Category: NY Climate & Community Protection Act

On July 18, 2019, Governor Cuomo signed into law the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (“Climate Act”). It is among the most ambitious climate laws in the world and requires New York to reduce economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions 40 percent by 2030 and no less than 85 percent by 2050 from 1990 levels. The law creates a Climate Action Council (CAC) charged with developing a scoping plan of recommendations to meet these targets.  This post summarizes the third meeting of the Council.  Summaries of other meetings are available here.

I am following the implementation of the Climate Act closely because its implementation affects my future as a New Yorker.  Given the cost impacts for other jurisdictions that have implemented renewable energy resources to meet targets at much less stringent levels, I am convinced that the costs in New York will be enormous and my analyses have supported that concern.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

According to the Climate Action Council website: “The New York State Climate Action Council is a 22-member committee that will prepare a Scoping Plan to achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  The co-chairs and ten of the members are representatives of state agencies and authorities.  The remaining ten members were chosen by politicians. Advisory panels and the Just Transition Working Group will help develop the scoping plan.

The meetings provide insight to the direction of the massive energy transition required by the Climate Act.  The meetings are run formally with a role call at the beginning, approval of minutes, and votes on any decisions.  The following is a description of the meeting and my impressions.  Meeting materials are provided here:

• Meeting Agenda [PDF]
• Meeting Presentation [PDF]
• June 24 Meeting Minutes [PDF]
• Meeting Recording

Co-Chair Remarks and Reflections

These remarks start at the 10:20 mark in the meeting recording. The political nature of this meeting is nowhere more evident than in this agenda item which included five slides: Isaias: A call for resilience, Going Big on Large-Scale Renewables, Investing nearly $1 billion in energy efficiency for low- to moderate-income households, Cleaning New York’s vehicle fleets, and Ensuring climate justice.  Clearly these remarks are scripted for the co-chairs to read and are crafted to reflect well on Governor Cuomo’s energy agenda.

The meeting was held soon after the remnants of Isaias passed through the state and Co-Chair Doreen Harris said that: “As the Governor himself stated, the worst of this situation was avoidable”.  This slide concluded with a clarion call: “We must be better prepared and adapt/improve our overall resilience”.        As is usual for the Cuomo administration, the impacts of this weather event were attributed to climate change.  The reality is that even if it was possible to tease out the potential effect of climate change on the storm’s wind and rain impacts, the impacts without climate change would have caused power outage problems.  It is unclear how the worst of this situation could be avoided.  If your goal is to reduce power outages as much as possible then you could place power lines underground but those costs are on an order of magnitude greater than the costs of overhead wires.  There is no possibility that GHG emission reductions made in New York will affect power outages because the possible effect on global warming is immeasurable.

The next three slides glowingly described progress on the energy initiatives of New York.  The real meat of this meeting started with a description of the startup of the Climate Justice Working Group.  This is one of the support committees for the CAC.  This particular one will consult with the Council on climate justice.

Advisory Panels and Working Groups

In addition to the Climate Justice Working Group, the council has a mandate to convene advisory panels “requiring special expertise and, at a minimum, shall establish advisory panels on transportation, energy intensive and trade-exposed industries, land-use and local government, energy efficiency and housing, power generation, and agriculture and forestry”. The panels will provide “recommendations to the council on specific topics, in its preparation of the scoping plan, and interim updates to the scoping plan, and in fulfilling the council’s ongoing duties”.  The members for the mandated working groups were announced at this meeting.  I will not comment here on the members proposed.

The transition to a new energy system is complex and clearly special expertise is needed.  The concept that the CAC would need this support when defining the plan for the transition is obvious.  However, it is not clear who decided on the proposed membership.  Based on the discussions I got the impression that people were nominated either by members of the CAC or by other stakeholders.  It was also clear that some people who were nominated did not get included.  The promise by the co-chairs that someone would take another look does not give me confidence that everyone will be satisfied.

There is another procedural issue.  The Climate Act specifies that there will be “no more than five voting members” in each advisory panel.  The nominated members for the advisory panels were larger: transportation (15), energy intensive and trade-exposed industries (12), land-use and local government (10), energy efficiency and housing (13), power generation (14), and agriculture and forestry (17).  It appears that there is a wide variation in the backgrounds of the members and I suspect that will result in differing opinions for recommendations.  How that will play out with the voting member criterion is not clear.

The presentation discussed how the advisory panels are expected to operate and their work products.  Frankly, the commitments to do this work are so significant that my expectation is that the process support staff described will do most of the work.  For example, in the “next steps for the advisory panels” slide they have been asked to organize a meeting in the first half of September to develop a work plan that includes:

• • • A Scope of Work, identifying topics and issues of the panel discussions, breakdown of sub-issues as needed, potential initial identification of needed research or analysis.
    • A timeline for conducting work and reaching recommendations. The timeline should include:
      • Projected schedule of meetings and public engagement opportunities and
      • Points of consultation with the Climate Justice and Just Transition working groups;
    • Identify any other processes or milestones that may inform the development and submission of recommendations.

Just getting something all down on paper for consideration of the work plan is more than I would expect any individual member to have the time or expertise to do.  Presumably agency staff will to that preparation work.  However the initial draft certainly guides the direction of the work plan.

The presentation also noted that the panels shall “seek public input to inform the development of recommendations to the Council for consideration”, “provide transparency by making meetings open to public viewing or/and publishing minutes of deliberations”, and make available information regarding advisory panel public meetings and comment opportunities on the climate.ny.gov webpage”.  While I hope they follow through on that promise, considering public input adds to the work load of panel members.  Moreover, there is no apparent mechanism with the CAC process to handle public input.  For example, there isn’t any reference to public input documentation.  Later in the meeting this issue was raised and Commissioner Seggos backed off public viewing for all meetings.

The timeline for the draft scoping plan is ambitious.  The work plans are supposed to be completed in mid-October.  Recommendations, development and outreach follow in five months so that the panels can make their proposals to the CAC in mid-March.  All the work is supposed to be integrated in three months for a target integrated draft in mid-June 2021.  Three months of draft review are followed by three months to “Prepare to issue draft scoping plan” ending in December 2021.

At the conclusion of this section of the meeting, after giving the CAC members a list without any documentation of the members other than their affiliation they were asked to approve the memberships.  I hope this rubber stamp approval approach is not a taste of what is to come in this process.

Discussion: Waste Management Decisions

The Climate Act does not specifically mandate an advisory panel for waste management even though it historically represents 8% of statewide emissions.  Commissioner Seggos from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) proposed setting up a core team at DEC (air resources and material management) to operate like an advisory panel rather than setting up another advisory panel.  CAC members were worried that there would not be as much opportunity for public input.  I am not sure how much practical difference this will make because agency staff will do much of the work anyway.

CLCPA Implementation

A couple of progress reports on state activities were described.  Of more interest to me was the discussion of DEC’s proposed Part 496.  A key part of the Climate Act is defining the baseline 1990 emission inventory and I have posted a couple of times on it:  one post looked at the emissions report timing by looking at the effect of four key considerations imposed by the CLCPA, and another post discussed the implications of two key requirements in the Climate Act.

The presentation noted that upstream emissions from fossil fuels and using a 20-year Global Warming Potential as mandated by the Climate Act were responsible for most of the increase from the prior NYS GHG Inventory baseline: 236.19 million metric tons (MMT) CO2e to 401.38 MMT.  During the development of the regulation DEC assumed that the emission limits should be based on 1990 gross emissions not net emissions because the 2050 target is an 85% reduction and net zero goal.  DEC had to use a bottom up inventory for 1990 because there wasn’t a top down inventory available.  CAC member Robert Howarth said they should use top down.  DEC and NYSERDA are working on the annual inventories now.

Conclusion

I sensed that there was some frustration amongst the CAC members that they might not be able to manage what they see as their charge.  I sympathize with some of their concern because it is not clear how decisions will be made.  Nobody explicitly said how the members were chosen for the advisory panels but if I had to guess I would bet a lot of money that it was made by Cuomo’s minions.  Clearly putting the future of our energy system in the hands of people chosen more on political optics than their expertise is a recipe for problems.

On the other hand, some of the whining about lack of input was made by people with agendas.  That makes the situation even worse.  Decision making with an over emphasis based on environmental ideology is certain to end badly.  I will address this concern more in a future post.

 

 

Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) in 2019 and planning for the transition of New York’s energy system is underway.  Because I am convinced that the general public has no idea what is going on with this energy policy and the possible ramifications, I have been preparing posts on this process.  This post addresses a webinar (slides and recording) by DEC on the value of carbon and the comments I submitted about the webinar.

The Citizens Budget Commission has developed an overview of the CLCPA and its targets, Green in Perspective: 6 Facts to Help New Yorkers Understand the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, that provides good background information.  The CLCPA was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  Unfortunately, the politicians that passed this law assumed that their political will was sufficient to make it happen and included no provision to determine whether it can work or how much it will cost.  I have written a series of posts on the feasibility, implications and consequences of this aspect of the law based on evaluation of data.

I am a retired electric utility meteorologist with nearly 40-years-experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  My posts on New York energy policy are here.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Climate Action Council is charged with developing a scoping plan to implement the CLCPA requirements.  When developing the plan, they are supposed to take into account the “economic and social benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions” taking into account the value of carbon. In a previous post, I described the requirement, the social cost of carbon, and concerns I have about this parameter.

The law states that “The social cost of carbon shall serve as a monetary estimate of the value of not emitting a ton of greenhouse gas emissions”. The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is the present-day value of projected future net damages from emitting a ton of CO2 today.  The idea is that New York will calculate the dollar-value of the Climate Act’s effect on climate change due to changes in greenhouse gas emissions.

In order to fulfill their required response to this requirement the DEC is in the process of developing guidance to establish the social cost of carbon that will be used in New York.  The webinar presentation on July 24, 2020 provided the public an opportunity to learn and ask questions.  DEC noted that comments and questions can be sent to ClimateAct@dec.ny.gov and this post describes comments I submitted on August 6, 2020.

The automatic response I received when I submitted the comment was interesting.  The automatic reply stated: “Thank you for your message. Your message will be directed to the Climate Action Council or one of the Advisory Panels, as appropriate.”  I thought the message would be directed to the staff at DEC responsible for the webinar not the Climate Action Council.  This illustrates one of the problems I have with the CLCPA.  For all the talk about best available science and consultation with the public in CLCPA presentations, there isn’t any clear description of how public input will be considered, indication that public comments will be documented, or whether there will be responses to comments.

Comments Submitted

The webinar gave an overview of valuing carbon and included questions on specific topics.  I sent Comments on the DEC Guidance for Establishing a Value of Carbon Webinar to the email address listed on the DEC website.  I will summarize those comments below.

I had two general comments.  DEC has decided that the value of carbon will be established as guidance not as a regulation.  While I agree with that in general, it also means that DEC has no obligation to provide documentation responding to comments or justify the choice of the value used.  I also commented that given the importance of this parameter and its inherent complexity that the guidance document should include a layman’s summary that explains how the parameter is developed, used and provide the full range of potential values along with the justification for the value chosen.

I also called attention to the fact that the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is mis-using the SCC in its press releases touting the benefits of their carbon reduction programs.  The CLCPA value of carbon is supposed to define the economic and social benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions so it is important that it be done correctly.  NYSERDA applies the SCC to the lifetime value of avoided carbon emissions.  However, the SCC is the present-day value of projected future net damages from emitting a ton of CO2 today so it should not be used with lifetime emissions.

One of the key considerations in calculating the SCC is the choice of the discount rate used.  The webinar attempted to explain how it is used but I believe a more general and more complete explanation is needed.  Another item for discussion is whether the state’s value of carbon should address global impacts or, for the sake of argument, just state-wide impacts.

The webinar presentation asked how the social costs of pollutants other than CO2 should be addressed.  I found a reference that I believe made a persuasive argument that using directly calculated societal values should be used.

Another question asked was “How can state agencies use the damages-based value of carbon?”.  The webinar slides explicitly stated “This is not a carbon price and will not impose any fees” but I think that will be the inevitable outcome at some date.  The webinar slides notes that the Federal government uses it in regulatory benefit-cost analyses and environmental reviews and I believe that it should be used the same way for the Climate Act.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this post was to document my comments made on the value of carbon webinar.  The value chosen and the venues where it is used will have important implications for the CLCPA.  I will continue to monitor this and report on the social cost of carbon.

Updated 10/26/2020 to corrected error in 1990 data shown

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  On August 14 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos released proposed regulations to support implementation of the CLCPA.  A key part of this regulation is defining the baseline 1990 emission inventory and this post expands on my initial inventory post and a second post on the emissions report timing by looking at the effect of four key considerations imposed by the CLCPA.

I am a retired air pollution meteorologist with nearly 40-years experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  I have been following the implementation of the CLCPA and posting on it as it develops. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

This 1990 emissions inventory is important because many of the targets of the CLCPA are based on reductions from this baseline.  For example, there is a target to reduce GHG emissions to 60 percent of 1990 emissions levels by 2030.  The CLCPA mandates specific requirements for the 1990 emission inventory that I am positive no legislator who voted for the law understood.  This post compares the proposed CLCPA 1990 emission inventory with the previous “official” New York greenhouse gas emission inventory was prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA). 

Updated 10/26/2020: Correction to show that NYSERDA 1990 emissions were in Table S-2.  Previously used the 2016 numbers in Table S-1.

The Part 496 Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) includes a section titled Key Requirements of the 1990 Emission Baseline section that explains the CLCPA mandates that required DEC to develop a new official inventory.   These requirements significantly affect the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission total for the State.  According to the latest edition of the NYSERDA GHG emission inventory (July 2019) Table S-1  Table S-2 New York State GHG Emissions 1990–2016 the New York State 1990 GHG emissions were 205.61  236.18 MMtCO₂e. The proposed Part 496 regulation 1990 emissions inventory total is 401.38 MMtCO₂e for an increase of 195.77 165.2 MMtCO₂e. 

Summary of 1990 Emission Inventories

Regulatory Impact Statement Table 1 Inventory in GWP20.

Sector	CO2	CH4	N2O	PFCs	HFCs	SF6	Total
Energy	254.43	70.12	1.31			4.00	329.87
IPPU	1.67	0.00	0.00	0.90	0.02	0.01	2.60
AFOLU	0.05	13.07	4.01				17.13
Waste	3.03	48.25	0.50				51.78
Total	259.18	131.45	5.83	0.90	0.02	4.01	401.38

NYSERDA July 2019 Table S-2 Emission Inventory in GWP100

Sector	CO2	CH4	N2O	PFCs	HFCs	SF6	Total
Energy							208.96
IPPU							3.99
AFOLU							8.37
Waste							14.86
Total							236.18

I will address the requirements and the effect on emissions in the following.

CLCPA Pollutants

The RIS states:

“The first requirement is that the greenhouse gases subject to the statewide emission limit include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFC), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). As the CLCPA references the IPCC, the IPCC protocol for national greenhouse gas inventories is used as a foundation for determining which sources of these gases are included in the 1990 baseline. That protocol applies a sectoral inventory, or a categorization of emission sources based on the broad economic sectors of energy, industry, waste, agriculture, and other land use.” 

The NYSERDA July 2019 emission inventory included all these parameters so this had no effect on emissions.

According to the RIS:

“The second key requirement of the CLCPA relevant to this proposed rule is that it directs the Department to set greenhouse gases on a common scale using the carbon dioxide equivalence metric (CO2e) and the 20-year Global Warming Potential (GWP20) of each gas, which the Department derived from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). The IPCC protocol requires national governments apply a 100-year Global Warming Potential metric (GWP100) from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4),5 and thus other government inventories more frequently utilize the GWP100 metric rather than GWP20 metric set forth in the CLCPA. While Part 496 uses the GWP20 metric derived from AR5, the Department provides an estimate of the 1990 baseline using both metrics below. This is for the purposes of comparing 1990 emission estimates with those of the previous State inventory, the inventory reports of other governments, and other references that use the more standard GWP100 metrics.”

The RIS provides a table with the GWP100 emissions so that a comparison of the two inventories is possible.  As shown below, the difference between the two is almost completely related to changes in methane (CH₄) in the energy and waste sectors.  Note that this difference accounts for 46% of the total change in emissions between the proposed regulation and the July 2019 NYSERDA inventory.

Comparison of GWP20 and GWP100 Inventories (MMtCO₂e)

Proposed Part 496 1990 Emissions Inventory (GWP20).

Sector	CO2	CH4	N2O	PFCs	HFCs	SF6	Total
Energy	254.43	70.12	1.31			4.00	329.87
IPPU	1.67	0.00	0.00	0.90	0.02	0.01	2.60
AFOLU	0.05	13.07	4.01				17.13
Waste	3.03	48.25	0.50				51.78
Total	259.18	131.45	5.83	0.90	0.02	4.01	401.38

Regulatory Impact Statement Table 2 Inventory in GWP100.

Sector	CO2	CH4	N2O	PFCs	HFCs	SF6	Total
Energy	254.43	20.87	1.48			5.22	282.00
IPPU	1.67	0.00	0.00	1.35	0.02	0.01	3.05
AFOLU	0.05	3.89	4.53				8.47
Waste	3.03	14.36	0.57				17.96
Total	259.18	39.12	6.58	1.35	0.02	5.22	311.47

Difference GWP20 Inventory Minus GWP 100 Inventory

Sector	CO2	CH4	N2O	PFCs	HFCs	SF6	Total
Energy	0.00	49.25	-0.17	0.00	0.00	-1.22	47.86
IPPU	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.45	0.00	0.00	-0.45
AFOLU	0.00	9.18	-0.52	0.00	0.00	0.00	8.66
Waste	0.00	33.89	-0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	33.82
Total	0.00	92.32	-0.76	-0.45	0.00	-1.22	89.89

The RIS notes that the “final two key requirements of the CLCPA set New York State apart from other governments in a way that makes it challenging to directly compare the statewide emission limits with the goals from other jurisdictions”.  The question that comes up is was this really necessary and my opinion is that the added burden dealing with this far out-weighs any benefits or needs.  Due to the lack of comprehensive documentation I was unable to tease out the individual effect of the requirement to include emissions located outside of New York vs the effect of the requirement to “establish regulatory limits based on a percentage of gross 1990 emissions as opposed to net emissions” but I can show what the effect of these considerations is on emissions.

The RIS explains that in the third requirement:

“The CLCPA establishes that the statewide emission limit, and therein the emission reduction requirements of the CLCPA, include certain emission sources that are located outside of the State borders. As mentioned above, ECL § 75-0101(13) defines statewide greenhouse gas emissions as including emissions associated with imported electricity and fossil fuels. The IPCC protocol for national governments do not include similar requirements to incorporate emissions produced outside of the relevant jurisdiction associated with energy imported into the jurisdiction. If comparing the 1990 baseline to other jurisdictions’ emission reports, the imported fuels and electricity sectors should be excluded. However, the statutory emission reduction requirements of the CLCPA include these sectors.”

The RIS describes the final key component: “The fourth and final key component of the CLCPA for purposes of this rulemaking is that the 100 percent net emission reduction goal, or a goal of attaining net zero emissions, is not part of the Legislature’s direction to the Department for promulgating the statewide emission limits. The directives to reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions (1) 40 percent from 1990 levels by 2030, and (2) 85 percent from 1990 levels by 2050 (40×30 and 85×50) are set forth in ECL § 75-0107, which further directs the Department to establish these statewide greenhouse gas limits as a percentage of estimated 1990 emissions.”  In order to meet this requirement DEC concludes that it is necessary to “establish regulatory limits based on a percentage of gross 1990 emissions as opposed to net emissions”.  The inventory includes anthropogenic CO2 emissions resulting from the combustion of biomass and biofuels in the 1990 baseline but notes that this assumption may have to be adjusted.  For waste emissions, the Department proposes a separate approach to the issue of accounting for gross and net emissions and a separate approach for anthropogenic versus non-anthropogenic emissions.

Update 10/26/2020: Correction to show that NYSERDA 1990 emissions were in Table S-2.  Previously used the 2016 numbers.

The following table shows the differences between the proposed emissions inventory and the July 2019 NYSERDA inventory as a function of the upstream out-of-state emissions, the gross vs. net adjustment for waste emissions and the adjustment for anthropogenic CO2 emissions resulting from the combustion of biomass and biofuels.  The waste emissions adjustment is 5.15  3.10 MMtCO₂e but I cannot differentiate exactly how much is due to either remaining factor.  However, I believe that because biomass burning is a relatively small component of overall emissions most of the approximate 100 75 MMtCO₂e difference is due to upstream added emissions.

Comparison of RIS Table 2 GWP100 Inventory and NYSERDA July 2019 Table S-1 GWP100 Without Other Part 496 Inventory Adjustments (MMtCO₂e)

Regulatory Impact Statement Table 2 Inventory in GWP100.

Sector	CO2	CH4	N2O	PFCs	HFCs	SF6	Total
Energy	254.43	20.87	1.48			5.22	282.00
IPPU	1.67	0.00	0.00	1.35	0.02	0.01	3.05
AFOLU	0.05	3.89	4.53				8.47
Waste	3.03	14.36	0.57				17.96
Total	259.18	39.12	6.58	1.35	0.02	5.22	311.47

NYSERDA July 2019 Table S-2

Sector	CO2	CH4	N2O	PFCs	HFCs	SF6	Total
Energy							208.96
IPPU							3.99
AFOLU							8.37
Waste							14.86
Total							236.18

Difference GWP100 Inventory Minus NYSERDA 2019 Inventory

Sector	CO2	CH4	N2O	PFCs	HFCs	SF6	Total
Energy							73.04
IPPU							-0.94
AFOLU							-0.10
Waste							3.10
Total							75.29

Update 10/26/2020: Correction to NYSERDA 1990 emissions in Table S-2. 

Discussion

The CLCPA also mandates specific requirements for the 1990 emission inventory that I am sure very few, if any, politicians who voted for the law understood.  The previous NYSERDA GHG inventory followed Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidance for developing an emissions inventory.  Why wasn’t that good enough?  Instead the law includes specific language that requires the development of a revised inventory that has to rely on some speculative assumptions for some sectors, is inconsistent with everyone else making comparisons difficult, and leads to almost a doubling of emissions in the baseline year of 1990.

The previous 1990 New York GHG emission inventory was 205.61  236.18 MMtCO₂e.  The proposed Part 496 regulation 1990 emissions inventory total is 401.38 MMtCO₂e an increase of 195.77  165.2 MMtCO₂e. 

One of the mandates specified that the global warming potential (GWP) had to be calculated over a 20-year time horizon.  The IPCC describes time horizons and the GWP[1] notes:

“The GWP has become the default metric for transferring emissions of different gases to a common scale; often called ‘CO2 equivalent emis­sions’ (e.g., Shine, 2009). It has usually been integrated over 20, 100 or 500 years consistent with Houghton et al. (1990). Note, however that Houghton et al. presented these time horizons as ‘candidates for discussion [that] should not be considered as having any special sig­nificance’. The GWP for a time horizon of 100 years was later adopted as a metric to implement the multi-gas approach embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and made operational in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The choice of time horizon has a strong effect on the GWP values — and thus also on the calculated contributions of CO2 equivalent emissions by component, sector or nation. There is no scientific argument for selecting 100 years compared with other choices (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Shine, 2009). The choice of time horizon is a value judgement because it depends on the relative weight assigned to effects at different times.”

This boils down to the conclusion that the authors of this section of the CLCPA imposed their value judgements upon the state. 

The other mandate that makes this inventory unique is the requirement to include upstream out-of-state emissions.  The IPCC protocol for national governments do not include similar requirements to incorporate emissions produced outside of the relevant jurisdiction associated with energy imported into the jurisdiction.  There is no question that this requirement was deliberately included.

Conclusion

The 1990 GHG emission inventory proposed in DEC’s proposed Part 496, statewide emission limits had to establish a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit as a percentage of 1990 emissions no later than one year after the effective date of the CLCPA.  As noted previously that deadline forced DEC to release the document with much less than the “best available” documentation required in the law. 

The two primary drivers for the doubling of the emissions inventory both add a little under 100 75 MMtCO₂e to the 1990 inventory.   As I noted it is not obvious why the authors of the law included those requirements that they had to know would increase the 1990 baseline.  On one hand a higher baseline may mean that the politicians can more easily claim victory for the interim target in 2030.  On the other hand, making the inventory more expansive by adding upstream requirements and two other smaller impact mandates makes compliance harder.  Couple that with the global warming potential specification that increases methane emissions I suspect that the authors tried to use the law to make the use of out-of-state natural gas impossible sooner rather than later.

I believe it is only a matter of time until economic reality slams into the CLCPA.  New York’s war on natural gas is a war on the most economical fuel that has been responsible for the vast majority of CO2 reductions observed to date.  When these policies require the use of more expensive fuels the inevitable result will be significant price increases on energy costs that are already among the highest in the country.  When the Cuomo Administration can no longer hide those cost increases in utility rate cases, hidden fees, or programs that are taxes in all but name, the reckoning will come.

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[1] Reference: Myhre, G., D. Shindell, F.-M. Bréon, W. Collins, J. Fuglestvedt, J. Huang, D. Koch, J.-F. Lamarque, D. Lee, B. Mendoza, T. Nakajima, A. Robock, G. Stephens, T. Takemura and H. Zhang, 2013: Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forc­ing. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  I have maintained that this legislation is deeply flawed because it presumed that its aspirational targets could be met without doing a feasibility study, that is to say they put the cart before the horse.  Before I can prepare a post on the differences between the new emissions inventory and the old one I want to discuss another flaw in the structure of the act.

I am a retired air pollution meteorologist with nearly 40-years experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  I have been following the implementation of the CLCPA and posting on it as it develops. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

CLCPA greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) reporting

In § 75-0105, the CLCPA mandates a statewide greenhouse gas emissions report.  No later than two years after the law was promulgated, and each year thereafter, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) must issue a report on statewide greenhouse gas emissions from all greenhouse gas emission sources in the state. The report is required to “include an estimate of what the statewide greenhouse gas emissions level was in 1990”. It is supposed to be a “comprehensive evaluation” not only of direct emissions but also include an “estimate of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the generation of imported electricity and with the extraction and transmission of fossil fuels imported into the state”.  There are explicit requirements to ensure it is high quality: “The statewide greenhouse gas emissions report shall utilize best available science and methods of analysis, including the comparison and reconciliation of emission estimates from all sources, fuel consumption, field data, and peer-reviewed research” and “shall clearly explain the methodology and analysis used in the department’s determination of greenhouse gas emissions and shall include a detailed explanation of any changes in methodology or analysis, adjustments made to prior estimates, as needed, and any other information necessary to establish a scientifically credible account of change.  Finally, it requires DEC to hold at least two public meetings to seek public input regarding the methodology and analysis.

The next section in the CLCPA, § 75-0107, Statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits, mandates that “No later than one year after the effective date of this article, the department shall, pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated after at least one public hearing, establish a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit as a percentage of 1990 emissions, as estimated pursuant to section 75-0105 of this article”.  There also is a requirement that “in order to ensure the most accurate determination feasible, the department shall utilize the best available scientific, technological, and economic information on greenhouse gas emissions and consult with the council, stakeholders, and the public in order to ensure that all emissions are accurately reflected in its determination of 1990 emissions levels”.

There is a contradiction in these two sections.  How can § 75-0107, Statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits, establish a limit estimated pursuant to § 75-0105 which is due later than this requirement?  Both sections mandate the use of the “best available” information and consultation with the public, but the timing requirements preclude that from happening.

In order to meet the requirements of § 75-0107 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos released proposed regulation Part 496 to establish statewide greenhouse gas emission limits based on 1990 emissions on August 14,2020.  In my opinion, the process is not meeting the requirement to use the “best available” or consult with the public.  I show below that the description of the emission inventory methodology is less extensive than the previous NYS GHG emission inventory and much less comprehensive that the EPA inventory that I would define as the “best available”.  Consultation with the public is not possible until November. In order to meet the legislative mandate schedule, the rule has been officially proposed.  During the comment period, consultations with the public are forbidden and the only recourse is to comment on the regulation.  In my opinion, consultation with the public should be an iterative process with multiple opportunities to interact with the DEC and respond to comments by others.

Documentation

Up until this time the “official” New York greenhouse gas emission inventory was prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA).  This inventory of greenhouse gas emissions in the state follows the standard Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) protocol. The July 2019 edition is 73 pages long and there is an accompanying fact sheet and a 196 page supplement: New York State Oil and Gas Sector Methane Emissions Inventory.

In April 2020, the US Environmental Protection Agency its annual Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2018.  The complete report is 733 pages, has ten chapters and nine appendices.  In my opinion that sets the standard for the “best available” supporting information for an emissions inventory.

In order to meet the CLCPA deadline for an emission limit one year after promulgation, DEC was forced to propose Part 496, Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emission Limits.  That includes an emissions inventory for 1990 but the only documentation is in the Regulatory Impact Statement.  The section on needs and benefits includes a description of sectoral methods and results that comprises the entirety of the documentation for the 1990 emissions inventory.  The documentation is on the order of 20 pages so it clearly is not “best available”.

Stakeholder Input

According to the Regulatory Impact Statement:

“The Department conducted pre-proposal, stakeholder outreach starting the date on which the CLCPA went into effect, or January 1, 2020, through May 2020. This included two public webinars held on February 14 and 28, 2020 to discuss the scope and key considerations of this rulemaking as well as other presentations and meetings with various stakeholders, including members of the Climate Action Council, by request. For example, the Department presented to the Manufacturers Association of Central New York and the Air and Water Managers Association in May 2020 and participated in meetings with Covanta, National Fuel Gas, and natural gas transmission pipeline companies62 in April 2020. The Department also consulted with other State agencies and authorities, including NYSERDA, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Public Service, and the Department of Agriculture and Markets. The Department reviewed the feedback received in this stakeholder outreach as part of further developing Part 496.”

The Regulatory Impact Statement for proposed Part 496 explains that DEC worked with NYSERDA to incorporate the CLCPA requirements that differ from the IPCC protocol and conduct new analyses as needed for the rulemaking. They also noted that:

“Some of these analyses were also assisted by a NYSERDA consultant (Eastern Research Group, Inc) and subcontractor (Synapse Energy Economics, Inc) and reviewed by subject matter experts from the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Department of Energy, the Environmental Defense Fund, and university partners. Additional stakeholder input is described later in this document. New analyses were not required in all cases, as the new requirements of the CLCPA do not completely differ from the methodology historically used by NYSERDA. As such, many components of the estimates provided here are the same or similar to the previous State inventory.”

One of the big changes in the proposed 1990 emissions inventory is how methane is handled.  A primary reference in the RIS is a Science article that was also published as an Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) report that claims “that in 2015, supply chain emissions were ∼60% higher than the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency inventory estimate”.  Given that the paper is cited as “proof” that the proposed bottom-up baseline is valid, it is inappropriate for New York policy to be reviewed by subject matter experts from EDF that were from the organization that published such an influential paper on the methane emissions.

I believe that an effective public stakeholder process has to be an iterative process including a DEC document for discussion, a DEC presentation of their rationale, a chance for the public to respond with questions and comments, a response to those comments that is available for the public to consider, and another chance to provide comments.  DEC held webinars that were very general in nature and offered little opportunity for technical questions.  Stakeholders responded with their thoughts but there was not another round of discussion.  Instead the inventory went into rule making and it is impossible to get answers to anything but general questions.  The rule-making process requires a public hearing but that won’t be interactive either.  It is only an opportunity to publicly submit comments which, frankly, can be done more effectively in written comments.

Conclusion

There are serious problems with the promulgation of an emissions standard based on an unvetted 1990 emission inventory.  There is no opportunity for meaningful comments based on a fully documented inventory.  The CLCPA inconsistency of the timing of the comprehensive statewide greenhouse gas emissions report that is issued a year after the emissions standard is required to be promulgated is an indictment of the political process that produced the CLCPA.  The rush to meet the schedule has over-ridden the alleged goal of using the “best available” inventory.

My fear that the CLCPA answer is already in the back of the book appears to be coming true.  The emission inventory is only one aspect of this massive transition.  If there is no opportunity for meaningful discourse for this element what hope is that there will be opportunities to fully evaluate other aspects of the rule.  Not only is the cart before the horse, the cart is fully loaded without the opportunity to examine its contents.

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  On August 14 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos released proposed regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emission statewide and implement the CLCPA.  A key part of this regulation is defining the baseline 1990 emission inventory and this is a quick initial post about the inventory.

Up until this time the “official” New York greenhouse gas emission inventory was prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA)  According to the latest edition of the NYSERDA GHG emission inventory Table S-2 New York State GHG Emissions 1990–2016 the New York State 1990 GHG emissions were 236.19 MMtCO2e.

The CLCPA mandates specific requirements for the 1990 emission inventory that I am positive no legislator who voted for the law understood.  The most impactful requirement was to specify that the global warming potential (GWP) be calculated over a 20-year time horizon.  The following section of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes time horizons and the GWP.

Reference: Myhre, G., D. Shindell, F.-M. Bréon, W. Collins, J. Fuglestvedt, J. Huang, D. Koch, J.-F. Lamarque, D. Lee, B. Mendoza, T. Nakajima, A. Robock, G. Stephens, T. Takemura and H. Zhang, 2013: Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forc­ing. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

“The GWP has become the default metric for transferring emissions of different gases to a common scale; often called ‘CO2 equivalent emis­sions’ (e.g., Shine, 2009). It has usually been integrated over 20, 100 or 500 years consistent with Houghton et al. (1990). Note, however that Houghton et al. presented these time horizons as ‘candidates for discussion [that] should not be considered as having any special sig­nificance’. The GWP for a time horizon of 100 years was later adopted as a metric to implement the multi-gas approach embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and made operational in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The choice of time horizon has a strong effect on the GWP values — and thus also on the calculated contributions of CO2 equivalent emissions by component, sector or nation. There is no scientific argument for selecting 100 years compared with other choices (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Shine, 2009). The choice of time horizon is a value judgement because it depends on the relative weight assigned to effects at different times. Other important choices include the background atmosphere on which the GWP calculations are superimposed, and the way indirect effects and feedbacks are included (see Section 8.7.1.4).”

According to the draft regulation released on August 14, § 496.4 Statewide Emission Limits (a) For the purposes of this Part, the estimated level of statewide greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 is 401.38 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, using a GWP20 as provided in the IPCC assessment report.

More to come on this topic.

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) and this summer the implementation process is in full swing.  This post addresses risk management concerns about the implementation process.

I am a retired electric utility meteorologist with nearly 40-years experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential effects of energy policies related to doing “something” about climate change.  I have written a series of posts on the feasibility, implications and consequences of this aspect of the Climate Act.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Climate Act establishes a Climate Action Council at §75-0103 that will develop a scoping plan to implement the requirements of the law.  The Citizens Budget Commission developed an overview of the CLCPA targets in Green in Perspective: 6 Facts to Help New Yorkers Understand the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.  The current emphasis is implementation of plans to meet the requirement to reduce GHG emissions from electricity production by 70% in 2030 and eliminate them altogether by 2040.  In my opinion, the proponents of the Climate Act believe that meeting the aspirational goal of a carbon-free electric system by 2040 is simply a matter of political will.  I am not nearly as optimistic because every time I look at any aspect of that transition I find unexpected complications, unintended consequences, and ever higher costs.

The basis of this article is work by the Risk Monger, a blog “meant to challenge simplistic solutions to hard problems on environmental-health risks”. The author of the blog, David Zaruk, is an EU risk and science communications specialist since 2000, active in EU policy events and science in society questions of the use of the Precautionary Principle. He is a professor at Odisee University College where he lectures on Communications, Marketing, EU Lobbying and PR. In my opinion, he clearly explains the complexities of risk management and I recommend his work highly.  I found his work apropos to the Climate Act implementation process.

Precautionary Principle

The Precautionary Principle is a strategy to cope with possible risks where scientific understanding is incomplete.  Unfortunately, many rely on this idea that to be safe we have to eliminate all risks as a precaution.  Zaruk explains that the problem is that policy-makers and politicians have confused this uncertainty management tool with risk management.  The conclusion of a recent series of posts on the failures of risk management of the COVID-19 response, while fascinating on its own, also provides a cautionary tale relative to New York’s energy policy and implementation of the Climate Act.

New York’s Climate Act is generally driven by the precautionary principle approach.  New York is trying to remove the risks of climate change impacts despite our lack of complete knowledge about climate variations.  For example, the Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) for proposed revisions to the Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program states that “Overwhelming scientific evidence confirms that a warming climate poses a serious threat to the environmental resources and public health of New York State”.  After pointing out that anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased and that ambient levels of CO2 are “higher than at any point in the past 800,000 years”, the RIS goes on to say “The large and persuasive body of research demonstrates through unequivocal evidence that the Earth’s lower atmosphere, oceans, and land surfaces are warming; sea level is rising; and snow cover, mountain glaciers, and Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are shrinking”.  In order to confront those risks the Climate Act focuses on greenhouse gas emission reductions but does not include a process to ensure that their cure is not worse than the alleged disease.

Risk Monger’s Risk Management Approach

Zaruk outlines seven steps of risk management:

1. 1. 1. 1. Scenario Building – all options must be mapped out;
         2. Risk Assessment – collect and refine data and evidence;
         3. Risk Analysis – weigh data against benefits and consequences;
         4. Apply Risk Reduction Measures – identify vulnerable groups and reduce exposures on them;
         5. Risk Communication (Empowerment) – inform public of risks and how to protect themselves;
         6. As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) – reduce exposures to a reasonable level vis-à-vis social well-being; and
         7. Refine ALARA: continuous exposure reductions – continually lower exposure levels so as to ensure benefits at higher safety levels

If these steps fail, apply the precautionary principle – As benefits and social goods will be lost, this is the last step and should only be temporary

These seven steps are the basis for twelve strategies he proposes as an alternative policy approach for rational discussion.  He believes that using these risk management strategies would have provided a better solution to the COVID-19 crisis and I believe that it would be appropriate to consider his alternative with respect to the Climate Act.

Zaruk argues that the docilian mindset, demanding a world with zero-risk, helped drive a solution that caused economic and social collapse in Western economies trying to reduce the effect of the virus outbreak.  Unfortunately, as he points out, there are influential forces lobbying for even more precaution.  His strategies for better risk management are entirely appropriate to consider with respect to the transition to an energy system that eliminates the use of fossil fuels because of the risks to affordability and reliability.  In the next section I address his strategies in this context.

Risk Management Strategies

The Risk-Monger’s first strategy is to place precaution properly in risk management.  The Climate Act is taking the precautionary step to ban the use of fossil fuels for electric generation by 2040.  Zaruk argues that stopping an activity can have significant consequences so it is more appropriate to implement this kind of stringent policy at the end of the process when “our capacity to prevent harm has failed or the value of the benefits could not be justified”.  The fact is that there are undeniable benefits to fossil fuels and alternative technologies are not well developed which could cause reliability problems and increase costs.  The Climate Act targets put the “cart before the horse” by not evaluating the potential consequences of the alternatives before setting the targets.

Two other strategies are related.  He argues that setting up government risk management units to provide independent oversight and foresight about emerging issues has tremendous value and proposes to have an independent risk assessment process outside of the political process that can present their findings to the public without interference.  Zaruk notes that “While Churchill’s saying: ‘Scientists should be kept on tap, but not on top’ stands as a truism of modern democracies and accountability, it does not mean that political leaders can be allowed to try to hide facts or deny evidence by pressuring their advisers”.  Unfortunately, this is directly opposite of the actions of the Cuomo Administration.  In the summer of 2019 a group of retired Department of Public Service employees submitted a letter that stated “Until the current administration, Governors have generally respected the plain language of the Public Service Law (PSL), which … safeguards the mission of the DPS to serve not political interests but the public interest.”  Based on my private discussions with staff at different agencies, the Governor’s minions micro-manage every decision based on political ramifications. This mindset permeates the state effectively eliminating any criticisms by industry in general and the utility industry in particular.

Zaruk recommends a strategy to promote scenario building in the governance process:

“Contrary to common practice in policymaking today, it is not a sign of weakness to have a Plan B or consider alternative eventualities. Examining a multitude of scenarios allows a risk manager to prepare for any situation, avoid black swans and limit unforeseen consequences. In most cases it is common sense: you better reduce your exposure to risks if you can imagine a wide range of scenarios and likelihoods and suitably prepare for them. “

The Climate Act mandates a scoping plan to implement an energy transition to meet the aspirational goals to reduce GHG emissions.  To me a scoping plan implies that there is no question about feasibility and the plan is simply a matter of picking the components to assemble the plan.  I have my doubts about the feasibility of the Climate Act targets.  There is no question in my mind that in order to prepare for any situation, avoid black swans and limit unforeseen consequences that outreach to many disciplines is necessary.  For example, as a meteorologist, I have spent some time trying to determine renewable resource availability for long duration periods of low renewable resources (most notably a period of calm winds in the winter when solar is at a minimum).  One scenario that I think is necessary is to look short-term at solar resource availability using an existing representative data set.  There has been no indication that state planners are considering the use of that resource.  My expectation is that the scoping plan will develop a narrow set of options that will allegedly meet the targets of the Climate Act but will sacrifice current reliability standards that reflect many different scenarios.

There are two recommended strategies directly at odds with the Climate Act implementation process: ensure expertise lies at the foundation of risk management and bring in different sources of expertise.  Zaruk points out that the European Union had an independent chief scientific advisor but that when there were results that were not politically correct, activist lobbying led to the abolishment of the position.  The position offered the opportunity to double-check policies to make sure that it represents science in the public interest and not just science that represents the most vocal proponents.  He explains that “Risk management needs to be based on the best evidence, not the strongest political ideology but as precaution serves as an easy, expedient, blameless solution, the battle to undo its dominance will be challenging”.  Such a function would be useful in New York but in the current Administration is clearly a non-starter.

He goes on to explain the need for different sources of expertise by noting that “limiting your advice pool is how mistakes are made”.    He states:

“I can’t count how many times in 2020 I have heard people talk about “the” science as if you simply needed to put a question into a machine and the answer would come out. Science is complex, often contested and defines itself by a method of challenging its theories and paradigms. Only consensus-loving neophytes (and a Swedish teenager) would talk about “the” science as if it meant something certain. Part of the risk management process is to plan out scenarios based on the best available scientific voices at that time.”

The Climate Action Council mandated to develop the scoping plan to implement the Climate Act ignores the importance of expertise.  The Council has 22 voting members: 12 political appointees who head various agencies and the rest non-agency experts: two appointed by the governor, three each appointed by majority leaders of the Assembly and Senate and one each appointed by the minority leaders of the Assembly and Senate.  The ten at large members shall “include at all times individuals with expertise in issues relating to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation, such as environmental justice, labor, public health and regulated industries”. In my opinion, it is lunacy that the Council that is supposed to determine how the future energy system of the state is supposed to operate does not specify energy system expertise as a criterion.  The bottom line is that none of these 22 people have relevant expertise for choosing options for a reliable energy system.

The only hope for New York’s future energy system is the requirement that the “The council shall convene advisory panels requiring special expertise and, at a minimum, shall establish advisory panels on transportation, energy intensive and trade-exposed industries, land-use and local government, energy efficiency and housing, power generation, and agriculture and forestry”. The advisory panels are charged “to provide recommendations to the council on specific topics, in its preparation of the scoping plan, and interim updates to the scoping plan, and in fulfilling the council’s ongoing duties”.  My concern is that it is not clear how any of these panels can provide recommendations that are inconsistent with the agendas of the Council that is weighed so heavily for those who believe that the meeting the goals is simply a matter of political will.  The plan for the Climate Act is directly at odds with these risk management expertise strategies.

Zaruk states that the key to risk management is that we should not be aiming for safe, but rather safer.  He defines this step: “As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)” and includes a strategy to use ALARA as a return to risk realism.  He explains:

“This zero-risk mindset, this demand for total safety, is built on a false objective. We should not be aiming for safe, but rather safer. But what level of safer is safe enough? Like any situation with uncertainty, it depends on the circumstances, needs and realities. If you are dying of thirst in a desert, what level of water purity will you accept? This is always a question of what is reasonably achievable. The principle goal for risk managers is to reduce exposure to hazards (risks) to as low as reasonably achievable”.

He explains what goes in ALARA:

“Some say it is simply a cost-benefit analysis (and then they would add that you cannot put a price on a human life). Every risk is different (to everyone) and the variables affecting our reasoning range from resources, available equivalent alternatives, time to undesired consequences, public perception of the risk, traditional practices, accountability, trust relations and the public willingness to change certain lifestyle habits.”

My primary concern with the Climate Act is the risk to electric system reliability that will occur when the system has to rely on intermittent and diffuse renewable energy.  There is a related principle particularly applicable to the Climate Act.  The Pareto principle states that, for many events, roughly 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes. The primary worry here, in the absence of using an ALARA strategy, is that 80% of the risks to the electric system will occur as the amount of fossil fuel use goes below 20% of the total.  As noted before, I expect the primary problem will be the need for dispatchable electric power when renewable resources are low (think a calm period in the winter when solar resources are weak).  The great advantage of fossil-fired power plants is dispatchability and the risks of losing this firm capacity must be evaluated.

He concludes this strategy as follows:

 “There is no one rule guiding risk management as ALARA. Each situation looks at what is reasonable and what is achievable. Dreamers and idealists want a world that is simply unachievable; pragmatists could probably achieve more. Continuous improvement is a key element to ALARA. It is not just to lower the risk to what is reasonably achievable, but to then push that exposure reduction even lower … continuously in an iterative, reasonable process.”

Zaruk also recommends some long-term strategies that are not directly applicable to Climate Act implementation but would serve New York’s policy process well.  They all relate to public education and I think the primary target should be politicians and policy making bureaucrats.  He suggests that we all need to accept that risk management is not about assuring 100% safe and that means we have to abandon the precautionary logic.  In order to manage the expertise necessary for risk assessment we need to develop a viable means for public consultation.  With that in place then we can create a community trust/communication mechanism.  All this can promote a risk resilient population.

Conclusion

I spend a lot of time writing about the oncoming train wreck of New York’s Climate Act.  I wrote this hoping someone, somewhere with some influence might pick up on the need to step back and assess the risks of trying to meet the aspirational goals.  Zaruk has much more influence but is frustrated by the fact that the precautionary principle is driving so much current policy.  His conclusion, after writing 15 articles on the response to COVID-19, is what I expect to be the likely outcome of the Climate Act on its present trajectory:

“I do not have the millions of euros of foundation-fed interests, the guru-led tribal passion or activist-driven fear-making machinery of the privileged zealots. What that crap-cash has bought them over the past two decades (relying on a misplaced precautionary policy tool) is expedience, irresponsibility and catastrophic risk management failure. And now as these relentless fundamentalists line up again at the public trough, we are facing economic collapse, famine and their insistence on even more precaution.”

Update July 6, 2020: I looked at the ETP Clean Energy Technology Guide in more detail and found their ratings for anerobic digesters.  I have modified the relevant section.

On July 18, 2019, Governor Cuomo signed into law the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act). It is among the most ambitious climate laws in the world and requires New York to reduce economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions 40 percent by 2030 and eliminate the use of fossil fuel for electricity production by 2040. New York’s politicians were sure that implementing these goals was simply a matter of political will so they offered no plan how it would be done.  The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently published “Special Report on Clean Energy Innovation” that directly relates to this implementation effort that I believe should be required reading for New York’s Climate Action Council.

I am following the implementation of the CLCPA closely because its implementation affects my future as a New Yorker.  Given the cost impacts for other jurisdictions that have implemented renewable energy resources to meet targets at much less stringent levels I am convinced that the costs in New York will be enormous and my analyses have supported that concern.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

On June 24, 2020 Energy plus Environmental Economics (E3) presented results of their emissions reductions pathway analyses to the New York Climate Action Council which gives the first inkling of what the law’s supporters acknowledge will have to be done.  I took issue with the presentation’s claim that “Deep decarbonization in New York is feasible using existing technologies” previously and in this post will highlight key points made in their Special Report on Clean Energy Innovation (“EIA Report”) that are relevant to New York’s Climate Act Implementation.

Introduction

New York’s Climate Act requires that the Climate Action Council prepare a plan for “net zero emissions in all sectors of the economy” in the following:

§ 75-0107. Statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits.

1. No later than one year after the effective date of this article, 24 the department shall, pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated after at least one public hearing, establish a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit as a percentage of 1990 emissions, as estimated pursuant to section 75-0105 of this article, as follows:

a. 2030: 60% of 1990 emissions.

b. 2050: 15% of 1990 emissions.

§ 75-0103. New York state climate action council.

11. The council shall on or before two years of the effective date of this article, prepare and approve a scoping plan outlining the recommendations for attaining the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits in accordance with the schedule established in section 75-0107 of this article, and for the reduction of emissions beyond eighty-five percent, net zero emissions in all sectors of the economy, which shall inform the state energy planning board’s adoption of a state energy plan in accordance with section 6-104 of the energy law. The first state energy plan issued subsequent to completion of the scoping plan required by this section shall incorporate the recommendations of the council.

The E3 presentation echoes the belief of the supporters of the Climate Act that achieving the net zero goal is essentially just a matter of political will.  However, the IEA report suggests that optimism is mis-placed:

“Without a major acceleration in clean energy innovation, net-zero emissions targets will not be achievable. The world has seen a proliferating number of pledges by numerous governments and companies to reach net-zero carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the coming decades as part of global efforts to meet long-term sustainability goals, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change. But there is a stark disconnect between these high-profile pledges and the current state of clean energy technology. While the technologies in use today can deliver a large amount of the emissions reductions called for by these goals, they are insufficient on their own to bring the world to net zero while ensuring energy systems remain secure – even with much stronger policies supporting them.”

Analysis

In order to focus my analysis on a manageable component of the Climate Act implementation plan I am going to address one component of the electric sector de-carbonization pathway.  E3 and I agree that the biggest problem for a de-carbonized electric system is going to be the winter peak when solar resources are low and the potential for a large high-pressure system could mean that wind resources are near zero for several days.  E3 claims the New York winter statewide peak load will be 24 GW in 2020 and in 2050 the peak load will be 35 GW with flex loads and 43 GW without flex loads when the added demands of electrifying transport and heating are added to the system. E3 offered a combination of five options to meet the challenge: large-scale hydro resources, renewable natural gas, synthetic fuels such as hydrogen, Carbon Capture Storage (CCS), and nuclear power.  I will look at these technologies with respect to the IEA report and feasibility in New York to determine if the 2040 de-carbonized electric system goal is realistic.

There are two technologies listed that are mature and have long histories of development: large-scale hydro resources and nuclear power.  However, New York needs additional resources to meet this demand challenge and I believe it is unlikely that either technology can be counted on in New York.  Although nuclear should be considered the fact that the completed nuclear power plant at Shoreham was never operated, the closing of one operational unit at Indian Point in 2020, and the planned closing of the last operational unit at Indian Point in 2021 suggests that new nuclear in New York is extremely unlikely.  I am comfortable saying that there are no significant sources of undeveloped hydro available much less permittable in New York.  There is a potential for Canadian hydro-power that will likely be considered.

The remaining three technologies are still in the “clean energy innovation pipeline” described in the IEA report.  IEA explains:

“Innovation is not the same as invention. After a new idea makes its way from the drawing board to the laboratory and out into the world, there are four key stages in the clean energy innovation pipeline. But this pathway to maturity can be long, and success is not guaranteed:

Prototype: A concept is developed into a design, and then into a prototype for a new device (e.g. a furnace that produces steel with pure hydrogen instead of coal).

Demonstration: The first examples of a new technology are introduced at the size of a full-scale commercial unit (e.g. a system that captures CO2 emissions from cement plants).

Early adoption: At this stage, there is still a cost and performance gap with established technologies, which policy attention must address (e.g. electric and hydrogen-powered cars).

Mature: As deployment progresses, the product moves into the mainstream as a common choice for new purchases (e.g. hydropower turbines).”

The EIA report notes that de-carbonization comes from four main technology approaches. These are the electrification of end-use sectors such as heating and transport; the application of carbon capture, utilization and storage; the use of low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen-derived fuels; and the use of bioenergy. EIA explains that each of these areas faces challenges in making all parts of the technological application process, what they call the value chain, commercially viable in the sectors where reducing emissions is hardest.  The IEA report uses the technology readiness level (TRL) scale (complete description in Box 3.2 on page 67) to assess where a technology is on its journey from initial idea to market use.  Their evaluation of the TRL for different de-carbonization technologies is summarized in three figures: Figure 3.2 TRL of technologies along the low-carbon electricity value chain, Figure 3.3 TRL of technologies along the CO2 value chain, and Figure 3.4 TRL of technologies along the low-carbon hydrogen value chain.

Figure 3.2 notes that hydropower and nuclear are mature technologies.  While it is straying from my intent to discuss only those technologies proposed for the winter peak, it is interesting that solar PV, solar thermal, wind, and hydrogen from water electrolysis are all listed as an early adoption TRL. 

E3 claims that Carbon Capture Storage (CCS) can be used to address the winter peak.  The EIA report notes that capture, transport and utilization or storage of CO2 emissions as a successful decarbonization strategy hinges on the commercial availability of technologies at each stage of the process as well as on the development and expansion of CO2 transport and storage networks at a sizeable scale (Figure 3.3). In this instance I assume that E3 is referring to CCS combined with natural gas combustion.  According to the EIA report natural gas electricity production coupled with chemical absorption has a demonstration TRL.  The feasibility issue in New York may ultimately be storage because there is no oil production to enhance.  Storage in saline formations has an early adoption TRL but New York refused to allow propane storage because of its impact on community character so I would imagine this could not be permitted either.

E3 claims that “synthetic fuels such as hydrogen” can be used to address the winter peak. I am going to only consider hydrogen synthetic fuel production and that is covered in Figure 3.4.  The EIA report notes:

“The value chain for low-carbon hydrogen is not completely developed at commercial scale today. It comprises many technologies that are necessary to produce, transport, store and consume low-carbon hydrogen, each of them at a different stage of maturity and facing specific technical challenges (Figure 3.4)”. 

The pathway report only mentions the use of hydrogen but not how it would be used for the winter peak.  I assume that E3 proposes to use hydrogen production from electrolysis and that has an early adoption TRL.  In order to have it available for use during the winter peaks it will need to be shipped and stored.  The hydrogen infrastructure for pipelines and tanks are both rated as mature technologies.  If the hydrogen is supposed to be used for heating hydrogen boilers and fuel cells have an early adoption TRL but hydrogen-driven fuel cells only have a large prototype TRL.  If the hydrogen is supposed to be used to generate electricity then high-temperature fuel cells have an early adoption TRL and hydrogen-fired gas turbines have a large prototype TRL.

Updated July 6, 2020: E3 also proposes to use renewable natural gas from anerobic digesters to address the winter peak problem.  I could not find a category in these three figures that I think fits this technology in the EIA report.  The poster version of the technology guide rates biogas from a non-algae feedstock as “Commercial Operation In Relevant Environment – Solution is commercially available, needs evolutionary improvement to stay competitive”. There are questions about the collection and storage infrastructure needed to transport and store it for the winter peak demand as well as how much gas is available relative to the need for the winter peak.  

Conclusion

I believe that this report underscores my belief that the statement “Deep decarbonization in New York is feasible using existing technologies” mis-characterizes the actual situation.  As EIA points out feasibility depends upon making all parts of the technological application process, what they call the value chain, commercially viable.  The fact is that for the technologies proposed to address the winter peak problem, one or more aspects of commercial viability, availability limitations, or public perception make the E3 recommendations risky bets for future reliability and affordability.

I suggest that it would be better for the State to take a measured approach rather than the all-in approach currently envisioned.  The fact is that we don’t know what will work best for New York so it would be better to have a plan that could be adjusted as necessary.  The IEA proposes five innovation principles that I think would be appropriate for New York to incorporate in their Climate Act implementation process. 

For governments aiming to achieve net-zero emissions goals while maintaining energy security, these principles primarily address national policy challenges in the context of global needs, but are relevant to all policy makers and strategists concerned with energy technologies and transitions:

Prioritise, track and adjust. Review the processes for selecting technology portfolios for public support to ensure that they are rigorous, collective, flexible and aligned with local advantages.

Raise public R&D and market-led private innovation. Use a range of tools – from public research and development to market incentives – to expand funding according to the different technologies.

Address all links in the value chain. Look at the bigger picture to ensure that all components of key value chains are advancing evenly towards the next market application and exploiting spillovers.

Build enabling infrastructure. Mobilise private finance to help bridge the “valley of death” by sharing the investment risks of network enhancements and commercial-scale demonstrators.

Work globally for regional success. Co-operate to share best practices, experiences and resources to tackle urgent and global technology challenges, including via existing multilateral platforms.