Balancing the risks and benefits of environmental initiatives
Author: rogercaiazza
I am a meteorologist (BS and MS degrees), was certified as a consulting meteorologist and have worked in the air quality industry for over 40 years. I author two blogs. Environmental staff in any industry have to be pragmatic balancing risks and benefits and (https://pragmaticenvironmentalistofnewyork.blog/) reflects that outlook. The second blog addresses the New York State Reforming the Energy Vision initiative (https://reformingtheenergyvisioninconvenienttruths.wordpress.com). Any of my comments on the web or posts on my blogs are my opinion only. In no way do they reflect the position of any of my past employers or any company I was associated with.
On July 18, 2019 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA), which establishes targets for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing renewable electricity production, and improving energy efficiency. According to a New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) bulletin dated May 10, 2021, the Advisory Panels to the Climate Action Council have all submitted recommendations for consideration in the Scoping Plan to achieve greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions economy-wide. My posts describing and commenting on the strategies are all available here. This post briefly addresses the Energy-Intensive and Trade-Exposed Industries (EITE) Advisory Panel enabling strategy recommendations more for completeness than anything else. Emissions are small, choices are few, and there is not much to see here.
Energy-Intensive and Trade-Exposed Industries Advisory PanelEmissions
Although the presentations all follow the same format the details differ. One of the more important components of the presentations is the emissions estimates and they all include a graphic showing historical emissions in 1990, “preliminary draft” emissions for 2018, and their projections for 2030 and 2050.
The 1990 emissions were defined in the Department of Environmental Conservation’s Part 496 regulations but the sectors used in that regulation are not comparable to this advisory panel’s sector. In the following graph 1990 emissions are 33 million metric tons (MMt) of carbon dioxide equivalent[1] (CO2e) and 2018 preliminary draft emissions are 16 MMt. Note the breakdown of the emissions by process, imported fossil fuels, and fuel combustions with the explanation at the bottom of the graph. The inclusion of imported fossil fuels makes comparison of these data with other emissions estimates impossible.
The projections for 2030 and 2050 show reductions that exceed the CLCPA targets. In 2030 the projected emissions are 55% less than 1990 as opposed to a target of 40% and the 2050 emissions are 91% compared to the target of 85%. In a previous post I noted that industrial energy use was 47% reduced and that reflected the loss of New York industry rather than any improvement in GHG emissions efficiency in operations.
[1] The amount of carbon dioxide by mass that would produce the same global warming impact as the given mass of another greenhouse gas over a specific time frame, as determined by the IPCC, and as provided in Section 496.5 of this Part.
EITE Strategies
According to the meeting minutes, the advisory panel proposed the following enabling strategies:
Industrial sectors within the Advisory Panel scope total a small share (less than 4%) of the State emissions;
The “heterogeneous” nature of industry may result in a higher cost per ton of emissions reduced;
Energy-Intensive and Trade-Exposed industries are likely to represent a high share of industrial sector emissions. These industries are highly sensitive to increased energy costs, that often cannot be passed along, which could cause them to leave the State, resulting in leakage;
Emissions will decline with decarbonization of the Power Generation sector; near-term opportunities will likely focus on energy efficiency, while most deep carbonization opportunities will occur further into the future as new technologies become more viable.
A brief translation of these strategies. This is a small and declining sector. The “heterogeneous” nature of industry refers to the fact that there are many different sources so economy of scale is not going to reduce costs. Clearly the unilateral transition off fossil fuels will increase relative energy costs and industries will have to leave to survive. The final bullet basically says this sector needs a magical solution to produce emission reductions and remain viable within the state.
The recommendations are available in a slide presentation. I am not going to critique these strategies individually there is so little to address.
The summary slide describing the strategies states:
Mitigation strategies: Directly reduce emissions and contribute to the achievement of the GHG emission limits or carbon sequestration needed to achieve net zero, where applicable:
1.Provide financial incentives and technical assistance for the decarbonization of EITE sectors
2.Create procurement incentives for business to capitalize on low-carbon economic opportunities
Enabling initiatives: No direct emissions benefit, but enable or magnify the mitigation strategies, enhance climate justice, or just transition. (Examples: outreach, education, and awareness; capacity building; workforce development; and research and development.)
3.Identify and support technological innovation to enable deep industrial decarbonization
4.Workforce development training to support Energy-Intensive and Trade Exposed (EITE) industries
5.Increase the available data on industrial GHG emissions to help prioritize efforts and monitor progress
6.Provide economic incentives to grow the green economy
In brief, the mitigation strategies consist of subsidies to provide GHG reductions and incentives, aka further subsidies, for companies to join the grifters already lined up to save the world as long as someone else is paying for it. If there is an existential climate crisis why are there any initiatives with no emission reduction benefits?
Conclusion
This sector is a relatively small actor relative to total New York GHG emissions. Reductions in the sector have exceeded the CLCPA targets but only because the sector has become much smaller.
It seems pretty obvious that this advisory panel was a political ploy to placate the industrial sector. Unfortunately, there is not much that can be done to reduce emissions significantly or prevent the remaining industries from fleeing the state out of necessity.
On July 18, 2019 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA), which establishes targets for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing renewable electricity production, and improving energy efficiency. According to a New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) bulletin dated May 10, 2021, the Advisory Panels to the Climate Action Council have all submitted recommendations for consideration in the Scoping Plan to achieve greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions economy-wide. My posts describing and commenting on the strategies are all available here. This post addresses the Waste Advisory Panel enabling strategy recommendations.
Although the presentations all follow the same format the details differ. One of the more important components of the presentations is the emissions estimates and they all include a graphic showing historical emissions in 1990, “preliminary draft” emissions for 2018, and their projections for 2030 and 2050. Most of the presentations added numbers to the slides so that it was not necessary to try to estimate the numbers. Such is not the case with the Waste panel presentation.
Moreover, there are problems with the data presented.. The 1990 emissions were defined in the Department of Environmental Conservation’s Part 496 regulations. According to Part 496 the 1990 Waste greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 by IPCC sector in Global Warming Potential over a twenty-year time frame (GWP20) totaled 52.88 million metric tons (MMt) of carbon dioxide equivalent[1] (CO2e) broken down as 3.03 MMt of CO2, 49.35 MMt of CH4 and 0.5 MMt of N2O. However, in the following graph the total is well above half the range between 50 and 60. Assuming that the wastewater component is not included in Part 496 brings the numbers close. The bigger problem is the claim that waste is 25% of the total in 1990 and 16% of the total in 2018. I guess the waste emissions in 1990 are 57 MMt and I know the 1990 Part 496 total emissions are 409 so that works out to 14%. I guess the waste emissions in 2018 are 55 MMt and I estimated that the sum of emissions from all the sides in the advisory panel presentations total 377 MMt and that works out to 15% for the waste % of total NY emissions. It could be a simple typo but in the absence of numbers in the graphic, readers do not know.
There are two emission reduction targets in the CLCPA: 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 and 85% reduction in GHG Emissions by 2050. The projected total reductions emission reduction goals for the Waste Advisory Panel are a 17.6% reduction from 1990 by 2030 and a reduction of 70.5% by 2050.
Waste Strategies
According to the meeting minutes, the advisory panel proposed the following enabling strategies:
Reducing methane generating wastes from disposal in landfills and combustors;
Identifying and reducing fugitive emissions at waste and water resource recovery facilities;
Reducing the need for new consumer products;
Ensuring proper end-of-life materials management, with a focus on solid waste management hierarchy;
Supporting domestic recycling facilities and markets for recovered resources, by emphasizing the highest and best use for recycling end products; and
No promotion of new fossil fuel energy infrastructure.
The recommendations are available in a slide presentation. I am not going to critique these strategies individually because it would take far too long. Instead, I will comment on a few things with an emphasis on inconsistencies and implementation issues.
Clearly landfills have to be the target for reductions because it is the largest source. The plan is to achieve the “aggressive goals of Beyond Waste, the New York State Solid Waste Management Plan (e.g., 90% paper recycling and 65% food waste diversion by 2030)”. This program was adopted 12/27/10 but beyond mentioning that meeting the goals was necessary there was no further mention of the plan in the presentation or recommendations. Under the “Ease of implementation” category for Initiative #1: Organic Waste Reduction and Recycling, there is the following description: “Easy; The technologies exist, the challenges are financial (e.g., investment & end markets), behavioral, and logistical (e.g., siting, etc.)”. During the question-and-answer period of the presentation Anne Reynolds asked about the status of the goals of the over ten year old Beyond Waste Program as a means of assessing how difficult achievement of the recommendations presented today might be and Ms. Rowland noted that “the State is roughly one-third of the way to 90% on the paper recycling and traditional recyclables, with significant work left to do on organics, as only about 2-3% is diverted.” In my opinion, the financial, behavioral, and logistical challenges defined as “easy” are not. Note that many of the recommended initiatives require legislative and regulatory action to make these “easy” changes.
There are folks involved with this process that have convinced themselves, contrary to the text of the law, that the zero-emissions mandate refers to all emissions and not just GHG emissions. I suspect that they are disappointed that the panel projects no reduction projected from existing combustor facilities will be needed to handle municipal solid waste remaining after reduction, reuse, and recycling strategies.
The advisory panel process and the Climate Action Council meetings provide a window into the hopes and dreams of the segment of the population that is driving the concept that the existential crisis of climate change can be solved simply by ending fossil fuel use as quickly as possible. The “no promotion of new fossil fuel energy infrastructure strategy” is the result of their concerns. Many of the most vocal people in this process are as passionate about this cause as they are clueless about the complexity of the energy systems and tradeoffs of their purported solutions. Renewable natural gas is a very good example of the resulting problem.
According to EPA:
Renewable natural gas is a term used to describe biogas that has been upgraded for use in place of fossil natural gas. The biogas used to produce RNG comes from a variety of sources, including municipal solid waste landfills, digesters at water resource recovery facilities (wastewater treatment plants), livestock farms, food production facilities and organic waste management operations.
The ultimate problem replacing fossil fuels with renewable wind and solar energy is providing power during periods when both resources are near zero. In their presentation to the Power Generation Advisory Panel on September 16, 2020 E3 included the following slide that notes that during these periods “firm, zero emission resources, such as bioenergy, synthesized fuels such as hydrogen, hydropower, carbon capture and sequestration, and nuclear generation could provide a number of benefits”. In my opinion, those benefits include keeping the lights on.
In light of the critical need for these firm, zero-emissions resources and the fact that the methane emissions from municipal solid waste landfills, digesters at water resource recovery facilities, livestock farms, food production facilities and organic waste management operations are a major percentage of the total emissions, it only seems logical to address both problems by developing those resources. However, there are passionate ideologues that don’t agree. The meeting minutes note “concern regarding renewable natural gas, suggesting that there is a limited opportunity for it to contribute to Climate Act goals and believes that efforts in this area benefit the source without contributing additional environmental benefits”. Another member “expressed his concerns about how to move ahead with biogas if it is combusted as this would clearly increase net co-pollutants locally, and suggested the Council consider applications for biogas that would not be combusted (such as fuel cell technology at wastewater treatment plants)”. Nonetheless the panel’s enabling initiatives included biogas recovery and agency staff argued for its use.
Most of the other strategies proposed identifying leaks and eliminating them. As part of New York’s irrational war on methane the new leak detection technology that has identified many new sources of methane is considered a rationale for eliminating the use of natural gas instead of an opportunity to make the source of energy that enabled most of the observed GHG reductions since 1990 even better. Because the residence time of methane is on the order of 12 years eliminating leaks has much value.
There is another aspect to the leak issue related to the cluelessness of some panel members. One of the other panels has a strategy that includes a public relations campaign to remove the label “natural” from natural gas because they allege that the name was chosen for advertising purposes. They presume that if the public only understood it was not natural then they would not be so likely to use it. The problem with that of course is that it is called natural gas because it is a naturally occurring gas. Wherever a geologic formation that contains natural gas is exposed to the air, natural gas can be released to the atmosphere. For example, western New York’s Eternal Flame Falls has a vent that seeps natural gas, and someone, sometime lit it off. It remains to be seen if this natural vent will be sealed off in the name of climate change mitigation but the bigger issue is what to do about all the other sources of naturally-occurring methane.
Conclusion
There are consistency issues with some of the numbers presented that I could not reconcile. Using the numbers provided, this sector generates under 15% of the total New York GHG emissions but it is notable that the strategies are only expected to reduce emissions 18% in 2030 as opposed to the target of 40% and only 71% in 2050 as opposed to the target of 85%. Clearly, this panel recognizes that there are limits to what can be achieved even though the results are disappointing.
Even though the enabling strategies do not meet the CLCPA targets, the results of the 2010 Beyond Waste, the New York State Solid Waste Management Plan suggest that even these strategies may be too optimistic “as only about 2-3%” of food waste is diverted as opposed to the 65% goal. The concession that no reduction is projected from existing combustor facilities needed to handle municipal solid waste remaining after reduction, reuse, and recycling strategies also suggests these are aspirational strategies.
The ideologues involved in this process hinder rational mitigation approaches. Collecting and using methane wherever possible not only addresses an emissions problem but also helps address a major concern related to reliability. It is scary that irrational concerns about using renewable natural gas were not cut off as untenable at the outset. Another example is not recognizing that natural gas leak detection technology advances are an opportunity to reduce emissions from the resource that has provided most of the recent co-pollutant and CO2 emission reductions rather than a reason to eliminate its use.
[1] The amount of carbon dioxide by mass that would produce the same global warming impact as the given mass of another greenhouse gas over a specific time frame, as determined by the IPCC, and as provided in Section 496.5 of this Part.
On July 18, 2019 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA), which establishes targets for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing renewable electricity production, and improving energy efficiency. According to a New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) bulletin dated May 10, 2021, the Advisory Panels to the Climate Action Council have all submitted recommendations for consideration in the Scoping Plan to achieve greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions economy-wide. My posts describing and commenting on the strategies are all available here. This post addresses the Agriculture and Forestry strategy recommendations.
According to Part 496 the 1990 Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 by IPCC in GWP20 totaled 17.13 million metric tons (MMt) of CO2e broken down as 0.05 MMt of CO2, 13.07 MMt of CH4 and 4.01 MMt of N2O. According to the presentation, in the 2018 preliminary draft emissions inventory there were a total of 24 MMt of CO2e. In 1990 emissions from this sector were 4.2% of the state total and in 2018 they were 6.4%.
There are two emission reduction targets in the CLCPA: 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 and 85% reduction in GHG Emissions by 2050. The emission reduction goals for this advisory panel are a 15% reduction from current levels by 2030 and a reduction of 30% which is a return to 1990 levels by 2050. There is an additional ambition of a 45% reduction by 2050. Unfortunately, the panel estimates that emissions will be 20 MMt of CO2e in 2030 an increase of 3 MMt over 1990 emissions. In 2050 two emission estimates are given that range from no change relative to 1990 to a 4 MMt of CO2e reduction in 2050 that is only a 24% decrease.
Note that the 85% reduction by 2050 target includes a goal to go net-zero. In order to meet that goal this sector is supposed to increase carbon sequestration from the current level of 33 MMt of CO2e to 60 MMt of CO2e. Included in the sequestration goal is for no net loss of forests from 1990 levels. The pa
Agriculture and Forestry Strategies
According to the meeting minutes, the advisory panel proposed the following enabling strategies:
Agriculture: Agricultural Environmental Management (AEM) planning for climate mitigation/adaptation (“carbon farm planning”), benchmarking and monitoring of GHG mitigation, carbon sequestration and adaptation performance across applicable management areas of farms;
Avoided Land Conversion, bolstering local agricultural economies, and enhanced local government planning for land conversion;
Forest Management: expanding funding for peer-reviewed climate and forest carbon research, developing and supporting workforce development and training programs, and developing forest- based outreach, education and marketing techniques;
Bioeconomy: expanding markets for sustainably-harvested durable wood products; sustainable biomass feedstock action plan for 2050 hard-to-decarbonize products; increasing market access for New York low-carbon products that achieve the climate and social justice goals of the Climate Act; financial and technical assistance for low-carbon product development; bio-based products research, development and demonstration; and net negative carbon dioxide removal.
I am not going to critique these strategies individually because it would take far too long. Instead, I will comment on a few things with an emphasis on inconsistencies and implementation issues. I made comments on the draft strategies and will note whether the panel addressed them.
One of the reasons that I don’t have time to critique the strategies is because the use of jargon would take so long to research. For example, “carbon farm planning” is a new concept to me and the strategy recommendations did not explain what this means in this context. An internet search finds this definition: “Carbon farming combines cutting-edge agricultural practices with the tools of ecological design to build healthy soil and profitable farms and ranches, as well as improving the rate at which carbon dioxide is removed from the atmosphere and converted to plant material and/or soil organic matter.” Frankly trying to unravel what that means in the context of the CLCPA does not appeal.
The alternative manure management strategy is a mystery to me because § 75-0109, (2) (b) states “Include legally enforceable emissions limits, performance standards, or measures or other requirements to control emissions from greenhouse gas emission sources, with the exception of agricultural emissions from livestock.” What is the point of alternative manure management if livestock emissions are exempt? I made the comment and because there is no response to comments document, I have no idea what their rationale was to do this anyway.
I agree that the enabling strategies of avoided forest conversion and avoided agricultural land conversion are important and should be included. However, the CLCPA electric sector targets are going to require enormous amounts of solar and wind energy development. I commented that this factor has to be addressed and it was not mentioned as an issue. If there was a response to comments document then they would have had to explain why this was ignored.
Conclusion
This sector is a relatively small actor relative to total New York GHG emissions but it is notable that the strategies are expected to actually increase 2030 emissions from the 1990 baseline rather than reduce emissions consistent with the CLCPA target of a 40% reduction by 2030. Clearly, this panel recognizes that there are limits to what can be achieved even though the results are disappointing.
There is a big flaw in two of the enabling strategies. There is no recognition or plan to address the extraordinary buildout of wind generation projected by the Analysis Group – 35,200 MW compared to 5,905 MW in the last DPS impact statement that evaluated wind energy cumulative impacts. I extrapolated results from several projects to estimate the potential cumulative impacts and found that if all the wind projects are built on agricultural land, then between 12% and 56% of the agricultural lands will be covered with wind turbines. Of course, it is more likely that wind turbines will be sited on ridge lines but that will affect forest land use. Nonetheless that study also projected 39,262 MW of utility scale solar that will have to go somewhere. The enabling strategies inexplicably do not address these potential impacts in their enabling strategies for avoided forest conversion and avoided agricultural land conversion.
On July 18, 2019 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA), which establishes targets for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing renewable electricity production, and improving energy efficiency. According to a New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) bulletin dated May 10, 2021, the Advisory Panels to the Climate Action Council have all submitted recommendations for consideration in the Scoping Plan to achieve greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions economy-wide. Until this point, the State has not formally released its estimates of current GHG emissions but the strategies mention the GHG emissions for the baseline in 1990 and the most recent year, 2018, so we can estimate where New York stands.
In late 2020, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) adopted Part 496 that defined the emissions limits for the CLCPA. That law sets targets based on 1990 emissions and the regulation developed the emission inventory for 1990. This year DEC will start producing an annual summary of current emissions but they have not released anything for public comment yet.
According to a New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) bulletin dated May 10, 2021, the Advisory Panels to the Climate Action Council have all submitted recommendations for consideration in the Scoping Plan to achieve greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions economy-wide and this is a “critical milestone to advance New York’s nation-leading Climate Law”. A recent post summarizes the status of the implementation program and includes links to the recommendations themselves. Buried in the strategies is a slide that lists the 1990 emissions, the current 2018 emissions and makes projections for 2030 and 2050 after the proposed strategies are adopted. This post summarizes the 2018 emissions.
Discussion
I am very familiar with emissions from the power generation sector and know that there have been significant reductions. However, the CLCPA mandates unique methods to calculate emissions including a requirement to include upstream emissions from fossil fuel extraction and I have no particular expertise relative to emissions from other sectors so I was unsure where the state stands relative to the CLCPA emissions.
I extracted the emissions from the presentations for the agriculture and forestry, energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries, power generation, energy efficiency and housing, waste and transportation advisory panel strategies presented to the Climate Action Council. In 1990 total GHG emissions were 409 million metric tons (MMt) of CO2e and according to these preliminary estimates there were 377 MMt of CO2e in 2018. This represents a reduction of only 7.8%.
NY Greenhouse Gas Emissions (MMt CO2e) in GWP20 by Advisory Panel Strategy Estimate
Advisory Panel
1990
2018
Difference
% Difference
Agriculture and Forestry
17
24
7
41.2%
Energy-Intensive and Trade-Exposed Industries
33
16
-17
-51.5%
Power Generation
100
60
-40
-40.0%
Energy Efficiency & Housing
103
115
12
11.7%
Waste
56
55
-1
-1.8%
Transportation
100
107
7
7.0%
Total
409
377
-32
-7.8%
Emissions were available in six categories. Three went down and three went up between 1990 and 2018. In order to determine the viability of the emission reduction programs it is instructive to look at why power generation and the energy-intensive & trade-exposed industries emissions went down.
Power generation emissions represent the largest mass reduction. In March 2021, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority published Patterns and Trends – New York State Energy Profiles: 2003-2017 that is “a comprehensive storehouse of energy statistics and data on energy consumption, supply sources, and price and expenditure information for New York State”. It includes information on the primary consumption of energy for electricity generation by different types of generation that explains why GHG emissions have gone down so much. In 1990 relatively high CO2 emitting coal and residual oil facilities generated 42% of the energy but in 2017 they only provided 1% an overall reduction of 98%. Total energy for electric generation went down only 4% so other sources picked up the slack. Natural gas use went up 68%, nuclear went up 76% and net imports went up nearly five times and wind and solar only contributed 25% relative to the increase in natural gas use.
The industry and waste reductions are much smaller. The Pattern and Trends document also has information on the primary consumption of energy for the industrial sector. Energy use in the industrial sector was reduced 47%. I believe that simply shows the loss of New York industry. The waste reduction was too small to worry about.
Conclusion
There are two emission reduction targets in the CLCPA: 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 and 85% Reduction in GHG Emissions by 2050. As of 2018 New York emissions have only been reduced by 8%. I think it is pretty obvious that the likelihood that the state can meet those targets is very low simply by looking at these numbers.
It gets worse though. Consider the three main sources of replacement power that displaced coal and residual oil in the power generation sector that caused the biggest emission reductions since 1990. Coal has been outlawed and residual oil is close to de minimus levels so no further reductions are possible by fuel switching. Nuclear had a big increase in power but that benefit will evaporate with the inexplicable decision to shut down Indian Point. It does not seem to be good policy to rely on imported power from both a reliability and economic impact of displaced jobs standpoint. Also of note is that the fuel switching to natural gas that occurred was despite New York policy that outlawed the technology that made that an economic switch. There is a massive technological challenge to get further reductions of emissions in the power generation sector necessary to meet the CLCPA targets and the costs will be enormous.
It gets even worse when you consider that getting reductions in the other sectors not only face technological challenges and affordability limits but also require significant changes to lifestyles and personal choices. Consider transportation: electric vehicles and public transit must be adopted by a significant fraction of the so far unsuspecting public.
It may just be me but I am beginning to suspect that the reason that the 2018 emission inventory has not been released is because of the implications of these numbers. I cannot imagine any way to meet the 2030 CLCPA targets that would not risk massive political repercussions. It is in the best interests of the state to repeal the CLCPA.
On July 18, 2019 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA), which establishes targets for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing renewable electricity production, and improving energy efficiency. According to a New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) bulletin dated May 10, 2021, the Advisory Panels to the Climate Action Council have all submitted recommendations for consideration in the Scoping Plan to achieve greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions economy-wide and this is a “critical milestone to advance New York’s nation-leading Climate Law”. This post summarizes the status of the implementation program and includes links to the recommendations themselves.
The CLCPA establishes an implementation schedule for compliance with its targets. In 2020 the law mandated that DEC establish the 2030 and 2050 statewide emission limits (Part 496) and determine a value of carbon for use by state agencies. In addition, the Climate Action Council (CAC) had to be set up and start meeting. According to the DEC bulletin:
The Climate Action Council is progressing according to the schedule included in the Climate Act and will now review the recommendations submitted by the seven advisory panels and the Just Transition Working Group to develop a draft Scoping Plan that will be released for public comment and the subject of six public hearings in 2022. The recommendations from the advisory panels, comprised of experts from across the State, will now be advanced into an integration analysis process, which will provide a cost-benefit assessment of the suite of strategies under consideration, accounting for the emissions reductions, job impacts, and health impacts of attaining the goals identified in the Climate Act. As required under the Climate Act, the final Scoping Plan will be posted online and delivered to the Governor and the Legislature in 2023, and DEC will release regulations to realize the emissions reductions from the plan’s strategies in 2024.
In order to “provide recommendations to the CAC on specific topics, in its preparation of the scoping plan, and interim updates to the scoping plan, and in fulfilling the council’s ongoing duties”, the CAC (§ 75-0103, 7) “shall convene advisory panels requiring special expertise and, at a minimum, shall establish advisory panels on transportation, energy intensive and trade-exposed industries, land-use and local government, energy efficiency and housing, power generation, and agriculture and forestry”. Once the process started it became obvious that a waste was an issue so an additional panel was set up.
The recommendations will be submitted to New York State Energy Research & Development Authority consultants who will do the analysis work needed to prepare the draft scoping plan. The CLCPA only notes that the draft scoping plan will be available next year, that there will be public hearings and that the final version is due during the year. It will be interesting to see when the results of that work are released to the public and whether interim drafts are discussed with the advisory panels.
I will follow up with articles about the specific recommendations in future articles but in the meantime the presentations made describing the recommendations and the recommendations themselves are available:
When I describe the recommendations in more detail in future articles, I will address specific issues related to implementation related to reliability, affordability, and environmental impacts. In this status update I only want to raise some generic issues with the recommendation process to date.
My first concern is that the precautionary principle is driving the CLCPA recommendations. Many members of the Advisory Panel and Climate Action Council want to eliminate risk. For example, they maintain that the zero-emissions mandate of the CLCPA means that not only will there be no GHG emissions but no combustion emissions whatsoever. Whether they don’t understand, don’t want to understand or understand but don’t care, the fact is that definition limits the technologies available to provide energy tremendously. Coupled with the desire to use this law to address social justice concerns I worry that this will seriously risk current reliability standards. As David Zaruk writes at the Risk Monger blog we have: “millennial militants preaching purpose from the policy pulpit, listening to a closed group of activists and virtue signaling sustainability ideologues in narrowly restricted consultation channels”. The desire for no risk and addressing social justice concerns of many involved in the CLCPA process appears to over-ride the need for affordable and reliable power.
One of the common elements of the presentations was a claim that the advisory panels had an open process which considered public comments. In 2010, New York prepared a similar Climate Action Plan that was intended to describe how the state could meet a GHG emissions reduction target of an 80% reduction target of 80% of 1990 levels by 2050. In that process, it was possible for stakeholders to review the public comments submitted. This process did not include any opportunity to see the comments submitted. Moreover, it is not clear from the outside that members of the advisory panels were asked to review public comments and I am unaware of any support provided to them that included summaries of the public comments submitted. I saw no indication whatsoever that any of my recommendations provided in comments were considered. As a result, the claim that “we listened to care with every comment we received” is a hollow statement without proof.
The belief underpinning of the ideological agendas of many of the members of the advisory panels is that the transition to a zero-emissions energy system is simply a matter of political will. I am convinced that many of the members simply don’t comprehend the technology issues that undermine that belief. Worse, because they believe there are no barriers, then they also believe that the schedule can be accelerated. As far as I could see none of the recommendations addressed logistical components of their recommendations in any detail. For example in order to build the offshore wind facilities needed to meet the CLCA mandates “factories, ports, and ships required to make and deliver the turbines must first be planned, designed, funded, permitted, and constructed.” As a result, the schedules in the recommendations are problematic and the suggestions that any aspects of the recommendations can be implemented immediately are absurd.
The biggest missing piece to the CLCPA story is the cost. A 2017 study by economists at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst found that New York “will need an annual investment of about $31 billion per year in combined private and public spending to bring CO2 emissions down to 100 million tons by 2030. I don’t expect that costs per ton reduced will improve so this is far less than what will be needed for the net-zero GHG emission target of the CLCPA. Apparently we will have to wait until next year for cost estimates.
Conclusion
The “experts” who developed the advisory panel recommendations and the members of the Climate Action Council were all chosen because of who they knew rather than because of their expertise. Worse most of them were chosen because their ideological biases conform to the Cuomo administration’s climate change green energy agenda. Political interference in technology underpinning society rarely ends well and I have no doubts that this initiative will cause sky rocketing costs, catastrophic blackouts, and worse environmental impacts than the purported effects of climate change that the CLCPA is intended to prevent. I will provide specific instances where their recommendations do not comport with reality in future articles.
UPDATE 5/12/2021: Contrary to my assertion, this legislation has not been passed by the New York Senate, it hasn’t even come up in committee yet in either house.
In the spring of 2021, the New York state Senate introduced and passed the Climate and Community Investment Act (CCIA). At the time of this writing in early May 2021, the bill is being considered by the Environmental Committee of the Assembly. Coming on the heels of the Texas energy debacle one might think that New York politicians would not propose any changes to energy and environmental laws until the causes of that disaster were understood or would at least make implementation contingent upon feasibility studies to determine if the ambitious goals of new legislation don’t risk a similar outcome in New York. Unfortunately, this summary of the proposed law shows that is not the case.
I have written extensively about implementation of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) because I believe it will adversely affect affordability and reliability as well as create more environmental harm than good. The CCIA will make those impacts worse. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Background
The sponsor memo for this proposed regulation lists specific provisions in the proposed legislation. I prepared an annotated version of the draft bill that includes internal links to the sections of the bill corresponding to those provisions. The summary of Senate Bill S4264A states:
Enacts the climate and community investment act; prioritizes the allocation of public investments in disadvantaged communities; addresses climate change challenges through the expansion and growth of clean and renewable energy sources; adopts best value requirements for the solicitation, evaluation and award of renewable energy projects; establishes a community just transition program; establishes a climate pollution fee and a household and small business energy rebate; and creates the climate and community investment authority.
I reviewed the sponsor memo for this proposed regulation in my overview post. The memo describes the sections of the legislation. I prepared posts on the following sections of the proposed law:
Section 2 establishes the legislative findings that justify the need for the law.
This post will summarize all the sections of the proposed law.
The rationale for the legislation in the legislative findings in section 2 follows the premise of all the New York legislative and regulatory initiatives: there is a climate crisis, the effects of climate change are observable today, changes in greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations due to humans are responsible for the observed climate changes, and New York action to reduce emissions will mitigate those effects. I addressed these claims in my post and found much evidence that does not support those claims. I also recently reviewed the state of the science related to the climate emergency and found that behind the façade of crying wolf about the alleged climate emergency there is a large body of evidence contradicting that claim. Even though advocates dismiss any contradictory evidence there is a gaping hole in their rationale for the value of mitigation. In the state of the science post I showed that the global warming impacts of New York emission reductions projected with the climate models being used to claim a climate emergency are simply too small to be measured, much less have an effect on any of the purported damages of greenhouse gas emissions. In the context of global emissions New York’s efforts will be subsumed quickly by emissions increases in other countries that are morally obligated to provide the tangible benefits of affordable, abundant energy to their citizens by using fossil fuels.
The rationale for the legislation claims that “Climate change especially heightens the vulnerability of disadvantaged communities including communities of color and low-income communities, which bear environmental and socioeconomic burdens as well as legacies of racial and ethnic discrimination”. It goes on to claim that air pollution is another disproportionate burden, that Covid-19 was exacerbated by those burdens, and somehow even managed to relate these impacts to the George Floyd murder. The authors of this legislation were surely affected by environmental justice advocate arguments that the disproportionate burdens of the environmental justice communities are exacerbated by power plants located in those communities as exemplified by articles like Fossil Fuel Phase Out Must Begin Where the Industry Has Hurt People the Most. There are two fatal flaws in those arguments however. They assume that there is no threshold for air pollution impacts which I believe is unsupportable. With regards to power plants themselves the primary health effects are from ozone and inhalable particulates which are not directly emitted by power plants so local effects are unlikely. As a result, the campaigns to retire power plants in disadvantaged communities is based on a mis-conception and will not have the desired effect.
Section 3 mandates a new air pollution pricing program by establishing a value of pollution and mitigation program. The authors of this legislation have heard about the social cost of carbon and propose to implement a similar approach for other air pollutants. I think this is deeply flawed because existing Clean Air Act regulations already address most of the concerns incorporated into a social costs approach. The only missing component is a negative externality fee to cover the alleged social costs that is included in the CCIA. The law mandates that New York will establish its own values but I have no doubts that the authors of the legislation don’t understand the effort needed to develop such a metric. The CLCPA includes a value of carbon requirement and the Department of Environmental Conservation developed its own value but that effort depended upon extensive previous work on the Federal level. There is nothing similar available for the other pollutants proposed in the legislation so that effort would have to start from scratch.
Section 8 establishes the Climate and Community Investment Authority. In general, I am not a fan of governmental agencies and I am particularly unimpressed with New York authorities. The particular problem is that despite the dedication in New York authorities of staff members chosen because of their background and experience, their work is co-opted by managers chosen by politicians. Over time and, particularly in the Cuomo Administration, the authorities no longer answer to the citizens of New York but to the agendas of the politicians. Setting up a new authority for a specific agenda-driven program is a recipe for public policy that is not necessarily in the best interests of the state as a whole. The mandated requirements for membership and operations exacerbate my concerns because they cater to the ideological preconceptions of the authors of the legislation.
The CLCPA does not include a provision to fund the efforts needed to implement the reductions necessary to meet the emissions targets. Section 9 establishes a climate pollution fee presumably to address that need. The authors of the legislation have proposed a complicated fee structure that includes an environmental integrity metric that adjusts the fee based on an arbitrary assessment of how they think the CLCPA reductions should be scheduled. Inexplicably, there is no reference to the CLCPA mandated value of carbon and the proposed emissions fees are inconsistent with the calculated social cost values.
The legislative findings also argue that good jobs and a thriving economy should be a key concern of climate policy. The bill includes provisions to establish responsible contracting, labor and job standards and worker protection; require prevailing wage for building service employees that are “employed in any building or facility that has received grants or tax abatements of one million or more”; and establish the climate change “just transition”. The “just transition” slogan describes efforts to “ensure an equitable transition for New York’s workforce toward the State’s renewable energy future and will develop a forward-looking jobs report, identify workforce training needs, and assess opportunities to put former power plant sites to productive use”. In my opinion all of these aspects of the law are included to cater to specific political demographics to engender support for the bill.
There is one aspect of the law that I completely support. Section 4 of the bill amends the executive law to add a new section 184 to limit diversion of funds dedicated to the climate and community investment. Too often in the past, funds that are supposed to be used for environmental control projects have been diverted to other politically expedient uses.
Discussion
I have previously described how the precautionary principle is driving the CLCPA mandates based on the work of David Zaruk, an EU risk and science communications specialist, and author of the Risk Monger blog. His explanation that managing policy has become more about managing public expectations with consultations and citizen panels driving decisions describes the Advisory Panels to the Climate Action Council and the authors of this legislation. He says now we have “millennial militants preaching purpose from the policy pulpit, listening to a closed group of activists and virtue signaling sustainability ideologues in narrowly restricted consultation channels”. This legislation proposes to mandate that approach. Instead of what they know, the Climate and Community Investment Authority directors will be determined by who they know. Based on what happened during the CLCPA advisory panel process, the social justice concerns of many involved in the CCIA bureaucracy, including the most vocal, will be more important than providing the state affordable and reliable power.
This legislation will generate a lot of revenue with one estimate of $15 billion per year. New York’s record investing the proceeds of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative are often cited as an example of the value of New York’s support of clean and renewable energy. The latest New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) report New York’s RGGI-Funded Programs Status Report – Semiannual Report through June 30, 2020 describes the programs New York has set up to invest the proceeds from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives. I found that NYSERDA supports 20 programs with associated CO2 reduction benefits and another 18 programs with no claimed CO2 reductions. I compared the cost per ton reduced for those programs against the 2021 $127 New York Value of Carbon metric for cost effective investments. Seventeen programs and the 18 programs with no claimed reductions do not meet this cost effectiveness standard. I found that only 1.1% of the NYSERDA RGGI funds invested cost-effectively reduce CO2 emissions. This legislation has specifc mandates for Climate and Community Investment Authority funding including 33% for the “community just transition fund”, 30% for the “climate jobs and infrastructure fund”, 30% for the “low-income and small business and household energy rebate fund”, and 7% for the “worker community assurance fund”. This will further dilute the cost effectiveness of emission reduction investments.
One of my biggest problems with this proposed legislation is mandates for specific information and programs that are already available elsewhere. The value of pollution and mitigation program replicates the standards setting process of the Clean Air Act but proposes to go beyond that process and conjure up emission fees based on the social cost of carbon model. There already is a pollutant emission fee and the effort necessary to develop social cost indices are clearly under-estimated. The only rationale for these components of the legislation is disappointment that the existing programs don’t give the answers the authors want.
Conclusion
The rationale for the CCIA epitomizes the belief that manmade climate change is a factor in many of today’s societal problems. Judith Curry describes and responds to the cover story, “Climate is Everything” in the April 26 issue of Time Magazine. She concludes:
The ever-expanding narrative of climate change entrains a range of social values into the proposed solutions. The momentum of the climate change narrative leads to claims that there is a solution to many other societal problems within the climate change cause – an example is social justice in the context of the U.S. Green New Deal. This link acts to energize both causes, and leverages the climate change narrative to blame or attack those opposed to the separate cause.
Climate change has thus become a grand narrative in which human-caused climate change has become a dominant cause of societal problems. Everything that goes wrong then reinforces the conviction that that there is only one thing we can do prevent societal problems – stop burning fossil fuels. This grand narrative misleads us to think that if we solve the problem of manmade climate change, then these other problems would also be solved. This belief leads us away from a deeper investigation of the true causes of these problems. The end result is narrowing of the viewpoints and policy options that we are willing to consider in dealing with complex issues such as public health, weather disasters and national security.
I leave it to readers to determine if their value judgements support the link between societal benefits and climate change mitigation but I believe that other risks must be considered. For example, there are reliability risks. The legislative findings note that Superstorm Sandy in 2012 “caused at least 53 deaths and $32 billion in damage in New York state”. It is notable that the February 2021 blackout in Texas caused similar impacts. One disaster was caused by nature and many impacts of the other were caused by a failure in the planning for the electric energy system. New York’s proposed energy transition goes well beyond the recent changes to the Texas energy system and risks a similar outcome unless all identified problems are addressed.
Energy cost affordability is another major risk. WHAM reports that the carbon tax alone would bring in $2.3 billion a year and could increase gasoline costs 55 cents a gallon. The sponsor, Senator Kevin Parker says: “We do believe that the benefits way outweigh the hurt that people may be feeling with this legislation”. I believe the purported benefits are illusions. Eliminating New York’s GHG emissions will not have any measurable effect on global warming and will be replaced by emissions elsewhere in the world in a matter of months. The social cost benefits of carbon are numbers developed to “prove” cost-effectiveness but the reality is the costs are real and the benefits illusions.
A primary objective in this legislation is environmental justice. I believe that if you want to protect the environment, you must fight poverty. On a global level the poor are trying to make it from one day to the next and don’t have energy or resources for protecting the environment. They have poorer health outcomes, lower quality of life, shorter lives, and worse education. In New York any additional costs of energy for this virtue-signaling legislation will increase energy poverty and exacerbate similar issues. The fact that those costs in aspects of this legislation are for efforts that duplicate Clean Air Act programs is especially troubling. My entire career has been related to air quality regulation and impacts and I am comfortable that the existing regulations are adequately protecting health and welfare.
To sum up the rationale for this law is that there is a climate crisis, the effects of climate change are observable today, changes in greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations due to humans are responsible for the observed climate changes, and New York action to reduce emissions will mitigate those effects. The most important takeaway from this post is that even if one accepts the premise that human emissions are affecting the climate in observable ways, New York’s contribution to the global greenhouse gas emissions is so small that eliminating New York’s GHG emissions will have no observable effect. Given the enormous costs this means that this legislation is a poor deal for New Yorkers.
In the spring of 2021, the New York state Senate introduced the Climate and Community Investment Act (CCIA). Coming on the heels of the Texas energy debacle one might think that New York politicians would not propose any changes to energy and environmental laws until the causes of that disaster were understood or would at least make implementation contingent upon feasibility studies to determine if the ambitious goals of this legislation don’t risk a similar outcome in New York. This post on the proposed amendment to Article 19 is one of a series of posts about this legislation. Posts to date include an overview, summaries of the climate pollution fee and legislative findings, and a description of the Climate and Community Investment Authority.
I have written extensively about implementation of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) because I believe it will adversely affect affordability and reliability as well as create more environmental harm than good. The CCIA will make those impacts worse. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Background
The sponsor memo for this proposed regulation lists specific provisions in the proposed legislation. I prepared an annotated version of the draft bill that includes internal links to the sections of the bill corresponding to those provisions. The summary of Senate Bill S4264A states:
Enacts the climate and community investment act; prioritizes the allocation of public investments in disadvantaged communities; addresses climate change challenges through the expansion and growth of clean and renewable energy sources; adopts best value requirements for the solicitation, evaluation and award of renewable energy projects; establishes a community just transition program; establishes a climate pollution fee and a household and small business energy rebate; and creates the climate and community investment authority.
Value of Pollution and Mitigation Program
This post describes the proposed amendment to Article 19 of the Environmental Conservation Law that adds a new title: Value of Pollution and Mitigation Program. The title includes the following sections: methodology and valuation of pollution price index, implementation of fees, allocation of revenues,
inventory, transportation pollution, and reporting. I will address each in turn.
The first section specifies a methodology for developing a pollution price index. A year after the effective date of the law the Climate and Community Investment Authority is required to develop a social cost index and methodology for regulated pollutants. The Authority is supposed to consider, at a minimum: “(a) public health impacts, including but not limited to: loss of life, loss of welfare, and employment impacts; (b) impacts to public and private property, including agricultural property; (c) impacts to ecosystems and the ability of ecosystems to provide ecosystem services; and (d) the full life-cycle of impacts”.
This apparently has its roots in the social cost of carbon approach to valuing social costs. There are issues with this. In the first place, while there is no equivalent Federal pollution social price index, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards in the Clean Air Act address health and welfare impacts. I believe that aside from the full life cycle of impacts requirement, these considerations are covered by the existing Clean Air Act process. In addition, to do this right requires a significant investment of resources to attract the subject matter experts necessary to develop a defensible index.
The next section implements fees based on the social cost indices developed in the previous section. New York already has a fee on regulated pollutants which are used to fund the Title V permitting process among other programs. It is not clear to me whether the legislation proposes to levy fees on sources not currently required to report detailed emissions reports. Note that as New York pollution has fallen the money necessary to maintain the permitting programs has become inadequate to cover those costs.
The revenues generated by the fee are allocated to more than the Title V permitting program. The proposed legislation states that “forty percent of funds shall go to the environmental justice office of the authority; twenty percent of funds shall go to expanding, operating and maintaining the New York state Title V emissions inventory within the department; twenty percent of funds shall go to expanding, operating and maintaining air quality monitoring, including ambient air quality monitoring and point source monitoring within the department; and twenty percent of funds shall be allocated at the discretion of the authority, based on the needs of the authority”. The proposal specifically states that “No funds shall be allocated to fund police, prisons or related infrastructure.” The annual per ton fee is established under 6 NYCRR 482-2. As of January 1, 2020 the fee per ton emitted ranges between $60 and $90 depending on the total emissions of the source. If the revenues provide equivalent funding for the Title V program, then the overall rates would be five times higher.
In my post on the Climate and Community Investment Authority I included some estimates of the revenues expected from this law and necessary to implement the CLCPA. According to this article, New York “will need an annual investment of about $31 billion per year in combined private and public spending to bring CO2 emissions down to 100 million tons by 2030, a 2017 study by economists at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst found. That equates to two percent of the state GDP. At a recent hearing a figure of $15 billion a year in revenues was mentioned. WHAM reports that the carbon tax alone would bring in $2.3 billion a year. According to the 2019 Title V emission inventory there were 41,084,926 tons of CO2 emitted and at $55 per ton that matches the news report. However, the total air emissions excluding CO2 in the 2019 Title V inventory are only 79,082 tons. The largest Title V permit fee is $90 per ton and that regulation caps the total tons. Note that 79,082 tons times $90 is $35.6 million, far short of the $15 billion. Therefore, in order to reach the $15 billion estimate the cost per ton of air pollutants would have to be $161,104 per ton. I conclude that I have no idea what the revenues will be other than “a lot”.
In order to implement the fees affected sources have to report their emissions. The Title V program already has an emissions reporting system in place. The proposed law defines “Regulated air contaminant” as the following:
a. oxides of nitrogen;
b. volatile organic compounds;
c. sulfur dioxide;
d. particulate;
e. carbon monoxide;
f. any class I or II substance subject to a standard promulgated pursuant to section 7671 of the Act;
g. any other air contaminant for which a national ambient air quality standard has been promulgated; or
h. any air contaminant that is regulated under section 7411 or 7412 (b) and (c) of the Act and which the commissioner has listed in regulation. The department may use emergency rulemaking pursuant to subdivision six of section two hundred two of the state administrative procedure act if necessary, in order to timely list such air contaminants.
While most of the major pollutants are already included in the existing inventory, I am not sure that it includes them all. One final note – DEC issues three types of air permits that have different reporting requirements. The naïve response is that not requiring reports is a loophole that subjects citizens of the state to undue risk. The reality is that there are so many small sources with so few total emissions that the time and effort necessary to report and process is unnecessary because there is no adverse risk.
There also is a provision in the law to “make the Title V emissions inventory more accessible to the public including, but not limited to, taking action to release the related data, analysis and assumptions of agency websites.” Frankly until I researched this post, I was not aware that the data were available but a quick internet search found the Title V emissions inventory data which fulfills the criterion for a publicly available inventory. The analysis and assumptions criteria are more difficult to address. I was responsible for submitting the emission statements and did the analysis because I had the background to do it. It was the one reporting task that I dreaded every year because documenting the analysis and assumptions was tedious and difficult to do in sufficient detail so that the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) technical staff could understand how my numbers were derived. This legal requirement reminds me of managers who would request information from different people until they got the answer they wanted or understood. Unless the emissions are directly measured at a source, emissions are estimated by multiplying an activity factor (e.g., the amount of the substance used) times an Environmental Protection Agency emission factor (derived from emissions testing programs). Is there really a need for the public to have that level of detail available? Isn’t sufficient to rely on the technical staff at the DEC to review the submitted documentation and confirm that the submittals are reasonable?
This title also addressed transportation pollution. In addition to my experience developing emission factors and using stationary source emission inventories, I also worked with transportation emissions. The transportation pollution aspects of this section entirely replicate the EPA Clean Air Act process apparently because the authors don’t like the current situation. I have sympathy for their concerns because I believe that in urban areas transportation sources are the primary source of air pollution. However, at the end of the day I doubt that this legislation can do anymore than what DEC is currently doing. There has been a long history of California attempting to impose stricter emission limits than the national levels and continuous litigation and settlement to resolve the differences. It could end up with car companies simply not offering cars in New York because of state limits and then the issue becomes one of enforcement at the borders to keep non-compliant cars out.
There also is a reporting requirement to document the implementation of the policies. The report must address reduction effectiveness of the fees, an overview of social benefits, compliance costs, and administrative costs, whether the fees are “equitable, minimize costs and maximize the total benefits to the state”, and include recommendations for policy changes and future regulatory actions. I agree that these are appropriate requirements but believe that it would be appropriate to do a feasibility report before implementing the requirements. I don’t think that any added costs to energy can ever be “equitable” because energy use is inelastic and extra costs will always disproportionally impact those least able to pay the most. A transparent and unbiased feasibility study could very well find other flaws that indicate that this agenda-driven is poor policy. In my opinion, many of the “wish list” components of this law would not stand up to scrutiny.
Conclusion
The social costs of pollution mandate included in the legislation is a naïve requirement. I believe that the authors heard about social costs someplace, thought it sounds good, believe it probably can be used to their advantage so they threw it into the regulation even though they don’t understand it fully. I believe the concept, if not the jargon, is already included in the Clean Air Act. The National Ambient Air Quality Standards are established based on health and welfare impacts at levels designed to protect the public. The rationale for this mandate comes back to the authors’ belief that existing air quality regulations don’t give us the answer we want so we will make up our own regulations.
The social costs approach is also included because it justifies the need for a pollution fee. Dr. Steven McKitrick evaluated carbon pricing policies in Canada that are the template for this approach. He explained that “a beneficial outcome is not guaranteed” because certain rules must be observed in order for social cost pricing to reduce emissions without unduly hurting the economy. He believes that social cost pricing only works in the absence of any other emission regulations. “If pricing is layered on top of an emission-regulating regime already in place (such as emission caps or feed-in-tariff programs), it will not only fail to produce the desired effects in terms of emission rationing, it will have distortionary effects that cause disproportionate damage in the economy.” As I explained before, nearly everything in this legislation replicates existing programs with established emission limits. The only exception is changing the pollutant fees to a flat fee to one indexed to a social cost parameter.
Ultimately, the Value of Pollution and Mitigation Program section of the CCIA replicates many aspects of existing programs in the Clean Air Act and New York regulations. I think the authors don’t fully understand existing regulations or don’t care because they are not getting the answer they want which is zero impacts. This law will impose reporting burdens and added costs to any sources that emit anything to the atmosphere and major commitments by NY agencies to implement a new regulatory reporting system. I believe that those burdens are all redundant because existing programs address their concerns. I also think that the authors do not understand the magnitude of the effort needed to develop air pollution social cost indices or that their plan will not work as they expect.
In the spring of 2021, the New York state Senate introduced the Climate and Community Investment Act (CCIA). Coming on the heels of the Texas energy debacle one might think that New York politicians would not propose any changes to energy and environmental laws until the causes of that disaster were understood or would at least make implementation contingent upon feasibility studies to determine if the ambitious goals of this legislation don’t risk a similar outcome in New York. This is one of a series of posts about this legislation. Posts to date include an overview and summaries of the climate pollution fee and legislative findings.
I have written extensively about implementation of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) because I believe it will adversely affect affordability and reliability as well as create more environmental harm than good. The CCIA will make those impacts worse. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Background
The sponsor memo for this proposed regulation lists specific provisions in the proposed legislation. I prepared an annotated version of the draft bill that includes internal links to the sections of the bill corresponding to those provisions. The summary of Senate Bill S4264A states:
Enacts the climate and community investment act; prioritizes the allocation of public investments in disadvantaged communities; addresses climate change challenges through the expansion and growth of clean and renewable energy sources; adopts best value requirements for the solicitation, evaluation and award of renewable energy projects; establishes a community just transition program; establishes a climate pollution fee and a household and small business energy rebate; and creates the climate and community investment authority.
Climate and Community Investment Authority
This post describes a proposed addition to the Public Authorities Law that adds the Climate and Community Investment Authority (Authority). The legislative findings explain the purpose of this authority:
21. It is in the interest of the state to establish a dedicated authority to ensure that New York’s climate goals are accomplished. Such an authority would be able to nimbly manage the proceeds from a polluter fee which will amass significant revenue and require ongoing management. This authority would also disburse funds for clean energy community scale projects in a timely and efficient manner while employing best value procurement practices. In addition, a new authority would have the capacity to ensure prioritization of projects and funds for impacted communities, coordinate statewide emissions reduction strategies and assist impacted workers in a transition away from fossil fuels through specialized assistance programs
The Authority’s board of trustees establishes the following offices: environmental justice, household and small business energy rebates, climate jobs and infrastructure, community just transition, worker and community assurance, value of pollution and mitigation program, procurement, public engagement and independent ombudsperson, and any other offices as necessary. Each office created by the authority shall: “Abide by the principles of environmental justice, including the federal executive order 12898 of 1994, relating to environmental justice, and the Jemez principles of democratic organizing. Such principles shall include: being inclusive; placing an emphasis on bottom-up organizing; letting people speak for themselves; working together in solidarity and mutuality; building just relationships among ourselves; and making a commitment to self-transformation.”
The Board of Trustees consists of five trustees from state agencies, two appointees from the Governor, three from the temporary president of the Senate and three from the speaker of the Assembly. At least one appointee must live in eight regions outside of New York City. A minimum of three trustees “shall be representative of environmental justice communities” and one shall be a representative of a youth organization under the age of 21. However, “All trustees appointed under this section shall have relevant experience in any or all of the following areas: utility, environmental justice, energy markets, energy systems, organized labor, workforce development, sustainable land use, transportation, and clean energy.”
Comments
In general, I am not a fan of governmental agencies and I am particularly unimpressed with New York authorities. The particular problem is that despite the dedication in New York authorities of staff members chosen because of their background and experience, their work is co-opted by managers chosen by politicians. Over time and, particularly in the Cuomo Administration, the authorities no longer answer to the citizens of New York but to the agendas of the politicians. Setting up a new authority for a specific agenda-driven program is a recipe for public policy that is not necessarily in the best interests of the state as a whole.
The legislative findings note that this authority “would be able to nimbly manage the proceeds from a polluter fee which will amass significant revenue and require ongoing management.” It is not clear to me how a new authority with six agenda-driven offices could ever “nimbly” manage anything much less money. Unfortunately, the nimble goal gets much less likely given the organizational mandates that dictate how decisions are supposed to be made.
The reference to “significant” revenues is a key point for New Yorkers to understand. In conversations with people familiar with Albany politics one of the major drivers of this law is to provide the funding needed for CLCPA target implementation. So far, the Climate Action Council and its advisory panels have avoided mentioning any cost estimates. However, according to this article, New York “will need an annual investment of about $31 billion per year in combined private and public spending to bring CO2 emissions down to 100 million tons by 2030, a 2017 study by economists at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst found. That equates to two percent of the state GDP. At a recent hearing a figure of $15 billion a year in revenues was mentioned. WHAM reports that the carbon tax alone would bring in $2.3 billion a year and that measure could increase gas prices 55 cents a gallon and raise home heating costs 26%. As egregious as these costs estimates are, the total cost of the CLCPA will likely be even more.
Each of the offices has a politically appointed director. I am uncomfortable with this language:
Pursuant to authority duly delegated to him or her, a director from time to time shall hire, without regard to any personnel or civil service law, rule, or regulation of the state and in accordance with guidelines adopted by the board, such officers, employees and consultants, as they may require for the performance of their duties and shall prescribe the duties and compensation of each such officer, employee or consultant. Notwithstanding the provisions of any general, special or local law, the board may determine that, if any pension or retirement plan becomes inapplicable or is terminated, all or such class or classes of employees of the authority as the board may determine may elect to become members of the New York state employees’ retirement system on the basis of compensation payable to them by the authority.
Maybe it is just me but this seems to be a recipe for bureaucratic abuse.
Finally, there are 13 trustees all chosen because of who they know rather than what they know. They all are politically appointed and despite the requirement that they will have “relevant experience” that requirement rings hollow when one of the trustees is supposed to be under 21. The only relevant experience for the child trustee that I can think of is membership in an environmental organization.
Conclusion
New York’s record for clean energy development is not good because the cost per ton of CO2 reduced using the proceeds from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative far exceeds the states social cost of carbon. My impression is that some of the reason for that poor performance is because of the cost of New York bureaucracy. This legislation would compound that problem significantly. It will be a windfall for the politically connected and the crony capitalists but will just mean increased costs of living for the citizens of New York.
In response to the Biden administration’s “World Climate Summit” there have been multiple summaries of the state of climate science, the alleged impacts and purported solutions. This post summarizes relative articles in the context of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’s likely effect on the alleged effects of global warming.
I am a retired electric utility meteorologist with 40 years-experience analyzing the effects of meteorology and climate on electric operations in general and impacts on electric service in particular. The opinions expressed in my comments do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
These comments consist of two parts. In the first part I calculated the potential impact on global warming if New York were to achieve complete elimination of all greenhouse gas emissions. In the second part I summarize information contradicting the notion of an on-going climate emergency that is the rationale for the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) emission reductions. These comments show that New York’s potential effect on global warming is too small to measure and there is evidence that there is no climate emergency.
Potential Impact on Global Warming
In this section I estimate how much CLCPA implementation might affect global warming itself. This information has never been provided for any New York climate mitigation legislation or regulation. For this analysis I adapted the calculations in Analysis of US and State-By-State Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Potential “Savings” In Future Global Temperature and Global Sea Level Rise[1] to estimate the potential effect. This analysis of U.S. and state by state carbon dioxide 2010 emissions relative to global emissions quantifies the relative numbers and the potential “savings” in future global temperature and global sea level rise. These estimates are based on MAGICC: Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change[2] so they represent projected changes based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates. All I did in my calculation was to pro-rate the United States impacts by the ratio of New York inventory emissions divided by United States emissions to determine the effects of a complete cessation of all New York’s emissions.
There is a fundamental assumption in this approach. The emissions in the primary reference are based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) methodologies. In order for these estimates to be correct the emission inventories used have to be calculated the same way. New York’s CLCPA inventory only followed IPCC approaches when the results comported with the political narrative and differ when more “appropriate” that is to say higher numbers can be derived. I am not sure how much of a difference New York’s mandated requirement to use a 20-year global warming potential for its emission inventory affects these results that use emissions with a 100-year global warming potential.
In light of that uncertainty, I developed results for multiple inventories. The official CLCPA 1990 emission inventory was recently promulgated in New York’s Part 496 regulation. As shown in the impacts table I estimated the benefits of getting 1990 emissions to zero for four inventories. I evaluated the CLCPA Part 496 inventories for all the greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, PFCs, HFCs and SF6) included in the law and just CO2. In order to compare the potential effects the way the rest of the world prepares inventories, I evaluated the CO2 and GHG inventories from Table S-1 in the last New York State Energy Research and Development Authority inventory. The impact table shows that for the CLCPA Part 496 inventories there would be a reduction, or a “savings,” of between approximately 0.0097°C and 0.0081°C by the year 2100. I compared those reductions to observed changes in the environment and relative to emissions in the rest of the world in an earlier post.
State of Science of a Climate Emergency
I base this section primarily on an article by Willis Eschenbach that lists many supposed reasons that there is a climate emergency. He shows data that contradict many of those allegations. For example, one rationale for a climate emergency is that there are increasing numbers of deaths from weather extremes but global deaths due to climate and weather-related events are decreasing a lot.
His post includes many figures that illustrate data that contradicts the political narrative. Storminess has not gone up, and there’s been no increase in hurricane strength or frequency. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says there’s only one chance in five (“low confidence”) that global droughts are increasing. Nor have the “wet areas been getting wetter and the dry areas getting drier” because the scatterplot of rainfall trend shows no trend as shown below.
Eschenbach uses National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 12-month averages of the Palmer Z-index for the contiguous US to show that droughts in the US have been decreasing, not increasing. He quotes work by Pielke that shows that global weather disaster losses as a percentage of assets at risk (global GDP) are decreasing, not increasing.
Eschenbach explains that alarmists keep posting scary-looking graphs of the loss of polar ice that show the total mass of ice loss but ignore the reality that those losses are tiny fractions of the total ice. He points out that tide gauges show no increase in the rate of sea-level rise, and the claimed acceleration in satellite-measured sea level is merely an artifact of changing satellites.
He uses Berkeley Earth land only temperature anomaly data to show that land temperatures have already risen more than the dreaded 2°C, with no cataclysmic consequences.
Another useful metric is to consider that the average temperature difference over the last two centuries is very small relative to temperature changes people know how to handle. Lindzen plots the observed global warming against average temperature changes between 8:00 AM and 10:00 AM, sunrise to afternoon, winter to summer average, winter morning to summer afternoon, average coldest to warmest daily extremes, and all time coldest to hottest to show that people deal with far greater temperature changes than the observed changes on the order of several degrees that occurred during the time that human welfare increased the most in history or that allegedly in the future will create an emergency.
Eschenbach shows that climate models have routinely predicted far greater warming than has actually occurred. He notes that “This should not surprise anyone—the intractability of climate predictions has long been recognized even by the IPCC, viz:
“In sum, a strategy must recognise what is possible. In climate research and modelling, we should recognise that we are dealing with a coupled non-linear chaotic system, and therefore that the long-term prediction of future climate states is not possible”
IPCC Third Assessment Report, The Scientific Basis 14 2 2 2, p.774”
Rud Istavan recently described a series of failed climate predictions that further undermines any confidence in the climate models used to predict a climate emergency. Climate models predict specific features in the tropics that are not observed. Advocates claim that the ability of climate models to hindcast past anomalies proves that they can be used to predict the future. However, he explains that the models are tuned to match the historical observations. He explains that when looking at all the climate models used that in absolute temperature terms, the “models varied by ~4C in the year 2000 (early in their tuning period), from about the observed ~15.5C global average”. Clearly that wide a range suggests poor model performance. He also describes the model estimates of the amount of warming due to a doubling of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere, the “equilibrium climate sensitivity”:
Models reliably predict an ‘Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity’ (ECS) of about 3C. Again half true. They all do, but not ‘reliably’. Observational ECS using energy budget (and other) methods consistently show about 1.6-1.7C, about half of modeled. This is a big deal, since all the alarmist doomstering depends on a high ECS (or its close cousin TCR). At 1.6, there is no climate problem at all. At 3, there might or might not be. The model/observation discrepancy is so great that AR5 declined to produce a central estimate of ECS, an embarrassing omission.
The climate emergency is supposed to be driven by changes to in downwelling radiation at the surface from the increase in CO2. Downwelling radiation had a radiative forcing of 505.2 W/m2 for the pre-industrial (1750) atmospheric concentration of 278 ppmv of CO2. Currently the CO2 concentration is 413 ppmv and the forcing is 507.5 W/m2. If CO2 is doubled from the 1750 value to 556 ppmv the total forcing will be 509 W/m2. Doubling the atmospheric CO2 concentration results in just a 1-2% perturbation to the Earth’s energy budget. This doubled-CO2 effect has less than 1/5th of the impact that the net effect of clouds. And yet we are told there is a climate emergency because that change in one variable, CO2, is predominantly responsible for altering global temperatures.
Lindzen and Happer write that “No scientist familiar with radiation transfer denies that more carbon dioxide is likely to cause some surface warming”. However, they go on to argue that “the warming would be small and benign” and explain that civilizations have flourished when temperatures have been warm and declined when they have been cold. Moreover, additional CO2 will increase the productivity of agriculture and forestry and those benefits are documented in many studies.
Advocates claim that climate models are somehow enough different than weather forecast models that our personal experience with failed weather forecasts beyond several days is inapplicable. However, short-range climate models have poor forecasting abilities. For example, The Weather Channel here not long ago issued it’s winter outlook up through March:
Obviously, there is an issue with this forecast given the Texas weather in February. Even if the seasonal averages turned out to be similar to this forecast, the fact that so much damage occurred means that the expectation that average climate projections preclude extreme contrary weather is erroneous.
Dr William Briggs recently published “The Climate Blame Game: Are We Really Causing Extreme Weather?” that looks at the claims of a climate emergency in a slightly different way. In particular he analyzed whether we can trust climate-change event attribution studies. His summary states:
Claims made in so-called climate change event attribution studies suffer from gross over-certainties and cannot be trusted. The techniques used in these studies are in their infancy and do not warrant the trust put into them. These studies assume either (a) perfect forecasting models, or (b) known, uncertainty-free causes of climate change. Neither condition holds. Because of this, attribution claims are far too certain or are wrong. They should not be used in any policy decisions.
Conclusion
New York climate change legislation and regulation invariably list a whole host of reasons why there is a climate emergency. This summary of the state of the science shows that the basis for their attribution claims is not fit for purpose. Eschenbach summarizes the climate emergency fallacy as follows:
Finally, an “emergency” is defined in the dictionary as “a serious, unexpected, and often dangerous situation requiring immediate action.” Alarmists have been warning us over and over about the purported impending “emergency” for 50 years, so it is hardly “unexpected”. None of their endless predictions of imminent tragedy have come true, and despite decades of warning, no significant “immediate action” has been taken … so by definition, it can’t be an emergency. For five decades, we’ve been told every year that we only have five, ten, or twenty years before disaster … I mean, seriously, how can people still believe these serial failed doomcasters? So before we spend trillions of dollars on an unachievable plan to totally redo the entire global energy supply, how about we wait until someone can actually let us in on the big secret—just where is this mysterious “CLIMATE EMERGENCY!!!”, and when did it start?
I also showed that the global warming impacts projected with the climate models being used to claim a climate emergency are simply too small to be measured much less have an effect on any of the purported damages of greenhouse gas emissions. In the context of global emissions New York’s efforts will be subsumed quickly by emissions increases in other countries that are morally obligated to provide the tangible benefits of affordable, abundant energy to their citizens.
The actions necessary to implement New York’s climate agenda have to be compared to the likelihood of climate change effects and potential for New York to change the purported impacts. The rationale to make the changes does not stand up to scrutiny and the fact is that New York’s contribution to the alleged problem even if they were substantiated is so small to have any effect. Advocates for the New York CLCPA have to be held accountable to these findings.
In the spring of 2021, the New York state Senate introduced the Climate and Community Investment Act (CCIA). Coming on the heels of the Texas energy debacle one might think that politicians would not propose any changes to energy and environmental laws until the causes of that disaster were understood or would at least make implementation contingent upon feasibility studies to determine if the ambitious goals of this legislation don’t risk a similar outcome in New York. Such is not the case as shown by the legislative findings for this proposal.
I have written extensively about implementation of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) because I believe it will adversely affect affordability and reliability as well as create more environmental harm than good. The CCIA will make those impacts worse. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Background
The sponsor memo for this proposed regulation lists specific provisions in the proposed legislation. I prepared an annotated version of the draft bill that includes internal links to the sections of the bill corresponding to those provisions. The summary of Senate Bill S4264A states:
Enacts the climate and community investment act; prioritizes the allocation of public investments in disadvantaged communities; addresses climate change challenges through the expansion and growth of clean and renewable energy sources; adopts best value requirements for the solicitation, evaluation and award of renewable energy projects; establishes a community just transition program; establishes a climate pollution fee and a household and small business energy rebate; and creates the climate and community investment authority.
This post evaluates Section § 2, legislative findings and declaration. In the following section I list the findings and my indented and italicized comments. I will confine my comments to technical findings and not comment on social justice findings that are personal value judgements.
Discussion
1. Climate change is adversely affecting economic well-being, public health, natural resources, and the environment of New York.
In general, the underlying premise in all the New York legislative and regulatory initiatives is that there is a climate crisis, that the effects of climate change are observable today, and that changes in greenhouse gas concentrations due to humans are responsible for the observed climate changes. The politicians and regulators who prepare the rationales that climate change needs to be addressed frequently confuse weather and climate. It happens so often that I have a page that references my evaluations of alleged climatic effects that turned out to be weather events and examples by other authors.
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Ocean Service “Weather reflects short-term conditions of the atmosphere while climate is the average daily weather for an extended period of time at a certain location.” The referenced article goes on to explain “Climate is what you expect, weather is what you get.” Also keep in mind that the standard climatological average is 30 years. In order to think about a change in today’s climate averages you really should at least compare the current 30 years against the previous 30 years. In order to get a trend, you need to look at as much data as possible. On the face of it that might seem easy but the reality is that the conditions for a representative trend are difficult to achieve. Ideally you need to use the same instruments, the same methodology, and keep the conditions around the observing location the same. No recent New York legislative or regulatory description of climate change impacts has presented any claims that make the distinction between weather and climate so they all their claims are suspect.
Dr. William Briggs shows that attempts to blame extreme weather on human-caused global warming are “overconfident and probably wrong”. He explains that the first problem is how to define natural because “some have the curious and false idea that earth’s climate never changed before mankind began ‘interfering’ with it.” Those people reason that the industrial revolution changed the environment due to man’s interference starting on the order of a hundred years ago. Briggs argues:
Now it is true that man, like every other creature, influences the climate and the environment to some extent. It is impossible for any creature, man included, not to have an effect. After all, every living thing is part of the environment. There is therefore no ‘natural’ state of the climate, defined as one operating without man’s influence.
Briggs explains the problems trying to attribute human-caused effect to weather and climate. No matter how you estimate that potential effect it is impossible to independently check that estimate. The primary tool used today to estimate effects is a climate model. In order to trust those models Briggs points out that “they first have to demonstrate forecast skill” and “if they can’t, or they are inaccurate, they can’t be trusted”. Finally, he explains that “we might pick a date and say all observations before it are ‘natural’ and all after are tainted by ‘climate change’. But this is not proof man caused the differences. It is mere assumption.” He concludes that “climate-change event attribution studies rely on all these kinds of guesses and claims. As such, they are either incorrect or are far too certain.”
The adverse impacts of climate change include:
an increase in the severity and frequency of extreme weather events, such as storms, flooding, and heat waves, which can cause direct injury or death, property damage, and ecological damage (e.g., through the release of hazardous substances into the environment);
This finding presumes that these events can be attributed to mankind’s impact on the climate. Briggs explains that these claims are based either on a comparison of current observations to historical observations or using climate models with and without the alleged effect of GHG emissions. He shows that it is not possible to verify what the “natural” atmosphere was in the past so these comparisons are highly uncertain. The fact is that the human effect on weather events is at best a tweak and trying to tease out that effect with climate models that are very large scale is “dicey”. He concludes that “the uncertainty in attribution claims is just too great and in ways not always recognized” to be relied upon to make decisions or, in this case, justify new legislation. In addition an evaluation of extreme weather in 2020 notes that there is little evidence of extreme event worsening and most can be linked to natural climate cycles.
rising sea levels, which exacerbate damage from storm surges and flooding, contribute to coastal erosion and saltwater intrusion, and inundate low-lying areas, leading to the displacement of or damage to coastal habitat, property, and infrastructure;
Sea levels have been rising at the Battery in New York City since record keeping began and local changes in the height of land relative to the height of the continental land mass are a significant factor of that sea-level rise that no amount of change to the greenhouse effect will affect.
exacerbation of air pollution;
The only climate change impact that could affect air pollution is an increase in temperature that could change the rate of the reactions that convert precursor emissions s to ozone and inhalable particulates. Note, however, that in both cases temperature is a minor actor in the conversion process and could only affect concentrations but several percent.
an increase in the incidences of infectious diseases, asthma attacks, heart attacks, and other negative health outcomes;
Absent supporting information for these health claims I cannot respond.
increased average temperatures, which increase the demand for air conditioning and refrigeration among residents and businesses; and
Recall that climate variability is over as long a period as possible. The EPA high and low temperature climate change indicators page shows that the 1930’s were the worst period for heat waves with a heat wave index four times higher than recent data. It is clear that temperatures are rising but it is not clear how much of the change is due to climate change and how much is due to land use changes like the urban heat island that are affecting temperature trends.
extensive environmental degradation with devastating impacts to wildlife and natural habitats, ecosystems and food supplies.
No examples of the devastating impacts are presented and there is no mention that in order to meet New York’s climate targets with wind and solar that thousands of wind turbines and square miles of solar panels will be required in the state or that the rare earth metals necessary for that technology will cause real environmental devastation somewhere else in the world. In order to justify this claim the authors would have to compare the life cycle impacts of renewable alternatives.
2. Many of the impacts of climate change are already observable in New York state and the northeastern United States. Annual average temperatures are on the rise, winter snow cover is decreasing, heat waves and precipitation are intensifying, and sea levels along New York’s coastline are approximately one foot higher than they were in 1900. New York has also experienced an increasing number of extreme and unusual weather events, like Hurricanes Irene and Lee and the unprecedented Superstorm Sandy in 2012, which caused at least 53 deaths and $32 billion in damage in New York state.
As noted previously these claims have high uncertainty. Nonetheless note that the sea level and the hurricane arguments are not supportable. Sea levels are approximately one foot higher than they were in 1900 but there is no change in the rate of sea level rise. NOAA’s Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory in Princeton NJ has concluded:
“In summary, it is premature to conclude with high confidence that increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations from human activities have had a detectable impact on Atlantic basin hurricane activity, although increasing greenhouse gases are strongly linked to global warming…Human activities may have already caused other changes in tropical cyclone activity that are not yet detectable due to the small magnitude of these changes compared to estimated natural variability, or due to observational limitations.”
New York was impacted by several hurricanes in recent years and that fact is used as “proof” that the climate is changing. However actually reviewing the data shows otherwise. Dr. Ryan Maue compiles data on the frequency of hurricanes across the globe and has found no trend.
Roger Pielke summarized hurricane landfalls and found a trend of decreasing landfalls since the early 1960’s.
3. New York should therefore minimize the risks associated with climate change through a combination of measures to reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions and improve the resiliency of the state with respect to the impacts and risks of climate change that cannot be avoided.
I have shown that the alleged risks associated with climate change are nonexistent so reducing greenhouse gas emissions will have no effect. On the other hand, observed extreme weather has major effects on society. Even if there is no climate change signal increased resilience is a no regrets policy that is in the best interests of the state
4. Climate change especially heightens the vulnerability of disadvantaged communities including communities of color and low-income communities, which bear environmental and socioeconomic burdens as well as legacies of racial and ethnic discrimination. Disadvantaged communities are more likely to experience flooding and urban heat island effects, and to live in housing vulnerable to destruction from storms. Low-income New Yorkers lack emergency savings to keep up with necessary expenses following the disruption from a major storm or climate event.
As shown above I do not believe climate change is an existential threat to society. However, I agree that extreme weather heightens vulnerability of disadvantaged communities and that suggests that resilience measures should focus on reducing weather impacts in those communities.
5. Actions taken by New York state to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and those taken to increase the resiliency of the state with respect to the impacts and risks of climate change, should prioritize the safety, health, and resiliency of disadvantaged communities, control potential regressive impacts of future climate change mitigation and adaptation policies on these communities, and prioritize the allocation of public investments in these areas.
I agree that resiliency measures should prioritize the safety and health of disadvantaged communities. I submit however, that the concept that reducing greenhouse gas emissions can be used to control potential regressive impacts of future climate change mitigation on these communities is not in the best interest of those communities. The fact is that mitigation of greenhouse gases invariably increases the cost of energy and the disadvantaged communities are disproportionately impacted more by energy costs. Any money spent on mitigation is not going to affect impacts so there cannot be any paybacks so increased costs to those least able to afford those increases is not in the best interests of the disadvantaged communities.
6. Disadvantaged communities in New York state experience greater exposure to air pollution and subsequent negative health impacts, in large part due to legacies of racial, ethnic, and socio-economic discrimination. New York’s communities of color are more likely to:
(a) live near sites of high pollution, including power plants, highly trafficked automotive routes, waste transfer stations, landfills, hazardous waste sites and toxic industrial facilities;
(b) breathe in a greater volume of pollution, including both ozone and particulate matter;
(c) experience asthma and other pollution-related illnesses including increased hospitalization rates for childhood asthma;
(d) have higher rates of cancer due to disproportionate exposure to air pollution, including lung cancer and other pollution-affiliated cancers; and
(e) experience other negative health impacts, including but not limited to reduced fertility rates, adverse pregnancy outcomes and increased vulnerability to the consequences of co-morbidities like diabetes and high blood pressure.
I do not dispute that disadvantaged communities experience greater exposure to air pollution and subsequent health impacts but there are some caveats that should be kept in mind. Many environmental justice organizations are taking the position that because of the legacies of the past that the only acceptable future scenario is no environmental impacts. For example, it is not acceptable for a facility to add controls that significantly reduce emissions and impacts. Instead, the facility has to be replaced with something with no local impacts.
There are technical issues with the demand for no local impacts from power plants. The over-riding problem is that the primary air quality health concerns are from ozone and inhalable particulates. Because those are both secondary pollutants that form by chemical reactions from the pollutants emitted by power plants, they don’t impact the neighborhoods around the power plants simply because by the time those reactions take place the emissions have been transported away from the plant. Another problem is that the projections of reduced health impact outcomes rely on analyses that are contradicted by other work. Finally, the projections of health impacts rely on the linear-no threshold model that is impossible to verify at the low pollutant levels associated with neighborhood power plants.
Ultimately the discussion of how best to address the air pollution problems of disadvantaged communities involves trade-offs and value judgements that are beyond the scope of this post.
7. In the spring of 2020, New York experienced the devastating impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. Tens of thousands of New Yorkers died, and many hundreds of thousands more became ill. Air pollution played a significant role in this pandemic, as residents of communities of color who live in highly polluted areas died disproportionately from Covid-19 when compared to patients from less polluted neighborhoods. Throughout the pandemic, New Yorkers of color continue to disproportionately contract, fall ill, and die from Covid-19, in part because of disproportionate exposure to toxic air pollution.
The basis of this claim is a study by Harvard that claimed that a small increase in PM2.5 in outdoor air increased the risk of death from COVID-19 by 15 percent. However, that study is flatly contradicted by astudy by University of Washington and Stanford researchers that found that nations with the highest smoking rates had the lowest COVID-19 death rates. Because the inhalable particulates from cigarette smoke are many times greater than the inhalable particulates in New York air the disproportionate COVID impacts on New York are due to another cause.
8. The Covid-19 pandemic has also caused a national economic crisis which has also severely impacted New York State. Many New Yorkers lost their jobs during the Covid-19 pandemic, with unemployment rates reaching levels not seen since the Great Depression. Such mass job loss increased precarity for thousands of New Yorkers and left many less able to weather current or future emergencies. Child and dependent care shortages are and continue to be a barrier to work in New York, especially for women, who disproportionately take on unpaid caregiving responsibilities when their family cannot find or afford child and dependent care. Low and middle-income families and families of color disproportionately lack access to quality child and dependent care.
No comment
9. New York state has an interest in reducing air pollution that increases risk for Covid-19 and ensuring that all populations are equally able to breathe clean air and live healthful lives. Actions undertaken by New York to reduce air pollution should prioritize the health and safety of disadvantaged communities, prioritize the allocation of public investments in these areas, and control potential regressive impacts of climate policies on these communities. Further, it is in the interest of the state to invest in creating stable and safe employment opportunities for individuals who have lost their jobs as part of the Covid-19 recession. This includes protecting and promoting the ability for all workers to equitably participate in a just clean energy transition by increasing equitable and comprehensive access to child and dependent care.
EPA and DEC have regulations in place to improve air quality. I am not sure whether incorporating the other goals described will help or hinder the efforts to improve air quality
10. Racial justice and environmental justice are inextricably linked to achieving a just clean energy transition in New York. The murder of George Floyd on May 25, 2020 was followed by mass protests for Black lives in New York state and throughout the nation. These movements have forced a national reckoning with the fact that racial injustice has resulted in over-policing and mass incarceration of communities of color. It is in the interest of the state of New York that no funds from programs for pricing greenhouse gas emissions are invested in police, prisons or related infrastructure.
No comment.
11. The adverse impacts of climate change are having a detrimental effect on some of New York’s largest industries, including agriculture, commercial shipping, forestry, tourism, and recreational and commercial fishing. These impacts also place additional strain on the physical infrastructure that delivers critical services to the citizens of New York, including the state’s energy, transportation, stormwater, and wastewater infrastructure.
No evidence is presented that there are detrimental effects on these industries. The tendency to blame any negative effect on climate change distracts resolution of the real cause of the problem. Even if there is some tenuous connection between an alleged climate change impact and strains on infrastructure the question should be what is the most cost-effective approach to address those problems. Should we try to indirectly invest to reduce climate impacts by reducing emissions or invest directly in the infrastructure to adapt to extreme weather?
12. Creating good jobs and a thriving economy is a core concern of New York state. Shaping the ongoing transition in our energy sector to ensure that it creates good jobs and protects workers and communities that may lose employment in the current transition must be key concerns of our climate policy. Setting clear standards for job quality and training standards encourages not only high-quality work but positive economic impacts.
Everybody wants good jobs. The tradeoff between jobs that are depend on government subsidies and those that don’t should be addressed in this conversation.
13. Ensuring career opportunities are created and shared geographically and demographically is necessary to ensure increased access to good jobs for marginalized communities while making the same neighborhoods more resilient. Climate change has a disproportionate impact on low-income people, communities of color, women, youth, children and workers. This includes formerly incarcerated individuals. Disadvantaged communities and workers must have access to all aspects of the state’s clean energy economy, including as investors and developers of clean energy projects. It is in the interest of the state of New York to protect and promote the interests of these groups against the impacts of climate change and severe weather events and to advance our equity goals by ensuring quality employment opportunities in safe working environments.
No comment
14. Addressing climate change challenges through the expansion and growth of clean and renewable energy sources requires New York to make substantial proprietary and financial investments in this sector and to become an investor and partner in the development of renewable energy programs and projects. New York has long provided forms of state assistance, including grants, energy credits, or tax incentives to developers, project owners and other entities proposing clean and renewable energy projects. Key findings relating to state assistance in the clean and renewable energy sector are as follows:
(a) providing forms of state assistance in renewable energy projects results in New York becoming a co-investor in this sector with strong financial, proprietary interests in the projects it supports. Such assistance is essential since the expansion and development of this market, would not occur at the scale and pace needed without substantial financial investment by the state. New York has already invested billions of dollars in promoting its renewable energy programs and will continue to invest substantial sums over the next several years to assist the growth and development of the sector. Such investments are critical not only for the development of individual renewable energy projects, but also to ensure that projects are effectively planned and executed and produce adequate amounts of clean energy needed to meet the state’s future needs for safe, affordable reliable power;
(b) it is vital that the state’s investments in clean and renewable energy be protected and monitored through all stages of development to make certain that they are effective in producing the intended results. The need for this protection has grown greater due to the enormous economic burden imposed on the state by the Covid-19 pandemic;
(c) one of the areas in need of most protection is the actual construction and operation of renewable energy projects, especially large-scale projects. Because the construction industry is inherently complex and challenging, the delivery of projects, especially large capital construction projects, is fraught with numerous high-level risks that stem from various sources. These include but are not limited to project funding, financial resources and stability of project partners, project designs and specifications. Risks also include site conditions, equipment and material supply chains, and the experience, capacity and technical qualifications of developers, contractors and craft labor personnel used for a given project;
(d) ensuring the sufficient supply of properly trained and qualified craft labor personnel is vital to the protection of state interests and investments in the renewable energy sector. Large-scale construction projects are both labor intensive and inherently dangerous operations. The timely, successful delivery of these projects is critical to the delivery of safe and reliable power to consumers. Thus, the safe and successful completion of these projects necessitates a highly skilled workforce. It is critical that the state support the development of this workforce, as the construction industry generally is facing the most acute, widespread skill shortage in craft labor personnel in modern times. This shortage can cause various types of project failures, including major schedule delays, cost-overruns, increased safety incidents, or other serious problems;
(e) while many aspects of construction project planning cannot be controlled, ensuring the adequate supply of properly trained craft personnel can be effectively managed through the use of labor performance tools and policies. Key labor performance provisions include prevailing wage requirements, project labor agreements and responsible contractor provisions. These policies, in use in New York and throughout the country, are shown to be effective at protecting capital investments and the proprietary interests of investors. These tools also help ensure that adequate numbers of skilled craft personnel are deployed to projects in a timely manner and that the most highly qualified contractors will be attracted to such projects. These tools also protect the wage rates of local communities, promote adherence to required licensing and technical certifications, and maintain labor peace on projects to avoid disruptions and protect project delivery;
(f) project labor agreements promote the planning and timely completion of construction projects, especially larger scale projects, by establishing pre-determined and uniform employment terms. This ensures an adequate supply of properly trained craft personnel, creates stability for project planning and prevents labor disruptions. Responsible contractor policies help ensure that contractors and subcontractors used for projects are reputable, qualified firms that have sufficient resources and capabilities needed to perform the work successfully. Prevailing wage requirements protect local area wage rates from being undermined; and
(g) project labor agreements, responsible contracting and prevailing wage requirements also produce valuable socio-economic benefits by creating quality middle class jobs and skill training opportunities in New York’s construction industry. Utilizing these policies will develop a new generation of craft labor personnel, create jobs in the state and foster economic development in communities where projects are located.
New York does have a long history supporting clean and renewable energy. However, the results of those investments do not bode well. The investments from the proceeds of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative are often cited as an example of the value of New York’s support of clean and renewable energy. The latest New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) report New York’s RGGI-Funded Programs Status Report – Semiannual Report through June 30, 2020 describes the programs New York has set up to invest the proceeds from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiatives. Upon closer examination though, I found that NYSERDA supports 20 programs with associated CO2 reduction benefits and another 18 programs with no claimed CO2 reductions. I compared the cost per ton reduced for those programs against the 2021 $127 New York Value of Carbon metric for cost effective investments. Seventeen programs and the 18 programs with no claimed reductions do not meet this cost effectiveness standard. I found that only 1.1% of the NYSERDA RGGI funds cost-effectively reduce CO2 emissions. I imagine that the limitations in this proposed legislation can only add costs to renewable developments and further reduce their effectiveness.
15. It is in the interest of the state to strengthen, monitor and enforce prevailing wages, project labor agreements and responsible contracting. While prevailing wage requirements are already required for some renewable energy projects, these requirements should be strengthened and used in coordination with the additional labor and performance standards established in this act.
No comment
16. The severity of current climate change and the threat of additional and more severe change will be affected by the actions undertaken by New York and other jurisdictions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. According to the U.S. Global Change Research Program and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will be required by mid-century in order to limit global warming to no more than 2°C and ideally 1.5°C, and thus minimize the risk of severe impacts from climate change. Specifically, industrialized countries must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 in order to stabilize carbon dioxide equivalent concentrations at 450 parts per million–the level required to stay within the 2°C target.
The Paris Climate Agreement will reduce temperatures just 0.05°C. It is not clear how much the alleged risks of severe impacts can be ameliorated by that small a change in temperature.
17. In 2019, New York state demonstrated national and international leadership on climate by enacting the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (“CLCPA”), the nation’s most aggressive climate law and the nation’s only climate law that provides for a just transition. The CLCPA created a comprehensive regulatory program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from all anthropogenic sources 100% over 1990 levels by the year 2050, with an incremental target of at least a 40 percent reduction in climate pollution by the year 2030, and requires investment in and protection of disadvantaged communities. To meet the goals of the CLCPA, the state will need to transform its energy infrastructure, including the rapid and significant deployment of clean and renewable energy. It is in the interest of the state to promote and provide resources towards the development and maintenance of clean energy infrastructure.
In the absence of any New York estimate of the effect of greenhouse gas emissions reductions on global warming I did my own estimate. I found that for the CLCPA emission inventories there would be a reduction, or a “savings,” of between approximately 0.0097°C and 0.0081°C by the year 2100. To give an idea of how small these temperature changes are consider changes with elevation and latitude. Generally, temperature decreases three (3) degrees Fahrenheit for every 1,000-foot increase in elevation above sea level. The projected temperature difference for eliminating all greenhouse gases is a 39-inch change in elevation or 32 inches if only the CO2 emissions are considered. The general rule is that temperature changes three (3) degrees Fahrenheit for every 300-mile change in latitude at an elevation of sea level. The projected temperature change is the same as a change in latitude of less than a mile.
New York should also be considered relative to the rest of the world. According to the China Electricity Council[1], about 29.9 gigawatts of new coal power capacity was added in 2019 and a further 46 GW of coal-fired power plants are under construction. If you assume that the new coal plants are super-critical units with an efficiency of 44% and have a capacity factor of 80%, the reductions provided by the CLCPA greenhouse gas inventory will be replaced by the added 2019 Chinese capacity in less than two years or four and a half years if the 2019 capacity and the units under construction are combined.
18. By exercising a global leadership role on greenhouse gas mitigation and climate change adaptation, New York will continue to position its economy, technology centers, financial institutions, and businesses to benefit from national and international efforts to address climate change. Action undertaken by New York to reduce greenhouse emissions will have an impact on global greenhouse gas emissions and the rate of climate change. In addition, such action will encourage other jurisdictions to implement complementary greenhouse gas reduction strategies and provide an example of how such strategies can be implemented. It will also advance the development of green technologies and sustainable practices within the private sector, which can have far-reaching impacts such as a reduction in the cost of renewable energy components, and the creation of jobs and tax revenues in New York.
The CLCPA does not include a requirement for a feasibility study with clear affordability, reliability, and environmental impact tests to determine whether it is appropriate for New York to proceed with a complete overhaul of the energy system. I showed that action undertaken by New York to eliminate greenhouse emissions will have an immeasurable effect on the rate of climate change. If the proposed transition of the New York energy system results in unacceptable affordability, reliability and environmental impacts the state’s actions will discourage other jurisdictions.
19. It is in the interest of New York to take rapid action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and transition to a just clean energy economy. Such actions include:
a) raising new, dedicated revenue specifically for climate programs;
(b) investing in clean and renewable energy infrastructure such as solar energy, offshore wind, grid storage technologies and energy efficiency;
(c) rapidly transitioning to zero-emission transportation, especially zero-emission school and transit buses, to reduce adverse health impacts for children, workers, and communities, and improve grid resilience and renewable energy reliance;
(d) prioritizing funding for locally driven projects to reduce emissions and increase resiliency, especially in disadvantaged communities that are most impacted by climate change and air pollution;
(e) creating quality employment opportunities for all New Yorkers in the transition to a just clean economy and ensuring the full participation and prioritization of disadvantaged communities; and
(f) ensuring workers and communities currently reliant on the fossil fuel industry are given resources to avoid adverse economic impacts.
I don’t think that the legislative finds presented a case that supports the notion that is in the interests of the state to implement these actions.
20. There is currently no state entity that is wholly dedicated to achieving the outcomes of the CLCPA. Without adequately devoting state resources and personnel, the outlined emissions reductions and electrification goals will not be realized in the target timeframe. Pursuant to the CLCPA, the state has less than 30 years to fully transition the 10th largest economy in the world to one that is fossil fuel free, and intentionally prioritize overburdened populations. Reaching these goals will improve the health and well-being of the residents of the state and advance the state’s economic interests. It is also critical that best value procurement requirements are established within the authority to optimize the solicitation, evaluation and award of renewable energy projects assisted by the state.
While there is no dedicated state entity dedicated to achieving the outcomes, NYSERDA has taken over that role because they have staff with the appropriate background and knowledge. Unfortunately, their record with the proceeds from the RGGI auction are not good. If New York has to rely on NYSERDA investment record to date to reduce fuel combustion CO2 emissions to zero for the CLCPA, then the cost would be $91.948 billion. Note that in my opinion the primary reason for this abysmal record is political interference because many of the programs included appear more to cater to specific interests and the agenda of the Cuomo Administration than trying to efficiently and effectively reduce greenhouse emissions.
21. It is in the interest of the state to establish a dedicated authority to ensure that New York’s climate goals are accomplished. Such an authority would be able to nimbly manage the proceeds from a polluter fee which will amass significant revenue and require ongoing management. This authority would also disburse funds for clean energy community scale projects in a timely and efficient manner while employing best value procurement practices. In addition, a new authority would have the capacity to ensure prioritization of projects and funds for impacted communities, coordinate statewide emissions reduction strategies and assist impacted workers in a transition away from fossil fuels through specialized assistance programs.
The last thing that this state needs is a dedicated authority for New York’s climate goals. The idea that any Albany bureaucracy controlled by political appointees could nimbly manage proceeds is laughable. As the NYSERDA RGGI investment results show, the more political interference the less efficient the process.
22. This legislation will build upon the developments outlined above by creating a comprehensive program for pricing greenhouse gas emissions and investing in a just transition to a low-carbon New York state economy, in accordance with the targets established in the CLCPA.
The theory of carbon pricing is that adding a price to greenhouse gas emissions will incentivize the market to develop the least cost alternatives to using fossil fuels. Note, however, that the theory also suggests that the way to prevent this from simply becoming a regressive tax is to offset the proceeds with comparable reductions in taxes elsewhere. This is not an aspect of the proposed pricing program in this legislation.
Conclusion
The findings note that Superstorm Sandy in 2012 “caused at least 53 deaths and $32 billion in damage in New York state”. It is notable that the February 2021 blackout in Texas caused similar impacts. One disaster was caused by nature and the other by a failure in the planning for the electric energy system. With all due respect to the electric energy planners, trying to anticipate all scenarios associated with a complete transition of the electric grid to renewables is probably impossible. If that process is dictated by political considerations without adequate time for planning and testing, then I believe blackouts in New York with similar impacts to those observed in Texas are inevitable. These legislative findings do not provide sufficient support to take that risk.
Two books and a recent essay suggest a different approach is more appropriate. Bjorn Lomborg’s book “False Alarm: How Climate Change Panic Costs Us Trillions, Hurts the Poor, and Fails to Fix the Planet” shows that the media, politicians and activists that hype climate catastrophe are picking and choosing results that support that narrative but do not reflect the whole story. He demonstrates that “in almost every way we can measure, life on earth is better now than at any time in history” and explains that “analysis by experts shows that we are likely to become much, much better off in the future”. He shows that we are committing to try to solve climate change with policies that he demonstrates will not make much of a difference but will cost a lot and not do much to change global warming. Michael Shellenberger “Apocalypse Never – Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All” evaluates the current war on nuclear and natural gas fracking by the environmental alarmists. He includes several examples of the hypocrisy of the loudest voices when it comes to the most obvious solutions. His evaluation of concentrated power provided by nuclear and natural gas compared to the dilute energy provided by wind and solar shows that they are obvious choices while we develop better fossil-free alternatives. The essay Undue Climate Haste explains that the Nobel Prize (2018) winning climate economist William Nordhaus showed in his Nobel lecture in Stockholm that the ‘economic optimum’ for climate policy is to allow 3.5 degrees Celsius of warming in 2100. Economically, it is better to accept a certain amount of climate damage and to limit the cost of mitigation than the other way round: ambitious goals such as staying below 2 degrees or even 1.5 degrees are extremely costly. Unfortunately, the CLCPA and CCIA are going down the exact path that these authors show will cost enormous sums of money, hurt more of the world’s poor than help, and will have no effect on global warming itself.