Climate Act – Page 2 – Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York

Initial Thoughts on Energy Planning Board Meeting on 1 December 2025

Note: Updated on 12/10/2025 to add a slide 32 from the presentation

On November 13 I published an article describing my initial thoughts about the State Energy Planning Board meeting that day that discussed public comments on the Draft State Energy Plan document. I had intended to follow up with another post providing more detail, but other projects got in the way. This post describes the latest meeting held on December 1.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document. The focus of this article is how the results of the Pathways Analysis relate to Climate Act goals. Note that I went so far as to request that the response be written up.

Energy Plan Overview

According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

I have provided background information and a list of previous articles on my Energy Plan page.

Meeting Overview

There were three items on the agenda: approval of last meeting minutes, discuss analyses conducted for the Energy Plan, and consider any new business. The recording of the meeting available here included a transcript. I created an edited transcript that has headings and includes the slides.

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) prepared a Draft Energy Plan last summer. Stakeholder comments were accepted until early October. At the last Energy Planning Board meeting there was a perfunctory description of the comments received. In this meeting NYSERDA described the updated Pathways Analysis—the modeling exercise that underpins New York’s triennial State Energy Plan.

Implementation Timing

Under New York’s own Climate Act accounting framework—the methodology that matters for compliance—no scenario modeled by NYSERDA hits the 40% economy-wide GHG reduction target by 2030. Not the “current policies” case. Not the “additional action” case. None of them. Instead, the core planning cases achieve the 40% GHG emission reduction by 2030 mandate in roughly 2037–2038, a full 7–8 years later than the statute requires. The 70% renewable electricity target by 2030 is also behind schedule. Offshore wind permitting delays push that into the 2036–2040 window.

This is not a surprise to anyone closely tracking federal policy and state implementation. However, this is the first time that it is not necessary to read between the lines of the NYSERDA presentations. NYSERDA laid it out in black-and-white. The State is no longer pretending the Climate Act is on schedule.

Federal Rollbacks and Deployment Headwinds

The updated modeling incorporates two major factors that were not included in the draft plan.

The draft plan was counting on extensive Federal support but there have been policy changes. The modeling breaks this down by sector:

Across the electric sector: $25 billion in lost investment tax credit (ITC) and production tax credit (PTC) for renewables and related credits.
Buildings: ~$1.5 billion in lost heat pump and efficiency incentives by 2040.
Transportation: ~$4.5 billion in lost EV incentives, plus higher long-term fuel costs if the Advanced Clean Car and Advanced Clean Truck programs are also repealed.
Offshore wind deployment delays. Federal permitting obstruction and supply-chain headwinds are slowing the pace of offshore wind additions.
Offshore wind deployment delays. Federal permitting obstruction and supply-chain headwinds are slowing the pace of offshore wind additions. The 2035 offshore wind capacity in the modeling is below the 9 GW target, which cascades into delays across the entire renewable timeline.

The second factor is that issues with siting constraints are slowing the physical deployment of wind and solar deployment relative to the unrealistic presumptions in the Draft plan. Offshore wind deployment delays because of changes in Federal permitting and supply-chain issues are slowing the pace of offshore wind additions. The 2035 offshore wind capacity in the modeling is below the 9 GW target, which cascades into delays across the entire renewable timeline.

Policy Implications

The Perplexity AI summary listed six takeaways.

NYSERDA plainly states that the 2030 targets cannot be met using the Climate Act’s accounting as shown on the Key Takeaways (3/3) Slide 32 shown below.. However, the presentation just described this analysis result and not the implication that this means that the Climate Act must be amended to shift the schedule.

The building sector urgently need more aggressive policy actions to achieve Climate Act goals. The gap between current-policy building decarbonization and a net-zero-consistent path is large, and it’s growing. Stronger codes, more financing, larger direct-install programs, and targeted support for renters and low-income owners are all needed.

The transition of the gas system requires active management and investment. This isn’t a “let the market sort it out” situation. Utilities, the PSC, and the state need coordinated strategies for how gas infrastructure evolves over time—including decisions about when and where to invest in network modernization versus when to accelerate targeted electrification.

The presentation noted the importance of Dispatchable Emissions Free Resources (DEFR). I disagree with the optionality adjective, however. There is nothing optional about the need for these new and unproven resources. The description of green hydrogen illustrates why it won’t solve the problem. The presentation argues the state should be actively exploring, piloting, and supporting a portfolio of zero-carbon dispatchable technologies. RNG, long-duration storage, ammonia, and others all deserve serious development support.

Federal policy is now a binding constraint. New York can optimize its own policies, but it cannot outrun federal rollbacks. The state’s energy strategy increasingly needs to figure out how to replace Federal funding, procure projects to lock in tax credits before phase-outs, and re-structure policy design that works even if federal support evaporates.

Nuclear is back in the conversation, and that’s not a bad thing. The modeling shows that nuclear power, where available and deployable, reduces system costs and relieves pressure on renewables and DEFR. The presentation argues that the state should pursue the NYPA project, explore other Small Modular Reactor and advanced reactor opportunities, and think carefully about lifecycle extension of existing assets.

Stakeholder Comments

I am extremely disappointed with the stakeholder process. In my comments at the first virtual public hearing and a subsequent written comment I explained that the lack of documentation on the disposition of stakeholder comments undermined the credibility of the process and the opportunity to improve the Energy Plan. The only acknowledgment of the comments received is a promise that “all comments will be posted on the State Energy Plan website as soon as practicable”. It has been two months since that promise was posted and the comments still are not posted.

This matters because the presentation at this meeting claimed the Pathways Analysis finds that the additional-action case generates net societal benefits of about $18 billion by 2040, with roughly $19 billion in aggregate net-present-value benefits through 2040, when carbon and health benefits are factored in. However, in my unacknowledged comments I pointed out that the cost accounting in the Pathways Analysis “No Action” scenario only includes costs associated with the Climate Act law, not the cost to meet the Climate Act targets. The misleading “No Action” scenario is not a baseline that excludes all programs necessary to achieve the Climate Act targets because it includes legacy programs in place prior to the Climate Act. Furthermore, in other comments I identified issues that reduced the alleged benefits. If costs and benefits were properly addressed, then I suspect that there would not be net societal benefits.

Discussion

I recently described the Oct. 24, 2025 New York Supreme Court decision and order in a case pitting environmental organizations against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed. Importantly, during the trial , the Attorney General Office submitted a supplemental letter that argued that promulgating regulations for the Climate Act target would cause “undue harm” because the Climate Act mandates are infeasible due to excessive costs that are “unaffordable for consumers” to bear. Subsequently, DEC appealed the decision which postpones resolution of the problem.

The rationale for the Judge’s decision coupled with the acknowledgement that the costs are unaffordable and the updated Pathways Analysis finding that the 2030 targets cannot be met using the Climate Act’s accounting methodology should mean that the Climate Act itself needs to be amended. This important finding was not mentioned in the presentation. Furthermore, there has been no sign that the Hochul Administration or the majority leadership in the Legislature are amenable to considering amendments to the Climate Act.

There is another aspect to this. The Climate Act is not the only law that includes the mandates for the net-zero transition. New York Public Service Law § 66 “Establishment of a renewable energy program” describes energy systems that are prohibit some of the findings in the updated Pathways Analysis. It appears to me that this legislation also needs to be amended.

I will follow up with another post on this meeting because there are more issues that I did not address.

Conclusion

Reality bats last. The findings of the updated Pathways Analysis reflect that fact. The aspirational schedule of the Climate Act was never realistic, and these results are simply acknowledgement of that fact. It remains to be seen how the identified problems and the implicit feasibility concerns described will be addressed. Given that it will require accountability by the politicians who got New York into this mess I am not optimistic.

Implications of New York State 2025 GHG Emissions Inventory

This post describes the latest New York State (NYS) GHG emission inventory report that provides data through 2023. A recent post explained why the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) 2030 target for a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 1990 levels was impossible. It included GHG emissions data through 2022 so this report updates that assessment. It also describes implications of other aspects of the inventory results.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. In addition GHG emissions are supposed to be 40% lower than the 1990 baseline. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.

NYS GHG Emissions

The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) released the 2025 statewide GHG emissions report (2025 GHG Report) at the end of November, a month earlier than recent releases. DEC is required by the Climate Act to follow unique inventory requirements. Four years ago I published an overview post of this greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory that described things that maximize emissions in an apparent attempt to make GHG emissions as large as possible.

The 2025 GHG Report includes the following documents:

Appendix: CLCPA Emission Factors (PDF)

The Summary Report for the GHG Inventory gives an overview of the highlights.

In 2023, statewide gross GHG emissions were 354.06 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent GHGs (mmt CO2e) using CLCPA accounting. Total gross emissions in 2023 were 14.8% lower than the 1990 baseline in this report and 13.6% below the 1990 statewide emission baseline adopted in regulation in 2020. Carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) comprised the largest portion of emissions by gas, 58% and 35% respectively, and energy was the largest source of emissions (73%). Net emissions were 316.58 mmt CO2e in 2023, which includes a net 37.48 mmt CO2e removed.

Note that the 1990 total gross emissions calculated in this analysis were different than the those calculated when the 1990 statewide emission baseline was adopted in regulation in 2020. The implications of this will be discussed later in this post. The Summary Report goes on:

Emissions in New York State in 2023 have mostly recovered from the effects of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. As noted in the two previous versions of this report, 2020 emissions were not considered representative and were expected to normalize to broader trends in future reports. Annual gross emissions in 2023 were less than 0.1% higher than in 2022 and 4% lower than the pre-pandemic levels in 2019. This trend is primarily the result of energy sector changes. Energy emissions in 2023 were 10% higher than in 2020, and 1% lower than in 2022. Within the energy sector, these trends were driven by the gradual recovery of energy sector subsectors such as transportation and a change in electricity generation sources. Some of the trends in energy emissions are also affected by seasonal weather patterns and interannual differences in the demand for heating or cooling.

When a New York state agency says “change in electricity generation sources” they cannot state the obvious that this is the result of poor energy policy. The changes in sources were caused by the politically motivated decisions to shut down two zero emissions Indian Point nuclear units and reject the permits to repower old and inefficient natural gas fired power plants. The Draft Energy Plan and multiple New York Independent System Operator reports clearly show that both nuclear power and fossil generation resources are needed to maintain electric system reliability.

The Summary Report goes on:

Greenhouse gas emissions from the extraction, processing, and transmission of imported natural gas greatly decreased for years 2020-2022 relative to the 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report due to updated data and methodology. This report uses an updated fuel lifecycle analysis model made available by the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL 2025) that estimates GHG emissions from natural gas systems based on year 2020 operating conditions. Note that use of the updated model reduced statewide greenhouse gas emission totals for years 2020-2022 compared to the totals included in the 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report. More details about the changes to the data and methodology underlying imported natural gas emissions are included in Sectoral Report #1: Energy.

Two points to keep in mind about this paragraph. New York’s unique GHG emission accounting methodology not only includes the use of different global warming potential but also includes upstream emissions. This means that most results cannot be compared to other jurisdictions. The second point is that this inventory relies on emission factors instead of direct emission measurements. As a result, updates to data and methodology mean that emission totals change. This will be discussed below.

2023 GHG Emissions

Table ES.2 in the Summary Report presents emissions for different sectors and different greenhouse gases. There are four Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sectors and there are four sectoral reports for energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, forestry and land use, and waste. The table also includes United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) totals that use the “conventional accounting used by other governments, applies a 100-year GWP (IPCC 2014), omits biogenic CO2, and does not include emissions outside of New York State.” These are the only data that can be compared to other jurisdictions.

In my recent post I claimed that the 2030 40% emission reduction target was impossible. According to the Final DEC Part 496 regulation, 1990 emissions were 409.78 MMTCO₂e. I used DEC’s 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report, covering data through 2022, that revealed that New York emissions as of 2022 were 371.08 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO₂e) from Table ES.2 in the 2024 report. Using these numbers NYS had only achieved a 9.3% reduction in gross GHG emissions from 1990 levels. Table ES.2 in the 2025 report states that NY emissions were 354.06 MMTCO₂e) at the end of 2023.

2030 40% Reduction Mandate

The Climate Act requires a 40% reduction of GHG emissions by 2030. Table 1 compares the current GHG inventories performance relative to th4 40% reduction mandate. At the end of 2023 the reductions since 1990 using the Part 496 state limit were only 14% lower. The fact that 2022 had slightly higher emissions reinforces the observation that the 2030 goal is impossible.

Table 1: Statewide GHG Emission Inventory Report Emissions Relative to Climate Act 2030 Mandate (mmt CO2e GWP20)

Emission Reduction Trend

The 2025 GHG Report describes emission trends:

Total statewide gross emissions in 2023 were 14.8% below 1990 and 24.5% below 2005 levels, when assessed using CLCPA accounting and the most up-to-date methodologies. Figure ES.1 shows overall trends in statewide emissions by gas on an annual basis, including gross and net emission totals, as well as the emission limits for 2030 and 2050 pursuant to ECL § 75-0107 and 6 NYCRR Part 496. Statewide emissions are 13.6% below the 1990 baseline used in the Part 496 regulation. Statewide emissions for 2020 are also described in this report but are not representative of historic nor current conditions due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Currently, the data for Figure ES.1 are not available. When it becomes available, I will dive into the trends. In the meantime, Table 3 extracts individual trend tables from each of the sectoral reports for energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, forestry and land use, and waste. The only emission categories that have reduced emissions in excess of 40% are the energy “other fossil fuel use” and “electricity transmission” categories but both total only 1% of the inventory. Total emissions increased in the Industrial Process and Product Use Sector “product use” category; the AFOLU Agriculture Emission Sector “livestock” category; and the Waste Sector “waste combustion” and “wastewater” categories. The increases in emissions were in categories that total 14% of the inventory.

Table 3: Summary of Sectoral Emission Trends

Annual Variation of the GHG Emission Inventory

I previously mentioned that 1990 total gross emissions calculated in this analysis were different than the those calculated when the 1990 statewide emission baseline was established by ECL 75-0107 and reflected in 6 NYCRR Part 496. It is important to understand that GHG emission inventories are not based completely on measured emissions. The power plant emissions used in EPA trading programs are based on direct measurements, but the estimates in this inventory are derived using emission factors and estimates of activities such as fuel use or vehicle miles traveled.

Table 3 illustrates how this affects the status relative to the 2030 emission limit. All the emission inventories have estimated a different 1990 value than the regulatory limit in Part 496. The Sum 1990 Gross Total row lists the different numbers. The rest of the table shows how these differences affect the comparison of current emissions to the 2030 limit.

Table 3: Annual Statewide GHG Emission Inventory Report Emissions Relative to Climate Act 2030 Mandate (mmt CO2e GWP20)

The variation in the emissions estimates is significant. The sectoral GHG emission reports list data for 1990, 2005, and the last five years. Table 4 presents the standard deviation and range of observed data for 1990, 2005, and 2019 for the last five reports for different sector emission categories. Note that the total range of variation for 2019 emissions is 12.18 million metric tons of CO₂e. In this report the total 2019 emissions were 367.25 million metric tons of CO₂e so variations in methodology are about 3% of the total estimated emissions.

If you take the time to dive into the details of Table 4 one thing stands out. The main driver of the observed variation range is the estimate for the “out of state energy” category in the energy sector. The 2019 variation range was 13.47 million metric tons of CO₂e.

Table 4: Standard Deviation and Range of Observed Emissions from Last Five GHG Emission Reports

Implications Discussion

There are several implications for the GHG inventory. Most important relates to the Climate Act target for a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 1990 levels by 2030. In 2023 statewide emissions were only 14% lower than 1990 and there is no suggestion that the rate is increasing so this confirms that the achieving the 2030 goal is impossible.

This article quantifies the variation of emissions estimates. This emission inventory relies on emission factors instead of direct emission measurements, so future variations are to be expected. Changes due to reporting sources and improvement of the emission factors used will be a feature of program going forward. The question is how it gets handled. The report notes “The 6 NYCRR Part 496 regulation may be revised at a later date using updated information.” For any affected source trying to determine their control strategy this uncertainty complicates planning. Worse, in the face of changing numbers, New York Cap-and-Invest Program compliance will be more challenging. Finally, when there is a price on carbon, say $10 per ton, the methodology changes will affect millions of dollars of costs.

Finally, I want to emphasize that this report illustrates that New York “follows the science” when it is convenient but ignores the consensus when politically expedient. In particular, the GHG emissions accounting is inconsistent with the UNFCCC. Note that the largest driver of the observed variation in emission estimates across reports is the “out of state energy” category in the energy sector. There are reasons that the UNFCCC methodology does not include upstream emissions and one of them is the challenge of estimating those emissions consistently.

Conclusion

The 2025 GHG emission inventory reports is another warning regarding Climate Act implementation. It is clear that the 2030 GHG emission reduction target cannot be met. There are unacknowledged challenges inherent in the emission inventory approach that will make the Cap-and-Invest program implementation more challenging.

December 2025 New York Cap and Invest Program Update

There have been a couple of developments since my last status update on June 13, 2025 regarding the New York Cap and Invest (NYCI) Program. I previously described the decision issued on Oct. 24, 2025 by the Albany New York Supreme Court. Last week the Hochul Administration appealed the ruling. Last June I described the draft regulation that establishes mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reporting requirements. The final rule has been released. This post describes these items.

I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. I have worked on every market-based program that affected electric generating facilities in New York including the Acid Rain Program, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I follow and write about the RGGI and New York carbon pricing initiatives so my background is particularly suited for NYCI. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan that outlines how to achieve the targets was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.

The CAC’s Scoping Plan recommended a market-based economywide cap-and-invest program. NYCI is supposed to work by setting an annual cap on the amount of greenhouse gas pollution that is permitted to be emitted in New York: “The declining cap ensures annual emissions are reduced, setting the state on a trajectory to meet our greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements of 40% by 2030, and at least 85% from 1990 levels by 2050, as mandated by the Climate Act.” Affected sources purchase permits to emit a ton (also known as allowances) and then surrender them at the end of the year to comply with the rule. As is the case with all aspects of the Climate Act, this approach is not simple and is riddled with complications that make it unlikely that it will work as advocates expect. I have explained that proponent claims that the program will simultaneously raise money, ensure compliance, and be affordable are wishful thinking and have described other concerns on my Carbon Pricing Initiatives page.

To implement the carbon pricing initiative, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) has proposed three regulations: mandatory GHG emissions reporting, a cap-and-invest rule that sets the cap or limit on emissions, and an auction rulemaking that establishes how the allowances will be allocated. The only regulation that was formally proposed this year was the reporting rule.

Court Decision and Order

On Oct. 24, 2025, the New York Supreme Court issued a decision and order in a case pitting environmental organizations against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The decision explained that the Climate Act implementation plan has three steps:

DEC was required to set emission limits for the reduction targets;
The Climate Action Council, “an advisory group made up of 22 members with relevant expertise”, was given two years to prepare a Scoping Plan containing recommendations for “attaining statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits”; and
The DEC was required to issue regulations that would achieve the mandated emissions reductions following the findings of the Scoping Plan.

The State met the first two requirements but the regulations that were supposed to be released by January 1, 2024, were not promulgated. On March 31, 2025, a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging, among other things, that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe.

The Attorney General Office submitted a supplemental letter during the trial stated that argued that promulgating regulations for the Climate Act target would cause “undue harm”. Nonetheless, the judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed.

The latest update is that DEC appealed the decision on November 25, 2025. The table of contents of the argument gives three reasons: mandamus to compel applies only to ministerial acts, promulgation of regulations by the court’s deadline is impossible, and publication of proposed rulemaking by the court’s deadline is impossible. The appeal concludes that “it is impossible for the Department to simultaneously comply with both the Court’s order and its substantive statutory obligations.”

I agree with the claim that it is impossible to comply with the regulation for the reasons given. However, the Judge already ruled that DEC does not have the authority, however persuasive its arguments, not to comply with the law. The law must be changed.

Cap-and-Invest

The press release announcing the finalization of the proposed rule claimed that the data collected will “inform future strategies to reduce pollution”.

New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Amanda Lefton today announced the finalization of regulations establishing a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program. This rule will improve New York State’s understanding of the sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As a result of the rule and reporting mechanism, New York State will know more about the largest polluters in the State, including those affecting disadvantaged communities and other sensitive populations, and will be able to more effectively monitor the State’s progress toward pollution reduction goals. This effort also supports the production of the annual GHG Emissions Report and will protect against anticipated federal rollbacks to ensure New York’s essential air pollution information remains accessible.

As part of the 2025 State of the State Address, Governor Kathy Hochul directed DEC to advance a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program. DEC released draft regulations in March 2025 and received more than 3,000 public comments through July 1, 2025. DEC also offered informational webinars in May to better inform stakeholders’ public comments on the proposal and held hearings in June to collect feedback

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DEC made some changes to the proposal based on comments received that will include additional flexibility for the regulated community. The final regulation extends the verification reporting deadline for the first two years, changed the requirement from three years to one year for reporting from facilities that closed or ceased operations, and clarifies some terms and definitions and better aligns with federal reporting.

DEC’s Mandatory GHG Reporting Program is for data collection only. It does not impose requirements for facilities to reduce GHG pollution or to obtain emission allowances. A facility required to report emissions will annually provide certain GHG emission data and information to DEC starting in June 2027 to reflect the previous year’s emissions. Certain large emission sources will also be required to verify their emissions data report annually using DEC-accredited third-party verification services.

The rule also helps minimize potential reporting requirement costs by utilizing data already required to be reported under existing State and federal requirements and other mandatory reporting programs. In light of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s reconsideration of key federal air quality and GHG regulations, including the U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, DEC’s regulation will also serve as a backstop to ensure the ongoing availability of critical GHG information.

I will follow up with another post on the details of the final rule and the responses to the comments I submitted.

Part 253 Schedule

The rulemaking documents for the adopted regulation is Part 253 – Mandatory GHG Reporting Program are available here. There are so many issues associated with this plan I am going to have to do another post. For this summary just consider one aspect of the schedule. These observations are based on my personal experience reporting emissions in Environmental Protection Agency and DEC market-based programs starting in 1993.

A universal component of reporting requirements is the monitoring Plan. In this regulation the definition states:

Part 253-1.7 Record Keeping (e) GHG Monitoring Plan

(1) The GHG monitoring plan shall include these elements:

(i) identification of positions of responsibility (i.e., job titles) for collection of the emissions data;

(ii) explanation of the processes and methods used to collect the necessary data for the GHG calculations; and

(iii) description of the procedures and methods that are used for quality assurance, maintenance, and repair of all continuous monitoring systems, flow meters, and other instrumentation used to provide data for the GHGs reported under this Part.

The description of the monitoring plan states that affected entities “must submit to the department a GHG monitoring plan by December 31, 2026. Basically this document just describes how the data will be collected and submitted.

However, according to DEC’s Mandatory GHG Reporting website the first Emissions Data Report is due to the Department. Annual emissions reports are due June 1, 2027, and it states that emission data reports and verification statements for the 2026 emissions data year would be due in 2027. For all previous market-based program emission reporting requirements iI have worked on, there was a phase-in period before required reporting started. I did not see any mention of the obvious need for DEC to review and approve the monitoring plans. Part 253-1.7 Record Keeping (e) GHG Monitoring Plan states “Each facility operator or supplier that meets the thresholds in section 1.2(f) of this Part must submit to the department a GHG monitoring plan by December 31, 2026”. Clearly, requiring emission data starting one month after the regulation was finalized, before affected sources can figure out how they will collect the data consistent with the regulation, before they are required to submit a monitoring plan, and before the DEC approves the monitoring plan is inappropriate and very likely subject to litigation.

Discussion

Even though the Court decision said DEC does not have the authority to not follow the law, the Hochul Administration is appealing the decision. This is a transparent ploy to prevent the costs of NYCI affecting the regulation.

The first of three implementing regulations has been promulgated. I will follow up with another post describing the implementation issues that are common throughout the regulation. As I noted in my last NYCI update stakeholders have had trouble interpreting the proposed rules and have found inconsistencies with past practices that will make this program unnecessarily more complicated and time-consuming than necessary. The comments from stakeholders who have the most experience with these programs appear to have been ignored.

Also note that this is the easiest of the three regulations. There are few impactful components of the reporting requirements for the affected sources and almost no impact on the public. All the tough decisions that will be controversial have been delayed until after the next gubernatorial election.

Conclusion

Activists continue to agitate for implementing NYCI faster in the hopes that this magical solution will work as advertised. However, it is not moving quickly despite litigation designed to quicken the pace. The first of the three implementing regulations is out, and the results do not inspire confidence that the other rules will be well written.

New York’s Impossible 2030 GHG Emissions Target

David Wojick recently published an article describing why New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) 2030 GHG emission mandate to reduce New York State 1990 GHG emissions 40% by 2030. This article supplements his article with numbers and additional context.

David Wojick is an independent policy analyst and senior advisor to Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT). As a civil engineer with a Ph.D. in logic and analytic philosophy of science, he brings a unique perspective to complex policy issues. His specializes in science and technology intensive issues. I correspond regularly with him on New York issues.

Supplemental Number for the Article

Wojick’s article is an overview of the challenge and impossibility of the Climate Act 2030 interim GHG emission reduction goal. He explains:

New York Governor Hochul has told the Court her administration cannot write the regulations required to enforce the Climate Act’s 2030 emission reduction targets because they would be infeasible and ruinously expensive to New Yorkers. For all practical purposes, they are actually impossible, so the law must be changed. The legal situation is explained in my article “New York’s climate law hits the wall” here:

He provides a brief qualitative analysis of the impossibility.

The law calls for a 40% reduction in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions from the 1990 levels by 2030. According to state data, the emissions have already been reduced by 10% leaving a whopping 30% to go in just four years.

The Department of Environmental Conservation’s 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report, covering data through 2022, revealed that New York emissions as of 2022 were 371.08 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO₂e) from Table ES.2 in the report. According to the Final Department of Environmental Conservation Part 496 regulation, 1990 emissions were 409.78 MMTCO₂e. Using these numbers NYS has achieved only a 9.3% reduction in gross GHG emissions from 1990 levels.

Table ES-2: 2022 New York State GHG Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by IPCC Sector

Click to access summaryreportnysghgemissionsreport.pdf

Table ES-2 lists data in four CLCPA sector categories. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to describe and summarize these sectors. The Energy sector is the dominant source (75%) of GHG emissions in New York State, accounting for about 282 MMTCO₂e in 2022. The Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU) sector covers emissions from manufacturing processes and the use of manufactured products, accounting for approximately 6% of total gross emissions (24.29 mmt CO₂e in 2022). The

Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) Sector encompasses emissions from agricultural activities, livestock management, and soil practices, as well as carbon sequestration from forests, wetlands, and harvested wood products. In 2022, agricultural emissions totaled 21.49 mmt CO₂e (6% of gross emissions). The Waste sector covers emissions from managing and treating waste materials, accounting for approximately 12% of total gross emissions (43.45 mmt CO₂e in 2022). This sector is unique in New York’s inventory because it includes emissions from waste exported to out-of-state facilities, addressing potential emission leakage.

Wojick describes the reasons for the observed reductions.

Most of the reductions occurred in just two ways that are similar to America as a whole. Foremost, is a switch from coal to natural gas in electric power generation. Second, is the loss of manufacturing, helping to make China the industrial center of the world. Neither of these reduction measures is available or feasible to help hit the remaining 30%.

Table 1 from the Part 496 Revised Regulatory Impact Statement lists 1990 emissions for the CLCPA sectors used in ES-2. The following table has been supplemented with the 2022 observed emissions. Note that there have been reductions in the energy and waste sectors but increases in the IPPU and AFPLU sectors. This supports Wojick’s assertions that observed reductions have come from the energy sector.

Table 1. Total Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1990 by IPCC Sector and Gas, in GWP20.

Click to access revisedris496.pdf

Wojick breaks down the potential for additional emission reductions.

According to EIA, roughly 50% of New York’s energy consumption is from petroleum. About 80% of this is transportation fuel, especially gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. It is clearly impossible to reduce transportation by 30%. In some cases, electrification is technologically feasible, but it cannot possible be done at the needed scale in just four years.

This is especially true given much of the transportation is from out of state vehicles. New York stands between New England and the rest of America, so it gets a huge amount of through traffic.

In addition, an estimated 20% of New York households heat with fuel oil. Winters are very cold, so we are not about to cut that by 30%.

The next biggest source is natural gas, which accounts for about 30% of energy consumption, not counting electricity generation. Roughly 60% of households are heated with natural gas as are most larger buildings, such as apartments, co-ops, offices and stores. Here again, while electrification is theoretically possible, it cannot possibly be done in just four years.

Table ES-3 from the most recent emission inventory lists emissions by economic sector. The type of fuels used are not included but this table supports Wojick’s arguments.

Table ES-3: 2022 New York State GHG Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by Economic Sector

Click to access summaryreportnysghgemissionsreport.pdf

Wojick points out that the Climate Act accounting includes unique provisions to account for imported fuels and imported electricity.

A big extra complication is that the emissions to be reduced by 30% include those out of state emissions created by producing imported electricity and fossil fuels. This might include emissions from things like Texas refineries and Pennsylvania coal fired power plants. New York obviously has no control over these sources.

Here is the Climate Law’s incredible definition of the emissions that need to be reduced: “”Statewide greenhouse gas emissions” means the total annual emissions of greenhouse gases produced within the state from anthropogenic sources and greenhouse gases produced outside of the state that are associated with the generation of electricity imported into the state and the extraction and transmission of fossil fuels imported into the state.”

New York imports almost all of the huge amounts of petroleum and natural gas that it uses. These out of state emissions are likely to be a significant fraction of those that are required to be reduced 30% in just four years.

Plus of course, there are the emissions from electric power generation. Roughly 40% of the natural gas consumed in New York is used to generate electricity. About 54% of the generated electricity is powered by natural gas versus just 15% from renewables, mostly hydro. These numbers can be little changed in just four years.

The sum of the imported fuels and imported electricity category GHG emissions in Table ES-3 is 63 MMT CO₂e or 17% of the total emissions. Those emissions are beyond the control of New York to reduce.

Climate Act Global Warming Potential

There is one aspect of the impossible target not addressed by Wojick. The Climate Act uses a unique GHG accounting methodology. This is a particular problem for me. I used Perplexity AI to provide a summary of the reasons I have described on this blog why I think the use of 20-year global warming potential emissions accounting is inappropriate. The reason that these values are used is because the authors of the Climate Act had an irrational obsession with methane because they thought that the global warming potential of methane is much greater than carbon dioxide. However, as the summary shows, the use of a 20-year global warming potential is scientifically flawed and politically motivated. In brief, the parameter measures the ability of a molecule of a greenhouse gas to reduce long wave radiation (the greenhouse effect) in the laboratory. In the atmosphere where proponents worry about greenhouse effects on global warming, saturation effects, relative impacts on black body radiation and actual concentrations make the global warming potential relative of methane to CO2 insignificant.

Tables ES-2 and ES-3 from the 2024 GHG report list the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) GHG emissions. This is the International Treaty aimed at addressing climate change. It includes established specific guidelines to report and compare emissions data using a global warming potential measured over 100 years instead of the 20 year parameter used in the Climate Act. New York proponents for climate change claim to follow the science but in this instance, they chose to ignore the established science. As a result, it is impossible to track New York’s progress relative to the rest of the world.

As a practical matter the Climate Act accounting increases emissions. In 2022, total GHG emissions using the GWP-20 units were 371.08 MMT CO₂e but are only 192.13 MMT CO₂e using the UNFCC GWP-100 units. Table 2 from the Part 496 Revised Regulatory Impact Statement lists 1990 emissions for the CLCPA sectors used in ES-2. Note that 1990 emissions were 317.92 MMT CO₂e compared to 409.78 MMT CO₂e using GWP-20. Furthermore, when compared to the 2022 emissions total emissions are down 39.6% – very near to the 40% 2030 mandate!

Table 2. Total Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1990 by IPCC Sector and Gas, in GWP100

Click to access revisedris496.pdf

Discussion

Wojick concludes:

New York State cannot cut emissions by the required 30% in just four years, so the 2030 target of the Climate Act is impossible. The legislature must change the law, and the Court has given them until February 6 to do so. After that, the Court says it will impose the Climate Law, which would be incredibly harmful.

When the reported numbers are considered the conclusion that New York State cannot make the 2030 40% GHG emission reduction target is confirmed. However, if the GWP-100 GHG emission accounting methodology is used a 40% reduction from 1990 by 2030 only needs a further 1% reduction from current emissions. There is a caveat to this observation. While this suggests that the 2030 reduction target is possible, the fuel switching and loss of manufacturing emission reductions that were the cause of the observed reductions will not provide significant future reductions. Future reductions will require replacement with zero emissions resources no matter what the accounting methodology. Those strategies are much more difficult and costly.

Although changing the accounting methodology would be a potential political approach to achieve compliance for the Hochul Administration, this is unlikely. In the spring of 2023, her Administration floated the idea of changing the metric undoubtedly because of these numbers. Climate Act activists melted down when that was proposed and the idea was shelved.

In my opinion, Wojick correctly points out that the law must be changed in response to the recent legal decision he referenced. These data are just one of a long list of other reasons that I think that Climate Act implementation should be paused and the lessons learned since 2019 incorporated in a new implementation schedule. I believe that evidence is overwhelming that the aspirational targets should also be modified to include affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions constraints.

Conclusion

David Wojick and I agree that the Climate Act 40% reduction by 2030 target cannot be met using the existing GHG accounting methodology. My numbers confirm everything he said in his article.

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment Implications

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA ) recently announced the completion of its Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment (Zero by 40 Report). The report directly addresses what I think is the biggest reliability risk of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero electric system transition. I previously summarized the report and described the technologies evaluated in a second article. This post describes the implications of the report findings relative to the future of the Climate Act.

I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate a summary of the report used to outline this commentary and to provide references included in this document.

Overview

The current focus of Climate Act implementation is on meeting the interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030 and the all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040 mandate. My previous post provides more background.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated a process to “identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target.” This class of technologies has been dubbed Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR). The Zero by 40 Report responds to that order.

An overview of Climate Act compliance must also consider Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-P (Renewable Energy Program). That law establishes the 70% by 2030 renewable energy mandate and zero-emissions by 2040 target under the Climate Act. It establishes which technologies qualify as “renewable energy systems”. Those technologies include solar thermal, photovoltaics, onshore and offshore wind, hydroelectric, geothermal electric, geothermal ground source heat, tidal energy, wave energy, ocean thermal, and hydrogen fuel cells (excluding fossil fuel-based generation).

There is one other Climate Act consideration. On Oct. 24, 2025, the New York Albany County Supreme Court issued a decision on litigation against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026, or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act modified. At the time of this writing, the Hochul Administration has not indicated how it will respond.

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment

I admit that I was not familiar with the term “technoeconomic”. When I looked it up, I found that there is another similar term “techno-economic analysis”. The difference is relevant. Technoeconomic assessment is an adjective that describes an analysis that includes both technical and economic factors. A techno-economic analysis is a formal process that compares the technical and economic performance that informs decision making. This report is a technoeconomic assessment but what we need is a techno-economic analysis.

The Zero by 40 Report is like the Scoping Plan and Draft Energy Plan because they all address technical and economic factors but do not include a feasibility analysis supporting a particular proposed pathway. None of these reports provide comprehensive, technology-specific cost estimates that would allow direct comparison of technologies to each other and to conventional alternatives. There are also technological considerations that are noted but not resolved in all three reports. A techno-economic analysis would provide the details necessary to determine feasibility of a future system meeting the legal mandates of PSL 66-P.

DEFR Definition

The Zero by 40 Report expands the situations where DEFR technology will be needed to close the gap between available resources and load projections in the zero-emission electric system. Prior to this report, DEFR requirements focused on extended periods during coldest and hottest weather events where there will be insufficient generation from renewable energy systems. This addressed the inconvenient fact that observed peak loads occurred during periods of low renewable resource availability. The additional DEFR concerns noted in the report reflect increased acknowledgment that there is more to a zero-emissions electric system than the technologies listed in PSL 66-P.

In this report the DEFR technologies were classified into three categories:

Low-capacity factor resources that can be deployed during periods of high demand and low renewable generation, offering reliability, fast-ramping capabilities, and no duration limitations, assuming fuel availability, but are not operated as baseload units due to plant economics.

High-capacity factor resources operate the majority of the year and can provide reliable baseload power, including power during challenging events, but are less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops.

Gap-rightsizing resources can help balance supply and demand to adjust the capacity gap. While they do not generate electricity directly, they enhance the utilization of other clean resources.

The original DEFR concern focused only on the peaking hours. The Zero by 40 Report explains that high-capacity factor DEFR is best suited to operate most of the year providing reliable baseload power. The report notes that these technologies can provide power during challenging events, but these resources are “less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops.” This means that to provide the required backup for the PSL 66-P renewable energy systems this category of DEFR will not be used as designed. When resources are used inefficiently it necessarily means higher costs.

Timing Considerations

An important implication is the lack of urgency with this process. The report states that “electric system modeling will be needed to understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions, which falls outside the scope of this study.” The PSC order that directed NYSERDA to address this problem was initiated in May 2023. The Department of Public Service (DPS) convened a two-day technical conference on December 11, 2023, but other than the process that defined “zero emissions” and now the release of this report nothing else happened in this proceeding related to DEFR.

The PSC, New York Independent System Operator and independent analysts all agree that DEFRs are needed. Before we can determine how to implement the Climate Act electric system consistent with PSL 66-P renewable energy resources it is necessary to determine if it is feasible. Every day the plan for DEFR backup is delayed the costs associated with what may be a false solution increase. If there is no viable DEFR solution, then the PSL 66-P renewable energy resources approach cannot be implemented.

There is another timing consideration. The conclusions in the Zero by 40 Report describe actions that can facilitate the readiness of DEFR to achieve the scale needed for 2040. Those actions include:

Pursue a diverse set of resources to minimize the risk of overreliance on individual technologies

Start early to increase the likelihood of readiness by 2040.

Invest in grid-enhancing technologies early to minimize the need for backstop resources.

Invest in innovation to enhance resource viability

Develop strategies across industries for unlocking key resources with infrastructure hurdles.

Engage early with technology developers, end users, and other stakeholders.

Conduct grid modeling to understand tradeoffs of relying on different resources.

Conduct a regular reassessment of options and remain flexible as new technology options come online.

In my opinion, there is very little reason to expect that the required DEFR support will be available in 2040. It is not necessary to spend a lot of time referencing quotes in the Zero by 40 Report supporting that position because these recommended actions support that conclusion. References to early action and the need for innovation are all you need to know that the report implicitly admits the schedule is in doubt. Importantly, if there are delays addressing these recommendations then successful DEFR deployment needed to achieve the 2040 mandate is impossible.

Feasibility

The Zero by 40 Report is proof that DEFR technologies are needed to make the PSL 66-P renewable resource electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. Clearly a feasibility analysis is needed to determine if acceptable DEFR technologies are possible. However, before one can begin, definitions for affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions need to be established because acceptability standards determine “feasibility”.

The New York Albany County Supreme Court decision requires the DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026, or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act modified. Given all the evidence suggesting that the 2030 GHG emission target cannot be met, establishing regulations that cannot be achieved is inappropriate. If DEC goes to the Legislature, then both the schedule and the aspirations of the Act should be reassessed based on what has happened since the Climate Act was enacted. The Zero by 40 Report supports changing the aspirations of the Act.

If there is a reassessment of the Climate Act, then the Legislature should establish definitions for affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions, mandate a feasibility analysis, and require that implementation only proceed if feasibility relative to the constraints is proven. Once implementation begins, status relative to those metrics should be assessed regularly and if the boundary conditions are exceeded, then implementation should be halted.

Discussion

There is a lot of useful information in this report. I did not address the specifics issues associated with the DEFR technologies evaluated. The conclusions in the report support my position that DEFR technologies are not ready to support the PSL 66-P renewable energy resources mandated by politicians.

Importantly, there is still no plan to propose a specific resource mix based on feasibility. The Zero by 40 Report calls for electric system modeling to “understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions” but does not admit that the DEFR technologies might fail a comprehensive feasibility assessment based on affordability, reliability risks, and environmental impacts.

Even if feasible DEFR technologies are found, the Climate Act schedule needs to be re-assessed. This report calls for additional work, but there is no urgency by the PSC to offer a plan to get there. The Order that initiated this report was filed 28 months ago in May 2023. If it takes another 28 months before the recommendations to take early action are evaluated, defined, and implemented that could too late to ensure these resources are available when needed.

Conclusion

This report provides multiple reasons that New York State needs to pause Climate Act implementation. Future action should only proceed if reliability requirements are ensured and this report identifies issues that may make that impossible.

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment – Resource Comparison

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA ) recently announced the completion of its Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment (Zero by 40 Report). The report directly addresses what I think is the biggest reliability risk of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero electric system transition. I summarized the report in my previous post. This is a companion article that does not include the background information in the first article and just compares the technologies evaluated

Overview

The previous post explains that the Zero by 40 report was prepared in response to the Public Service Commission (PSC) recognition that there is a “need for resources to ensure the reliability of the 2040 zero-emissions electric grid mandated by the Climate Act”. A May 2023 Order notes that the Climate Act directs the PSC to establish a program to ensure that the electric sector targets are achieved and explains that “there is a gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technology and expected future system reliability requirements.” It concludes: “This Order responds to the Petition and initiates a process to identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target.” This class of technologies has been dubbed Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR). This Zero by 40 Report responds to that order.

I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate a summary of the report used as an outline and to provide references included in this document.

Technologies Evaluated in the Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment

I had originally planned only a second companion article about the implications to the Climate Act to my summary post but decided that I needed to describe the technologies too. Section 1.4 in the Zero by 40 Report describes the technologies evaluated:

This report evaluates potential resources that can provide firm energy and capacity in a zero-emissions power sector. The study examines seven technology categories that could serve as DEFRs. These technologies are grouped into three resource groups based on their expected operational characteristics. While some resources can be configured to serve different roles, these groupings reflect constraints on costs, emissions, and availability in New York State, which are discussed later in the report.

Low-capacity factor resources can be deployed during periods of high demand and low renewable generation, offering reliability, fast-ramping capabilities, and no duration limitations, assuming fuel availability, but are not operated as baseload units due to plant economics. Low-capacity factor Resources include:

Hydrogen (H₂)

Renewable natural gas (RNG) and renewable diesel (RD)

High-capacity factor resources operate the majority of the year and can provide reliable baseload power, including power during challenging events, but are less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops. High-capacity factor resources include:

Advanced nuclear

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) on thermal plants

Geothermal

Gap-rightsizing resources can help balance supply and demand to adjust the capacity gap. While they do not generate electricity directly, they enhance the utilization of other clean resources. Gap-rightsizing resources include:

Long duration energy storage (LDES) – Note that this refers to interday storage 10-36 hours

Virtual power plants (VPP)

Figure 1 provides an illustrative example of the role of these different DEFR resource groups. While renewables play a significant role in overall power generation, the high-capacity factor resources supplement renewables by providing an additional source of baseload power. Low-capacity factor resources help to meet peak demand when renewables are insufficient. Gap-rightsizing resources can shift generation or load, increasing the value of renewable generation by mitigating intermittency to balance supply with demand.

Figure 1. Role of DEFR Resource Types in Meeting Electricity Demand

Source: New York State Energy and Research Development Authority (NYSERDA). 2025. “Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment, Final Report.” Prepared by Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment

Operational Characteristics

Figure 2 from the Zero by 2040 Report describes the characteristics of the three functional categories. It is instructive to consider these resources relative to three categories of generating resource production over time.

Figure 2. Functional Categories of DEFR Resource Types

Technology Assessment Technologies Summary

Chapter 9 in the Zero by 2040 report compares the potential DEFR technologies. The report uses the following criteria: performance attributes, readiness by 2040, infrastructure and supply chain readiness dynamics, project lead times, emissions and other considerations, cost, and scalability for 2040. Instead of looking at individual technologies the Chapter 9 summary describes the results for the three functional DEFR categories.

The Report describes Low-capacity factor resources as follows:

Low-capacity factor resources offer high flexibility and responsiveness to grid needs. They can be deployed during periods of high demand and low renewable generation, offering reliability and fast-ramping capabilities without duration limitations, assuming fuel availability. These resources are expected to be critical in any future zero-emission grid. However, they are expected to operate for only a limited number of hours per year due to a high operating-to-capital cost ratio, primarily driven by the cost of fuel, as well as fuel availability constraints. The low capacity factor resources evaluated in this study are H2, RNG, and RD.

The Low-Capacity resource summary states:

Low-capacity factor resources are expected to critical in any future zero-emission grid, offering reliability and fast-ramping capabilities on days with the most extreme system needs. Each technology evaluated has advantages and challenges. Infrastructure constraints and high costs may limit the widespread availability of H2 in 2040, but low GHG emissions, especially for green H2, will likely provide value across various industries in 2040 and beyond, making investments in pilot projects and eventual strategic infrastructure deployment important from an economywide perspective.

RNG and RD may be the most viable low-capacity factor resources for 2040 deployment given their technology readiness, existing fuel transport infrastructure, and ability to serve as drop-in fuels in existing plants. However, the combination of feedstock limitations, competition for fuels from other sectors and states, and GHG considerations necessitates limiting their use to low capacity factor applications.

High-capacity resources are described as follows:

High-capacity factor resources operate the majority of the year, providing reliable baseload power. These technologies can meet existing and growing load, reducing the need for both high-cost low-capacity factor DEFRs and some intermittent renewable deployment, often with a lower land footprint on a per-capacity basis. They also typically provide inertia and other ancillary grid services to support a grid increasingly dependent on variable renewables. While they have some ramping capabilities, they are less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops. This analysis compares LLWRs, lwSMRs, non-water-cooled reactors, NG combined cycle plants with 95% carbon capture and storage (CCS), and next-generation geothermal systems.

The High-Capacity resource summary states:

High-capacity factor resources are valuable for meeting existing load and expected load growth. While renewables are projected to supply most of the energy demand in 2040, high-capacity factor resources can provide firm power and grid services that support reliability in a predominantly renewable grid. Their high energy density also helps mitigate potential land-use challenges associated with large-scale renewable deployment. High-capacity factor resources could also reduce the need for low capacity factor resources, which are expensive and mostly idle. However, high-capacity factor resource technologies require long lead times, often 10 years or more. To ensure they are operational by 2040, stakeholders must take early action.

Each technology offers unique advantages and faces specific challenges. From a deployment-readiness perspective, LLWRs and CCS are the most prepared for near-term implementation. However, lwSMRs and non-water-cooled reactors could also become commercially viable by 2040. Geothermal, while promising, has lower readiness and limited scalability in New York State.

Gap-Rightsizing Resources are described as:

Gap-rightsizing resources help balance supply and demand, addressing the firm capacity gap. While these technologies do not generate electricity directly, they enhance the potential of other clean resources. They are expected to have significant value even today due to opportunities for energy arbitrage and infrastructure cost avoidance but will not be sufficient on their own to meet all grid needs due to duration limitations and because they do not generate electricity on their own. This study considers two main categories of Gap-Rightsizing Resources: LDES and VPPs. LDES includes mechanical, electrochemical, and thermal storage technologies. Within each of these buckets are several technologies with a range of attributes.

The Zero by 2040 report does not summarize this category. Both of the gap-rightsizing resources LDES and VPP are largely ready for deployment. Costs for VPP are lower than other technologies but depend on costumer participation which makes availability uncertain. Furthermore, there are limits to the energy potential of this technology. LDES batteries will be more expensive, but “has the potential for longer discharge durations and higher operational certainty, but it is also a net load on the grid due to the need to recharge and round trip efficiency losses.”

Discussion

There are two missing pieces to the path forward for the May 2023 Order. Someday some is going to have make recommendations about these technologies. The PSC needs another order specifying how it intends to “identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target”

The following caveat in Chapter 9 suggests the other component needed to move forward:

Most of the comparison focuses on comparing technologies within three resource groups: low capacity factor resources (hydrogen and biofuels), high capacity factor resources (advanced nuclear, carbon capture and storage, and next-generation geothermal), and gap-rightsizing resources (LDES and VPPs). Because technologies in different resource groups serve different functions, are expected to operate with very different profiles, and provide fundamentally different value to the grid, direct comparisons across resource groups are difficult and can be misleading. Ultimately, electric system modeling will be needed to understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions, which falls outside the scope of this study.

This report says more work is needed. It states that “electric system modeling will be needed to understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions, which falls outside the scope of this study.” In my opinion, it is not just the least-cost mix, but also the mix that minimizes reliability risks and environmental impacts. I think that New Yorkers need to know the impacts of this approach relative to impacts of continued use of fossil fuels, a lower-carbon approach that combines increased use of nuclear energy supplemented with fossil fuels where appropriate, and an all-in approach that uses nuclear as much as possible to reduce GHG emissions as much as possible. This report is committed to a mix of resources that includes massive amounts of wind, solar, and energy storage resources.

I also want to comment on the lack of urgency regarding this initiative. Responsible New York agencies all agree that the new Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR) technologies described in this report are needed to make a solar and wind-reliant electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. Every day that a determination whether there is a viable DEFR approach is delayed means the costs, reliability risks, and environmental impacts associated with a wind and solar potentially false solution increase.

Conclusion

This is another reason that New York State needs to pause Climate Act implementation. The Legislature is required by a court decision to revisit the Climate Act to modify the schedule. It would also be appropriate for the politicians who insisted on this course of action to define affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions that would frame a feasibility analysis be addressed. I further suggest that appropriate metrics be developed that ensure that implementation stops if those boundary conditions are exceeded. New Yorkers need to demand that the politicians who passed the Climate Act become accountable for its impact.

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment Summary

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA ) recently announced the completion of its Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment. This report directly addresses what I think is the biggest reliability risk of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero electric system transition so I believe understanding the implications of the report findings is important. This article provides a summary overview of the report. I will follow up with another post describing the implications.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target by 2050. It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Integration Analysis prepared by NYSERDA and its consultants quantified the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies. After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.

One fundamental flaw in the Climate Act is the mistaken belief by the authors of the law that existing wind, solar, and energy storage would be sufficient and that no new technology would be required. In May 2023 the Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated a process “to examine the need for resources to ensure the reliability of the 2040 zero-emissions electric grid mandated by the Climate Act” that directly contradicted that presumption. The Order notes that the Climate Act directs the PSC to establish a program to ensure that the electric sector targets are achieved. It goes on:

However, several studies indicate that renewable energy resources may not be capable of meeting the full range of electric system reliability needs that will arise as fossil generation is replaced. These studies suggest that there is a gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technology and expected future system reliability requirements.

The Order concludes: “This Order responds to the Petition and initiates a process to identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target.” This report responds to that order.

Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment

The announcement for the study stated:

NYSERDA is pleased to share that following yearslong thorough, deliberative analysis in partnership with State agency staff, it has completed its Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment, which is intended to help inform the State’s assessment of the readiness and timing for the introduction of new technologies. The Assessment has been filed with the New York State Public Service Commission to inform stakeholders engaged in the Commission’s proceeding investigating different technologies that could contribute to a zero-emission electricity system.

This article will summarize the report. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate a summary of the report and provide references included in this document.

The study was prepared by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) under contract to NYSERDA.

The NYSERDA Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment evaluates technologies needed for New York’s goal of a zero-emissions electric grid by 2040. NYSERDA and Department of Public Service staff “provided guidance, review, and strategic prioritization for this project.”

The Summary of the report gives a good overview. I have annotated the following quotes from the Summary below.

The Summary explains the reason for the report:

In May 2023, the New York State (NYS) Public Service Commission (PSC) issued an order initiating a process “to identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of [New York State’s] Zero Emission by 2040 target.” New York State has engaged in this process by conducting a study to evaluate candidate technologies that could close the gap.

The authors of the Climate Act relied on analyses that used a simplistic model of the electric system to conclude that no new technologies would be needed. The Summary describes the nuances not considered by the Climate Act authors:

A 2040 zero-emission grid will require resources with a mix of attributes to maintain reliability requirements. These include resources that can provide energy and capacity for long durations, that are dispatchable and flexible with quick-start and fast ramping capabilities over multiple starts in a day, and that can provide inertial response, frequency control, dynamic reactive control, and high short circuit current contribution to the grid. Every resource does not need to provide every attribute, but the grid needs enough of each to maintain reliability.

Meeting these needs will require a diverse set of resources. This includes intermittent zero-emission energy resources such as solar and land-based and offshore wind, short-duration energy storage, legacy resources like hydropower and existing nuclear, dispatchable emissions free resources (DEFRs), transmission infrastructure, and other technologies that can provide grid services, like grid-forming (GFM) inverters. This report focuses on DEFRs.

The Summary describes the technologies evaluated in the report:

This report evaluates seven candidate DEFR technology categories that could provide clean, firm power to the NYS grid to achieve a zero-emissions power sector. The candidate resources include hydrogen, biofuels (such as renewable natural gas [RNG] and renewable diesel [RD]), advanced nuclear, carbon capture and storage on thermal power plants, next-generation geothermal, long-duration energy storage (LDES), and virtual power plants (VPPs).

The next paragraph in the Summary describes the problem. In my opinion, the statements also reveal the bias of the EPRI authors and the guidance from NYSERDA and DPS. There is no consideration of the potential finding that nothing might be affordable and technically feasible within the constraints of the Climate Act. The report is skewed towards optimism that technologies can solve this challenge within the constraints of a net-zero grid.

Given that these technologies are not currently deployed at scale, each is expected to require a varying degree of innovation and deployment support. However, all of these technologies can still contribute usefully to the grid, and any present challenges faced by an individual technology should not exclude it from consideration. Even as certain technologies may see structural deployment obstacles in some regions—for example, near urban settings—smaller and more targeted deployments remain possible.

I had difficulty interpreting the following paragraph. I think it ranks the options. Things like hydrogen that require pipelines and fuel storage facilities are less preferable than the other options.

To continue reliably serving New York State’s energy needs, the State will need to deploy resources with more limited infrastructure barriers in the near term. Technologies that require significant infrastructure build, such as new pipelines, fuel storage facilities, and additional transmission, add costs and complexity. Therefore, resources with fewer infrastructure needs will play a crucial role in reliably and cost-effectively providing zero-emission electricity.

The next paragraph supports my belief that they are ranking the options.

Each resource has characteristics that make it better suited for some use cases over others. Figures S-1 and S-2 show how these candidate resources were classified for comparison in this report. This classification is based on resource performance, as well as technology-specific supply, cost, and emission constraints that could affect availability. This resource classification approach is a simplification—in some configurations, technologies could fit into multiple classes.

I think Figure S-2 has important ramifications. However, if I started to address these categories it would make this document too long. I will hold off further discussion for a subsequent post.

Technologies Evaluated

The report assesses seven candidate DEFR technologies based on performance, readiness, emissions, costs, and other factors:

Hydrogen: Explored for use in combustion turbines and fuel cells. This was the place holder DEFR technology in the Scoping Plan.
Biofuels: Recognized for near-term availability but limited by supply constraints.
Advanced Nuclear: Including small modular reactors (SMRs), noted for high-capacity factors and flexibility in meeting energy demands.
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS): Evaluated for its potential to reduce emissions while utilizing existing fossil-fuel infrastructure.
Next-Generation Geothermal: Assessed for its capability to provide clean, firm power generation.
Long-Duration Energy Storage (LDES): Essential for addressing extended periods of low renewable output, beyond typical battery durations.
Virtual Power Plants (VPPs): Aggregated distributed energy resources that enhance grid flexibility and capacity.

Zero by 2050 Report Conclusions

In this summary article I will just list the conclusion highlights.

A 2040 zero-emission grid will require a mix of attributes to maintain reliability requirements, and meeting these needs will require diverse resources.
A mix of DEFR technologies within and across resource categories will best meet statewide needs, maximize benefits, and minimize the risk associated with overreliance on any one resource. The following three categories were identified:
Low capacity factor DEFR with fast ramping capabilities will play a vital role on days with the most extreme system needs and will be needed throughout New York State. Potential resources such as hydrogen and biofuels are expected to be needed throughout the State to support the grid during peaking events, but each type of fuel faces distinct geographic limitations and cost challenges.
High capacity factor DEFR can help meet growing loads, reduce the need for buildout of some intermittent renewables and mostly idle peaking plants, diversify the energy mix, and provide inertia and other critical grid services to support a grid increasingly dependent on variable renewables. Potential resources such as nuclear, Natural Gas combustion paired with carbon capture, and geothermal can increase energy diversity while meeting load growth, but projects face geographic limitations, high and uncertain capital costs per project, and timeline challenges.
Gap-rightsizing DEFR can balance supply and demand, reduce the need for upgrades to transmission and distribution infrastructure, and provide benefits to consumers even today. Regional variability may require different solutions in different locations. Potential resources such as VPPs and LDES can provide valuable support in balancing supply and demand and reducing infrastructure buildout needs, but they have inherent duration limitations.

The report described actions that can facilitate the readiness of these resources to achieve the scale needed for 2040.

Pursue a diverse set of resources to minimize the risk of overreliance on individual technologies.
Start early to increase the likelihood of readiness by 2040.
Invest in grid-enhancing technologies early to minimize the need for backstop resources.
Invest in innovation to enhance resource viability.
Develop strategies across industries for unlocking key resources with infrastructure hurdles.
Engage early with technology developers, end users, and other stakeholders.
Conduct grid modeling to understand tradeoffs of relying on different resources.
Conduct a regular assessment of options and remain flexible as new technology options come online.

Discussion

I think this report is a good first step towards addressing “the need for resources to ensure the reliability of the 2040 zero-emissions electric grid mandated by the Climate Act.” The question now is where do we go from here? Just like the Scoping Plan and the Draft Energy Plan, this document lists different technologies and their characteristics but does not include a feasibility analysis suitable for putting together an actual implementation plan. The Public Service Commission must propose a plan that can guide implementation, project the potential costs, and propose a realistic timeline. The Legislature should then revise the Climate Act to comply with those requirements.

I think there is a major issue with this report. The document is full of statements that when viewed objectively indicate that the schedule of the Climate Act is not realistic. That calls out for a re-assessment of the Climate Act itself. What is missing is that the authors did not address the presumption that an electric system reliant upon weather-dependent wind and solar resources can safely and affordably prevent a blackout during the worst-case renewable resource drought. I will address my arguments that this is not possible in my next post. In the meantime, I described the challenges just defining the worst case in a filing earlier this year.

Conclusion

In a rational world, New York politicians would announce that they wanted to develop regulations to achieve a zero emissions electric grid and then go to the organizations in New York responsible for the electric system and ask them for a plan. This report should be a component of a future plan to achieve zero emissions. There still is no feasibility analysis, comprehensive estimate of the costs, or realistic timeline to achieve the 2040 zero emissions goal. Instead, we have a Climate Act mandate to achieve a zero-emission electric grid by 2040 because the New York Legislature naively believed it was only a matter of political will. It is long past time that the Public Service Commission should break away from the ideology and admit that the Climate Act schedule and aspiration needs to be revisited.

Initial Thoughts on Energy Planning Board Meeting on 13 November 2025

Yesterday I published a post that described my thoughts about today’s State Energy Planning Board meeting that discussed public comments on the Draft State Energy Plan document. This post describes my initial thoughts about the meeting and compares my predictions for the outcome.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Energy Plan Overview

According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

I have provided background information and a list of previous articles on my Energy Plan page.

Meeting Overview

There were three items on the agenda: approval of last meeting minutes, discuss public comments on the Draft Energy Plan, and consider any new business. As has been the case for previous meetings Chair Doreen Harris added an Update on the status of the net-zero transition.

The highlight of the update discussion was not what was mentioned but what was not mentioned. I did not make a copy of the first slide that included impacts of Federal rollbacks on New York’s clean energy industry where it was mentioned that “reporting has estimated that more than 6,200 jobs and $2.5B in investments have been lost or delayed in 2025 due to the Trump administration’s energy policies.” Harris put in a plug for Governor Hochul’s $1 billion Sustainable Future Program. The following slide shows where the money is allocated.

Harris described the renewable directive and energy solicitation.

Harris also mentioned that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) approved required permits for the proposed Northeast Supply Enhancement (NESE) pipeline project, that the Constitution pipeline application was withdrawn, and that the air permit for the Greenidge crypto mining facility had been approved. There also were a couple of slides for statewide updates.

That covers what was mentioned in the Update. Conspicuous by its absence, there was no mention of the Supreme Court decision described in yesterday’s post. On Oct. 24, 2025, New York Albany Supreme Court issued a decision in a case brought by environmental organizations that sued the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed. Importantly, the Attorney General Office supplemental letter submitted during the trial stated that the Climate Act target would cause “undue harm”:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

In my opinion, the fact that the Attorney General said this is unaffordable and the Judge said they need to consider changing the law is important information relative to the Energy Plan so it was inappropriate to exclude this as part of the update.

Public Comment Discussions

My previous article highlighted four issues that I thought should be addressed in the discussion of the public comments. Unfortunately, the presentations gave no indication whatsoever that individual comments would be addressed. I will follow up with another post that describes the presentation specifics. For this post I will only describe my initial impression relative to issues raised yesterday.

In my first oral comments I stated that unless the process includes stakeholder meetings that give the public to ask clarifying questions and there is a commitment to document the response to all comments submitted, the stakeholder process will have no credibility. The fact that people asked for more meetings was mentioned during the meeting but no reason that they did not hold them was given. My suggestions for changes to make the comment process credible were ignored.

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) comments included recommendations that are sure to infuriate proponents of the Climate Act. They say that we are not ready to retire existing fossil-fired generating plants, the necessary resources to replace them will not be ready any time soon so we need to build new fossil-fired units, and maintaining existing nuclear facilities is necessary. I was very disappointed that the discussion of comments was just an overview and that the impression given was that the greater number of comments supporting a particular position the greater the value of the comment. NYISO had some unique opinions and there was no acknowledgement of their positions relative to others on things like the need to keep fossil fired infrastructure in place.

I submitted comments that described significant problems with the Health Benefits Analysis chapter including over-simplification of the air quality analysis used to predict health impacts, failure to correctly verify the new model used, claiming health benefits when there is no observed relationship between annual average PM_2.5 and emergency room visits related to asthma, and suggesting significant benefits when the effects are much less than the observed inter-annual variation. Another characteristic of the NYSERDA description of comments was that there was no indication that any of the numbers in the Draft Plan or Pathways Analysis were incorrect anywhere. The Energy Planning Board can only assume that the NYSERDA work is infallible and above reproach.

I also submitted comments that described why New York is not ready to eliminate the use of natural gas. I addressed natural gas use for transportation, unacknowledged advantages for natural gas used for electric generation, arbitrary permitting decisions that have blocked necessary infrastructure projects, and the use at peaking power plants that provide critical reliability support. As I will show in a subsequent post, this topic was popular. The following slide exemplifies the briefing approach as it only shows themes of the comments. There is nothing explicit in this to suggest a link to my concerns. I want to make the point that I never heard the word feasibility in any of the presentations. NYISO says you need natural gas but “others urge leaning further into renewables, energy storage, electrification, and/or the efficient use of energy to reduce reliance on fossil fuels. How will this contradiction get resolved?

Discussion

When the meeting materials are released, I will follow up with more observations on the comments. However, it is probably a waste of time because this process is not credible. While there are some indications that reality is dawning on the Hochul Administration, these presentations show that NYSERDA, undoubtedly at the behest of the Administration, is using the Energy Plan process to fulfill an obligation and further their energy agenda. Unfortunately for the Governor there is a loud faction of her party that demand doubling down on renewable energy resources at the same time reality is showing that simply will not work. This tradeoff colors everything related to energy policy. It appears that the Administration is going to try to placate both sides by not taking public positions on controversial issues.

All signs are that NYSERDA did not use the Energy Plan as an opportunity to consider the implications of the observed transition and improve the transition going forward. There is no indication that there will be any attempt to meaningfully engage with stakeholders and address feasibility.

Conclusion

The Energy Plan should be based on energy and physical reality. Unfortunately, there are clean energy ideologues who cannot accept that their presumptions are indefensible relative to those standards. Sooner or later this conflict must be resolved, and it will cause political fallout for the Governor. Holding the safety of the citizens of New York hostage for political gain will not end well.

Predictions for 13 November 2025 Energy Planning Board Meeting

On July 23, 2025, the Draft Energy Plan was released for comment and comments were due on October 6, 2025. On November 13 the State Energy Planning Board will meet to discuss public comments on the Draft document. I predict that the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) will avoid specifics and only describe the comments received in general terms. I have no expectations that NYSERDA will provide a summary of comments received or document how comments submitted were treated. The Draft Energy Plan also has addressed affordability, but it is not clear how that will be treated going forward. I will publish a summary soon after the meeting to verify my prediction.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Energy Plan Overview

According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

I have provided background information and a list of previous articles on my Energy Plan page. While there are some indications that reality is dawning on the Hochul Administration, the process has not given me a lot of confidence that those concerns will be addressed sufficiently. My biggest concerns are whether the Hochul Administration will use the Energy Plan process as an opportunity to consider the implications of the observed transition so far and if the advice of stakeholders in its stakeholder process will be treated as an opportunity to improve the transition or an obligation with no attempt to meaningfully engage with any comments inconsistent with the narrative.

Supreme Court Decision

There is another interesting angle to this meeting. I recently described the Oct. 24, 2025, New York Albany Supreme Court decision as a fork in the road. Multiple environmental organizations sued the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed. There has been no indication yet how this will be addressed.

This is relevant to the resolution of the Draft Energy Plan because during the legal process the State submitted a letter that addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Act. The letter argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

The biggest question for the State Energy Planning Board discuss of the resolution of the Draft Energy Plan is how this acknowledged affordability issue will be addressed.

Resolution of My Comments

My Energy Plan page lists 6 articles describing the Pathways Analysis that provided quantitative information for the Draft Energy Plan and 18 more articles about comments on the Plan. Here are some highlights that I will be watching for

I submitted comments that described significant problems with the Health Benefits Analysis chapter including over-simplification of the air quality analysis used to predict health impacts, failure to correctly verify the new model used, claiming health benefits when there is no observed relationship between annual average PM_2.5 and emergency room visits related to asthma, and suggesting significant benefits when the effects are much less than the observed inter-annual variation. This makes the Draft plan claims of benefits invalid. Will the final energy plan acknowledge this?

In my first oral comments I stated that unless the process includes stakeholder meetings that give the public to ask clarifying questions and there is a commitment to document the response to all comments submitted, the stakeholder process will have no credibility. NYSERDA never held a stakeholder meeting, and I doubt that the comment responses will be documented.

Discussion

This will be interesting. Despite my pessimism that NYSERDA will meaningfully respond to all stakeholder input, the meeting’s discussion of affordability relative to the position of the Attorney General’s supplemental letter will be fascinating. I also wonder if they will acknowledge that something must be done relative to the judge’s decision. In the best case, they will describe a path forward.

Stay tuned.

Climate Act Energy Affordability

Although proponents of the net-zero transition in New York and elsewhere continue to claim that building wind and solar energy resources is the cheapest resource, reality is catching up. If this is true, then why aren’t electricity bills going down? I believe that affordability is the biggest challenge for the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero transition mandate. This post addresses affordability and risks that proponents who claim it is cheaper ignore.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Lessons for an Energy Affordability Agenda

A recent article by Lauren Teixeira at the Ecomodernist Blog examines the affordability of renewable energy relying heavily on a new study from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) by Ryan Wiser, Eric O’Shaughnessy, Galen Barbose, Peter Cappers, and Will Gorman (LBNL Report). The LBNL Report examined state-level trends in U.S. retail electricity prices. There is a wide range of state-level trends.

The LBNL Report and Teixeira emphasize that there are many facts affecting electricity prices. Teixeira explains that the LBNL Report distinguishes between market-driven renewables, which show a statistically insignificant negative effect on prices, and policy-mandated renewables that are linked to significant price increases. The LBNL Report found that generation mix effects are not the biggest drivers of electricity prices. Instead, the key factors driving price increases include utility infrastructure spending, load dynamics and factors like utility spending on wildfire mitigation are more influential on electricity prices.

There is an important finding relative to the Climate Act. The abstract for the LBNL Report notes:

States with the greatest price increases typically exhibited shrinking customer loads—partially linked to growth in behind-the-meter solar and end-use energy efficiency—and had renewables portfolio standards (RPS) that required additional renewable energy supply. By contrast, the 75 percent of recent utility-scale wind and solar deployment that occurred outside Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) programs had no broadly discernible positive impact on retail prices and had suggestive (weak) evidence of reducing prices over the most recent time periods.

This is an unacknowledged implementation constraint for the Climate Act. States with favorable renewable resources, like Texas, can lower prices without mandates but New York’s comparatively poor resources face higher costs because more capacity must be installed to produce the same amount of power, additional energy storage is required, and more transmission must be built for the greater capacity development. As a result, it is unlikely that renewable energy could ever be cheaper.

If affordability is a priority, Teixeira advocates removing subsidies and policies favoring specific energy sources with a focus on market efficiency. That is the fundamental problem with the Climate Act energy transition. The Climate Act requires subsidies and includes mandates for specific energy technologies. The article criticizes simplified narratives in the renewable energy debate, arguing for a nuanced understanding of the interactions between generation types, policies, and geographic factors. Given the importance of energy affordability she calls for a shift from technology advocacy to a focus on consumer affordability, recognizing the trade-offs inherent in energy policy.

There is one other aspect of Teixeira’s article that is relevant to the New York discussion. State agencies have claimed that renewable energy is cheaper because of lower price volatility. Teixeira’s explains that the merit order effect impacts that claim. The merit order effect explains how electricity prices are determined by the marginal costs of power plants, with cheaper sources like wind and solar being dispatched first. As a result, renewables, having near-zero marginal costs post-construction, push out more expensive fossil fuel generators, leading to lower wholesale electricity prices. However, without adequate energy storage in poor resource locations, it is impossible to push out fossil resources so it may be necessary to eventually subsidize them. In the short term, as renewable energy increases supply during peak periods, it shifts the supply curve, reducing prices for all generators due to marginal pricing. However, that means the costs necessary to support the resources that come on line during the worst peak periods must be secured during the peaks. That means that price volatility during peaks will be higher as a feature not a bug of the system.

Teixeira claims that the costs of solar and wind energy have dramatically decreased, with solar prices dropping by 88% since 2009. She notes that while renewables can lower prices, they may also lead to “price cannibalization,” where excess renewable generation during high output periods can depress prices, sometimes resulting in negative pricing. Parker Gallant explains how this led to Ontario ratepayers coughing up $14 million in two days. Finally, she argues that falling battery storage costs are expected to mitigate these challenges, enhancing the viability of renewables. I disagree with her expectation that renewables can be viable if the underlying resources are weak like New York.

In my opinion, the LBNL Report and Teixeira both miss the effect of what I think is the intractable problem associated with dark doldrums. Dark doldrums are extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. The LBNL report analyzed 24 years of U.S. data and found that states with higher renewable energy penetration see lower electricity price increases over time. However, that reduction in prices does not account for the reliability risks of infrequent prolonged periods of low renewable resource availability. Using Texas as an example, while they have great wind and solar resources on average, in February 2021, the Texas electric grid failed to provide sufficient energy when it was needed. The storm and accompanying dark doldrum was the worst energy infrastructure failure in Texas history 4.5 million homes and residences were without power, at least 246 people died, and total damages were at least $195 billion. Apologists for renewables claim the disaster was caused because other resources did not cover the lack of wind and solar. In my opinion, electric market pricing must reflect the fact that wind and solar are intermittent and that the costs for backup during the worst periods should reflect that requirement. Proponents claim that renewables act as fuel-saving resources that reduce the operational need for costly gas and coal plants and that results in system-wide savings for consumers. However, if insufficient investments are made in backup resources, current policies are risking catastrophic blackouts that will wipe out all the savings and directly lead to injuries and death.

State Supplemental Letter

Even the New York State Attorney General office agrees that the current Climate Act implementation schedule will lead to infeasible costs. On Oct. 24, 2025, the New York Albany Supreme Court ruled that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) failed to implement regulations necessary to comply with the Climate Act mandates. During the legal process the State submitted a letter that addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Act. The letter argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

Discussion

It is no longer possible to argue that New York can afford to implement the Climate Act mandates. The State Attorney General’s office argued that meeting the 2030 emission reduction mandate was infeasible. The LBNL Report found that States like New York that have RPS that require additional renewable energy supply but do not have adequate renewable energy resource potential for those resources to be developed without subsidies have seen and will continue to see higher retail energy prices.

Consistent with the Draft State Energy Plan, the LBNL Report found that renewable energy deployment was not the primary driver of increased electric prices. The LBNL Report noted price increases were associated with load dynamics, extreme weather, natural disasters, and wildfires contributed to sizable price increases in some states. The Draft State Energy Plan argued that electric energy prices increased because of infrastructure investment requirements, transmission system expansion, and distribution system upgrades as well as increasing loads.

However, there is no question that energy affordability is a problem. Governor Hochul has expressed concerns about the affordability impacts of Climate Act implementation, stating worries about costs and “collateral damage” to New York families. I have long argued that components of New York Public Service Law Section 66-p (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” should be considered because it includes safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability. § 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. The increase in arrears metric is an indirect indicator of affordability and I have shown that there has been a significant increase in arrears since Climate Act implementation began.

Even if Climate Act costs are not the primary driver of retail electric price increases can we afford to continue the net-zero transition? New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990. Anything we do is subsumed by increases elsewhere so that this is just political theater that negatively impacts those least able to afford energy increases.

Conclusion

The Attorney General office says compliance with 2030 emission reduction mandates is infeasible. The LBNL Report suggests that states like New York that have policies that mandate renewable deployment but have renewable resources that require subsidies will increase costs. Clearly, it is time for the New York Legislature to revisit the Climate Act and establish affordability metrics to protect New Yorkers.