Citizens Budget Commission Getting Greener – Findings

Update: I have prepared three technical posts on this report: Once I completed these three posts, I realized that they were too wonky for a general audience.  The first post discussed their findings, the second post addressed their renewable energy forecast to meet the CLCPA, and the third post calculates the energy storage requirement for a winter peak period.  Because the CBC study is so important, I have prepared a less-technical summary that hits the highlights of all three posts.

On December 9, 2019 the Citizens Budget Commission (CBC) released a report entitled Getting Greener: Cost-Effective Options for Achieving New York’s Greenhouse Gas Goals  that addresses the impacts of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).   There is much to like about the report but I disagree with a few of their recommendations and have concerns about some of the methodology.  In order to do this report justice, I have prepared three posts.  If you have an interest in New York energy policy I recommend that you read the entire document.  It is well written, comprehensively covers many of the issues associated with the CLCPA, and makes estimates of the resources needed to implement the CLCPA.  This post concentrates on their findings.  The second post addresses their energy forecast to meet the CLCPA and the final post calculates the energy storage needed.

Background

The CBC is a nonpartisan, nonprofit civic organization whose mission is “to achieve constructive change in the finances and services of New York City and New York State government”.  They claim to serve the public rather than narrow special interests try to preserve public resources, whether financial or human; and focus on the well-being of future New Yorkers which they say are “the most underrepresented group in city and state government”.

The CBC Energy Policy Committee managed the development of the report.  It was prepared for CBC by Seth Hulkower, President of Strategic Energy Advisory Services.  Apparently, this project has been in the works for a long time because the “initial findings of this report were presented at a CBC research conference held in New York City in December 2018”. The report was not completed until December 2019 because of New York’s changing policies over the past year.  In particular, the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) was promulgated in July 2019. They made revisions based on feedback from external reviewers and staff at the Public Service Commission and the New York League of Conservation Voters but noted that their willingness to assist in the research does not “imply any endorsement of the report’s findings and recommendations”.

Annotated CBC Findings

The report notes that New York is already green: “compared to other states it produced the fewest per-capita GHG emissions in 2016 and experienced the greatest percentage decrease in emissions– 13 percent– between 1990 and 2016”. Most of New York’s decrease occurred in the electric power sector as NY power plants shifted almost entirely away from coal and oil to increased use of natural gas and nuclear power.  They also say that during this time GHG emissions also decreased significantly in the industrial sector and declined slightly in the residential and commercial sectors. In contrast, emissions grew 25 percent in the transportation sector and that represents more than one-third of all GHG state emissions and over 40 percent of end-use energy.

The report explains that New York’s ability to continue to make such gains and to meet CLCPA goals is uncertain and gives the following reasons.  My comments are italicized.

    1. “Immense scaling up of renewable generation capacity is necessary and is likely infeasible by 2030. Much of New York’s GHG strategy rests upon continued reductions in the electric sector; specifically, state plans are to more than double renewable generation capacity, mostly from offshore wind turbines. However, it will be challenging to install the required resources by 2030: too few projects are underway and project timelines are lengthy and are likely to be delayed by extensive permitting procedures and often community opposition. New York is poised to direct the expenditure of billions of dollars and still fall short of the stated goals.”
      • I agree with these concerns. It is not clear to me what the amount of offshore wind turbines relative to other renewables will be because there is no state comprehensive plan.
    2. “The focus on building renewable resources, particularly offshore wind, and entering into long-term power contracts limits flexibility and diminishes consideration of other cost-effective approaches. Efforts to scale up renewables are necessary, but projects planned require the State to offer supplemental payments to make them work. Furthermore, the massive infrastructure investment required to procure offshore wind capacity will require long-term contracts that will lock in increased costs for electric customers for years to come. Based on analysis of a recent offshore wind project contract, meeting the renewable target entirely with offshore wind will increase electricity costs by $2.3 billion annually, an increase of between 8 and 12 percent to New Yorkers’ electric bills, which could be a significant increase in monthly living expenses for some low-income and working class New Yorkers. Other options may be more cost-effective, particularly as technology evolves in the long term.”
      • The importance of concern about locking in long-term contracts cannot be over-estimated. If the State does this wrong then we will be locked into significant cost increases for a long time.  Moreover, I think that their cost estimates are low because they only consider the cost of the turbines themselves and do not include the extra costs necessary to make off-shore wind power dispatchable.
    3. “State policies on nuclear, natural gas, and hydropower are counterproductive. First, the state’s six nuclear power plants are scheduled to shut down between 2020 and 2046. Elimination of the nuclear fleet will erase nearly all previous emissions gains as that power supply by necessity will likely be replaced in the near-term by natural gas, which produces greater emissions than nuclear power. Second, attempts to expand natural gas pipelines have been blocked, which resulted in moratoria on new gas installations downstate. Natural gas provides an economical alternative to dirtier fossil fuels and is a dependable source when renewable sources like solar and wind are not available. Third, while hydro is a key renewable resource, state policies have not supported use of hydro when construction of a new dam is involved, limiting the ability to access additional affordable and clean power from Canada.”
      • I admire the restraint of this section. Calling the policies counterproductive is kind.  The massive hypocrisy of on one hand calling for a response to an existential threat while at the same time shutting down operating nuclear plants begs out to be called stupid at least.  Energy facts undermine the current administration’s irrational war on fracked natural gas which is based purely on emotions.  Throw in the lack of support for hydro and the State’s energy future is not going to go through tough times.
    4. “The focus on other sectors—particularly transportation—is insufficient. The State’s strategy to tackle growing transportation emissions is focused on facilitating expanded use of electric vehicles, which is expensive and challenging for some parts of the state. Furthermore, achieving the long-term goals to cut GHGs by 85 percent will require electrifying almost all heating and transportation, affecting every home and business and nearly every vehicle in the state. This conversion from direct fossil fuel consumption to electric power will necessitate a dramatic further increase in renewable energy supply and energy efficiency: New York State will need to add an additional 94,000 Gigawatt hours of renewables, more than double existing renewable resources. It will also require an expansion of the state’s transmission capacity, which is already constrained from upstate to the downstate area, where most energy is used. The construction of offshore wind facilities will bring more renewable energy directly to the downstate market, but a larger mix of resources, some operating intermittently, will require an expanded transmission grid to deliver power throughout the state.”
      • This paragraph summarizes a fundamental issue with the CLCPA very well. On one hand the State proposes to completely re-make the energy production system while simultaneously increasing our dependency upon reliable power.  The only thing I would add to this discussion is a concern about resiliency.  What happens when everyone depends on electric heat and an ice storm takes out the power lines?

The report introduces the recommendation summary with the following:

While GHG emissions have risen in other large states like Texas and Florida, New York has been a leader in reducing GHG emissions; the focus on further emissions reductions is necessary and important. The challenge now is to find the most efficient approaches to secure the greatest amount of incremental carbon reduction per each dollar spent. Doing so will require tackling emissions across all sectors; maintaining optionality in the approaches used; and partnering with other states and Canada.

        • I take exception to the comment “the focus on further emissions reductions is necessary and important” because the State has never provided its estimates of the effects these policies on global warming potential. By my calculations, the ultimate impact of a 100% reduction of New York’s 1990 218.1 million metric ton of emissions on projected global temperature rise would be a reduction, or a “savings,” of approximately 0.0032°C by the year 2050 and 0.0067°C by the year 2100.  This small a temperature difference cannot be measured.  I don’t accept those changes as necessary and important.

The report offers the following six recommendations:

  1. Establish an economy-wide carbon pricing system to deliver effective price signals to energy consumers. Two options for such a system are: (1) a carbon fee and (2) a cap-and-trade system. To be most effective, these policies should be implemented on at least a regional, if not national, scale, so that dollars are directed most effectively toward the dirtiest energy sources and states. CLCPA tasks the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation with estimating a “social cost of carbon,” that is, a monetary figure capturing the costs of an incremental increase in carbon emissions, an important step for implementing a pricing scheme. New York is already a member of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), an effective 9-state cap-and-trade system covering the electrical generation power sector. To be most effective RGGI should be expanded to other sectors of the economy, including transportation.
    • Carbon pricing has theoretical appeal but in practice I am very pessimistic that the results will work out as planned based on the results of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. CBC correctly recognizes that carbon pricing should be economy-wide and regional, if not national, to be successful but appears to favor a tax where “dollars are directed most effectively”.  The problem with that is that it is regressive and hurts those least able to afford it the hardest.  Trying to address a regressive tax makes this approach less effective.
    • CLCPA notes that determining a social cost of carbon is part of the CLCPA. Aside from the very real issues associated with that value it is not clear that the social cost of carbon is an adequate price signal for renewable energy development.
    • CBC states that RGGI is an “effective 9-state cap and trade system”. In the first place it is not a cap and trade program it is simply a tax masquerading as a cap and auction   More importantly, it is not particularly effective because I have shown that RGGI itself was responsible for only 5% of the observed reductions since the inception of the program.  Finally, the Accumulated Annual Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Benefits table shows that the cost per ton reduced from RGGI investments ($897) are far in excess of the $50 global social cost of carbon at a 3% discount rate.  Because the social cost of carbon is an estimate of the economic damages that would result from emitting one additional ton of greenhouse gas this means that RGGI investments are much more costly than the economic damages.
  2. Look beyond New York’s borders for low-cost, low-emission energy supplies and to cut GHG emissions. New York should explore the possibility of a multi-state buyers’ consortium to purchase large-scale low- and zero-GHG energy resources. New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts are all in the process of developing offshore wind energy projects. The states are seeking low-cost electricity, but also vying for jobs from the burgeoning offshore wind industry. Rather than compete, these states should work together to bring the most cost-effective resources to the market. Another opportunity is to import Canadian hydropower, which is competitively priced and clean.
    • No comment – this seems reasonable.
  3. Retain nuclear energy to retain the benefits of carbon avoidance. The state’s nuclear facilities operate with the help of subsidies, known as Zero Emissions Credits, that expire in 2029. If these subsidies are not extended, the nuclear plants may shut down while still holding valid operating licenses. The state should explore further extensions of these operating licenses with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The implementation of a properly priced carbon fee would be a benefit to the nuclear plants, which generate no greenhouse gases.
    • CBC recognizes that if there is a climate emergency then reducing power from the largest source of carbon free electric generation in the state is counter-productive.
  4. Avoid self-imposed constraints such as limiting gas pipeline capacity. A strong preference for renewable energy has resulted in constraints on expansion of natural gas. Denying permits to several natural gas pipelines is constraining energy markets to the point that New York will not be able to reap the GHG reduction benefits of converting home heating from oil to natural gas. Likewise, a lack of stable natural gas supply for new businesses may harm the state’s economic competitiveness. Regulatory and legal actions should not hamper use of resources that can continue to reduce GHG emission and provide reliable energy solutions. New York should create a competitive market of options to reduce greenhouse gases.
    • CBC recognizes that renewable energy implementation for the entire energy sector is a long-term process and that natural gas should be an interim part of the transition or a rational energy plan when the State realizes it cannot afford the CLCPA boondoggle.
  5. Promote broad transportation solutions that build on existing infrastructure. New York has made a large commitment to electric vehicles that will subsidize both car buyers and the construction of charging stations. This is an expensive GHG emissions reduction strategy. Greater emphasis should be placed on one of the areas that has made New York a low GHG-emitting state: energy-efficient public transportation. While a hybrid or electric vehicle produces fewer GHGs than a gasoline powered vehicle, public transportation produces even less per passenger mile traveled.
    • CBC recognizes that the commitment to electric vehicles is expensive and suggest greater emphasis on energy-efficient public transportation. I agree with the sentiment but the problem is what do you do in rural and suburban areas where cost-effective public transportation is out of the question.
  6. Establish a prioritization system to pursue renewables that provide the greatest GHG reductions at lowest cost. Renewables are and must be an increasing part of the state’s energy portfolio; however, policymakers should allow price signals to determine how much wind capacity, distributed solar, utility-scale solar, and hydropower is built rather than mandating specific technologies. All these projects should be put on a common basis of cost to consumer for tons of GHG avoided and those with the lowest net cost should be prioritized for development and contracts. A balanced portfolio of resources and contract term lengths will provide New York with the greatest security and stability to reach its long-term GHG reductions goals. This also will allow for competition from new resources so that if newer projects can be completed at lower cost, New York will reap the benefit. It also allows for the possibility that leaps in technology will be able to fill the mix rather than being locked into old technology for 20 years. New York is now leading the way on greenhouse gas reductions, but it should also lead the way in using competition to provide the greatest emissions reductions at the lowest cost.
    • I agree that spending priorities should be established based on emission reduction cost effectiveness but I think if CBC spent some time looking at the numbers, they would be surprised how expensive these technologies are. I fully support their suggestions to minimize future financial exposure.

Summary

The findings support my position that the State needs to do a feasibility study to determine how the CLCPA could be implemented. I will address their renewables analysis in a future post but the spoiler alert is that it requires massive renewable development.  This will require enormous investments and the findings point out the financial and flexibility risks if those investments are funded incorrectly.  They also raise the concern that existing sources of nuclear and hydro zero emitting generating power are not currently encouraged to remain in operation and suggest that discouraging natural gas infrastructure is counter-productive.  The final finding is the observation that there is much work to be done to implement the CLCPA targets for other sectors.  I agree with all these concerns.

The report makes a number of recommendations.   I agree that the State should prioritize investments based on performance, look beyond New York for additional sources of reduction support, eliminate self-imposed constraints on natural gas use, and retain our existing nuclear energy capacity as long as possible.  I do not think that a carbon pricing system will work if it only applies to New York or a limited region so I disagree with their recommendation for one even if it is across all sectors. Their transportation recommendation to think beyond electric vehicles for reductions makes sense where public transit investments could be cost-effective but that precludes rural areas.

Although I am not on board with the CBC’s desire to do something because it is “necessary”, I am encouraged that an organization that feels that is necessary realizes the magnitude of the effort and the very real possibility of massive future financial exposure.  The CBC report underscores the potential that doing something wrong would not be in the best interests of the State no matter how noble the intention.

RGGI – A Cap and Tax Market Program

I think it is wrong to assume that the success of market-based cap and trade pollution control programs for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) guarantees that market-based trading variations such as cap and dividend or a carbon price will work for carbon dioxide (CO2) reductions.  This post describes the reasons why I think the results from RGGI show that success is unlikely and could end badly.

My Background

I think it is important to understand where I come from on this topic.  You won’t find any papers by me in the literature and I have no background in economics.  However, I have been involved with cap and trade programs since the start of the EPA Acid Rain Program in the early 1990’s.  At the beginning I was responsible for compliance submittals to EPA in a traditional utility but as the electric generation business transitioned to de-regulation in New York my responsibilities grew to helping to develop trading program compliance strategies for affected sources across the country in a non-regulated generating company.  From that time until the present I have evaluated numerous national, regional, and state-only trading programs for SO2, NOx, and CO2.  As a result, I have a niche understanding of the information necessary to critique trading programs from the seldom heard background of affected source staff complying with the rules.

Since my retirement I have turned to blogging with an emphasis on a pragmatic approach to pollution control.  My posts can be very technical because that was necessary to submit substantive comments to regulatory agencies.  I regularly post on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and update the status of investment proceeds and allowance holdings regularly.  The opinions expressed on this blog and in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Cap and Trade

In a standard cap and trade program i a cap is established, allowances are allocated to sources based on historical operations, and affected sources are required to submit an allowance for every ton emitted.  Sources are in compliance if their allowances are less than the cap established.  As long as there are sources that can over-control cost-effectively below their cap limits and trade allowances so that sources that don’t have options to meet their limits, then overall costs are cheaper to meet the cap.  The Environmental Protection Agency’s Acid Rain Program (ARP) is a standard cap and trade program and has been an unconditional success in my opinion.   Annual SO2 emissions are down 92% since 1990 and annual NOx emissions are down 84% since 1990 at a much lower cost than expected at the beginning of the program.

Despite the success of the ARP there are caveats that should be considered.  When the ARP cap was proposed it was assumed that sources would have to install control equipment to significantly reduce SO2 emissions.  However, it turned out that fuel switching was a very effective option because power companies figured out how to burn low-sulfur coal and railroad de-regulation made it cost effective to ship low sulfur coal everywhere.  My point is that the primary reason that the ARP was cheaper and produced greater reductions than expected had much more to do with the fuel switching to meet the cap than trading resulting from pollution control installation providing over-control and generating tradable allowances.

On the other hand, pollution control technology advancements have played a role in the reductions in NOx cap and trade programs.  I feel more comfortable arguing that cap driven technological solutions contributed to the success for those programs than fuel switching.  Importantly though, I believe trading on the open market is not a widespread compliance option.  Rather than depending on the vagaries of the allowance market, power plant operators implemented control programs based on system-wide compliance across their facilities.  The majority of trades necessary for compliance have been within operating systems and not on the open market.

There are some misconceptions about cap and trade programs within the environmental advocacy community.  For example in a description of the cons of cap and trade this author states many of the emissions credits are just given away: “Sometimes these credits are just given away, creating no trade benefit at all. This means it costs a business nothing to expand their emissions and that can harm a local economy, which receives no economic gain in return.”  However, because the cap is lower than the existing emissions even if a business expands their emissions others have to reduce their emissions so the cap is met.  The perception that there is a give-away colors the opinion of traditional cap and trade opponents such as the author’s comment that giving them away creates “no economic gain in return”.  Actually, the allowance credits only have economic value because they are a compliance obligation.  That economic value has to be earned by a facility that invests in pollution control equipment to over-control their emissions.  In doing so they earn the right to sell their excess and fund their investment.

Over time, the concept that the affected sources have received a “windfall” has led to program adjustments where regulators set aside allowances for sale and a variation on cap and trade where the allowances are sold at an auction.  The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a prime example of cap and auction program.  Note that these programs are commonly branded as “cap and dividend” programs where the money earned is a dividend to the public.

Cap and Auction

It is commonly accepted that RGGI cap and auction program has been successful.  As shown in the RGGI Nine-State EPA CAMD Annual CO2 Emissions table the total emissions have decreased from over 127 million tons prior to the program to just under 75 million tons in 2018, for over a 40% decrease.  However, as I have shown, when you evaluate emissions by the primary fuel type burned it is obvious that emissions reductions from coal and oil generating are the primary reason why the emissions decreased.  Both coal and oil emissions have dropped over 80% since the baseline.  Natural gas emissions increased but because of the inherent low emission rate overall emissions declined.  I believe that the fuel switch from coal and oil to natural gas occurred because natural gas was the cheaper fuel and had very little to do with RGGI because the CO2 allowance cost adder to the plant’s operating costs was relatively small.

I think that there are fundamental differences with CO2 trading programs as compared to SO2 and NOx trading programs that make CO2 trading programs inherently suspect.  Most importantly, there are no cost-effective add-on pollution control systems available to reduce CO2 emissions at existing sources so they have limited options to reduce emissions to meet the cap.  For example, there is no evidence that any affected source in RGGI installed add-on controls to reduce their CO2 emissions.  The only other substantive option at a power plant is to become more efficient and burn less fuel.  However, because fuel costs are the biggest driver for operational costs that means efficiency projects to reduce fuel use means have always been considered by these sources.   In other words, if it made financial sense it was implemented long before this program.  Because the cost adder of the RGGI carbon price was relatively small I do not believe that it changed the business case at any affected source to install an efficiency project as part of its RGGI compliance strategy.  Therefore, because affected sources in RGGI and, arguably any other CO2 cap and auction program, do not have any viable control options, they simply treat the cost of purchasing allowances at an auction as a tax.

Conclusion

Cap and trade programs have proven successful for SO2 and NOx.  The primary reason that those programs have reduced emissions at lower costs as opposed to simply requiring every facility to meet a specified limit is that there were technology or fuel-switching options available to the owners and operators of the affected sources that allowed some facilities to over-control and trade with facilities that did not have cost-effective control options.  Note however, that to date, SO2 and NOx trading programs have not constrained allowances beyond the control option capabilities.  Future cap reductions will have to push this limit so I think future cap and trade reductions will not be as cost-effective as in the past.

There are ramifications to the success of the SO2 and NOx trading programs that have not been acknowledged by the regulators or advocates for stringent CO2 cap programs.  If there are no control options then affected sources provide power as long as they have allowances to cover their emissions.  While in an idealized world advocates may think that a fossil-fired plant operate would invest in carbon-free generation, I think the reality is different simply because the owners background, resources, and expertise is mostly inapplicable to fossil generation.  Those owners simply treat the auction cost as a tax.

In the real world, there is another problem if the cap and auction program actually constrains emissions.  Because RGGI is “successful” the latest program review reduced the number of allowances available in the future so we will conduct an experiment to see what happens.  Because the allowances were sold in an open auction anyone can purchase them[1].  There is a problem associated with the allowances purchased in the past and banked for future use (see posts here and here). At this time, non-compliance entities own the majority of the surplus or banked allowances that were sold in earlier auctions.  When the number of allowances available in future auctions is reduced, the inevitable result will be that entities that have compliance obligations will necessarily have to buy allowances on the market with the non-compliance entity knowing that it is a seller’s market.  Obviously, the price will increase markedly to the consumer’s disadvantage.

Finally, a constraining CO2 allowance program will cause the price of allowances and the ultimate cost of energy to consumers to go up in the best case, but in a worse case, allowances are unavailable and affected sources will simply not run.  However, in the worst case the reliability of the electric grid could be endangered if enough affected sources are unable to run.

[1] In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I own RGGI allowances that I purchased in an auction.

Not a Lot of People Know That on Carbon Taxes

I recently published a post on my concerns with carbon pricing schemes.  Subsequently Paul Homewood at the Not a Lot of People Know That blog described the flaws in an article supporting yet another carbon tax plan. This post describes Mr. Homewood’s description of the flaws because he brings up additional issues that I did not consider.  I have also included my comment on the original post and a reply to my comment.

AEP’s Carbon Tax Fantasy

Mr. Homewood commented on an opinion piece in the British Telegraph newspaper by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard supporting HR 763, the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act.  According to the article “this initiative by the Citizens Climate Lobby has the support of Democrats and Republicans in Congress. It has been endorsed by Alan Greenspan, the late Paul Volcker, and Nobel laureate Myron Scholes in the free market camp, and Janet Yellen, Amartya Sen, and Larry Summers on the interventionist side.”

Mr. Homewood described seven flaws in the proposal.  My comments in italics.

    1. The only logical reason for a carbon tax is to reduce emissions. Such a tax might help to reduce energy consumption, but only at punitive levels, because energy demand is so inelastic. Therefore, the real intention is to make fossil fuels so expensive that renewables can eventually become competitive, along with CCS, hydrogen heating etc. But when that happens, there are less emissions, and consequently less carbon tax revenue to redistribute. Meanwhile energy consumers will still have to face the extra cost of expensive renewables.
      • The point that energy demand is inelastic is important. Supporters of carbon taxes either underestimate energy demand change assuming, that people will use less or count on magical solutions that will cost less.  If they are wrong then society gets stuck with the higher costs.  I noted the problem with decreasing revenues over time in my post but did not pick up on the fact that consumers will be stuck with higher costs.
    1. It is well established that once governments get their hands on a new source of tax revenue, they don’t give it back. And that’s even before counting the cost of collecting and administering it.
      • I agree completely and should note that New York’s record with the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative revenues confirms this problem. Twice since the inception of that program New York has raided the revenues for the general fund.  Governor Cuomo has been circumspect – he simply diverts funds from RGGI to existing programs.
    1. AEP claims in this same article that the cost of renewables is already plunging. In that case why do wind and solar power still need subsidies, guarantees, and now apparently punitive carbon taxes to be able to compete?
      • Clearly this the case everywhere.
    1. His case for carbon taxes assumes that the world can run on predominantly unreliable renewable energy. So far, coal power has been squeezed out in Europe and the US through a combination of carbon pricing, air quality rules etc. But it has been largely replaced by extra gas fired generation. There is no evidence that gas and oil can in turn be replaced by wind and solar, and certainly not in the short time scales he has in mind.
        • The primary reason that coal is no longer used in New York is that natural gas is cheaper. My biggest concern with the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act mandate to eliminate fossil-fired generation from the electric sector by 2040 is the lack of a plan to do it.
    1. In the UK at least, the power sector only accounts for about a tenth of emissions. Most arise from heating, transport and industry. A carbon tax would have little effect on, for instance, domestic gas usage or car travel. (We do after all already have a punitive carbon tax on cars, called fuel duty – it has not encouraged us to buy EVs). AEP’s colleague Jeremy Warner wrote about carbon taxes a few weeks ago. He reckoned that a $75 carbon tax would raise natural gas prices by 70%. Does he really believe this is acceptable to millions of people up and down the country who are already struggling to make ends meet?  As the Committee on Climate Change accept, to switch domestic heating from gas to heat pumps or hydrogen will cost hundreds of billions, money which neither householders or government has.
      • These concerns should be red flags for the New York Independent System Operator’s proposal to have a carbon price just on the New York electricity market.
    1. If a punitive level of carbon tax really was introduced in Europe, the consequences would be earth shattering. The Gilets Jaune would look like a tea party in comparison with the riots such a policy would cause. As the squeeze took effect, people’s cost of living would be badly affected. At the same time, the economy would quickly tank, with companies contracting, shutting down or simply offshoring.

AEP talks about a “border carbon tax”, but this would make matters even worse. For a start it would put up prices for consumers even more. Secondly it would set off a highly damaging trade war, as China and the rest of Asia would not sit back and take it. There would be only one loser in such a war, and it would not be Asia.

In any event, an EU carbon tax and border tax would never get off the ground, as the East bloc would reject it out of hand. Why, after all, should their economies, which rely heavily on coal, be hamstrung to suit German and French Greens?

      • These are the leakage issues that I described in my original post. I agree that implementation of a carbon tax that actually drove behavior changes and investment decisions would be so expensive that protests and political changes would be inevitable.
    1. Of course, the bottom line with all of this is that a carbon tax would need to be truly global to have any real effect. Would anybody trust China, for instance, to institute a proper system, rather than some fake one which merely shuffled bits of paper around. Many other developing countries would be in the same position.  They won’t stop using fossil fuels, because they know that they work and renewables don’t. No amount of creative accounting will change that.  Maybe he thinks the UN could ultimately administer a carbon tax, collecting and redistributing the revenue itself. If so, heaven help us all!
      • I agree completely with this bottom line.

 My Comment

I commented (December 27, 2019 9:31 pm) with the following:

I agree that all carbon pricing schemes are flawed. I think that there are a number of practical reasons that carbon pricing will not work as theorized. Because a global program is impractical, leakage is always going to be a problem. The carbon price has to be set such that revenues over time increase significantly and either the funding to make reductions dries up or as you point out the rebates dry up. The economists who support this theory seem to be blissfully unaware of the reality of the energy market or how inelastic demand is. Based on observed emission reduction programs in New York I think that indirect market signals are going to lead to less cost-effective reductions in the time frame necessary for the aggressive reduction rules. Finally, no supporters seem to understand the very real problems of implementation logistics. More here https://wp.me/p8hgeb-gw.

Phoenix44 replied to my comment (December 28, 2019 9:20 am):

None of that is true. The simple point about a carbon tax is that it encourages markets to come up with solutions. Unless you believe there are no solutions, it is the best way of solving the problem. We can continue to argue on here that there is no problem, but nobody who matters is listening.

Refusing to then support the least damaging solution is I am sorry to say, stupid.

My reply comment to Phoenix44 (December 28, 2019 1:57 pm):

With all due respect I think you miss the point of our critiques.  Even if you believe that a carbon tax is the best solution, that does not mean that our criticisms are incorrect.  It just means that this theoretical solution is not perfect.  I believe that it can be claimed to be the best solution only if you can implement this across the globe and across all the energy sectors.  If that cannot be done, then to claim that it is the least damaging solution because it is the best theory is flawed.  At the link above I posted on this problem in New York.  Advocates claim this is the best theory so it should be least damaging when we apply it to just the electric sector, in just New York State.  I don’t think it is going to work.

So, what would I do to address your problem?  I believe that the only way to successfully de-carbonize is to make the alternatives cheaper with no subsidies or externalities considered.  One way to try to do that would be to have a small carbon tax on those that feel we have to do something and invest all that money in research and development for cheaper and safer alternatives – how about small modular thorium reactors or fusion?   If you want to electrify transportation then you need a cheap, environmentally benign battery too.  Unfortunately, there are those opposed to nuclear in any form and even oppose getting cheap, abundant electric power to those who don’t have it.  Ultimately that is the stupid position.

Conclusion

Despite all the theoretical advantages  of carbon pricing I believe that any carbon pricing scheme that gets implemented will suffer from the practical constraints that Mr. Homewood and I have described.  In New York, I believe direct funding of emission reduction efforts will be more cost-effective.  As noted in my reply comment I think that the only way to successfully de-carbonize is to make the alternatives cheaper with no subsidies or externalities considered.  If the real goal is to de-carbonize the world, then it would be far better for New York to mobilize its intellectual capital for research and development for cheaper alternatives than to try to use intermittent and diffuse renewable energy to make emissions reductions now.  Carbon pricing will not provide incentives for the breakthrough technology needed to solve the global problem.

NYISO Wind Generation Record Publicity

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) issued a press release on December 17, 2019 announcing a new wind generation record for the state.  I disagree with the tenor of the press release and this post explains why I think it is inappropriate.  It was a lost opportunity to educate the public about the magnitude of the effort needed to meet the State’s ambitious clean energy goals.

Press Release

The press release stated:

Strong winds across New York State over the weekend pushed electricity generated by wind power to a new record.

The new record output of 1,675 megawatts (MW) was set during the 11:00 p.m. hour on Saturday, December 14, eclipsing the previous record of 1,651 MW which was set during the 8:00 p.m. hour on April 26, 2019.

When overall wind production peaked at 1,675 MW on Saturday night, it provided 11% of all energy generation in New York. The record output represents 84% of the 1,985 MW of installed wind capacity in New York State.

One megawatt is approximately the amount of electricity required to supply 800 to 1,000 homes. Interested parties can track the NYISO’s real-time fuel mix on our website, www.nyiso.com.

In my opinion the press release is thinly veiled propaganda support for the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which includes a requirement to eliminate the use of fossil-fueled electric generation by 2040.  Announcing this record without qualifying the wind resources of New York gives the impression that the State is on track to meet that target.

Right off the bat note that the “record output represents 84% of the 1,985 MW of installed wind capacity in New York State.  Think about that.  The State has invested in wind energy and the best they have done is 84% of the total installed.  Unfortunately, when you look at the big picture serious problems show up.

Approach

I used two sources of data from NYISO to evaluate the existing New York wind energy resource.  For an overview I used the annual report that presents load and capacity data including historical and forecast seasonal peak demand, energy usage, and existing and proposed generation and transmission facilities.  The Load and Capacity Date Report or Gold Book is a featured report in the NYISO document library.  This post and a summary I posted in April 2019 use data in Table III-2 Existing Generating Facilities from those reports to describe the annual wind energy resources available.  Note that in 2018 all wind energy came from on-shore facilities.

The NYISO Real-Time Dashboard includes a window for the real-time fuel mix that includes the amount of wind generation being generated in the state.  The window also includes a link to historical data.  I downloaded data for all of 2018, sorted out the wind production numbers, and then calculated hourly averages to compare with the annual numbers from the Gold Book.  I use Statgraphics Centurion software from StatPoint Technologies, Inc. to do my statistical analyses and in this case I loaded the hourly data and calculated frequency distribution statistics.

Results

The NY 2018 Wind Facilities in the NYISO 2019 Gold Book table lists all the New York wind energy facilities.  The NYISO table provides the name plate ratings and 2018 net energy produced.  I used that information to calculate the annual capacity factor for each facility.  Note that there is a wide variation of capacity factors, that the highest is only 35.7%, and the state-wide capacity factor is only 24.5%.  In other words, New York wind facilities only provide a quarter of their name plate capacity.  So in the best hour wind energy has reached 84% of the nameplate capacity and over the year wind energy only produces only 24.5% of the possible power that could be produced.  But wait, there’s more.

Another wind-resource issue is the distribution of the hourly output.  The 2018 Hourly Wind Generation (MW) Frequency Distribution document lists frequency distribution data for all of 2018.  The histogram of wind output categories shows a skewed distribution such that low output is more frequent than high output.  The frequency tabulation for wind table shows that there were 10 hours when none of the 24 wind facilities in the state produced any power and that 32% of the time less than 200 MW per hour was produced.  The percentiles indicate that half the time hourly wind output is less than 346 MW and that for 876 hours (the tenth percentile) wind energy provides less than 49 MW of energy.

If New York has to rely on renewable energy in the future it is important to know the frequency distribution of wind at night when solar output is unavailable.  I used the New York City sunrise and sunset times and calculated when it was dark.  The 2018 Hourly Wind Generation (MW) Frequency Distribution at Night document lists the same statistics as before but only for night time hours.  While there was only one hour with no wind output and the frequency of hours with output less than 200 MW was down to 28% there still is a significant number of hours when there is no appreciable renewable energy being generated. The percentiles indicate that half the time at night hourly wind output is less than 367 MW and that for 876 hours (the tenth percentile) wind energy provides less than 65 MW of energy.  That means that energy storage is going to be absolutely necessary.

Conclusions

I think that the independent system operator has an obligation to the consumers of the state to tell it like it is.  This politically expedient press release did not mention any of the issues associated with wind energy relative to the CLCPA target.  Based on my results I am sure they could have easily found a day when the wind resources were weak.

I have no doubt that NYISO knows about these issues.  They know that the annual capacity factors are low.  I have never seen them publish the distribution of hourly wind output but I have to assume that they have looked at the resource in a similar manner.  I did not think it would be as bad as it is, and these results have important implications with respect to energy storage.  In an earlier post I estimated how much energy storage would be needed for one example period and the costs are startling.

Advocates for renewable power maintain that it is possible to address the problem of calm winds at one location by simply adding facilities in other locations where the wind is blowing.  If that were the case using New York resources the hourly distribution would not show that 5% of the time the total wind energy production for the entire state was less than 24 MW.  Furthermore, I suspect that even expanding the location of wind facilities to off-shore New York and adjoining jurisdictions is not going to significantly reduce the number of hours when wind resources are going to have to be supported by energy storage.  The fact that night time wind generation also shows significant hours with low levels exacerbates the need for energy storage because we cannot use solar to shave the amount needed.

I am very disappointed that NYISO ignored the opportunity to educate the public about the limitations of New York’s wind energy resource.  These results reinforce my position that New York State has to do a comprehensive analysis of the availability of renewable resources to determine a strategy for meeting demand with an all-renewable system.  Until that is complete, we are only guessing whether this can be done, much less how much this is all going to cost.  The NYISO should be pressing for this analysis and this was an opportunity to explain why it is necessary.

Generic Carbon Pricing Issues

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is currently campaigning for its Carbon Pricing Initiative as the preferred approach to meet the requirements of New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).  For example, they sponsored a blurb in the Politico New York Energy daily newsletter.  I have written extensively on my issues with the NYISO initiative and this post explains my concerns with carbon pricing schemes in general.

 The NYISO sponsored the following message in Politico New York Energy:

An increasing number of organizations recognize this unique, market-based solution as a viable, scalable option for helping to reduce carbon emissions. The World Economic Forum recently published an article by New York ISO, CEO Rich Dewey, Putting a Price on Carbon Will Help New York State Achieve a Clean Energy Future.

The World Economic Forum, an organization for public-private cooperation, engages the foremost political, business, cultural and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. New York, the 11th largest economy in the world, recently enacted the United States’ most aggressive climate change legislation. The New York ISO’s proposal for carbon pricing would embed a cost per ton of CO2 emissions in the sale of wholesale electricity, creating a price signal for investment in new clean energy resources. Read article.

Carbon pricing theory says that when the price of energy is raised by adding a cost for carbon, the increased costs at the higher CO2 emitting sources of energy will provide incentives to transition to lower or zero CO2 energy sources.  This is supposed to lead to the most cost-effective reductions.  I think that there are a number of practical reasons that carbon pricing will generally not work as theorized: leakage, revenues over time, theory vs. reality, market signal inefficiency, and implementation logistics.  Based on those concerns the NYISO plan is not going to solve anything in NYS.

Leakage

Leakage refers to the situation when a pollution reduction policy simply moves the pollution around rather than actually reducing it.  Ideally you want the carbon price to apply to all sectors across the globe so that cannot happen.  I don’t think a global carbon pricing scheme is ever going to happen because of the tradeoff between the benefits which are all long term versus the costs which are mostly short term.  I don’t see how anyone could ever come up with a pricing scheme that equitably addresses the gulf between the energy abundant “haves” and those who don’t have access to reliable energy such that “have nots” will be willing to pay more to catch up with those who have abundant energy.

Ultimately, I think that leakage will be a problem for any limited area carbon pricing policy.  Trying to force fit this global theory into the New York electricity market is an even more difficult problem.  As proposed, it will likely result in locational leakage where energy and emissions are not reduced but simply shift emission location within the inter-connected electric grid.   Additionally note that a carbon price on just the electric sector may result in leakage if more consumers generate their own power using unpriced fossil fuel.

Revenues Over Time

A fundamental problem with all carbon pricing schemes is that funds decrease over time as carbon emissions decrease unless the carbon price is adjusted significantly upwards over time.  This problem is exacerbated because over time reducing CO2 emissions becomes more difficult.  It has been observed that roughly 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes and everyone knows the meaning of low hanging fruit.  This has been observed with regard to New York’s observed CO2 emission reductions to date.  New York electric sector emissions dropped 56% between 1990 and 2016 mostly by retiring old units and fuel switching to lower emitting fuels.  It can be argued that those reductions would have happened anyway because retirements and fuel switching were lower cost options without even considering CO2 emissions.   Furthermore, I believe that air pollution control costs increase exponentially as efficiency increases which makes this issue even more problematic.

This difficulty should be even more of a concern with CO2 emission reductions because at some point replacing existing fossil-fired generation not only has to consider the direct power output conversion costs but must also address dispatchability and grid support costs.  When those costs are included there will be a sharp increase in total costs per CO2 reduced.  Like many others, the NYISO Carbon Pricing Initiative proposes to use the social cost of carbon (SCC) as the carbon price.  The SCC cost increases over time but the costs over time do not increase enough in my opinion to keep pace with the necessarily more expensive total costs to maintain reliable electricity to consumers.

Theory vs. Reality

Another problem with carbon pricing theory is that in practice affected sources may not act rationally or as theory expects.  The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a market-based carbon pricing program and I have written extensively on it.  The academic theory for RGGI market behavior is that affected sources will treat allowances as a storable commodity and act in their own best interest on that basis.  If that were true affected sources would be purchasing allowances for long-term needs and “playing” the market to maximize earnings.  In practice RGGI affected sources plan and operate on much shorter time frames and have shown no signs of making compliance obligations a profit center.

Carbon pricing theory claims that when the cost of using higher emitting energy increases that will provide incentives to develop alternatives and discourage continued use of existing resources.  However, these incentives are indirect and again assume rational behavior in the market.  While theory says that a company that currently operates a fossil-fired plant will change its business plan and develop a renewable energy facility to stay in business, there are a whole host of reasons why the company may not go that route and instead treat the carbon price as a tax and continue to operate with that constraint.  In my opinion RGGI did not induce any NYS companies to change their business plans.

Market Signal Inefficiency

I am also concerned because the carbon price signal is an indirect inducement for emission reductions. CO2 emission reduction efficiency is an issue based on New York’s experience in RGGI.  The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) report New York’s RGGI-Funded Programs Status Report – Semiannual Report through December 31, 2018 (“Status Report”) describes how New York invested the proceeds from the RGGI auctions.  That report lists the many programs that are funded using RGGI proceeds as shown in Table 2 Summary of Expected Cumulative Annualized Program Benefits through December 31, 2018. There are six program categories: Green Jobs – Green New York, Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energy, Community Clean Energy, Innovative GHG Abatement Strategies, and Clean Energy Fund.

I combined the data for the six program categories in the Consolidated Summary of Expected Cumulative Annualized Program Benefits through 31 December 2018 table.  It summarizes the emission reduction benefits and costs for those categories.  The cost per ton reduced ratio ranges from $167 to $3,437.  At the high end the GHG Abatement Strategies category emphasizes long-term research and development.  Because this research could lead to a cost breakthrough this funding can be justified.  Looking at the other categories it appears that the more investments are focused on direct reductions rather than indirect investments the better the cost benefit ratio.  For example, the best ratio ($167 per ton removed) is in Community Clean Energy and that category includes direct support for renewable energy projects.   The Energy Efficiency category is an example of indirect support because investments in this category do not directly reduce emissions.  Instead the investments reduce energy use which reduces the need for energy production and indirectly reduces emissions.  However, the cost per ton removed, $425, is markedly higher than the best category.

Theory says that the carbon price alone can incentivize lower emitting energy production and that the market choices will be more efficient than government mandated choices. However, as a result of these observations, I do not think that carbon pricing schemes, like the NYISO initiative, that raise the cost of energy and do not include specific funding aspects will work as efficiently in the short term and in limited markets like New York as theory suggests.  There are risks involved so who is going to make the investments and when will they make investments?

Implementation Logistics

Finally, I believe that there are significant logistical issues associated with carbon pricing that the NYISO process has simply ignored.  In order to set a carbon price, you have to know what the carbon emissions are for every source providing energy to the market.  For a global all-sector pricing scheme, you could set the price as the fuel is produced so that everyone pays the cost all the way through its end use.  On the other hand, the NYISO has to set the price as electric energy is sold on a real-time basis.  That is a non-trivial problem.  In New York, NYISO knows which generator is running and has a pretty good idea of their emission rate.  However, the final emission numbers are not available real-time because the emission values reported to prove compliance are not finalized until quality assurance post processing is complete and that can be months after the fact. The more significant problem is that NYISO has no way to calculate imported electricity carbon emissions on a real-time basis so cannot assign a carbon price value that accurately reflects how imported electricity is being generated.  These issues have been glossed over to date.

Conclusion

The NYISO claims that “An increasing number of organizations recognize this unique, market-based solution as a viable, scalable option for helping to reduce carbon emissions market-based solution”.  I frankly don’t think those organizations have had actual experience with a carbon pricing initiative logistics and have not evaluated whether the carbon prices proposed will provide the market signals necessary to spur the necessary renewable development needed to meet any CO2 emission reduction goals as a viable, scalable option for helping to reduce carbon emissions for the CLCPA.

The success of any carbon pricing scheme boils down to the question whether the carbon price set will provide enough of an incentive for projects that produce emission reductions that displace today’s generators and eventually covers the costs to provide the dispatchability and grid support functions provided by today’s generation mix. There are no estimates that this will be the case for the NYISO initiative.

In my opinion, NYISO carbon price initiative support is based on parochial interests.  In the case of NYISO they appear to believe it will simplify the cost accounting for New York’s renewable implementation efforts.  I think they have under-estimated the difficulty implementing the infrastructure necessary to accurately track the price of carbon and have ignored the potential that the complex scheme needed to reduce leakage will lead to unintended consequences.  Other support appears to be based on the potential to make money and it is not clear that is in the best interest of the State’s desire to reduce CO2 emissions as cost-effectively as possible.

The more I study the practical implementation of carbon pricing schemes the more skeptical I become.  I think that there are a number of practical reasons that carbon pricing will not work as theorized.  Because a global program is impractical, leakage is always going to be a problem.  The carbon price has to be set such that revenues over time increase significantly.  The economists who support this theory seem to be blissfully unaware of the reality of the energy market. Based on observed results I think that indirect market signals are going to lead to less cost-effective reductions in the time frame necessary for the aggressive reduction rules.  Finally, no supporters seem to understand the very real problems of implementation logistics.

Update December 30, 2019:  Please check out the companion post describing additional problems with carbon pricing raised by Paul Homewood at Not a Lot of People Know That blog.

Transportation Climate Initiative Polling Results

I have previously posted on the Transportation Climate Initiative and its disconnect with reality.  To this point its promoters and stakeholders have labored in obscurity all the while believing that they have a mandate from the public to change the transportation system significantly.  Now there is a poll out claiming that the majority of the public supports the plan.

Survey

A new survey from MassINC Polling Group purportedly shows broad support for the Transportation Climate Initiative.  According to the press release:

A new set of polls of registered voters across the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic finds broad support for a multi-state policy to cap carbon pollution from transportation and invest in transportation improvements. That policy is currently being developed by the Transportation and Climate Initiative (TCI), a collaboration between 12 states and the District of Columbia.

The research surveyed registered voters in the seven largest states at the TCI table: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Overall, 66% of voters said they would support the policy, while 23% were opposed. Support ranged from a high of 71% in New York to a low of 60% in Virginia.

“This is a complex policy, and so we took the time to explain the basics of how it would work and how states might use the funds generated by it,” said Steve Koczela, president of The MassINC Polling Group, which conducted the polls with support from the Barr Foundation. “Support was broad, stretching across demographic and party lines and throughout the region.”

Across nearly every demographic group, more voters support than oppose their state joining in the program. Support was highest about younger voters (78%), non-white voters (75%), and lower income voters. Women (69%) were slightly more supportive than men (63%). The partisan gap was smaller than is seen on many issues in the current polarized climate, with Democratic support outpacing Republican support.”

 Voters were also asked to rate several potential uses for the funds generated by the proposed program. While majorities supported each item, two rose to the top overall and across the seven states polled: improving public transit and protecting transportation infrastructure from the effects of climate change. Generally, investing the proceeds of the program in existing infrastructure was favored over seeding newer technologies like electric vehicles, targeting communities most effected by pollution, or insulating drivers from higher costs at the pump.

The polls also asked voters about their views of climate change:

                • 73% of voters across the region think climate change is probably happening;
                • Among those, 85% think it is due at least in part to human activity;
                • 66% think climate change will be a serious problem for their state if left unchecked;
                • 57% think the federal government is doing too little to address climate change; and
                • 44% think the same of their own state government.

Voters also understand that transportation is contributing to climate change. When asked to rank six sectors of their state’s economy based on their greenhouse gas emissions, 65% ranked transportation first or second.

Despite all this, only 48% cited addressing climate change as a “major priority” for state government in their state. More (64%) considered improving roads, highways and bridges a major priority, just below health care costs (73%) and jobs and the economy (71%).

The disconnect between voters’ professed concern about climate change and the priority they place on addressing it is consistent with other polling MPG has conducted on climate change. “We’ve seen in other polling on this issue that voters believe in climate change and support policies that would address it, though not always because of the link,” said Koczela. “They may not always rank climate as a top immediate concern, but they do support actions to address it.”

About the Poll

These results are based on a survey of 6,395 registered voters across seven Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Responses were collected via online survey interviewing November 12-19, 2019. Final survey data was weighted to known and estimated population parameters for each state’s registered voters by age, gender, race, education, geography, and party. Each state was then weighted to its relative proportion of registered voters to create an “Overall” regional average. This project was sponsored by The Barr Foundation.

My Thoughts

Steve Koczela, president of The MassINC Polling Group said “This is a complex policy, and so we took the time to explain the basics of how it would work and how states might use the funds generated by it”.  It is mind boggling to me that he never thought to include a question about costs.  Obviously if costs are low why wouldn’t everyone be in favor of “improving public transit and protecting transportation infrastructure from the effects of climate change”.

The published plan says that in December 2019 there will be a release of a regional policy proposal in the form of a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), accompanied by modeling results that estimate the energy and emissions implications of different cap levels and investment scenarios, as well as potential costs and benefits of different program design options.  When it is released then there can be a poll that determines how much appetite the public has when they know potential costs.  Until then any poll is suspect.

I have one other problem with the poll itself.  I was unable to find details about the geographic distribution but because the only geographical categories listed were by state, I doubt that there was consideration of urban vs. rural.  The fact is that rural respondents are not going to rate improvements to public transit very high because it is of no value to them.  On the other hand, the gasoline tax increase needed to fund the TCI will disproportionally disadvantage anyone who has no choice but to use their personal vehicle.  For example, the National Household Travel Survey estimated vehicle miles traveled in 2009.  In the TCI jurisdictions urban vehicles mile traveled totaled 386.55 million miles, suburban miles traveled were 666.36 million miles, and rural miles traveled 703.38 million miles.  Failure to account for that geographic difference makes the poll suspect.

Finally, I think there is a corollary to the concept that you can prove anything with statistics.  In particular, you can prove anything with a survey poll.  The Barr Foundation sponsored this poll.  Their website states:

“Climate change is real. It is happening. It is accelerating. All over the world, people are experiencing its effects. And these are becoming more devastating every year—a trend that can be checked only through dramatic, global effort.”

I believe they got what they paid for.

NYISO Winter Peak Analysis Implications to CLCPA

A new report prepared at the request of the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) addresses issues associated with an electric system reliant on renewable energy sources during the winter.  This post compares these results with my previous work related to New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) and discusses the implications on that law.

The Citizens Budget Commission developed an overview of the CLCPA targets in Green in Perspective: 6 Facts to Help New Yorkers Understand the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.  The goals of the law are truly aspirational:

Reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions:

      • Reduce GHG emissions to 60 percent of 1990 emissions levels in 2030;
      • Generate zero GHG emissions from electricity production by 2040; and
      • Ensure GHG emissions are less than 15 percent of 1990 emissions levels in 2050, with offsets to reduce net emissions to zero.
      • GHG offsets means that for every ton emitted into the air one ton is removed via GHG capture of some sort. For example, a company or individual can pay a landowner to leave trees standing that would otherwise be removed or plant additional trees to offset GHG emissions.

Increase renewable electricity:

      • Increase renewable sources to 70 percent by 2030; and

Develop or support:

      • 9 gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind electric generation by 2035;
      • 6 GW of distributed photovoltaic solar generation by 2025; and
      • 3 GW of energy storage capacity by 2030.
      • Conserve 185 trillion British thermal units (TBTUs) of annual end-use energy use by 2025, of which at least 20 percent should be from energy efficiency improvements in disadvantaged communities.
      • The CLCPA also requires between 35 percent and 40 percent of spending on clean energy or efficiency programs be in disadvantaged communities and mandates an air monitoring program in at least four such communities.

I have evaluated winter peak impacts in previous posts on New York Resource Adequacy Proceeding Comments, Solar Issues in Upstate New York , CLCPA Solar and Wind Capacity Requirements and CLCPA Energy Storage Requirements.  My primary concern is the requirement to generate zero GHG emissions from electricity sector production by 2040 coupled with the increased load needed to electrify the heating and transportation sectors enough to meet the 85% reduction by 2050 target.

Fuel and Energy Security In New York State Report

NYISO  had the Analysis Group do a forward-looking assessment of the fuel and energy security of the New York electric grid during winter operations.  The November 2019 final report was titled: Fuel and Energy Security In New York State: An Assessment of Winter Operational Risks for a Power System in Transition.  The objective was to assess winter fuel and energy security risks and identify key factors that would affect risks. Specifically, the study targeted potential reliability risks and impacts under severe winter conditions and adverse circumstances regarding system resources, physical disruptions, and fuel availability.  Importantly it is a snapshot of the winter of 2023-2024 before the CLCPA renewable energy and electrification of other sectors implementation really kicks in

Previously I have analyzed the effect of winter peaks and I chose 12/29/17 to 1/12/2018, a period that is included in their analysis.  The Analysis Group defined extreme weather events including the largest increase above average daily load over a long period as 14 days from 12/25/2017 to 1/8/2018 and more extreme shorter periods where they found in the last 25 years the fourth lowest 3-day cold snap was 1/4/2018 to 1/7/2018.  Then they evaluated different scenarios that included different combinations of “(a) timeframe for the development of new renewable resources; (b) capacity imports from neighboring regions; (c) potential retirement of units affected by the peaker rule; and (d) availability of natural gas for power generation”. The evaluation determined where these scenarios might cause problems.

The analysis included the following relevant conclusions (two key points underlined by my emphasis):

    • With the continued operation and availability of most of the assets currently expected to be in place in the winter of 2023/2024, the NY grid contains sufficient diversity and depth of fuel supply to support reliable winter operations. This result is consistent with the historical operating experience in recent past winters, including during severe weather conditions.
    • Meeting the state’s renewable and clean energy goals can provide valuable reliability support, and may be particularly true with respect to offshore wind. Delayed realization of renewable resource additions (as compared to the 2017 CARIS Phase 1, System Resource Shift case levels that are assumed under initial conditions) can lead to potential LOL events that would not otherwise occur when combined with other adverse system conditions. The potential magnitude and pace of change to the resource fleet stemming from requirements under the CLCPA may be of far greater importance for evaluation than the considerations, scenarios and physical disruptions evaluated in this fuel and energy security study with respect to winter operational risks.
    • The availability and contributions of adequate levels of natural gas-fired and oil-fired (or dual fuel) generating resources is necessary to maintain power system reliability in cold winter conditions in the near-term. This is particularly true for Long Island and New York City. Simply put, avoidance of potential loss of load events in these load centers, under plausible adverse winter conditions, requires operation of natural gas and oil-fired units. Reduction in the generation available from such resources – whether through capacity retirements, low initial oil inventories, reduction in natural gas availability for power generation, or interruptions in the ability to refuel oil tanks throughout the winter represents the most challenging circumstances for reliable winter system operations in New York over the coming years.

Implications for CLCPA

The analysis notes that the “potential magnitude and pace of change to the resource fleet stemming from requirements under the CLCPA may be of far greater importance for evaluation than the considerations, scenarios and physical disruptions evaluated in this fuel and energy security study with respect to winter operational risks”.  I agree because I believe that it is absolutely necessary for the State to prove that when the energy load increases when other sectors are electrified that fuel and energy security can be maintained without using fossil fuels.

The analysis also states that “Simply put, avoidance of potential loss of load events in these load centers, under plausible adverse winter conditions, requires operation of natural gas and oil-fired units”.  The CLCPA requirement that all electric energy must come from non-fossil fired sources in 2040 is an extraordinarily difficult goal to meet.  The political calculus to include this in legislation was not backed up by any analysis.  The state has to show how this can be done as soon as possible lest New York resources be squandered on an impossible quest.  As I show below, the actual renewable resource may not support this target because of logistical issues and even if it does there may be immense costs.

Need for Renewable Energy Resource Analysis

In my back of the envelope analysis of the summer peak energy storage requirements I used actual wind speed data to estimate the New York off-shore wind resource.  New York State awarded the first two contracts for off-shore wind projects in July 2019.  The Equinor 816 MW winning project press release said “The project is expected to be developed with 60-80 wind turbines, with an installed capacity of more than 10 MW each”.  Among the many details redacted in the public version of their proposal was specific information on the proposed wind turbines.  The public version included a diagram of the proposed wind turbine size as compared to the Chrysler building and showed that top tip of the blade at 250 m.  I estimated the hub height to be 173 m by scaling the drawing.  In this analysis I characterized wind energy output as a function of observed wind as follows.   I found a wind turbine power output variation curve that had a cut-in speed of 3.5 m/s and a cut-out wind speed of 25 m/s. Using that wind variation curve, I estimated that output of each 10.2 MW wind turbine will equal 0.971 times the wind speed minus 3.4.

For the input meteorological data, I found a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration buoy located 30 nautical miles south of Islip, NY (40°15’3″ N 73°9’52” W) that I used to represent NY offshore wind resource availability. The observed wind speed at the hub height is proportional to the logarithm of the height above ground.  For that calculation I assumed a hub height of 173 m and a surface roughness of 0.0003 using the buoy anemometer height of 4.9 m. I downloaded hourly NDBC data for 2018 and 2017 and calculated the wind energy output for every hour in the period 12/25/2017 to 1/8/2018 using that relationship and the wind turbine output variation equation I derived.

The key finding is that there were two no wind energy output periods on 3-4 January 2018 during an intense cold snap when electric load is high as shown in the New York Off-Shore Wind Generation Estimate for 9000 MW CLCPA Off-Shore Target table.  I was surprised to see that the wind resource went to zero during a high load period not only when the winds were light on January 3 but also when a deep low pressure developed and the wind speeds exceeded 25 m/s on the very next day.  The wind generation estimate table lists the output from a single 10.2 MW wind turbine, 80 turbines in the Equinor proposed wind facility and for all 9,000 MW of Cuomo’s CLCPA target of 9,000 MW of off-shore wind.  It is important to note that adding even more wind turbines still does not preclude the need for substantial energy storage.  While all the New York off-shore wind resource may not go to zero simultaneously that resource is going to be highly correlated across the available area so they all will track closely.

Conclusion

Every time I look at the meteorological data relative to the winter peak I get a surprise.  I expected that the winter observed peak load would occur during very cold weather associated with a slowly moving high pressure system that originated in the cold northern plains large enough to cover the entire northeastern US.  The resulting multi-day period of clear skies, light winds, and inherent cold temperatures would result in very high energy demand for heating.  The early January 2018 high load period was very different.  Weather maps for this period show (January 2018 Weather Maps) a relatively small high pressure system in the central US on January 2 that moved east ahead of a storm system on January 3.  The high pressure was strong enough over the New York offshore wind region that winds were less than 3.5 m/s for five hours on January 3.  However, the storm system moved eastward and re-developed into a strong storm just off the coast on January 4 with an eleven-hour period of greater than 25 m/s wind speed 13 hours after the light wind period ended.  By January 5 the storm had raced northeast to the Canadian Maritimes but was pumping cold air back across New York State.

This period must be analyzed in more detail by New York State to determine whether the CLCPA requirements endanger fuel and energy security.  If the assumptions I used for no wind power due to light winds and strong winds are correct then there will be 16 hours of no wind power in a 29-hour period during the coldest extended duration cold weather event that the Analysis Group identified after analyzing 25 years of data.  Furthermore, it also overlaps fourth worst 3-day cold snap.  The State needs to estimate what the future load will be when the home heating and transportation sectors are electrified to meet the CLCPA emission reduction goal and then assess whether renewable resources will be adequate during the entire extended duration period using the proprietary energy output information in the renewable energy proposals submitted to the State not only in the NYSERDA off-shore wind program but also the Article Ten applications.  This analysis has to be done for the entire state and obviously will lead to an estimate of the amount of energy storage necessary in 2040 when no electric energy from fossil-fired facilities is allowed.  It is not clear to me if there is enough space available where it is needed to site all the renewable and energy storage necessary.  Even if there is enough space, this analysis will provide the information needed to estimate how much all this will cost.

Frankly, it is laughable that the New York State legislature and Governor Cuomo enacted a law mandating specific energy and emission reduction goals without doing such an analysis first.  I believe it is time for the energy professionals in the State to step up and demand such an analysis before the State squanders money on a system design that can only be implemented with massive wind, solar and energy storage development.  Even if this system could be developed it will surely be expensive.  Just how much is anyone’s guess until such a study is completed.

CLCPA Renewables Needed for Doubled Electric Load

The Brattle Group recently released a report entitled “Achieving New England’s Ambitious 2050 Greenhouse Gas Reduction Goals Will Require Keeping the Foot on the Clean Energy Deployment Accelerator”.  The primary emphasis of this blog is on New York environmental and energy policy issues so this post applies their renewables needed estimate to the New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) requirements.

In particular, the Brattle report notes that in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the whole economy it will be necessary to electrify transportation and heating which will increase electric load.  They estimate that in order to meet New England’s goal of an 80% reduction by 2050 that electricity demand could be “twice the current level by 2050”.   I have yet to see any New York agency estimate of future load for the CLCPA so I decided to try to estimate how much renewable energy would be needed if New York electric load doubles by 2040 at the same time that New York electric load is supposed to eliminate fossil-fired generation.  I used that estimate to estimate how much renewable energy capacity (MW) in the form of on-shore wind, off-shore wind and solar could be needed in New York in 2040.  I determined how much power (MWh) was used in 2018, doubled that, and then guessed how the necessary capacity could be distributed between on-shore wind, off-shore wind and utility solar.

Brattle Key Findings

The Brattle Group prepared their report on behalf of the Coalition for Community Solar Access.  According to the news release there were several key findings:

      • Electricity will play a critical role in decarbonizing the New England economy. As a result, electricity demand will grow substantially and could well be twice the current level by 2050.
      • In supplying this growing demand for power, both solar photovoltaic (PV) and offshore wind will likely play a critical role.
      • Merely maintaining the current rate of clean energy resource deployment will cause the region to fall short of its targets. Currently planned clean energy resource generation for 2019–2030 in New England amounts to approximately 830 MW per year. This represents a significant increase from the historical generation of 280 MW per year from 2010–2018.
      • However, to achieve the 2050 targets, New England will need to accelerate clean energy resource additions to between 4 and 7 GW per year on average between 2021 and 2050.
      • To reach these levels, annual clean energy resource additions will need to continue to grow by approximately 9% per year through 2050.

Procedure

The first step is to determine how much generation was used in 2018.  I used the 2019 NYISO  Load & Capacity Report “Gold Book” Summary of Table III-3c 2018 Annual Net Energy Generation by Zone and Type to estimate 2018 energy generation by generator type and I have included a consolidated summary of data by fuel type.  Note that fossil fuel accounted for 41.9% of the generation in 2018.  Total load was 135,585 GWh so a 2040 doubled load will equal 271,170 GWh.

Estimating the feasibility for future development scenarios is difficult.  The Projected Net Energy Generation in 2040 table lists the assumptions I made to determine how New York generation could meet the doubled load.  There are three main components of the response: expand output from pumped storage and conventional hydro, maintain nuclear, and expand renewable combustion (landfill gas and municipal waste incineration); reduce load through energy efficiency, tighter codes & standards, behind-the meter (BTM) distributed solar and BTM non-solar distributed generation; and utility scale on-shore wind, off-shore wind and solar.

In the first component I estimated future generation as a function of fuel type.  The CLCPA law requires that all fossil-fired electric generation be replaced by 2040 so I zeroed out potential generation in those categories.  Although I have seen claims that additional hydro generation can be developed, I doubt that those resources could ever exceed a 10% increase over current levels.  In 2040 I estimated that only Nine Mile 2 nuclear would be operating because all the other nuclear generating stations would be over 60 years old.  The renewable combustion category includes internal combustion from landfill gas as well as wood and refuse fired steam generators.  I assumed that those resources could only increase 10% over current levels.  The result is that Component 1 can only cover 18.4% of the estimated load.

Reducing energy use through energy efficiency, improvements in codes and standards for energy use, behind the meter solar, and behind the meter non-solar distributed generation will reduce the amount of energy needed in Component 2.  Table I-b: Summary of NYCA Annual Energy Forecasts in the Gold Book lists GWh projections for these categories in 2040. The Gold book also includes tables that provide the net energy and the estimated capacity for each of these categories.  Since the publication of the 2019 Gold Book, the distributed solar deployment target was increased to 6,000 megawatts by 2025, up from 3,000 megawatts by 2023.  I adjusted my projection for that by assuming 6,000 MW in 2025, that observed energy per capacity would remain the same and that the annual increase after 2025 would be the same as the Gold Book projection.  Instead of 5,928 GWh from 4,525 MW of distributed BTM solar I estimate 9,847 GWh from 7,517 MW in 2040. The result is that Component 2 can only cover 13.6% of the estimated load.

The last component of the expected load is utility-scale wind and solar. On the basis of the assumptions for components 1 and 2, these resources will have to provide 68% of the load or 184,285 GWh.  In my opinion, this requirement will lead to a large increase in imported generation but if we assume that is not the case, this will require a massive buildout of large renewables.  In round numbers this buildout will require development of 9,214 GWh of generation output per year as shown in the Projected Renewable Energy Resources Needed to Meet Doubled Annual Electric Load in 2040 table.

In order to determine how much capacity will have to be developed to generate that much energy capacity factors have to be used.  In 2018, 1,739 MW of on-shore wind produced 3,985 GWh of net energy and 32 MW of utility solar produced 49 GWh of net energy.  Those observed values can be used to determine an on-shore wind capacity factor of 26% and a utility solar capacity factor of 17%.  I assumed those capacity factors for 2040.  Off-shore wind capacity will be developed by 2040 and I assumed a capacity factor of 50% based on the NYSERDA assumption for its recent awards. Using those capacity factors, I arbitrarily picked an annual development rate to meet the 9,214 GWh annual rate target.  I calculated that 1,050 MW of on-shore wind, 1,500 MW of utility solar and 1,050 MW of off-shore wind which will generate 9,293 GWh additional energy per year which exceeds the target development rate.

Sanity Check

One question is whether my arbitrary future renewable energy choices are reasonable.  I compare those numbers to an earlier wind analysis and NYS announced projects below.

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory sponsored the Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study (EWITS) and that report includes an estimate of future NY wind requirements.  The study was designed to examine the operational impact of up to 20% to 30% wind energy penetration on the bulk power system in the Eastern Interconnection of the United States. It included development of a database of wind resource and plant output data for the eastern United States.  One of the scenarios modeled 30% penetration of wind energy into the total energy consumed.  The scenario was labeled “Aggressive On- and Offshore” and required “a substantial amount of the higher quality wind resource in the NREL database” and noted that a “large amount of offshore generation is needed to reach the target energy level”.  The total wind capacity projected for the New York State Independent System Operator to meet a 30% penetration level was 23,167 MW of on-shore wind and 9,280 MW of off-shore wind.  The total on-shore wind capacity projected for the arbitrary choice is 20,000 MW and that compares well with the EWITS value, but the arbitrary choice for total off-shore wind is 23,000 MW more than double the EWITS value.

Another sanity check is to compare the annual generation development predicted with the queue of New York Projects.  In New York all utility scale projects over 25 MW are required to go through an Article 10 review process.  As part of that process all the projects in the review queue are tracked.  The New York State Department of Public Service Article Ten Project Queue table lists the MW capacity for projects summed by technology proposed categories and the year the permitting process began.  In the best year 1,478 MW if wind projects started permitting and in 2019 to date there have been 3,193 MW of solar and solar plus storage projects have started permitting.  Therefore, it appears that my guess that 1,050 MW of on-shore wind and 1,500 MW of utility solar development per year is possible.

Conclusion

The Brattle estimate for the additional energy needed to power all the electrification necessary to reduce CO2 emissions in New England by 80% is double the current load.  Thus, when New York State gets around to proposing how much energy might be necessary for the CLCPA, it is not unreasonable to expect that it will be at least two times the current amount.

At some point the intermittent and diffuse nature of renewables will have to be addressed.  Because renewables are intermittent, storage to cover light winds and low solar irradiance will be required.  Because they are diffuse transmission links to move the power as needed are also required.  As a result, the renewable generating facilities will not only have to replace existing fossil-fired dispatchable load but also provide support to the transmission system that is currently provided by those facilities.  I believe that will add to the amount of renewables needed.

When New York State gets around to proposing how much energy might be necessary for the CLCPA, it is not unreasonable to expect that it will be at least two times the current amount.  The wild guess estimate of the renewable capacity does not appear to exceed any feasibility threshold but there are some caveats.  For all components of the proposed response the problem of diminished returns on investment cannot be dismissed.  For example, it is not unreasonable to expect that the best on-shore wind development sites will be developed first and may in fact be already developed.  Consequently, later developments are going to have to go to sites with a lower potential wind resource so the capacity factor for future developments will be reduced.  The same problem should be expected for distributed solar, utility solar, and energy efficiency investments.

There are other issues of course.  First, and foremost, is cost.  There are also logistical issues developing this much renewable energy over this time frame.  Finally, note that given that the expected lifetime of these renewable projects is on the order of 20 to 25 years, there will be an eventual de-commissioning and re-development steady-state of constant investments required forever in the future.

Hay Harvest Climate Trend?

At a recent meeting I ran into Lois New who, before she retired, was the Director of the New York Department of Environmental Conservation’s Office of Climate Change.  I have known her for years and we worked together during RGGI stakeholder meetings. During our conversation she mentioned that her neighboring farmers were seeing the effects of climate change because they were having more trouble getting hay in before winter.  I said I thought it was more likely weather, she disagreed, and that ended the conversation.  This post looks at data to see if there is, in fact, a climatic trend for worse weather for haying.

First, let’s define weather and climate.  According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Ocean Service “Weather reflects short-term conditions of the atmosphere while climate is the average daily weather for an extended period of time at a certain location.”  The referenced article goes on to explain “Climate is what you expect, weather is what you get.”

New York State policy is all in that there is an imminent and inevitable climate change catastrophe that can only be averted if we do something.  In this case New York’s version of doing something is the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was enacted last summer.  It is described as “the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country”.  When Governor Cuomo signed the bill he said:

“The environment and climate change are the most critically important policy priorities we face.  They literally will determine the future – or the lack thereof. Even in today’s chaos of political pandering and hyperbole there are still facts, data and evidence – and climate change is an undeniable scientific fact.”

In order to rationalize these statements Governor Cuomo has a long history of attributing any observed unusual or extreme weather to climate change’s effects being seen today.

Paul Homewood at the Not a Lot of People Know That web page authored a couple of recent articles slamming NY Governor Cuomo for a couple of examples. The first article points out that his statement that “we did not use to have hurricanes, we did not have super storms, we did not have tornadoes” is dead wrong.  The second article entitled “Cuomo’s Fake Claims About Extreme Rainfall” noted that Cuomo implied in an MSNBC interview (referenced in the blog post) that extreme rainfall was getting much worse in NY State.  However, Homewood showed that “there is absolutely no evidence of that at all” at the long running Ithaca station or a New York City station.

As a member of the Governor’s inner climate circle Ms. New must have been a part of the public relations campaign justifying the CLCPA.  Her claim that farmers cannot complete harvesting hay because of climate change is entirely consistent.  This post will look at the facts, data, and evidence that there is a climate effect on haying.   Homewood referenced a link to precipitation data at http://climod2.nrcc.cornell.edu/ which is what I needed to do this analysis.

Approach

According to Mother Earth News in a Guide to Growing, Harvesting and Baling Hay “there are three steps involved in turning a green crop into what can rightfully be called hay:

      1. Cutting (followed by partial drying.)
      2. Windrowing (followed by further drying.)
      3. Baling hay or stacking hay.”

For our purposes the key is that freshly cut hay has to be dried because if hay is tied into tight bales when it still contains moisture it will go through a curing process that creates heat which can lead to self-combustion.  Therefore, farmers do not want to bale their cut crop until the moisture is less than 20%.  To do that the cut grass is allowed to dry for up to several days, then raked into rows and allowed to dry out most of the moisture.  Once dry then the hay can be baled.

The Northeast Regional Climate Center data sets provide processed values for temperature and precipitation for many observing sites in New York.  I chose to look at two stations with long records: Ithaca (1894-2019) and Mohonk House (1896-2019 with 1899 missing).  I downloaded the daily maximum, minimum, and average temperatures, precipitation amount, snowfall amount, snow depth and growing degree days.  A growing degree is the difference between average temperature in deg F and 50.  For example, if the average daily temperature is 60 deg F then there are ten daily growing degree days for that date.

I assumed that in order to harvest hay that the farmer would need to have at least four days when there was no precipitation greater than 0.05”.  Whenever that threshold was reached or exceeded the Harvest-Day parameter was set to one.  The total number of days that met this criterion in each month was summed along with the number of growing degree days per month for the growing season that I set as May through October.

I did a simple analysis of the two data sets.  I calculated the growing degrees and number of harvest days for each month in the growing season that I defined as May 1 to October 31.  I summed these values for the whole growing season.  I also summed values for the fall hay harvest season that I defined as August and September.  I fit a linear regression model to describe the relationship between growing degree days and hay harvest days by year for the whole growing season and just August and September. I use Statgraphics Centurion software from StatPoint Technologies, Inc. to do my statistical analyses because it enables the user to choose the best relationship from 27 different linear regression equations.  I determine which linear regression model provides the best fit and then use that model to describe the data. If the calculated probability value (P-value) is less than 0.05, there is a statistically significant relationship at the 95.0% confidence level and I defined the test result as significant. In addition, I calculated simple statistics to describe the two data sets.

Results

The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the claim that farmers are having more trouble getting their hay harvested because of climate change.  If that were in fact the case then we would primarily expect to see a trend in decreasing hay harvest days and to a lesser extent a decrease in the number of growing degree days.  The linear regression statistical results for two sites over the entire growing season and August and September were evaluated.  Overall eight tests were done with the following results:

Mohonk Growing Season hay-harvesting days

      • Insignificant reduction in the number of hay-harvesting days over the growing season

Mohonk Growing Season growing degree days

      • Significant increase in the number of growing degree days over the growing season

Mohonk August and September hay-harvesting days

      • Significant increase in the number of hay-harvesting days in August and September

Mohonk August and September growing degree days

      • Significant increase in the number of growing degree days in August and September

Ithaca Growing Season hay-harvest days

      • Significant reduction in number of hay-harvesting days over the growing season

Ithaca Growing Season growing degree days

      • Significant reduction in growing degree days over the growing season

Ithaca August and September hay-harvest days

      • Insignificant reduction in number of hay-harvesting days in August and September

Ithaca August and September growing degree days

      • Significant reduction in growing degree days in August and September

Of the eight tests: three were consistent with the hypothesis that getting hay harvested is getting more difficult because hay-harvesting days and growing degree days decreased, three were inconsistent with the hypothesis because hay-harvesting days and growing degree days increased, and two tests were statistically insignificant.  Note that if growing degree days are going down that is an indication that temperatures are cooling and not warming.

Another way to look at the climate change impact is to statistically evaluate the data.  The Ithaca Hay Season Climatological Normal and Last 30 Year Dataand the Mohonk House Hay Season Climatological Normal and Last 30 Year Data tables include climatological normal data, the last 30 years of data, and summary statistics.

I believe that one way to check climate change claim effects is to check the 30-year average from the beginning of the period of record with the 30-year average at the end of the period of record.  I also believe that there are multi-year weather cycles of differing lengths and if that is the case then arbitrarily picking these two periods may not be representative.  Therefore, consider this comparison with caution. At Mohonk House the growing season hay harvesting days decreased by two days but the August and September days increase by three days.  The Ithaca growing season hay harvesting days decrease by five days but the August and September days stayed the same.

Importantly, these data also indicate that there is a lot of inter-annual variation in hay harvesting days.  The standard deviation of the August and September data at Ithaca was 6, the minimum was 2 and the maximum was 28. At Mohonk House the standard deviation was 8, the minimum was 0 and the maximum was 43.  The difference between the first 30-years and the last 30-years is less than the standard deviation variation.  Therefore, I don’t think it is reasonable for anyone to claim that they can discern a climatic trend.

So why is there an impression that hay harvesting is getting worse?  A quick review of the last 30 years of data indicates to me that this impression is consistent with weather variations.  At Mohonk House in 2014 and 2015 there were a couple of years that were great for hay harvesting with half the days (31) in August and September suitable.  Jump forward to the last two years and there were only 11 and 12 days suitable.  In that short time frame of reference an alarming trend is evident.  However, also recall that the average number of hay harvesting days is 18 and with a standard deviation of 8.  So even though  2018 and 2019 data suggest there may be a problem, the data are within one standard deviation of the mean which means that they are well within natural variation observed since 1896.

Conclusion

The points that I want readers to remember are that climate numerical analysis results are likely ambiguous, picking a climatic trend out of weather records is not simple, and, most importantly, any statistically significant trends are likely smaller than the observed inter-annual variation.   As a result, anecdotal claims of observed changes of weather parameters due to climate change are likely biased and unsubstantiated.

This data analysis shows ambiguous results.  It suggests that there is conflicting support for a climate-change induced problem with hay harvesting in August and September.  Mohonk House data indicate a statistically significant trend in more days suitable for harvesting hay whereas Ithaca data indicate a trend towards less days suitable for harvesting hay but the trend is insignificant.  At both stations there is a negative statistically significant trend in the number of growing degree days.  Depending upon your intent, statistics can “prove” an argument that there is a problem or there isn’t a problem.

In order to do a comprehensive analysis to settle the question would take a lot of work.  Before doing any more analysis work, the evaluation data used should be confirmed as appropriate.  In order to represent the New York region adequately, stations across New York and the region would all have to be analyzed similarly.  It might also be appropriate to look at each month when haying is done.

I think the comparison of possible trends against inter-annual variation is illuminating.  If there is a climate change signal the difference between the first thirty years of the records with the last thirty years should show changes.  What differences that do exist are smaller than the observed variations.  All changes are less than one standard deviation from the mean.  I believe that this is a consistent problem for lines of the so-called evidence for climate change impacts observed in New York.

Based on this analysis I believe that anecdotal claims of observed changes of problems with hay weather parameters due to climate change are likely biased and unsupported by the data.  The variations noted and ascribed to climate change are in fact due to weather.

I also think that similar analyses of other claims would provide similar results.  The Governor’s claim “Even in today’s chaos of political pandering and hyperbole there are still facts, data and evidence – and climate change is an undeniable scientific fact” and his tendency to blame any unusual weather on climate change are not supported by this analysis.  In my opinion, careful evaluation of data and evidence for most of his claims would find similarly ambiguous and less certain results.

RGGI Lessons to Date – November 2019 Edition

I recently had a simple version of this RGGI article published at Whats Up with That .  This article provides more details and considers other issues with the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).  The program is ten years old and has been touted as a successful example of a “cap and dividend” pollution control program and now it is being proposed as the model for a similar control program in the Transportation Control Initiative (TCI).  This post looks at the numbers to see if this praise is warranted and whether RGGI is a good model for the proposed TCI.  Ultimately the question is whether any cap and trade program for carbon dioxide (CO2) can be successful.

I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception.  I blog about the details of the RGGI program because very few seem to want to provide any criticisms of the program. I have extensive experience with air pollution control theory and implementation having worked every cap and trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including the Acid Rain Program, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and several Nitrogen Oxide programs.  Note that my experience is exclusively on the industry side and the difference in perspective between affected sources trying to comply with the rules and economists opining about what they should be doing have important ramifications.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It is a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector.  According to a RGGI website: “The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances which are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs. Programs funded with RGGI investments have spanned a wide range of consumers, providing benefits and improvements to private homes, local businesses, multi-family housing, industrial facilities, community buildings, retail customers, and more.”

The RGGI states developed a cap during a long stakeholder process that was based on historical operations and emissions.  The cap is the regional budget for CO2 emissions.  The Nine-State RGGI Region Emissions, Original RGGI Cap, and the Adjusted RGGI Cap table lists observed emissions and two caps.  The original cap was developed before the fracking revolution changed the cost of natural gas such that it became significantly cheaper than coal and residual oil.  After natural gas prices dropped so much the original projections for emissions were so out of tune to what was happening the RGGI states developed an adjusted cap to account for that development.

In order to determine if RGGI is successful and a program to emulate let’s define some metrics.  The primary goal of the program is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from the electric generation sector so quantifying the emissions change from before the program to the present is a key metric.  Another appropriate metric is cost efficiency per ton of CO2 reduced compared to the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC).  This parameter is an estimate of the economic damages from emitting a ton of CO2 and is widely used to justify GHG programs.  For a comparison metric I will ignore issues with this parameter even though I agree with the following by Paul Driessen and Roger Bezdek: “The SCC assumes fossil-fuel-driven carbon dioxide emissions are causing dangerous manmade climate change, and blames U.S. emissions for every conceivable climate-related cost worldwide. But it fails even to mention, much less analyze, the tremendous and obvious benefits of using oil, gas and coal to power modern civilization.”

In addition to these metrics we have to look at lessons learned and considerations that are not yet resolved to determine whether RGGI is a good model for future control programs.  I address the following: the theory and reality of historical trading programs, control options for affected sources, allowance management, allowance ownership and allowance costs.  Most of these issues were not discussed in the What’s Up with That post.

Theory and Practice

I agree with the argument that economic incentives or market trading programs reduced emissions more cost-effectively than a command and control program.  However, it is instructive to look at the reasons why emission reductions occurred because the theory does not necessarily drive the observed reductions.  It is necessary to review historical performance of RGGI to determine why CO2 emissions reductions have occurred so we can reasonably expect a similar result in other applications like the TCI..

Let me first point out that there is a fundamental difference between the way affected sources operate in emissions trading markets and the way economic theory predicts they should operate.  I believe that electric generating affected source allowance management is different than theory because the affected sources do not treat allowances as a storable commodity or a financial asset in the usual sense of the term.  Instead allowance management is overwhelmingly driven by regulatory requirements for the current compliance period. i.e., do I have enough allowances to cover expected emissions?  Financially it is simply another cost of operating and not a potential profit center.  The important difference is that the academic economic theory holds that affected sources are looking years into the future, but in reality, there is no such long-term time horizon for affected sources.  Their decision on the quantity of allowances to buy is driven by their expected operations in the period between auctions and, at most, the entire compliance period.  Also note that most companies include a small margin for operational variations and regulatory compliance considerations. Because of the differences between the way affected sources operate and the way economic theory says they should operate, I have little faith in the models that predict future allowance margins.

The Acid Rain Program (ARP) was undoubtedly a successful program because it lowered emissions more than expected at far lower costs than predicted.  This program was open and transparent so all emissions and allowance data are available.  In order to meet the initial emission cap target of a 50% reduction, affected sources were awarded half of their historical emissions.  Although it is common practice to vilify this program for giving away the allowances for free the rationale is still valid today. The concept for the acid rain program was that power plants would install SO2 control equipment and if they over-controlled their emissions, they could sell the excess allowances earned to other facilities that could not install the control equipment as cost-effectively.  This approach incentivizes over-control because affect sources can subsidize control equipment investments they made by selling excess allowances.  This cost reduction efficiency brings down overall costs.   It turned out that fuel switching and technological improvements were so effective that far greater than expected reductions occurred.  Fuel switching occurred because technology to burn lower sulfur coal was developed and railroad de-regulation opened the market to transporting coal cost-effectively over very long distances. Another subtle point is that the ARP allowance bank was earned, that is to say excess allowances in the bank represent over-controlling emissions lower than the cap limits.

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGG) is a cap-and-invest program that has been touted as a model for a TCI cap-and-invest trading program because of its “success”.  Although the RGGI states claim that the program is open and transparent the fact is that there is no allowance ownership information available.  There is no question that CO2 emissions have come down in the RGGI states since the inception of the program but it is important to determine why they have come down.  I will address that point later on.  There is a fundamental difference in the way that affected sources treated RGGI as opposed to ARP, namely ARP was considered a control program and RGGI was considered a tax.  Because there are no cost-effective add-on controls for CO2 at existing power plants there are limited options to meet the cap.  Because allowances all have to be purchased and the incremental cost was low plant control programs to reduce CO2 through efficiency were not implemented.  The allowance bank does not represent earned reductions below the cap limits.  Instead the bank is made up of allowances purchased at auctions and on the market.  The RGGI states in their program reviews were very concerned that the allowance bank was large and have taken steps to adjust the allowances sold at auction to force the bank smaller.  In the naïve belief that RGGI investments significantly reduced emissions the RGGI states have also reduced the cap going forward.  As a result. RGGI going forward is going to be significantly different that RGGI in the past and that has ramification on its value as a model for TCI or any other future emissions trading program.

I noted above the distinction between the ARP “earned” allowance bank and the RGGI allowance bank.  Because the ARP affected sources over-controlled emissions below their cap levels, they earned the allowance bank.  That means the bank represents surplus allowances that are not needed for compliance so it does not matter who owns them.  On the other hand, all RGGI allowances were purchased at one time or another by anyone who offered a high enough price at an auction or on the market.  Because allowance ownership is not transparent, we only know the number of allowances owned in the following three categories:

      • Compliance-oriented entities are compliance entities that appear to acquire and hold allowances primarily to satisfy their compliance obligations.
      • Investors with Compliance Obligations are firms that have compliance obligations but which hold a number of allowances that exceeds their estimated compliance obligations by a margin suggesting they also buy for re-sale or some other investment purpose. These firms often transfer significant quantities of allowances to unaffiliated firms.
      • Investors without Compliance Obligations are firms without any compliance obligations.

To this point in 2019 the affected sources with compliance obligations have been able to get the allowances needed to cover their emissions from auctions and the market.  However, at some point going forward this will change and it will make a difference.  I have addressed the status of RGGI emissions and allowances elsewhere but briefly because the allowance cap is being reduced so much, the affected sources are going to have to go to the investors without compliance obligations.  This is uncharted territory and, at a minimum, I expect that the allowance prices will spike upwards.  Note that this price spike provides no dividends for CO2 reduction investments because the dividends are earned at the initial sale.  But it could be even worse if the entities without compliance obligations withhold allowances and create a shortage such that affected sources do not have enough allowances to run.

RGGI supporters who claim it is successful point to emission reductions of 40 to 50%.  In order to evaluate the RGGI emissions reduction claims I used data from the Environmental Protection Agency Clean Air Markets Division air markets program website.  Emissions data from the electric generating unit (EGU) sector are available from before RGGI started to the present, so I downloaded all the EGU data for the nine states currently in RGGI from 2006 until 2018.  In order to establish a baseline, I calculated the average of three years before the program started.  As shown in the RGGI Nine-State EPA CAMD Annual CO2 Emissions table the total emissions have decreased from over 127 million tons prior to the program to just under 75 million tons in 2018, for over a 40% decrease.  Note that these numbers are slightly different than the previous table because different sets of sources are used.

However, when you evaluate emissions by the primary fuel type burned it is obvious that emissions reductions from coal and oil generating are the primary reason why the emissions decreased.  Note that both coal and oil emissions have dropped over 80% since the baseline.  Natural gas increased but not nearly as much.  I believe that the fuel switch from coal and oil to natural gas occurred because natural gas was the cheaper fuel and had very little to do with RGGI because the CO2 allowance cost adder to the plant’s operating costs was relatively small.   There is no evidence that any affected source in RGGI installed add-on controls to reduce their CO2 emissions.  The only other option at a power plant is to become more efficient and burn less fuel.  However, because fuel costs are the biggest driver for operational costs that means efficiency projects to reduce fuel use means have always been considered by these sources.   Because the cost adder of the RGGI carbon price was relatively small I do not believe that any affected source installed an efficiency project as part of its RGGI compliance strategy.

As a result, the only reductions from RGGI that can be traced to the program are the reductions that result from direct investments of the RGGI auction proceeds. Information necessary to evaluate the performance of the RGGI investments is provided in the RGGI annual Investments of Proceeds update.  In order to determine reduction efficiency, I had to sum the values in the previous reports because the most recent report only reported lifetime benefits.  In order to account for future emission reductions against historical levels the annual reduction parameter must be used.  The Accumulated Annual Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Benefits table lists the sum of the annual avoided CO2 emissions generated by the RGGI investments from three previous reports.  The total of the annual reductions is 2,818,775 tons while the difference between the baseline of 2006 to 2008 compared to 2017 emissions is 59,508,436 tons.  The RGGI investments are only directly responsible for less than 5% of the total observed reductions!

In order to argue that RGGI emission reduction programs are a good investment relative to the expected societal cost of CO2 emissions the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) parameter can be used.  SCC values range widely depending on assumptions, but if you use a discount rate of 3% and consider global benefits like the Obama-era Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did then the 2020 SCC value is $50.  The Accumulated Annual Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Benefits table lists the data needed to calculate the RGGI CO2 reduction cost per ton.  From the start of the program in 2009 through 2017 RGGI has invested $2,527,635,414 and reduced annual CO2 emissions 2,818,775 tons.  The result, $897 per ton reduced, is 18 times than the current EPA SCC value for United States benefits.

There is another key lesson from RGGI that applies to any CO2 emissions marketing control program. There is an important difference between cap and trade programs for SO2 and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions and cap and invest programs for GHG emissions.  There are add-on control options for SO2 an NOx whereas there isn’t any cost-effective option for CO2.  In the ARP the affected sources could directly control their compliance.  In RGGI there were limited direct options for the affected sources and, going forward especially, they are going to have to rely on indirect reductions, i.e., someone will build a zero-emitting plant that displaces enough output from a fossil plant that enough allowances are available to cover the affected source requirements.  The ultimate control strategy for a emissions marketing CO2 control program is to run less and hope power is available from somebody else.

Conclusion

I believe that RGGI is not the success that its adherents believe. Based on the numbers there are some important caveats to the simplistic comparison of before and after emissions.  Fuel switching was the most effective driver of emissions reductions since the inception of RGGI.  Emission reductions from direct RGGI investments were only responsible for 5% of the observed reductions.  RGGI investments in emission reductions were not efficient at $897 per ton of CO2 removed.  In my opinion those are not the hallmarks of a successful program.

I want to highlight a related point.  In order to determine emission reduction efficiency from the RGGI investment reports, I had to sum the values in the previous reports because the most recent report only reported lifetime benefits.  The RGGI website only lists the lifetime benefits of RGGI investments in 2017 but those parameters are useless for the most obvious application.  In order to account for future emission reductions against historical levels the annual reduction parameter must be used.  It is hard to not believe that excluding the accumulated annual reductions was deliberate because the numbers are so poor.

As a model for future programs, RGGI successfully proved that a regional entity could implement a cap and auction program.  However, the actual cause of observed reductions and ability of affected sources to make the reductions proposed should be considered before other programs adopt the RGGI model.  I considered the use of the RGGI model in Transportation Climate Initiative Draft Framework Cap and Invest Caiazza Comments  that were submitted as part of their stakeholder process.  I concluded that there are so many differences between a program for mobile sources and electric generating units that simply implementing a tax and investing the proceeds as proposed would be less likely to have serious problems with unintended consequences and unanticipated issues.

As a result of the issues raised in this post, I believe that it is fair to ask whether any cap and trade program for CO2 can be successful if the ultimate goal is a significant reduction in emissions.  Because CO2 from fossil fuels is such an integral part of our lifestyles a large reduction in emissions is going to have to require changes in lifestyles.  Therefore, the question becomes will people accept lifestyle changes such as giving up the gas automobile with all its current advantages over any alternative as a result of indirect CO2 pricing?