Climate Act – Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York

PSL 66-P Petition Filing – Analysis of Future Utility Rates

The comment period for comments regarding the safety valve provision in New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p for the Renewable Energy Program in the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) recently ended. I published a series of posts describing this process that was summarized in my most recent post. Independent Intervenors Richard Ellenbogen, Constantine Kontogiannis, Francis Menton, and myself explained why we thought it would be appropriate to hold a hearing addressing the safety valve provisions in our filing. We agreed that we would not submit technical arguments from all of us but we are all driven by a common motivator that when we see something outlandish, we have to respond. Richard Ellenbogen’s filing describing an Artificial Intelligence (AI) analysis impact of the Climate Act on utility rates was initiated by such a trigger.

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to lawmakers, policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in New York State (NYS) energy policy. He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where it has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system. I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

Background

In response to the PSL 66-P safety valve, Ellenbogen filed a description of his analysis of the results of other jurisdiction’s attempts to implement energy policies like the Climate Act. His filing was titled: “An AI Analysis of the CLCPA that Shows it will raise Utility rates between 50% and 150% over the Next 40 years with no rate relief appearing for between 100 – 150 years, IF EVER” and was described:

“Prejudices Inherent in the drafting of the CLCPA Introduced a rigid framework, unsupported by scientific facts, that preclude better long-term solutions from both a carbon emissions standpoint and an economic frame of reference”. He also submitted a spreadsheet that was developed by Perplexity in response to his queries.

This post is based on the filing and his email description circulated to his mailing list. I have lightly edited his work for consistency.

AI Analysis Background

Both Ellenbogen and I have been using Perplexity AI more as a research tool and we are just starting to realize the potential of its use. He explains how he used it for this analysis:

For the past three weeks, i have been sitting and asking energy related questions of Perplexity AI. The questions were asked without bias and conditions were only added based upon responses from prior questions, although as I learned over time, the AI algorithm remembered all of the conditions without my asking and applied those to subsequent questions.

The paper covers everything that I could think of. It has AI answers to the major problems facing NY State. I added context to the answers to help people understand them and explain how we got here.

The questions were asked in plain English. Some of the AI responses can be technical in places.

The first 23 pages tell most of the story with the 50 pages of appendices adding context. AI has become a frighteningly powerful tool. Watching it generate code to answer some of the questions was comparable to what an incredibly fast human would do that could access information at a pace that no human could possibly do, let alone think of all the parameters needed. When I was building the spreadsheet, the second query was to add BESS to the calculation to make the wind dispatchable so that it would be more of an “apples to apples” comparison to the retooled gas plants. I didn’t specify how much but the AI algorithm automatically researched it and found NYISO requirements and pulled those into the calculation. It also was telling me what it was doing as it did it.

An experienced utility analyst looked at the spreadsheet and said, “That’s exactly what I used to do for the utility companies, except that would take at least a week.” It took me an hour. It was built from three queries and the AI wrote code, produced results, checked conformity, found its errors, redid the code and checked conformity again until the results made numerical sense. It took about 20 minutes for each question. It then added the additional questions to the same spreadsheet and suggested more related questions to research. It could turn into an infinitely long research rabbit hole. When I asked about natural gas prices, it had remembered my questions about the LI gas plants and automatically related the pricing questions to those without my asking. It inferred that was why I was asking.

I spent time checking the answers which accounted for much of the time writing the document. I knew the answers to many of the questions before I asked them based upon extensive reading and almost fifty years of experience dealing with energy systems. I am hoping that AI confirmation of the answers will make people realize that this is not ideological.

On a final note, I’m a tech geek and this technology is very useful but a little creepy. When I was doing this, I felt like I was dealing with “Skynet”. The rate of evolution of the technology is breathtaking, and I don’t think that I could have generated this report six months ago.

Ellenbogen’s Filing

Consistent with Ellenbogen’s use of AI, I submitted the following question to Perplexity: “Provide an overview summary of Ellenbogen’s filing that I can incorporate into a blog post. “ The following is the response:

Core thesis

Ellenbogen’s filing argues that New York’s CLCPA will drive very large, long‑lasting rate increases and will not deliver genuine rate relief for at least 100–150 years, if ever, under anything resembling realistic assumptions. He frames CLCPA as a capital‑heavy, prejudiced policy design that blocks cheaper and faster emission‑reduction options (notably repowered gas and nuclear), locking customers into a multi‑generation cost burden for modest climate benefits.

Australia as the warning case

A central plank is a detailed Australia comparison, which he uses as a “best possible” renewable case study to bound what New York can realistically expect. Australia has six times New York’s solar capacity, far higher solar capacity factors, far more land at a fraction of New York’s cost, and far lower heating loads, yet wholesale prices only clearly began trending down in 2024–2025 after roughly 20 years of policy implementation, and even then retail bills are only expected to fall about 5 percent over the next five years.

He then scales this experience to New York’s much worse fundamentals: four times the per‑capita heating load, roughly half the solar capacity factor, far less developable land, and much higher land and interconnection costs. On that basis, he argues New York would need 80–150 years before seeing durable rate relief, with residential rates rising on the order of 50–150 percent over the next 30–40 years and upstate households facing bill increases of 2,000–5,000 dollars per year at the peak of the transition.

Grid, labor, and supply‑chain constraints

The filing emphasizes that official NYSERDA/CLCPA planning assumes “ideal” supply chains and grid conditions that do not exist. He cites transformer shortages with multi‑year lead times, insufficient trained labor to electrify buildings and upgrade panels and substations, and local grid stress already appearing as “blue sky blackouts” in electrified pockets like the Albany area.

Because load from electrification is ramping faster than new dispatchable capacity and network reinforcements, he argues New York is replicating Victoria’s mistakes in Australia: voltage problems, constrained substations, and reliability risks driven by “electrify first, supply later” policy sequencing. His bottom line is that these constraints stretch the transition into a 40‑year or longer construction effort, add huge cost premiums, and push any hypothetical “payoff” far into the next century.

Cost comparisons: offshore wind, storage, and gas repowering

A major section uses an Excel LCOE framework, fed by AI‑generated parameter sets, to compare offshore wind plus batteries against repowered combined‑cycle gas at Long Island sites like Northport, Barrett, and Port Jefferson. Across a wide range of gas prices (current Henry Hub and 2–4× that level), the model shows that offshore wind plus 4–8 hours of battery storage remains substantially more expensive than repowered gas over 20‑ and 40‑year horizons, even after layering in a state carbon tax on gas.

He also notes that the wind‑plus‑storage cost stack in his base case does not include synchronous condensers and other stability equipment required in a heavily inverter‑based system, which would drive the renewable system cost even higher relative to combined‑cycle plants. In his framing, the oft‑repeated “renewables are cheaper” line collapses once you include the full system cost of firming, transmission, and stability equipment in a New York context, as opposed to Texas or Australia with far better wind and solar resource.

Nuclear and statute‑driven “prejudice”

Ellenbogen then asks, via AI prompts, what an unconstrained least‑cost, low‑carbon system for New York would look like over a 60‑year horizon. When the CLCPA’s statutory renewable carve‑outs and timelines are removed, the response (which he quotes extensively) favors a nuclear‑heavy system, with long‑life reactors providing 60–100 years of output at high capacity factors and lower firm system LCOE than “firmed renewables” once overbuild, storage cycling, replacements, and grid expansions are included.

He uses that to argue that the CLCPA embeds an explicit prejudice against nuclear and gas repowering by design, because it hard‑codes high penetrations of wind and solar irrespective of system cost, reliability, or practical feasibility. In his conclusions, he characterizes the CLCPA as an ideologically driven statute that overrides physics and engineering judgment, and he urges the PSC to invoke its PSL‑66 powers to pivot toward a combination of repowered gas as an interim 40–60‑year bridge and nuclear as the primary long‑term zero‑carbon backbone, with hydrogen‑fueled peakers using excess nuclear output as a complement.

Discussion

Ellenbogen’s email concludes that the analysis shows a very grim future for NY State if there is not a course correction. He notes:

Hopefully, an impartial question and answer session with the world’s computer systems will alter the discussion and make people realize that if we proceed down this path, we will be increasing emissions while needlessly increasing costs in search of a holy grail that is not feasibly attainable in NY State’s climate. As I have written on several occasions, the CLCPA was a college thought experiment about what could be done if there were no limitations on money, labor, supply chains, land, and if there was no public resistance to having large renewable installations located near their homes. Unfortunately, our state government, and particularly Andrew Cuomo, turned that thought experiment into public policy. While the authors of the thought experiment considered it attainable, engineers in the energy industry understood that the concept was preposterous in NYS.

Conclusion

I have a great deal of respect for Ellenbogen because he has personally approached the challenge of decarbonization as an experiment. His home and manufacturing facility were the subjects and included data monitoring systems for the test. He knows what will work and his opposition to the Climate Act technology transition plan is based on what his experiment shows will not work.

His use of AI is based on his experience and the results are consistent with what he has learned. I recommend his entire analysis for the unconvinced. This analysis is another great example why New York should conduct a PSL 66-P hearing to determine if renewable energy can provide safe, adequate, and affordable electricity in New York.

Filings Opposed to the PSL 66-P Safety Valve

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) and includes a safety valve provision. In recently published posts I provided a status update that provides extensive background information, a description of the Independent Intervenor (Richard Ellenbogen, Constantine Kontogiannis, Francis Menton, and myself) filing describing how the hearing to address the safety valve should be handled, described how the Independent Intervenors think the Public Service Commission should respond to the hundreds of identical comments prompted by advocacy organizations, and finally described the Independent Intervenor filing. This post describes comments opposing the petition from parties to the cases.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries included in this document.

Background

Party Comments Opposing the Petition

There were ten submittals that opposed the petition:

Green Energy Developers Advanced Energy United, Alliance for Clean Energy New York, Inc, Coalition for Community Solar Access, New York Battery and Energy Storage Technology Consortium, Solar Energy Industries Association
Green Energy Advocates Citizens Campaign for the Environment, Earthjustice, Environmental Advocates of New York, Natural Resources Defense Council, New York League of Conservation Voters, New Yorkers for Clean Power, Sierra Club, Urban Green Council, WE ACT for Environmental Justice
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.
Environmental Defense Fund
First Unitarian Church Environmental Justice Ministry
New York State Solar Energy Industries Association
PEAK Coalition
Public Utility Law Project of New York, Inc.
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School
Third Act Upstate New York

In response to a query to summarize and critique these comments Perplexity AI responded.

The opposing party comments generally argue that a PSL §66‑p(4) hearing is unnecessary, legally unwarranted, and contrary to the CLCPA’s purposes; however, across the various filings there is a recurring tendency to conflate “opposition to the program” with “request for oversight,” to rely on policy aspirations more than record evidence on reliability and costs, and to treat §66‑p’s hearing provision as effectively formally in effect but no longer necessary.

The Perplexity response addressed each of the comments. The following are the highlights.

The “Green Energy Developers” coalition (Advanced Energy United, ACE NY, CCSA, NY‑BEST, SEIA) positions the petition as a broadside against the CLCPA and the clean‑energy transition rather than as a procedural request to use §66‑p(4). In other words, they do not want anything to get in the way of their revenue stream. They argue that granting a hearing would increase investor uncertainty, slow project development, and jeopardize achievement of the 70‑by‑30 and 100‑by‑40 mandates. Their comments emphasize sunk costs, signed contracts, and an existing “orderly” procurement framework, and they tend to characterize reliability and bill‑impact concerns as either already addressed in prior Commission orders or overstated by petitioners.

New York State Solar Energy Industries Association (NYSSEIA) has similar interests as the Green Energy Developers coalition, but their comments focused on small developers and customer-sited projects. They made the same arguments that the act of holding a hearing is tantamount to rolling back the Climate Act and their desire for investor certainty and program continuity are more important than reliability and cost impacts.

The “Green Energy Advocates” group (Citizens Campaign for the Environment, Earthjustice, NRDC, NYLCV, Sierra Club, etc.) generally frames the petition as an attempt to “roll back” CLCPA mandates and to “suspend” the renewable program, emphasizing the urgency of climate action, public‑health co‑benefits, and environmental‑justice goals. They argue that any delay or reconsideration via a §66‑p(4) hearing would violate the CLCPA’s spirit, exacerbate climate risk, and perpetuate fossil‑fuel pollution in disadvantaged communities. The comments rely heavily on broad climate‑science consensus and statewide emissions‑reduction imperatives rather than on the specific evidentiary record on reliability, costs, or implementation feasibility.

Consolidated Edison and Orange & Rockland’s joint comments oppose the petition for a hearing but do so in a more procedural and incremental tone. They emphasize that reliability is being managed through existing NYISO and DPS processes, that the Commission has previously reviewed and adjusted the Clean Energy Standard and related programs, and that another formal §66‑p(4) hearing could be duplicative or disruptive. Note as rate‑regulated entities with pass‑through cost recovery, these utilities have a structural incentive to avoid procedural steps that might slow capital deployment or introduce new prudence reviews, a factor not fully acknowledged in their arguments.

Other opposing commenters include Environmental Defense Fund, the First Unitarian Church Environmental Justice Ministry, Public Utility Law Project (PULP), the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Third Act Upstate New York, and the PEAK Coalition. EDF and the Sabin Center focus on the legal structure, arguing that §66‑p(4) gives the Commission discretion (“may”) and that existing orders, impact analyses, and ongoing CLCPA implementation proceedings already satisfy any implied need for review. They argue that the petitioners have not met the burden to show that safe and adequate service or just‑and‑reasonable rates are at risk. PULP and EJ‑oriented commenters stress that low‑income and disadvantaged communities stand to benefit from the CLCPA and that a hearing framed around costs and reliability could be used to justify delaying those benefits. This is frustrating because it does not recognize their benefits are societal but the cost and reliability impacts personally affect low-income and disadvantaged community members. The PEAK Coalition emphasizes the point that delays are unacceptable because local public health impacts improvements and peaker plant retirements would be delayed. All these commenters do not recognize the risk that reliability events or bill spikes could politically endanger the very Environmental Justice‑oriented clean‑energy policies they want to protect.

Perplexity Summary

•            Most opposing parties reframe the petition as an attack on the CLCPA itself, not as an effort to use a statutory safeguard that the Legislature expressly included. This framing lets them avoid a granular debate over NYISO reliability indicators, actual bill trajectories, and implementation challenges.

•            There is heavy reliance on prior Commission orders and broad policy goals instead of a acknowledging the observed evidence of impacts on system reliability, project attrition, cost escalation, and deliverability constraints that have emerged since 2019.

•            Several commenters implicitly treat §66‑p(4) as a purely discretionary “safety valve” never actually meant to be opened, which risks reducing a substantive statute to symbolic surplusage.

•            Investor confidence, climate urgency, and EJ goals are repeatedly invoked as reasons not to hold a hearing but rarely balanced against the statutory obligation to ensure safe and adequate service and just and reasonable rates. A more balanced approach would treat a narrowly focused, evidence‑driven hearing as a way to protect those goals from backlash driven by reliability events or bill shocks.

Public Comments

In addition to the comments filed by parties to the cases, the PSC accepted public comments. In a previous post I described how the Independent Intervenors think the Public Service Commission should respond to the hundreds of identical comments opposing the petition. From the very first comments submitted about the petition in early March until May 1, 2026, there were 3,789 public comments submitted in Case 15-E-0302 and 2,516 comments submitted in Case 22-M-0149. Case 15-E-0302 covers a wide range of topics and there were some public comments submitted in this time frame addressing other topics. Nonetheless there are thousands of comments that were essentially identical. As described in the previous article, the arguments made do not warrant rejecting the petition or make a convincing argument that the PSL 66-P Renewable Energy Program obligations may not need to be temporarily suspended or modified to ensure safe, adequate, and affordable electricity.

Steve Helmin pointed out that there is a pattern to these nearly identical comments that suggests the use of automation in submitting to the DMM site. This pattern and what has been observed in other proceedings suggests that advocacy organizations are collecting comments on their own servers and then pushing them to the PSC, as opposed to requiring commenters to navigate the DMM interface to submit comments. This enables a “Click Button” knee jerk reaction that insulates commenters from any potential independent review of the case materials and enables an unrivaled single point of context for commenters as they never even see the DMM website. This automation reinforces my opinion that State Agencies should not be swayed by the number of comments but judge each different opinion on its merits. The stakeholder process in the Scoping Plan and the Energy Plan did not respond to comments in this manner. This must change.

Discussion

Consider this quote from the PEAK Coalition comment:

The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (“Petitioner”)—solely representing business interests—has requested a hearing to permanently suspend or modify the Renewable Energy Program pursuant to PSL § 66-p(4), alleging that the program and its associated CLCPA targets “might negatively impact electric reliability” (emphasis added) and may subsequently impede the Commission’s duty of ensuring safe and adequate electric service.

This illustrates a fundamental misunderstanding in common with many other opposition comments. The petition is only requesting a hearing to determine if the Renewable Energy Program “impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. If the hearing finds that there are problems, then the PSC “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations” of the Renewable Energy Program. In my opinion, the most likely outcome, given all the renewable energy deployment problems observed since 2019, is some modification to the schedule for renewable energy deployment.

Opponents who demand that the request for the hearing consistent with PSL 66-P be denied suggests that they are not confident that renewable energy programs can provide safe and adequate electricity. Given that there has never been a feasibility analysis confirming that the schedule and ambition of the Climate Act are possible and the fact that no jurisdiction has successfully implemented an electric system totally consistent with the Climate Act should be red flags. Don’t forget that the Climate Act was passed during the 2019 budget process without the opportunity for the public to weigh in. It is long past time that New Yorkers are given a complete accounting of what will be needed, what it will cost and how it will risk safe and adequate energy supply. I naively hope that if there is a hearing that those issues will be addressed for the renewable energy system.

Conclusion

Opponents of the petition to hold a hearing to consider whether the Renewable Energy Program can provide safe, adequate, and affordable energy do not have strong arguments against holding a hearing. I also believe that they oppose the hearing so much because they know that their support of the Program cannot be defended. Finally, a hearing would expose the impacts of the Climate Act to many New Yorkers who are unaware of it. I think those are three good reasons to hold the hearing.

Independent Intervenor Filing in Support of PSL 66-P Safety Valve

Update: 5/3/2026

Here are the links in the DPS DMM System for our filing and the three exhibits

Filing in support of petition
Exhibit 1 documents the trend of New York customers in arrears
Exhibit 2 is the spreadsheet with the calculations and data for the results in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 3 responds to a public comment submitted by hundreds of individuals to illustrate why the stakeholder process must change for the hearing from that used in the Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan.

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) and includes a safety valve provision. In posts published this week I provided a status update that provides extensive background information, a description of the Independent Intervenor filing describing how the hearing to address the safety valve should be handled, and described how the Independent Intervenors think the Public Service Commission should respond to the hundreds of identical comments prompted by advocacy organizations. This post describes the filing the Independent Intervenors submitted in support of the petition for a safety valve hearing.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Act. It provides that the Commission “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. This safety valve was included because even the lawmakers realized that it may not be possible to transition the electric system to “zero-emissions” by relying on renewable energy. New York State never followed up with a feasibility study proving that it could be done, never pointed to another jurisdiction that implemented such a system successfully, and has not provided clear and comprehensive cost estimates.

I have joined Richard Ellenbogen, Constantine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (“Independent Intervenors”) submitting comments in a few Public Service Commission proceedings. I am a retired utility meteorologist, with extensive electric energy and environmental regulatory analysis experience. Ellenbogen is an electrical engineer who is President of Allied Converters where he has pioneered how “green” manufacturing can work. Constantine Kontogiannis is an engineer who has decades of experience providing energy consulting services. Menton is a retired lawyer and now writes articles on his Manhattan Contrarian blog that analyze New York’s energy transition. We have no financial interest in Climate Act policy, have received no funding from any outside interests for our filings, and have invested thousands of hours of our time in efforts to explain why physics, engineering and economics prevent a Renewable Energy Program that powers a safe, adequate, and affordable electric system in New York State.

Petition Support

The Independent Intervenor filing argued that the Legislature included this safety valve precisely for the circumstances New York now faces. Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates regardless of affordability or reliability constraints. However, PSL § 66-p is also a legal requirement, and it charges the PSC with implementing the Renewable Energy Program subject to feasibility safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability. We described four lines of evidence that support the need for the hearing.

Safe and Adequate Service Is Imperiled by Declining Reliability Margins

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) has documented a systematic deterioration of grid reliability since the Climate Act was enacted. NYISO data show a net loss of 2,041 MW of dispatchable capacity (4,315 MW retired versus 2,274 MW added). Fossil retirements are outpacing new supply additions, with additions largely consisting of intermittent renewables and limited-duration storage that cannot provide the firm, dispatchable capacity the grid requires.

NYISO’s 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) identifies an actionable reliability need in New York City beginning in 2033, with deficiencies ranging from 17 to 97 MW, and high-risk scenarios show the deficiency could begin as early as 2025 and grow to over 1,000 MW by 2034. The “high‑risk scenarios” are from the RNA’s High Demand Forecast Scenario and related NYC risk scenarios documented in the 2024 RNA report’s “Exploring Uncertainty: Scenarios and Risks” section and detailed in Appendix E/F scenario figures and text. The 2025 Q3 Short-Term Assessment of Reliability (STAR) Report identifies a Zone J (NYC) summer 2027 reliability need requiring retention of peaker units scheduled for retirement. Statewide, NYISO projects that by 2034 there will be no surplus power without further development of reliable sources of electricity.

NYISO has officially stated that the dispatchable emission-free (DEFR) technologies needed to replace fossil generation “are not yet available on a commercial scale”. The CLCPA and Scoping Plan implicitly assume large volumes of firm zero-emission resources will be available, cost-effective, and sited in New York by 2040, but there is no clear procurement or market framework to ensure they materialize. This represents a technology and market design gap between what the CLCPA requires and what is under contract or in interconnection queues today.

The Renewable Energy Program depends heavily on transmission infrastructure that either does not exist, has been terminated, or faces severe uncertainty:

Clean Path NY terminated: NYSERDA and developers mutually agreed to suspend the Tier 4 REC Purchase and Sale Agreement in late November 2024 due to cost escalation. The PSC subsequently denied NYPA’s petition for Priority Transmission Project designation in August 2025. There are no plans to revive Clean Path NY.
Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) winter limitations: Although CHPE is in late-stage construction, NYISO’s Short-Term Reliability Process Report states that “the facility is not expected to provide any capacity in the winter.” The New England Clean Energy Connect experience during the January 2026 cold snap, where power flows from Québec largely collapsed, foreshadows this vulnerability. This is a serious failure of planning given the prospect that New York grid demand will peak in the winter rather than, as now, in the summer, if building and transportation electrification advances.
Offshore wind transmission withdrawn: The PSC voted to withdraw the NYC Public Policy Transmission Need determination in July 2025, cancelling the process for delivering 4,770 to 8,000 MW of offshore wind into New York City. Proposal costs ranged from $7.9 billion to $23.9 billion.
Federal disruptions to offshore wind: The Trump administration’s stop-work orders on offshore wind projects and suspension of leasing have further compromised the transmission pathway for the mandated 9,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035.

NYISO has warned that without major transmission project completion, NYC reliability margins will become deficient. NYISO has concluded that cumulative factors — retirements, electrification, and delays — risk creating reliability metric violations incompatible with safe and adequate electric service.

The Affordability Crisis Demands a Hearing

The affordability evidence satisfies the PSL 66-p(4) threshold of “a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections.” As of December 2024, over 1.3 million New York households were behind on their energy bills by sixty days or more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion. Independent Intervenors have demonstrated that the increase in the number of accounts in arrears from 2019 before enactment of the CLCPA and 2024 are statistically significant for statewide totals and four of ten utilities. We filed exhibits that updated the analysis through 2025. We found the same results.

The cost trajectory is alarming. The recently completed New York State Energy Plan found that Climate Act costs are expected to require $120 billion in annual energy system investments through 2040, equivalent to over $1,200 per month per household. NYSERDA’s own Energy Affordability analysis shows that Climate Act compliance adds approximately $594 per month (a 43% increase) for an upstate moderate-income household that fully electrifies.

Recent rate cases approved by the PSC between March 2025 and January 2026 for five major utilities have markedly increased residential electric bills, and as Kris Martin of NY Solar Divide has noted only “a small fraction of Climate Act expenses” have been incurred to date — the bulk will hit ratepayers in the next 5-10 years as onshore and offshore wind, grid-scale solar, and electrification mandates ramp up.

The State’s own Attorney General has acknowledged that achieving the 2030 target is “currently infeasible” and that “New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability”. DPS staff estimates that Climate Act residential impacts range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 monthly electric bills, and these estimates are widely considered conservative.

The PSC’s existing 6% energy burden target for low-income households lacks any tracking or compliance reporting mechanism. Despite the urgent need for clear affordability metrics, the Hochul Administration and Legislature have not adopted transparent tracking systems or mandatory corrective actions when affordability thresholds are exceeded.

Multiple Independent Sources Confirm the Need for a Hearing

The case for a hearing is supported by multiple independent, authoritative analyses:

NYISO: Reliability Needs Assessments, STAR Reports, and Power Trends documents consistently identify declining margins, capacity shortfalls, and transmission dependencies.
New York State Comptroller: The July 2024 audit found that PSC and NYSERDA plans “did not comprise all essential components, including assessing risks to meeting goals and projecting costs”.
DPS Biennial Review: Concluded that the 70% renewable target by 2030 “will likely not be achieved until 2033” and that a delay “may be unavoidable”.
State Energy Plan: Acknowledged that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient to meet statutory targets”.
DPS Second Informational Report: Identified four feasibility concerns, including that the 2030 target is “likely unattainable,” offshore wind faces “major obstacles,” transmission remains a “critical bottleneck,” and grid reliability challenges are “mounting”.
State Attorney General: Acknowledged on the record that the current implementation schedule creates unacceptable affordability liabilities.

Responding to Opposition Arguments

ACE NY and WE ACT have urged the Commission to reject this petition, suggesting that all progress would stop if a hearing were held. This characterization is inaccurate. PSL 66-p(4) authorizes temporary suspension or modification — not abandonment — of Climate Act obligations. A hearing represents pragmatic management to ensure safe, adequate, and affordable service while the clean energy transition continues. Refusing to invoke the safety valve does not eliminate the underlying reliability and affordability problems; it simply ensures they go unaddressed until a crisis forces emergency action.

The Commission Should Proceed Directly to a Hearing

The evidence presented by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, the Independent Intervenors, NYISO, the State Comptroller, and the State’s own agencies demonstrates that the statutory criteria for a PSL 66-p(4) hearing have been met. Our filing recommended that rather than further delaying action through an extended review period, the Commission should proceed expeditiously to conduct the hearing that the law contemplates.

At minimum, a hearing should:

Establish clear affordability metrics — Define “safe and adequate electric service” and “significant increase in arrears” with specific, measurable criteria so that the safety valve operates as the Legislature intended.
Evaluate reliability margins — Examine NYISO’s documented capacity shortfalls, transmission deficiencies, and the gap between policy assumptions and physical grid reality.
Assess the technology gap — Determine whether the firm, zero-emission resources assumed by the CLCPA will be available on the timelines required.
Review transmission status — Evaluate whether the termination of Clean Path NY, the winter limitations of CHPE, the withdrawal of the offshore wind PPTN, and federal disruptions collectively impede the ability to provide safe and adequate service.
Require transparent cost reporting — Mandate that DPS and NYSERDA provide comprehensive, auditable cost projections covering all CLCPA implementation costs, not just utility rate case impacts. NYSERDA should be instructed to develop comprehensive cost projections that reflect the total expense of meeting CLCPA mandates, rather than limiting estimates to individual CLCPA program elements.

On April 17, 2026, we filed a recommendation regarding the stakeholder process. Our filing recommended that once everyone has had an equal chance to raise their concerns that the Commission categorize and prioritize the technical issues submitted and convene a technical hearing conference that resolves the substantive issues raised in comments. Resolution of issues is necessary to assure New Yorkers that the PSL 66-P Renewable Energy Program can provide safe, adequate, and affordable electricity.

Conclusion

The Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world constraints. The Commission has both the authority and the obligation to act. I am relatively optimistic that the Commission will call for a hearing, but I am 100% sure that any decisions regarding the need to temporarily delay or modify the Renewable Energy Program obligations will not occur until after the election.

Climate Act Budget Status and Cap-and-Invest Program

This year’s New York budget negotiations include significant changes to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act). One of the contentious issues is implementation of the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program. This post addresses a misleading opinion piece published in the Albany Times Union by environmental organizations.

Overview

In a recent post I described several initiatives that have led Governor Hochul to suggest that the timeline for the Climate Act electric sector goals needs to be revised. Legislative leaders and Hochul have not yet announced a final climate plan deal. Reporting as of April 19–21 describes a stalemate with ongoing behind‑closed‑doors talks rather than agreed‑upon bill text. Environmental groups have rejected the proposed revisions to the Climate Act.

I believe that opinion pieces published in the Albany Times Union have an out-sized impact on negotiations in Albany simply because everyone sees what is published. I also believe that the Times Union is biased towards the environmentalist side. This post addresses the Governor Hochul is mispresenting our CLCPA lawsuit (“TU Letter”) piece published this week written by Josh Berman, senior attorney with the Sierra Club’s Environmental Law Program and Eric Walker, energy justice senior policy manager at WE ACT for Environmental Justice. I do not think that the Times Union will publish a response to the op-ed that is long enough to rebut what I think is a misleading opinion.

NYCI Lawsuit

The first argument in the TU Letter describes the author’s rationale for the lawsuit. I will only address the claims associated with NYCI. The letter states:

The governor asserts that only a cap-and-invest program with no checks on cost will satisfy the law and litigants. This is false.

The Preliminary Statement in the litigation Petition filed by the authors clearly states that they wanted to ensure that the emission reduction requirements were achieved.

Statement 2 states that

Although the climate law sets mandatory limits on New York’s statewide greenhouse gas emissions, it does not specify how the emissions reductions will occur or obligate any polluting entity to reduce emissions. Instead, the Legislature directed the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) to give the law teeth by issuing regulations that ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates.

Statement 2 states that

Although the climate law sets mandatory limits on New York’s statewide greenhouse gas emissions, it does not specify how the emissions reductions will occur or obligate any polluting entity to reduce emissions. Instead, the Legislature directed the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) to give the law teeth by issuing regulations that ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates.

Statement 10 states that

DEC’s abdication of its statutory duties is unlawful and critically threatens the state’s ability to achieve the emissions reductions requirements of the CLCPA. DEC’s failure to implement the Legislature’s directive is also endangering Petitioners’ members who continue to breathe dirty air, suffer from pollution-related illnesses, and face economic barriers in their efforts to protect themselves and their communities by replacing fossil fuel-burning equipment with clean new technology. The state must not be allowed to continue to violate the law by withholding a climate solution that it has deemed necessary to achieve the greenhouse gas reduction targets of the climate law and that it estimates will prevent many premature deaths and asthma-related emergency room visits each year.

The litigation clearly states that they sued to ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates.

The petition also describes the timeline of the regulatory process. It started in 2023 with the release of draft regulations and public meetings. Of particular interest was the June 1, 2023 pre-proposal Cap-and-Invest overview session because DEC requested feedback on the Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) program stability mechanism. As described in the NYCI Second Stage Outreach: Preliminary Analysis Overview Preliminary Analysis on January 26, 2024, the CCR is a price control mechanism. If the bidding price reaches a preset trigger limit, additional allowances would be released to the market. That results in lower prices. However, the CCR is a pool of extra allowances that is only used if the trigger price is exceeded and that means that the cap will be exceeded if used. I

I always felt that this was an inconsistency that would eventually cause problems. Proponents of the economy-wide cap-and-invest approach presumed compliance with the Climate Act mandates, but this affordability mechanism would cause non-compliance. Frankly, I do not think that the litigants understood that this provision was inconsistent with their desire to ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates.

As the petition notes everyone understood at the end of 2024 that the regulations were ready and would be released in January 2025. That did not happen. The only regulation released was the greenhouse gas emission reporting rule and that was months later. The cap-and-invest rule regulation was put on hold and on March 31, 2025 the litigants filed the petition demanding that the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) issue the draft regulations.

In October 2025, the New York Supreme Court issued a decision ordering the DEC to either issue the regulations or revise the regulations. DEC appealed the decision, a hearing was held in the last month, but no decision has been made.

However, this is an election year and the Governor is pushing an affordability agenda. David Caralfamo described the political theater that preceded the budget deliberations: “Two days after Governor Hochul’s own budget director stood up at a hearing and all but announced that CLCPA rollbacks were coming, a conveniently alarming memo from NYSERDA — dated the very same day — found its way into the press.” The NYSERDA memo was allegedly a new analysis, but I believe that these numbers have been available since early 2024 and were the driver for the recommendation to include the CCR mechanism. That is the key. These are the cost estimates for NYCI without the CCR which will necessarily increase the costs but is also the only way to ensure compliance.

NYCI Affordability

The TU Letter addresses Hochul’s affordability arguments:

Hochul appears to have forgotten that many of our groups had expressed support for a program that controlled for cost and would have lowered energy bills by over $1,000 a year for families making under $200,000. That’s not our number; it’s based on two independent research reports. There is no reason such a program cannot move forward now.

I addressed those “independent research reports” when they came out. I believe they are referring to a January 2025 report titled New York’s Affordable Energy Future and a January 2026 report titled Investments for New York’s Future. In my opinion described research reports as “independent” when they were sponsored by the authors’ organizations is misrepresentation. The 2025 report was funded in part by WE ACT for Environmental Justice and the 2026 report was funded by EDF. Moreover, there was no independent peer review of the reports so they are not unbiased independent analyses.

I raised a number of concerns with the 2025 analysis by Switchbox. I found that while the report does acknowledge that cap-and-invest alone won’t achieve the 2050 goals (which is honest), it doesn’t adequately address a critical problem: the proposed investments cannot achieve the required annual emission reduction rates to meet 2030 targets. I showed that under Scenario C (lower revenue), the program falls short of the 2030 goal entirely, and neither scenario achieves the 2050 target.

The bigger problem, and one that exemplifies the authors’ presumptions about NYCI, is that fundamental feasibility problems are not addressed. The authors assume compliance as a matter of faith and ignore reality. There are no add-on controls that achieve zero emissions for any sector. The only strategy is to convert to different energy sources, which takes time and is partially outside the control of compliance entities. The political timeline of the Climate Act has never been evaluated for feasibility and the record since 2019 proves that it is impossible.

Another feasibility aspect is the cost-effectiveness of controls. I showed that using New York’s experience with Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative proceeds that the proposed spending allocations will not provide meaningful reductions. Furthermore, in the book Making Climate Policy Work, the authors argue that the level of expenditures needed to implement the net-zero transition vastly exceeds the “funds that can be readily appropriated from market mechanisms”.

The TU Letter and this report don’t acknowledge what happens if the program fails to meet emission reduction targets. Organizations don’t voluntarily violate compliance requirements, and the penalties are severe. If the schedule or technologies aren’t feasible, the only remaining option is to simply stop selling fuel or generating power. This could create an artificial energy shortage with serious consequences as the only way to comply with the regulations.

I concluded that while Switchbox is more transparent than some analyses in acknowledging price ceiling limitations, it remains advocacy research designed to support a predetermined conclusion. It overstates benefits while downplaying the fundamental feasibility challenges of meeting Climate Act targets, and it doesn’t adequately address whether the proposed investments can actually deliver the emission reductions needed—especially by 2030.

I also reviewed the2026 EDF Investments for New York’s Future report and found that it was advocacy research, not independent analysis. I showed that:

Greenline Insights explicitly states they “develop compelling research questions and build the right mix of tools to answer them” – which I interpret as getting the results clients want

EDF has been actively lobbying for cap-and-invest since 2023 and has a vested interest in the program’s success

They strategically rebranded the program as the “Clean Air Initiative” (CAI) instead of using the official “New York Cap-and-Invest” (NYCI) terminology – a deliberate messaging strategy

I also explained that the methodology has serious flaws:

The analysis doesn’t account for opportunity costs—what else could be done with those resources

It assumes idle economic resources, which is unrealistic in a full employment economy

It measures “gross economic activity” without subtracting displaced economic activity elsewhere

It’s missing “the Missing Peter Problem”—robbing Peter (existing economy) to pay Paul (clean energy sector) while claiming total growth

I also showed that the economic projections are questionable and concluded that the report is simply a lobbying presentation that was commissioned by EDF. The benefits are overstated, the costs are minimized, if not ignored, and the methodology is sketchy.

Discussion

The TU Letter was published without qualification at a critical time in the Climate Act revision negotiations by the organizations that sued the DEC to release the NYCI regulations. It is ironic that the unintended consequence of their successful lawsuit turned into political cover for the Governor to argue that NYCI would be unaffordable. However, the TU Letter attempt to resolve the perverse result of their actions is flawed and their arguments that the Climate Act does not need to be changed are without merit.

Their lawsuit explicitly demanded NYCI regulations that “ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates”. The authors of the TU Letter disagree with the presumption that “only a cap-and-invest program with no checks on cost” will satisfy the law and their litigation. However, I showed that the CCR checks on cost mechanism in the pre-proposal documents was incompatible with ensuring compliance with the reduction mandates.

The two reports referenced in the TU Letter do not provide credible affordability mechanisms. Moreover, the reports do not acknowledge that the CCR mechanism is necessary to keep the costs palatable. The NYSERDA memo with the high costs that Hochul cites as the reason that revisions to the rule are necessary simply shows costs for NYCI without the CCR mechanism.

Conclusion

This opinion piece offers no credible reasons why New York State should not be considering revisions to the Climate Act but got published in Albany while negotiations are underway. I plan to submit a letter to the editor of the Times Union summarizing this post. Unfortunately, a word limited summary could not incorporate the explanations why this letter was flawed even if it was accepted. This is a perfect example of the BS Asymmetry Principle: Alberto Brandolini: “The amount of energy necessary to refute BS is an order of magnitude bigger than to produce it.”

PSL 66-P Safety Valve Advocacy Comments

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Act and includes a safety valve provision. In posts published this week I provided a status update that provides extensive background information and a description of the Independent Intervenor filing describing how the hearing to address the safety valve should be handled. This post explains how the Independent Intervenors think the Public Service Commission should respond to the hundreds of identical comments prompted by advocacy organizations.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

I have joined Richard Ellenbogen, Constantine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (“Independent Intervenors”) submitting comments in a few Public Service Commission proceedings. I am a retired utility meteorologist, with extensive electric energy and environmental regulatory analysis experience. Ellenbogen is an electrical engineer who is President of Allied Converters where he has pioneered how “green” manufacturing can work. Constantine Kontogiannis is an engineer who has decades of experience providing energy consulting services. Menton is a retired lawyer and now writes articles on his Manhattan Contrarian blog that analyze New York’s energy transition. We have no financial interest in the Climate Act, have received no funding from any outside interests, and have invested thousands of hours of our time in efforts to explain why physics, engineering and economics prevent a Renewable Energy Program that powers a safe, adequate, and affordable electric system in New York State.

The Problem

As I explained in my previous post, the Independent Intervenors filed a petition on April 17, 2026 recommending that the stakeholder process for the PSL 66-P hearing should differ from the process used in the Scoping Plan and the Energy Plan. In those proceedings the response to comments was handled by the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA). NYSERDA did not use the stakeholder process as an opportunity to improve those plans. Instead, they went through the motions of stakeholder interaction and only provided a list of comments without any responses. I was particularly disappointed that the NYSERDA general characterization of comments was along the lines of “most of the comments agreed” with the draft documents. As a result, green energy advocacy organizations were encouraged to organize advocacy campaigns to swamp the public comments with comments supporting their policy preferences.

To have a stakeholder process that informs the PSC decision on the PSL 66-P hearing we stated that the Commission should order the following process steps:

A notice opening an initial comment period that gives all stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to identify issues relevant to the statutory findings required by PSL § 66-p(4).
At the conclusion of the comment period, Commission Staff should prepare an issue list that categorizes and prioritizes the comments received into major technical subjects, including reliability, resource adequacy, transmission readiness, contract and compliance obligations, arrears and disconnections, and definitions of safe, adequate, and affordable service.
The documentation should identify opposing positions on each material issue so that participants and Staff can see where there is consensus, where there is factual disagreement, and where methodological disagreements require focused review.
The schedule must provide sufficient time for written comments, reply comments, and preparation of supporting technical materials so that the record is not limited to conclusory assertions.
One or more technical conferences should be convened at which both sides of disputed issues are presented in a structured manner, with sufficient time for questions from Staff and stakeholders.
A dedicated conference session addressing the meaning of “safe,” “adequate,” and “affordable” service should also be included, because those terms are central to the Commission’s statutory findings and need common definitions before competing analyses can be compared.
A post-conference report prepared by Staff that summarizes the issues raised, the competing positions presented, the areas of agreement and disagreement, and explains how those discussions inform the Commission’s determination under PSL § 66-p(4).
This information would enable the Commission to determine if it is necessary to temporarily suspend or modify obligations under the Renewable Energy Program.

This post explains how I think the proposed stakeholder process should handle hundreds of similar advocacy comments expressing policy preferences without technical or economic support.

Recommended Response to From Letter Campaign

The Independent Intervenors plan to submit our comments on the petition on May 1. Our filing addresses a comment submitted by hundreds that express policy preferences without technical or economic support. The comment lacks the analytical detail needed for meaningful regulatory consideration. We are not suggesting that these comments lack value. In our April 17 filing, we recommended that once everyone has had an equal chance to raise their concerns that the Commission categorize and prioritize the technical issues submitted and convene a technical hearing conference that resolves the substantive issues raised in comments. This exhibit is an example of issues that need to be addressed in this manner.

As an example of our recommended comment process consider 100 public comments number 1151 posted on 4/23/26 through number 1050 posted on 4/3/26 at Case Number 22-M-0149. The first 50 characters of more than half these comments were identical, which clearly indicates a campaign to submit comments. Comment number 1151 posted on 4/23/26 by Melanie Acampora met these criteria. It states:

Dear PSC Commissioners, I urge the Public Service Commission (PSC) to reject the petition filed by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, which would improve neither safety nor reliability, and would instead raise utility costs by deepening New York’s reliance on expensive and volatile fossil fuels. With the cost of oil and gas skyrocketing as a result of the U.S. war on Iran, this is not the time for New York to be considering rollbacks to our renewable energy targets. I urge the PSC to remain committed to the goals of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) and the Clean Energy Standard. Temporarily modifying or suspending the clean energy mandates in the CLCPA will not benefit New Yorkers and is entirely unnecessary to maintain a reliable electric grid. In fact, any further investments in the fossil fuel economy will have a negative financial impact on New Yorkers. Costs of energy in New York are driven by the price of fossil fuels, which are highly volatile and affected by events outside of the control of New York, such as the invasion of the Ukraine by Russia and the U.S. war on Iran. Sticking to fossil fuels means unpredictable, unaffordable bills for New Yorkers. Renewable energy – which requires no fuel – offers predictable costs which makes families less vulnerable to energy price shocks. Renewable energy is a long-term cost-saving strategy that will promote affordability and protect New York utility customers from the impacts of volatile fossil fuel prices. I urge the PSC to reject the unsupported request to hold a hearing to consider temporarily modifying or suspending the renewable energy and zero-emission energy goals. Sincerely,

This comment appears many other times since the first comment addressing the petition (Comment number 33) appeared in the record on 3/9/26 in Case Number 22-M-0149. It also appears many more times in the public comments for Case Number 15-E-0302. The Independent Intervenors believe that the comment incorrectly characterizes the petition as an attempt to “roll back” or “suspend” the CLCPA mandates and asserts, without record support, that a §66‑p(4) hearing is “unsupported” and “entirely unnecessary.” In the following sections we describe our responses to this comment as an example of responses to a disputed issue that should be resolved in a hearing.

Recommended Response

The form letter argues that the petition filed by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy should be rejected because it “would improve neither safety nor reliability and would instead raise utility costs by deepening New York’s reliance on expensive and volatile fossil fuels.” However, it does not provide any support for those claims.

It argues that “Temporarily modifying or suspending the clean energy mandates in the CLCPA will not benefit New Yorkers and is entirely unnecessary to maintain a reliable electric grid.” It is important to note that the hearing will not necessarily temporarily modify or suspend the Renewable Energy Program, but it will address feasibility. The fact is that the State has never done a feasibility analysis to determine if Renewable Energy Programs are a viable path to a zero-emissions electric system. If the hearing finds that safe and adequate energy is not impeded by the Renewable Energy Program, then we can continue the current path reassured that it is feasible. However, the Independent Intervenors cannot help but think that the concerted effort to flood the docket with comments that all say do not even consider the hearing is a sign that even devoted proponents have concerns.

The comment goes on to argue that fossil fuels are the cause of the high prices and that renewable energy is a long-term cost saving strategy. The Independent Intervenors believe that this argument needs to be addressed at a hearing. We believe that cheap intermittent energy does not lead to a cheap energy system. The claims that renewable energy is cheaper are based on an incomplete analysis that tells you what it costs to produce electricity under ideal conditions, but it leaves out what it takes to run a system that has to perform under real ones. Accounting for reliability, timing, infrastructure, and risk, the picture changes and renewable costs are not cheaper.

The commenters deserve to have their arguments addressed. As detailed below, the Independent Intervenors believe that those arguments are flawed but they must be addressed. A PSL 66-P hearing is the appropriate venue to resolve the issues raised.

The Petition Properly Invokes PSL §66‑p(4)

The Coalition’s petition expressly requests that the Commission “hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law §66‑p(4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.”

Thus, a hearing is the statutorily prescribed mechanism for testing whether the safety‑valve criteria are satisfied; it is not an extraordinary or anti‑CLCPA measure but part of the CLCPA implementation framework itself. The adverse comment’s request to deny a hearing disregards this structure and effectively ignores §66‑p(4) in the statute. Note however, that the hearing must resolve issues.

Reliability and Affordability Triggers Have Been Met

Multiple filings in Case 22‑M‑0149, as well as the Coalition petition, present credible evidence that the current implementation of the Renewable Energy Program may: (a) impede safe and adequate service, and (b) coincide with a significant increase in arrears, thereby implicating both primary §66‑p(4) triggers. The recommended technical conference would evaluate this evidence.

The Commission itself has acknowledged in Case 22‑M‑0149 that PSL §66‑p(4) includes safety‑valve provisions and that the customers‑in‑arrears condition has been specifically raised as a trigger. The adverse comment does not grapple with any of this record; it simply asserts that a hearing is “unsupported” and “unnecessary,” which is inadequate given the clear statutory language and evidence already before the Commission.

Mischaracterization of the Petition and of Fossil Fuel Risk

The form comment argues that granting the petition and potentially modifying obligations would “deepen New York’s reliance on expensive and volatile fossil fuels” and that “sticking to fossil fuels means unpredictable, unaffordable bills for New Yorkers.”

If this issue were addressed as proposed we believe that it would show the Coalition petition does not seek to abandon the CLCPA’s targets; it seeks a recalibration of obligations and timelines, if warranted by the evidence, so that the Renewable Energy Program is compatible with reliable and affordable service. A transition that outpaces feasible infrastructure development, transmission build‑out, and proven firm zero‑emission resources can actually increase reliance on emergency fossil generation and expensive backstop measures, thereby exacerbating the very fuel‑price and affordability risks the comment highlights.

Granting the Hearing is Consistent with, Not Contrary to, the CLCPA

The Independent Intervenors generally support the CLCPA’s broad decarbonization objectives, but durable climate policy must be aligned with reliability and affordability constraints. A PSL §66‑p(4) hearing is the means the Legislature chose to ensure that alignment. If there was a hearing these concerns could be addressed.

Conclusion

New York’s climate and energy policy choices are too consequential to ignore the legal mandate to confirm that the Renewable Energy Program can provide safe, adequate, and affordable electricity. The Independent Intervenors believe that genuine stakeholder processes require open discussion of trade‑offs, clear documentation of how comments are handled, and a willingness to adjust course when the evidence points in a different direction. In my opinion, green energy advocacy organizations are trying to game the system by submitting an overwhelming number of comments. While they deserve to have their opinions heard, the system should transparently address their concerns. In the example shown, the arguments do not warrant rejecting the petition or make a convincing argument that the PSL 66-P Renewable Energy Program obligations should not be temporarily suspended or modified.

PSL 66-P Safety Valve Stakeholder Process

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Act and includes a safety valve provision. Yesterday I provided a status update that provides extensive background information. In this post I describe the Independent Intervenor filing on April 16, 2026 that explained why the PSL 66-P stakeholder process must be changed from what was used in the Scoping Plan and the State Energy Plan.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

I have joined Richard Ellenbogen, Constantine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (“Independent Intervenors”) submitting comments in a few Public Service Commission proceedings. I am a retired utility meteorologist, with extensive electric energy and environmental regulatory analysis experience. Ellenbogen is an electrical engineer who is President of Allied Converters where he has pioneered how “green” manufacturing can work. Constantine Kontogiannis is an engineer who has decades of experience providing energy consulting services. Menton is a retired lawyer and now writes articles on his Manhattan Contrarian blog that analyze New York’s energy transition. We have no financial interest in the Climate Act have received no funding from any outside interests, and have invested thousands of hours of our time in our efforts to explain why physics, engineering and economics prevent a Renewable Energy Program that powers a safe, adequate, and affordable electric system in New York State.

The Problem

At one time or other all the Independent Intervenors have submitted comments in proceedings that were ignored. That prompted us to make this filing recommendation for a stakeholder process that meaningfully assures New Yorkers that all technical issues have been addressed.

New York’s Climate Act Scoping Plan and the 2025 State Energy Plan were both sold as products of robust “stakeholder engagement.” My experience participating in both processes suggests something very different: carefully choreographed exercises designed to check the stakeholder box without ever putting core assumptions, modeling, or policy direction at risk.

The Climate Act Scoping Plan was supposed to be built on a transparent public process that clarified feasibility, affordability, and reliability concerns. Instead, the stakeholder phase functioned more as a one‑way comment intake system with no meaningful response‑to‑comments record and no evidence that critical technical input affected the final product.

The 2025 Draft State Energy Plan was billed as a “comprehensive roadmap” developed with extensive stakeholder input. The actual process closely mirrored the Scoping Plan experience: scripted hearings, limited opportunities for real dialogue, no systematic response to comments, and no acknowledgment of stakeholder concerns reflected by revisions in the Plan. I submitted formal comments on the stakeholder process that explained how the lack of any commitment to a response‑to‑comments document strip the process of credibility. As an example of a material problem that the State ignored, consider the Draft Energy Plan Air Quality Health Benefits Analysis Shortcomings article that showed flaws in the analytical methods and assumptions that were treated as obstacles rather than inputs to improve the Plan.

Our experience with comments in the Scoping Plan and Energy plan show a consistent pattern that we attempted to address in this filing:

Stakeholder engagement is emphasized in the marketing materials but minimized in the actual decision‑making.
Critical technical comments on feasibility, modeling, costs, and health benefits analysis are accepted but not addressed transparently.
Final documents move forward as if consensus exists, when in fact substantial unresolved issues were raised in the record.

Stakeholder Process Comments

On April 17, we submitted comments arguing that the PSC must establish a revised stakeholder process for any PSL § 66-p(4) hearing that is designed to develop a usable factual record on the statutory standards in the law. The requested process should replace prior stakeholder approaches for the Climate Act Scoping Plan and the New York State Energy Plan that relied primarily on broad public participation without a structured mechanism to identify, test, and resolve disputed technical issues bearing on reliability, system adequacy, affordability-related arrears, and consistency with existing obligations.

Specifically, we stated that the Commission should order the following process steps:

A notice opening an initial comment period that gives all stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to identify issues relevant to the statutory findings required by PSL § 66-p(4).
At the conclusion of the comment period, Commission Staff should prepare an issue list that categorizes and prioritizes the comments received into major technical subjects, including reliability, resource adequacy, transmission readiness, contract and compliance obligations, arrears and disconnections, and definitions of safe, adequate, and affordable service.
The documentation should identify opposing positions on each material issue so that participants and Staff can see where there is consensus, where there is factual disagreement, and where methodological disagreements require focused review.
The schedule must provide sufficient time for written comments, reply comments, and preparation of supporting technical materials so that the record is not limited to conclusory assertions.
One or more technical conferences should be convened at which both sides of disputed issues are presented in a structured manner, with sufficient time for questions from Staff and stakeholders.
A dedicated conference session addressing the meaning of “safe,” “adequate,” and “affordable” service should also be included, because those terms are central to the Commission’s statutory findings and need common definitions before competing analyses can be compared.
A post-conference report prepared by Staff that summarizes the issues raised, the competing positions presented, the areas of agreement and disagreement, and explains how those discussions inform the Commission’s determination under PSL § 66-p(4).
This information would enable the Commission to determine if it is necessary to temporarily suspend or modify obligations under the Renewable Energy Program.

Basis for the Petition

PSL § 66-p(4) does not authorize a policy-only exercise; it requires the Commission to conduct a hearing and make findings on whether the renewable energy program impedes safe and adequate electric service, is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements, or is related to significant increases in arrears or service disconnections. Those subjects turn on technical evidence, analytical assumptions, and transparent evaluation of conflicting claims, so the stakeholder process must be designed to identify and test those issues rather than obscure them.

New York State’s prior stakeholder processes in related planning exercises did not provide an adequate mechanism to acknowledge and resolve technical objections raised in comments. As a result, parties could submit technical concerns, but there was no reliable process to classify disputed issues, identify contrary positions, and explain how unresolved disagreements affected the final conclusions.

A revised process is also consistent with the statute’s structure. Section 66-p(2) requires the Commission to consider impacts on safe and adequate electric service under reasonably foreseeable conditions when establishing the renewable energy program, and Section 66-p(4) provides a hearing mechanism to suspend or modify obligations if the program later impedes safe and adequate service or triggers other statutory concerns.

Because both provisions depend on technically supportable judgments, the Commission should adopt a stakeholder framework that is structured enough to support findings pursuant to Public Service Law § 20, the statutory standard for Commission hearings, including contested matters and proceedings where the Commission is required to make findings on the record under Section 20 hearing standards and eventual Commission action.

Proposed Process Elements
We recommended the following process components.

Open Comment Period
The first step should be an open comment period that allows any stakeholder to identify issues relevant to the PSL § 66-p(4) standards. That period should be long enough to permit submission of technical analyses, not merely summary statements, because the statutory questions involve complex electric system and affordability matters.

Staff Issue List and Prioritization
After the initial comments, Staff should prepare a public issue list that groups submissions into discrete categories and ranks them by their significance to the statutory findings. This step would focus the proceeding on the issues that matter most to whether the renewable energy program is compatible with safe and adequate electric service and related legal obligations.

Opposing Positions
For each major issue, the process should identify the principal opposing positions and the key factual or methodological disputes separating them. Doing so would prevent a one-sided workshop format and would ensure that the record clearly distinguishes contested assertions from uncontested facts.

Technical Conferences
The Commission should convene technical conferences devoted to the prioritized issues, with balanced presentation of opposing analyses and active questioning by Staff. This format would better align the proceedings with the statute’s hearing purpose by creating an organized record on disputed technical issues instead of a generalized policy conversation.

Definitions Session
A separate session should address the definitions of safe, adequate, and affordable service. Without agreed or at least clearly stated definitions, parties may use those terms inconsistently, making it difficult for the Commission to determine whether the statutory thresholds in PSL § 66-p(4) have been met.

Staff Report
At the close of the technical conferences, Staff should issue a report that documents the issues discussed, the competing positions, the evidence relied upon, and the way those discussions bear on the statutory findings the Commission must make. That report would improve transparency and help ensure that final Commission determinations are traceable to the actual record developed in the proceedings.

Rationale
The proposed process is necessary because technical comments are useful only if the proceeding has a structure that can evaluate them and explain their effect on the ultimate decision. A revised process that classifies issues, identifies competing positions, allows time for technical support, and produces a documented record would materially improve the Commission’s ability to decide whether the renewable energy program impedes safe and adequate electric service within the meaning of PSL § 66-p(4).

The process would also provide a fairer and more credible framework for all participants. Supporters and critics of the renewable energy program would each have an opportunity to present their best technical case, respond to contrary analyses, and create a record that the Commission can use for findings that are legally and factually defensible.

Proposed Ordering Clauses
Our filing requested that the Commission issue an order:

Establishing a revised stakeholder process for any PSL § 66-p(4) hearing consistent with the process elements described above.

Directing Department of Public Service Staff to develop and publish a categorized and prioritized issue list based on stakeholder comments.

Requiring the identification of opposing positions on disputed technical issues material to the statutory standards in PSL § 66-p(4).

Scheduling technical conferences with adequate time for written submissions, replies, and conference presentations.

Including a dedicated session on the definitions of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service for purposes of the hearing record.

Requiring a post-conference Staff report that explains how the record developed through the stakeholder process informs the Commission’s determination whether the renewable energy program should be suspended or modified under PSL § 66-p(4).

Conclusion
New York’s climate and energy policy choices are too consequential to be based on engagement promises. Genuine stakeholder processes require open discussion of trade offs, clear documentation of how comments are handled, and a willingness to adjust course when the evidence points in a different direction. If a PSL 66-P hearing follows the approaches used in the Scoping Plan and Energy Plan, then all the arguments for a hearing will have been in vain.

PSL 66-P Safety Valve Status Update

This post summarizes the status of the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition with the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting that “the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.” On January 28, 2026, the New York State Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding a petition for a hearing to suspend or temporarily modify the Renewable Energy Program. This week I am going to publish posts about this because comments are due on May 1. I debated whether to include this material in a longer post but opted to go for a short post. This provides background for the forthcoming articles and includes a reminder to submit a comment.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate an outline and references included in this document.

Overview

In March Rory Christian, Chair and CEO of the Public Service Commission posted a brief status update regarding the Commission’s ability to make changes to the Climate Act. He explained that they can only make changes to the electric sector targets established in the Public Service Law section of the Climate Act. Although he did not explicitly mention PSL 66-P there is no question the electric sector targets in that law is what he is referring to. I believe he was trying to placate Climate Act proponents who have been claiming that the petition somehow would temporarily suspend or modify all the obligations of the Climate Act. That is simply not the case.

Filings and Background Information

I have been advocating for the use of the PSL §66‑p safety valve for a long time because of my concerns about relying on wind and solar resources as the backbone of the electric system. The following blog posts describe my recommendations and the filings chronicle submittals and PSC notices.

In Search of the Climate Act Safety Valve (June 18, 2025): Documents where PSL §66‑p safety valve provisions appear in DPS DMM proceedings and highlights the Comptroller’s acknowledgement of a built‑in affordability and reliability safety valve.
DPS Response to Safety Valve Recommendations (July 1, 2025): In the spring of 2025, I filed comments in the Niagara Mohawk rate case suggesting that a hearing was necessary. This post analyzes DPS staff’s reply and shows how DPS implementation of the Climate Act ignores PSL §66‑p(4) limits on affordability and reliability.
Independent Intervenors Filing (Case 22‑M‑0149, August 11, 2025): “Concerning the Need for Safety Valve Provisions Regarding the Implementation of the Public Service Law Section 66‑P(4) Mandate…”– Last August I filed a petition with Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (Independent Intervenors) that formally urged the PSC to recognize PSL §66‑p(4) as an affordability and reliability safety valve and to establish clear trigger criteria.
Climate Act Safety Valve Filing (August 13, 2025): Describes the Independent Intervenor filing on August 11.
Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy Petition (Cases 15-E-0302 and 22‑M‑0149, January 6, 2026): Petition requesting that “the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.”
Summary of Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy Petition (January 8, 2026): Describes the Coalition’s petition on January 6, 2026.
New York Climate Act Affordability Status (January 27, 2026): Asserts that multiple state findings and cost projections demonstrate the need for a PSL §66‑p(4) hearing to define acceptable affordability metrics and evaluate real‑world implementation risks.
Notice Soliciting Comments Regarding Petition for Hearing To Suspend Or Temporarily Modify Renewable Energy Program (January 28, 2026): Interested stakeholders are invited to submit comments by March 30, 2026, on the Petition filed by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy.
Stalling the New York Climate Act Pause Evaluation (January 28, 2026): Explains how PSL §66‑p both mandates the renewable program and authorizes the PSC to pause or modify obligations when reliability and affordability are threatened.
Notice Extending Date for Comments Regarding Petition for Hearing To Suspend Or Temporarily Modify Renewable Energy Program (March 24, 2026): Extends deadline for comments on petition until May 1, 2026.
“66‑P Stakeholder Process Independent Intervenors Comments” (Case 22‑M‑0149, April 16, 2026): Comments on the PSL 66‑p stakeholder process emphasizing that §66‑p(4) was included to address exactly the current reliability and affordability challenges and that the hearing needs to follow a different approach than the Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan.

Comments

I am impressed by the ability of green energy advocates to mobilize members in their organizations to submit form letters. On April 27, 2026 alone for Case Number 22-M-0149 402 comments were submitted and nearly all were similar to the following:

Dear PSC Commissioners,

I urge the Public Service Commission (PSC) to reject the petition filed by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, which would improve neither safety nor reliability, and would instead raise utility costs by deepening New York’s reliance on expensive and volatile fossil fuels. With the cost of oil and gas skyrocketing as a result of the U.S. war on Iran, this is not the time for New York to be considering rollbacks to our renewable energy targets.

I urge the PSC to remain committed to the goals of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) and the Clean Energy Standard. Temporarily modifying or suspending the clean energy mandates in the CLCPA will not benefit New Yorkers and is entirely unnecessary to maintain a reliable electric grid. In fact, any further investments in the fossil fuel economy will have a negative financial impact on New Yorkers. Costs of energy in New York are driven by the price of fossil fuels, which are highly volatile and affected by events outside of the control of New York, such as the invasion of the Ukraine by Russia and the U.S. war on Iran. Sticking to fossil fuels means unpredictable, unaffordable bills for New Yorkers. Renewable energy – which requires no fuel – offers predictable costs which makes families less vulnerable to energy price shocks. Renewable energy is a long-term cost-saving strategy that will promote affordability and protect New York utility customers from the impacts of volatile fossil fuel prices. I urge the PSC to reject the unsupported request to hold a hearing to consider temporarily modifying or suspending the renewable energy and zero-emission energy goals.

In my opinion, this comment is long on emotion and opinion and sadly lacking in understanding of the electric system. The claim that renewable energy is a long-term cost savings strategy is simply wrong. The only reference to reliability is a throwaway comment that ignores all the concerns that have been raised by the New York State Independent System Operator.

In my next post I will describe the Independent Intervenor filing on April 16, 2026 that explained why the PSL 66-P stakeholder process must be changed from what was used in the Scoping Plan and the State Energy Plan. In those cases, it seemed that the State valued the number of comments rather than the quality of the comments to support the plans. I believe the State needs to respond to all comments and resolve all issues raised. A subsequent post will use this form letter as an example of how all comments should be addressed.

Comment Submittal Instructions

I encourage you to submit comments supporting the petition because the hearing is a commonsense reality check Comments were originally due on March 30 but the deadline has been delayed to May 1 at 4:30 PM EDT. Instructions to submit a comment are included at the end of this post.

If you have not done so already, please follow these instructions to submit a comment.

There are two cases. Either go to this link at the Department of Public Service website: https://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Comments/PublicComments.aspx?MatterCaseNo=15-E-0302 or this link https://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Comments/PublicComments.aspx?MatterCaseNo=22-M-0149 E-0302 is a huge proceeding so going to M-0149 will be faster.

Enter your name, address, and email address.

Copy and paste the following message into the comments field

Click the “I understand…” box and the “I’m not a robot” Captcha box

Wait until the Captcha completes and Click Post Comment

That’s it. You’re done!

Here is a suggestion for a comment to paste.

I support the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy’s petition requesting that the Commission hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-p(4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).

The law includes an explicit safety valve for reliability and affordability, conditioned on a hearing and the Coalition petition correctly invokes this mechanism. There is credible reliability and arrears evidence that triggers the safety valve provisions. Granting the hearing would implement, not undermine, the CLCPA by ensuring that its Renewable Energy Program is administered in a manner consistent with safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.

Stop Energy Sprawl Call for Action

I have been privileged to join Stop Energy Sprawl monthly meetings for some time. I always learn something and have been impressed with the dedication of its members. This post describes a recent distribution to its members titled “Tell New York State ‘It’s Time to Pause the CLCPA!’ and save our communities”.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

Stop Energy Sprawl is a “coalition of community groups, municipalities, and elected officials from localities in New York State targeted by land-wasting large-scale wind & solar projects located far from where that energy is needed.” They have warned that Climate Act‑driven reliance on large‑scale wind and solar could require hundreds of thousands acres of New York farmland and forest for generation, storage, and associated transmission infrastructure.

Stop Energy Sprawl (has provided comments supporting the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy’s petition requesting a hearing on suspending or modifying the CLCPA targets. This post describes a recent distribution to their members where they recommend submitting comments supporting the petition and announced a survey they set up to document how renewable development has harmed their communities.

Petition Recommendation

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Act. It provides that the Commission “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. In a rare example of commonsense this safety valve was included because even the lawmakers realized that it may not be possible to transition the electric system to “zero-emissions” by relying on renewable energy. New York State never followed up with a feasibility study proving that it could be done, never pointed to another jurisdiction that implemented such a system successfully, and has not provided clear and comprehensive cost estimates. Conducting a hearing is a commonsense reality check and I encourage you to submit comments.

Comments were originally due on March 30 but have been delayed to May 1. Stop Energy Sprawl recommended submitting comments on the petition.

The CLCPA targets for 2030 are based on a technology goal — not an environmental goal (and they’re making the electric grid less reliable and more expensive) !

These targets put our communities at risk by mandating poorly-performing large-scale wind and solar facilities that will overrun hundreds of thousands of acres of high-quality farmland and forest, imperil fisheries and shorelines, destroy agriculturally-based, maritime, and tourism-based economies, and severely damage community character, historic sites, and the quiet enjoyment of our homes and communities, as well as the value of those residences and communities.

The State uses the RAPID Act to implement these wind & solar goals. New York State routinely places out-of-state and foreign developers ahead of its own citizens and stomps on communities’ Home Rule and self-determination by overriding nearly every local law the developers ask them to.

Help us fight back for your community and all our communities by submitting a comment:

There are two cases. Either go to this link at the Department of Public Service website: https://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Comments/PublicComments.aspx?MatterCaseNo=15-E-0302 or this link https://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Comments/PublicComments.aspx?MatterCaseNo=22-M-0149 E-0302 is a huge proceeding so going to M-0149 will be faster.

Enter your name, address, and email address.

Copy and paste the message at the end of the post into the comments field (feel free to modify or add information about projects in your town)

Click the “I understand…” box and the “I’m not a robot” Captcha box

Wait until the Captcha completes and Click Post Comment

That’s it. You’re done!

Stop Energy Sprawl also told readers to share thismessage with others in your organization, friends, neighbors, and town and county officials. The voices looking to defile our communities with these facilities are already loudly opposing this hearing — we need to make our voices known!

Harmful Impact Survey

In addition, the distribution asked readers to compile their stories from communities targeted by land-wasting and coast-endangering large-scale wind and solar projects located far from where that energy is needed. They have prepared a survey that seeks to collect information about the impacts experienced by communities throughout New York State targeted be wind, solar and energy storage development. The goal is to bring awareness to these issues and to fight back against ill-considered laws that enable these destructive policies.

New York readers who have experience with these projects are encouraged to respond to the survey “How Did Wind or Solar Harm Your Community?” Whether it was fire, farmland desecration, habitat loss, or setting residents against one another, we want to hear about it. Respond at https://forms.gle/DYxEpmTBFkAAp11M8

For more information, contact them at stopenergysprawl@gmail.com or check out our website, stopenergysprawl.org

Conclusion

I think we are at an inflection point relative to the Climate Act. It appears that the Hochul Administration has caught on that the net-zero transition is unsustainable. Unfortunately there are still many that fail to acknowledge that physics, engineering, and economics all indicate that the renewable-based electric system is impossible. The PSL 66-P hearing will provide a venue for public debate on the capability for renewable energy to provide safe and adequate electricity.

I also think that careful documentation of the harmful impacts of renewables developments will prove that the Rapid Act is an environmental disaster scandal. The failure of the state to establish siting standards has led to unacceptable impacts that very few people know about. I look forward to the survey results and encourage everyone with first-hand knowledge to tell their story.

Comment Recommendation

The following are the suggested comments supporting the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy’s petition requesting a hearing on suspending or modifying the CLCPA targets

It’s time for a hearing. I support the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy’s petition requesting that the Commission hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-p(4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).

PSL 66-p(4) provides that the Commission “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. A PSL 66-p(4) hearing is essential to evaluate whether the Renewable Energy Program, as currently implemented, is compatible with safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.

Safe and adequate service is imperiled by declining reliability margins documented by the New York Independent System Operator. Acceptable reliability risks associated with the Renewable Energy Program have not been defined so the public has no assurance that the declining margins are safe.

Transmission deficiencies threaten reliable delivery. New transmission is needed to get the renewable energy collected to where it is needed. If this transmission is not available, then the energy supply will not be adequate.

The affordability crisis demands a hearing because safe and adequate is only possible if it is affordable. The PSL 66-p(4) hearing must define acceptable affordability metrics that can be tracked.

Multiple independent sources confirm the need for a hearing. State agencies, the Attorney General Office, the NYISO and others have identified schedule and ambition issues associated with the Climate Act implementation that affect the Renewable Energy Program.

The Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world constraints. The Commission has both the authority and the obligation to act. The Commission must convene a hearing as soon as possible.

Why “Cheap Renewables” Don’t Deliver Cheap Electricity

In a recent article I noted instances where Governor Hochul and Public Service Commission Chair Rory Christian have raised the possibility for limited changes to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) interim targets primarily because of affordability concerns. Proponents disagree insisting that renewables currently provide cheapest electricity. I addressed this myth based on an article by Matt Jacobson at Matt’s Substack. I promised to follow up with more details. This article is based on a series of articles at the Science of Doom blog by Steve Carson. It is a long post documenting all the reasons cheap renewables is misinformation.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. A recent recommendation by Governor Hochul to adjust the deadlines has spurred conversations about the schedule and ambition of the Climate Act. A primary concern is affordability.

Carson’s series of articles provided the supporting arguments for a detailed rebuttal of the myth of cheap renewables. An article by Emily Pontecorvo summarizes the Green Energy Blob take on decarbonization and affordability if you are interested.

The Seductive “Cheap” Story

The primary basis of the myth that wind and solar are now the “cheapest” sources of electricity is Lazard’s Levelized cost of energy (LCOE). This parameter claims renewables beat coal, gas, and nuclear on a dollar-per-megawatt-hour basis. This underpins the narrative that renewable energy should translate into lower electricity bills for consumers. However, LCOE project-level costs are junk.

Steve Carson explains that the reality of jurisdictions trying to transition tells a different story than the LCOE theory. Germany has massively expanded wind and solar while shutting down coal and nuclear, but German households face some of Europe’s highest electricity prices. The United Kingdom’s coal phaseout and wind surge haven’t delivered cheap power. South Australia, with the world’s highest penetration of rooftop solar and substantial wind capacity, maintains some of the developed world’s highest retail electricity rates.

This disconnect between “cheap renewables” and expensive electricity isn’t a coincidence or a policy failure in implementation. It reflects that the LCOE narrative obscures the fundamental truth that the cost of a reliable electricity system is not the same as the cost of intermittent generation. As Science of Doom’s comprehensive series demonstrates, when you need electricity every hour of every day, the system must pay for flexibility, backup capacity, grid stability services, and expanded transmission infrastructure—costs that persist regardless of how low the marginal cost of wind and solar generation falls.

What “Cheap Renewables” Actually Means – Blind Spots in the LCOE Metric

The levelized cost of electricity is the net present value of the unit-cost of electricity over the lifetime of a generating system. It divides total lifetime costs (capital, operations, maintenance, fuel) by total expected lifetime electricity output. LCOE is useful for comparing similar technologies under similar conditions, but it has significant limitations when applied to system planning or comparing dispatchable and intermittent resources.

LCOE looks attractive for wind and solar because these technologies have:

High upfront capital costs but near-zero marginal operating costs
No fuel expenses
Relatively predictable maintenance schedules
Declining capital costs due to manufacturing scale and technological improvements

In New York’s electric dispatch system, renewables with zero fuel cost naturally displace higher marginal-cost fossil generation when available. This creates the appearance of “cheap” electricity—wind and solar bid low or even negative in wholesale markets, setting clearing prices near zero during periods of abundant renewable output.

What LCOE Doesn’t Capture

The critical problem is what LCOE excludes from its calculation.

Dispatchability and timing: LCOE treats all megawatt-hours as equal, whether generated at 2 PM on a sunny summer afternoon when demand is moderate and supply is abundant, or at 7 PM on a windless winter evening when demand peaks and solar is unavailable. The market value of these megawatt-hours is radically different, but LCOE treats them identically.
Capacity value degradation: The first wind farm in a system has significant capacity value—it can reliably displace fossil capacity. But as wind penetration grows and multiple wind farms experience correlated low-output periods, the system cannot count on wind for reliability. Capacity value falls toward zero at high penetration, even as LCOE remains constant.
Integration and system costs: LCOE does not account for the costs of integrating intermittent generation into a reliable grid. These expenses include: transmission upgrades and expansion to connect remote renewable resources; grid stability and frequency control services (increasingly needed as synchronous generation declines); backup and flexible capacity to cover renewable output variability; energy storage or other time-shifting mechanisms; and curtailment costs when renewable generation exceeds instantaneous demand
Correlation with demand: Solar generates during midday but not during evening peak hours. Wind output is weather-dependent and poorly correlated with demand patterns. LCOE cannot capture the system cost of this mismatch.

The Merit-Order Illusion

New York’s electric system dispatches on merit order, but when renewables set the wholesale clearing price at near-zero during sunny, windy periods, it creates a misleading signal. Yes, wholesale prices fall—sometimes into negative territory. But the system still requires dispatchable capacity for the hours when renewables cannot generate. That dispatchable capacity must recover its fixed costs from fewer operating hours at higher prices, leading to extreme price volatility. Retailers must price their offerings to survive the high-price periods, so negative wholesale prices do not translate into lower retail bills.

Germany provides a clear test case. From 2010 to 2025, Germany dramatically reduced coal generation, phased out nuclear entirely, and massively expanded wind and solar capacity. Renewable generation now regularly exceeds 50% of domestic production on favorable days. If cheap renewables meant cheap electricity, German consumers should be celebrating. Instead, German households pay among the highest electricity prices in Europe—often 30-35 euro cents per kilowatt-hour, more than double the rates in France

The merit-order cost stack includes far more than energy and is the reason for the high prices:

Grid charges: Massive transmission expansion to connect offshore wind in the north to demand centers in the south, plus distribution upgrades to handle distributed solar,
Capacity payments: Gas plants kept available for reliability despite operating far fewer hours,
Interconnector costs: Germany now relies heavily on electricity imports from neighbors during low-renewable periods, requiring expensive cross-border infrastructure
Renewable subsidies: Feed-in tariffs and other support mechanisms recovered through consumer surcharges, and
Ancillary services: Frequency control, voltage support, and system strength services previously provided “free” by synchronous generators now are procured separately.

The Power Grid as Extended Grid Storage

Steve Carson highlights a critical but often invisible function of grid interconnections: they act as “extended grid storage” by allowing regional transmission operators to share both cheap generation and backup capacity. For example, when German wind and solar are abundant, exports flow to neighbors. When German renewables underperform, imports flow back—often from French nuclear, Scandinavian hydro, or even Polish coal.

This flexibility is valuable, but it isn’t free. The infrastructure costs billions, and Germany effectively outsources reliability to its neighbors’ dispatchable capacity. The neighboring countries must maintain that capacity, and those costs ultimately appear in electricity prices across the interconnected system. This is an inevitable result in North America.

South Australia -The World’s Renewable Laboratory

South Australia offers the clearest real-world experiment in high-renewable electricity systems. This small state (1.8 million population) transformed its grid faster and more completely than almost any comparable jurisdiction:

Extremely high rooftop solar penetration—over 40% of households with solar panels,
Substantial utility-scale wind capacity,
Tight interconnection to the rest of Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM),
Aggressive renewable energy targets and supportive policies, and
Near-complete exit from coal generation

If cheap renewables automatically produced cheap electricity, South Australia should have the lowest power bills in the developed world. Instead, it consistently ranks among the highest.

The Canyon Curve: Free Solar, Expensive Evenings

South Australia has better solar resource potential than New York. Carson’s analysis reveals the “pricing paradox” at the heart of South Australia’s solar experience. The wholesale price pattern creates a dramatic “canyon curve”, i.e., a more intense duck curve load and generation pattern:

Midday (high solar output): Wholesale prices regularly fall to zero or go negative. In 2025, nearly half of all trading intervals saw negative prices during midday hours. Generators literally pay to produce electricity because they cannot or will not curtail output.
Evening ramp (solar fades, demand peaks): Prices spike dramatically, often reaching several thousand dollars per megawatt-hour. Extreme spikes to $15,000/MWh (the market price cap) occur dozens of times per year during tight supply conditions.

This extreme volatility creates a counterintuitive result: even though wholesale prices are “free” or negative for many hours, retail bills remain very high. Several mechanisms drive this outcome:

Scarcity pricing sets clearing prices for everyone: In the NEM’s energy-only market, the last, most expensive generator needed to meet demand sets the wholesale price for all generators in that interval. Even if 95% of electricity comes from “cheap” wind, batteries, and gas, if the final 5% requires an expensive gas peaker bidding $10,000/MWh to cover its costs in limited operating hours, everyone gets paid $10,000/MWh for that interval.
Retailers must survive the spikes: Retail electricity providers offer customers flat-rate contracts, but they purchase wholesale power at volatile spot prices. To avoid bankruptcy during extreme price events, retailers must build a substantial risk premium into their retail tariffs. A few hours per year at $15,000/MWh can exceed the cost of thousands of hours at negative prices.
Time-of-use tariffs have limited adoption: Most residential customers remain on flat-rate tariffs and cannot respond to price signals. Even customers with solar panels typically don’t have battery storage to arbitrage the price differential, so they export at negative prices and import at extreme prices.

Invisible Costs: Flexibility, Backup, and Wiring

Carson’s detailed analysis of South Australia’s battery deployments reveals a critical misunderstanding in public discourse about energy storage. Large-scale batteries are not being built to store “a day” or even “several hours” of electricity for later use. They’re being built because the market pays premium prices for fast response in specific narrow windows. I have never seen this distinction mentioned relative to New York but suspect that we are not there yet.

Two articles (Batteries in SA: The Market in Operation and Batteries and the Market Machinery — How the Grid’s ‘Invisible Hand’ Rewards Speed) describe the actual function of grid batteries in South Australia (Table 1).

Table 1: Grid battery revenue streams in South Australia

Batteries are valuable and economically rational investments given current market design, but they don’t fundamentally solve the integration challenge. Their limited duration (typically 2-4 hours) means they cannot address multi-day weather events or seasonal renewable output variations.

Transmission: The 1,500km Relay Race

Carson’s analysis of European transmission interconnections illustrates another hidden cost: transmission infrastructure operates as a multi-decade, multi-billion-dollar “relay race” to move power across vast distances. Green energy advocates in New York universally ignore the challenges of supplying renewables across great distances but claim that this is a solution to local renewable lulls.

Carson describes the challenge for jurisdictions further along the transition to renewables, Spain, for example, often experiences weather patterns opposite to Germany—sunny and windy when Germany is calm and cloudy. In principle, Spanish renewable generation could supply German demand. In practice, moving that power requires it to flow through France, with each border crossing representing a constrained bottleneck. Expanding these interconnectors requires massive investment and decades of planning and construction.

Even within countries, transmission expansion represents a substantial cost. Renewable resources are often located far from demand centers (offshore wind, remote solar farms, high-altitude wind sites). Connecting them requires new high-voltage transmission lines, substations, and grid reinforcements. These infrastructure costs are recovered from consumers through grid charges, separate from energy prices. Upstate New York electric rates are increasing because of this..

Reliability Problems in a Renewable-Based Grid

Most electricity markets were designed around a specific paradigm: generators with controllable output and marginal costs that rise with fuel consumption compete to supply demand, with the market clearing at the marginal cost of the last generator needed. This “energy-only” market design works reasonably well when most generation is dispatchable. New York’s market also includes a capacity component but problems remain. These references (one and two) describe how intermittent renewables change electric resource planning in several ways:

Zero marginal cost undermines investment signals: When wind and solar set clearing prices at or near zero during periods of abundant output, dispatchable generators cannot recover their fixed costs. This discourages investment in the backup capacity the system requires for reliability during low-renewable periods.
Capacity value diverges from energy value: A generator that produces cheap energy when it’s not needed has low system value. A generator that reliably produces energy during scarcity periods has high system value. Energy markets struggle to properly value this difference, leading to underinvestment in dispatchable capacity[.
The “missing money” problem: Dispatchable plants kept available for reliability but operating only during scarcity periods cannot earn sufficient revenue from energy-only markets. This creates a “missing money” problem where economically necessary capacity cannot be sustained under market rules.

The Fat Tail Problem

Renewable-dominated systems face what can be called the “fat tail” reliability problem. It’s relatively easy and cheap to supply electricity 90-95% of the time using wind, solar, and short-duration storage. But guaranteeing supply for the remaining 5-10% of hours—when demand is high and renewables are unavailable—becomes disproportionately expensive.

These tail events include:

Multi-day periods of low wind across a broad geographic region (wind droughts),
Winter evenings with high heating and lighting demand but no solar output,
Heat waves with high air conditioning demand and reduced wind, and
Cold snaps that strain both electricity and gas systems simultaneously.

Current market designs systematically undervalue the capacity needed to address these tail events. The result is either reliability problems (as seen in Texas and California) or out-of-market interventions and capacity payments that add to consumer costs but don’t appear in LCOE calculations and proponent claims of cheaper renewables..

Conclusion

LCOE is the commonly used proof that renewables are cheapest. Steve Carson’s series of articles demonstrates a fundamental point that policy discussions too often overlook: cheap intermittent megawatt-hours are not the same as cheap electricity systems. LCOE measures the former, but consumers pay for the latter.

A reliable electricity system operating 24/7/365 requires:

Sufficient generation capacity to meet peak demand plus reserves,
Dispatchable resources or storage to cover periods when intermittent resources underperform,
Transmission infrastructure to connect generation to load,
Grid stability services (frequency control, voltage support, inertia, system strength),
Market mechanisms to ensure adequate investment in all necessary resources, and
Coordination across time (energy storage), space (transmission), and technology (diverse generation portfolio)

Intermittent renewables with low LCOE can supply cheap megawatt-hours during favorable conditions, but they don’t eliminate or substantially reduce most of these system requirements. In many cases, high renewable penetration increases system complexity and cost:

More transmission is needed to connect remote resources and balance geographic diversity,
More flexibility is needed to manage output variability,
More grid services are needed to replace functions previously provided by synchronous generators, and
More sophisticated market designs are needed to maintain reliability incentives.

These costs appear in consumer bills as transmission charges, capacity payments, ancillary service costs, and renewable support mechanisms—not in LCOE calculations. Germany’s high consumer prices reflect genuine system costs of operating a high-renewable grid. South Australia’s price volatility reflects the challenge of balancing supply and demand with weather-dependent generation. The UK’s persistent high bills reflect the need to maintain dispatchable backup despite growing renewable capacity. New York’s transition to a renewable-based electric system will inevitably follow these examples.

Policy Implications

Serious energy policy planning must start from total system cost, not headline LCOE numbers. This means:

Evaluate technologies based on system value, not just LCOE. A dispatchable low-carbon resource available on demand may provide more value than a cheaper intermittent resource, even if its LCOE is higher.
Account for all integration costs. Transmission expansion, grid stability services, backup capacity, and storage requirements must be included in cost comparisons.
Design markets to properly value reliability. Energy-only markets systematically undervalue the capacity needed to maintain reliability in high-renewable systems. Market reforms or capacity mechanisms are necessary.
Be honest about cost trade-offs. High renewable penetration may be desirable for emissions reduction, but it comes with real system costs. Pretending these costs don’t exist or can be eliminated through further renewables deployment undermines public trust and leads to poor planning.
Diversify the resource portfolio. No single technology provides all necessary grid services. A mix of resources—including dispatchable low-carbon generation, energy storage, demand flexibility, and transmission—produces a more reliable and likely more cost-effective system than over-reliance on intermittent renewables.

The goal should not be the “cheapest” generation on an LCOE basis, but rather the least-cost pathway to a reliable, low-emission electricity system. As the Science of Doom series convincingly demonstrates, these are not the same thing. Until policy discussions and planning processes grapple honestly with this distinction, consumers will continue to face the disconnect between promises of “cheap renewables” and the reality of expensive electricity bills.

Senator Harkham Climate Act Mal-Information

New York State Sen. Peter Harckham argues that New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act). will reduce high utility rates “if we let it.” He blames today’s affordability crisis entirely on fossil fuel volatility, dismisses nuclear as a “fantasy,” and claims that if we just double down on renewables and distributed solar, families will see “real, predictable savings.” He is wrong on all three counts.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate an outline and draft for this post.

Overview

In a recent post I described several initiatives that have led Governor Hochul to suggest that the timeline for the Climate Act electric sector goals needs to be revised. Apparently, the proposed changes are part of the budget negotiations and there is very little information describing exactly what the Governor has proposed. The most disappointing thing to me is that Climate Act proponents like Harkham refuse to acknowledge that there are any issues that cannot be resolved by doubling down on current policies.

The opinion piece by Harkham is mal-information. Media Defence defines mal-information as information that is based on reality, but it is used to inflict harm on a person, organization or jurisdiction like New York. Given the status of the Climate Act, it is necessary to refute the opinion piece because what he claims bears little resemblance to what the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA), the Public Service Commission (PSC), the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), and even the State Energy Plan are now saying.

Affordability Crisis: Not Just Fossil Volatility

Senator Harckham correctly notes that in 2025 more than 1.3 million New York customers were over 60 days behind on their bills, with arrears approaching $1.8 billion. Where we part company is the explanation.

Harckham says these customers are struggling only because of the “fossil fuel status quo” and “future green energy targets” are not to blame. I addressed this in my “New York Climate Act Affordability Status” article. But the arrears crisis is occurring while Climate Act implementation is driving up both utility and economy‑wide energy costs. In recent rate cases approved between March 2025 and January 2026, residential electric bills at the major utilities increased markedly, and that was before most Climate Act capital spending shows up in rates. The PSC’s own staff “Second Informational Report” on Climate Act costs found that CLCPA‑related program impacts already account for 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 residential electric bills—numbers I consider conservative given the political pressure to minimize cost estimates.

And we are still at the front end of the cost curve. As Kris Martin from NY Solar Divide pointed out, only a small fraction of Climate Act expenses has hit bills so far; the bulk will land in the next 5–10 years as offshore wind, large‑scale solar, school‑bus electrification, and other mandates scale up. So no, this is not just a “fossil fuel” affordability problem. It is also a policy‑driven cost‑loading problem, and the state’s own documents say so.

What NYSERDA and the State Energy Plan Actually Show

If the Climate Act were really a path to lower bills, NYSERDA and the State Energy Plan (SEP) would show that clearly. They don’t.

The 2025 State Energy Plan admits that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient” and that external constraints “continue to impede progress,” concluding that the Climate Act schedule is effectively impossible to meet. It also estimates that achieving the Climate Act goals will require about $120 billion per year in energy system investment through 2040—roughly $1,282 per month per household when you levelize those costs.

NYSERDA’s Energy Affordability analysis underlying the plan is even more revealing. The public‑facing fact sheets emphasize that electrification might lower operating energy expenses for some households. But when you examine the data tables and include the levelized capital cost of mandated equipment, the picture changes dramatically. For a representative upstate moderate‑income gas‑heated household, NYSERDA’s own numbers show that replacing fossil systems and vehicles with the required “zero‑emission” alternatives adds about $594 per month in 2031 compared to a conventional replacement path—a 43% increase in total energy‑related costs. That is roughly $7,000 per year in additional costs that the glossy brochures don’t emphasize.

In other words, once you include what it actually costs to buy the heat pumps, envelope upgrades, and EVs that the mandates require, the Climate Act is not a bill‑cutting program. It is a massive, regressive cost shift onto households that Albany has never honestly explained.

Reliability: The Cost of Ignoring NYISO

Harckham frames the debate as a simple choice between “low‑cost” renewables and “volatile” fossil fuels. He never mentions grid reliability, even though NYISO has been warning for years that Climate Act timelines and technology assumptions are pushing the system toward unacceptable risk. NYISO’s 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment shows statewide resource margins declining so quickly that by 2034 there is no surplus left without additional development. A 2025 Short‑Term Assessment of Reliability identified a Zone J (New York City) reliability need as early as summer 2027, requiring peaker units scheduled for retirement to be retained. There has already been a net loss of dispatchable capacity—NYISO’s 2025 Power Trends notes that since the Climate Act passed, 4,315 MW of capacity have retired while only 2,274 MW of mostly intermittent resources have been added, a net loss of about 2,041 MW.

These reports also point out that Climate Act planning assumes timely completion of critical transmission projects like Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) if this slips, New York City’s reliability margins become “deficient.” And their studies show that high penetrations of wind and solar require more operating reserves, new reserve products, and far more total installed capacity, including firm, zero‑emission resources that do not yet exist at required scale.

None of that shows up in Harckham’s breezy claim that renewables are “the cheapest new power source.” A system that must rely increasingly on emergency procedures, backstop contracts, and delayed environmental rules to keep the lights on is not a low‑cost system.

The “Cheapest Renewables” Talking Point

Harckham leans heavily on Energy Information Administration data and asserts that a kWh of solar is “consistently” cheaper than electricity from gas or nuclear. I have addressed this “cheap renewables myth” at length. Project‑level levelized cost of energy (LCOE) comparisons ignore the system‑wide costs that NYISO must actually manage:

Backup and firming capacity to cover multi‑hour ramps and multi‑day renewable droughts.
New transmission to move remote resources to load centers.
Storage sized to reliability needs, not just to smooth daily solar output.
Curtailment and overbuild required as penetration rises.

At low penetration, subsidized wind and solar can appear cheap on paper. At high penetration, the cost of keeping the system reliable at all hours rises sharply, and those costs are socialized through rates and surcharges.

Nuclear: New York Policy Disaster

Harckham dismisses nuclear as a “fantasy” for bill relief, citing the long and expensive Vogtle expansion in Georgia. That is a convenient example, but ignores New York’s misguided nuclear policy Cheered on by Harckham, New York chose to close Indian Point, a major source of zero‑emission, dispatchable power located near the New York City load center, and then tried to cover both that loss and growing demand with a mix of imports, gas, and promised future renewables. Emissions went up in the short term, and reliability margins tightened.

The fastest way to raise both emissions and costs is to shut down existing nuclear plants and then pretend that nuclear is irrelevant to affordability. New York State has not provided clear and transparent cost estimates for the Climate Act transition using renewables or an alternative approach using nuclear as the base load source. As a result, it is simply false to claim that nuclear has no role in cost containment, especially if the alternative is building a massive overbuilt, weather‑dependent system plus long‑duration storage that does not yet exist commercially at scale.

Distributed Solar and the “$1 Billion” Promise

Harckham touts a Synapse Energy Economics study for the Accelerate Solar for Affordable Power Act, claiming “an estimated $1 billion in annual savings for ratepayers” by raising distributed solar goals and reforming interconnections. I don’t doubt that a modeling exercise can produce that figure under optimistic assumptions. But New York’s record with these programs is that system‑level “savings” often mask who pays and who benefits.

Net metering and Value of Distributed Energy Resource credits shift revenue shortfalls onto non‑participants. Interconnection and distribution upgrade costs are socialized. Program administration and incentives are funded via surcharges. Those costs show up in the bills of the very households already in arrears. Unless a study rigorously accounts for these rate‑base effects and distributional impacts, a headline “$1 billion in savings” can easily mean $1 billion in shifted costs, not genuine relief for the typical customer. Furthermore, I recently showed that the distributed solar failed to provide any meaningful energy during last winter’s extreme weather. I doubt that the long-term costs will be cheaper if all the expenses necessary to support the system when solar is unavailable are included.

What PSL §66‑p(4) Is There For – And Why It Matters Now

One thing Harckham does not mention is that the Legislature itself anticipated a situation where Climate Act implementation might threaten affordability and reliability. Public Service Law §66‑p(4) explicitly authorizes the PSC to temporarily suspend or modify Renewable Energy Program obligations if it finds that the program:

Impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service,
Is likely to impair existing obligations, and/or
Is associated with a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections.

Two recent petitions—one from Independent Intervenors (including me), and one from the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy—ask the PSC to hold a §66‑p(4) hearing based on precisely these concerns. On January 28, 2026, the PSC issued a notice soliciting comments on whether Renewable Energy Program targets should be suspended or adjusted. That is not routine housekeeping. It is a legal acknowledgment that the current trajectory may be incompatible with safe, adequate, and affordable service. The fact is that New York has never done a feasibility study proving that transitioning the electric system to depend on renewables will work.

Conclusion: Stop Pretending, Start Reviewing

Harckham urges New Yorkers to “reject misinformation” and “double down” on the Climate Act to lower bills. But the state’s own data tell a different story:

NYSERDA’s cap‑and‑invest modeling shows steep fuel price increases and thousands of dollars per year in added household costs.
Energy affordability analysis shows a 40+% increase in energy‑related costs for a representative upstate family once capital is included.
The State Energy Plan projects $120 billion per year in system investment, about $1,282 per month per household on a levelized basis.
NYISO warns of declining reliability margins, dependence on a few critical transmission projects, and a technology gap for firm, zero‑emission resources.
More than 1.3 million households already owe nearly $1.8 billion in arrears.

This is not what an affordable transition looks like.

Reconsidering the Climate Act’s timelines and mandates does not mean abandoning climate goals. It means using the tools the Legislature provided—especially PSL §66‑p(4)—to align ambition with reality, ensure that reliability is not sacrificed, and prevent climate policy from becoming an uncontrolled energy tax on working families.

New Yorkers were promised a “clean, resilient, and affordable” energy future. Now that NYSERDA, NYISO, the Comptroller, and the Attorney General’s office have all signaled serious cost and feasibility issues, the responsible course is not to “double down” on slogans, but to require a transparent §66‑p(4) hearing on whether the Renewable Energy Program is compatible with safe, adequate, and affordable service.

That is the conversation we should be having—not whether critics are guilty of “misinformation” for reading the state’s own numbers aloud. It is frustrating that misinformation claims are grounded on information that is based on reality, but it is incorrect that it inflicts harm on the state.

Conclusion

Since the promulgation of the Climate Act we now know we must address what we have learned. New York’s affordability crisis is being exacerbated by Climate Act‑driven costs, not just fossil volatility. NYSERDA and the State Energy Plan show large household cost increases once capital is included, not bill reductions. NYISO’s reliability warnings reveal that a high‑renewables system without firm backup is neither cheap nor risk‑free. Claims that renewables are “the cheapest power” ignore system‑wide costs, rate‑base effects, and reliability needs. Finally, PSL §66‑p(4) exists as a safety valve and should be used now to review and, if necessary, modify Climate Act obligations.