Author: rogercaiazza

Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) in 2019 and planning for the transition of New York’s energy system is underway.  Because I am convinced that the general public has no idea what is going on with this energy policy and the possible ramifications, I have been preparing posts on this process.  This post addresses a webinar (slides and recording) by DEC on the value of carbon and the comments I submitted about the webinar.

The Citizens Budget Commission has developed an overview of the CLCPA and its targets, Green in Perspective: 6 Facts to Help New Yorkers Understand the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, that provides good background information.  The CLCPA was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  Unfortunately, the politicians that passed this law assumed that their political will was sufficient to make it happen and included no provision to determine whether it can work or how much it will cost.  I have written a series of posts on the feasibility, implications and consequences of this aspect of the law based on evaluation of data.

I am a retired electric utility meteorologist with nearly 40-years-experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  My posts on New York energy policy are here.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Climate Action Council is charged with developing a scoping plan to implement the CLCPA requirements.  When developing the plan, they are supposed to take into account the “economic and social benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions” taking into account the value of carbon. In a previous post, I described the requirement, the social cost of carbon, and concerns I have about this parameter.

The law states that “The social cost of carbon shall serve as a monetary estimate of the value of not emitting a ton of greenhouse gas emissions”. The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is the present-day value of projected future net damages from emitting a ton of CO2 today.  The idea is that New York will calculate the dollar-value of the Climate Act’s effect on climate change due to changes in greenhouse gas emissions.

In order to fulfill their required response to this requirement the DEC is in the process of developing guidance to establish the social cost of carbon that will be used in New York.  The webinar presentation on July 24, 2020 provided the public an opportunity to learn and ask questions.  DEC noted that comments and questions can be sent to ClimateAct@dec.ny.gov and this post describes comments I submitted on August 6, 2020.

The automatic response I received when I submitted the comment was interesting.  The automatic reply stated: “Thank you for your message. Your message will be directed to the Climate Action Council or one of the Advisory Panels, as appropriate.”  I thought the message would be directed to the staff at DEC responsible for the webinar not the Climate Action Council.  This illustrates one of the problems I have with the CLCPA.  For all the talk about best available science and consultation with the public in CLCPA presentations, there isn’t any clear description of how public input will be considered, indication that public comments will be documented, or whether there will be responses to comments.

Comments Submitted

The webinar gave an overview of valuing carbon and included questions on specific topics.  I sent Comments on the DEC Guidance for Establishing a Value of Carbon Webinar to the email address listed on the DEC website.  I will summarize those comments below.

I had two general comments.  DEC has decided that the value of carbon will be established as guidance not as a regulation.  While I agree with that in general, it also means that DEC has no obligation to provide documentation responding to comments or justify the choice of the value used.  I also commented that given the importance of this parameter and its inherent complexity that the guidance document should include a layman’s summary that explains how the parameter is developed, used and provide the full range of potential values along with the justification for the value chosen.

I also called attention to the fact that the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is mis-using the SCC in its press releases touting the benefits of their carbon reduction programs.  The CLCPA value of carbon is supposed to define the economic and social benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions so it is important that it be done correctly.  NYSERDA applies the SCC to the lifetime value of avoided carbon emissions.  However, the SCC is the present-day value of projected future net damages from emitting a ton of CO2 today so it should not be used with lifetime emissions.

One of the key considerations in calculating the SCC is the choice of the discount rate used.  The webinar attempted to explain how it is used but I believe a more general and more complete explanation is needed.  Another item for discussion is whether the state’s value of carbon should address global impacts or, for the sake of argument, just state-wide impacts.

The webinar presentation asked how the social costs of pollutants other than CO2 should be addressed.  I found a reference that I believe made a persuasive argument that using directly calculated societal values should be used.

Another question asked was “How can state agencies use the damages-based value of carbon?”.  The webinar slides explicitly stated “This is not a carbon price and will not impose any fees” but I think that will be the inevitable outcome at some date.  The webinar slides notes that the Federal government uses it in regulatory benefit-cost analyses and environmental reviews and I believe that it should be used the same way for the Climate Act.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this post was to document my comments made on the value of carbon webinar.  The value chosen and the venues where it is used will have important implications for the CLCPA.  I will continue to monitor this and report on the social cost of carbon.

Updated 10/26/2020 to corrected error in 1990 data shown

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  On August 14 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos released proposed regulations to support implementation of the CLCPA.  A key part of this regulation is defining the baseline 1990 emission inventory and this post expands on my initial inventory post and a second post on the emissions report timing by looking at the effect of four key considerations imposed by the CLCPA.

I am a retired air pollution meteorologist with nearly 40-years experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  I have been following the implementation of the CLCPA and posting on it as it develops. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

This 1990 emissions inventory is important because many of the targets of the CLCPA are based on reductions from this baseline.  For example, there is a target to reduce GHG emissions to 60 percent of 1990 emissions levels by 2030.  The CLCPA mandates specific requirements for the 1990 emission inventory that I am positive no legislator who voted for the law understood.  This post compares the proposed CLCPA 1990 emission inventory with the previous “official” New York greenhouse gas emission inventory was prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA). 

Updated 10/26/2020: Correction to show that NYSERDA 1990 emissions were in Table S-2.  Previously used the 2016 numbers in Table S-1.

The Part 496 Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) includes a section titled Key Requirements of the 1990 Emission Baseline section that explains the CLCPA mandates that required DEC to develop a new official inventory.   These requirements significantly affect the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission total for the State.  According to the latest edition of the NYSERDA GHG emission inventory (July 2019) Table S-1  Table S-2 New York State GHG Emissions 1990–2016 the New York State 1990 GHG emissions were 205.61  236.18 MMtCO₂e. The proposed Part 496 regulation 1990 emissions inventory total is 401.38 MMtCO₂e for an increase of 195.77 165.2 MMtCO₂e. 

Summary of 1990 Emission Inventories

Regulatory Impact Statement Table 1 Inventory in GWP20.

NYSERDA July 2019 Table S-2 Emission Inventory in GWP100

I will address the requirements and the effect on emissions in the following.

CLCPA Pollutants

The RIS states:

“The first requirement is that the greenhouse gases subject to the statewide emission limit include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFC), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). As the CLCPA references the IPCC, the IPCC protocol for national greenhouse gas inventories is used as a foundation for determining which sources of these gases are included in the 1990 baseline. That protocol applies a sectoral inventory, or a categorization of emission sources based on the broad economic sectors of energy, industry, waste, agriculture, and other land use.” 

The NYSERDA July 2019 emission inventory included all these parameters so this had no effect on emissions.

According to the RIS:

“The second key requirement of the CLCPA relevant to this proposed rule is that it directs the Department to set greenhouse gases on a common scale using the carbon dioxide equivalence metric (CO2e) and the 20-year Global Warming Potential (GWP20) of each gas, which the Department derived from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). The IPCC protocol requires national governments apply a 100-year Global Warming Potential metric (GWP100) from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4),5 and thus other government inventories more frequently utilize the GWP100 metric rather than GWP20 metric set forth in the CLCPA. While Part 496 uses the GWP20 metric derived from AR5, the Department provides an estimate of the 1990 baseline using both metrics below. This is for the purposes of comparing 1990 emission estimates with those of the previous State inventory, the inventory reports of other governments, and other references that use the more standard GWP100 metrics.”

The RIS provides a table with the GWP100 emissions so that a comparison of the two inventories is possible.  As shown below, the difference between the two is almost completely related to changes in methane (CH₄) in the energy and waste sectors.  Note that this difference accounts for 46% of the total change in emissions between the proposed regulation and the July 2019 NYSERDA inventory.

Comparison of GWP20 and GWP100 Inventories (MMtCO₂e)

Proposed Part 496 1990 Emissions Inventory (GWP20).

Regulatory Impact Statement Table 2 Inventory in GWP100.

Difference GWP20 Inventory Minus GWP 100 Inventory

The RIS notes that the “final two key requirements of the CLCPA set New York State apart from other governments in a way that makes it challenging to directly compare the statewide emission limits with the goals from other jurisdictions”.  The question that comes up is was this really necessary and my opinion is that the added burden dealing with this far out-weighs any benefits or needs.  Due to the lack of comprehensive documentation I was unable to tease out the individual effect of the requirement to include emissions located outside of New York vs the effect of the requirement to “establish regulatory limits based on a percentage of gross 1990 emissions as opposed to net emissions” but I can show what the effect of these considerations is on emissions.

The RIS explains that in the third requirement:

“The CLCPA establishes that the statewide emission limit, and therein the emission reduction requirements of the CLCPA, include certain emission sources that are located outside of the State borders. As mentioned above, ECL § 75-0101(13) defines statewide greenhouse gas emissions as including emissions associated with imported electricity and fossil fuels. The IPCC protocol for national governments do not include similar requirements to incorporate emissions produced outside of the relevant jurisdiction associated with energy imported into the jurisdiction. If comparing the 1990 baseline to other jurisdictions’ emission reports, the imported fuels and electricity sectors should be excluded. However, the statutory emission reduction requirements of the CLCPA include these sectors.”

The RIS describes the final key component: “The fourth and final key component of the CLCPA for purposes of this rulemaking is that the 100 percent net emission reduction goal, or a goal of attaining net zero emissions, is not part of the Legislature’s direction to the Department for promulgating the statewide emission limits. The directives to reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions (1) 40 percent from 1990 levels by 2030, and (2) 85 percent from 1990 levels by 2050 (40×30 and 85×50) are set forth in ECL § 75-0107, which further directs the Department to establish these statewide greenhouse gas limits as a percentage of estimated 1990 emissions.”  In order to meet this requirement DEC concludes that it is necessary to “establish regulatory limits based on a percentage of gross 1990 emissions as opposed to net emissions”.  The inventory includes anthropogenic CO2 emissions resulting from the combustion of biomass and biofuels in the 1990 baseline but notes that this assumption may have to be adjusted.  For waste emissions, the Department proposes a separate approach to the issue of accounting for gross and net emissions and a separate approach for anthropogenic versus non-anthropogenic emissions.

Update 10/26/2020: Correction to show that NYSERDA 1990 emissions were in Table S-2.  Previously used the 2016 numbers.

The following table shows the differences between the proposed emissions inventory and the July 2019 NYSERDA inventory as a function of the upstream out-of-state emissions, the gross vs. net adjustment for waste emissions and the adjustment for anthropogenic CO2 emissions resulting from the combustion of biomass and biofuels.  The waste emissions adjustment is 5.15  3.10 MMtCO₂e but I cannot differentiate exactly how much is due to either remaining factor.  However, I believe that because biomass burning is a relatively small component of overall emissions most of the approximate 100 75 MMtCO₂e difference is due to upstream added emissions.

Comparison of RIS Table 2 GWP100 Inventory and NYSERDA July 2019 Table S-1 GWP100 Without Other Part 496 Inventory Adjustments (MMtCO₂e)

Regulatory Impact Statement Table 2 Inventory in GWP100.

NYSERDA July 2019 Table S-2

Difference GWP100 Inventory Minus NYSERDA 2019 Inventory

Update 10/26/2020: Correction to NYSERDA 1990 emissions in Table S-2. 

Discussion

The CLCPA also mandates specific requirements for the 1990 emission inventory that I am sure very few, if any, politicians who voted for the law understood.  The previous NYSERDA GHG inventory followed Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidance for developing an emissions inventory.  Why wasn’t that good enough?  Instead the law includes specific language that requires the development of a revised inventory that has to rely on some speculative assumptions for some sectors, is inconsistent with everyone else making comparisons difficult, and leads to almost a doubling of emissions in the baseline year of 1990.

The previous 1990 New York GHG emission inventory was 205.61  236.18 MMtCO₂e.  The proposed Part 496 regulation 1990 emissions inventory total is 401.38 MMtCO₂e an increase of 195.77  165.2 MMtCO₂e. 

One of the mandates specified that the global warming potential (GWP) had to be calculated over a 20-year time horizon.  The IPCC describes time horizons and the GWP[1] notes:

“The GWP has become the default metric for transferring emissions of different gases to a common scale; often called ‘CO2 equivalent emis­sions’ (e.g., Shine, 2009). It has usually been integrated over 20, 100 or 500 years consistent with Houghton et al. (1990). Note, however that Houghton et al. presented these time horizons as ‘candidates for discussion [that] should not be considered as having any special sig­nificance’. The GWP for a time horizon of 100 years was later adopted as a metric to implement the multi-gas approach embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and made operational in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The choice of time horizon has a strong effect on the GWP values — and thus also on the calculated contributions of CO2 equivalent emissions by component, sector or nation. There is no scientific argument for selecting 100 years compared with other choices (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Shine, 2009). The choice of time horizon is a value judgement because it depends on the relative weight assigned to effects at different times.”

This boils down to the conclusion that the authors of this section of the CLCPA imposed their value judgements upon the state. 

The other mandate that makes this inventory unique is the requirement to include upstream out-of-state emissions.  The IPCC protocol for national governments do not include similar requirements to incorporate emissions produced outside of the relevant jurisdiction associated with energy imported into the jurisdiction.  There is no question that this requirement was deliberately included.

Conclusion

The 1990 GHG emission inventory proposed in DEC’s proposed Part 496, statewide emission limits had to establish a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit as a percentage of 1990 emissions no later than one year after the effective date of the CLCPA.  As noted previously that deadline forced DEC to release the document with much less than the “best available” documentation required in the law. 

The two primary drivers for the doubling of the emissions inventory both add a little under 100 75 MMtCO₂e to the 1990 inventory.   As I noted it is not obvious why the authors of the law included those requirements that they had to know would increase the 1990 baseline.  On one hand a higher baseline may mean that the politicians can more easily claim victory for the interim target in 2030.  On the other hand, making the inventory more expansive by adding upstream requirements and two other smaller impact mandates makes compliance harder.  Couple that with the global warming potential specification that increases methane emissions I suspect that the authors tried to use the law to make the use of out-of-state natural gas impossible sooner rather than later.

I believe it is only a matter of time until economic reality slams into the CLCPA.  New York’s war on natural gas is a war on the most economical fuel that has been responsible for the vast majority of CO2 reductions observed to date.  When these policies require the use of more expensive fuels the inevitable result will be significant price increases on energy costs that are already among the highest in the country.  When the Cuomo Administration can no longer hide those cost increases in utility rate cases, hidden fees, or programs that are taxes in all but name, the reckoning will come.

[1] Reference: Myhre, G., D. Shindell, F.-M. Bréon, W. Collins, J. Fuglestvedt, J. Huang, D. Koch, J.-F. Lamarque, D. Lee, B. Mendoza, T. Nakajima, A. Robock, G. Stephens, T. Takemura and H. Zhang, 2013: Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forc­ing. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  I have maintained that this legislation is deeply flawed because it presumed that its aspirational targets could be met without doing a feasibility study, that is to say they put the cart before the horse.  Before I can prepare a post on the differences between the new emissions inventory and the old one I want to discuss another flaw in the structure of the act.

I am a retired air pollution meteorologist with nearly 40-years experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential quantitative effects of energy policies based on doing something about climate change.  I have been following the implementation of the CLCPA and posting on it as it develops. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

CLCPA greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) reporting

In § 75-0105, the CLCPA mandates a statewide greenhouse gas emissions report.  No later than two years after the law was promulgated, and each year thereafter, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) must issue a report on statewide greenhouse gas emissions from all greenhouse gas emission sources in the state. The report is required to “include an estimate of what the statewide greenhouse gas emissions level was in 1990”. It is supposed to be a “comprehensive evaluation” not only of direct emissions but also include an “estimate of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the generation of imported electricity and with the extraction and transmission of fossil fuels imported into the state”.  There are explicit requirements to ensure it is high quality: “The statewide greenhouse gas emissions report shall utilize best available science and methods of analysis, including the comparison and reconciliation of emission estimates from all sources, fuel consumption, field data, and peer-reviewed research” and “shall clearly explain the methodology and analysis used in the department’s determination of greenhouse gas emissions and shall include a detailed explanation of any changes in methodology or analysis, adjustments made to prior estimates, as needed, and any other information necessary to establish a scientifically credible account of change.  Finally, it requires DEC to hold at least two public meetings to seek public input regarding the methodology and analysis.

The next section in the CLCPA, § 75-0107, Statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits, mandates that “No later than one year after the effective date of this article, the department shall, pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated after at least one public hearing, establish a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit as a percentage of 1990 emissions, as estimated pursuant to section 75-0105 of this article”.  There also is a requirement that “in order to ensure the most accurate determination feasible, the department shall utilize the best available scientific, technological, and economic information on greenhouse gas emissions and consult with the council, stakeholders, and the public in order to ensure that all emissions are accurately reflected in its determination of 1990 emissions levels”.

There is a contradiction in these two sections.  How can § 75-0107, Statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits, establish a limit estimated pursuant to § 75-0105 which is due later than this requirement?  Both sections mandate the use of the “best available” information and consultation with the public, but the timing requirements preclude that from happening.

In order to meet the requirements of § 75-0107 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos released proposed regulation Part 496 to establish statewide greenhouse gas emission limits based on 1990 emissions on August 14,2020.  In my opinion, the process is not meeting the requirement to use the “best available” or consult with the public.  I show below that the description of the emission inventory methodology is less extensive than the previous NYS GHG emission inventory and much less comprehensive that the EPA inventory that I would define as the “best available”.  Consultation with the public is not possible until November. In order to meet the legislative mandate schedule, the rule has been officially proposed.  During the comment period, consultations with the public are forbidden and the only recourse is to comment on the regulation.  In my opinion, consultation with the public should be an iterative process with multiple opportunities to interact with the DEC and respond to comments by others.

Documentation

Up until this time the “official” New York greenhouse gas emission inventory was prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA).  This inventory of greenhouse gas emissions in the state follows the standard Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) protocol. The July 2019 edition is 73 pages long and there is an accompanying fact sheet and a 196 page supplement: New York State Oil and Gas Sector Methane Emissions Inventory.

In April 2020, the US Environmental Protection Agency its annual Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2018.  The complete report is 733 pages, has ten chapters and nine appendices.  In my opinion that sets the standard for the “best available” supporting information for an emissions inventory.

In order to meet the CLCPA deadline for an emission limit one year after promulgation, DEC was forced to propose Part 496, Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emission Limits.  That includes an emissions inventory for 1990 but the only documentation is in the Regulatory Impact Statement.  The section on needs and benefits includes a description of sectoral methods and results that comprises the entirety of the documentation for the 1990 emissions inventory.  The documentation is on the order of 20 pages so it clearly is not “best available”.

Stakeholder Input

According to the Regulatory Impact Statement:

“The Department conducted pre-proposal, stakeholder outreach starting the date on which the CLCPA went into effect, or January 1, 2020, through May 2020. This included two public webinars held on February 14 and 28, 2020 to discuss the scope and key considerations of this rulemaking as well as other presentations and meetings with various stakeholders, including members of the Climate Action Council, by request. For example, the Department presented to the Manufacturers Association of Central New York and the Air and Water Managers Association in May 2020 and participated in meetings with Covanta, National Fuel Gas, and natural gas transmission pipeline companies62 in April 2020. The Department also consulted with other State agencies and authorities, including NYSERDA, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Public Service, and the Department of Agriculture and Markets. The Department reviewed the feedback received in this stakeholder outreach as part of further developing Part 496.”

The Regulatory Impact Statement for proposed Part 496 explains that DEC worked with NYSERDA to incorporate the CLCPA requirements that differ from the IPCC protocol and conduct new analyses as needed for the rulemaking. They also noted that:

“Some of these analyses were also assisted by a NYSERDA consultant (Eastern Research Group, Inc) and subcontractor (Synapse Energy Economics, Inc) and reviewed by subject matter experts from the US Environmental Protection Agency, the US Department of Energy, the Environmental Defense Fund, and university partners. Additional stakeholder input is described later in this document. New analyses were not required in all cases, as the new requirements of the CLCPA do not completely differ from the methodology historically used by NYSERDA. As such, many components of the estimates provided here are the same or similar to the previous State inventory.”

One of the big changes in the proposed 1990 emissions inventory is how methane is handled.  A primary reference in the RIS is a Science article that was also published as an Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) report that claims “that in 2015, supply chain emissions were ∼60% higher than the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency inventory estimate”.  Given that the paper is cited as “proof” that the proposed bottom-up baseline is valid, it is inappropriate for New York policy to be reviewed by subject matter experts from EDF that were from the organization that published such an influential paper on the methane emissions.

I believe that an effective public stakeholder process has to be an iterative process including a DEC document for discussion, a DEC presentation of their rationale, a chance for the public to respond with questions and comments, a response to those comments that is available for the public to consider, and another chance to provide comments.  DEC held webinars that were very general in nature and offered little opportunity for technical questions.  Stakeholders responded with their thoughts but there was not another round of discussion.  Instead the inventory went into rule making and it is impossible to get answers to anything but general questions.  The rule-making process requires a public hearing but that won’t be interactive either.  It is only an opportunity to publicly submit comments which, frankly, can be done more effectively in written comments.

Conclusion

There are serious problems with the promulgation of an emissions standard based on an unvetted 1990 emission inventory.  There is no opportunity for meaningful comments based on a fully documented inventory.  The CLCPA inconsistency of the timing of the comprehensive statewide greenhouse gas emissions report that is issued a year after the emissions standard is required to be promulgated is an indictment of the political process that produced the CLCPA.  The rush to meet the schedule has over-ridden the alleged goal of using the “best available” inventory.

My fear that the CLCPA answer is already in the back of the book appears to be coming true.  The emission inventory is only one aspect of this massive transition.  If there is no opportunity for meaningful discourse for this element what hope is that there will be opportunities to fully evaluate other aspects of the rule.  Not only is the cart before the horse, the cart is fully loaded without the opportunity to examine its contents.

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) which was described as the most ambitious and comprehensive climate and clean energy legislation in the country when Cuomo signed the legislation.  On August 14 New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos released proposed regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emission statewide and implement the CLCPA.  A key part of this regulation is defining the baseline 1990 emission inventory and this is a quick initial post about the inventory.

Up until this time the “official” New York greenhouse gas emission inventory was prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA)  According to the latest edition of the NYSERDA GHG emission inventory Table S-2 New York State GHG Emissions 1990–2016 the New York State 1990 GHG emissions were 236.19 MMtCO2e.

The CLCPA mandates specific requirements for the 1990 emission inventory that I am positive no legislator who voted for the law understood.  The most impactful requirement was to specify that the global warming potential (GWP) be calculated over a 20-year time horizon.  The following section of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes time horizons and the GWP.

Reference: Myhre, G., D. Shindell, F.-M. Bréon, W. Collins, J. Fuglestvedt, J. Huang, D. Koch, J.-F. Lamarque, D. Lee, B. Mendoza, T. Nakajima, A. Robock, G. Stephens, T. Takemura and H. Zhang, 2013: Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forc­ing. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

“The GWP has become the default metric for transferring emissions of different gases to a common scale; often called ‘CO2 equivalent emis­sions’ (e.g., Shine, 2009). It has usually been integrated over 20, 100 or 500 years consistent with Houghton et al. (1990). Note, however that Houghton et al. presented these time horizons as ‘candidates for discussion [that] should not be considered as having any special sig­nificance’. The GWP for a time horizon of 100 years was later adopted as a metric to implement the multi-gas approach embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and made operational in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The choice of time horizon has a strong effect on the GWP values — and thus also on the calculated contributions of CO2 equivalent emissions by component, sector or nation. There is no scientific argument for selecting 100 years compared with other choices (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Shine, 2009). The choice of time horizon is a value judgement because it depends on the relative weight assigned to effects at different times. Other important choices include the background atmosphere on which the GWP calculations are superimposed, and the way indirect effects and feedbacks are included (see Section 8.7.1.4).”

According to the draft regulation released on August 14, § 496.4 Statewide Emission Limits (a) For the purposes of this Part, the estimated level of statewide greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 is 401.38 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, using a GWP20 as provided in the IPCC assessment report.

More to come on this topic.

In the summer of 2019 Governor Cuomo and the New York State Legislature passed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) and this summer the implementation process is in full swing.  This post addresses risk management concerns about the implementation process.

I am a retired electric utility meteorologist with nearly 40-years experience analyzing the effects of meteorology on electric operations. I believe that gives me a relatively unique background to consider the potential effects of energy policies related to doing “something” about climate change.  I have written a series of posts on the feasibility, implications and consequences of this aspect of the Climate Act.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Climate Act establishes a Climate Action Council at §75-0103 that will develop a scoping plan to implement the requirements of the law.  The Citizens Budget Commission developed an overview of the CLCPA targets in Green in Perspective: 6 Facts to Help New Yorkers Understand the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.  The current emphasis is implementation of plans to meet the requirement to reduce GHG emissions from electricity production by 70% in 2030 and eliminate them altogether by 2040.  In my opinion, the proponents of the Climate Act believe that meeting the aspirational goal of a carbon-free electric system by 2040 is simply a matter of political will.  I am not nearly as optimistic because every time I look at any aspect of that transition I find unexpected complications, unintended consequences, and ever higher costs.

The basis of this article is work by the Risk Monger, a blog “meant to challenge simplistic solutions to hard problems on environmental-health risks”. The author of the blog, David Zaruk, is an EU risk and science communications specialist since 2000, active in EU policy events and science in society questions of the use of the Precautionary Principle. He is a professor at Odisee University College where he lectures on Communications, Marketing, EU Lobbying and PR. In my opinion, he clearly explains the complexities of risk management and I recommend his work highly.  I found his work apropos to the Climate Act implementation process.

Precautionary Principle

The Precautionary Principle is a strategy to cope with possible risks where scientific understanding is incomplete.  Unfortunately, many rely on this idea that to be safe we have to eliminate all risks as a precaution.  Zaruk explains that the problem is that policy-makers and politicians have confused this uncertainty management tool with risk management.  The conclusion of a recent series of posts on the failures of risk management of the COVID-19 response, while fascinating on its own, also provides a cautionary tale relative to New York’s energy policy and implementation of the Climate Act.

New York’s Climate Act is generally driven by the precautionary principle approach.  New York is trying to remove the risks of climate change impacts despite our lack of complete knowledge about climate variations.  For example, the Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) for proposed revisions to the Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program states that “Overwhelming scientific evidence confirms that a warming climate poses a serious threat to the environmental resources and public health of New York State”.  After pointing out that anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased and that ambient levels of CO2 are “higher than at any point in the past 800,000 years”, the RIS goes on to say “The large and persuasive body of research demonstrates through unequivocal evidence that the Earth’s lower atmosphere, oceans, and land surfaces are warming; sea level is rising; and snow cover, mountain glaciers, and Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are shrinking”.  In order to confront those risks the Climate Act focuses on greenhouse gas emission reductions but does not include a process to ensure that their cure is not worse than the alleged disease.

Risk Monger’s Risk Management Approach

Zaruk outlines seven steps of risk management:

1. 1. 1. 1. Scenario Building – all options must be mapped out;
         2. Risk Assessment – collect and refine data and evidence;
         3. Risk Analysis – weigh data against benefits and consequences;
         4. Apply Risk Reduction Measures – identify vulnerable groups and reduce exposures on them;
         5. Risk Communication (Empowerment) – inform public of risks and how to protect themselves;
         6. As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) – reduce exposures to a reasonable level vis-à-vis social well-being; and
         7. Refine ALARA: continuous exposure reductions – continually lower exposure levels so as to ensure benefits at higher safety levels

If these steps fail, apply the precautionary principle – As benefits and social goods will be lost, this is the last step and should only be temporary

These seven steps are the basis for twelve strategies he proposes as an alternative policy approach for rational discussion.  He believes that using these risk management strategies would have provided a better solution to the COVID-19 crisis and I believe that it would be appropriate to consider his alternative with respect to the Climate Act.

Zaruk argues that the docilian mindset, demanding a world with zero-risk, helped drive a solution that caused economic and social collapse in Western economies trying to reduce the effect of the virus outbreak.  Unfortunately, as he points out, there are influential forces lobbying for even more precaution.  His strategies for better risk management are entirely appropriate to consider with respect to the transition to an energy system that eliminates the use of fossil fuels because of the risks to affordability and reliability.  In the next section I address his strategies in this context.

Risk Management Strategies

The Risk-Monger’s first strategy is to place precaution properly in risk management.  The Climate Act is taking the precautionary step to ban the use of fossil fuels for electric generation by 2040.  Zaruk argues that stopping an activity can have significant consequences so it is more appropriate to implement this kind of stringent policy at the end of the process when “our capacity to prevent harm has failed or the value of the benefits could not be justified”.  The fact is that there are undeniable benefits to fossil fuels and alternative technologies are not well developed which could cause reliability problems and increase costs.  The Climate Act targets put the “cart before the horse” by not evaluating the potential consequences of the alternatives before setting the targets.

Two other strategies are related.  He argues that setting up government risk management units to provide independent oversight and foresight about emerging issues has tremendous value and proposes to have an independent risk assessment process outside of the political process that can present their findings to the public without interference.  Zaruk notes that “While Churchill’s saying: ‘Scientists should be kept on tap, but not on top’ stands as a truism of modern democracies and accountability, it does not mean that political leaders can be allowed to try to hide facts or deny evidence by pressuring their advisers”.  Unfortunately, this is directly opposite of the actions of the Cuomo Administration.  In the summer of 2019 a group of retired Department of Public Service employees submitted a letter that stated “Until the current administration, Governors have generally respected the plain language of the Public Service Law (PSL), which … safeguards the mission of the DPS to serve not political interests but the public interest.”  Based on my private discussions with staff at different agencies, the Governor’s minions micro-manage every decision based on political ramifications. This mindset permeates the state effectively eliminating any criticisms by industry in general and the utility industry in particular.

Zaruk recommends a strategy to promote scenario building in the governance process:

“Contrary to common practice in policymaking today, it is not a sign of weakness to have a Plan B or consider alternative eventualities. Examining a multitude of scenarios allows a risk manager to prepare for any situation, avoid black swans and limit unforeseen consequences. In most cases it is common sense: you better reduce your exposure to risks if you can imagine a wide range of scenarios and likelihoods and suitably prepare for them. “

The Climate Act mandates a scoping plan to implement an energy transition to meet the aspirational goals to reduce GHG emissions.  To me a scoping plan implies that there is no question about feasibility and the plan is simply a matter of picking the components to assemble the plan.  I have my doubts about the feasibility of the Climate Act targets.  There is no question in my mind that in order to prepare for any situation, avoid black swans and limit unforeseen consequences that outreach to many disciplines is necessary.  For example, as a meteorologist, I have spent some time trying to determine renewable resource availability for long duration periods of low renewable resources (most notably a period of calm winds in the winter when solar is at a minimum).  One scenario that I think is necessary is to look short-term at solar resource availability using an existing representative data set.  There has been no indication that state planners are considering the use of that resource.  My expectation is that the scoping plan will develop a narrow set of options that will allegedly meet the targets of the Climate Act but will sacrifice current reliability standards that reflect many different scenarios.

There are two recommended strategies directly at odds with the Climate Act implementation process: ensure expertise lies at the foundation of risk management and bring in different sources of expertise.  Zaruk points out that the European Union had an independent chief scientific advisor but that when there were results that were not politically correct, activist lobbying led to the abolishment of the position.  The position offered the opportunity to double-check policies to make sure that it represents science in the public interest and not just science that represents the most vocal proponents.  He explains that “Risk management needs to be based on the best evidence, not the strongest political ideology but as precaution serves as an easy, expedient, blameless solution, the battle to undo its dominance will be challenging”.  Such a function would be useful in New York but in the current Administration is clearly a non-starter.

He goes on to explain the need for different sources of expertise by noting that “limiting your advice pool is how mistakes are made”.    He states:

“I can’t count how many times in 2020 I have heard people talk about “the” science as if you simply needed to put a question into a machine and the answer would come out. Science is complex, often contested and defines itself by a method of challenging its theories and paradigms. Only consensus-loving neophytes (and a Swedish teenager) would talk about “the” science as if it meant something certain. Part of the risk management process is to plan out scenarios based on the best available scientific voices at that time.”

The Climate Action Council mandated to develop the scoping plan to implement the Climate Act ignores the importance of expertise.  The Council has 22 voting members: 12 political appointees who head various agencies and the rest non-agency experts: two appointed by the governor, three each appointed by majority leaders of the Assembly and Senate and one each appointed by the minority leaders of the Assembly and Senate.  The ten at large members shall “include at all times individuals with expertise in issues relating to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation, such as environmental justice, labor, public health and regulated industries”. In my opinion, it is lunacy that the Council that is supposed to determine how the future energy system of the state is supposed to operate does not specify energy system expertise as a criterion.  The bottom line is that none of these 22 people have relevant expertise for choosing options for a reliable energy system.

The only hope for New York’s future energy system is the requirement that the “The council shall convene advisory panels requiring special expertise and, at a minimum, shall establish advisory panels on transportation, energy intensive and trade-exposed industries, land-use and local government, energy efficiency and housing, power generation, and agriculture and forestry”. The advisory panels are charged “to provide recommendations to the council on specific topics, in its preparation of the scoping plan, and interim updates to the scoping plan, and in fulfilling the council’s ongoing duties”.  My concern is that it is not clear how any of these panels can provide recommendations that are inconsistent with the agendas of the Council that is weighed so heavily for those who believe that the meeting the goals is simply a matter of political will.  The plan for the Climate Act is directly at odds with these risk management expertise strategies.

Zaruk states that the key to risk management is that we should not be aiming for safe, but rather safer.  He defines this step: “As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)” and includes a strategy to use ALARA as a return to risk realism.  He explains:

“This zero-risk mindset, this demand for total safety, is built on a false objective. We should not be aiming for safe, but rather safer. But what level of safer is safe enough? Like any situation with uncertainty, it depends on the circumstances, needs and realities. If you are dying of thirst in a desert, what level of water purity will you accept? This is always a question of what is reasonably achievable. The principle goal for risk managers is to reduce exposure to hazards (risks) to as low as reasonably achievable”.

He explains what goes in ALARA:

“Some say it is simply a cost-benefit analysis (and then they would add that you cannot put a price on a human life). Every risk is different (to everyone) and the variables affecting our reasoning range from resources, available equivalent alternatives, time to undesired consequences, public perception of the risk, traditional practices, accountability, trust relations and the public willingness to change certain lifestyle habits.”

My primary concern with the Climate Act is the risk to electric system reliability that will occur when the system has to rely on intermittent and diffuse renewable energy.  There is a related principle particularly applicable to the Climate Act.  The Pareto principle states that, for many events, roughly 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes. The primary worry here, in the absence of using an ALARA strategy, is that 80% of the risks to the electric system will occur as the amount of fossil fuel use goes below 20% of the total.  As noted before, I expect the primary problem will be the need for dispatchable electric power when renewable resources are low (think a calm period in the winter when solar resources are weak).  The great advantage of fossil-fired power plants is dispatchability and the risks of losing this firm capacity must be evaluated.

He concludes this strategy as follows:

 “There is no one rule guiding risk management as ALARA. Each situation looks at what is reasonable and what is achievable. Dreamers and idealists want a world that is simply unachievable; pragmatists could probably achieve more. Continuous improvement is a key element to ALARA. It is not just to lower the risk to what is reasonably achievable, but to then push that exposure reduction even lower … continuously in an iterative, reasonable process.”

Zaruk also recommends some long-term strategies that are not directly applicable to Climate Act implementation but would serve New York’s policy process well.  They all relate to public education and I think the primary target should be politicians and policy making bureaucrats.  He suggests that we all need to accept that risk management is not about assuring 100% safe and that means we have to abandon the precautionary logic.  In order to manage the expertise necessary for risk assessment we need to develop a viable means for public consultation.  With that in place then we can create a community trust/communication mechanism.  All this can promote a risk resilient population.

Conclusion

I spend a lot of time writing about the oncoming train wreck of New York’s Climate Act.  I wrote this hoping someone, somewhere with some influence might pick up on the need to step back and assess the risks of trying to meet the aspirational goals.  Zaruk has much more influence but is frustrated by the fact that the precautionary principle is driving so much current policy.  His conclusion, after writing 15 articles on the response to COVID-19, is what I expect to be the likely outcome of the Climate Act on its present trajectory:

“I do not have the millions of euros of foundation-fed interests, the guru-led tribal passion or activist-driven fear-making machinery of the privileged zealots. What that crap-cash has bought them over the past two decades (relying on a misplaced precautionary policy tool) is expedience, irresponsibility and catastrophic risk management failure. And now as these relentless fundamentalists line up again at the public trough, we are facing economic collapse, famine and their insistence on even more precaution.”