Category: Reasons to Pause Climate Act

Christopher Walsh’s latest article in the Easthampton Star, South Fork Wind’s Electricity Generation Proves Reliable repeats claims from the developer that the facility provides reliable energy.  An infographic prepared for the U.S. Department of War’s Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency, defines malinformation as  sabotage because it is based on fact but is used out of context to mislead, harm, or manipulate.  Walsh’s article is based on fact but the information presented is used out of context to mislead readers into believing that the South Fork offshore wind facility provided reliable electric generation to the grid during this winter’s extreme period. 

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes a specific target for 9,000 MW of offshore wind capacity by 2035.   

Ørsted’s South Fork Wind is the only New York operational offshore wind facility.  It has 12 turbines with 132 MW of capacity.  There are two other New York offshore wind facilities under construction but both had work suspended in December when the Trump administration issued a stop-work order suspending the lease. A federal judge issued a temporary injunction in January 2026 allowing construction to resume while the legal case proceeds.

​Empire Wind 1 (810 MW), developed by Equinor, is the first offshore wind project that will deliver power directly into New York City.  The project was approximately 60% complete when work was suspended. Empire Wind aims to deliver first electricity by late 2026 and reach commercial operation by 2027.  Supporting transmission support is proceeding.  As of late 2025, export cable installation was actively underway. Equinor reported that trenching, cable-laying, and cable pulling were ongoing on the outer continental shelf, and the export cable was brought onshore in 2025. The onshore substation at SBMT was under construction with transformer delivery completed in early 2025. An offshore substation was scheduled for installation in early 2026.

Sunrise Wind (924 MW), developed by Ørsted, also suspended work in December but work was cleared to resume in early February.  Approximately 44 of 84 monopile foundations were installed, and the HVDC offshore substation arrived from Norway and was installed in September 2025. The project is expected to be completed and operational in 2027. It is the first U.S. offshore wind project to use High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission, which reduces the number of cables needed and improves efficiency.  As of December 2025, onshore transmission work — including the converter station and duct bank — was over 90% complete. Offshore, the export cable was being tunneled through the surf zone (at 11–60 ft deep), with nearshore installation to follow.

The prices for offshore wind are significantly higher than land-based renewables.  Empire Wind 1 and Sunrise Wind contracts were repriced by the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSEDA) in early 2024 to prevent cancellation.  Their combined weighted average price is $150.15/MWh.  The 2024 NYSERDA Tier 1 solicitation average strike price was $94.73 for 23 projects totaling ~3.5GW.  That makes the offshore wind costs 59% higher.

Clearly, the Climate Act mandate for 9,000 MW of offshore wind is in jeopardy.  The question is whether that is a bad thing or not.  Walsh’s article argues that it is a bad thing.

“Reliable” South Fork Wind

Christopher Walsh’s article in the Easthampton Star, South Fork Wind’s Electricity Generation Proves Reliable is quoted below with my annotations.  

As the Trump administration pledges to appeal all five court rulings that sided with offshore wind farms under construction on the Eastern Seaboard, and Canadian officials call on the industry to shun the United States in favor of the ocean off its shores, developers of South Fork Wind, the nation’s first commercial-scale offshore wind farm, are pointing to its reliable generation of electricity in its second year of operation and during this winter’s extreme cold.

Renewable advocates focus on energy production, but power systems are built around reliability during peak demand. If you look at the grid through the lens of accredited capacity, that is, capacity that can be relied upon during peak demand – instead of average energy, the resource allocations for different technologies look radically different.  This is the energy vs. power capacity distinction that Walsh ignored.

The 12-turbine, 132-megawatt farm, electricity from which makes landfall in Wainscott, achieved a 46.3-percent capacity factor in 2025. “Capacity factor” refers to real-world performance, or the ratio of energy generated versus the maximum theoretical output of an installation running at its full rated capacity around the clock. For offshore wind, typical values are between 20 and 40 percent, reflecting intermittent wind speeds, maintenance downtime, and site efficiency.

In January of this year, South Fork Wind delivered a 52-percent capacity factor, comparable to New York State’s most efficient gas plants. Output at offshore wind farms in the Northeast — South Fork Wind, the smaller Block Island Wind, and Vineyard Wind 1, which is still under construction — is typically at its strongest during winter months, when energy supplies on Long Island are often constrained.

I take exception to the claim that the 52% capacity factor is comparable to gas plants.  If a gas plant was only limited by maintenance downtime  it can easily achieve an 85-percent annual capacity factor but more importantly they can be dispatched by the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) as necessary to match loads including peak load conditions.

The NYISO January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report includes a graph of net statewide wind and solar performance total monthly production and capacity factors (Figure 1).  These data show that the January 2026 monthly capacity factors for all New York State wind facilities was 38%, Behind the Meter (BTM) rooftop solar was 3% and  the Front of the Meter (FTM) utility-scale solar was 6%.  Offshore wind facilities are expected to perform better than onshore wind facilities and this is clearly shown by the South Fork Wind performance.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Monthly Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

The article goes on:

Over the course of 2025, South Fork Wind generated electricity on 99 percent of all days and across 90 percent of all hours, according to its developers, the Danish energy company Orsted and the German company Skyborn Renewables. The developers assert that the wind farm generates electricity sufficient to power 70,000 average-size residences.

These claims have the reliability challenge exactly backwards.  South Fork Wind did not generate electricity on 1 percent of all days or at least 3 whole days and across 10 percent or 876 of all hours.  The problem is that peak loads are commonly associated with high-pressure systems that suppress wind generation.  As a result South Fork Wind was likely unavailable when needed most.

This effect was seen during the January 24 to January 27, 2026 winter storm.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather that caused a peak in the electric load.  Table 1 lists daily extrapolated statewide capacity factors from Figure 2.  Consider January 31 when the statewide capacity factors were BTM solar 2%, FTM solar 9%, and wind 12%.  The total daily renewable energy capacity factor was 10% and only provided 2% of the system’s daily load.  Data from individual facilities are not available but the hourly statewide data indicate that wind capacity was less than 10% for 13 hours including the morning and evening peak loads.

Table 1: Renewable Resource Capacity Factors

Figure 2: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Wind Farm Status

The remainder of the article goes on:

Earlier this month, a federal judge handed the Trump administration a fifth consecutive loss in court challenges to its December 2025 order pausing construction of five wind farms along the East Coast. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction sought by Sunrise Wind L.L.C., another Orsted project, regarding the suspension order issued by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. The move allows the construction of Sunrise Wind in federal waters about 30 miles east of Montauk Point to resume immediately while the underlying lawsuit challenging the administration’s order progresses.

The 924-megawatt wind farm’s export cable is to make landfall at Smith Point County Park in Shirley and is to generate electricity sufficient to power nearly 600,000 residences.

The decision follows successful challenges to the administration’s order by the developers of Empire Wind 1, a 54-turbine, 810-megawatt project being built by the Norwegian company Equinor and which is to send electricity to New York City; Revolution Wind, a joint venture between Orsted and Skyborn that is to send electricity sufficient to power 350,000 residences in Connecticut and Rhode Island; Vineyard Wind 1, jointly developed by Avangrid Renewables and Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, which is nearly complete and has already sent electricity to Massachusetts, and Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind, under development by Dominion Energy.

An Orsted official delivered the statistics on the South Fork Wind farm at the advocacy organization Oceantic Network’s annual International Partnering Forum in Manhattan. It was there that Tim Houston, the premier of Nova Scotia, made a pitch to business executives to invest in offshore wind projects off his province rather than in the United States, where the federal government has repeatedly attempted to kill the nascent offshore wind industry while promoting fossil fuel-derived energy, which scientists say is causing dangerous and accelerating warming of the atmosphere.

“We are a predictable and reliable regulatory jurisdiction,” David MacGregor, associate deputy minister of the Nova Scotia Department of Energy, said at the conference, as quoted in The New Bedford Light, a Massachusetts digital news outlet.

Perhaps demonstrating that the United States under the Trump administration is equally predictable, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum told Bloomberg News that the administration will appeal the five court rulings that thwarted its effort to halt construction of the five offshore wind farms. The administration had cited vague national security concerns, and its December order pausing the wind farms’ construction prompted Gov. Kathy Hochul and the governors of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts to demand that the federal government rescind the order, and prompted the wind farms’ developers to sue the government.

Construction has since resumed on all five wind farms.

In my opinion, the rest of the article is a marketing plea by an offshore wind advocate. I don’t want to waste my time responding.

Discussion

If the New York electric system were to rely primarily on wind, solar, and energy storage then this extended period of light winds, low solar availability, and snow-covered solar panels simply cannot provide the power when needed the most.  State agencies responsible for electric system reliability agree that a new dispatchable, emissions free resource is needed for these periods but admit that there isn’t any such resource available today.  Given that there is no such technology available, proceeding under the assumption that one will magically appear is an enormous risk for reliability. 

New York currently has an energy affordability crisis because as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.  Climate Act costs are already between 8.5 and 13.7% of monthly electric bills. The combined weighted average price revised contracts for the offshore wind projects under construction is $150.15/MWh.  NYISO reports that the average New York wholesale electric price in 2025 was about 74.40 dollars per MWh, up from 41.81 dollars per MWh in 2024.  Those costs do not include the price of dedicated transmission lines to get the energy to where it is needed.  Adding offshore wind at costs double the current cost of electricity will only exacerbate the energy crisis.

Conclusion

Claiming that South Fork Wind is a reliable source of electricity is based on fact but is used out of context to manipulate readers into believing that offshore wind is a viable generating resource for New York’s future.  Offshore wind is the most expensive source of electricity. Continued funding for a resource that cannot provide energy when needed most is a poor investment.

The recent winter storm stressed electric systems across the country. It also offers electric resource planners an opportunity to examine the impacts of future increased use of renewable energy during high-load conditions.  This article takes an initial look at the potential impact of such a weather event on the existing New York renewable resources.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.. 

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

This is a good case study for a New York extreme event that must be addressed by electric system planners.  Although the data are for New York, this is a universal problem.  It is only a matter of degree.

I relied on two sources of New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data for this analysis.  New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  The second source of data is the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report prepared by the NYISO Operating Committee.  I looked at data from January 22-31, 2026 to bound conditions before the storm and after.  Note that the cold weather went into February but the Metrics Report data for February are not available yet.

NYISO Real-Time Fuel Mix

The dashboard real-time fuel mix data includes links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State.  I processed that data to calculate hourly averages.  The generator types include “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind; “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil.

Figure 1 graphs all the fuel mix hourly data and Table 1 summarizes the data. The relative average fuel mix energy provided over these ten days was nuclear 18%, hydro 14%, and fossil fuels 61%.  New York’s efforts to transition to renewables yielded only 7% of the total.  In addition, the wind capacity ranged from 6% of the possible production to 96%, but 25% of the time the production was less than a quarter of possible production.

Figure 1: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix January 22 to January 31, 2026

Table 1: Summary of Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Data Mix January 22 to January 31, 2026

These data do not show the contribution of wind and solar well.  “Other Renewables” includes solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood. The methane, refuse and wood facilities show up as the relatively constant base in Figure 3.  Making the assumption that the 63 MW of energy storage is too small to show up on this graph, that means that the utility-scale “front-of-the-meter” solar shows up as the daily peaks on the first three days.  The snow arrived in New York on the night of 24 January and continued through the next day.  Note that utility solar was essentially zero on the 25^th and did not return to the level of the 22^nd until the 31^st.

Figure 3: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix Other Renewables and Wind January 22 to January 31, 2026

Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

I used the January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report for this analysis.  There is a lot of information in these reports that is relative to the prospects for a successful Climate Act transition.  So much that I am going to defer that discussion for a later post.  For this post I am only going to highlight a couple of results presented in the report.

The report includes a graph of net wind and solar performance total monthly production and capacity factors (Figure 4).  On average the higher solar output in the summer balances out the lower wind resources in the summer.  Winter total renewable resources are lower, and wind does somewhat offset the low solar output. 

Figure 4: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Monthly Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Figure 5 is most important for this analysis because it breaks out the wind, utility-scale solar, also known as Front of the Meter (FTM) solar, and the rooftop top solar, also known as Behind the Meter (BTM) solar total daily production and capacity factors.  Note that these data support the assumption that the daily peaks represent utility-scale production output in Figure 3.  These data show that FTM solar has a higher output than the BTM solar.  There is no question that the January snowstorm severely impacted solar output for days. 

Figure 5: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Table 2 consists of three smaller tables.  On the left,  capacity factors derived from Figure 5 are listed for each day of the episode.  At the top, resource capacity (MW) from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report are listed for solar and wind resources.  The main body of the table lists the calculated renewable daily energy (MWh) for each parameter and the renewable percentage of the total system energy that I calculated using the real-time fuel mix data. 

Table 2: Capacity Factors Derived from Figure 5, Resource Capacity (MW) from Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report, and Calculated Renewable Daily Energy (MWh)

The total renewable output in Table 2 is an important finding.  On average, wind resources counterbalance low winter solar resource availability.  However, during dark doldrums when the wind fails renewable resources plummet.  This storm also shows that the critical renewable resource period is best described as snowy dark doldrums.

Discussion

I contacted NYISO to get the actual data for these parameters but did not get a response.  I have no doubt that NYISO staff will eventually evaluate these data in a similar fashion because of its importance to planning policy.  Their results will only differ in degree but will conclusively show that DEFR is necessary.  They may also show when DEFR is necessary as more renewables come on line and existing dispatchable resources are shut down.

The NYISIO “Gold Book” has noted that New York will become a winter peaking system depending upon the timing and composition of heating electrification.  This will exacerbate the correlation problem between peak loads and dark doldrum low renewable resource availability.  There has not been a similar snowstorm since the deployment of significant amounts of BTM solar in New York City so this is the first unsurprising confirmation that snow can severely impact solar production when the solar panels are installed on flat roofs.

Figure 6: View of BTM Solar in New York City

Conclusion

On January 31, 2026 the total renewable energy production was 2% of the potential amount available.  That was because of the weather conditions.  No amount of additional capacity is going to be able to substantively improve that percentage.  Intermittent, diffuse, and correlated electric generating resources are incompatible with electric system reliability when needed most.

On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.  Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  These results are another indication that it is time to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

On January 28, 2026, the New York State Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding a petition for a hearing to suspend or temporarily modify the Renewable Energy Program. While on one hand I should be celebrating official recognition of something I have long advocated, on the other hand, the timing is problematic.  The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming and this request for comments simply postpones the inevitable hearing.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates.  However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations.  It includes provisions stating that the PSC is empowered to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.  Today’s announcement is the first PSC response to numerous calls to address this requirement.

Announcement

The following is the text of the announcement requesting comments:

The Public Service Commission (Commission) is considering a petition, filed on January 6, 2026 (the Petition), by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) requesting that the Commission hold a hearing, pursuant to Section 66-p of the Public Service Law, to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

The Coalition, which describes itself as a group consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce, and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers, and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council, affirmatively contends that the Renewable Energy Program and its associated renewable energy targets may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service. In support of its request for such a review by the Commission, the Coalition points to information that it claims suggests that the State will not achieve the Climate Act targets that, by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems, and that, by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. The Coalition also suggests the existence of decreasing reliability margins and aging fossil-fueled generation resources, referencing statements by the New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that interested stakeholders are invited to submit comments by March 30, 2026, on the Petition filed by the Coalition.

Comments provided in response to this Notice should reference “Case 15-E-0302.” Comments should be submitted electronically by going to http://www.dps.ny.gov, clicking on “File Search” (located under the heading “Commission Files”), entering “15-E-0302” in the “Search by Case Number” field, and then clicking on the “Post Comments” box located at the top of the page. Those unable to file electronically may mail their comments to the Hon. Michelle L. Phillips, Secretary, New York State Public Service Commission, Three Empire Plaza, Albany, New York 12223-1350; however, electronic filing of comments is strongly encouraged.

Basis for the Hearing Summary

New York Public Service Law § 66-p Section (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” includes safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability.   Section 66-p (4) states:

The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program. 

My recent post summarized multiple independent analyses, audits, litigation findings, and party filings in DPS proceedings that document that the Climate Act transition will exacerbate energy affordability issues such that this PSL 66-P hearing is appropriate.  I also used Perplexity AI to generate a chronology of the recommendations made to hold a hearing that provides an overview of the suggestions for the hearing.

The chronology described three independent pathways to trigger PSL66-p(4) anyone of which  can justify a hearing:

Pathway 1: Reliability – “Program Impedes Safe and Adequate Electric Service”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find that the Renewable Energy Program “impedes” (not merely “risks” or “threatens”) the provision of safe and adequate service.

Evidence Presented:

• NYISO 2024 RNA identifies actionable reliability need in NYC beginning 2033 (17-97 MW deficiency)
• Statewide resource adequacy approaching limits with “no surplus power” remaining by 2034 without further development
• Net capacity loss of 2,000 MW since Climate Act passage (retirements outpacing additions)
• NYISO official statement that emission-free technologies to replace fossil generation “are not yet available on a commercial scale”
• NERC highest-level alert documenting systemic deficiencies in modeling Inverter Based Resources and >15,000 MW of unexpected generation reductions in major events
• Multiple NYISO high-risk scenarios showing NYC deficiency could begin as early as 2025 and grow to >1,000 MW by 2034

Assessment: The reliability evidence is substantial and comes from authoritative technical sources (NYISO, NERC). The case for a hearing under the reliability criterion is strong.

Pathway 2: Contractual – “Program Likely to Impair Existing Obligations”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find the program is “likely” to impair existing obligations and agreements.

Evidence Presented:

• Repowering disincentive: Current Climate Act targets effectively discourage repowering existing facilities because developers face 2040 forced retirement risk, “undermining investment recovery”
• Offshore wind contract renegotiations: Multiple offshore wind developers have sought contract amendments due to changed economic conditions
• Tier 1 REC contract attrition: Biennial Review acknowledged 30% attrition rate in renewable energy contracts

Assessment: The evidence on contractual impairment is moderate. This criterion appears to be less central to the petitioners’ arguments than reliability and affordability.

Pathway 3: Affordability – “Significant Increase in Arrears or Disconnections”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find (1) a “significant” increase in arrears or service disconnections and (2) determine the increase is “related to the program.”

Evidence Presented:

• Statistical significance established: Independent Intervenors demonstrated increases exceeding 2× standard deviation for statewide totals and 4 of 10 utilities
• Magnitude: $1.8 billion in arrears affecting 1.2 million households
• Trend: NMPC 17% increase (33,840 customers), Con Ed 59% increase (173,398 customers)

The Perplexity AI summary also lists two examples of evidence that does not support the claim that need to be explained.  For the “Causation not established”  description the AI program referenced an article written before the latest  DPS annual informational report came out that said it was impossible to determine if increases are “related to the program”.  A more recent report is now available, but DPS staff did not try to link the observed increases to this PSL 66-P requirement so it still is impossible to attribute significant changes to the Climate Act.  The other example gave an alternative explanation for the number of customers in arrears: “Post-pandemic economic impacts, inflation, and energy price increases due to factors beyond Climate Act (e.g., natural gas price volatility, supply chain disruptions)”

The Perplexity AI Assessment description stated:

The affordability evidence meets the first criterion (statistical significance) but cannot satisfy the second criterion (program causation) until DPS provides the mandated cost reporting. This represents a data gap, not necessarily a failure of the substantive argument. A hearing could establish causation through discovery and testimony.

The conclusion in this section notes that the reliability pathway has the strongest evidentiary weight:

Among the three pathways, the reliability criterion presents the most compelling case for a hearing:

• Evidence comes from independent technical authorities (NYISO, NERC) with statutory responsibility for reliability
• Deficiencies are quantified with specific MW shortfalls and timeframes
• High-risk scenarios demonstrate sensitivity to plausible uncertainties
• NYISO’s statement that required technologies “are not yet available on a commercial scale” directly supports finding that the program “impedes” safe and adequate service
• Net capacity loss since Climate Act passage (2,000 MW) demonstrates actual, not theoretical, impact

The affordability criterion faces an evidentiary gap on program causation, though the statistical significance of arrears increases is well-established. Importantly, this gap exists because the PSC/DPS have failed to comply with their own reporting mandates—the very accountability failure the petitioners criticize. 

Discussion

In this discussion I liberally paraphrased the Perplexity AI response. Ultimately, the Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability emerging as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world supply chain, permitting, interconnection, and technological readiness constraints. 

In response to the petitions ACE-NY and WEACT filed a response that urged the PSC to reject the petition suggesting that all progress would stop if the heating was held.  However, the provision for a hearing does not require abandoning climate goals—it authorizes temporary suspension or modification to ensure safe, adequate, and affordable service while the transition continues. This represents pragmatic management, not capitulation.

I have long warned of the consequences if the current aspirational ambition and schedule of the Climate Act is not changed.  The PSC’s decision extends beyond energy policy:

• If reliability suffers, the result could be rolling blackouts, industrial curtailments, and catastrophic economic disruption
• If affordability spirals, the political backlash could undermine not just Climate Act but climate policy more broadly
• If the safety valve remains unused, the precedent may discourage future legislatures from including adaptive management mechanisms in ambitious policy frameworks

Conclusion

Clearly it is no longer possible for the Hochul Administration to ignore the adverse impacts of Climate Act Implementation.  I have long argued that PSL 66-P was a logical excuse to reconsider the ramifications of the Climate Act so I should be happy that the potential of this requirement has been recognized at last.

However, this response is more evidence that the Climate Act has always been more about political catering to constituencies than about saving the planet. The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming so I believe that the PSC should have moved to hold the hearing at this time.  That would infuriate the proponents of the Climate Act that Hochul needs for her re-election campaign.  This request for comments pushes the hearing and any decision related to the hearing beyond the election next November.  The question is whether New Yorkers will catch on that the Hochul Administration is risking reliability and affordability in an effort to appease Climate Act proponents.

Stay tuned because there I will undoubtedly be writing about this more before the comments are due,

David Wojick recently published an article describing why New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) 2030 GHG emission mandate to reduce New York State 1990 GHG emissions 40% by 2030.  This article supplements his article with numbers and additional context.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

David Wojick is an independent policy analyst and senior advisor to Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT). As a civil engineer with a Ph.D. in logic and analytic philosophy of science, he brings a unique perspective to complex policy issues. His specializes in science and technology intensive issues.  I correspond regularly with him on New York issues.

Supplemental Number for the Article

Wojick’s article is an overview of the challenge and impossibility of the Climate Act 2030 interim GHG emission reduction goal. He explains:

New York Governor Hochul has told the Court her administration cannot write the regulations required to enforce the Climate Act’s 2030 emission reduction targets because they would be infeasible and ruinously expensive to New Yorkers. For all practical purposes, they are actually impossible, so the law must be changed. The legal situation is explained in my article “New York’s climate law hits the wall” here:

He provides a brief qualitative analysis of the impossibility.

The law calls for a 40% reduction in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions from the 1990 levels by 2030. According to state data, the emissions have already been reduced by 10% leaving a whopping 30% to go in just four years.

The Department of Environmental Conservation’s 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report, covering data through 2022, revealed that New York emissions as of 2022 were 371.08 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO₂e) from Table ES.2 in the report.  According to the Final Department of Environmental Conservation Part 496 regulation, 1990 emissions were 409.78 MMTCO₂e.  Using these numbers NYS has achieved only a 9.3% reduction in gross GHG emissions from 1990 levels.

Table ES-2: 2022 New York State GHG Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by IPCC Sector

Click to access summaryreportnysghgemissionsreport.pdf

Table ES-2 lists data in four CLCPA sector categories.  I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to describe and summarize these sectors.  The Energy sector is the dominant source (75%) of GHG emissions in New York State, accounting for about 282 MMTCO₂e in 2022. The Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU) sector covers emissions from manufacturing processes and the use of manufactured products, accounting for approximately 6% of total gross emissions (24.29 mmt CO₂e in 2022).  The

Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) Sector encompasses emissions from agricultural activities, livestock management, and soil practices, as well as carbon sequestration from forests, wetlands, and harvested wood products. In 2022, agricultural emissions totaled 21.49 mmt CO₂e (6% of gross emissions).  The Waste sector covers emissions from managing and treating waste materials, accounting for approximately 12% of total gross emissions (43.45 mmt CO₂e in 2022). This sector is unique in New York’s inventory because it includes emissions from waste exported to out-of-state facilities, addressing potential emission leakage.

Wojick describes the reasons for the observed reductions. 

Most of the reductions occurred in just two ways that are similar to America as a whole. Foremost, is a switch from coal to natural gas in electric power generation. Second, is the loss of manufacturing, helping to make China the industrial center of the world. Neither of these reduction measures is available or feasible to help hit the remaining 30%.

Table 1 from the Part 496 Revised Regulatory Impact Statement lists 1990 emissions for the CLCPA sectors used in ES-2.  The following table has been supplemented with the 2022 observed emissions.  Note that there have been reductions in the energy and waste sectors but increases in the IPPU and AFPLU sectors.   This supports Wojick’s assertions that observed reductions have come from the energy sector.

Table 1. Total Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1990 by IPCC Sector and Gas, in GWP20.

Click to access revisedris496.pdf

Wojick breaks down the potential for additional emission reductions.

According to EIA, roughly 50% of New York’s energy consumption is from petroleum. About 80% of this is transportation fuel, especially gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. It is clearly impossible to reduce transportation by 30%. In some cases, electrification is technologically feasible, but it cannot possible be done at the needed scale in just four years.

This is especially true given much of the transportation is from out of state vehicles. New York stands between New England and the rest of America, so it gets a huge amount of through traffic.

In addition, an estimated 20% of New York households heat with fuel oil. Winters are very cold, so we are not about to cut that by 30%.

The next biggest source is natural gas, which accounts for about 30% of energy consumption, not counting electricity generation. Roughly 60% of households are heated with natural gas as are most larger buildings, such as apartments, co-ops, offices and stores. Here again, while electrification is theoretically possible, it cannot possibly be done in just four years.

Table ES-3 from the most recent emission inventory lists emissions by economic sector.  The type of fuels used are not included but this table supports Wojick’s arguments.

Table ES-3: 2022 New York State GHG Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by Economic Sector

Click to access summaryreportnysghgemissionsreport.pdf

Wojick points out that the Climate Act accounting includes unique provisions to account for imported fuels and imported electricity.

A big extra complication is that the emissions to be reduced by 30% include those out of state emissions created by producing imported electricity and fossil fuels. This might include emissions from things like Texas refineries and Pennsylvania coal fired power plants. New York obviously has no control over these sources.

Here is the Climate Law’s incredible definition of the emissions that need to be reduced: “”Statewide greenhouse gas emissions” means the total annual emissions of greenhouse gases produced within the state from anthropogenic sources and greenhouse gases produced outside of the state that are associated with the generation of electricity imported into the state and the extraction and transmission of fossil fuels imported into the state.”

New York imports almost all of the huge amounts of petroleum and natural gas that it uses. These out of state emissions are likely to be a significant fraction of those that are required to be reduced 30% in just four years.

Plus of course, there are the emissions from electric power generation. Roughly 40% of the natural gas consumed in New York is used to generate electricity. About 54% of the generated electricity is powered by natural gas versus just 15% from renewables, mostly hydro. These numbers can be little changed in just four years.

The sum of the imported fuels and imported electricity category GHG emissions in Table ES-3 is 63 MMT CO₂e or 17% of the total emissions.  Those emissions are beyond the control of New York to reduce. 

Climate Act Global Warming Potential

There is one aspect of the impossible target not addressed by Wojick.  The Climate Act uses a unique GHG accounting methodology.  This is a particular problem for me. I used Perplexity AI to provide a summary of the reasons I have described on this blog why I think the use of 20-year global warming potential emissions accounting is inappropriate.  The reason that these values are used is because the authors of the Climate Act had an irrational obsession with methane because they thought that the global warming potential of methane is much greater than carbon dioxide.  However, as the summary shows, the use of a 20-year global warming potential is scientifically flawed and politically motivated. ​In brief, the parameter measures the ability of a molecule of a greenhouse gas to reduce long wave radiation (the greenhouse effect) in the laboratory.  In the atmosphere where proponents worry about greenhouse effects on global warming, saturation effects, relative impacts on black body radiation and actual concentrations make the global warming potential relative of methane to CO2 insignificant.

Tables ES-2 and ES-3 from the 2024 GHG report list the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) GHG emissions.  This is the International Treaty aimed at addressing climate change.  It includes established specific guidelines to report and compare emissions data using a global warming potential measured over 100 years instead of the 20 year parameter used in the Climate Act.  New York proponents for climate change claim to follow the science but in this instance, they chose to ignore the established science.  As a result, it is impossible to track New York’s progress relative to the rest of the world.

As a practical matter the Climate Act accounting increases emissions.  In 2022, total GHG emissions using the GWP-20 units were 371.08 MMT CO₂e but are only 192.13 MMT CO₂e using the UNFCC GWP-100 units. Table 2 from the Part 496 Revised Regulatory Impact Statement lists 1990 emissions for the CLCPA sectors used in ES-2.  Note that 1990 emissions were 317.92 MMT CO₂e compared to 409.78 MMT CO₂e using GWP-20.  Furthermore, when compared to the 2022 emissions total emissions are down 39.6% – very near to the 40% 2030 mandate!

Table 2. Total Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1990 by IPCC Sector and Gas, in GWP100

Click to access revisedris496.pdf

Discussion

Wojick concludes:

New York State cannot cut emissions by the required 30% in just four years, so the 2030 target of the Climate Act is impossible. The legislature must change the law, and the Court has given them until February 6 to do so. After that, the Court says it will impose the Climate Law, which would be incredibly harmful.

When the reported numbers are considered the conclusion that New York State cannot make the 2030 40% GHG emission reduction target is confirmed.  However, if the GWP-100 GHG emission accounting methodology is used a 40% reduction from 1990 by 2030 only needs a further 1% reduction from current emissions.  There is a caveat to this observation.  While this suggests that the 2030 reduction target is possible, the fuel switching and loss of manufacturing emission reductions that were the cause of the observed reductions will not provide significant future reductions.  Future reductions will require replacement with zero emissions resources no matter what the accounting methodology.  Those strategies are much more difficult and costly.

Although changing the accounting methodology would be a potential political approach to achieve compliance for the Hochul Administration, this is unlikely.  In the spring of 2023, her Administration floated the idea of changing the metric undoubtedly because of these numbers.  Climate Act activists melted down when that was proposed and the idea was shelved.

In my opinion, Wojick correctly points out that the law must be changed in response to the recent legal decision he referenced.  These data are just one of a long list of other reasons that I think that Climate Act implementation should be paused and the lessons learned since 2019 incorporated in a new implementation schedule.  I believe that evidence is overwhelming that the aspirational targets should also be modified to include affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions constraints.

Conclusion

David Wojick and I agree that the Climate Act 40% reduction by 2030 target cannot be met using the existing GHG accounting methodology.  My numbers confirm everything he said in his article.