Carbon Price Needed to Fund Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act Reductions

I have been following the concept of carbon pricing for quite some time.  While I agree that the theory that setting a carbon price could lead to the least-cost decarbonization, I also believe that there are a whole host of practical problems that mean it won’t work as suggested by the theory.  One of the problems I have noted is that the actual costs of decarbonization are very large and that means a carbon price would also have to be high.  In this post I try to estimate the carbon price needed to fund the CO2 reductions necessary to meet New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) goal to eliminate fossil-fired generation by 2040.

I first became involved with pollution trading programs nearly 30 years ago and have been involved in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) carbon pricing program since it was being developed in 2003.  During that time, I analyzed effects of these programs on operations and was responsible for compliance planning and reporting.  I write about the issues related to the energy and environmental interface from the viewpoint of staff people who have to deal with implementing these programs.  This represents my opinion and not the opinion of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with.

Background

In a post at Watts Up With That, Carbon Pricing is a Practical Dead End,  I noted that carbon pricing proponents have convinced themselves that somehow a carbon price is different than a tax but, in my experience working with affected sources, it is treated just like a tax simply because the affected sources have no options to cost-effectively reduce emissions.  As a result, they just add the carbon price to their cost of doing business – just like a tax.  As a result, the over-riding problem with carbon pricing is that it is a regressive tax raising the price to those least able to afford it.  In that article, I described a number of other practical reasons that cap-and-invest carbon pricing, or any variation thereof, will not work as theorized: leakage, revenues over time, theory vs. reality, market signal inefficiency, control options, total costs of alternatives, and implementation logistics.  In addition, The Regulatory Analysis Project (RAP) recently completed a study for Vermont, Economic Benefits and Energy Savings through Low-Cost Carbon Management, that raises additional relevant concerns about carbon pricing implementation.

In this post I will estimate a cost for decarbonizing the electric sector by 2040, project the CO2 emissions between the present and 2040 and calculate the carbon price needed to make those reductions.

Decarbonization Costs

The first step is to estimate how much electric capacity will be needed in 2040 so I can figure out how much additional wind and solar energy will be needed when fossil fuels are eliminated from New York’s electric generation fuel mix in 2040.  Until I see a convincing argument otherwise, I believe that distributed solar, utility-scale solar, on-shore wind and off-shore wind will provide nearly all the additional energy needed to decarbonize New York’s electric generating sector.  The Citizen’s Budget Commission not only provided a great summary of the CLCPA but also made estimates of the renewable capacity needed as shown in the Forecast of 2040 Capacity (MW) Resources to Meet CLCPA Goals table.

The second step is to estimate the cost of replacement power.  A recent blog post at the edmhdotme blog determined the excess cost of weather dependent renewable power generation in the EU provided a technique and a reference to calculate those costs.  The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2020 published Cost and Performance Characteristics of New Generating Technologies in January 2020.  The document includes a table with Total overnight capital costs of new electricity generating technologies by region that includes development costs for New York City and Long Island (NYCW) and Upstate New York (NYUP).

The Estimated CLCPA Cost for Wind and Solar Additional Capacity Needed for Citizen’s Budget Commission Projected Load table lists the estimated costs for each category.  For the grand total I assumed all the renewables would be in the Upstate New York region.  I could not find an EIA estimate for installed costs for residential solar but I did find a National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) comparison of the 2018 costs which found that residential PV $2.17 per watt and that utility-scale PV with a one-axis tracker was $1.13 per watt.  I estimated the residential solar costs in the table by using the 2.17 to 1.13 ratio from the NREL presentation. The grand total is $169.5 billion.

In 2019 New York electric sector CO2 emissions were 24,866,404 tons.  In 2040 they are supposed to be zero.  If the annual reduction is 1,184,115 tons this goal will be met.  The sum of all the CO2 emitted with that annual reduction is 273,530,329 tons between now and 2040. If the carbon price is set so that the money obtained for the cumulative emissions is sufficient to pay for the $169.5 billion needed for the additional wind and solar capacity, then the carbon price would have to equal $619.54 per ton as shown in the Projected CO2 Emissions through 2040, Total Costs, and Revenues table.

This is an initial estimate of costs.  The $169.5 billion capacity cost does not include the cost to provide storage when the intermittent solar and wind are unavailable, the cost to modify the transmission system to move the diffuse solar and wind where needed, or the cost to provide additoinal transmission support so that the grid can deliver power where needed.  Nor does it include the cost to replace generation because the expected life-time of these renewable resources is on the order of 20 years.  This is also an estimate of the costs only for power generation so the costs to electrify heating, cooking, and water heating needs and the transportation sector are not included.  On the other hand, there should be some reduction of the costs for renewable generation development over time but the scale of that reduction likely is much lower than these unincluded costs.

Conclusion

I have previously stated that market signal inefficiency, the total costs of alternatives, and decreasing revenues over time were three practical reasons that carbon pricing is a practical dead end.  This post quantifies these issues.  This estimate only considered the installed costs of residential solar, utility-scale solar, on-shore wind and off-shore wind but estimates that the carbon price would have to be $681 per ton to provide enough money to build those facilities.  This is an inefficient market signal because the Obama-era Interagency Working group social cost of carbon with a discount rate of 3% and considering global benefits is $50 in 2020 which is an order of magnitude less than the projected carbon price.  Also note that in the Projected CO2 Emissions through 2040, Total Costs, and Revenues table the revenues go down significantly over time.  Because the expected lifetime of the wind and solar resources is on the order of 20 years there will be a continuing need for funding these projects and there won’t be any carbon price revenues available.

My fundamental problem with the CLCPA is that it presumes that the target reductions mandated by the act are technically and financially feasible.  No other jurisdiction remotely approaching the size of New York has reduced its emissions anywhere near the CLCPA targets so there are technical challenges.  This analysis of carbon pricing feasibility projects enormous costs even without including storage and transmission requirements.  Besides the fact that these costs are far above the purported negative externality cost in the social cost of carbon, they are so large that I cannot imagine a scenario where they would be willing accepted by the citizens of the State.  Pielke’s Iron Law of Climate, “While people are often willing to pay some price for achieving climate objectives, that willingness has its limits”, surely will be the inevitable result of these programs.

Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act Climate Action Council Power Generation Advisory Panel

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  This is another in a series of posts on the feasibility, implications and consequences of the CLCPA.  This post addresses the power generation advisory panel that is supposed to help implement the CLCPA scoping plan.

I am a retired electric utility meteorologist with nearly 40-years-experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

My biggest concern with the CLCPA is that I am convinced that the general public has no idea what is going on with these energy policies and the possible ramifications.  Moreover, I do not believe that the CLCPA implementation process includes sufficient provisions for the general public to find out what this law will mean to them until it is too late to prevent the inevitable higher costs of energy.

Background

Section § 75-0103 in the CLCPA establishes the New York state climate action council (CAC). The CAC is charged with planning responsibility:

“The council shall on or before two years of the effective date of this article, prepare and approve a scoping plan outlining the recommendations for attaining the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits in accordance with the schedule established in section 75-0107 of this article, and for the reduction of emissions beyond eighty-five percent, net zero emissions in all sectors of the economy, which shall inform the state energy planning board’s adoption of a state energy plan in accordance with section 6-104 of the energy law. The first state energy plan issued subsequent to completion of the scoping plan required by this section shall incorporate the recommendations of the council. “

In order to develop this scoping plan that will transition New York’s entire energy economy, the CAC has a membership strongly weighted with Cuomo administration appointees.  The CAC consists of 22 members: twelve agency heads, two non-agency expert members appointed by the Governor, six members appointed by the majority leaders of the Senate and Assembly, and two members appointed by the minority members of the Senate and Assembly.  All twelve agency heads and two non-agency expert members were appointed by the Governor so the majority of the CAC is directly beholden to him.

In order to “provide recommendations to the council on specific topics, in its preparation of the scoping plan, and interim updates to the scoping plan, and in fulfilling the council’s ongoing duties”, the CAC (§ 75-0103, 7) “shall convene advisory panels requiring special expertise and, at a minimum, shall establish advisory panels on transportation, energy intensive and trade-exposed industries, land-use and local government, energy efficiency and housing, power generation, and agriculture and forestry”.

Section § 75-0103, 7 (b) states that “Advisory panels shall be comprised of no more than five voting members. The council shall elect advisory panel members, and such membership shall at all times represent individuals with direct involvement or expertise in matters to be addressed by the advisory panels pursuant to this section.”  Note, however, that all the advisory panels had more than five members nominated: transportation (15), energy intensive and trade-exposed industries (12), land-use and local government (10), energy efficiency and housing (13), power generation (14), and agriculture and forestry (17).  It is not clear how any issues will be resolved given the voting member requirement.  When the issue was raised at the August 24 CAC meeting there was a waffling discussion of building a consensus to resolve issues.

This post describes the power generation advisory panel approved at the Climate Action Council meeting on August 24, 2020.

Advisory Panels Description at CAC Meeting August 24, 2020

I suspect that I am not the only one who does not really understand how this is all supposed to work.  The discussion at the CAC meeting offers some insights.

According to the CAC presentation each advisory panel is expected to “Identify a range of emissions reductions, consistent with analysis and in consultation with the CAC, for the sector which contributes to meeting the statewide emission limits.”  According to the slide presentation, they are supposed to:

      • Present a list of recommendations for emissions reducing policies, programs or actions, for consideration by the Climate Action Council for inclusion in the Scoping Plan.
          • Recommendations should identify the estimated scale of impact, knowable costs to achieve, ease of deployment or commercial availability, potential co-benefits to emissions reduction, advancement of climate justice outcomes, and impacts to businesses.
          • Recommendations may be informed by quantitative analysis or qualitative assessment.
      • Seek public input to inform the development of recommendations to the Council for consideration.
          • Panels may seek input from selected expertise in a subject area, as determined necessary by the members.
          • Panels shall, during the next six months, hold at least one forum to receive broad-based public input.
          • Provide transparency by making meetings open to public viewing or/and publishing minutes of deliberations.

The CLCPA recognizes that this is a significant undertaking and provides process support:

      • Each advisory panel will be supported by:
            • Access to consulting firm Energy and Environmental Economics (“E3”) to provide economic and technology assumptions, understanding of market development as based on literature research, some quantitative analysis of higher impact recommendations.
            • A working group comprising staff from contributing state agencies or authorities to assist with research and less-detailed analytical work.
            • Completed state technology or market studies and other research resources as available.
            • Where initiated, current state agency technical analysis or market development assessments that may serve as a foundation for recommendations or as reference material for development of recommendations.

Power Generation Advisory Panel

The Climate Action Council approved 14 members, a chairman and a co-chair to the power generation advisory panel but left open consideration to add more people.  It is not clear to me how choosing members worked.   I think that the panel members were nominated by CAC members to some core group from the DPS, Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority who provide supporting services but those folks did not make the decisions.  I believe that the decision-making role is entirely within the Cuomo Administration and given the tendency for the Governor to micro-manage I suspect that all decisions are made by high-level staff if not the Governor himself.

There are six advisory panels but because my primary concern is the electric system, I will concentrate on the power generation advisory panel.  I researched the membership of the Power Generation Advisory Panel.  The CLCPA Power Generation Advisory Panel attachment summarizes each member with a link to their organization including, where appropriate, a brief description of their organization’s mission, along with a summary of the individual named to the panel.  Note that most of the people nominated are senior-level staff presumably with extensive obligations.  As a result, I believe that most of their input will be based on work by others within their organizations.  One final note, during the webinar one of the themes of the introductions was the importance of diversity within the membership.

I categorized the organizations represented by the 14 non-state agency members: three members work for generating companies, two renewable and one fossil oriented; one member is from the New York Independent System Operator, the state’s grid operating company; one member is a consultant for energy and sustainability issues; and the remaining eight members were from advocacy organizations representing either renewable technologies, the environment, or trade unions, with one representing ratepayers.

 

Discussion

The CLCPA states that the “council shall convene advisory panels requiring special expertise”.  It is no simple matter understanding how the New York electric system works and I believe that it requires a hard science education or electric sector experience.  In my opinion, only five of the Power Generation panel members have the special expertise necessary.  How in the world can the public expect that this panel will provide meaningful recommendations to the CAC on the electric power system?  The most glaring omission is that there is no one from the electric utility sector included so transmission expertise is unavailable.

I find it telling and troubling that reliability was not mentioned in the CAC presentation on the advisory panels.  There are extensive electric system reliability requirements in place.  The New York State Independent System Operator (NYISO), New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC), and New York Department of Public Service (DPS) all have responsibilities related to maintaining the reliability of the electric system. The CLCPA mandates a complete transition of the system away from fossil fuels by 2040.  It is not clear how differences between the reliability needs and CLCPA mandates will be resolved.

New York State has an existing energy planning process.  The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a “clean, resilient, and affordable” energy system for all New Yorkers.  It focuses on “reliably meeting projected future energy demands, while balancing economic development, climate change, environmental quality, health, safety and welfare, transportation, and consumer energy cost objectives”.  Importantly that process was integrated with the responsibilities of the NYISO, NYSRC and DPS.  In my opinion, the agency staff who have prepared this plan in the past should provide primary support to all the advisory panels if only to circumvent re-inventing the wheel.

The Energy Planning Board has 13 voting members and one non-voting member.  Eleven of the members are appointed by the Governor and most also are members of the CAC.  The CAC’s scoping plan “shall inform the state energy planning board’s adoption of a state energy plan in accordance with section 6-104 of the energy law”.  The CLCPA explicitly states that “The first state energy plan issued subsequent to completion of the scoping plan required by this section shall incorporate the recommendations of the council”.  It is not clear whether any exceptions to the ideological agenda of the Cuomo Administration will be considered, much less incorporated into the scoping plan.

Among the mysteries of the CLCPA implementation is how the scoping plan and energy plan are to be reconciled. It is not clear to me how the Climate Action Council’s scoping plan will be integrated with the all the planning functions and reliability rules of the NYISO, NYSRC, and DPS that are incorporated into the Energy Plan.  If there is a difference does the scoping plan trump the energy plan?  That would be dangerous in my opinion.

Conclusion

My fundamental problem with the CLCPA is that it presumes that the target reduction of emissions beyond eighty-five percent net zero emissions in all sectors of the economy is technically and financially feasible.  I think that needs to be proven first.  Within the power generation sector, a feasibility plan could determine how much renewable energy is available relative to how much energy is needed, describe different approaches to meet the targets with the renewable availability constraints, and explain the strengths and weaknesses of the options.  Once that is complete then the scoping plan would have a basis for its recommendations for attaining the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits.  I think the CLCPA process essentially precludes doing this right.

I am not aware of any jurisdiction of any size approaching New York State that has successfully made a complete transition to non-fossil electric generation so this will truly be an unprecedented endeavor.  The makeup of the power generation advisory panel does not engender confidence that New York’s transition will be successful.  The majority of the members have insufficient background and experience to do anything other than rubber stamp whatever they are given to review.  Coupled with the fact that the majority of the members also have a bias towards the belief that the transition is simply a matter of political will, it is not clear whether inconvenient facts will be considered or simply dismissed.

In August 2020, California grid operators had to impose rolling electric blackouts to maintain grid reliability standards.  The basic problem was that power demand peaks as people turn on their air conditioning in the late afternoon just as the solar power supplies cut off as the sun goes down.  So little power was available the California grid operator had to reduce load to prevent an uncontrolled, much wider scale blackout in the event of a problem at an operating power plant.  The scale of that problem pales compared to the scale of the situation when the CLCPA requirements to electrify heating and transportation increase winter load and the elimination of fossil generation increases the dependency upon wind and solar electricity generation.  In the winter at New York’s latitude the days are short and the solar panels could be covered by snow.  When there is a prolonged cold snap accompanied by light winds both renewable resources will be unavailable and the only question is for how long[1].  This worst-case availability scenario has to be considered by the CAC scoping plan to prevent a 2040 New York blackout that could result in people freezing to death in the dark unable to flee.  Will the Power Generation Advisory Panel and the Climate Action Council address this issue or simply brush these concerns aside?

[1] The need for a feasibility study was emphasized in my comments to the Department of Public Services resource adequacy proceeding.  I described my initial comments submitted on 9/16/19 and summarized my reply comments submitted on 1/23/20.

 

 

24 August 2020 New York Climate Action Council Meeting

On July 18, 2019, Governor Cuomo signed into law the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (“Climate Act”). It is among the most ambitious climate laws in the world and requires New York to reduce economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions 40 percent by 2030 and no less than 85 percent by 2050 from 1990 levels. The law creates a Climate Action Council (CAC) charged with developing a scoping plan of recommendations to meet these targets.  This post summarizes the third meeting of the Council.  Summaries of other meetings are available here.

I am following the implementation of the Climate Act closely because its implementation affects my future as a New Yorker.  Given the cost impacts for other jurisdictions that have implemented renewable energy resources to meet targets at much less stringent levels, I am convinced that the costs in New York will be enormous and my analyses have supported that concern.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

According to the Climate Action Council website: “The New York State Climate Action Council is a 22-member committee that will prepare a Scoping Plan to achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  The co-chairs and ten of the members are representatives of state agencies and authorities.  The remaining ten members were chosen by politicians. Advisory panels and the Just Transition Working Group will help develop the scoping plan.

The meetings provide insight to the direction of the massive energy transition required by the Climate Act.  The meetings are run formally with a role call at the beginning, approval of minutes, and votes on any decisions.  The following is a description of the meeting and my impressions.  Meeting materials are provided here:

Co-Chair Remarks and Reflections

These remarks start at the 10:20 mark in the meeting recording. The political nature of this meeting is nowhere more evident than in this agenda item which included five slides: Isaias: A call for resilience, Going Big on Large-Scale Renewables, Investing nearly $1 billion in energy efficiency for low- to moderate-income households, Cleaning New York’s vehicle fleets, and Ensuring climate justice.  Clearly these remarks are scripted for the co-chairs to read and are crafted to reflect well on Governor Cuomo’s energy agenda.

The meeting was held soon after the remnants of Isaias passed through the state and Co-Chair Doreen Harris said that: “As the Governor himself stated, the worst of this situation was avoidable”.  This slide concluded with a clarion call: “We must be better prepared and adapt/improve our overall resilience”.        As is usual for the Cuomo administration, the impacts of this weather event were attributed to climate change.  The reality is that even if it was possible to tease out the potential effect of climate change on the storm’s wind and rain impacts, the impacts without climate change would have caused power outage problems.  It is unclear how the worst of this situation could be avoided.  If your goal is to reduce power outages as much as possible then you could place power lines underground but those costs are on an order of magnitude greater than the costs of overhead wires.  There is no possibility that GHG emission reductions made in New York will affect power outages because the possible effect on global warming is immeasurable.

The next three slides glowingly described progress on the energy initiatives of New York.  The real meat of this meeting started with a description of the startup of the Climate Justice Working Group.  This is one of the support committees for the CAC.  This particular one will consult with the Council on climate justice.

Advisory Panels and Working Groups

In addition to the Climate Justice Working Group, the council has a mandate to convene advisory panels “requiring special expertise and, at a minimum, shall establish advisory panels on transportation, energy intensive and trade-exposed industries, land-use and local government, energy efficiency and housing, power generation, and agriculture and forestry”. The panels will provide “recommendations to the council on specific topics, in its preparation of the scoping plan, and interim updates to the scoping plan, and in fulfilling the council’s ongoing duties”.  The members for the mandated working groups were announced at this meeting.  I will not comment here on the members proposed.

The transition to a new energy system is complex and clearly special expertise is needed.  The concept that the CAC would need this support when defining the plan for the transition is obvious.  However, it is not clear who decided on the proposed membership.  Based on the discussions I got the impression that people were nominated either by members of the CAC or by other stakeholders.  It was also clear that some people who were nominated did not get included.  The promise by the co-chairs that someone would take another look does not give me confidence that everyone will be satisfied.

There is another procedural issue.  The Climate Act specifies that there will be “no more than five voting members” in each advisory panel.  The nominated members for the advisory panels were larger: transportation (15), energy intensive and trade-exposed industries (12), land-use and local government (10), energy efficiency and housing (13), power generation (14), and agriculture and forestry (17).  It appears that there is a wide variation in the backgrounds of the members and I suspect that will result in differing opinions for recommendations.  How that will play out with the voting member criterion is not clear.

The presentation discussed how the advisory panels are expected to operate and their work products.  Frankly, the commitments to do this work are so significant that my expectation is that the process support staff described will do most of the work.  For example, in the “next steps for the advisory panels” slide they have been asked to organize a meeting in the first half of September to develop a work plan that includes:

      • A Scope of Work, identifying topics and issues of the panel discussions, breakdown of sub-issues as needed, potential initial identification of needed research or analysis.
      • A timeline for conducting work and reaching recommendations. The timeline should include:
        • Projected schedule of meetings and public engagement opportunities and
        • Points of consultation with the Climate Justice and Just Transition working groups;
      • Identify any other processes or milestones that may inform the development and submission of recommendations.

Just getting something all down on paper for consideration of the work plan is more than I would expect any individual member to have the time or expertise to do.  Presumably agency staff will to that preparation work.  However the initial draft certainly guides the direction of the work plan.

The presentation also noted that the panels shall “seek public input to inform the development of recommendations to the Council for consideration”, “provide transparency by making meetings open to public viewing or/and publishing minutes of deliberations”, and make available information regarding advisory panel public meetings and comment opportunities on the climate.ny.gov webpage”.  While I hope they follow through on that promise, considering public input adds to the work load of panel members.  Moreover, there is no apparent mechanism with the CAC process to handle public input.  For example, there isn’t any reference to public input documentation.  Later in the meeting this issue was raised and Commissioner Seggos backed off public viewing for all meetings.

The timeline for the draft scoping plan is ambitious.  The work plans are supposed to be completed in mid-October.  Recommendations, development and outreach follow in five months so that the panels can make their proposals to the CAC in mid-March.  All the work is supposed to be integrated in three months for a target integrated draft in mid-June 2021.  Three months of draft review are followed by three months to “Prepare to issue draft scoping plan” ending in December 2021.

At the conclusion of this section of the meeting, after giving the CAC members a list without any documentation of the members other than their affiliation they were asked to approve the memberships.  I hope this rubber stamp approval approach is not a taste of what is to come in this process.

Discussion: Waste Management Decisions

The Climate Act does not specifically mandate an advisory panel for waste management even though it historically represents 8% of statewide emissions.  Commissioner Seggos from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) proposed setting up a core team at DEC (air resources and material management) to operate like an advisory panel rather than setting up another advisory panel.  CAC members were worried that there would not be as much opportunity for public input.  I am not sure how much practical difference this will make because agency staff will do much of the work anyway.

CLCPA Implementation

A couple of progress reports on state activities were described.  Of more interest to me was the discussion of DEC’s proposed Part 496.  A key part of the Climate Act is defining the baseline 1990 emission inventory and I have posted a couple of times on it:  one post looked at the emissions report timing by looking at the effect of four key considerations imposed by the CLCPA, and another post discussed the implications of two key requirements in the Climate Act.

The presentation noted that upstream emissions from fossil fuels and using a 20-year Global Warming Potential as mandated by the Climate Act were responsible for most of the increase from the prior NYS GHG Inventory baseline: 236.19 million metric tons (MMT) CO2e to 401.38 MMT.  During the development of the regulation DEC assumed that the emission limits should be based on 1990 gross emissions not net emissions because the 2050 target is an 85% reduction and net zero goal.  DEC had to use a bottom up inventory for 1990 because there wasn’t a top down inventory available.  CAC member Robert Howarth said they should use top down.  DEC and NYSERDA are working on the annual inventories now.

Conclusion

I sensed that there was some frustration amongst the CAC members that they might not be able to manage what they see as their charge.  I sympathize with some of their concern because it is not clear how decisions will be made.  Nobody explicitly said how the members were chosen for the advisory panels but if I had to guess I would bet a lot of money that it was made by Cuomo’s minions.  Clearly putting the future of our energy system in the hands of people chosen more on political optics than their expertise is a recipe for problems.

On the other hand, some of the whining about lack of input was made by people with agendas.  That makes the situation even worse.  Decision making with an over emphasis based on environmental ideology is certain to end badly.  I will address this concern more in a future post.

 

 

RGGI Response to Investment of RGGI Proceeds 2018 Letter

On August 3, 2020 I submitted a letter to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative describing the issues raised in my article Investment of RGGI Proceeds Report for 2018.  This post documents their response, my thoughts about that response, my follow-up letter and their final response.  I really appreciate the fact that RGGI responded to my letters.

I have been involved in the RGGI program process since discussion started on it sometime in early 2004.  I blog about the details of the RGGI program because very few seem to want to provide any criticisms of the program. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It is a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector.  According to a RGGI website: “The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances which are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs. Programs funded with RGGI investments have spanned a wide range of consumers, providing benefits and improvements to private homes, local businesses, multi-family housing, industrial facilities, community buildings, retail customers, and more.”  Note that New Jersey has re-joined RGGI and Virginia will be joining in 2021.

The latest update was released on July 29, 2020.   The Investment of RGGI Proceeds in 2018 report tracks the investment of the RGGI proceeds and the benefits of these investments throughout the region. According to the report, the lifetime benefits of RGGI investments made in 2018 include:

      • $2 billion in lifetime energy bill savings
      • 4.6 million short tons of CO2 emissions avoided

RGGI notes that “The largest share of the investments was directed to energy efficiency, with 38% of the 2018 total. Greenhouse gas abatement programs, which include carbon-reducing beneficial electrification projects, received 20% of 2018 investments. 19% of investments were directed to clean and renewable energy programs, with direct bill assistance receiving 16%.”

The original letter was sent on August 3 and received a prompt reply on August 10 as documented in RGGI August 10 Response to Investment Proceeds Letter from Caiazza.  My thoughts on the response are shown below.  Caiazza – RGGI correspondence August 21 2020 documents my follow-up letter and the response received.  I appreciate Fred Hill responding to these letters.

Issues Raised in August 3, 2020 Letter

In the following I will summarize the concerns raised in my letter, followed by the RGGI bullet response and with my thoughts in italics.  The RGGI reply is in the bullets and my response italicized below.

I brought up the claim that “As a whole, the RGGI states have reduced power sector CO2 pollution over 50% since 2005, while the region’s gross domestic product has continued to grow”. The first year of the RGGI program was 2009, when the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont emitted 108,487,823 tons of CO2.  The report’s comparison starting date was 2005 when the emissions from those nine states equaled 147,032,069 tons.  The 50% reduction is attributed to the RGGI program but the reduction between 2005 and the start of the program was 26% so clearly something else has been going on.

    • While the report spotlights the impact of RGGI investments on reducing carbon emissions, these investments are part of a broader story about the leadership of the RGGI participating states in showing it is possible to grow the economy while reducing emissions.
        • The ultimate problem supposedly is climate change caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, I believe that the report should include documentation describing the efficacy of the program to reduce carbon emissions.
    • Concentrating on only the emissions reductions attributed directly to RGGI proceeds investments would be ignoring the effects of the RGGI regional cap and the market signal of a CO2 allowance price, as well as other policies in each RGGI state.
        • There is a major disconnect between the theory of RGGI described here and its practical effect on affected sources. I believe that the fuel switch from coal and oil to natural gas occurred because natural gas was the cheaper fuel and is the primary driver of the observed CO2 emission reductions.  This had very little to do with the RGGI market signal because the CO2 allowance cost adder to the plant’s operating costs was relatively small.   The affected sources treat the RGGI cost as tax and have not done anything else to meet the cap requirements. There is no evidence that any affected source in RGGI installed add-on controls to reduce their CO2 emissions.  The only other option at a power plant is to become more efficient and burn less fuel.  However, because fuel costs are the biggest driver for operational costs that means efficiency projects to reduce fuel use means have always been considered by these sources.   Because the market signal from the additional cost of the RGGI carbon price was small I do not believe that any affected source installed an efficiency project as part of its RGGI compliance strategy. 
    • The emissions reductions achieved in the RGGI states from 2005 to 2009 can be attributed to a variety of factors, as examined in a 2010 draft white paper available on the RGGI website.
        • The referenced white paper states:

The analysis concludes that three categories of factors are the primary drivers of the decreased CO2 emissions over this period: 1) lower electricity load (due to weather; energy efficiency programs and customer-sited generation; and the economy); 2) fuel-switching from petroleum and coal to natural gas (due to relatively low natural gas prices); and 3) changes in available capacity mix (due to increased nuclear capacity availability and uprates; reduced available coal capacity; increased wind capacity; and increased use of hydro capacity).

        • In your report describing the results of RGGI I believe that the statement in question, “the RGGI states have reduced power sector CO2 pollution over 50% since 2005” suggests that RGGI was the cause of the 50% reduction and the white paper clearly indicates that from 2005 to 2009 it was not.
        • The true value of RGGI would be clarified if the reductions since the start of RGGI were compared to a period before the program started. My preference is a three-year baseline of 2006 to 2008 data.

I noted that the document and press release both state:

In 2018, $248 million in RGGI proceeds were invested in programs including energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy, greenhouse gas abatement, and direct bill assistance. Over their lifetime, these 2018 investments are projected to provide participating households and businesses with $2 billion in energy bill savings and avoid the emission of 4.6 million short tons of CO2.

While it is appropriate to document the lifetime energy bill savings from RGGI investments, it is mis-leading to provide the lifetime avoided emissions value.

    • Assessing program effectiveness by totaling the “annual benefits” in prior reports would be discounting the fact that most investments continue to accrue benefits after the year in which the investment was made. (For example, a weatherization investment completed in 2015 would continue to result in avoided CO2 emissions not only in 2015 but in years to come.) The report does not include a figure for “cumulative annual emissions reduced” because taking the sum of in-year reductions in each annual report would not be an accurate figure for the lifetime CO2 reductions resulting from investments.
        • As I noted reporting lifetime energy bill savings is appropriate but the RGGI cap is an annual number. In order to assess the efficacy of the investments relative to meeting the cap I believe the RGGI investment proceeds report should also report cumulative RGGI investments and cumulative annual emissions reduced.

Until this report the Benefits of RGGI Investments table listed the annual and life-time benefits of that year’s investments for eight categories.  The 2018 report only lists the benefits for two categories: energy bill savings and total CO2 avoided.  Is there a reason for the change?

    • In terms of the change in the report in 2018, CO2 emissions avoided and energy bill savings are the metrics that are relevant across all categories of program investment. Additional metrics associated with more detailed categories continue to be reported for relevant program categories. The reason for this change is to better tailor the metrics for relevancy. (For example, “avoided MWh” would not be a relevant metric for a program funding electric vehicles.)
        • Now I that know the rationale I understand why the change was made.

Although from your perspective, the annual investment proceeds report is to inform the public about the investments and benefits I think that RGGI is a pollution control initiative and this report should also provide sufficient information to determine its effectiveness as a control program

    • Since 2015, the reports have focused on the investments made in a single year rather than the cumulative investments. This type of reporting is more accurate given that many states continue to refine and evolve their reporting methodologies over time. As the report notes, “All-time benefits metrics may be best understood as a general indication of the cumulative benefits of RGGI-funded investments since the program’s inception. Table 6 shows that the track record from all RGGI investments includes benefits on the order of billions of dollars in customer bill savings, and tens of millions of short tons of CO2 avoided. Note that as the program’s track record grows longer, all-time numbers may include changes in states’ methodologies from year to year.”
        • From my perspective, RGGI is a pollution control initiative and the report should provide sufficient information to determine its effectiveness in that regard. If the states have refined their estimates and reporting methodologies such that their annual investment and reduction estimates have improved then the historical data should be updated to provide the best estimate of the program investments relative to the RGGI cap.  The cap is an annual number so lifetime numbers are irrelevant.

I conclude that in order to accurately reflect the value of RGGI as a GHG emissions reduction program that this emissions proceeds report should provide the cumulative annual reductions from RGGI because that is the “apples to apples” comparison to policy emission targets.

    • Please note that the scope of the Investment of RGGI Proceeds report is to provide information to the public about how participating states invest RGGI proceeds and the benefits from those investments. Investment of RGGI proceeds is one of the policy mechanisms available to achieve participating states’ carbon reduction or other policy goals.
        • Even though I think I understand the perceived purpose of the report now the question becomes where should the cumulative annual investment and reductions numbers needed to calculate cost effectiveness numbers be presented? The ultimate goal of RGGI is to provide a template so other states will join the program and that parameter is needed to justify participation.

Conclusion

My reply letter to the RGGI response focused on the need to include cumulative annual investment and reduction estimates so that the cost effectiveness of the program’s investments can be determined. Despite RGGI’s intent in the report to inform the public about the investments and benefits ultimately this is still is a pollution control program and this report should provide sufficient information to calculated its effectiveness in that regard.  The Proceeds report always include a caveat that the states refine their estimates update their methodologies, but the annual numbers are not updated.  Therefore, in order to get the best estimate of the cumulative value RGGI should update the annual numbers and provide the cumulative total in future editions.

I am very appreciative that Fred Hill responded to my letters.  The promise to pass my comments on to the RGGI states for consideration is a first step.  It remains to be seen whether the states will provide this information in the future.

Comments on the DEC Webinar on the CLCPA Value of Carbon

Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) in 2019 and planning for the transition of New York’s energy system is underway.  Because I am convinced that the general public has no idea what is going on with this energy policy and the possible ramifications, I have been preparing posts on this process.  This post addresses a webinar (slides and recording) by DEC on the value of carbon and the comments I submitted about the webinar.

The Citizens Budget Commission has developed an overview of the CLCPA and its targets, Green in Perspective: 6 Facts to Help New Yorkers Understand the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, that provides good background information.  The CLCPA was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  Unfortunately, the politicians that passed this law assumed that their political will was sufficient to make it happen and included no provision to determine whether it can work or how much it will cost.  I have written a series of posts on the feasibility, implications and consequences of this aspect of the law based on evaluation of data.

I am a retired electric utility meteorologist with nearly 40-years-experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  My posts on New York energy policy are here.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Climate Action Council is charged with developing a scoping plan to implement the CLCPA requirements.  When developing the plan, they are supposed to take into account the “economic and social benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions” taking into account the value of carbon. In a previous post, I described the requirement, the social cost of carbon, and concerns I have about this parameter.

The law states that “The social cost of carbon shall serve as a monetary estimate of the value of not emitting a ton of greenhouse gas emissions”. The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is the present-day value of projected future net damages from emitting a ton of CO2 today.  The idea is that New York will calculate the dollar-value of the Climate Act’s effect on climate change due to changes in greenhouse gas emissions.

In order to fulfill their required response to this requirement the DEC is in the process of developing guidance to establish the social cost of carbon that will be used in New York.  The webinar presentation on July 24, 2020 provided the public an opportunity to learn and ask questions.  DEC noted that comments and questions can be sent to ClimateAct@dec.ny.gov and this post describes comments I submitted on August 6, 2020.

The automatic response I received when I submitted the comment was interesting.  The automatic reply stated: “Thank you for your message. Your message will be directed to the Climate Action Council or one of the Advisory Panels, as appropriate.”  I thought the message would be directed to the staff at DEC responsible for the webinar not the Climate Action Council.  This illustrates one of the problems I have with the CLCPA.  For all the talk about best available science and consultation with the public in CLCPA presentations, there isn’t any clear description of how public input will be considered, indication that public comments will be documented, or whether there will be responses to comments.

Comments Submitted

The webinar gave an overview of valuing carbon and included questions on specific topics.  I sent Comments on the DEC Guidance for Establishing a Value of Carbon Webinar to the email address listed on the DEC website.  I will summarize those comments below.

I had two general comments.  DEC has decided that the value of carbon will be established as guidance not as a regulation.  While I agree with that in general, it also means that DEC has no obligation to provide documentation responding to comments or justify the choice of the value used.  I also commented that given the importance of this parameter and its inherent complexity that the guidance document should include a layman’s summary that explains how the parameter is developed, used and provide the full range of potential values along with the justification for the value chosen.

I also called attention to the fact that the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is mis-using the SCC in its press releases touting the benefits of their carbon reduction programs.  The CLCPA value of carbon is supposed to define the economic and social benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions so it is important that it be done correctly.  NYSERDA applies the SCC to the lifetime value of avoided carbon emissions.  However, the SCC is the present-day value of projected future net damages from emitting a ton of CO2 today so it should not be used with lifetime emissions.

One of the key considerations in calculating the SCC is the choice of the discount rate used.  The webinar attempted to explain how it is used but I believe a more general and more complete explanation is needed.  Another item for discussion is whether the state’s value of carbon should address global impacts or, for the sake of argument, just state-wide impacts.

The webinar presentation asked how the social costs of pollutants other than CO2 should be addressed.  I found a reference that I believe made a persuasive argument that using directly calculated societal values should be used.

Another question asked was “How can state agencies use the damages-based value of carbon?”.  The webinar slides explicitly stated “This is not a carbon price and will not impose any fees” but I think that will be the inevitable outcome at some date.  The webinar slides notes that the Federal government uses it in regulatory benefit-cost analyses and environmental reviews and I believe that it should be used the same way for the Climate Act.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this post was to document my comments made on the value of carbon webinar.  The value chosen and the venues where it is used will have important implications for the CLCPA.  I will continue to monitor this and report on the social cost of carbon.

My RGGI Testimony to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Environmental Resources & Energy Committee

On August 6, I tuned into the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) webinar titled “RGGI 101 How it Works and How it Benefits Pennsylvanians” because I have a long-standing interest in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).  I prepared a https://wp.me/p8hgeb-slpost describing my impression of the presentation against the reality of my experience with it that caught the attention of Daryl Metcalfe, the Chair of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Environmental Resources & Energy Committee who asked me to provide testimony at the August 25, 2020 committee meeting regarding RGGI.  This post summarizes my testimony.

I have been involved in the RGGI program process since it was first proposed prior to 2008.  I blog about the details of the RGGI program because very few seem to want to provide any criticisms of the program. I have extensive experience with air pollution control theory and implementation having worked every cap and trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including the Acid Rain Program, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and several Nitrogen Oxide programs.  Note that my experience is exclusively on the industry side and the difference in perspective between affected sources trying to comply with the rules and economists opining about what they should be doing have important ramifications.  I think this background served me well providing the testimony presented.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector.  According to a RGGI website: “The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances which are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs. Programs funded with RGGI investments have spanned a wide range of consumers, providing benefits and improvements to private homes, local businesses, multi-family housing, industrial facilities, community buildings, retail customers, and more.”

RGGI started in 2009 and the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont have participated ever since.  New Jersey was included at the start of the program, dropped out and re-joined in 2020.  Virginia recently announced that they would join in 2021.  According to this presentation Pennsylvania is planning to join in 2022.

According to the DEP’s RGGI website,  “Governor Wolf recently signed an Executive Order that directed DEP to begin a rulemaking process that will allow Pennsylvania to participate in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), with the goal of reducing carbon emissions from the electricity sector”.  I know very little about Pennsylvania politics but I did figure out that the Governor is not planning to go through the legislature to have Pennsylvania to join RGGI.  Because Pennsylvania not only has significant coal-fired generation but also mines it, there are significant concerns about the impact of joining RGGI on the continued viability of those resources.

I have never presented testimony before so this was a new experience.  The web page for the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Environmental Resources & Energy Committee lists the transcript and presentations for the witnesses who presented testimony on August 24, 2020.  If you are very bored there is even a video of the testimony of the six presentations.

Testimony

I will summarize my main points in the remainder of this post.  For more detail you can go listen to the presentation or read the  testimony and  slides I submitted.

The first discussion point addressed carbon pricing because ultimately RGGI is a carbon pricing scheme.  I admit that the theory of putting a price on carbon is attractive but there are very real problems associated with implementation.  Unless the carbon price is set across the globe and covers all energy sectors pollution leakage, where a pollution reduction policy simply moves the pollution around the globe rather than actually reducing it, is an inevitable short-coming.  Within the electric generating sector there is a very real problem because power plants have limited control options: switching fuels or operating less.  As a result, generating companies simply treat it as an added cost to doing business which is pretty much the same as a tax.  While proponents call this a cap and dividend program I call it a cap and tax program and because all energy taxes are regressive this will impact those who can least afford additional energy costs.

RGGI proponents claim that it is a success and often cite the observed emission reductions.  As shown in my testimony and previous post, both the PA DEP and RGGI accurately claimed that regional CO2 emissions are down on the order of 50% since 2005, but RGGI had very little to do with it.  The vast majority of the reductions were due to fuel switching from coal and residual oil to natural gas. Because the RGGI price adder is small relative to the fuel cost differential RGGI itself had very little to do with the observed fuel switching.  I believe that the only reductions that RGGI can claim are those that result from the investment of RGGI proceeds.  Using that criterion, RGGI is only responsible for on the order of 5% of the observed reductions.

I also showed that the emission reductions would have a negligible effect on global warming itself.  I found there would be a reduction, or a “savings,” of approximately 0.0011°C by the year 2050 and 0.0023°C by the year 2100 if all Pennsylvania CO2 emissions were eliminated.  To give an idea of how small this temperature change is it is the same as a change in elevation of nine inches or change in latitude of two tenths of a mile.

Finally, I compared the emissions and operational changes of Pennsylvania relative to the nine states in RGGI since 2009 when RGGI started.  Pennsylvania without RGGI has accomplished nearly as much as the nine RGGI states in terms of maintaining fossil generation levels while reducing emissions, improving efficiency, and switching to cleaner fuels.

I concluded that despite the claims made by its proponents, upon close examination RGGI is an inefficient method for reducing CO2 emissions.  The affected sources will treat it simply as a tax.  As a result, that means that the primary impact to the public is a regressive tax.  Fuel switching to Marcellus Shale gas created by Pennsylvania’s fracking revolution was the primary cause of the observed decreases in emissions.  Clearly, Pennsylvania has done more to reduce CO2 in the RGGI states than the RGGI itself and that will continue whether or not Pennsylvania joins RGGI.

Media Coverage of Clean Energy

I had other plans for today but I have to post on this topic.  I came across two separate articles that stated that the costs of renewables are cheaper than power from existing alternatives which reminded me that I have to do a post on that topic.  However, the thing that prompted this post was buried at the bottom of the Christian Science Monitor article Power pivot: What happens in states where wind dethrones King Coal?

Background

In particular at the bottom of article was the statement: “This story was produced with support from an Energy Foundation grant to cover the environment.”  That link leads to a June 29, 2018 page that notes that “the Energy Foundation has given a grant to support the Monitor’s distinctive approach to climate change coverage”.  It goes on to say:

The Monitor believes the solution to climate change doesn’t come from speaking more loudly or citing even more peer-reviewed science, but from recognizing why people come to climate change from such vastly different perspectives – and meeting them where they are. Changing minds to find paths forward starts with a deep commitment to humanity and respect, not from frustrated finger-pointing.

That perspective has drawn the attention of some philanthropists interested in supporting media outlets bringing light to this divisive topic. The Monitor’s science desk is the proud recipient of a special grant from the Energy Foundation, a philanthropic organization dedicated to “serving the public interest by helping to build a strong, clean energy economy.” You can read more about the Energy Foundation here. These funds are specifically to bolster the Monitor’s approach to coverage of climate, energy, and the environment during the coming year.

Presumably, the grant was extended to continue support since it has longer than a year since this description appeared and the August 21, 2020 publication of Power pivot: What happens in states where wind dethrones King Coal?

Energy Foundation

I had never heard of the Energy Foundation.  Their mission statement makes their motivation clear: “Our mission is to secure a clean and equitable energy future to tackle the climate crisis.”

The following is their vision statement:

We envision a healthy, safe, equitable economy powered by clean energy. We believe a thriving clean energy economy can create sustainable opportunities, spur innovation, and protect our climate—for today and future generations.

Energy Foundation supports education and analysis to promote non-partisan policy solutions that advance renewable energy and energy efficiency while opening doors to greater innovation and productivity—growing the economy with dramatically less pollution. For nearly 30 years, Energy Foundation has supported grantees to help educate policymakers and the general public about the benefits of a clean energy economy. Our grantees include business, health, environmental, labor, equity, community, faith, and consumer groups, as well as policy experts, think tanks, universities, and more.

We are a complex, multi-site, multicultural nonprofit organization with big plans for the future. Under the leadership of our CEO, Energy Foundation has embarked on a major strategy refresh, a prioritized commitment to Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI), and rapid geographic expansion.

Our comprehensive approach advances energy efficiency and renewable energy in the power, transportation, and buildings sectors. Our programs focus on developing innovative policies and campaigns to help propel clean energy development in these sectors. The Venues team is a cross-disciplinary team of policy, communications, and campaign experts dedicated to advancing strong state and regional climate and clean energy policies. The Policy team works to deliver strategy and network support services to our issue-focused grantees and funding partners. And the Strategic Communications team develops powerful narrative and communications strategies designed to build support for our work regionally and nationwide.

Energy Foundation’s founding office is in San Francisco, CA, with regional offices in Raleigh, NC; Chicago, IL; Washington, DC; and Las Vegas, NV.

Energy Foundation funds do not support legislative lobbying or electoral activities.

The Energy Foundation is not a small organization courageously fighting the noble cause against “Big Oil”.  Their 2017 IRS Form 990 claims total revenues in 2016 of $118.9 million and $110.2 million in 2017; total expenses of $113.6 million in 2016 and $114.1 million in 2017; and net assets of $62.4 million at the close of 2017.  The Form 990 is worth a read if only to see the large number of organizations that receive grants to “promote education and analysis” to support a clean energy future.  I was surprised to see universities among the grantees –           three California state universities received on the order of $2 million alone.  Missing from their web page is any description of who funds the Energy Foundation itself.

Conclusion

I wrote this post because this particular quote caught my eye: “We’ve reached a point where it is now cheaper to build and operate a wind farm or solar plant than it is to operate a coal plant,” says Joe Daniel, senior energy analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington. “And that trend is going to continue.”  I see that often and get exasperated every time I see it because, like most people, I don’t care what it costs to build a power plant.  The only thing I care about is how much it costs me to get electricity when and where I need it.  When those considerations are added to the costs of any renewable source of electricity the price sky rockets.

I have long thought that any journalist that does not caveat such a statement either lacks understanding in general or does not understand the energy system well enough.  After finding out that there is a foundation that provides funding to news organizations I have to add a less flattering reason for not providing the full explanation.  The Christian Science Monitor has a motivated reason to continue to receive funding from an organization dedicated to “serving the public interest by helping to build a strong, clean energy economy.”  In that light even the possibility that a “clean energy economy” may have flaws and that overall it may not be in the best public interest is not going to be incorporated in any reporting.

Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act 1990 Emissions Inventory Requirements

Updated 10/26/2020 to corrected error in 1990 data shown

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  On August 14 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos released proposed regulations to support implementation of the CLCPA.  A key part of this regulation is defining the baseline 1990 emission inventory and this post expands on my initial inventory post and a second post on the emissions report timing by looking at the effect of four key considerations imposed by the CLCPA.

I am a retired air pollution meteorologist with nearly 40-years experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  I have been following the implementation of the CLCPA and posting on it as it develops. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

This 1990 emissions inventory is important because many of the targets of the CLCPA are based on reductions from this baseline.  For example, there is a target to reduce GHG emissions to 60 percent of 1990 emissions levels by 2030.  The CLCPA mandates specific requirements for the 1990 emission inventory that I am positive no legislator who voted for the law understood.  This post compares the proposed CLCPA 1990 emission inventory with the previous “official” New York greenhouse gas emission inventory was prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA). 

Updated 10/26/2020: Correction to show that NYSERDA 1990 emissions were in Table S-2.  Previously used the 2016 numbers in Table S-1.

The Part 496 Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) includes a section titled Key Requirements of the 1990 Emission Baseline section that explains the CLCPA mandates that required DEC to develop a new official inventory.   These requirements significantly affect the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission total for the State.  According to the latest edition of the NYSERDA GHG emission inventory (July 2019) Table S-1  Table S-2 New York State GHG Emissions 1990–2016 the New York State 1990 GHG emissions were 205.61  236.18 MMtCO2e. The proposed Part 496 regulation 1990 emissions inventory total is 401.38 MMtCO2e for an increase of 195.77 165.2 MMtCO2e. 

Summary of 1990 Emission Inventories

Regulatory Impact Statement Table 1 Inventory in GWP20.

SectorCO2CH4N2OPFCsHFCsSF6Total
Energy254.4370.121.31  4.00329.87
IPPU1.670.000.000.900.020.012.60
AFOLU0.0513.074.01   17.13
Waste3.0348.250.50   51.78
Total259.18131.455.830.900.024.01401.38

NYSERDA July 2019 Table S-2 Emission Inventory in GWP100

SectorCO2CH4N2OPFCsHFCsSF6Total
Energy208.96
IPPU3.99
AFOLU8.37
Waste   14.86
Total236.18

I will address the requirements and the effect on emissions in the following.

CLCPA Pollutants

The RIS states:

“The first requirement is that the greenhouse gases subject to the statewide emission limit include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFC), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). As the CLCPA references the IPCC, the IPCC protocol for national greenhouse gas inventories is used as a foundation for determining which sources of these gases are included in the 1990 baseline. That protocol applies a sectoral inventory, or a categorization of emission sources based on the broad economic sectors of energy, industry, waste, agriculture, and other land use.” 

The NYSERDA July 2019 emission inventory included all these parameters so this had no effect on emissions.

According to the RIS:

“The second key requirement of the CLCPA relevant to this proposed rule is that it directs the Department to set greenhouse gases on a common scale using the carbon dioxide equivalence metric (CO2e) and the 20-year Global Warming Potential (GWP20) of each gas, which the Department derived from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). The IPCC protocol requires national governments apply a 100-year Global Warming Potential metric (GWP100) from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4),5 and thus other government inventories more frequently utilize the GWP100 metric rather than GWP20 metric set forth in the CLCPA. While Part 496 uses the GWP20 metric derived from AR5, the Department provides an estimate of the 1990 baseline using both metrics below. This is for the purposes of comparing 1990 emission estimates with those of the previous State inventory, the inventory reports of other governments, and other references that use the more standard GWP100 metrics.”

The RIS provides a table with the GWP100 emissions so that a comparison of the two inventories is possible.  As shown below, the difference between the two is almost completely related to changes in methane (CH4) in the energy and waste sectors.  Note that this difference accounts for 46% of the total change in emissions between the proposed regulation and the July 2019 NYSERDA inventory.

Comparison of GWP20 and GWP100 Inventories (MMtCO2e)

Proposed Part 496 1990 Emissions Inventory (GWP20).

SectorCO2CH4N2OPFCsHFCsSF6Total
Energy254.4370.121.31  4.00329.87
IPPU1.670.000.000.900.020.012.60
AFOLU0.0513.074.01   17.13
Waste3.0348.250.50   51.78
Total259.18131.455.830.900.024.01401.38

Regulatory Impact Statement Table 2 Inventory in GWP100.

SectorCO2CH4N2OPFCsHFCsSF6Total
Energy254.4320.871.48  5.22282.00
IPPU1.670.000.001.350.020.013.05
AFOLU0.053.894.53   8.47
Waste3.0314.360.57   17.96
Total259.1839.126.581.350.025.22311.47

Difference GWP20 Inventory Minus GWP 100 Inventory

SectorCO2CH4N2OPFCsHFCsSF6Total
Energy0.0049.25-0.170.000.00-1.2247.86
IPPU0.000.000.00-0.450.000.00-0.45
AFOLU0.009.18-0.520.000.000.008.66
Waste0.0033.89-0.070.000.000.0033.82
Total0.0092.32-0.76-0.450.00-1.2289.89

The RIS notes that the “final two key requirements of the CLCPA set New York State apart from other governments in a way that makes it challenging to directly compare the statewide emission limits with the goals from other jurisdictions”.  The question that comes up is was this really necessary and my opinion is that the added burden dealing with this far out-weighs any benefits or needs.  Due to the lack of comprehensive documentation I was unable to tease out the individual effect of the requirement to include emissions located outside of New York vs the effect of the requirement to “establish regulatory limits based on a percentage of gross 1990 emissions as opposed to net emissions” but I can show what the effect of these considerations is on emissions.

The RIS explains that in the third requirement:

“The CLCPA establishes that the statewide emission limit, and therein the emission reduction requirements of the CLCPA, include certain emission sources that are located outside of the State borders. As mentioned above, ECL § 75-0101(13) defines statewide greenhouse gas emissions as including emissions associated with imported electricity and fossil fuels. The IPCC protocol for national governments do not include similar requirements to incorporate emissions produced outside of the relevant jurisdiction associated with energy imported into the jurisdiction. If comparing the 1990 baseline to other jurisdictions’ emission reports, the imported fuels and electricity sectors should be excluded. However, the statutory emission reduction requirements of the CLCPA include these sectors.”

The RIS describes the final key component: “The fourth and final key component of the CLCPA for purposes of this rulemaking is that the 100 percent net emission reduction goal, or a goal of attaining net zero emissions, is not part of the Legislature’s direction to the Department for promulgating the statewide emission limits. The directives to reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions (1) 40 percent from 1990 levels by 2030, and (2) 85 percent from 1990 levels by 2050 (40×30 and 85×50) are set forth in ECL § 75-0107, which further directs the Department to establish these statewide greenhouse gas limits as a percentage of estimated 1990 emissions.”  In order to meet this requirement DEC concludes that it is necessary to “establish regulatory limits based on a percentage of gross 1990 emissions as opposed to net emissions”.  The inventory includes anthropogenic CO2 emissions resulting from the combustion of biomass and biofuels in the 1990 baseline but notes that this assumption may have to be adjusted.  For waste emissions, the Department proposes a separate approach to the issue of accounting for gross and net emissions and a separate approach for anthropogenic versus non-anthropogenic emissions.

Update 10/26/2020: Correction to show that NYSERDA 1990 emissions were in Table S-2.  Previously used the 2016 numbers.

The following table shows the differences between the proposed emissions inventory and the July 2019 NYSERDA inventory as a function of the upstream out-of-state emissions, the gross vs. net adjustment for waste emissions and the adjustment for anthropogenic CO2 emissions resulting from the combustion of biomass and biofuels.  The waste emissions adjustment is 5.15  3.10 MMtCO2e but I cannot differentiate exactly how much is due to either remaining factor.  However, I believe that because biomass burning is a relatively small component of overall emissions most of the approximate 100 75 MMtCO2e difference is due to upstream added emissions.

Comparison of RIS Table 2 GWP100 Inventory and NYSERDA July 2019 Table S-1 GWP100 Without Other Part 496 Inventory Adjustments (MMtCO2e)

Regulatory Impact Statement Table 2 Inventory in GWP100.

SectorCO2CH4N2OPFCsHFCsSF6Total
Energy254.4320.871.48  5.22282.00
IPPU1.670.000.001.350.020.013.05
AFOLU0.053.894.53   8.47
Waste3.0314.360.57   17.96
Total259.1839.126.581.350.025.22311.47

NYSERDA July 2019 Table S-2

SectorCO2CH4N2OPFCsHFCsSF6Total
Energy208.96
IPPU3.99
AFOLU8.37
Waste   14.86
Total236.18

Difference GWP100 Inventory Minus NYSERDA 2019 Inventory

SectorCO2CH4N2OPFCsHFCsSF6Total
Energy73.04
IPPU-0.94
AFOLU-0.10
Waste3.10
Total75.29

Update 10/26/2020: Correction to NYSERDA 1990 emissions in Table S-2. 

Discussion

The CLCPA also mandates specific requirements for the 1990 emission inventory that I am sure very few, if any, politicians who voted for the law understood.  The previous NYSERDA GHG inventory followed Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidance for developing an emissions inventory.  Why wasn’t that good enough?  Instead the law includes specific language that requires the development of a revised inventory that has to rely on some speculative assumptions for some sectors, is inconsistent with everyone else making comparisons difficult, and leads to almost a doubling of emissions in the baseline year of 1990.

The previous 1990 New York GHG emission inventory was 205.61  236.18 MMtCO2e.  The proposed Part 496 regulation 1990 emissions inventory total is 401.38 MMtCO2e an increase of 195.77  165.2 MMtCO2e. 

One of the mandates specified that the global warming potential (GWP) had to be calculated over a 20-year time horizon.  The IPCC describes time horizons and the GWP[1] notes:

“The GWP has become the default metric for transferring emissions of different gases to a common scale; often called ‘CO2 equivalent emis­sions’ (e.g., Shine, 2009). It has usually been integrated over 20, 100 or 500 years consistent with Houghton et al. (1990). Note, however that Houghton et al. presented these time horizons as ‘candidates for discussion [that] should not be considered as having any special sig­nificance’. The GWP for a time horizon of 100 years was later adopted as a metric to implement the multi-gas approach embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and made operational in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The choice of time horizon has a strong effect on the GWP values — and thus also on the calculated contributions of CO2 equivalent emissions by component, sector or nation. There is no scientific argument for selecting 100 years compared with other choices (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Shine, 2009). The choice of time horizon is a value judgement because it depends on the relative weight assigned to effects at different times.”

This boils down to the conclusion that the authors of this section of the CLCPA imposed their value judgements upon the state. 

The other mandate that makes this inventory unique is the requirement to include upstream out-of-state emissions.  The IPCC protocol for national governments do not include similar requirements to incorporate emissions produced outside of the relevant jurisdiction associated with energy imported into the jurisdiction.  There is no question that this requirement was deliberately included.

Conclusion

The 1990 GHG emission inventory proposed in DEC’s proposed Part 496, statewide emission limits had to establish a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit as a percentage of 1990 emissions no later than one year after the effective date of the CLCPA.  As noted previously that deadline forced DEC to release the document with much less than the “best available” documentation required in the law. 

The two primary drivers for the doubling of the emissions inventory both add a little under 100 75 MMtCO2e to the 1990 inventory.   As I noted it is not obvious why the authors of the law included those requirements that they had to know would increase the 1990 baseline.  On one hand a higher baseline may mean that the politicians can more easily claim victory for the interim target in 2030.  On the other hand, making the inventory more expansive by adding upstream requirements and two other smaller impact mandates makes compliance harder.  Couple that with the global warming potential specification that increases methane emissions I suspect that the authors tried to use the law to make the use of out-of-state natural gas impossible sooner rather than later.

I believe it is only a matter of time until economic reality slams into the CLCPA.  New York’s war on natural gas is a war on the most economical fuel that has been responsible for the vast majority of CO2 reductions observed to date.  When these policies require the use of more expensive fuels the inevitable result will be significant price increases on energy costs that are already among the highest in the country.  When the Cuomo Administration can no longer hide those cost increases in utility rate cases, hidden fees, or programs that are taxes in all but name, the reckoning will come.

[1] Reference: Myhre, G., D. Shindell, F.-M. Bréon, W. Collins, J. Fuglestvedt, J. Huang, D. Koch, J.-F. Lamarque, D. Lee, B. Mendoza, T. Nakajima, A. Robock, G. Stephens, T. Takemura and H. Zhang, 2013: Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forc­ing. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act Emissions Report Timing

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  I have maintained that this legislation is deeply flawed because it presumed that its aspirational targets could be met without doing a feasibility study, that is to say they put the cart before the horse.  Before I can prepare a post on the differences between the new emissions inventory and the old one I want to discuss another flaw in the structure of the act.

I am a retired air pollution meteorologist with nearly 40-years experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  I have been following the implementation of the CLCPA and posting on it as it develops. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

CLCPA greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) reporting

In § 75-0105, the CLCPA mandates a statewide greenhouse gas emissions report.  No later than two years after the law was promulgated, and each year thereafter, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) must issue a report on statewide greenhouse gas emissions from all greenhouse gas emission sources in the state. The report is required to “include an estimate of what the statewide greenhouse gas emissions level was in 1990”. It is supposed to be a “comprehensive evaluation” not only of direct emissions but also include an “estimate of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the generation of imported electricity and with the extraction and transmission of fossil fuels imported into the state”.  There are explicit requirements to ensure it is high quality: “The statewide greenhouse gas emissions report shall utilize best available science and methods of analysis, including the comparison and reconciliation of emission estimates from all sources, fuel consumption, field data, and peer-reviewed research” and “shall clearly explain the methodology and analysis used in the department’s determination of greenhouse gas emissions and shall include a detailed explanation of any changes in methodology or analysis, adjustments made to prior estimates, as needed, and any other information necessary to establish a scientifically credible account of change.  Finally, it requires DEC to hold at least two public meetings to seek public input regarding the methodology and analysis.

The next section in the CLCPA, § 75-0107, Statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits, mandates that “No later than one year after the effective date of this article, the department shall, pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated after at least one public hearing, establish a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit as a percentage of 1990 emissions, as estimated pursuant to section 75-0105 of this article”.  There also is a requirement that “in order to ensure the most accurate determination feasible, the department shall utilize the best available scientific, technological, and economic information on greenhouse gas emissions and consult with the council, stakeholders, and the public in order to ensure that all emissions are accurately reflected in its determination of 1990 emissions levels”.

There is a contradiction in these two sections.  How can § 75-0107, Statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits, establish a limit estimated pursuant to § 75-0105 which is due later than this requirement?  Both sections mandate the use of the “best available” information and consultation with the public, but the timing requirements preclude that from happening.

In order to meet the requirements of § 75-0107 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos released proposed regulation Part 496 to establish statewide greenhouse gas emission limits based on 1990 emissions on August 14,2020.  In my opinion, the process is not meeting the requirement to use the “best available” or consult with the public.  I show below that the description of the emission inventory methodology is less extensive than the previous NYS GHG emission inventory and much less comprehensive that the EPA inventory that I would define as the “best available”.  Consultation with the public is not possible until November. In order to meet the legislative mandate schedule, the rule has been officially proposed.  During the comment period, consultations with the public are forbidden and the only recourse is to comment on the regulation.  In my opinion, consultation with the public should be an iterative process with multiple opportunities to interact with the DEC and respond to comments by others.

Documentation

Up until this time the “official” New York greenhouse gas emission inventory was prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA).  This inventory of greenhouse gas emissions in the state follows the standard Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) protocol. The July 2019 edition is 73 pages long and there is an accompanying fact sheet and a 196 page supplement: New York State Oil and Gas Sector Methane Emissions Inventory.

In April 2020, the US Environmental Protection Agency its annual Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2018.  The complete report is 733 pages, has ten chapters and nine appendices.  In my opinion that sets the standard for the “best available” supporting information for an emissions inventory.

In order to meet the CLCPA deadline for an emission limit one year after promulgation, DEC was forced to propose Part 496, Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emission Limits.  That includes an emissions inventory for 1990 but the only documentation is in the Regulatory Impact Statement.  The section on needs and benefits includes a description of sectoral methods and results that comprises the entirety of the documentation for the 1990 emissions inventory.  The documentation is on the order of 20 pages so it clearly is not “best available”.

Stakeholder Input

According to the Regulatory Impact Statement:

“The Department conducted pre-proposal, stakeholder outreach starting the date on which the CLCPA went into effect, or January 1, 2020, through May 2020. This included two public webinars held on February 14 and 28, 2020 to discuss the scope and key considerations of this rulemaking as well as other presentations and meetings with various stakeholders, including members of the Climate Action Council, by request. For example, the Department presented to the Manufacturers Association of Central New York and the Air and Water Managers Association in May 2020 and participated in meetings with Covanta, National Fuel Gas, and natural gas transmission pipeline companies62 in April 2020. The Department also consulted with other State agencies and authorities, including NYSERDA, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Public Service, and the Department of Agriculture and Markets. The Department reviewed the feedback received in this stakeholder outreach as part of further developing Part 496.”

The Regulatory Impact Statement for proposed Part 496 explains that DEC worked with NYSERDA to incorporate the CLCPA requirements that differ from the IPCC protocol and conduct new analyses as needed for the rulemaking. They also noted that:

“Some of these analyses were also assisted by a NYSERDA consultant (Eastern Research Group, Inc) and subcontractor (Synapse Energy Economics, Inc) and reviewed by subject matter experts from the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Department of Energy, the Environmental Defense Fund, and university partners. Additional stakeholder input is described later in this document. New analyses were not required in all cases, as the new requirements of the CLCPA do not completely differ from the methodology historically used by NYSERDA. As such, many components of the estimates provided here are the same or similar to the previous State inventory.”

One of the big changes in the proposed 1990 emissions inventory is how methane is handled.  A primary reference in the RIS is a Science article that was also published as an Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) report that claims “that in 2015, supply chain emissions were ∼60% higher than the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency inventory estimate”.  Given that the paper is cited as “proof” that the proposed bottom-up baseline is valid, it is inappropriate for New York policy to be reviewed by subject matter experts from EDF that were from the organization that published such an influential paper on the methane emissions.

I believe that an effective public stakeholder process has to be an iterative process including a DEC document for discussion, a DEC presentation of their rationale, a chance for the public to respond with questions and comments, a response to those comments that is available for the public to consider, and another chance to provide comments.  DEC held webinars that were very general in nature and offered little opportunity for technical questions.  Stakeholders responded with their thoughts but there was not another round of discussion.  Instead the inventory went into rule making and it is impossible to get answers to anything but general questions.  The rule-making process requires a public hearing but that won’t be interactive either.  It is only an opportunity to publicly submit comments which, frankly, can be done more effectively in written comments.

Conclusion

There are serious problems with the promulgation of an emissions standard based on an unvetted 1990 emission inventory.  There is no opportunity for meaningful comments based on a fully documented inventory.  The CLCPA inconsistency of the timing of the comprehensive statewide greenhouse gas emissions report that is issued a year after the emissions standard is required to be promulgated is an indictment of the political process that produced the CLCPA.  The rush to meet the schedule has over-ridden the alleged goal of using the “best available” inventory.

My fear that the CLCPA answer is already in the back of the book appears to be coming true.  The emission inventory is only one aspect of this massive transition.  If there is no opportunity for meaningful discourse for this element what hope is that there will be opportunities to fully evaluate other aspects of the rule.  Not only is the cart before the horse, the cart is fully loaded without the opportunity to examine its contents.

Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act 1990 Emissions Inventory

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  On August 14 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos released proposed regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emission statewide and implement the CLCPA.  A key part of this regulation is defining the baseline 1990 emission inventory and this is a quick initial post about the inventory.

Up until this time the “official” New York greenhouse gas emission inventory was prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA)  According to the latest edition of the NYSERDA GHG emission inventory Table S-2 New York State GHG Emissions 1990–2016 the New York State 1990 GHG emissions were 236.19 MMtCO2e.

The CLCPA mandates specific requirements for the 1990 emission inventory that I am positive no legislator who voted for the law understood.  The most impactful requirement was to specify that the global warming potential (GWP) be calculated over a 20-year time horizon.  The following section of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes time horizons and the GWP.

Reference: Myhre, G., D. Shindell, F.-M. Bréon, W. Collins, J. Fuglestvedt, J. Huang, D. Koch, J.-F. Lamarque, D. Lee, B. Mendoza, T. Nakajima, A. Robock, G. Stephens, T. Takemura and H. Zhang, 2013: Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forc­ing. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

“The GWP has become the default metric for transferring emissions of different gases to a common scale; often called ‘CO2 equivalent emis­sions’ (e.g., Shine, 2009). It has usually been integrated over 20, 100 or 500 years consistent with Houghton et al. (1990). Note, however that Houghton et al. presented these time horizons as ‘candidates for discussion [that] should not be considered as having any special sig­nificance’. The GWP for a time horizon of 100 years was later adopted as a metric to implement the multi-gas approach embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and made operational in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The choice of time horizon has a strong effect on the GWP values — and thus also on the calculated contributions of CO2 equivalent emissions by component, sector or nation. There is no scientific argument for selecting 100 years compared with other choices (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Shine, 2009). The choice of time horizon is a value judgement because it depends on the relative weight assigned to effects at different times. Other important choices include the background atmosphere on which the GWP calculations are superimposed, and the way indirect effects and feedbacks are included (see Section 8.7.1.4).”

According to the draft regulation released on August 14, § 496.4 Statewide Emission Limits (a) For the purposes of this Part, the estimated level of statewide greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 is 401.38 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, using a GWP20 as provided in the IPCC assessment report.

More to come on this topic.