scoping plan an estimated 24.4 million solar panels, each 25 square meters in size, would be needed. (See page 43 of the critique). A “rule of thumb” published in recent solar literature is that each megawatt of solar energy capacity requires about ten acres of land. At that rate it would take about 950 square miles. of New York farm and forest lands to accommodate this massive solar buildout. What will be the reaction of upstate New Yorkers to such a huge expansion? Yet solar energy is the least attractive choice for dealing with climate change. It is inherently less resilient to climate change than firm energy sources (See section 6.3 of the attached critique) It has the lowest capacity factor of any clean energy source, around 14%, as reported by NYISO, while nuclear is over 90%. Without expensive storage It is not dispatchable and is incapable of reducing the peak demand in winter which occurs after sunset. As NY State moves towards being a winter peaking state, this winter limitation of solar energy becomes an even larger negative attribute. Further, such extensive reliance on solar energy furthers  upstate/ downstate friction. Upstate people are to make sacrifices in values they hold dear, such as not being a victim of renewable energy industrialization in their back yard, just  to provide electricity  to downstate areas and NY City. NYSERDA should clearly and completely discuss the future use of present upstate nuclear plants which many upstate people support, particularly since their land use per KW hour is far less than renewable energy sources and jobs at these units pay well..

Land use is a highly charged subject. Not only is it an issue in upstate NY, it shows up  everywhere. For example, people in White Plains recently rejected the installation of solar panels in a cemetery because doing so  would have required the cutting down of a large stand of trees.  The two nuclear units at Indian Point supplied enough clean electricity to power 25% of the electricity in New York City and Westchester County, yet their land use was less than one half of one square mile. 

10.Data  errors. The NYSERDA plan has serious data errors in the capacity factors it used (See Section 8 of the attachment) . These data errors, collectively, would produce a capacity shortfall are almost the size of the whole NY State present electricity capacity.

11. Modeling errors. In 2021 an estimated 702 people died and almost $200 billion dollars worth of damage occurred in Texas when there was a gap in the supply of electricity during a polar vortex. Two things are happening simultaneously which call for a careful analysis of what is needed to design a NY  future electric grid. We  will experience extreme temperatures, hot and cold, more frequently and for longer durations. Also, we are moving towards a more electrified future we are far more dependent on electricity.. When there is an electricity gap during a time of extreme heat or cold,  people may die.  It appears that the  NYSERDA draft plan is not based on preventing an energy gap during extreme conditions like a polar vortex or very high statewide temperatures, but is just designed to meet the  typical energy needs during a week of cold weather in January, 2050. (See Section 9.2 of the attachment). To prevent loss of lives the grid should be designed to cope with extreme temperatures, with an additional margin  for unanticipated losses of generation and transmission. Further, NYSERDA did not account for very large and long duration wind lulls like that which occurred last year over all of northern England (See Reference 6  in the attached critique). There are other modeling errors identified in the attachment, as well as very questionable assumptions about the rate renewable energy devices, like offshore wind turbines, can be built and installed.

12. Energy storage. Unlike nuclear plantswhere energy storage is built right into the uranium pellets in the fuel rods, renewable energy needs energy storage because of its variability and for times when the sun is not shining and/or the wind is not blowing.  Unlike other New York energy future  studies which relied on Renewable Natural Gas, an undeveloped technology, NYSERDA turned to hydrogen for energy storage. It is hard to imagine a more difficult material to work with. Because of its very small molecular size, hydrogen has a much higher propensity than natural gas to leak out of piping and storage systems. Hydrogen leakage is important from a safety point of view; hydrogen has an ignition range six times wider than what natural gas has. (See TABLE A-8 of the attached critique.)

The volumetric energy density of hydrogen is very low. In order to achieve economically attractive volumetric energy densities, hydrogen would either have to be compressed to pressures in the 10,000 to 15,000 PSI (pounds per square inch) range or cooled to minus 253 degrees C, which is approaching absolute zero. Because of the required very high pressures, hydrogen cannot be distributed through the present natural gas piping or used in present gas storage infrastructure. It takes a significant amount of energy to cool hydrogen down to an extremely low temperature and to maintain this very low temperature. Hydrogen also embrittles steel. How did the NYSERDA plan account for this?

These challenging attributes of hydrogen make it difficult to store or distribute at reasonable costs. In practice, when hydrogen is used in industry, its source and the end user, like a refinery, are co-located on the same site. This co-location minimizes hydrogen storage and distribution issues. The distributed nature of NYSERDA’s energy sources and NYSERDA’s end users greatly limits co-location opportunities. The scoping plan describes a process of using solar energy to make hydrogen from water by  electrolysis. This (compressed?) hydrogen would be stored for months then, assumedly, burned  in some kind of a hydrogen fueled gas turbine (now under development) or fuel cells to convert the stored hydrogen back into electricity. NYSREDA assigns a 50% round trip energy loss for this process. It is not clear if this includes hydrogen losses through leakage while in storage, or the energy it takes to compress or cool the hydrogen, or the energy losses in the gas turbine. If the source of electricity is solar energy and NYISO’s 14% solar capacity factor is used, the overall efficiency of the solar/hydrogen storage/ burning in gas turbines to get back to electricity would be, at best, about (0.14)((0.50) = 0.07. Would a 7% efficient energy storage system result in a low-cost electricity as needed by LIM families? If it becomes obvious that hydrogen storage is unworkable, what is NYSERDA’s backup storage plan?

About the Author

Herschel Specter, President of Micro-Utilities, Inc., holds a BS in Applied Mathematics from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn and a MS from MIT in Nuclear Engineering. He is a Licensed Professional Engineer in the State of New York. At the Atomic Energy Commission in the 1970s he was responsible for the licensing of the Indian Point 3 nuclear power plant. In the 1980s the New York Power Authority hired Mr. Specter to defend its Indian Point 3 nuclear plant in a federal adjudicatory trial. He and his team of experts prevailed in court. Mr. Specter served at diplomat rank for 5 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria where he led an international effort writing design safety standards for nuclear power plants.

Mr. Specter has been Chairman of two national committees on nuclear power plant emergency planning and was a guest lecturer for several years on emergency planning at Harvard’s School of Public Health. He analyzed emergency responses for a hypothetical terrorist attack on the Indian Point power plants which were located in the nation’s highest population density area. Mr. Specter has presented testimony at the National Academy of Sciences on the Fukushima accident and on other nuclear safety matters and has been a guest speaker at many universities on matters of energy policy.Today he is one of 14 Topic Directors in Our Energy Policy Foundation, a group of about 1500 energy professionals who seek to bring unbiased and comprehensive energy information to our political leaders and members of the public.

Mr. Specter has been active in social and environmental matters. He has been a Big Brother and in 1971 had the honor of being selected as “Big Brother of the Year” for all of the USA and Canada. While voluntarily serving as President of Big Brothers of Washington, D.C., the number of boys the agency helped was doubled. He also received a personal letter of commendation from the President of the United States for his work with the Youth Conservation Corps.

Mr. Specter was born in White Plains, NY and lives there now.

Pragmatic Approach to Climate Change Policy

The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has a legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050 but is anything but a pragmatic approach.  Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  Similarly, there certainly is a risk associated with climate change that popular opinion wants to address.  This post highlights a couple of recent articles that I believe should be incorporated into a pragmatic alternative to the Climate Act. 

I have written extensively on implementation of New York’s response to that risk because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability, impact affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, and will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York.  New York’s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions are less than one half one percent of global emissions and since 1990 global GHG emissions have increased by more than one half a percent per year.  Moreover, the reductions cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

As shown in the following overview summary. the Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050, various renewable energy mandates, a social equity component, and, of particular concern to me, a requirement for zero-carbon electricity by 2040. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  They were assisted by Advisory Panels who developed and presented strategies to meet the goals to the Council.  Those strategies were used to develop the integration analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants that quantified the impact of the strategies.  That analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that describes the strategies to achieve the mandates.  It was released for public comment on December 30, 2021, and comments on the draft can be submitted until June 10, 2022.

Alternate Climate Change Policies

My Citizens Guide to the Climate Act is intended to be a layman summary of the difficulties of a net-zero transition.  I have posted articles recommending books that do a much better job than I have done to explain the problems here and here.  Unfortunately reading a book is a big commitment and recently I described an article, Inconvenient Truths About Energy, that describes most of the issues that worry me.  In brief, the consensus of all the authors of these recommendations argue that New York’s plans will cost a lot, hurt the world’s poor, and fail to fix the issues.

This post highlights two articles that are consistent with what I think would constitute a pragmatic approach to climate change.  In “A ‘Plan B’ for addressing climate change and the energy transition” Judith Curry describes problems with all net-zero energy transition programs.  On March 10, 2022 Doomberg published “A Serious Proposal on US Energy” that described four energy priorities.

Plan B

Judith Curry’s article describes the popular narrative that there is a climate change crisis and sums up the problem with the Climate Act and all net-zero energy transition programs:

“In a nutshell, we’ve vastly oversimplified both the problem of climate change and its solutions.  The complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity of the existing knowledge about climate change is being kept away from the policy and public debates.  The dangers of manmade climate change have been confounded with natural weather and climate variability. The solutions that have been proposed for rapidly eliminating fossil fuels are technologically and politically infeasible on a global scale.” 

She continues the discussion of the current state of the science and makes another important point that argues for a more pragmatic approach to potential climate change impacts.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) modeling “projections neglect plausible scenarios of natural climate variability, which are acknowledged to dominate regional climate variability on interannual to multidecadal time scales”.  Natural climate variability accounts for most of impacts of the extreme weather events that “prove” the need for immediate action.  Ultimately “emissions reductions will do little to improve the climate of the 21st century – if you believe the climate models, most of the impacts of emissions reductions will be felt in the 22nd century and beyond”.  The emotional plea that we have to do something immediately for our children and grandchildren is not supportable.

The article goes on to address the urgency for the energy transition.  She defines Plan A as the attempt to reach net-zero in carbon emissions by 2050.  It is based on the precautionary principle that “rapidly reducing CO2 emissions is critical for preventing future dangerous warming of the climate”.  The Climate Act rationale is that there is a crisis.   However, Curry points out:

Note that the IPCC itself does not use the words ‘crisis’, ‘catastrophe’, or even ‘dangerous’; rather it uses the term ‘reasons for concern.’ Apart from the scientific uncertainties, the weakest part of the UN’s argument about manmade global warming is that it is dangerous. The highest profile link to danger relies on linking warming to worsening extreme weather events, which is a tenuous link at best.

Curry raises another important point:

All other things being equal, everyone would prefer clean over dirty energy.  However, all other things are not equal. We need secure, reliable, and economic energy systems for all countries in the world. This includes Africa, which is currently lacking grid electricity in many countries. We need a 21st century infrastructure for our electricity and transportation systems, to support continued and growing prosperity. The urgency of rushing to implement 20th century renewable technologies risks wasting resources on an inadequate energy infrastructure, increasing our vulnerability to weather and climate extremes and harming our environment in new ways.

The article goes on to discuss a Plan B:

The problem is with the urgency of transitioning away from fossil fuels, driven by fears about global warming.  By rapidly transitioning to this so-called clean energy economy driven by renewables, we’re taking a big step backwards in human development and prosperity. Nations are coming to grips with their growing over dependence on wind and solar energy.  Concerns about not meeting electricity needs this winter are resulting in a near term reliance on coal in Europe and Asia. And we ignore the environmental impacts of mining and toxic waste from solar panels and batteries, and the destruction of raptors by wind turbines and habitats by large-scale solar farms.

She goes on to argue:

Here’s a framework for how we can get to a Plan B.  A more pragmatic approach to dealing with climate change drops the timelines and emissions targets, in favor of accelerating energy innovation. Whether or not we manage to drastically curtail our carbon dioxide emissions in the coming decades, we need to reduce our vulnerability to extreme weather and climate events.

So what does a Plan B actually look like?  Rather than top-down solutions mandated by the UN, Plan B focuses on local solutions that secure the common interest, thus avoiding political gridlock. In addition to reimagining 21st century electricity and transportation systems, progress can be made on a number of fronts related to land use, forest management, agriculture, water resource management, waste management, among many others.  Human wellbeing will be improved as a result of these efforts, whether or not climate change turns out to be a huge problem and whether or not we manage to drastically reduce our emissions.  Individual countries and states can serve as laboratories for solutions to their local environmental problems and climate-related risks.

A Serious Proposal on US Energy

As good as Dr. Curry’s article is, it is short on specifics for an alternate implementation plan.  The Doomberg article provides some specifics.  The article proposes four priorities to address the direct connection between energy and economic power. My proposed plan incorporates three of the priorities.

Not so long ago the idea that natural gas could be used a bridge fuel until aspirational technology that had zero emissions but could maintain current reliability standards was generally accepted as a rational approach. Doomberg quotes EQT CEO Toby Rice with what has happened to the natural gas industry: “You’re in a situation today where I think it’s very hard pressed for companies to be incentivized to go out and develop this large-scale infrastructure that this country needs, this world needs because of the regulatory uncertainty and just the pressure we get from anti-fossil fuel, keep-it-in-the-ground groups that are out there.Doomberg argues that “It is time to put an end to nuisance lawsuits, regulatory inertia, and environmental radicalism” because expanding the use of natural gas provides immediate benefits.  “It borders on criminal negligence that much of the Northeast burns oil to heat their homes” New England relies on foreign sources of not only oil but natural gas because of a lack of infrastructure.  New York State decisions blocking pipelines have materially contributed to this negligence.

Doomberg’s second priority would expand the production of a crucial component of solar cells:

With the natural gas industry unleashed, the President should make co-located production of polysilicon another national priority. The US blundered into allowing China to secure a dominant position in this critical market, and it is time to reverse that error. Making solar cells is incredibly energy-intensive, and cheap natural gas is the ideal feedstock. There’s going to be huge demand for solar in the decades ahead, and the only thing stopping the US from being the preferred global supplier is a lack of polysilicon production capacity.

The single stupidest New York decision related to zero-emissions energy is the closure of two nuclear stations.  The Shoreham plant was completed but closed in 1989 before it operated.  Indian Point was closed before its operating license expired removing 2,000 MW of the only zero-emissions capacity that can be expanded at the scale needed for New York’s electric system. The third Doomberg priority proposes a commitment to nuclear power.  In particular, “accelerate the development and deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs), which are safer, cheaper, and quicker to bring online than traditional nuclear power plants”.

Finally, Doomberg argues that the automotive industry should pivot from “a focus on full battery electric vehicles (BEVs) to plugin hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) instead”.   The reason: “there simply aren’t enough battery materials available to support the conversion of a substantial portion of our automotive fleet to full electric.”  It is ludicrous to not recognize that battery materials are a constraint, and that we must manage to that constraint.

Pragmatic Environmentalist Alternate Plan

The basis of my recommendations is my belief that the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology, that there is little additional risk for a policy that emphasizes innovation over implementation at this time, and that doing “good enough” will address many of the problems that the Climate Act purports to address. In short, my alternate plan would incorporate the natural gas, nuclear, and pivot away from BEV Doomberg priorities.   A recent article summarizes my fears that the Climate Act “solutions” are worse than the problem and his alternative priorities are more appropriate.

The ultimate problem with a transition of the electric grid that depends upon intermittent wind and solar generation is that there are extended periods when those resources are low.  Electric resource capacity planners have identified the need for a dispatchable emissions-free resource (DEFR) for those periods.  Unfortunately, there is nothing available at this time that meets the characteristics needed for that resource. 

I recently published an article describing my pragmatic principles as they relate to the Climate Act and I will mention several here.  Gresham’s Law of Green Energy shows that reliance on subsidized renewable resources will drive out competitive generators, lead to higher electric prices, and reduce economic growth.  I recommend a deployment plan that makes wind and solar implementation conditional upon the development of viable DEFR before any further deployment.  There is no sense going down that path until the required technology is unavailable.  In the meantime, inherent subsidies should be discarded.  New York’s electric markets should pay very little for any generating resource that is not dispatchable and discount “semi-dispatchable” resources that cannot guarantee availability during periods of high expected demand. In this approach solar net metering would be eliminated and the subsidies for the Champlain Hudson Express project would be much reduced because power is not guaranteed during the winter.

The Pareto principle or 80-20 rule states that 20% of efforts or inputs can yield 80% of the results or outputs and exemplifies “good enough”.  The Doomberg priority that the automotive industry should pivot from “a focus on full battery electric vehicles (BEVs) to plugin hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) instead” is a great example of the value of that principle.  I also believe that going all in for natural gas as suggested by Doomberg should be a priority.  New York’s irrational jihad against natural gas is not in the best interests of the state.

One of the problems highlighted in the Draft Scoping Plan is the effects of diesel exhaust on environmental justice communities.  The aspirational goal to convert tractor trailer trucks to zero-emissions BEVs is such a great leap forward in technology that it could be years, if ever, before it could be viable.  Conversion to PHEV trucks could resolve some of the issues but the development and deployment of compressed natural gas (CNG) trucks is further along.  Encouraging CNG trucks and cars would provide immediate reductions in inhalable particulate and ozone ambient concentrations.  This is a real problem as opposed to the contrived problems claimed from the use of natural gas that are incorporated into the Climate Act.

There is another viability aspect of the need for DEFR that should be considered.  One of my pragmatic principles is that we can do almost anything we want, but we can’t do everything.  New York’s reliability experts are worried about the quantity of generating capacity that is needed to meet the 2040 goal of a zero-emissions electric grid in general.  However, the fact that recent analyses project that the quantity of DEFR needed is on the order of the entire existing generation capacity raises a financial concern.  The only time that DEFR is needed is when there is lull in wind and solar resource availability.  When the costs for that high quantity but low-capacity requirement are determined it may be so high that New York will be unable to address other pressing environmental issues.

Conclusion

Three books support the conclusions of the articles referenced here: “False Alarm: How Climate Change Panic Costs Us Trillions, Hurts the Poor, and Fails to Fix the Planet” by Bjorn Lomborg;  “Apocalypse Never – Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All” by Michael Shellenberger; and “Unsettled: What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn’t, and Why It Matters” by Steven Koonin.  The referenced articles make a compelling case that the Climate Act is simply not good policy.  Dr. Curry explains that the claims of a crisis are not backed up when the veneer of the climate change “science” narrative is peeled back to the fundamental findings.  This obviates the need to charge ahead deploying today’s renewable technologies.  The Doomberg article offers serious solutions for the energy system.

I believe that existing technology is just not ready to meet the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act.  I concur with Dr. Curry that a “more pragmatic approach to dealing with climate change drops the timelines and emissions targets, in favor of accelerating energy innovation” and that “whether or not we manage to drastically curtail our carbon dioxide emissions in the coming decades, we need to reduce our vulnerability to extreme weather and climate events.” My pragmatic approach would make deployment of wind and solar contingent upon the development of a viable DEFR technology.  The development of a new and hopefully more viable nuclear generating technology such as small modular reactors should be a priority even if a DEFR solution is found.  There are many advantages of natural gas that make it ideal for intermediate and peak load uses on the electrical grid; residential heating, cooking, hot-water, and backup electric generators; and as vehicle fuel.  It is not perfect because there are some emissions but when considered on a fair reliability, affordability, and environmental impact basis it deserves to be part of a sustainable solution to minimize overall global impacts and improve human well-being. 

I have no illusions that the Climate Act will be modified to incorporate nuclear and natural gas as priorities with the current administration and legislature.  However, when the costs are finally publicized to the general public or even worse show up on utility bills, we will see how much New Yorkers are willing to pay for achieving greenhouse gas emission reduction objectives and whether that willingness has limits.  I have long maintained that the costs will be too much and that there will be “yellow-vest” protest response