PSL 66-P Petition Filing – Analysis of Future Utility Rates

The comment period for comments regarding the safety valve provision in New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p for the Renewable Energy Program in the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) recently ended.  I published a series of posts describing this process that was summarized in my most recent post.  Independent Intervenors Richard Ellenbogen, Constantine Kontogiannis, Francis Menton, and myself explained why we thought it would be appropriate to hold a hearing addressing the safety valve provisions in our filing.  We agreed that we would not submit technical arguments from all of us but we are all driven by a common motivator that when we see something outlandish, we have to respond.  Richard Ellenbogen’s filing describing an Artificial Intelligence (AI) analysis impact of the Climate Act on utility rates was initiated by such a trigger.

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to lawmakers, policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in New York State (NYS) energy policy.  He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where it has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system.  I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

Background

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Act.  It  provides that the Commission “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  This safety valve was included because even the lawmakers realized that it may not be possible to transition the electric system to “zero-emissions” by relying on renewable energy. 

In response to the PSL 66-P safety valve, Ellenbogen filed a description of his analysis of the results of other jurisdiction’s attempts to implement energy policies like the Climate Act.  His filing was titled: “An AI Analysis of the CLCPA that Shows it will raise Utility rates between 50% and 150% over the Next 40 years with no rate relief appearing for between 100 – 150 years, IF EVER” and was described:

“Prejudices Inherent in the drafting of the CLCPA Introduced a rigid framework, unsupported by scientific facts, that preclude better long-term solutions from both a carbon emissions standpoint and an economic frame of reference”.  He also submitted a spreadsheet that was developed by Perplexity in response to his queries.

This post is based on the filing and his email description circulated to his mailing list.  I have lightly edited his work for consistency.

AI Analysis Background

Both Ellenbogen and I have been using Perplexity AI more as a research tool and we are just starting to realize the potential of its use.  He explains how he used it for this analysis:

For the past three weeks, i have been sitting and asking energy related questions of Perplexity AI.  The questions were asked without bias and conditions were only added based upon responses from prior questions, although as I learned over time, the AI algorithm remembered all of the conditions without my asking and applied those to subsequent questions.

The paper covers everything that I could think of.  It has AI answers to the major problems facing NY State.  I added context to the answers to help people understand them and explain how we got here.

The questions were asked in plain English.  Some of the AI responses can be technical in places. 

The first 23 pages tell most of the story with the 50 pages of appendices adding context.  AI has become a frighteningly powerful tool.  Watching it generate code to answer some of the questions was comparable to what an incredibly fast human would do that could access information at a pace that no human could possibly do, let alone think of all the parameters needed. When I was building the spreadsheet, the second query was to add BESS to the calculation to make the wind dispatchable so that it would be more of an “apples to apples” comparison to the retooled gas plants.  I didn’t specify how much but the AI algorithm automatically researched it and found NYISO requirements and pulled those into the calculation.  It also was telling me what it was doing as it did it.

An experienced utility analyst looked at the spreadsheet and said, “That’s exactly what I used to do for the utility companies, except that would take at least a week.”  It took me an hour.  It was built from three queries and the AI wrote code,  produced results, checked conformity, found its errors, redid the code and checked conformity again until the results made numerical sense.  It took about 20 minutes for each question.  It then added the additional questions to the same spreadsheet and suggested more related questions to research. It could turn into an infinitely long research rabbit hole. When I asked about natural gas prices, it had remembered my questions about the LI gas plants and automatically related the pricing questions to those without my asking.  It inferred that was why I was asking.

I spent time checking the answers which accounted for much of the time writing the document.  I knew the answers to many of the questions before I asked them based upon extensive reading and almost fifty years of experience dealing with energy systems.  I am hoping that AI confirmation of the answers will make people realize that this is not ideological.

On a final note, I’m a tech geek and this technology is very useful but a little creepy.   When I was doing this, I felt like I was dealing with “Skynet”.  The rate of evolution of the technology is breathtaking, and I don’t think that I could have generated this report six months ago.

Ellenbogen’s Filing

Consistent with Ellenbogen’s use of AI, I submitted the following question to Perplexity: “Provide an overview summary of Ellenbogen’s filing that I can incorporate into a blog post. “ The following is the response:

Core thesis

Ellenbogen’s filing argues that New York’s CLCPA will drive very large, long‑lasting rate increases and will not deliver genuine rate relief for at least 100–150 years, if ever, under anything resembling realistic assumptions. He frames CLCPA as a capital‑heavy, prejudiced policy design that blocks cheaper and faster emission‑reduction options (notably repowered gas and nuclear), locking customers into a multi‑generation cost burden for modest climate benefits.

Australia as the warning case

A central plank is a detailed Australia comparison, which he uses as a “best possible” renewable case study to bound what New York can realistically expect. Australia has six times New York’s solar capacity, far higher solar capacity factors, far more land at a fraction of New York’s cost, and far lower heating loads, yet wholesale prices only clearly began trending down in 2024–2025 after roughly 20 years of policy implementation, and even then retail bills are only expected to fall about 5 percent over the next five years.

He then scales this experience to New York’s much worse fundamentals: four times the per‑capita heating load, roughly half the solar capacity factor, far less developable land, and much higher land and interconnection costs. On that basis, he argues New York would need 80–150 years before seeing durable rate relief, with residential rates rising on the order of 50–150 percent over the next 30–40 years and upstate households facing bill increases of 2,000–5,000 dollars per year at the peak of the transition.

Grid, labor, and supply‑chain constraints

The filing emphasizes that official NYSERDA/CLCPA planning assumes “ideal” supply chains and grid conditions that do not exist. He cites transformer shortages with multi‑year lead times, insufficient trained labor to electrify buildings and upgrade panels and substations, and local grid stress already appearing as “blue sky blackouts” in electrified pockets like the Albany area.

Because load from electrification is ramping faster than new dispatchable capacity and network reinforcements, he argues New York is replicating Victoria’s mistakes in Australia: voltage problems, constrained substations, and reliability risks driven by “electrify first, supply later” policy sequencing. His bottom line is that these constraints stretch the transition into a 40‑year or longer construction effort, add huge cost premiums, and push any hypothetical “payoff” far into the next century.

Cost comparisons: offshore wind, storage, and gas repowering

A major section uses an Excel LCOE framework, fed by AI‑generated parameter sets, to compare offshore wind plus batteries against repowered combined‑cycle gas at Long Island sites like Northport, Barrett, and Port Jefferson. Across a wide range of gas prices (current Henry Hub and 2–4× that level), the model shows that offshore wind plus 4–8 hours of battery storage remains substantially more expensive than repowered gas over 20‑ and 40‑year horizons, even after layering in a state carbon tax on gas.

He also notes that the wind‑plus‑storage cost stack in his base case does not include synchronous condensers and other stability equipment required in a heavily inverter‑based system, which would drive the renewable system cost even higher relative to combined‑cycle plants. In his framing, the oft‑repeated “renewables are cheaper” line collapses once you include the full system cost of firming, transmission, and stability equipment in a New York context, as opposed to Texas or Australia with far better wind and solar resource.

Nuclear and statute‑driven prejudice

Ellenbogen then asks, via AI prompts, what an unconstrained least‑cost, low‑carbon system for New York would look like over a 60‑year horizon. When the CLCPA’s statutory renewable carve‑outs and timelines are removed, the response (which he quotes extensively) favors a nuclear‑heavy system, with long‑life reactors providing 60–100 years of output at high capacity factors and lower firm system LCOE than “firmed renewables” once overbuild, storage cycling, replacements, and grid expansions are included.

He uses that to argue that the CLCPA embeds an explicit prejudice against nuclear and gas repowering by design, because it hard‑codes high penetrations of wind and solar irrespective of system cost, reliability, or practical feasibility. In his conclusions, he characterizes the CLCPA as an ideologically driven statute that overrides physics and engineering judgment, and he urges the PSC to invoke its PSL‑66 powers to pivot toward a combination of repowered gas as an interim 40–60‑year bridge and nuclear as the primary long‑term zero‑carbon backbone, with hydrogen‑fueled peakers using excess nuclear output as a complement.

Discussion

Ellenbogen’s email concludes that the analysis shows a very grim future for NY State if there is not a course correction.  He notes:

Hopefully, an impartial question and answer session with the world’s computer systems will alter the discussion and make people realize that if we proceed down this path, we will be increasing emissions while needlessly increasing costs in search of a holy grail that is not feasibly attainable in NY State’s climate.  As I have written on several occasions, the CLCPA was a college thought experiment about what could be done if there were no limitations on money, labor, supply chains, land, and if there was no public resistance to having large renewable installations located near their homes.  Unfortunately, our state government, and particularly Andrew Cuomo,  turned that thought experiment into public policy.  While the authors of the thought experiment considered it attainable, engineers in the energy industry understood that the concept was preposterous in NYS.

Conclusion

I have a great deal of respect for Ellenbogen because he has personally approached the challenge of decarbonization as an experiment.  His home and manufacturing facility were the subjects and included data monitoring systems for the test.  He knows what will work and his opposition to the Climate Act technology transition plan is based on what his experiment shows will not work. 

His use of AI is based on his experience and the results are consistent with what he has learned.  I recommend his entire analysis for the unconvinced.  This analysis is another great example why New York should conduct a PSL 66-P hearing to determine if renewable energy can provide safe, adequate, and affordable electricity in New York.

Independent Intervenor Filing in Support of PSL 66-P Safety Valve

Update: 5/3/2026

Here are the links in the DPS DMM System for our filing and the three exhibits

  • Filing in support of petition
  • Exhibit 1 documents the trend of New York customers in arrears
  • Exhibit 2 is the spreadsheet with the calculations and data for the results in Exhibit 1. 
  • Exhibit 3 responds to a public comment submitted by hundreds of individuals to illustrate why the stakeholder process must change for the hearing from that used in the Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan.

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) and includes a safety valve provision.  In posts published this week I provided a status update that provides extensive background information, a description of the Independent Intervenor filing describing how the hearing to address the safety valve should be handled, and described how the Independent Intervenors think the Public Service Commission should respond to the hundreds of identical comments prompted by advocacy organizations.  This post describes the filing the Independent Intervenors submitted in support of the petition for a safety valve hearing.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Act.  It  provides that the Commission “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  This safety valve was included because even the lawmakers realized that it may not be possible to transition the electric system to “zero-emissions” by relying on renewable energy.  New York State never followed up with a feasibility study proving that it could be done, never pointed to another jurisdiction that implemented such a system successfully, and has not provided clear and comprehensive cost estimates. 

I have joined Richard Ellenbogen, Constantine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (“Independent Intervenors”) submitting comments in a few Public Service Commission proceedings.  I am a retired utility meteorologist, with extensive electric energy and environmental regulatory analysis experience.   Ellenbogen is an electrical engineer who is President of Allied Converters where he has pioneered how “green” manufacturing can work.  Constantine Kontogiannis is an engineer who has decades of experience providing energy consulting services.  Menton is a retired lawyer and now writes articles on his Manhattan Contrarian blog that analyze New York’s energy transition.  We have no financial interest in Climate Act policy, have received no funding from any outside interests for our filings, and have invested thousands of hours of our time in efforts to explain why physics, engineering and economics prevent a Renewable Energy Program that powers a safe, adequate, and affordable electric system in New York State.

Petition Support

The Independent Intervenor filing argued that the Legislature included this safety valve precisely for the circumstances New York now faces.  Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates regardless of affordability or reliability constraints. However, PSL § 66-p is also a legal requirement, and it charges the PSC with implementing the Renewable Energy Program subject to feasibility safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability. We described four lines of evidence that support the need for the hearing.

Safe and Adequate Service Is Imperiled by Declining Reliability Margins

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) has documented a systematic deterioration of grid reliability since the Climate Act was enacted. NYISO data show a net loss of 2,041 MW of dispatchable capacity (4,315 MW retired versus 2,274 MW added). Fossil retirements are outpacing new supply additions, with additions largely consisting of intermittent renewables and limited-duration storage that cannot provide the firm, dispatchable capacity the grid requires.

NYISO’s 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) identifies an actionable reliability need in New York City beginning in 2033, with deficiencies ranging from 17 to 97 MW, and high-risk scenarios show the deficiency could begin as early as 2025 and grow to over 1,000 MW by 2034.  The “high‑risk scenarios” are from the RNA’s High Demand Forecast Scenario and related NYC risk scenarios documented in the 2024 RNA report’s “Exploring Uncertainty: Scenarios and Risks” section and detailed in Appendix E/F scenario figures and text. The 2025 Q3 Short-Term Assessment of Reliability (STAR) Report identifies a Zone J (NYC) summer 2027 reliability need requiring retention of peaker units scheduled for retirement. Statewide, NYISO projects that by 2034 there will be no surplus power without further development of reliable sources of electricity.

NYISO has officially stated that the dispatchable emission-free (DEFR) technologies needed to replace fossil generation “are not yet available on a commercial scale”. The CLCPA and Scoping Plan implicitly assume large volumes of firm zero-emission resources will be available, cost-effective, and sited in New York by 2040, but there is no clear procurement or market framework to ensure they materialize. This represents a technology and market design gap between what the CLCPA requires and what is under contract or in interconnection queues today.

The Renewable Energy Program depends heavily on transmission infrastructure that either does not exist, has been terminated, or faces severe uncertainty:

  • Clean Path NY terminated: NYSERDA and developers mutually agreed to suspend the Tier 4 REC Purchase and Sale Agreement in late November 2024 due to cost escalation. The PSC subsequently denied NYPA’s petition for Priority Transmission Project designation in August 2025. There are no plans to revive Clean Path NY.
  • Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) winter limitations: Although CHPE is in late-stage construction, NYISO’s Short-Term Reliability Process Report states that “the facility is not expected to provide any capacity in the winter.” The New England Clean Energy Connect experience during the January 2026 cold snap, where power flows from Québec largely collapsed, foreshadows this vulnerability. This is a serious failure of planning given the prospect that New York grid demand will peak in the winter rather than, as now, in the summer, if building and transportation electrification advances. 
  • Offshore wind transmission withdrawn: The PSC voted to withdraw the NYC Public Policy Transmission Need determination in July 2025, cancelling the process for delivering 4,770 to 8,000 MW of offshore wind into New York City. Proposal costs ranged from $7.9 billion to $23.9 billion.
  • Federal disruptions to offshore wind: The Trump administration’s stop-work orders on offshore wind projects and suspension of leasing have further compromised the transmission pathway for the mandated 9,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035.

NYISO has warned that without major transmission project completion, NYC reliability margins will become deficient. NYISO has concluded that cumulative factors — retirements, electrification, and delays — risk creating reliability metric violations incompatible with safe and adequate electric service.

The Affordability Crisis Demands a Hearing

The affordability evidence satisfies the PSL 66-p(4) threshold of “a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections.” As of December 2024, over 1.3 million New York households were behind on their energy bills by sixty days or more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion. Independent Intervenors have demonstrated that the increase in the number of accounts in arrears from 2019 before enactment of the CLCPA and 2024 are statistically significant for statewide totals and four of ten utilities.  We filed exhibits that updated the analysis through 2025. We found the same results.

The cost trajectory is alarming. The recently completed New York State Energy Plan found that Climate Act costs are expected to require $120 billion in annual energy system investments through 2040, equivalent to over $1,200 per month per household. NYSERDA’s own Energy Affordability analysis shows that Climate Act compliance adds approximately $594 per month (a 43% increase) for an upstate moderate-income household that fully electrifies.

Recent rate cases approved by the PSC between March 2025 and January 2026 for five major utilities have markedly increased residential electric bills, and as Kris Martin of NY Solar Divide has noted only “a small fraction of Climate Act expenses” have been incurred to date — the bulk will hit ratepayers in the next 5-10 years as onshore and offshore wind, grid-scale solar, and electrification mandates ramp up.

The State’s own Attorney General has acknowledged that achieving the 2030 target is “currently infeasible” and that “New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability”. DPS staff estimates that Climate Act residential impacts range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 monthly electric bills, and these estimates are widely considered conservative.

The PSC’s existing 6% energy burden target for low-income households lacks any tracking or compliance reporting mechanism. Despite the urgent need for clear affordability metrics, the Hochul Administration and Legislature have not adopted transparent tracking systems or mandatory corrective actions when affordability thresholds are exceeded.

Multiple Independent Sources Confirm the Need for a Hearing

The case for a hearing is supported by multiple independent, authoritative analyses:

  • NYISO: Reliability Needs Assessments, STAR Reports, and Power Trends documents consistently identify declining margins, capacity shortfalls, and transmission dependencies.
  • New York State Comptroller: The July 2024 audit found that PSC and NYSERDA plans “did not comprise all essential components, including assessing risks to meeting goals and projecting costs”.
  • DPS Biennial Review: Concluded that the 70% renewable target by 2030 “will likely not be achieved until 2033” and that a delay “may be unavoidable”.
  • State Energy Plan: Acknowledged that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient to meet statutory targets”.
  • DPS Second Informational Report: Identified four feasibility concerns, including that the 2030 target is “likely unattainable,” offshore wind faces “major obstacles,” transmission remains a “critical bottleneck,” and grid reliability challenges are “mounting”.
  • State Attorney General: Acknowledged on the record that the current implementation schedule creates unacceptable affordability liabilities.

Responding to Opposition Arguments

ACE NY and WE ACT have urged the Commission to reject this petition, suggesting that all progress would stop if a hearing were held. This characterization is inaccurate. PSL 66-p(4) authorizes temporary suspension or modification — not abandonment — of Climate Act obligations. A hearing represents pragmatic management to ensure safe, adequate, and affordable service while the clean energy transition continues. Refusing to invoke the safety valve does not eliminate the underlying reliability and affordability problems; it simply ensures they go unaddressed until a crisis forces emergency action.

The Commission Should Proceed Directly to a Hearing

The evidence presented by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, the Independent Intervenors, NYISO, the State Comptroller, and the State’s own agencies demonstrates that the statutory criteria for a PSL 66-p(4) hearing have been met. Our filing recommended that rather than further delaying action through an extended review period, the Commission should proceed expeditiously to conduct the hearing that the law contemplates.

At minimum, a hearing should:

  1. Establish clear affordability metrics — Define “safe and adequate electric service” and “significant increase in arrears” with specific, measurable criteria so that the safety valve operates as the Legislature intended.
  2. Evaluate reliability margins — Examine NYISO’s documented capacity shortfalls, transmission deficiencies, and the gap between policy assumptions and physical grid reality.
  3. Assess the technology gap — Determine whether the firm, zero-emission resources assumed by the CLCPA will be available on the timelines required.
  4. Review transmission status — Evaluate whether the termination of Clean Path NY, the winter limitations of CHPE, the withdrawal of the offshore wind PPTN, and federal disruptions collectively impede the ability to provide safe and adequate service.
  5. Require transparent cost reporting — Mandate that DPS and NYSERDA provide comprehensive, auditable cost projections covering all CLCPA implementation costs, not just utility rate case impacts.  NYSERDA should be instructed to develop comprehensive cost projections that reflect the total expense of meeting CLCPA mandates, rather than limiting estimates to individual CLCPA program elements.

On April 17, 2026, we filed a recommendation regarding the stakeholder process.  Our filing recommended that once everyone has had an equal chance to raise their concerns that the Commission categorize and prioritize the technical issues submitted and convene a technical hearing conference that resolves the substantive issues raised in comments.  Resolution of issues is necessary to assure New Yorkers that the PSL 66-P Renewable Energy Program can provide safe, adequate, and affordable electricity.

Conclusion

The Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world constraints. The Commission has both the authority and the obligation to act. I am relatively optimistic that the Commission will call for a hearing, but I am 100% sure that any decisions regarding the need to temporarily delay or modify the Renewable Energy Program obligations will not occur until after the election.

Climate Act Budget Status and Cap-and-Invest Program

This year’s New York budget negotiations include significant changes to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  One of the contentious issues is implementation of the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program.  This post addresses a misleading opinion piece published in the Albany Times Union by environmental organizations.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate an outline and draft for sections of this post.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040.

In a recent post I described several initiatives that have led Governor Hochul to suggest that the timeline for the Climate Act electric sector goals needs to be revised. Legislative leaders and Hochul have not yet announced a final climate plan deal.  Reporting as of April 19–21 describes a stalemate with ongoing behind‑closed‑doors talks rather than agreed‑upon bill text.  Environmental groups have rejected the proposed revisions to the Climate Act.

I believe that opinion pieces published in the Albany Times Union have an out-sized impact on negotiations in Albany simply because everyone sees what is published.  I also believe that the Times Union is biased towards the environmentalist side.  This post addresses the Governor Hochul is mispresenting our CLCPA lawsuit (“TU Letter”) piece published this week written by Josh Berman, senior attorney with the Sierra Club’s Environmental Law Program and Eric Walker, energy justice senior policy manager at WE ACT for Environmental Justice.  I do not think that the Times Union will publish a response to  the op-ed that is long enough to rebut what I think is a misleading opinion.

NYCI Lawsuit

The first argument in the TU Letter describes the author’s rationale for the lawsuit.  I will only address the claims associated with NYCI. The letter states:

The governor asserts that only a cap-and-invest program with no checks on cost will satisfy the law and litigants. This is false.

The Preliminary Statement in the litigation Petition filed by the authors clearly states that they wanted to ensure that the emission reduction requirements were achieved. 

Statement 2 states that

Although the climate law sets mandatory limits on New York’s statewide greenhouse gas emissions, it does not specify how the emissions reductions will occur or obligate any polluting entity to reduce emissions. Instead, the Legislature directed the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) to give the law teeth by issuing regulations that ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates.

Statement 2 states that

Although the climate law sets mandatory limits on New York’s statewide greenhouse gas emissions, it does not specify how the emissions reductions will occur or obligate any polluting entity to reduce emissions. Instead, the Legislature directed the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) to give the law teeth by issuing regulations that ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates.

Statement 10 states that

DEC’s abdication of its statutory duties is unlawful and critically threatens the state’s ability to achieve the emissions reductions requirements of the CLCPA. DEC’s failure to implement the Legislature’s directive is also endangering Petitioners’ members who continue to breathe dirty air, suffer from pollution-related illnesses, and face economic barriers in their efforts to protect themselves and their communities by replacing fossil fuel-burning equipment with clean new technology. The state must not be allowed to continue to violate the law by withholding a climate solution that it has deemed necessary to achieve the greenhouse gas reduction targets of the climate law and that it estimates will prevent many premature deaths and asthma-related emergency room visits each year.

The litigation clearly states that they sued to ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates. 

The petition also describes the timeline of the regulatory process.  It started in 2023 with the release of draft regulations and public meetings.  Of particular interest was the June 1, 2023 pre-proposal Cap-and-Invest overview session because DEC requested feedback on the Cost Containment Reserve (CCR) program stability mechanism.  As described in the NYCI Second Stage Outreach: Preliminary Analysis Overview Preliminary Analysis on January 26, 2024, the CCR is a price control mechanism.  If the bidding price reaches a preset trigger limit, additional allowances would be released to the market.  That results in lower prices.  However, the CCR is a pool of extra allowances that is only used if the trigger price is exceeded and that means that the cap will be exceeded if used.  I

I always felt that this was an inconsistency that would eventually cause problems.  Proponents of the economy-wide cap-and-invest approach presumed compliance with the Climate Act mandates, but this affordability mechanism would cause non-compliance.  Frankly, I do not think that the litigants understood that this provision was inconsistent with their desire to ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates. 

As the petition notes everyone understood at the end of 2024 that the regulations were ready and would be released in January 2025.  That did not happen.  The only regulation released was the greenhouse gas emission reporting rule and that was months later.  The cap-and-invest rule regulation was put on hold and on March 31, 2025 the litigants filed the petition demanding that the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) issue the draft regulations.

In October 2025, the New York Supreme Court issued a decision ordering the DEC to either issue the regulations or revise the regulations.  DEC appealed the decision, a hearing was held in the last month, but no decision has been made. 

However, this is an election year and the Governor is pushing an affordability agenda.  David Caralfamo described the political theater that preceded the budget deliberations:  “Two days after Governor Hochul’s own budget director stood up at a hearing and all but announced that CLCPA rollbacks were coming, a conveniently alarming memo from NYSERDA — dated the very same day — found its way into the press.”  The NYSERDA memo was allegedly a new analysis, but I believe that these numbers have been available since early 2024 and were the driver for the recommendation to include the CCR mechanism.  That is the key.  These are the cost estimates for NYCI without the CCR which will necessarily increase the costs but is also the only way to ensure compliance.

NYCI Affordability

The TU Letter addresses Hochul’s affordability arguments:

Hochul appears to have forgotten that many of our groups had expressed support for a program that controlled for cost and would have lowered energy bills by over $1,000 a year for families making under $200,000. That’s not our number; it’s based on two independent research reports. There is no reason such a program cannot move forward now.

I addressed those “independent research reports” when they came out.  I believe they are referring to a January 2025 report titled New York’s Affordable Energy Future and a January 2026 report titled Investments for New York’s Future.  In my opinion described research reports as “independent” when they were sponsored by the authors’ organizations is misrepresentation.  The 2025 report was funded in part by WE ACT for Environmental Justice and the 2026 report was funded by EDF.  Moreover, there was no independent peer review of the reports so they are not unbiased independent analyses.

I raised a number of concerns with the 2025 analysis by Switchbox. I found that while the report does acknowledge that cap-and-invest alone won’t achieve the 2050 goals (which is honest), it doesn’t adequately address a critical problem: the proposed investments cannot achieve the required annual emission reduction rates to meet 2030 targets. I showed that under Scenario C (lower revenue), the program falls short of the 2030 goal entirely, and neither scenario achieves the 2050 target.

The bigger problem, and one that exemplifies the authors’ presumptions about NYCI, is that fundamental feasibility problems are not addressed.  The authors assume compliance as a matter of faith and ignore reality. There are no add-on controls that achieve zero emissions for any sector. The only strategy is to convert to different energy sources, which takes time and is partially outside the control of compliance entities.  The political timeline of the Climate Act has never been evaluated for feasibility and the record since 2019 proves that it is impossible. 

Another feasibility aspect is the cost-effectiveness of controls.  I showed that using New York’s experience with Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative proceeds that the proposed spending allocations will not provide meaningful reductions.  Furthermore, in the book Making Climate Policy Work, the authors argue that the level of expenditures needed to implement the net-zero transition vastly exceeds the “funds that can be readily appropriated from market mechanisms”. 

The TU Letter and this report don’t acknowledge what happens if the program fails to meet emission reduction targets. Organizations don’t voluntarily violate compliance requirements, and the penalties are severe. If the schedule or technologies aren’t feasible, the only remaining option is to simply stop selling fuel or generating power.  This could create an artificial energy shortage with serious consequences as the only way to comply with the regulations.

I concluded that while Switchbox is more transparent than some analyses in acknowledging price ceiling limitations, it remains advocacy research designed to support a predetermined conclusion. It overstates benefits while downplaying the fundamental feasibility challenges of meeting Climate Act targets, and it doesn’t adequately address whether the proposed investments can actually deliver the emission reductions needed—especially by 2030.

I also reviewed the2026 EDF Investments for New York’s Future report and found that it was advocacy research, not independent analysis. I showed that:

  • Greenline Insights explicitly states they “develop compelling research questions and build the right mix of tools to answer them” – which I interpret as getting the results clients want
  • EDF has been actively lobbying for cap-and-invest since 2023 and has a vested interest in the program’s success
  • They strategically rebranded the program as the “Clean Air Initiative” (CAI) instead of using the official “New York Cap-and-Invest” (NYCI) terminology – a deliberate messaging strategy

I also explained that the methodology has serious flaws:

  • The analysis doesn’t account for opportunity costs—what else could be done with those resources
  • It assumes idle economic resources, which is unrealistic in a full employment economy
  • It measures “gross economic activity” without subtracting displaced economic activity elsewhere
  • It’s missing “the Missing Peter Problem”—robbing Peter (existing economy) to pay Paul (clean energy sector) while claiming total growth

I also showed that the economic projections are questionable and concluded that the report is simply a lobbying presentation that was commissioned by EDF. The benefits are overstated, the costs are minimized, if not ignored, and the methodology is sketchy.

Discussion

The TU Letter was published without qualification at a critical time in the Climate Act revision negotiations by the organizations that sued the DEC to release the NYCI regulations.  It is ironic that the unintended consequence of their successful lawsuit turned into political cover for the Governor to argue that NYCI would be unaffordable.  However, the TU Letter attempt to resolve the perverse result of their actions is flawed and their arguments that the Climate Act does not need to be changed are without merit.

Their lawsuit explicitly demanded NYCI regulations that “ensure the state achieves its statutory greenhouse gas reduction mandates”.  The authors of the TU Letter disagree with the presumption that “only a cap-and-invest program with no checks on cost” will satisfy the law and their litigation.  However, I showed that the CCR checks on cost mechanism in the pre-proposal documents was incompatible with ensuring compliance with the reduction mandates. 

The two reports referenced in the TU Letter do not provide credible affordability mechanisms.  Moreover, the reports do not acknowledge that the CCR mechanism is necessary to keep the costs palatable.  The NYSERDA memo with the high costs that Hochul cites as the reason that revisions to the rule are necessary simply shows costs for NYCI without the CCR mechanism.

Conclusion

This opinion piece offers no credible reasons why New York State should not be considering revisions to the Climate Act but got published in Albany while negotiations are underway.   I plan to submit a letter to the editor of the Times Union summarizing this post.  Unfortunately, a word limited summary could not incorporate the explanations why this letter was flawed even if it was accepted.  This is a perfect example of the BS Asymmetry Principle: Alberto Brandolini: “The amount of energy necessary to refute BS is an order of magnitude bigger than to produce it.”

PSL 66-P Safety Valve Advocacy Comments  

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Act and includes a safety valve provision.  In posts published this week I provided a status update that provides extensive background information and a description of the Independent Intervenor filing describing how the hearing to address the safety valve should be handled.  This post explains how the Independent Intervenors think the Public Service Commission should respond to the hundreds of identical comments prompted by advocacy organizations.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Act.  It  provides that the Commission “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  This safety valve was included because even the lawmakers realized that it may not be possible to transition the electric system to “zero-emissions” by relying on renewable energy.  New York State never followed up with a feasibility study proving that it could be done, never pointed to another jurisdiction that implemented such a system successfully, and has not provided clear and comprehensive cost estimates. 

I have joined Richard Ellenbogen, Constantine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (“Independent Intervenors”) submitting comments in a few Public Service Commission proceedings.  I am a retired utility meteorologist, with extensive electric energy and environmental regulatory analysis experience.   Ellenbogen is an electrical engineer who is President of Allied Converters where he has pioneered how “green” manufacturing can work.  Constantine Kontogiannis is an engineer who has decades of experience providing energy consulting services.  Menton is a retired lawyer and now writes articles on his Manhattan Contrarian blog that analyze New York’s energy transition.  We have no financial interest in the Climate Act, have received no funding from any outside interests, and have invested thousands of hours of our time in efforts to explain why physics, engineering and economics prevent a Renewable Energy Program that powers a safe, adequate, and affordable electric system in New York State.

The Problem

As I explained in my previous post, the Independent Intervenors filed a petition on April 17, 2026 recommending that the stakeholder process for the PSL 66-P hearing should differ from the process used in the Scoping Plan and the Energy Plan.  In those proceedings the response to comments was handled by the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA).  NYSERDA did not use the stakeholder process as an opportunity to improve those plans.  Instead, they went through the motions of stakeholder interaction and only provided a list of comments without any responses.  I was particularly disappointed that the NYSERDA general characterization of comments was along the lines of “most of the comments agreed” with the draft documents. As a result, green energy advocacy organizations were encouraged to organize advocacy campaigns to swamp the public comments with comments supporting their policy preferences.

To have a stakeholder process that informs the PSC decision on the PSL 66-P hearing we stated that the Commission should order the following process steps:

  1. A notice opening an initial comment period that gives all stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to identify issues relevant to the statutory findings required by PSL § 66-p(4).
  2. At the conclusion of the comment period, Commission Staff should prepare an issue list that categorizes and prioritizes the comments received into major technical subjects, including reliability, resource adequacy, transmission readiness, contract and compliance obligations, arrears and disconnections, and definitions of safe, adequate, and affordable service.
  3. The documentation should identify opposing positions on each material issue so that participants and Staff can see where there is consensus, where there is factual disagreement, and where methodological disagreements require focused review.
  4. The schedule must provide sufficient time for written comments, reply comments, and preparation of supporting technical materials so that the record is not limited to conclusory assertions.
  5. One or more technical conferences should be convened at which both sides of disputed issues are presented in a structured manner, with sufficient time for questions from Staff and stakeholders.
  6. A dedicated conference session addressing the meaning of “safe,” “adequate,” and “affordable” service should also be included, because those terms are central to the Commission’s statutory findings and need common definitions before competing analyses can be compared.
  7. A post-conference report prepared by Staff that summarizes the issues raised, the competing positions presented, the areas of agreement and disagreement, and explains how those discussions inform the Commission’s determination under PSL § 66-p(4).
  8. This information would enable the Commission to determine if it is necessary to temporarily suspend or modify obligations under the Renewable Energy Program.

This post explains how I think the proposed stakeholder process should handle hundreds of similar advocacy comments expressing policy preferences without technical or economic support.

Recommended Response to From Letter Campaign

The Independent Intervenors plan to submit our comments on the petition on May 1. Our filing addresses a comment submitted by hundreds that express policy preferences without technical or economic support. The comment lacks the analytical detail needed for meaningful regulatory consideration.  We are not suggesting that these comments lack value.  In our April 17 filing, we recommended that once everyone has had an equal chance to raise their concerns that the Commission categorize and prioritize the technical issues submitted and convene a technical hearing conference that resolves the substantive issues raised in comments.  This exhibit is an example of issues that need to be addressed in this manner.

As an example of our recommended comment process consider 100 public comments number 1151 posted on 4/23/26 through number 1050 posted on 4/3/26 at Case Number 22-M-0149.  The first 50 characters of more than half these comments were identical, which clearly indicates a campaign to submit comments.  Comment number 1151 posted on 4/23/26 by Melanie Acampora met these criteria.  It states:

Dear PSC Commissioners, I urge the Public Service Commission (PSC) to reject the petition filed by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, which would improve neither safety nor reliability, and would instead raise utility costs by deepening New York’s reliance on expensive and volatile fossil fuels. With the cost of oil and gas skyrocketing as a result of the U.S. war on Iran, this is not the time for New York to be considering rollbacks to our renewable energy targets. I urge the PSC to remain committed to the goals of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) and the Clean Energy Standard. Temporarily modifying or suspending the clean energy mandates in the CLCPA will not benefit New Yorkers and is entirely unnecessary to maintain a reliable electric grid. In fact, any further investments in the fossil fuel economy will have a negative financial impact on New Yorkers. Costs of energy in New York are driven by the price of fossil fuels, which are highly volatile and affected by events outside of the control of New York, such as the invasion of the Ukraine by Russia and the U.S. war on Iran. Sticking to fossil fuels means unpredictable, unaffordable bills for New Yorkers. Renewable energy – which requires no fuel – offers predictable costs which makes families less vulnerable to energy price shocks. Renewable energy is a long-term cost-saving strategy that will promote affordability and protect New York utility customers from the impacts of volatile fossil fuel prices. I urge the PSC to reject the unsupported request to hold a hearing to consider temporarily modifying or suspending the renewable energy and zero-emission energy goals. Sincerely,

This comment appears many other times since the first comment addressing the petition (Comment number 33) appeared in the record on 3/9/26 in Case Number 22-M-0149.  It also appears many more times in the public comments for Case Number 15-E-0302.  The Independent Intervenors believe that the comment incorrectly characterizes the petition as an attempt to “roll back” or “suspend” the CLCPA mandates and asserts, without record support, that a §66‑p(4) hearing is “unsupported” and “entirely unnecessary.”  In the following sections we describe our responses to this comment as an example of responses to a disputed issue that should be resolved in a hearing.

Recommended Response

The form letter argues that the petition filed by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy should be rejected because it “would improve neither safety nor reliability and would instead raise utility costs by deepening New York’s reliance on expensive and volatile fossil fuels.”  However, it does not provide any support for those claims.

It argues that “Temporarily modifying or suspending the clean energy mandates in the CLCPA will not benefit New Yorkers and is entirely unnecessary to maintain a reliable electric grid.”  It is important to note that the hearing will not necessarily temporarily modify or suspend the Renewable Energy Program, but it will address feasibility.  The fact is that the State has never done a feasibility analysis to determine if Renewable Energy Programs are a viable path to a zero-emissions electric system.   If the hearing finds that safe and adequate energy is not impeded by the Renewable Energy Program, then we can continue the current path reassured that it is feasible.  However, the Independent Intervenors cannot help but think that the concerted effort to flood the docket with comments that all say do not even consider the hearing is a sign that even devoted proponents have concerns.

The comment goes on to argue that fossil fuels are the cause of the high prices and that renewable energy is a long-term cost saving strategy.  The Independent Intervenors believe that this argument needs to be addressed at a hearing.  We believe that cheap intermittent energy does not lead to a cheap energy system.  The claims that renewable energy is cheaper are based on an incomplete analysis that tells you what it costs to produce electricity under ideal conditions, but it leaves out what it takes to run a system that has to perform under real ones. Accounting for reliability, timing, infrastructure, and risk, the picture changes and renewable costs are not cheaper.

The commenters deserve to have their arguments addressed.  As detailed below, the Independent Intervenors believe that those arguments are flawed but they must be addressed.  A PSL 66-P hearing is the appropriate venue to resolve the issues raised.

The Petition Properly Invokes PSL §66p(4)

The Coalition’s petition expressly requests that the Commission “hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law §66‑p(4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.”

Thus, a hearing is the statutorily prescribed mechanism for testing whether the safety‑valve criteria are satisfied; it is not an extraordinary or anti‑CLCPA measure but part of the CLCPA implementation framework itself. The adverse comment’s request to deny a hearing disregards this structure and effectively ignores §66‑p(4) in the statute. Note however, that the hearing must resolve issues.

Reliability and Affordability Triggers Have Been Met

Multiple filings in Case 22‑M‑0149, as well as the Coalition petition, present credible evidence that the current implementation of the Renewable Energy Program may: (a) impede safe and adequate service, and (b) coincide with a significant increase in arrears, thereby implicating both primary §66‑p(4) triggers. The recommended technical conference would evaluate this evidence.

The Commission itself has acknowledged in Case 22‑M‑0149 that PSL §66‑p(4) includes safety‑valve provisions and that the customers‑in‑arrears condition has been specifically raised as a trigger. The adverse comment does not grapple with any of this record; it simply asserts that a hearing is “unsupported” and “unnecessary,” which is inadequate given the clear statutory language and evidence already before the Commission.

Mischaracterization of the Petition and of Fossil Fuel Risk

The form comment argues that granting the petition and potentially modifying obligations would “deepen New York’s reliance on expensive and volatile fossil fuels” and that “sticking to fossil fuels means unpredictable, unaffordable bills for New Yorkers.”

If this issue were addressed as proposed we believe that it would show the Coalition petition does not seek to abandon the CLCPA’s targets; it seeks a recalibration of obligations and timelines, if warranted by the evidence, so that the Renewable Energy Program is compatible with reliable and affordable service. A transition that outpaces feasible infrastructure development, transmission build‑out, and proven firm zero‑emission resources can actually increase reliance on emergency fossil generation and expensive backstop measures, thereby exacerbating the very fuel‑price and affordability risks the comment highlights.

Granting the Hearing is Consistent with, Not Contrary to, the CLCPA

The Independent Intervenors generally support the CLCPA’s broad decarbonization objectives, but durable climate policy must be aligned with reliability and affordability constraints. A PSL §66‑p(4) hearing is the means the Legislature chose to ensure that alignment. If there was a hearing these concerns could be addressed.

Conclusion

New York’s climate and energy policy choices are too consequential to ignore the legal mandate to confirm that the Renewable Energy Program can provide safe, adequate, and affordable electricity.  The Independent Intervenors believe that genuine stakeholder processes require open discussion of trade‑offs, clear documentation of how comments are handled, and a willingness to adjust course when the evidence points in a different direction.  In my opinion, green energy advocacy organizations are trying to game the system by submitting an overwhelming number of comments.  While they deserve to have their opinions heard, the system should transparently address their concerns.  In the example shown, the arguments do not warrant rejecting the petition or make a convincing argument that the PSL 66-P Renewable Energy Program obligations should not be temporarily suspended or modified.

No to an “All of the Above” Energy Policy

Both New York Democrats and Republicans are embracing an all-of-the-above Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) energy strategy that includes a role for wind and solar because it provides a “diversity of generation sources”.  I believe that wind is useless and solar should only be used on-site to reduce a structure’s energy use, so I have wanted to respond to this for a while.  However, providing an easily understood comprehensive explanation why dependency on wind and solar is flawed has given me pause.  Richard Lyon has written up exactly what I needed and this article describes his series of posts describing the core arguments of his forthcoming book The Energy Trap: Why the Renewable Energy Transition Can’t Work — And What Can.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the 2022 Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In 2025, the State Energy Planning Board approved the 2025 Energy Plan that “provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision making “.  The documents did not provide a complete, transparent accounting of the total costs to achieve the Climate Act mandates or a feasibility analysis that demonstrated that the proposed dependency on renewable energy would provide safe and adequate electricity.

Wind and solar are intermittent, diffuse, and correlated. I believe that those physical realities preclude their use as the backbone of New York’s electric system.  Explaining why those characteristics and others make a renewable energy transition impossible is a challenge, however.  Richard Lyon has provided the necessary documentation by describing his forthcoming book at The State of Britain Substack.

He is a former senior oil and gas operations manager with 35 years of international experience, and academic qualifications in electrical engineering and power systems, petroleum engineering, and energy economics. 

His series of posts: “walks through the core arguments of my book The Energy Trap: Why the Renewable Energy Transition Can’t Work — And What Can. Each post is self-contained, but they build on one another”. He suggests starting at the top and once you’ve read them all, use this page is your reference.  In this article I quote each post with some comments.

Renewables Cannot Work – Physics

Every electrical engineer has told me straight up that renewables won’t work because “physics”  In Chapter 1 — The Physics of Energy Lyons provides an analogy that explains why they all say that:

There is far more heat energy in a swimming pool than in a pan of boiling water. You can boil an egg in the pan. You cannot boil an egg in the pool. And if you doubled the size of the pool, you’d double the energy available — and still have a cold, raw egg.

This is not a riddle. It is the single most important concept in the energy debate, and almost nobody making energy policy understands it.

The difference is not quantity but quality: the gradient between hot and cold that makes work possible. This chapter introduces the three physical measures — energy gradient, energy density, and areal power density — that determine whether an energy source can sustain industrial civilisation. Every successful transition in history moved up on all three. The proposal to replace gas and nuclear with wind and solar reverses the direction.

When I said that renewables won’t work because they are diffuse, energy density is an example of that problem.  Lyons goes on to explain two other physical constraints:  gradient or the difference in energy availability  and power density or the amount of energy that can be extracted from a given area.  The weather related impacts that wind and solar are intermittent and correlated compound these issues.

Renewables Cannot Work – Chemistry

I always want to ask people who want to ban fossil fuels if they want to ban the use of fossil fuels for energy generation and as feedstock to society  In Chapter 2 — The Industrial Metabolism Lyons shows why we are not ready to go completely off fossil fuels.

Steel, cement, ammonia, and plastics: four materials that hold up virtually everything. Each requires hydrocarbons not merely as a fuel but as a chemical feedstock — the carbon and hydrogen atoms become part of the product itself. Electricity is an energy carrier, not a fuel, and each conversion from one to the other loses energy. “Electrify everything” is a slogan that ignores the chemistry. The industrial core of civilisation will continue to require hydrocarbons for the foreseeable future.

Renewables Life Cycle

New York’s Climate Act accounting mandates the life cycle of fossil-fired infrastructure be considered but ignores the life cycle of renewables.  In Chapter 4 — The renewables paradox Lyons eviscerates that approach:

The number that matters is not how much energy a turbine produces, but how much is left over after the system has fed itself. Add storage, grid infrastructure, and fossil-fueled backup to the headline figures and the system Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI} drops into the danger zone of the energy cliff — where small errors in the ratio can be civilisation-ending. The IEA calculates that onshore wind requires nine times more critical minerals than a gas plant, offshore wind thirteen times more. Every link in the supply chain is a hydrocarbon operation. And because wind and solar wear out in 20–30 years while a nuclear plant runs for 60–80, the entire system must be rebuilt two or three times within the life of the conventional plant it replaces.

Magical Solutions

Looking back at the Climate Act Council deliberations during the development of the Scoping Plan there was great faith in the ideas that energy efficiency would provide significant benefits, that hydrogen could replace fossil fuels for hard to electrify applications among other things, and that reducing energy use would not affect the economy  Lyons addresses these ideas in Chapter 5 — The escape hatches.

Three reasons for believing the transition can still work — efficiency, hydrogen, and decoupling — and why none of them survive the evidence. Efficiency triggers the Jevons Paradox: cheaper energy use produces more use, not less, and economy-wide rebound effects typically exceed 50%. Hydrogen is an energy carrier with a round-trip efficiency of 30–40%, requiring infrastructure that would need to be largely rebuilt from materials resistant to hydrogen embrittlement. And decoupling — the claim that GDP can grow while energy use shrinks — has never been achieved by any country except through recession or near-stagnation. The escape hatches are closed.

Economics

Richard Ellenbogen constantly points out to me that renewable energy proponents do not understand the economics of infrastructure development.  In Chapter 6 — Energy and your money Lyons points out that there is a more fundamental economic problem.

Money is a claim on future energy conversion. When the money supply grows while the energy supply contracts, each unit of money claims less — and what follows is not a policy choice but an arithmetic certainty. McKinsey estimates the transition at $275 trillion, or 7.5% of global GDP, likely an underestimate. No government can raise that from taxation, so the unspoken plan is to print it. But you cannot print energy. Since 2008 the global economy has added roughly $200 trillion in debt against a contracting energy supply. Every pension, every bond, every mortgage is a promise that the energy to honour it will be there. The physics says it will not.

Oil Depletion

I am not as pessimistic about oil depletion as Lyons.  In Chapter 3 — The depleting oil inheritance he argues:

Not all oil is equal. A barrel of Saudi crude costs $10 to extract and returns over 30:1 on energy invested. The Canadian oil sands yield bitumen so heavy it must be mined or melted with steam. Conventional crude peaked around 2006; the shale boom that appeared to disprove peak oil was financed by $28 trillion in central-bank balance-sheet expansion and was cash-flow negative for over a decade. Discovery peaked in the 1960s at roughly 50 billion barrels a year; in 2024 the world discovered under 2 billion while consuming 30 billion. Oil is the bridge fuel that builds the new energy system while keeping us alive: we can’t squander a single barrel on replacements that can’t work. It’s running out.

I am optimistic because when there were similar historical constraints solutions were found and I expect that to continue.  For example, if we simply exploit resources we know exist, like New York’s shale gas, that are off limits now for irrational reasons, then there will be additional resources.  Despite my optimism the fact is that transforming to a new energy system is an enormous challenge that will take decades.  I agree that we should not be squandering oil.

The Solution

Energy system realists have argued for a long time that society needs a rational discussion of the future energy system and that always includes a nuclear power component.  Lyons addresses this in Chapter 7 — Forging a new realism.

The energy trap: the renewable transition is consuming the very hydrocarbon surplus needed to build whatever comes next. The only proven way up the quality ladder is nuclear — two million times the energy density of coal, power density matching gas, sixty to eighty years of operation from a one-time construction investment. Even so, a gap of decades is unavoidable while the new system is built. A seven-point blueprint — start with the physics, protect the inheritance, fast-track nuclear, eliminate demand, redirect subsidies, anchor money to energy, trust the public with the truth — offers a framework for navigating a managed descent rather than an unmanaged collapse.

Discussion

Taken together, Lyons’ work makes it clear that an “all of the above” energy policy is not prudent policy  but a way to avoid addressing hard physical and economic limits. His articles show that modern society depends on high‑quality, high‑density energy sources that deliver large surplus energy after the system feeds itself.  He shows that utility‑scale wind and solar move us away from that path and toward the energy cliff once storage, backup, and grid costs are honestly counted. At the same time, fossil fuels remain indispensable chemical feedstocks for steel, cement, ammonia, plastics, and broader societal needs.  They cannot simply be swapped out by electricity or slogans like “electrify everything.” In that light, “all of the above” becomes a dangerously vague invitation to waste our finite fossil fuels on low‑return projects, under build nuclear, and pretend that efficiency, hydrogen, and using less energy while still growing the  GDP will magically close the gap.  New York must commit to physically credible options with nuclear at the center and stop making believe that wind and solar should be included.

Conclusion

As an outsider with no concerns about appeasing the special interests foisting wind and solar energy upon New York, I can stop pretending that an “all of the above” energy policy is appropriate.  In the series of posts that Richard Lyon uses to describe his forthcoming book The Energy Trap: Why the Renewable Energy Transition Can’t Work — And What Can he clearly explains why utility-scale and wind and solar are a distraction for a rational energy policy.  Besides the intractable problems described here, there are enormous costs and scandalous environmental impacts related to wind and solar energy resource development.  It is time to just say no.

NYISO 2025 Renewables Summary

I recently published an article about cold weather operations in New York during the most extreme cold weather episode that described other articles I wrote that addressed the impacts of the cold weather.  This article describes the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) summary of the renewable energy covering all of 2025 for the New York Control Area (NYCA)

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.  These mandates presume reliance on wind and solar.  I believe that the poor wind and solar resource availability described in this post make it impossible to achieve the aspirational renewable mandates and continue to provide safe and adequate electricity.

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated weather-dependent resource variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

NYCA Renewables 2025

Cameron McPherson, NYISO Senior Operations Analysis & Services Analyst, presented the following document at the NYISO Installed Capacity Working Group (ICAPWG}and Market Issues Working Group MIWG meeting on April 8, 2026.  There are five sections in the presentation:

  • Wind Performance
  • Behind the Meter (BTM) and Front of the Meter (FTM) Solar Performance
  • Real-Time Market Curtailments
  • Coincident Wind and Solar
  • Load Ramps

Slide 3 in the presentation (Figure 1) documents the metrics used.  Offshore wind data is not reported because there is only one active facility and NYISO does not report individual unit information.  Past presentations and datasets are also available, Annual Renewable Presentations and hourly data sets from prior years can be found at the this primary link ant the locations below.

  • BTM Solar Information is available under ‘Links’
  • Annual Wind and Solar Information is available under ‘Reports’

Figure 1: Slide 3 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

I am not going to describe all the material in the presentation.  I will limit this to the overviews of solar and wind, and the annual and monthly capacity factors for the renewable energy resources.  There is much more interesting information in the presentation, so I encourage you to read the document.

NYCA Wind Performance

Figure 2 summarizes the wind nameplate capacity since 2005.  It is notable that there really hasn’t been an appreciable uptick in wind development since the passage of the Climate act in 2019.  That is going to change because the State and renewable energy developers have so rigged the permitting system now that any local objections are over-ruled and environmental protections are ignored.

Figure 2: Slide 6 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

Wind and solar generating resources are intermittent. The standard metric for measuring generating availability is the  capacity factor.  It is defined as the percentage of the electricity a power plant actually generates over a period of time compared to what it could have generated if it ran at full power the entire time.  Figure 3 describes NYCA monthly and annual wind capacity factors over the last four years.  There is interannual variation – some years are windier.  Note, however, that the last year may be affected by the addition of an offshore wind facility that we would expect to have higher capacity.  On a monthly basis there is a lot of variation.  In 2025, the windiest month, March had a capacity factor of 44% while September was only 12%.  The good news is that wind is available more in the winter when we expect solar to be less because the days are shorter and the sun is lower in the sky.

Figure 3: Slide 9 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

Figure 4 lists the frequency of hourly capacity factors in 2025.  There were less than 1,000 hours when the capacity factor of all the wind generators in the state were between 0% and 5%.  I added the annual percentages on the right for the hourly frequency labels on the left.  The less than 1,000 hours when the capacity factor of all the wind generators in the state were between 0% and 5% is somewhere between 9% and 11% of the annual hours.  I included this to show that the wind capacity factor across New York State was less than 10% for nearly a quarter of the hours.  At the other end, there are less than 20% of the hours when the statewide capacity factor exceeds 50%.  New York does not have an impressive wind resource capacity.

Figure 4: Slide 12 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

NYCA Solar Performance

Figure 5 describes the Behind-the-Meter (BTM) solar methodology.  These solar resources are the rooftop solar panels that are not directly monitored by NYISO.  To provide the data, NYISO depends on a vendor who has instrumented a representative sample of sites across the state.  Those measurements are combined with the estimated solar capacity to estimate solar production.  This slide describes the process.

Figure 5: Slide 14 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

Figure 6 summarizes the solar nameplate capacity since 2018.  The Climate Act set a goal of 6 GW of distributed photovoltaic solar generation by 2025 and met the target in 2024.

Figure 6: Slide 15 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

One of the more naïve presumptions by the authors of the Climate Act was the idea that success in other jurisdictions would lead to similar results in New York.  The available solar resources in California and Texas are the not the same as New York.  Figure 7 describes NYCA monthly and annual BTM solar capacity factors over the last four years.  There should be no surprise that at New York’s latitude January and December capacity factors are very low and that brings down the annual capacity factors.   In the best year rooftop solar was only 13% of the total possible. 

Figure 7: Slide 18 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

Figure 8 describes NYCA monthly and annual FTM or utility solar capacity factors over the last four years.  Utility-scale developments are sited to maximize the availability of solar resources and there is an improvement of annual capacity from 13% to 19%.  Of course, nothing can improve the length of the day so solar drops significantly in the winter.

Figure 8: Slide 20 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

Curtailments

Figure 9 “Background on Curtailment Metrics” explains the criteria for curtailments.  The NYISO’s real-time market economically evaluates bids submitted by wind and FTM solar resources and when forecasted generation is uneconomic, wind and FTM solar resources are instructed to limit their output to economic levels.  This section finds that real-time market curtailments associated with transmission constraints are the primary current driver of curtailments.  Those can be outages for maintenance, repair or upgrades or something that requires upgrades to the system.  All those who claim that the Climate Act does not affect utility rates must ignore that the costs for these transmission improvements are buried in the rate cases.  Someday the over build necessary to supply peak loads with as much renewable as possible will shift the reason for curtailments to generation-to-load balancing constraints.

Figure 9:  Slide 26 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

Coincident Wind and Solar

The sections describing wind and solar monthly capacity factors showed that wind was generally higher when solar was generally lower and vice versa.  This suggests that together they might be dependable.  However, both parameters must be considered at the same time.  Figure 10 describes monthly performance in 2025 and supports the idea that the combined wind and solar support each other.

Figure 10: Slide 36 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

NYISO grid operators match generating resources to load variations.  If that process worked on a monthly time scales it would be easy and this observation would be relevant, but operators must match load constantly at minute intervals.  Even the wind and solar daily performance shows the challenge of constantly meeting load.  In Figure 11 the total daily renewable energy production started at 36 GWh, rose to 58 GWh but plunged to 12 GWh later in the first week. To support the “free” renewable resources, other resources must be maintained so that they can be turned on during dark doldrums when the weather does not cooperate.

Figure 11: Slide 37 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

On an hourly basis the challenges are greater.  Figure 12 describes wind and solar performance during summer peak loads.  Obviously, NYISO must deal with diurnal solar availability.  Also note that wind and mostly solar appreciably reduce the generation needed from other resources for this example peak.  Based on this slide I don’t think NYISO has serious “duck curve” concerns yet.

Figure 12: Slide 38 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

Figure 13 describes wind and solar performance during a winter peak load example.   Note that they used this year’s winter peak as an example.  It appears that wind and solar make up a smaller proportion of the total load provided so can be relied on less in the winter.

Figure 13: Slide 39 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

NYCA Renewables 2025 includes a section describing “Load Ramps” that addresses the NYISO system load concerns related to short-term changes to the operating loads.  I am not going to describe any slides from this part of the presentation because I do not understand it well enough to explain it to others.  For most of my readers it is sufficient to know that there is a concern that wind and solar resources could change so quickly that operators would not be able to adjust other generating units to compensate.  The results indicate that the NYISO has this under control.

Discussion

A few observations based on the data.

On March 20, 2026 Governor Hochul stated in an exclusive opinion piece in New York Empire Report that “Since I have been Governor, more than $88.7 billion has been invested in clean energy through programs that have made us an example for the rest of the nation.”  I noted that the BTM 2025 target was achieved a year early.  However, other goals are in trouble.

I cannot break out the renewable capacity additions since she has been Governor but the nameplate capacities in Figures 1 and 5 enable us to calculate the capacity additions since the start of the Climate Act.  Table 1 shows that wind capacity has increased 876 MW, BTM solar has increased 5,114 MW and FTM solar has increased 540 MW.  This suggests that something has to change but the question is whether it can be done responsibly.

Table 1: Renewable Capacity Additions (MW) since Climate Act

Figure 14 describes emissions free resources in 2025.  The Climate Act has a 2030 “70% renewable” target as defined in Public Service Law §66‑p as “a minimum of 70 percent of the state wide electric generation secured by jurisdictional load serving entities…in 2030 be generated by renewable energy systems” (wind, solar, hydro, certain biomass, etc.)  The law requires that “by the year 2040…the statewide electrical demand system will be zero emissions.” This is framed as a characteristic of the entire system, not just a percentage of MWh from specific technologies.

Figure 14: Slide 40 from NYCA Renewables 2025

Source: NYCA Renewables 2025

Table 2 compares the observed emissions free data to the 2030 and 2040 targets.  In 2025 the sum of solar, wind and hydro contribution to gross load was only 21%, far short of 70%.  Adding nuclear to the total, zero emissions are only 38% of the total gross load.  Trying to achieve 100% in 15 years is not likely in my opinion.

Table 2: Percentage Contribution to Gross Load

Conclusion

Proponents of renewable energy in New York frequently point to other states and claim that New York should emulate their performance.  The fact is that the location and climate of New York are not conducive to wind and solar generating resources.  The NYISO summary of 2025 NYCA renewables documents this deficiency well.

January February 2026 Winter Weather Proves the Need for DEFR

Last month I took an initial look at the impact of the January 23-27 winter storm on wind and solar energy production.  I showed that  dispatchable  emissions free  resources (DEFR) are necessary to achieve net-zero in New York.  This post extends my analysis through the end of the cold snap ending on February 9, 2026.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.

In a recent article I noted instances where Governor Hochul and Public Service Commission Chair Rory Christian have raised the possibility for limited changes to the Climate Act interim targets.  A recent article by Emily Pontecorvo summarizes the Green Energy Blob take on decarbonization but does not mention reliability risks of renewable energy.  Those folks do not understand that electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind and wintertime solar resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

I summarized the weather and load impacts of the January 23 – February 9 extreme weather episode in a recent post that was based on two New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) documents: a presentation titled Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations (“Winter Operations”) by Aaron Markham, NYISO Vice President Operations and the February 2026 Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  This post relies on two additional NYISO sources of data:    New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard and the January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report.

NYISO Daily Energy Production

Figure 1 combines the net wind and solar performance data figures from the Operations Performance Metrics reports for the 2026 Winter episode.  It shows that solar energy production was near zero during and immediately after the snowstorm.  I interpolated data off this figure for the analysis described below.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January and FebruaryOperations Performance Metrics Monthly Reports

©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

Table 1 combines data from the dashboard and the Operations Performance Metric reports.  I have previously described my use of the dashboard real-time fuel mix data to calculate daily energy use (MWh).  The generator types include real-time fuel mix data base “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil. Two renewables are shown. “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind from the NYISO real-time fuel mix data base.  That source is also used for “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood.  The performance metric reports break out the wind, utility-scale solar, also known as Front of the Meter (FTM) solar, and the rooftop top solar, also known as Behind the Meter (BTM) solar total daily production and capacity factors.  In this table, I subtracted the FTM solar data from the Performance Metric Report data. 

Table 1: Daily NYISO Energy Production (MWh) January 23 to February 9, 2026

Table 2 includes two data sets.  The top table lists resource capacity (MW) from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report for solar and wind resources.  The main body of the table lists the calculated renewable daily energy (MWh) for each parameter and the renewable percentage of the total system energy based on my analysis of the real-time fuel mix data.  Note that wind and solar produced less than 10% of the total energy production for 17 consecutive days during an extremely cold period with high loads and seven of those days had renewable production under 5% of the total generation.

Table 2: Resource Capacity (MW) from Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report, Calculated Renewable Daily Energy (MWh), and Realtime Total System Energy (MWh)

Table 3 combines a table from Markham’s Winter Operations presentation that summarizes the load and weather from January 23 through February 9 and the daily capacity factors calculated using Table 2 data.  Markham pointed out that:

  • Highest peak load (24,317 MW) occurred on Saturday, 2/7, aligning with the lowest HB18 temperature (6.1oF) and highest wind speed (19.3 mph) during the period
  • SCR/EDRP was called, which reduced the measured peak load by an estimated 400 MW

NYISO documents are heavy on jargon.  HB18 temperatures means the load‑weighted average New York Control Area temperature during hour beginning 18:00 (6–7 PM).  “SCR/EDRP” refers to two reliability-based demand response programs: Special Case Resources (SCR) and the Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP).  Were it not for those programs the peak loads would have been around 400MW higher.

The capacity factor results are particularly important for the Public Service Law 66-P renewable energy program component of the Climate Act.  This law mandates increased use of renewable energy.  For the days when the electric system was stressed enough that the NYISO requested demand response programs note that on the renewable capacity factor on the best day was 18%. That result is because of weather conditions and will not change appreciably however much new renewable capacity is added.  As a result, if, for example, the NYISO determines that they need another 1,000 MW of energy, then providing that using renewables will require at least 5,000 MW of capacity.  That is for the best case!  To cover the 24th of January 10,000 MW of additional renewable energy capacity is needed.

Table 3: New York Control Area Weather and Peak Load Statistics and Renewable Capacity Factors for January 23 to February 9, 2026

Dark Doldrum

This episode is a great example of what the Germans call “Dunkelflaute” and I have called the dark doldrums.    This refers to episodes when solar resource availability is reduced due to the length of day or clouds and there are light winds.  Based on this episode we know that dark doldrums impacts can be exacerbated by the snow that covered solar panels with enough snow to eliminate production (Figure 1).  Note that most rooftop solar in New York City is essentially flat so snow cover is this is a significant issue there.  I am going to have to amend my worst weather label to “snowy dark doldrums”.

DEFR and Peaking Units

In an article last month I showed earlier that these conditions are the fundamental driver of the need for DEFR.  It is disappointing that clean energy advocates have continued to argue that the size of the DEFR gap has been overstated even after all the agencies responsible for electric system reliability argue otherwise.  These results should put those arguments to rest.  In this analysis, I take a slightly different approach to demonstrate both the need for DEFR and dispute arguments that things like Virtual Power Plants can replace the need for DEFR and existing electric system peaking power plants.

In New York State, peaking power plants have been vilified by environmental advocates because they emit more pollutants and are expensive to operate during peak demand periods. However, their essential role in providing power when the grid is most strained is often overlooked, as some proponents argue that their output can be replaced by expanded demand response programs, energy storage systems, and Virtual Power Plants (VPPs)

My analysis of the January data and VPP showed that the lack of renewable energy recharge means that the short-term energy storage systems will be completely exhausted early in a snowy, dark doldrum event and will not be recharged for days.  This raises the question why we would want to invest in something that may save some short tern money, but when it inevitably fails the costs will be greater than the savings and potentially threaten lives in the ensuing blackout.

One rationale for virtual power plants (VPPs) is that they could reduce or even eliminate the need for peaking power plants. Estimating how much electricity peaking units produce compared to other fossil-fired plants involves considerable interpretation. However, it is clear that oil-fired power plants operate as peaking units—the high cost of oil relative to natural gas ensures they are dispatched only when needed to meet peak demand.

Figure 2 from the Winter Operations presentation lists the Real-Time Dispatch schedule of alternative fueled units during the 2026 extreme winter weather episode.  In other words, this represents the shows the use of oil-fired units.  Two fuels stand out: Ultra Low Sulfur Oil (ULSO) and Oil #6.  ULSO is burned in New York City at several of the vilified peaking power plants.  There are a small number of oil-fired steam boilers that use residual oil (#6).  The Winter Operations report notes that an estimated 2 million MWh were produced from liquid fuels during this period.

Figure 2: Alternative Fuel Mix Plot for January 23 – February 9, 2026

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

These observations allow us to estimate how much additional renewable capacity would be required to replace the 2 million MWh supplied by oil. The total renewable energy produced over this period was 469,308 MWh.   During peak load periods with limited renewable output, it is likely that all short-term energy storage would be depleted early, leaving insufficient renewable generation to both meet demand and recharge storage systems. The overall renewable capacity factor in this episode was only 10% so replacing the oil-fired generation would require expanding renewable capacity from the current 10,389 MW to approximately 100,000 MW. This level of expansion is clearly unrealistic, reinforcing the conclusion that DEFR is essential.

Discussion

Large wind and solar capacities do no good when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow.  This period exemplifies a period where that situation is evident.  Addressing this problem is a major concern of the NYISO resource planners. 

I wish I could say that Governor Hochul understands the magnitude of this challenge.  Alas,  Governor Hochul recently claimed that “Since I have been Governor, more than $88.7 billion has been invested in clean energy through programs that have made us an example for the rest of the nation.”  I am not sure that investments that produced less than 10% of the total energy production for 17 days during an extremely cold period with high loads is an example anyone else would want to emulate.

My last concern is that DEFR is indispensable for a renewables heavy system, yet there is still no concrete plan to commercialize and deploy any DEFR technology at the scale required. Significant technical, economic, and regulatory uncertainties remain for all proposed DEFR options, so assuming that a viable solution will simply emerge in time amounts to taking an extraordinary reliability risk with the bulk power system.

If nuclear ultimately proves to be the only practical DEFR candidate, then a grid architecture centered on wind, solar, and short duration storage cannot be implemented reliably without large scale nuclear generation. However, nuclear power is best suited to continuous, high capacity factor operation, so holding it in reserve as an infrequently used DEFR “backup” misuses the technology and wastes its economic advantages.

Nuclear generation instead should serve as the backbone of a decarbonized electric system, providing the bulk of firm capacity and energy, with wind, solar, and storage playing complementary roles. In that case, the only realistically workable path to deep decarbonization may be a nuclear centered system model, implying that large scale investment in a wind , solar , and storage only strategy would amount to pursuing a “false solution” that cannot stand on its own without nuclear support.

Conclusion

The extreme winter weather episode of January 23 – February 9, 2026, has major implications for New York Climate Act implementation.  The current debate about the possibility for limited changes to the Climate Act interim targets has focused on cost impacts.  However these unacknowledged  findings of reliability risks make an equally strong case for consideration of changes to the Climate Act.

Hochul Claims the Climate Act Can Be Affordable

On March 20, 2026 Governor Hochul claimed in an exclusive opinion piece in New York Empire Report that the climate action and affordability “can and must” go hand in hand. She did not provide substantive evidence to support that claim and her claims do not address many other Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) affordability issues.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for approving the Scoping Plan prepared by New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” NYSERDA also prepared the recent State Energy Plan that was approved by Energy Planning Board (EPB).  Both the CAC and the EPB were composed of Governor Cuomo and Hochul appointees who believed that implementation of the Climate Act was only a matter of political will. 

Status

Progress  on the Climate Act is at an inflection point.  I recently described two affordability aspects of the implementation process that are causing confusion for almost everyone.  Hochul’s administration has recognized two aspects but has covered up a third component.

I think the primary reason for Hochul’s announcement is related to the first issue: New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations.  In February the Hochul Administration “leaked” a New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that said that “full compliance with New York’s 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act could cost upstate households more than $4,000 a year – on top of what they are already paying today”.  Note that these costs are only for this component of the Climate Act.  Last fall a decision regarding an environmentalist petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleged that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 implementation date was rendered.  The decision stated that DEC shall “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines” and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits or request the Legislature amend the law.  As we will see, Hochul is advocating changes to the law so that NYCI can be revised and the projected costs do not become an election issue.

The second issue is a PSC request for comments related to New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p “renewable energy systems” that includes an indirect affordability mandate and the potential for suspension or modification of obligations if certain conditions are met and a hearing is held to determine if changes are needed.  Even though New York has seen a significant increase in arrears since the Climate Act was enacted the PSC has not address this provision.  The Commission has finally acknowledged the possible need for a hearing and asked for comments.  Rory Christian, Chair and CEO of the Public Service Commission (PSC) recently posted a brief status update regarding the PSC’s ability to make changes to the Climate Act even if there is a hearing.  Clearly, they can address aspects of the PSL 66-P renewable energy systems targets in 2030 and 2040 but little else.

Hochul’s Administration is trying to deflect attention away from the third affordability aspect of Climate Act – all the other costs not included in NYCI and utility rates.   NYCI is simply an economy-wide carbon tax and will affect the cost of energy that anyone uses in New York.  The Climate Act mandates also will require reductions in the building, transportation, industrial sectors, agricultural, forestry, and waste sectors that include aspects beside fuel.  Those costs have received very little attention.

Late last year the Hochul Administration completed the New York State Energy Plan.  Plan reports included an Affordability Analysis Overview Fact Sheet that describes affordability impacts of household costs related to energy used and the need for electric vehicles to meet the Climate Act mandates for those sectors.  I summarized the contents of the fact sheet, the Energy Affordability Data Annex spreadsheet (Annex Spreadsheet)  and the Energy Affordability Impacts Analysis (Impact Analysis last December.  The results show that the Hochul Administration is not providing transparent and comprehensive costs for expected residential costs.  When the appliances, electric vehicles, and building shell upgrades necessary are included then costs increase as shown in the Figure 1.

Figure 1: NYS Energy Planning Board Meeting Presentation Slide 43

The Hochul Administration has covered up the costs buried in this figure.  The equipment cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment. The difference for an upstate moderate‑income gas‑heated household is roughly a 43% increase in levelized monthly energy‑related costs—about $7,000 per year.

Hochul’s Proposal

Governor Hochul’s Empire Report op‑ed presents New York as a national leader on climate, highlighting offshore wind contracts, large-scale renewables, Champlain Hudson Power Express, and continued participation in RGGI as evidence that the State is on track and that affordability concerns are primarily the product of federal “headwinds” and local opposition. She argues that the Climate Act is “not the driver of the high energy prices we are experiencing,” and that limited, “common‑sense” adjustments to timelines and accounting will preserve ambition while avoiding “crushing costs” for households and businesses.

The op‑ed also shifts blame outward: to the Trump administration for hostility to renewables and tax incentives, to global events like the war in Iran for high fuel prices, and to local NIMBYism and siting barriers for delays in renewable deployment. What it does not do is confront the extent to which the design of the Climate Act itself, and the implementation choices made since 2019, hardwire higher costs and reliability risks into New York’s energy system.

Hochul’s opinion piece outlined revisions to NYCI but ignored the ramifications of PSL 66-P and the State Energy Plan.   The following is a copy of the recommendations in her opinion piece.  She introduces her revisions with some general recommendations:

It’s why I am pushing a Ratepayer Protection Plan that will hold utilities accountable, reform the process by which regulators consider rate hike requests, and make it easier for working families to learn about and access the state’s Energy Affordability Programs.

And to make sure we keep the lights and heat on and costs down for New Yorkers, I have adopted an all-of-the-above approach to energy that includes more renewables, emission-free, reliable round-the-clock nuclear, and other needed power sources.

The remainder of her recommendations are sure to infuriate the zealots who advocated for the law and demand that there be no changes.  The only question is whether the Democratic lawmakers who have supported the Climate Act so far will acknowledge reality or double down on the current law. 

It’s also why, despite supporting the intentions of the Climate Act, I am pushing changes to the law as part of our budget discussions with the Legislature. This is solely out of necessity – to protect New Yorkers’ pocketbooks and economy.  Despite all the headwinds and obstacles that could not have been foreseen when the law was enacted in 2019, advocates still took the extreme step of suing the state to force it to issue regulations to meet the Climate Act’s 2030 emission reductions targets.

A judge agreed and ruled that the state must swiftly issue regulations to achieve what now would be costly and unattainable targets, unless the law is changed.

This refers to the NYCI economy-wide lawsuit and lays out the challenge to the Legislature who should change the law.  Next ,she lays out the cost of NYCI compliance while ignoring the State Energy Plan costs for equipment needed to comply with the Climate Act.

I have repeatedly said that utility rates in our state are too high. And while the Climate Act is not the driver of the high energy prices we are experiencing, the undeniable fact is we cannot meet the Climate Act’s 2030 targets without imposing new and additional crushing costs on New York businesses and residents.

Absent changes to the law, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority found the impact of meeting the Climate Act’s 2030 targets would be staggering—more than $4,000 a year for upstate oil and natural gas households, and $2,300 more for New York City natural gas households. And gas prices at the pump would jump an additional $2.23 per gallon above where it would otherwise be.

In the next paragraphs she piously claims that costs are too high. 

As Governor, I can’t let that happen. While I am still committed to working toward our targets, with all the stress our residents are under, New Yorkers expect their elected officials to prioritize affordability.  They are suffering from high costs every single day and I for one will not ignore their cries for relief.

This is utter hypocrisy given that she knows about the levelized costs to purchase equipment. In addition, it long past time that NYSERDA admit their analyses compare mitigation scenarios to a Reference Case that already embeds zero‑emission vehicle mandates and other policies, excluding large chunks of Climate Act cost from the “action” side while still counting their benefits.  This biases cost low.  We simply do not know how much this will cost.  Hochul goes on to discuss schedule problems.

The fact is, we will be dealing with a White House outright hostile toward renewable energy for at least another three years, making it impossible for us to meet our targets without imposing higher costs on homeowners, renters, and businesses.

We need more time, and so I am proposing we amend the law to require regulations to reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions to be issued at the end of 2030. We are seeking to change what emission limits the regulations are tied to – including a new 2040 target as well as the existing 2050 statewide emission limits. Nothing else in the CLCPA is changing regarding the existing statewide emission limit targets and these new regulations would still require the state to make timely progress, ensuring long-term policy stability.

The schedule targets mentioned must be changed because they cannot be achieved.  The politicians who arbitrarily set deadlines must recognize that the energy system is more complicated than they thought in 2019.  However, the bigger question is whether extending the deadlines will enable cost-effective implementation at any time.

Conclusion

The Climate Act has always been about politics.  New York has a woeful history of legislative mandates on the energy system, but this has never stopped Albany lawmakers from trying again.  Hochul’s pragmatic proposal is sure to infuriate the political constituency that advocated for the law and do not want changes.  The changes proposed are unquestionably needed but they only address portions of the Climate Act. 

NYISO Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations – Weather and Loads

Last month I wrote a couple of articles about the January 23-27 winter storm and its ramifications on a future electric system that depends upon wind and solar and how it demonstrated that Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR) will be needed.  This article describes New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) documents that extend the previous analysis through February 9.  The following documents were on the agenda for the NYISO Operating Committee March 19, 2026 meeting: a presentation titled Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations by Aaron Markham, NYISO Vice President Operations and the February 2026 Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  This article is limited to the description of the weather and resulting loads.  I will follow up on the implications to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) later.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040. 

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated weather-dependent resource variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

January and February Winter Weather

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

Markham’s presentation summarized the cold weather event from January 23 through February 9:

  • Coldest stretch of the 2025/2026 winter season with a daily average temperature of 15.2oF.
  • Central Park was below freezing from 1/24 to 2/1 (9 days); longest consecutive day stretch since December 2017-January 2018 (14 days)
  • Albany was below freezing from 1/23 to 2/10 (19 days); longest consecutive day stretch since January 2011 (21 days)
  • Minimum temperature (-0.1o F) occurred on Sunday, February 8th and was the lowest of the season
  • Essentially equal to the Winter 90th percentile design condition (0oF)
  • Average season minimum: 3.8o F (2004-2005 to 2024-2025)

Figure 1: Observed Hourly Temperature and Wind Speed 1/23/26 to 2/9/26

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

NYISO Real-Time Fuel Mix

New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  These data include links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State.  I processed that data to calculate hourly averages.  The generator types include “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind; “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil.  Note, my calculated values are not completely compatible with the final NYISO values. 

Figure 1 graphs all the fuel mix hourly data and Table 1 summarizes the data. The relative average fuel mix energy provided over these ten days was nuclear 19%, hydro 14%, and fossil fuels 62% totaling 94% of the total.   

Figure 1: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix (MW) January 24 to February 9, 2026

Table 1: Summary of Daily NYISO Realtime Fuel Data Mix (MWh) January 24 to February 9, 2026

These data do not show the contribution of wind and solar well.  “Other Renewables” includes solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood. The methane, refuse and wood facilities show up as the relatively constant base in Figure 3.  Assuming that the 63 MW of energy storage is too small to show up, that means that the utility-scale “front-of-the-meter” solar shows up as the daily green peaks.  The snow arrived in New York on the night of 24 January and continued through the next day.  Note that utility solar was essentially zero on the 25th and did not return to the level of the 24th until February 2nd.

Figure 3: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix Other Renewables and Wind January 24 to February 9, 2026

Loads Markham’s presentation summarized the load from January 23 through February 9:

  • Highest peak load (24,317 MW) occurred on Saturday, 2/7, aligning with the lowest HB18 temperature (6.1oF) and highest wind speed (19.3 mph) during the period
  • SCR/EDRP was called, which reduced the measured peak load by an estimated 400 MW

NYISO documents are heavy on jargon.  HB18 temperatures means the load‑weighted average New York Control Area temperature during hour beginning 18:00 (6–7 PM).  “SCR/EDRP” refers to two reliability-based demand response programs: Special Case Resources (SCR) and the Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP).

Table 1: NYCA Weather and Peak Load Statistics For January 23 to February 9, 2026

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

This article is not going to describe the SCR/EDRP resources and what these results mean but I will define what they mean.  Special Case Resources (SCR) are demand response or behind-the-meter generation resources enrolled in the ICAP market that commit to be available to reduce load when NYISO calls an emergency event.  Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP) is an emergency-only demand response program that pays for voluntary load reductions during NYISO-declared emergencies but does not provide capacity payments.

These resources do impact observed load as shown in Figure 4.  The blue bars represent the observed load and the light green the estimated reduction in load due to the SCR/EDRP programs.  The dotted lines represent the projected daily peak load from the NYISO annual load and capacity data report universally known as the “Gold Book”.  The P50 load forecast is the “most likely” baseline forecast.  Tt represents the expected New York Control Area (NYCA) load under expected future weather conditions, with the load-modifying impacts already included. The P90 estimate is the weather-uncertainty “stressed weather” forecast case for a colder-than-expected winter peak episode.  Demand during three days during the cold snap were about equal to the baseline peak load forecast of 24,200 MW.  If the SCR/EDRP demand response programs were not available, then five days would have exceeded the baseline forecast topping out at 24,717 MW on 2/7/26. 

Figure 4: Daily Peak Load and Estimated SCR/EDRP Impact

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

Figure 5 puts the peak loads in perspective. The cold weather this winter was the second lowest winter average since 2010-2011.  The winter 2025–2026 peak load (24,317 MW) occurred on February 7th and was the highest winter peak since 2018-2019.  Note that the SCR/EDRP demand reduction programs reduced the peak by an estimated 400 MW and was activated eight days.  There were 33 daily peak loads in excess of 22,000 MW which is the most since winter 2014–2015

Figure 5: Winter 2025–2026 Daily Peak Loads In Perspective

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

Renewables vs. Load

The NYISO Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations summarizes the NYCA renewables and load for the January and February portions of the cold snap in Figures 6 and 7.  Relative to the total load it is clear that wind and solar under performed during the event.  By 25 January solar output was essentially zero and did not provide much support until 4 February. 

Figure 6: NYCA Renewables vs. Load – January 23 – 31, 2026

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

Figure 7: NYCA Renewables vs. Load – February 2 – 9, 2026

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

The observed lack of solar is an important result.  It shows that when there was a large snowstorm, all the solar resources in New York produced virtually nothing to support the system when there were significant peak loads.  Wind performed better but still was only a small component of the total generation.  It is impossible to resolve this by building more solar and wind because all New York weather-reliant generating resources ares correlated.  One way to resolve this is to build energy storage but the amount of storage necessary is overwhelming.  All the responsible projections for future energy resources that rely on solar and wind resources agree that a new dispatchable emissions-free resource (DEFR) is needed for these situations.

Discussion

This article simply describes the observed renewable energy production and loads during the episode with the day with this winter’s coldest temperature and peak load.  Solar resources performed poorly during the episode and on the days when the wind gave out the need for DEFR is unquestionable.  I intend to follow up with another post describing the implications to future electric resource planning.  I expect that NYISO will incorporate their observations of this winter’s weather in their planning.  I would not be surprised if revisions result in substantive changes.

Conclusion

The results provided confirm my prior assertions that wind and solar fail to support the system when needed most. Proponents of the Climate Act fail to recognize that electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand and that this winter’s weather shows how risky the dependence on wind and solar will be without DEFR. 

PSC Commissioner Christian Note Implications

Rory Christian, Chair and CEO of the Public Service Commission recently posted a brief status update regarding the Commission’s ability to make changes to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  He explained that they can only make changes to the electric sector targets established in the Public Service Law section of the Climate Act. This is an important distinction that has ramifications to the hints that Governor Hochul wants to make changes to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for approving the Scoping Plan prepared by New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” NYSERDA also prepared the recent State Energy Plan that was approved by Energy Planning Board (EPB).  Both the CAC and the EPB were composed of political appointees . 

On February 26, 2026 the Hochul Administration “leaked” a New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that said that “full compliance with New York’s 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act could cost upstate households more than $4,000 a year – on top of what they are already paying today”. On March 5, 2026, a group of 29 New York Democratic state senators responded with a letter (“Democratic Letter”) to Governor Hochul saying they “categorically oppose any effort to roll back New York’s nation leading climate law” and urging Hochul to “stand strong in the face of misinformation” about affordability.  The letter insists that any pushback on the Climate Act amounts to “climate denial” and that only their “bold” agenda will save New Yorkers money, clean the air, and protect a livable climate for our grandchildren. That framing gets the politics right, but the facts are wrong.  Hochul’s suggestion that lawmakers need to delay emission mandates in NYCI.

Christian Linkedin Note

Christian recently posted the following on Linkedin:

A recent Times Union article highlighted a provision in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) that provides the Public Service Commission with discretion to modify certain aspects of the law.

This is a reference to New York Public Service Law § 66-p “renewable energy systems”.  Section 66-p (4) “Establishment of a renewable energy program” states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  Christian went on:

It is important to clarify the scope of that authority. The Commission’s ability to make changes is limited to the electric sector targets established in the Public Service Law section of the Climate Act. The Commission does not have authority to amend the Climate Act’s economy-wide emissions reduction targets. Only the Legislature can amend those targets.

The distinction between Section 66-p (4) and the Climate Act’s economy-wide emissions reduction targets has caused confusion.  The economy-wide emissions reductions target refers to the mandate for New York to implement  New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations.  I described these regulations  in a summary of Climate Act issues.  DEC was supposed to implement NYCI regulations by 1/1/2024 but has only finalized the Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule.  There have been no suggestions when the two other implementing regulations will be proposed.  A year ago a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 implementation date.  Supreme Court Judge Julian Schreibman’s decision stated that DEC shall “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines” and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.  DEC appealed the decision which means that the deadline is suspended until the Appellate Division rules.  

The February 26, 2026 New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that was “leaked” refers to NYCI and not PSL 66-P.  Christian’s note is all about PSL 66-P.  He explains:

Specifically, the statute provides that the Commission may temporarily suspend or modify obligations under New York State’s renewable energy program — the Clean Energy Standard — if the Commission finds that the program:

  • Impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; 
  • Is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or
  • Significantly increases arrears or service disconnections determined to be related to the program.

Even though New York has seen a significant increase in arrears since the Climate Act was enacted, The Commission did not hold a hearing to address their safe, adequate, and affordable obligations to New Yorkers.  Christian notes that the Commission has finally acknowledged the possible need for a hearing:

Relatedly, a third party recently petitioned the Commission requesting adjustments to the electric sector targets. The Commission has posted the petition for public comment and will be accepting comments through the end of the month.

You can read the petition here: https://lnkd.in/edE92bhF
You can submit comments here: https://lnkd.in/eVeaJA5Y

Ramifications

Recent developments paint a consistent picture that it is appropriate to reconsider the Climate Act. NYSERDA’s cap‑and‑invest memo admits that hitting statutory targets on the current schedule requires fuel price shocks and thousands of dollars per year in added household energy costs. The PSC’s request for comments shows that the state’s own regulator is now weighing whether renewable mandates under the Climate Act have crossed the line into threatening safe, adequate, and affordable service—the core mission it cannot ignore. As a result, I encourage everyone to submit comments demanding a hearing to consider adjustments to the electric sector targets.

The important point made by Christian is that the Commission has limited powers to address the myriad implementation issues observed.  It is up to the Legislature to address those other issues.  Unfortunately, this would require many lawmkers to admit that their “nation-leading” law to save the planet needs to be reconsidered.  I previously noted that 29 of the 41 Democratic senators went on the record saying they “categorically oppose any effort to roll back New York’s nation leading climate law”.  However, there are 63 seats in the Senate, so this represents a minority.  It is time to convince those 29 senators and the Assembly members that they need to step up and support the State’s obligation to provide safe, adequate, and affordable energy for all New Yorkers by addressing the observed problems.

Fundamental Implementation Issues

The Climate Act, Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan presumptions rest on a cluster of unrealistic assumptions that ignore engineering, economic, and scale realities. Lawmakers set legally binding “net‑zero” and renewable mandates without first demonstrating that they can be achieved on the required timetable while keeping electric service safe, adequate, and affordable, effectively turning the state into a live experiment.

Reliability is largely treated as a legal requirement rather than an engineering constraint: the Council assumes that a system dominated by wind, solar, and storage will work because the statute says it must, even though NYISO and others warn that needed dispatchable emissions‑free resources do not yet exist commercially on the required schedule. Costs are downplayed through modeling choices that embed major policies in the “reference” case and lean heavily on inflated “costs of inaction,” while NYSERDA’s own affordability work shows on the order of 40‑plus percent higher levelized monthly costs for a representative upstate household once capital costs are counted.

Climate Act environmental review assumes that large‑scale wind, solar, and storage build‑outs are benign, even though the cumulative impact statement has not been updated to match Scoping Plan build‑out levels or to define thresholds for wildlife loss, land conversion, or local impacts.  Subsequent revisions to permitting requirements have turned project environmental assessments into unconscionable parodies of ecological protection.

Finally, the state behaves as if its actions will meaningfully change the climate experienced by New Yorkers, despite emitting less than one‑half of one percent of global greenhouse gases, so any reductions are quickly overwhelmed by growth elsewhere.

What is Needed

There is no question that the Commission needs to hold a hearing to address the Public Service Law mandates.  Anyone who argues otherwise is not paying attention or does not want to admit that real‑world constraints in offshore wind, onshore wind, transmission, supply chains, and inflation that were not anticipated when the law passed in 2019 preclude achievement of the Climate Act 2030 targets.  The hearing will undoubtedly find that the targets need to be delayed.

A cap-and-and invest program for carbon is not the magical solution that the Climate Action Council thought it was when they recommended an “economy-wide program” to cost‑effectively meet Climate Act targets. Hochul’s concerns about NYCI affordability are legitimate, but she does not recognize New York’s experience with the similar Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative indicate that the touted benefits of dividend investments did not include substantive emission reductions.  Because GHG emissions and energy production are closely related, the cap on GHG emissions this means that setting the caps based on the artificial Climate Act schedule will likely lead to limits on energy production.

Most of the other issues are beyond the scope of the PSL 66-P hearing or NYCI. The Legislature needs to address the other issues openly and rely on the input of subject matter experts who are responsible for energy system reliability, not just a selected few academics who agree with their preconceived notions.  First, and foremost a plan must be developed that demonstrates legally binding “net‑zero” and renewable mandates can be achieved on the required timetable while keeping electric service safe, adequate, and affordable. 

The Legislature must define acceptable safe, adequate, and affordable metrics for electric service and energy resources.  it is long past time that Legislators stop pretending to be energy experts and listen to and act on the existing reliability experts and standards of the NYISO and New York State Reliability Council.  The Legislature must demand that NYSERDA transparently provide all the costs to achieve the Climate Act mandates, not just costs for the law itself, to provide guidance for an acceptable affordability criterion. In my opinion a key component of safe electrical service is environmentally responsible generation.  The Office of Renewable Energy Siting and RAPID Act permitting guidance must establish thresholds for wildlife loss, land conversion, and local impacts. 

Conclusion

There are reasons to be optimistic that the inevitable Climate Act disaster that will occur if there are no changes might be averted before real damage is done.  The admission by Hochul that NYCI will be unaffordable and needs to be revised suggests that the Administration recognizes the affordability implications.  The Commission is accepting comments on the need for a hearing regarding the Public Service Law component of the Climate Act is also encouraging.  However, Commission Chair Christian’s note makes an important point that there are limitations on what the .Commission can do.  Ultimately, the fundamental shortcomings of the Climate Act can only be changed by the Legislature.  It is not clear whether New York lawmakers will cling  to the current timetable in the face of reality or step up and resolve the problems. I recommend that readers contact your legislators and demand that they resolve the identified problems.