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Time to Reconsider the Climate Act Press Release

UPDATE: Two weeks after this was published I can safely now say that nobody I contacted responded. I thought that showing that $593 per month in added energy expenses would have prompted some kind of response.

A recent court decision and findings presented at the 1 December 2025 State Energy Planning (SEP) Board meeting present overwhelming evidence that implementing the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act)  as mandated will be unaffordable and the 2030 CLCPA 40% emission reduction target and 70% renewable energy in the electric system mandate will not be achieved.  I don’t think that most New Yorkers are aware of the Climate Act much less its potential impacts, so I prepared a press release that I distributed to various New York press outlets explaining why it is time to reconsider the Climate Act.   This article documents the findings included in the press release and refers to recent articles published on this blog.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two interim 2030 targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy and GHG emissions must be reduced 40%.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantified the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation. 

Note there is a second implementation law.  Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a renewable energy program, that requires the Public Service Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 electric system Climate Act requirements.  

Energy Plan Overview

In 2025 another overarching evaluation of the energy system was initiated.  According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) released the Draft Energy Plan last summer.  Stakeholder comments were accepted until early October.  The Energy Planning Board has the responsibility to approve the document. At the November 13, 2025 Board meeting there was a perfunctory description of the comments received.  There was another meeting on December 1 that presented results from additional analyses.  During the wrap up for the latest meeting Chair Doreen Harris said the Board will meet later this month to approve the plan. I have provided background information and a list of relevant articles on my Energy Plan page

Court Decision

On Oct. 24, 2025, there was an Albany County New York Supreme Court decision ordering the Department of Environmental Conservation to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.   On November 3, I published an article providing detailed information about the decision. 

In another article I explained that during the legal process the State submitted a letter that addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Act.”  The letter argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”. 

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

The Judge acknowledged that this information was relevant but ruled that DEC must promulgate regulations implementing a law however persuasive their arguments it is inappropriate are. The Hochul Administration and DEC appealed the decision on November 25, 2025 claiming that “it is impossible for the Department to simultaneously comply with both the Court’s order and its substantive statutory obligations.” 

Energy Affordability

In addition to the Attorney General’s supplemental letter arguing that the Climate Act is unaffordable, there were findings presented at the State Energy Planning (SEP) Board meeting on December 1, 2025 that present extraordinary cost estimates.  My article on the Energy Affordability presentation at the meeting documents the projections for a moderate-income household in Upstate New York that uses natural gas.  My article found the difference between replacement of conventional existing equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment necessary for CLCPA compliance increases monthly average energy expenditures $593 when capital costs are considered. That number was in a slide but there was only passing mention of the cost.

I derived explanatory numbers from information presented at the SEP Board meeting.  The following energy affordability analysis slide summarizes the projection approach.  It explains that for eleven household profiles, NYSERDA evaluated future household and transportation energy expenditures for four cases involving different technology mixes and fuel types.  These “Illustrative Household Journeys” include:

  • Starting Point: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with average existing equipment
  • Conventional Replacement: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with new, more efficient equipment
  • Moderate Efficient Electrification: Some electrification of heating and transportation, with basic building envelope efficiency measures
  • High Efficient Electrification: More electrification of heating and transportation, with basic or medium building envelope efficiency measures, and efficient electric appliances

Slides were presented that describe the four journeys for several profiles.   My numbers were derived from the typical Upstate moderate-income household that uses natural gas for heat household profile.  This was the only profile that included all the information needed to project total cost.  In the following slide,  three projected “household journeys” reduce monthly energy expenditures relative to the current starting point.  However, buried at the bottom of the page is the notation that these values are “Average monthly expenditures. Does not include equipment costs”. 

It turns out that including equipment costs makes a difference as shown in the next slide.

I extracted information from these slides to prepare Table 1.  Rows 1-4 list the monthly energy expenditures with the total in row 5 from the first slide.  The increase in efficiency decreases monthly energy costs for all three journeys but that changes when CapEx is considered.  The CapEx monthly total cost in row 6 is available on the second slide.  However, the breakdown between the costs of a new plugin hybrid electric vehicle (moderate electrification) in row 7 and a battery electric vehicle (high efficiency electrification) relative to home energy electrification row 8 is not listed on the included slides.  I estimated the percentage of home electrification from the size of the blue bars on the right side of the second slide. (Row 10). When the CapEx costs are included all the projected alternative journeys are more expensive.  Row 9 lists the total monthly energy costs including the costs of equipment from the second slide.  The cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment.  Row 12 lists the $593 difference  necessary for Climate Act compliance and row 11 lists the 43% increase in energy costs. 

Table 1: Upstate New York Moderate Income Household That Uses Natural Gas for Heat Projected Monthly Costs and Costs Necessary to Comply with the Climate Act

The affordability messaging is embedded in this table.  I prepared an annotated transcript for this presentation that includes a heading for questions made during the meeting with a link to each person who commented or asked a question. I believe that this presentation and the questions asked was scripted to further the messaging of the Administration.  Chair Doreen Harris of the Energy Planning Board asked NYSERDA presenter James Wilcox about energy price uncertainty.  He admitted that the key driver of change over the next five years is “change in energy price”.  The modeling shows that this could increase household energy spending 3% to 8% in the starting point base case but could go up to as much as 14% to 19% even if they do nothing.  Chair Harris elicited a response from him that summarizes the public messaging: “That is what I was trying to elicit: What does doing nothing get you?”  Even if you do nothing costs could rise as much as 19%.  That is misleading because the equipment costs are the main causes of future cost not changes in energy prices.

The presentations emphasized that Climate Act costs are not the primary energy cost increase driver and that multiple factors beyond climate policy contribute to expected costs.  The other implementation cost message in the NYSERDA presentations is that the additional costs to meet the Climate Act mandates are smaller than expected cost increases.  This table quantifies that claim.  If this example household replaces its internal combustion car with another one and replaces household appliances with natural gas appliances total costs will go up $868 from $506 to $1,374.  The cost to meet the Climate Act mandates beyond conventional replacement is “only”  $593 more which is less than the cost of conventional replacement. 

I think the magnitude of these impacts are being downplayed as much as possible.  After I published my analysis I went to the Draft Energy Plan supporting documentation page and reviewed the Energy Affordability Outputs and Input Data spreadsheet.  The equipment costs are only provided as a sensitivity for one household. I think that this is by design because these costs are so extraordinary.  I believe these numbers indicate a serious energy affordability crisis is coming.  In my opinion, including an additional 43% cost increase is unconscionable.  New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.  New York cannot solve global warming by itself. 

Implementation Timing

I summarized my initial thoughts about the Pathways Analysis presentation at the December SEP Planning Board meeting.  The presentation found that neither the CLCPA 40% GHG emission reduction target nor the electric system 70% renewable energy mandate would be achieved on time.  The “Key Takeaways (3/3)” Slide (#31) in the meeting presentation states that “the state is currently not on track to meet the 2030 emission limit – Current Policies is estimated to hit 40% reduction in 2038 while Additional Action is estimated to hit 40% reduction in 2037.” 

The Electric Sector Results: Additional Action slide (#21) states that “Pace of additions leads to delayed achievement of 70% renewable to 2036-2040”.

Discussion

The Court Decision and the Energy Plan findings are not the only reasons given by state agencies that it would be appropriate to reconsider the Climate Act.  I described three other findings in an article last month. The New York State Comptroller Office audit of the NYSERDA and PSC  implementation efforts for the Climate Act was an early acknowledgement that the implementation plan needs to be revised.  The Public Service Commission (PSC) compared the renewable energy deployment progress relative to the Climate Act goal to obtain 70% of New York’s electricity from renewable sources by 2030. The final Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review Report document found that 2030 goal will likely not be achieved until 2033.  Finally, The Second Informational Report prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff described four feasibility concerns: the 2030 renewable energy target is “likely unattainable”, offshore wind faces major obstacles, transmission remains a “critical bottleneck”, and grid reliability challenges are mounting

There have been other recent articles arguing that New York has impossible targets.  David Wojick recently published an article explaining implementation issues that I backed up with observed data.  Tom Shepstone describes a New York Post editorial that cites a Progressive Policy Institute article that calls the Climate Act an “undeniable” failure.

These findings should inspire the Hochul Administration to amend the  Climate Act.  It is troubling that the SEP Board meeting presentations did not mention these ramifications in the presentation.  Furthermore, there has been no sign that the Hochul Administration or the majority leadership in the Legislature are amenable to considering amendments to the Climate Act.

Conclusion

I was motivated to publish this and distribute it to the media because these findings have significant implications for the future New York energy system.  In the near term, something must be done to reconcile the reality that the CLCPA schedule is too ambitious to have any hope of compliance.  More importantly, the findings described should become the basis for a discussion of more New Yorkers.  As it stands now New York energy policy is being guided by a small but extremely vocal and motivated constituency that does not understand the physics of the energy system.  Thomas Sowell has been quoted as saying: “It is hard to imagine a more stupid or more dangerous way of making decisions than by putting those decisions in the hands of people who pay no price for being wrong”.  In this instance, there is nothing more stupid or dangerous than ignoring the people who will pay the price if there are problems with the energy system.

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Climate Act Fork in the Road

I recently described the Oct. 24, 2025,  New York Albany Supreme Court decision pitting environmental organizations against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC).  The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed.  I have argued for months that there are so many issues coming up with the schedule and ambition of the Climate Act that it is obvious that we need to pause implementation and consider modifications to the Climate Act.  This post summarizes the findings by the State of New York that support that position.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

For this overview of New York State findings, I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.

Court Decision

The most important reason that the Legislature should consider revisions to the Climate Act is the recent court case.  Environmental organizations initiated this lawsuit because the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) did not promulgate regulations as mandated by the Climate Act.  The State agued that regulations were inappropriate but Judge Schreibman’s decision stated that:

DEC does not have the discretion to say no or to decide that it has the authority to choose not to follow the express legislative directive at issue. Under our system of separation of powers, upon concluding, based on its subject-matter expertise, that achieving the goals of the Climate Act might be “infeasible” for the reasons stated, DEC had two options. One, it could issue compliant regulations anyway, and let the chips fall where they may for the State’s political actors. Or, two, it could raise its concerns to the Legislature so that the State’s elected representatives could make a determination about what costs their constituents can or cannot bear in the pursuit of reining in climate change.

This decision should prompt the Legislature to address the concerns raised by DEC.  Furthermore, there are other State analyses that indicate that changes are in order as described below.

State Supplemental Letter

As part of the legal wrangling associated with the trial Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted further correspondence related to the litigation.  The State’s submittal  addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’s (the Climate Act) goals in a timely manner.” 

The State of New York argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.  The following paragraph concedes that there are significant upfront cost issues that out-weigh other benefits.

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

Comptroller Audit

The New York State Comptroller Office audit of the NYSERDA and PSC  implementation efforts for the Climate Act was an early acknowledgement that the implementation plan needs to be revised.  The report titled Climate Act Goals – Planning, Procurements, and Progress Tracking (“Comptroller Report”) found issues that question the current plan.  The Perplexity AI summary concludes that “the audit reveals critical deficiencies in planning, cost assessment, risk management, and progress tracking” and notes that “With outdated data, calculation errors, project cancellations, technology limitations, transmission constraints, and escalating costs all threatening goal achievement, the audit calls for immediate action to improve planning and transparency.”

Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review

The Public Service Commission (PSC) released the draft  Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review Report (“Biennial Report”) in July 2024.  It compares the renewable energy deployment progress relative to the Climate Act goal to obtain 70% of New York’s electricity from renewable sources by 2030 (the 70% goal). The final document found that 2030 goal will likely not be achieved until 2033. The Perplexity AI summary describes seven key factors impeding progress.

  1. Global economic pressures,
  2. Transmission system inadequacies,
  3. Interconnection delays,
  4. Capacity accreditation changes,
  5. Federal policy uncertainty,
  6. Siting and permitting complexity, and
  7. Increasing electric load.

All these factors are part of the lessons learned since the implementation of the Climate Act that began five years ago.  I think this shows that the Legislature needs to address the schedule and ambition of the law.

Second Informational Report

The Climate Act requires the Department of Public Service (DPS) to prepare an annual report as described in the following slide from the presentation that summarizes the report. 

The Second Informational Report (Report) prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff “focuses on Commission actions from January 2023 through August 2025, and includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.”  According to the Perplexity AI summary there are four feasibility concerns: the 2030 renewable energy target is “likely unattainable”, offshore wind faces major obstacles, transmission remains a “critical bottleneck”, and grid reliability challenges are mounting.  There also are cost trajectory concerns.  Despite the report’s careful messaging—”emphasizing that CLCPA costs are not the primary bill driver and that multiple factors beyond climate policy contribute to rate increases” – it cannot hide the magnitude of the challenges to meet the Climate Act requirements schedule. 

Draft State Energy Plan

The Energy Plan process is currently underway.  The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) is processing stakeholder comments on the draft document for the Energy Planning Board to consider when it decides whether to approve the draft.  I recently highlighted New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) comments on the Draft Energy Plan recommendations.  There are six extensive quotations from the Draft Energy Plan that NYISO supports that represent previously unacknowledged concerns about the Climate Act ambition and schedule:

  1. The State will need to be strategic about the pace of combustion unit retirements and/or replacement
  2. Combustion generating units will remain essential parts of electric grid reliability and affordability. Retirement of these units will not be able to occur until resources that provide the same grid reliability attributes are put in place.
  3. A primary challenge for New York’s energy system is its advancing age, which creates unique risks for reliability.
  4. The State will need to be strategic in identifying and integrating clean firm technologies that have the attributes necessary to support the achievement of a zero emissions electric grid by 2040.
  5. For the electricity system, continue to incorporate the impacts of climate change into future reliability planning scenarios.
  6. Consider whether the current reliability-related metrics should be supplemented given the evolving nature of the grid and increased risks of high-impact reliability events

The Perplexity AI summary concludes that:

The 2025 Draft State Energy Plan represents New York’s effort to reconcile the CLCPA’s statutory mandates with economic, technical, and political realities that have emerged since 2019. By acknowledging that key deadlines will be missed while maintaining long-term decarbonization objectives, the plan shifts from aspirational targets to pragmatic pathways.

Discussion

Judge Schreibman’s decision is very straightforward.  The law says that regulations must be promulgated to meet the Climate Act mandates so DEC must either do that or get the Legislature to modify the law.  If the Hochul Administration cynically appeals the decision, it is simply a politically-motivated delaying tactic to kick the resolution off until after the gubernatorial primary and state-wide election in late 2026.  Because there is so much evidence that the schedule and ambition of the law are infeasible, the Legislature should address the law, however unpopular lessons learned reality will be to the environmentalist community.

Bill Gates recently argued that climate change is not going to wipe out humanity and that we need to “put human welfare at the center of our climate strategies.”.   That is another argument for modifying the Climate Act.  Even if the premise of the Climate Act that human emissions of greenhouse gases is a primary driver of observed warming is true, New York cannot solve climate change by itself.  New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.

In my opinion, the best way to proceed is to modify the law.  Revisions should couple a revised Climate Act schedule with clearly defined standards for affordability, reliability, and environmental impacts.  A trackable metric for each should be developed and a tracking system put in place.  The key point is that the law should be modified so that there are requirements to modify the mandates when those metrics are exceeded.  In short, the safety valve provisions of Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P should be modified and incorporated into the Climate Act. 

The process to establish these metrics should incorporate extensive public participation.  New Yorkers need to understand the range of costs, impacts on personal choice, and changes to lifestyles that are buried in the Scoping Plan and Energy Plan.  If the safety valve metrics have reasonable limits, I expect that affordability, reliability, and environmental impact targets will be exceeded as soon as tracking begins.   That is the point.  Eliminating fossil fuels sounds has been portrayed as simple and cheap but the reality is very different.  Accepting that and developing a new way forward is necessary.

Conclusion

There is overwhelming evidence that something must give in the energy transition.  The Climate Act has always been about politics and money. The authors of the Climate Act mistakenly believed that the energy transition would be simple and cheap.  Experience shows otherwise.  It is long past time for the politicians to revisit the Climate Act and make the proposed energy transition accountable.  Unfortunately, there is a politically connected constituency that is dependent upon the status quo for their business plans.

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Attention New Visitors

The articles on this blog reflect my background as an environmental and energy analyst in the electric utility business.  Writing on behalf of industry requires documentation and backup for anything submitted as part of a regulatory proceeding.  Articles here provide that information so that readers have enough information to decide whether what I say is and is not true. .  However, it also means the posts can be dense, long, and include technical jargon. 

If you are interested in the material but do not want to wade everything in the posts, there is an alternative.  I prepare a fortnightly summary of posts that describes my recent posts with minimal technical jargon and includes links if you want to read the entire post.

If that is of interest there are two options.  For an email edition you can sign up by contacting me via the contact link at the top of this page or by sending an email to NYpragmaticenvironmentalist@gmail.com . The other option is to subscribe to my Substack where I publish a copy of the summary.  Click on this summary and there is an option to subscribe to future summaries.  

Ellenbogen on Utility Scale Lithium Based Energy Storage System Issues

This post describes a recently completed white paper by Richard Ellenbogen  M.E.E. titled The Intrinsic Danger of Siting Utility Scale Lithium Based Energy Storage Systems In Densely Populated Areas.  Ellenbogen and I collaborated on an article about the potential impacts of a fire like the Moss Battery Plant fire if it were to occur in New York City.  This report finds that the local conditions at the proposed large Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) facility at 220 Rabro Drive, Hauppauge, NY would magnify the impacts of a BESS fire in Nassau and Suffolk counties.  The following two sections are lightly edited direct quotes from the report.

Executive Summary

This report was written at the request of the Hauppauge Fire Department because of their concerns about a proposed large Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) facility at 111 Rabro Drive. This would be located within 3500 feet of an elementary school, a much less than ideal siting for such a volatile and potentially dangerous facility.

Research on that issue revealed, in addition, that the proposed location is close to streams and has a high water table. In a location with these characteristics, a lithium-ion battery fire, of the type that frequently has occurred at BESS facilities, could produce long-term, catastrophic environmental damage. This is in addition to the more immediate, very serious threat to people and structures at the school and in nearby neighborhoods from heat and toxic gases in the event of a fire. The body of this report explains these threats in detail and also provides background that shows why the occurrence of fire at a BESS facility, like the one proposed, presents such a high level of risk. The readers should be aware in reading this report, that the author received no compensation or payment in kind for the research and writing, but willingly invested the hundreds of hours of work required for its preparation strictly as a result of his great concern for the Hauppauge community, Nassau and Suffolk Counties, the downstate region, and the State of New York in general, inspired by the high level of threat and risk arising from the proposed BESS facility. The report is designed to be read on a network connected device and is arranged with hyperlinks providing backup documentation for each issue should readers wish to learn more about the statements made within.

Introduction

Utility scale electrical energy storage has been a recognized need in the New York Metropolitan Area for over sixty years. For example, Con Ed first proposed the Storm King Mountain Pumped Storage facility in the early 1960’s to address this. However, that facility was never built because of potentially negative environmental impacts and community opposition. However, the need for energy storage has not gone away and has recently been exacerbated by a growing trend toward electrification to reduce carbon emissions, along with several years of state energy policies that have left the New York state critically short of electric generation.

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) recently released their 2025 – 2034 Reliability Study that determined that electric generation capacity margins could go below zero as early as 2027 with the risk increasing even more each year through 2034. Figure 1 from page 10 of that document clearly shows the problem.

This crisis has resulted from state policies, many associated with New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (CLCPA), that have blocked the construction or retooling of new gas generation plants for the past seven years, while simultaneously closing a 2 Gigawatt nuclear plant without having a viable operating alternative to replace the lost energy. As a result, NY State officials are moving hastily to find solutions to bridge the gaps. Among these hasty measures, the consequences of which do not seem to have been carefully thought out, is the proposed development and addition to its electrical grid of a number of lithium-ion-battery-based electrical energy storage facilities. To expedite this process, these officials have been attempting to override local zoning laws and their own Department of Environmental Conservation, via the six-year-old Office of Renewable Energy Siting (ORES).

One of these hastily conceived and poorly thought through BESS facilities is proposed for Long Island, within the town of Islip, in Suffolk County. This siting of an intrinsically dangerous BESS facility, in such a densely populated and environmentally sensitive area, having a high water table and close proximity to many streams and the ocean, would seem to defy logic. This is especially true given the very recent catastrophic history of a similar BESS siting at Moss Landing, near Monterey Bay in California.

Figure 1: Plausible Range of Statewide System Generation Margins 2025 – 2034. Source: NYISO 11/2025

Whatever help a BESS facility in Islip might promise for the NY state electrical grid is certainly offset by the risks of such a move and the likelihood of accidents with long-term very negative consequences that would impact millions of people and large geographic areas of the state and its waters. These risks follow from three categories of intrinsic dangerous characteristics of lithium ion batteries and the large number of them housed within a BESS facility. These categories of risks are as follows:

  • Lithium metal, when brought into contact with any water, creates an exothermic reaction that generates a great deal of heat which can drive the batteries into a state of thermal runaway. So Li-ion batteries and BESS facilities that contain them are very subject to fires, especially if they are located near large bodies of water and exposed to significant humidity or moisture. Lithium Batteries can also burst into flame if they overheat and enter thermal runaway under heavy load.
  • Li-ion battery fires are very hot and damaging. They burn at temperatures between 2600 – 5000 degrees-F making these fires, even small ones, very difficult and costly to put out, even if a fire department is well-prepared, which most are not. These fires spread rapidly within a BESS facility, quickly resulting in a conflagration. In addition to the great heat from them, there is release of toxic gases during the fires.
  • In the aftermath of large-scale Li-ion battery fires, there is significant, nearly impossible to remediate environmental pollution of land and water with heavy metals and other toxins. This will be particularly damaging in areas with surface water or a high water table, and particularly on Long Island which has a history of water issues and highly permeable soil..

Sections of this report explain in detail, with reference to each of these risk categories, why siting utility-scale lithium battery facilities in densely populated areas, like Nassau and Suffolk Counties, is a problem, in general. Also, it will be detailed why this is made especially problematic in coastal areas because of the hydrology and soil composition in this part of Long Island, as well as its proximity to the ocean.

Report Sections

The report has four sections: The issues with lithium storage, the aftermath of Moss Landing, negative impacts of ingesting heavy metals, and groundwater leaching issues on Long Island.  I summarized Ellenbogen’s main points below and refer you to the report for more details. 

There are substantive issues associated with lithium energy storage systems.  It is necessary to keep water away from the batteries because lithium is volatile in the presence of water.  Water causes lithium batteries to overheat and enter thermal runaway and catch fire.  These fires are not unusual.  Appendix 1 has a list of the fires, locations, and dates along with a link to the EPRI Battery Storage Fire Database. Once started the fires are so difficult to extinguish that they must left to burn out but during a fire there is release of toxic gases. To reduce the spread of the fire water is used to cool nearby batteries. As a result, in the aftermath of Li-ion battery fires, there is significant heavy metal and other toxin pollution of land and water from the smoke and water used to control the fire.

In another section Ellenbogen describes the aftermath of a BESS fire at Moss Landing California.  On January 16, 2025, the Moss Landing 300 Megawatt – 1200 Megawatt-Hour Vistra BESS facility caught fire.  A description of the fire and its aftermath is provided in Appendix 2.  He explains that researchers from San Jose State had been working in the marshes around Moss Landing since 2018 and had measurements of the levels of certain chemicals in the ground and water around the BESS Site for at least two years prior to the battery fire. Their research on the effects of the fire on the ground and marshes around the BESS Site appear in the document Coastal wetland deposition of cathode metals from the world’s largest lithium-ion battery fire. It is also attached as Appendix 3.  Ellenbogen includes the following quote from the paper:

The 2025 fire at the Moss Landing, California, battery energy storage system (BESS)—the world’s largest—released approximately 55,000 pounds (25 metric tons) of toxic cathode metals (nickel, manganese, cobalt) into surrounding Elkhorn Slough coastal wetlands. This airborne particulate matter formed a thin, widespread layer (<<5 mm) in surface soils, creating a “fingerprint” of the NMC-type batteries.

Environmental Impact: The metals, particularly cobalt and manganese, are toxic to aquatic and terrestrial organisms. They pose risks to the ecosystem by potentially bioaccumulating through the food chain, from small invertebrates to shellfish, crabs, and top predators like sea otters.

Fate of Contaminants: While initially settling in the soil, heavy metals have been mobilized into the estuary through tidal action and rain, spreading the risk beyond the initial deposition zone.

Detection and Monitoring: Researchers from San Jose State University’s Moss Landing Marine Laboratories utilized field-portable X-ray fluorescence (FpXRF) to map the contamination.

Long-Term Concerns: The long-term impacts on the restored tidal marsh ecosystem are under investigation, as the contaminants may cause lasting, subtle damage to the food web.

Ellenbogen also included a section describing the negative impacts of ingesting heavy metals contained in Lithium-Ion batteries.  He used an AI search to ask which health effects are linked to nickel, manganese, and cobalt exposure in soil and water from BESS fire runoff over extremely porous soil with a shallow aquifer.  The response explained: that exposure to nickel, manganese, and cobalt from battery fire runoff in porous soil and shallow aquifers heightens risks due to rapid leaching into groundwater, amplifying ingestion and dermal contact pathways. These metals, common in lithium-ion batteries, can contaminate drinking water and crops, leading to bioaccumulation in the food chain. Health agencies like Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry note that such scenarios mirror industrial pollution patterns where soil pH and redox conditions accelerate mobility.

In his final section Ellenbogen describes the particular issues of local conditions at the proposed large Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) facility on Long Island, NY.  Long Island is a terminal moraine formed during from the melting of the Laurentide ice sheet, specifically the Wisconsin Glacier, around 60,000 years ago.  Ellenbogen explains that Long Island has a long history of water quality issues due to the resulting porous soils and its shallow aquifer which is used to provide its drinking water. A history of Long Island environmental advocacy, initiated by water quality concerns, appears here. There are numerous instances of specialized treatment being given to Long Island regarding chemicals that can leach into the aquifer. A history of chemical bans on Long Island can be found in Appendix 4. His report includes maps of aquifer depths that show that if a fire occurred at the proposed location that it would cause problems from the heavy metals.

Conclusion

Ellenbogen’s conclusion notes that he has no monetary interest either way in Lithium Storage technologies. He views the issue entirely from a perspective of, “Would he want one of these facilities near him based upon what he knows, and if not, why not?”   his analysis leads him to clearly believe that he would not want one located near him.

He believes that if you combine the hazardous emissions and the potential environmental damage, it becomes apparent that the suitable locations for these types of systems have to be restricted to areas where there are very few people and no surface water or ground water. Anything less than that will lead to a high probability of increased public health issues.

Ellenbogen Background

Richard Ellenbogen is the President [BIO] of Allied Converters and frequently copies me on emails that address various issues associated with the New York Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act). I have published other articles by Ellenbogen including a description of his keynote address to the Business Council of New York 2023 Renewable Energy Conference Energy titled: “Energy on Demand as the Life Blood of Business and Entrepreneurship in the State -video here:  Why NY State Must Rethink Its Energy Plan and Ten Suggestions to Help Fix the Problems”. He comes to the table as an engineer who truly cares about the environment and as an early adopter of renewable technologies at both his home and business two decades ago.

Stalling the New York Climate Act Pause Evaluation

On January 28, 2026, the New York State Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding a petition for a hearing to suspend or temporarily modify the Renewable Energy Program. While on one hand I should be celebrating official recognition of something I have long advocated, on the other hand, the timing is problematic.  The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming and this request for comments simply postpones the inevitable hearing.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates.  However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations.  It includes provisions stating that the PSC is empowered to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.  Today’s announcement is the first PSC response to numerous calls to address this requirement.

Announcement

The following is the text of the announcement requesting comments:

The Public Service Commission (Commission) is considering a petition, filed on January 6, 2026 (the Petition), by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) requesting that the Commission hold a hearing, pursuant to Section 66-p of the Public Service Law, to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

The Coalition, which describes itself as a group consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce, and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers, and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council, affirmatively contends that the Renewable Energy Program and its associated renewable energy targets may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service. In support of its request for such a review by the Commission, the Coalition points to information that it claims suggests that the State will not achieve the Climate Act targets that, by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems, and that, by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. The Coalition also suggests the existence of decreasing reliability margins and aging fossil-fueled generation resources, referencing statements by the New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that interested stakeholders are invited to submit comments by March 30, 2026, on the Petition filed by the Coalition.

Comments provided in response to this Notice should reference “Case 15-E-0302.” Comments should be submitted electronically by going to http://www.dps.ny.gov, clicking on “File Search” (located under the heading “Commission Files”), entering “15-E-0302” in the “Search by Case Number” field, and then clicking on the “Post Comments” box located at the top of the page. Those unable to file electronically may mail their comments to the Hon. Michelle L. Phillips, Secretary, New York State Public Service Commission, Three Empire Plaza, Albany, New York 12223-1350; however, electronic filing of comments is strongly encouraged.

Basis for the Hearing Summary

New York Public Service Law § 66-p Section (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” includes safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability.   Section 66-p (4) states:

The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program. 

My recent post summarized multiple independent analyses, audits, litigation findings, and party filings in DPS proceedings that document that the Climate Act transition will exacerbate energy affordability issues such that this PSL 66-P hearing is appropriate.  I also used Perplexity AI to generate a chronology of the recommendations made to hold a hearing that provides an overview of the suggestions for the hearing.

The chronology described three independent pathways to trigger PSL66-p(4) anyone of which  can justify a hearing:

Pathway 1: Reliability – “Program Impedes Safe and Adequate Electric Service”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find that the Renewable Energy Program “impedes” (not merely “risks” or “threatens”) the provision of safe and adequate service.

Evidence Presented:

  • NYISO 2024 RNA identifies actionable reliability need in NYC beginning 2033 (17-97 MW deficiency)
  • Statewide resource adequacy approaching limits with “no surplus power” remaining by 2034 without further development
  • Net capacity loss of 2,000 MW since Climate Act passage (retirements outpacing additions)
  • NYISO official statement that emission-free technologies to replace fossil generation “are not yet available on a commercial scale”
  • NERC highest-level alert documenting systemic deficiencies in modeling Inverter Based Resources and >15,000 MW of unexpected generation reductions in major events
  • Multiple NYISO high-risk scenarios showing NYC deficiency could begin as early as 2025 and grow to >1,000 MW by 2034

Assessment: The reliability evidence is substantial and comes from authoritative technical sources (NYISO, NERC). The case for a hearing under the reliability criterion is strong.

Pathway 2: Contractual – “Program Likely to Impair Existing Obligations”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find the program is “likely” to impair existing obligations and agreements.

Evidence Presented:

  • Repowering disincentive: Current Climate Act targets effectively discourage repowering existing facilities because developers face 2040 forced retirement risk, “undermining investment recovery”
  • Offshore wind contract renegotiations: Multiple offshore wind developers have sought contract amendments due to changed economic conditions
  • Tier 1 REC contract attrition: Biennial Review acknowledged 30% attrition rate in renewable energy contracts

Assessment: The evidence on contractual impairment is moderate. This criterion appears to be less central to the petitioners’ arguments than reliability and affordability.

Pathway 3: Affordability – “Significant Increase in Arrears or Disconnections”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find (1) a “significant” increase in arrears or service disconnections and (2) determine the increase is “related to the program.”

Evidence Presented:

  • Statistical significance established: Independent Intervenors demonstrated increases exceeding 2× standard deviation for statewide totals and 4 of 10 utilities
  • Magnitude: $1.8 billion in arrears affecting 1.2 million households
  • Trend: NMPC 17% increase (33,840 customers), Con Ed 59% increase (173,398 customers)

The Perplexity AI summary also lists two examples of evidence that does not support the claim that need to be explained.  For the “Causation not established”  description the AI program referenced an article written before the latest  DPS annual informational report came out that said it was impossible to determine if increases are “related to the program”.  A more recent report is now available, but DPS staff did not try to link the observed increases to this PSL 66-P requirement so it still is impossible to attribute significant changes to the Climate Act.  The other example gave an alternative explanation for the number of customers in arrears: “Post-pandemic economic impacts, inflation, and energy price increases due to factors beyond Climate Act (e.g., natural gas price volatility, supply chain disruptions)”

The Perplexity AI Assessment description stated:

The affordability evidence meets the first criterion (statistical significance) but cannot satisfy the second criterion (program causation) until DPS provides the mandated cost reporting. This represents a data gap, not necessarily a failure of the substantive argument. A hearing could establish causation through discovery and testimony.

The conclusion in this section notes that the reliability pathway has the strongest evidentiary weight:

Among the three pathways, the reliability criterion presents the most compelling case for a hearing:

  • Evidence comes from independent technical authorities (NYISO, NERC) with statutory responsibility for reliability
  • Deficiencies are quantified with specific MW shortfalls and timeframes
  • High-risk scenarios demonstrate sensitivity to plausible uncertainties
  • NYISO’s statement that required technologies “are not yet available on a commercial scale” directly supports finding that the program “impedes” safe and adequate service
  • Net capacity loss since Climate Act passage (2,000 MW) demonstrates actual, not theoretical, impact

The affordability criterion faces an evidentiary gap on program causation, though the statistical significance of arrears increases is well-established. Importantly, this gap exists because the PSC/DPS have failed to comply with their own reporting mandates—the very accountability failure the petitioners criticize. 

Discussion

In this discussion I liberally paraphrased the Perplexity AI response. Ultimately, the Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability emerging as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world supply chain, permitting, interconnection, and technological readiness constraints. 

In response to the petitions ACE-NY and WEACT filed a response that urged the PSC to reject the petition suggesting that all progress would stop if the heating was held.  However, the provision for a hearing does not require abandoning climate goals—it authorizes temporary suspension or modification to ensure safe, adequate, and affordable service while the transition continues. This represents pragmatic management, not capitulation.

I have long warned of the consequences if the current aspirational ambition and schedule of the Climate Act is not changed.  The PSC’s decision extends beyond energy policy:

  • If reliability suffers, the result could be rolling blackouts, industrial curtailments, and catastrophic economic disruption
  • If affordability spirals, the political backlash could undermine not just Climate Act but climate policy more broadly
  • If the safety valve remains unused, the precedent may discourage future legislatures from including adaptive management mechanisms in ambitious policy frameworks

Conclusion

Clearly it is no longer possible for the Hochul Administration to ignore the adverse impacts of Climate Act Implementation.  I have long argued that PSL 66-P was a logical excuse to reconsider the ramifications of the Climate Act so I should be happy that the potential of this requirement has been recognized at last.

However, this response is more evidence that the Climate Act has always been more about political catering to constituencies than about saving the planet. The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming so I believe that the PSC should have moved to hold the hearing at this time.  That would infuriate the proponents of the Climate Act that Hochul needs for her re-election campaign.  This request for comments pushes the hearing and any decision related to the hearing beyond the election next November.  The question is whether New Yorkers will catch on that the Hochul Administration is risking reliability and affordability in an effort to appease Climate Act proponents.

Stay tuned because there I will undoubtedly be writing about this more before the comments are due,

New York Climate Act Affordability Status

In my opinion the biggest problem with the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) is that it will inevitably lead to extraordinary cost increases.  My last article described the recent rate case decisions that have markedly increased residential customer electric bills. These rate increases arrive amid an escalating affordability crisis, as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.  This article documents unresolved affordability issues associated with the Climate Act.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates.  However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations.  It includes provisions stating that the PSC is empowered to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.  This requirement has been noted but, unfortunately, establishing a methodology to resolve the mandate has been ignored.

Petitions for a Hearing

The first unresolved affordability issue is the petitions by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy and the Independent Intervenors submitted to PSC Proceeding Case 22-M-0149 that called for a hearing.  There has been no indication by the PSC that they will respond to those petitions.

The recent filings argued that the PSC should convene a hearing. On August 11, 2025 “Independent Intervenors” Roger Caiazza, Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton petitioned  the  PSC arguing that safety valve provisions for customers in arrears trends in PSL  66-p(4) have been exceeded  which should trigger a hearing.  On January 6, 2026 the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filed a petition with the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting that the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4).  Both filings make similar arguments.  The Independent Intervenors argued that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded.  The Coalition makes a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.

In addition, last summer two members of the Climate Action Council, Donna DeCarolis and Dennis Elsenbeck, sent a letter to Rory Christian, Chair & Chief Executive Officer of the New Yok State Public Service Commission (PSC) that made a similar argument that there are more than sufficient circumstances to warrant the PSC commencing a hearing process to “consider modification and extension of New York Renewable Energy Program timelines pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4).

Agency Affordability Findings

There also have been New York Agency findings that argue that observed issues with schedule and costs suggest a pause to reconsider the mandates is appropriate.

The Draft Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) Staff and NYSERDA  “details the numerous factors, including inflation, transmission constraints, shifting federal energy and trade policies and interconnection and siting challenges that have adversely impacted renewable development and the state’s trajectory towards achieving the Program’s 2030 target.”  The Biennial Review “concludes that a delay in achieving the 70% goal may be unavoidable.”

The recently completed New York State Energy Plan (SEP) found that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient to meet statutory targets, and that external constraints continue to impede progress.”  Volume 2 “Our Energy Systems” explains that “Considering resource build limitations and increased loads, the model aligns with the CES Biennial Review, projecting the procurement schedule of CES resources through 2035.”  In other words, the SEP acknowledges that the Climate Act schedule is impossible to meet.  The SEP found that Climate Act costs are expected to require $120 billion in annual energy system investments through 2040, equivalent to $1,282 per month per household. This baseline includes what the authors of the SEP characterizes as costs “no matter which future path we take” but I believe that framing is fundamentally deceptive because that scenario includes substantial greenhouse gas reduction programs implemented before 2019 that are necessary to meet the Climate Act goals.

The July 2024 New York State Comptroller Status report “Climate Act Goals – Planning, Procurements, and Progress Tracking” audited PSC and NYSERDA efforts to achieve the Climate Act mandates.  It found that “While PSC and NYSERDA have taken considerable steps to plan for the transition to renewable energy in accordance with the Climate Act and CES, their plans did not comprise all essential components, including assessing risks to meeting goals and projecting costs.”  The report recommended that the agencies begin the comprehensive review of the Climate Act, “continuously analyze” existing and emerging risks and known issues, conduct a detailed analysis of cost estimates, and “assess the extent to with ratepayers can reasonably assume the responsibility” of the implementation costs.  This is the information necessary for the PSL 66-P hearing.

My last article summarized recent residential electric utility customers rate case decisions approved between March 2025 and January 2026.  The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) “approved new multi-year rate plans for five major utilities—Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, and Orange & Rockland—while two additional utilities (New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG) and Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) have pending rate cases seeking significantly larger increases”.

Kris Martin from NY Solar Divide pointed out:

When we look at those modest Climate Act (CLCPA) percentages on “typical” electric bills, it’s important to understand that we have incurred only a small fraction of Climate Act expenses to date. The bulk of those expenses will really start to impact us in another 5-10 years as we start to seriously build out onshore and offshore wind and grid-scale solar, implement policy changes (e.g., school bus electrification), and deal with increases in demand.

Department of Public Service (DPS) staff is supposed to provide Climate Act information. On September 18, 2025 the PSC announced that they “received an update from DPS staff regarding progress toward the clean energy goals of the Climate Act”.  The Second Informational Report prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff “focuses on Commission actions from January 2023 through August 2025, and includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.”  According to the Summary of Ratepayer Impact for Electric Utilities table, residential impacts of the Climate Act range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 total monthly electric bills.  In my opinion, those estimates are conservative because there is immense pressure on agency staff to minimize the costs of the Climate Act.  In addition, the costs necessary to implement the Climate Act were ramping up in 2023.  As Martin notes these costs are just the tip of the iceberg.

Affordability Metrics

PSL law Section 66-p (4) states that the hearing could “temporarily suspend or modify the obligations” of the Renewable Energy Program if the PSC makes a finding that “there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.   This refers to affordability limits, but they are not specific enough.  I believe the PSC must establish specific affordability limits.

This issue was also raised to the DPS last year.  On March 26, 2025, Jessica Waldorf, Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Implementation for the Department of Public Service (DPS) posted a letter responding to a letter from Michael B. Mager Counsel to Multiple Intervenors that had been submitted earlier in March to Chair of the Public Service Commission Rory Christian regarding the affordability standard.       I agreed with the comments submitted by Multiple Intevenors and was disappointed with the DPS response so I submitted a letter to Christian.

As described in my article My Comments on the NYS Affordability Standard: I believe that as part of the Scoping Plan the Climate Action Council should have developed criteria for the PSC to consider affordability and reliability.  That did not happen.  Based on issues observed with the transition it is incumbent upon the Commission to define “safe and adequate electric service” and “significant increase in arrears or service disconnections” as part of this Proceeding.  My letter stated that this is necessary so that there is a clearly defined standard for the temporarily suspending or modifying the provisions of Section 66-p (4).

The Public Service Commission has an existing target energy burden set at or below 6 percent of household income for all low-income households in New York State.  Reviewing it raises questions about its suitability for defining energy affordability acceptability.

The six percent target was included as part of Public Service Commission (PSC) Case Number: 14-M-0565, the Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers.  According to the PSC: “The primary purposes of the proceeding are to standardize utility low-income programs to reflect best practices where appropriate, streamline the regulatory process, and ensure consistency with the Commission’s statutory and policy objectives.”  On May 20, 2016 the Order Adopting Low Income Program Modifications and Directing Utility Findings adopted “a policy that an energy burden at or below 6% of household income shall be the target level for all 2.3 million low income households in New York.” 

The order notes that:

There is no universal measure of energy affordability; however, a widely accepted principle is that total shelter costs should not exceed 30% of income. For example, this percentage is often used by lenders to determine affordability of mortgage payments. It is further reasonable to expect that utility costs should not exceed 20% of shelter costs, leading to the conclusion that an affordable energy burden should be at or below 6% of household income (20% x 30% = 6%). A 6% energy burden is the target energy burden used for affordability programs in several states (e.g., New Jersey and Ohio), and thus appears to be reasonable. It also corresponds to what U.S. Energy Information Administration data reflects is the upper end of middle- and upper-income customer household energy burdens (generally in the range of 1 to 5%). The Commission therefore adopts a policy that an energy burden at or below 6% of household income shall be the target level for all low-income customers.  The policy applies to customers who heat with electricity or natural gas. 

The utility companies submit quarterly reports documenting the number of low-income customers receiving discounts and the amount of money distributed.  However, I have been unable to find any documentation describing how many customers meet the 6% energy burden criteria, much less any information on how those numbers are changing.  The biggest problem with this energy burden program is that it only applies to electric and gas utility customers.  Citizens who heat with fuel oil, propane, or wood are not covered.  Moreover, it only considers utility costs but the economy-wide provisions of the CLCPA include transportation energy burdens.

Clearly, if this parameter is to be used for a CLCPA affordability standard, then defining what is acceptable and what is not acceptable is necessary.  Whatever affordability standard is chosen a clear reporting metric must be provided and frequent updates of the status of the implementation relative to the affordability standard provided.

It is also notable that Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted correspondence related to the litigation associated with Climate Act implementation.  The State’s submittal  to the petition addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’s (the Climate Act) goals in a timely manner.” 

The submittal means that the State of New York argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.  The following paragraph concedes that there are significant upfront cost issues that out-weigh other benefits.

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

Conclusion

It is impossible to ignore that multiple independent analyses, audits, litigation findings, and party filings in DPS proceedings document that the Climate Act transition will exacerbate energy affordability issues at a time when more than a million New York households are already in arrears on their energy bill.  Unfortunately, the Hochul Administration and Legislature have not adopted clear affordability metrics, a transparent tracking system, or mandatory corrective actions when affordability thresholds are exceeded.  Of course, these are bright line accountability metrics, and no political supporter of the Climate Act wants to admit their role in the New York affordability crisis.

New York Recent Rate Case Impacts on Residential Customers

In my opinion the biggest problem with the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is that it will inevitably lead to extraordinary cost increases.  This post summarizes recent residential electric utility customers rate case decisions approved between March 2025 and January 2026. I do not discuss gas rate cases.  The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) “approved new multi-year rate plans for five major utilities—Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, and Orange & Rockland—while two additional utilities (New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG) and Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) have pending rate cases seeking significantly larger increases”. These rate increases arrive amid an escalating affordability crisis, as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Trying to decipher rate case decisions is a difficult task because of the volume of materials associated with each rate case. The PSC maintains a database that compiles all the filed documents and public comments for each rate case.  The Matter Master file for the current NYSEG rate case lists 913 filed documents and 1967 public comments.  To compile this summary, I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.  Assume all the results shown are referenced to the original Perplexity response.

Rate Case Results

Figure 1 summarizes the recent rates cases for Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, and Orange & Rockland that have been completed since 2025.  NYSEG and RG&E have pending rate cases, so their results shown are not directly comparable.

Figure 1: New York Utility Rate Cases Impact on Residential Customer (2025-2026) – Perplexity

The NYSEG and RG&E cases are pending and the results shown represent their initial offer.  All the results shown for the other utilities had much higher initial rates. For example, Con Edison initially requested annual revenue increases of $1.612 billion for electric service (18.0 percent increase in base delivery revenues) and $440 million for gas service (18.8 percent increase in base delivery revenues). Following intense public opposition, intervention by Governor Kathy Hochul, and even comments by President Trump, and extensive settlement negotiations, the PSC approved a dramatically reduced three-year rate plan on January 22, 2026.   The approved joint proposal represents an 87 percent reduction from Con Edison’s initial request.

Utility Summaries

Con Edison’s service territory covers New York City and Westchester County with 3.6 million residential customers.  For typical NYC residential customers using 280 kilowatt-hours monthly, electric bills will increase by approximately $4 per month (3.9 percent) in 2026, $3.55 per month in 2027, and $4.22 per month in 2028, resulting in a cumulative 10.4 percent increase over three years. Westchester County residential customers using 425 kWh monthly face increases of $5.25 (2.6 percent) in year one, $4.84 (2.3 percent) in year two, and $4.95 (2.2 percent) in year three, totaling 10.1 percent over the period

National Grid’s rate case was approved on August 13, 2025.  The service territory covers 1.7 million electric customers across 25,000 square miles in Upstate New York. For residential electric customers using an average of 625 kilowatt-hours per month National Grid’s three-year upstate rate plan includes a $14.32 per month increase in year 1, a $6.44 per month increase in year 2, and a $4.34 per month increase in year 3 with an expected total increase over three years of 31%.

Central Hudson 315,000 residential customers in its Hudson Valley and Mid-Hudson region service territory.  Central Hudson’s rate case followed a unique trajectory, proceeding through litigation rather than settlement, ultimately resulting in a one-year rate plan approved on July 18, 2024, followed by a subsequent multi-year joint proposal filed on May 13, 2025, and approved on August 14, 2025.  Typical residential electric customers will experience total bill increases of approximately 7.85 percent, equating to approximately $12.65 per month.

Orange & Rockland serves 233,000 residential electric customers in Rockland, Orange, and Sullivan counties.  On March 19, 2025, the PSC adopted a three-year rate plan for Orange & Rockland that substantially reduced the utility’s initial request, keeping electric revenue flat for the first year while authorizing incremental increases in subsequent years. For residential electric customers using 600 kilowatt-hours per month the 2025 total bill increase will be 4.6 percent, in 2026 the total bill increase will be 3.3 percent and in 2027 the total bill increase will be 3.5 percent total bill increase.

New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG) and Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) filed rate case proposals on

June 30, 2025.  The case is currently under review.  I am an active party in the rate cases and am unsure what I can say about the status.  I don’t think it is inappropriate to note that an evidential hearing is scheduled for early February.  The service territories of the two utilities are all over the state but is primarily located in Central and Western New York.  NYSEG serves 921,000 customers and RG&E serves 392,00 customers. The initial NYSEG electric request asked for an amount that works out for a typical residential customers (600 kWh electric usage) to a $33.12 per month increase (23.7 percent increase to total bill).  The initial RG&E electric request asked for an amount that works to a $33.01 per month increase (26.0 percent increase to total bill).

 Climate Act Impacts

It is unfortunate that the utilities fail to provide a breakdown of how much implementation of the Climate Act adds to these rate case costs.  I used a Perplexity AI search of the National Grid rate case to provide Climate Act cost estimates.   It found that the approved rate plans do not contain explicit breakdowns of specific dollar amounts or percentages of the rate increases allocated specifically to the Climate Act projectsand state mandated programs. The query response included the following:

CLCPA-Related Investments Identified

While specific cost breakdowns are not provided, the orders identify several CLCPA-related investment categories within the approved rate plans:

Electric System CLCPA Investments

Transmission Infrastructure:

  • CLCPA Phase 2 Transmission Projects
  • Smart Path Connect
  • Grid Modernization

Distribution System Enhancements:

  • Enhanced grid capabilities for solar, wind, and energy storage interconnection
  • Smart grid technologies to manage intermittent renewable resources
  • Electric vehicle infrastructure support programs

Historical CLCPA Investment Context

Previous utility filings and planning documents provide context for CLCPA-related costs across New York utilities:

Statewide CLCPA Transmission Investments:

  • Phase 1 Projects: Approximately $4.16 billion in transmission investments and $2.64 billion in distribution investments across all New York utilities
  • Phase 2 Conceptual Estimates: $7.62 billion in transmission and $2.16-$2.85 billion in distribution investments (conceptual estimates)

National Grid’s Historical CLCPA Share:

  • Phase 2 Transmission: $1.37 billion estimated for National Grid transmission projects
  • Phase 2 Distribution: $510 million to $1.2 billion estimated for National Grid distribution projects

Department of Public Service (DPS) staff is supposed to provide Climate Act information. On September 18, 2025 the PSC announced that they “received an update from DPS staff regarding progress toward the clean energy goals of the Climate Act”.  The Second Informational Report prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff “focuses on Commission actions from January 2023 through August 2025, and includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.”  According to the Summary of Ratepayer Impact for Electric Utilities table, residential impacts of the Climate Act range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 total monthly electric bills.  In my opinion, those estimates are conservative because there is immense pressure on agency staff to minimize the costs of the Climate Act.  In addition, the costs necessary to implement the Climate Act were ramping up in 2023.  I expect that these costs will continue to climb.

Discussion

The Perplexity summary of the rate cases raised some overarching issues.  New York residential utility bills consist of two primary components, each subject to different pricing mechanisms and contributing to overall cost increases through distinct channels.

Delivery Charges account for approximately two-thirds of bills. These charges represent what customers pay utilities to build, maintain, and operate the physical infrastructure that transmits electricity and natural gas to homes and businesses. Delivery charges remained relatively stable historically but have increased substantially in recent years to fund:

  • Infrastructure Modernization and Replacement: Utilities must replace aging equipment that has reached the end of its useful life, including transformers, substations, transmission lines, and distribution networks.
  • Grid Hardening and Storm Resiliency: Utilities must enhance system resiliency to manage severe weather events. This includes vegetation management, reinforced poles and wires, and backup systems.
  • Clean Energy Integration Infrastructure: The Climate Act mandates necessitate substantial transmission and distribution system upgrades to connect renewable energy resources, accommodate distributed generation, manage bi-directional power flows, and handle increased electrification of transportation and heating.
  • Property Taxes: Utility companies pay significant property taxes on their infrastructure, which are passed through to customers. Note that the clean energy infrastructure increases the property tax burden.
  • Return on Equity (Profit Margin): Regulated utilities earn a PSC-approved rate of return on their capital investments. Approved returns on equity in recent cases range from 9.4 percent (Con Edison) to 9.5 percent (National Grid).

Supply Charges  account for approximately one-third of bills.  They represent the actual cost of purchasing electricity or natural gas in wholesale markets. These charges fluctuate based on market conditions and are typically adjusted monthly. These have increased for the following reasons:

  • Explosive Demand Growth: New York and the broader Northeast region are experiencing unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by several factors that are fundamentally reshaping the supply-demand balance. The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) reports that the pace of new energy sources coming online is insufficient to keep pace with demand growth.
  • Wholesale electricity prices have responded predictably to this supply-demand imbalance. The average monthly wholesale electricity price in New York soared by 67 percent over the past year according to NYISO data.
  • Thermal Generation Fuel Costs: Natural gas remains the marginal fuel setting electricity prices in New York’s wholesale markets during most hours. Natural gas commodity prices have increased due to growing domestic demand (particularly for heating during cold winters), export demand for liquefied natural gas, and supply constraints.
  • Weather-Driven Consumption: The 2025-26 winter has proven particularly severe, with temperatures 15-20 percent colder than the prior year. Colder weather increases heating demand, driving up both consumption (measured usage) and market prices due to heightened competition for available supply.

Conclusion

These rate case results are unsustainable.  For all the noise made by politicians about affordability, the fact remains that the New York State Legislature or Administration has not defined affordable energy.  The Public Service Commission has an existing target energy burden set at or below 6 percent of household income for all low-income households in New York State.  I have been unable to find any documentation describing how many customers meet the 6% energy burden criteria, much less any information on how those numbers are changing.  The biggest problem with this energy burden program is that it only applies to electric and gas utility customers.  Citizens who heat with fuel oil, propane, or wood are not covered.  There is a clear need for an affordability metric that can be tracked.

Investments for New York’s Future

According to a new report from Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, New Yorkers will “realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative.”  This article explains why this report is bogus on multiple levels.

I have extensive experience with market-based pollution control programs.  I have been involved in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I have also been following the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program and other similar programs in New York   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated

Clean Air Initiative

My first thought when I read this was what is the Clean Air Initiative?   The report states: “state agencies have developed proposals for an economy-wide cap-and-invest program – known as the Clean Air Initiative (CAI).”  I have been following the economy-wide cap-and-invest program and I was unaware of any agency calling the economy-wide program anything other than the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program.  So, I used Perplexity AI to ask if any New York agencies used CAI instead of NYCI.    The response stated:

No New York State agency officially refers to the cap-and-invest program as the “Clean Air Initiative.” Throughout all Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) official documentation, press releases, regulatory proposals, and public communications from 2023 through early 2026, the program is consistently designated as:

  • New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) – the primary official name
  • Cap-and-Invest Program – the standard reference

I believe the answer to why these organizations use this nomenclature is directly related to the mission of the organizations. Greenline Insights “provides non-partisan research to drive smart decision-making. We specialize in modeling, analysis, and policy design to maximize positive outcomes for local workforces, businesses, and communities.” Their description of services provided states: “We work with clients to develop compelling research questions and build the right mix of tools to answer them.”  Reading between that line I think it means that if a client wants a particular answer, they will get that result.

EDF claims “Guided by science and economics, and committed to climate justice, we work in the places, on the projects and with the people that can make the biggest difference.”  According to another Perplexity AI query EDF has “strongly supported the economy-wide cap and invest program proposal included in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) Scoping Plan” finalized in 2022 and since then “has engaged in extensive and sustained lobbying and advocacy efforts to advance New York’s economy-wide cap-and-invest program since early 2023.”  EDF has a vested interest in the success of an economy-wide program.

The Perplexity AI “Deep Research” response to my query about the use of CAI the AI program concluded “The Environmental Defense Fund and allied advocacy organizations strategically adopted “Clean Air Initiative” as alternative branding to frame the program around air quality and public health benefits in their campaigns to pressure Governor Hochul to finalize and implement the regulations.”

In other words, the Clean Air Initiative terminology  is all about the messaging.

Clean Air Initiative Claims

The January 8, 2026 CAI  report announcement states:

NEW YORK — New Yorkers will realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative, a new report from Environmental Defense Fund and Greenline Insights finds.  

The report comes as New Yorkers continue to await the launch of the Clean Air Initiative: an economywide cap-and-invest program that works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.” At the same time, energy affordability remains an issue that’s top of mind for New York voters.  

“Our analysis shows that the vast majority of New Yorkers are missing out on savings and economic opportunities across the state due to delays in implementing the Clean Air Initiative,” said Kate CourtinSenior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy. “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.” 

The report finds that, over its first decade, the Clean Air Initiative would deliver: 

$6.9 billion in net savings, or an average of $1,060 per household earning $200k per year or less — about 85% of households in the state.  

Over 300,000 new jobs, with job growth strongest in fields like construction and transit as a result of investments in clean transportation services, decarbonization of buildings, and the build-out of clean energy infrastructure.

$48 billion in economic growth supported by program investments across the state. 

“The data is clear that the Clean Air Initiative is a potent job creator and economic development tool.” said Jonah Kurman-Faber, Founder and Principal at Greenline Insights. “The program’s investments play to the state’s economic strengths and provide meaningful financial benefits to an overwhelming majority of the population.” 

Pollution Control

EDF claims without any evidence that setting a cap ensures compliance with the arbitrary limits of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  The report claims that the “economywide cap-and-invest program works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.”  That is the theory.

I recently published several articles about RGGI, the existing New York cap-and-invest program for electric utility generating units that shows reality is different.  I showed that the reason NY utility emissions have dropped is because NY power plants switched from using coal and oil to using natural gas.  Natural gas emits less CO2 and was cheaper, so the observed reductions are mostly because of economic fuel switching not RGGI.  I compared the observed reductions and RGGI investment emission savings and found that the total cumulative annual emission savings represents a reduction of only 4.2% from the pre-RGGI baseline.  That comparison also found that the observed cost per ton of emissions removed is $583.  None of these results suggest that the CAI will work as claimed.

GHG emissions are directly related to energy generation.  When a GHG pollution control program caps emissions it caps energy use so capping emissions essentially rations energy use.   Combined with the RGGI results, that means that compliance with the cap can only occur if energy use is rationed

Economic Benefits

According to the announcement, Kate Courtin, Senior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy said that “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.”   I am not an economist so I submitted another Perplexity AI query asking about opportunity costs and the Greenline Insights analysis.  The summary notes:

The “Investments for New York’s Future” report by Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, released in January 2026, projects that New York’s Clean Air Initiative (cap-and-invest program) would generate $6.9 billion in household savings, create over 300,000 jobs, and support $48 billion in economic growth over the program’s first decade (2026-2035). While the specific methodological details of this report remain inaccessible through the provided URL, extensive research into Greenline Insights’ comparable analyses, standard input-output (I-O) modeling practices, and economic impact assessment literature reveals fundamental concerns about the treatment—or more precisely, the omission—of opportunity costs in such economic analyses.

Even a non-economist like me understands that if an analysis does not consider how the money raised by NYCI might have been used elsewhere is not considered, then that is a problem: 

Opportunity cost represents “the value of the alternative foregone by choosing a particular activity”—the benefits that could have been realized if the same resources were deployed differently. In climate policy analysis, this concept is essential because government spending and regulatory mandates redirect capital, labor, and productive resources from alternative uses. A comprehensive economic evaluation must compare not just the projected benefits of a policy against its direct costs, but also assess what economic activity would have occurred absent the intervention—the counterfactual baseline.

The response to my query raised the following issues with the Greenline Insights methodology:

1. The “Missing Peter” Problem

As economists from the Beacon Hill Institute articulated in critiquing renewable energy economic impact studies: “They are robbing Peter [existing economic activities] to pay Paul [the supported sector], and claiming the program increased total spending because now Paul spends more, but they ignore accounting for Peter”.

Every dollar collected through allowance auctions or allocated to climate investments is a dollar unavailable for alternative economic uses—whether private consumption, business investment in other sectors, or different government priorities. Standard I-O models “cannot compute possible reductions in output and jobs elsewhere in the economy, due to the reallocation of resources towards the supported project”.

2. Assumption of Idle Resources

The typical economic impact study assumes “that the dollar that flows through the industries identified by model’s I-O tables, and the resources that they are commanding, would not otherwise be used”. This assumption may be defensible during severe recessions with high unemployment and underutilized productive capacity, but becomes increasingly problematic as economies approach full employment.

New York State added over 1 million private sector jobs since April 2020 and reached record employment levels as of September 2024. In this context, labor and capital redirected to clean energy investments necessarily displace activity in other sectors. One analysis noted explicitly: “IMPLAN cannot be used to model nonresidential sector opportunity costs, so those were not included”—a tacit acknowledgment of the methodology’s inherent limitation.

3. No Counterfactual Baseline

Rigorous policy evaluation requires comparing outcomes under the policy scenario against a well-specified counterfactual: what would have happened in the policy’s absence. This counterfactual must account for:

  • Alternative deployment of capital: If the $61-126 billion in projected cap-and-invest revenues were instead left with households and businesses, what consumption and investment would occur?
  • Baseline economic trajectories: What job growth, wage increases, and economic output would materialize under business-as-usual conditions?
  • Displaced economic activity: Which sectors contract as resources shift toward clean energy, and what are the productivity implications?

Standard I-O models do not construct this counterfactual. They measure gross economic activity associated with program spending but do not subtract the economic activity that would have occurred with alternative resource allocation.

4. The Economist’s Critique

The academic economics community has long criticized the misapplication of I-O analysis for policy advocacy. As one prominent critique states: “There’s a joke among economists who look at economic impact studies, and we say ‘Define all costs as benefits, and double them'”. This captures the tendency of such analyses to:

  • Present gross job creation without netting out job displacement
  • Calculate multiplier effects on program spending without comparable analysis of opportunity cost multipliers
  • Report total economic output without addressing whether this represents additional output or reallocated output

The response to my query concludes:

For policymakers and stakeholders evaluating the economic case for New York’s Clean Air Initiative, this means:

  • The reported economic benefits are overstated to the extent they represent reallocation of economic activity rather than net additions
  • The true net economic impact depends on the relative productivity of clean energy investments versus displaced alternatives—a comparison the analysis does not make
  • The strongest case for the policy rests on climate and health benefits, not the economic multiplier effects emphasized in the report’s communications
  • More rigorous analysis following a similar Resources for the Future approach or comprehensive cost-benefit frameworks would provide better-informed decision-making

Conclusion

This report is simply a lobbying presentation that was commissioned by EDF to support their arguments that NYCI is a good idea.  One common aspect of all these analyses is that the benefits are overstated, the costs are minimized if not ignored, and the methodology is sketchy.  I do not think that any of the job estimates and economic projections are credible.

Recommended Reading – Dr. Matthew Wielicki

Dr. Matthew authors the Irrational Fear blog.  He frequently writes about issues that I think are important relative to the ultimate need for transitioning off fossil fuels and other aspects of the response to the “climate crisis” that I think are important for everyone to understand.  This recommendation to read his work was prompted by several recent articles.

Background

According to Wielicki’s website:

With a Ph.D. in earth science from UCLA and as a professor-in-exile, he bravely challenges the norms that many in the scientific community only whisper about. Fear of losing positions and research funds keeps many silent, but not Dr. Wielicki. He boldly addresses the unfounded fears surrounding climate change, culture, and politics on his Substack, offering a perspective rooted in solid scientific understanding.

I did a search of his background.  He resigned from the University of Alabama citing personal family matters but also a frustration with the politicization at the school.  The article states:

Wielicki told The Fix via email he takes issue with the narrow scope that the sciences are constricted by with university and government funding priorities.

“The majority of funding within the earth sciences is climate-focused,” he said. “This means that those that don’t do climate science have to compete for fewer and fewer resources as so much is being funneled to climate science.”

Since leaving academia he has positioned himself as an independent geoscientist and commentator, speaking and writing about Earth science and climate issues, including through media appearances and his “Irrational Fear” Substack.

I will briefly describe several recent articles.  I only subscribe to his Substack as a free basis.  I have limitations on the number of paid subscriptions that I can afford and his free subscriptions generally provide enough information for my purposes.

Climate “Solutions” Are the Real Danger

I have been leery about plans to counter act global warming directly by modifying the atmosphere to “cool” the planet but haven’t spent the time to research an article about the dangers.  This post by Wielicki is a great introduction to the plans and the risks.  He explains:

For decades, we were told that climate change itself was the looming threat… rising temperatures, extreme weather, catastrophe just over the horizon. But quietly, almost without public debate, the conversation has shifted. The danger is no longer climate change alone. The danger, increasingly, is what powerful institutions now propose to do about it.

What were once fringe, crackpot “solutions” whispered in obscure academic circles are breaking into the mainstream, published in reputable journals and pushed as serious policy ideas. These aren’t just bad ideas… they’re dangerous, hubristic experiments that could cause real harm, all in the name of fighting a crisis that’s more hype than reality.

I’ve been warning about this for years on Irrational Fear. In “Geoengineering Madness,” I exposed how companies like Make Sunsets are proposing to inject sulfur into the atmosphere to “cool” the planet, conveniently ignoring the trillions we’ve already spent scrubbing sulfur from fuels to combat acid rain. In “Exposing the Waste in Climate Solutions,” I detailed how $2 trillion has been flushed down the drain on unproven tech like carbon capture and blue hydrogen, while real environmental issues get ignored. And don’t get me started on Bovaer… the methane-busting additive for cows that sterilizes lab rats and comes with a laundry list of side effects, as I covered in “Follow The Money, And You’ll Find The Science”. The pattern is clear: climate change itself has never directly killed anyone or posed an existential threat, but the so-called “solutions” could unleash environmental, health, and economic disasters on a massive scale.

He goes on to describe two new chilling examples of proposals in mainstream publications for his paid subscribers: one proposing we weaponize a tick-borne disease to force people off meat, and another suggesting we pump sulfur into the skies using jumbo jets.”  These are the antithesis of pragmatic solutions to the alleged problems.

Greenland’s Ancient Melt: The Bombshell Study That Buries Climate Alarmism

I recently did a post pointing out all the unknown factors affecting natural climate change.  I pointed out that there are numerous poorly understood oceanic and atmospheric cycles that are ignored by the Global Climate Models that predict gloom and doom from global warming due to greenhouse gas emissions.  The observations of global temperatures correlate well with certain oscillations.

Wielicki describes another inconvenient truth.  He describes a new paper that is inconsistent with the existential threat claims.  He points out:

This ties directly into what I’ve called the “Greenland Warming Paradox,” which I detailed in a previous article. In short, Greenland has been dramatically warmer in the past… like during the Holocene Thermal Maximum 9,000 to 5,000 years ago, when temperatures were 4–8.5°C higher than today, yet sea levels were lower. This challenges the alarmist claims that modest modern warming will drown the world.

The new paper reveals that Prudhoe Dome, a key part of northwestern Greenland’s ice sheet, was completely ice-free around 7,000 years ago during the early Holocene. This happened at pre-industrial CO2 levels, under natural warming of just 3–5°C above today’s temperatures. If CO2 is the supposed driver of today’s melting, why was Greenland deglaciating back then without any human emissions?

This is the kind of bombshell that should make headlines for debunking the narrative, but instead, it’s being spun as a warning for future warming.

I doubt that this kind of information will ever get covered by the mainstream media.  They wonder why many do not trust them.

Hunga Tonga–Hunga Haʻapai Volcanic Eruption

This is another example of an inconvenient truth.  Charles Rotter describes the eruption:

When the Hunga Tonga–Hunga Haʻapai volcano erupted in January 2022, it immediately posed a problem—not merely scientific, but institutional. The eruption was the most explosive in the satellite era, injected an unprecedented quantity of water vapor into the stratosphere, and did so with a chemical signature unlike the canonical climate-cooling eruptions of the late twentieth century. It was followed, inconveniently, by a pronounced surge in global surface temperatures. The timing alone guaranteed scrutiny. What mattered was how that scrutiny would be framed.

The thing to remember is that water vapor is that it is the dominant contributor to the natural greenhouse gas effect.  It is ignored by climate activists because it does not accumulate like other greenhouse gases.  Wielicki published an article addressing the framing in the response by the climate science activists.  He describes the consensus response to the eruption:

This 382-page volume from the Atmospheric Processes and their Role in Climate (APARC) project, involving over 100 scientists worldwide, dissects the atmospheric aftermath of this massive submarine blast. I’ve tackled Hunga before in my article “The Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai Volcanic Eruption and the Stochastic Nature of Climate Variability,” where I explained how this event – a relatively common geologic occurrence – pumped an astonishing ~146 Tg (teragrams, or millions of metric tons) of water vapor into the stratosphere. That’s equivalent to a sudden 10% increase in the stratosphere’s total water content. Water vapor is Earth’s most powerful greenhouse gas (GHG), trapping far more heat than CO2 ever could.

In that piece, I highlighted how such natural events underscore the chaotic, unpredictable side of our climate system – the “stochastic” nature, meaning random and hard-to-model fluctuations that can override human influences overnight. I also critiqued global mean temperature (GMT) as a metric in “The Absurdity of Global Mean Temperature and Mean Sea Level Metrics,” noting it’s a statistically contrived number based on extrapolating from tiny fractions of actual measurements (just 0.01% of Earth’s surface is directly gauged), masking huge regional differences and uncertainties.

Now, this fresh APARC report claims Hunga’s effects were mostly “minor” on surface climate, despite that massive water injection. But here’s the kicker: If a instantaneous 10% spike in the strongest GHG has negligible warming impact, why the hysteria over CO2’s slow creep upward at about 0.5% per year? Are we witnessing scientific contortions to keep CO2 as the villain, even if it undermines the very case for GHG sensitivity? After all, when careers and funding depend on seeing CO2 everywhere, that’s exactly what you’ll find – ignoring how natural variability like Hunga could explain recent warming spikes without any CO2 surge. And let’s not forget: For years, the climate community has downplayed water vapor as merely a “feedback” to CO2-driven warming, but Hunga injected it independently – exposing that as an oversimplification that inflates CO2’s role.

What Politicians Should Say About Climate and Energy

2026 is going to be a pivotal year for New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act.  Wielicki offers recommendations about messaging for politicians.

Bill McKibben recently published an essay titled “Pretend you’re running for Congress,” offering guidance on how candidates should talk about climate and energy heading into the 2026 midterm elections. His central claim is that elections will hinge on affordability, that energy prices will be decisive, and that candidates should keep the message simple: Republicans are driving demand, blocking clean energy, and raising prices… while renewable energy is cheap, abundant, and inevitable.

On the surface, this sounds pragmatic. But beneath the rhetoric is a familiar problem: the same slogans, the same moral framing, and the same absence of scientific or economic nuance that have defined climate politics for decades.

McKibben tells candidates to keep it simple because energy systems are “intricate and abstruse.” What he really means is that complexity gets in the way of the story. And the story must remain intact.

What’s missing from his essay is striking. There is almost no discussion of climate science itself… no mention of uncertainty, natural variability, or observational constraints. There is no acknowledgment that climate concern has already peaked politically. And there is no recognition that energy is not merely an input to the economy, but the foundation of human flourishing.

That omission matters because voters, especially younger ones, are no longer responding to fear the way they once did.

The uncertainty issue extends to the purported “solutions”.  The narrative is that there is no question that wind and solar energy are cheaper but the reality is that the only question is just how much more an energy system that depends upon those resources would cost. It is a lot.

Conclusion

In order to fully appreciate his work a paid subscription is a good investment.  However, even the free subscription is useful insight into the climate community’s biases and inconvenient truths.  I recommend going to his Substack and subscribing.

New York Nuclear Renaissance

Governor Hochul plans to pursue “the most ambitious development of nuclear power in America, setting a new goal to build five gigawatts of new nuclear capacity”.  I believe that nuclear power is the best option to reduce electric system GHG emissions but there are issues.  This post includes Richard Ellenbogen’s description of practical deployment issues and my observations relative to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy.  He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where it has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system.  I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because the energy density of wind and solar energy is too low and the resource intermittency too variable to ever support a reliable electric system relying on those resources. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Hochul Proposal

Hochul’s State of the State Book describes the nuclear proposal in the following two sections:

Establishing a Nuclear Reliability Backbone for a Zero-Emission Grid

As New York transitions to a zero-emission electric grid, the State must ensure reliable and cost effective baseload power to keep homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure running at all hours.  Governor Hochul will ensure that New York State leads in the race to harness safe and reliable advanced nuclear energy to power homes and businesses with zero-emission electricity for generations to come.

To catalyze progress towards those goals, the Governor will advance a new initiative, the Nuclear Reliability Backbone, directing state agencies to establish a clear pathway for additional advanced nuclear generation to support grid reliability. The Nuclear Reliability Backbone will be developed by a new Department of Public Service (DPS) process to consider, review, and facilitate a cost-effective pathway to four gigawatts of new nuclear energy that will combine with existing nuclear generation and the New York Power Authority’s (NYPA) previously announced one gigawatt project, to create an 8.4 gigawatt “backbone” of reliable energy for New Yorkers.

This effort will provide firm, clean power that complements renewable energy resources and reduces reliance on fossil fuel generation. By creating a stable foundation of always-on energy, the Backbone will allow renewable resources to operate more efficiently and flexibly. Together, these actions will support a resilient, flexible, and zero-emission grid that meets New York’s growing energy needs.

Ensuring New York’s Nuclear Power Future is Built By and For New Yorkers

As New York expands advanced nuclear energy, the State must ensure that New Yorkers benefit from these jobs and investments, including making sure New Yorkers are prepared to build, operate, and sustain this emerging industry. Governor Hochul will launch NextGen Nuclear New York to develop a skilled, in-state nuclear workforce through coordinated education and training pathways.

The initiative will expand partnerships across K–12 schools, higher education institutions, labor organizations, and training programs to align curricula, credentials, and career pathways with industry needs. It will also support workforce transitions for existing energy workers and increase public awareness of nuclear career opportunities. By investing in people and skills, New York will ensure its nuclear future is powered by New Yorkers, for New Yorkers.

Practical Deployment Issues – Ellenbogen

Ellenbogen recently sent an email that described his concerns about the proposal to add 5 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear to NY State’s generation fleet that forms the basis for this article.  Because we are closely aligned on our thoughts I am not going to try to differentiate between his material and my supplemental information.  However, I take responsibility for the contents of this article and accept that I may have misquoted or misrepresented Ellenbogen’s beliefs.

For background consider New York’s nuclear power plants (Table 1).  Five gigawatts of nuclear is basically equivalent to building five new traditional reactors like Nine Mile 2, the last completed plant in New York. Note that Shoreham was completed, tested, and then shut down before it operated in the mid 1980’s.

Table 1: New York Nuclear Generating Plants

We agree on one thing completely: It’s a step in the right direction but it is too little, too late.  Building this amount of capacity will take a long time.  Nine Mile 2 construction took 13 years, and the most recent reactors built in the US at Vogtle, Georgia took 15 years from the start of initial site work.

According to a Perplexity AI query, The new Vogtle units are Westinghouse AP1000 designs with passive safety systems; The capacity of each unit is on the order of 1.1 GW.  Construction went over schedule and budget “as the first new U.S. nuclear build in decades, became a protracted megaproject with schedule slips and cost growth to roughly the mid‑$30‑billion range, widely characterized as one of the most expensive infrastructure projects in U.S. history”. These issues were caused by a “combination of incomplete design and planning, contractor and supply‑chain problems, first‑of‑a‑kind AP1000 implementation issues, weak project management and oversight, and the 2017 Westinghouse bankruptcy, which disrupted construction and financing”. 

Most of these underlying factors will be problems for New York State.  If new technology is used the design and planning will have to evolve as the plants are built.  There are contractor and supply-chain problems with existing infrastructure construction so this will be more of a problem for the new technology.  If the deployment goes so far as to mandate that the facilities are “built by and for New Yorkers”, then there will be delays because there are insufficient skilled trade workers available today.

Climate Act Schedule and Reliability Issues – Ellenbogen

The Climate Act has a requirement for zero emissions electric generation by 2040.  There is no possibility that all the nuclear capacity proposed by Hochul could be built by 2040 and there is a low probability that any new nuclear could be built by then.  Last June Hochul ordered the New York Power Authority (NYPA) to develop at least on gigawatt of nuclear capacity.  NYPA has not even announced where they might consider siting new nuclear capacity.  In my experience with power plant permitting, it takes at least three years to secure permits for existing design equipment.  There have been indications that New York would favor new designs which would slow down permitting substantially.  Finally, “Nuclear” has been a four-letter word in New York State for about 45 years so we expect opponents to try to delay permitting in every way possible.

Last November the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) released its 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP).  The report found that “the electric grid is at an inflection point driven by the convergence of three major trends: the rapid growth of large loads, (e.g.: microchip manufacturing and AI-related data centers); the aging generation fleet; and a lack of new dispatchable generation resources being added to the system.”   The description of the CRP went on to say:

The CRP highlights that the future reliability of the grid depends on the development of flexible generation capable of performing during extended periods of high consumer demand and extreme weather. The report examines lessons-learned from the June 2025 heatwave and the need for a planning framework that better reflects present challenges of operating the grid while anticipating plausible future risks.

“The system requires additional dispatchable generation to serve forecasted increases in consumer demand,” said Zach Smith, Senior Vice President, System and Resource Planning. “We also need to refine and evolve our planning processes to better reflect this period of great change on the grid and a broader range of plausible future outcomes.”

The CRP demonstrates that due to emerging reliability challenges, traditional planning methods built around a single forecast are no longer sufficient. To maintain system reliability and protect public safety, the economy and quality of life, the CRP recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment before reliability margins disappear.

Our biggest concern is the reliability margin crisis described in the CRP.  The NYISO plausible range of reliability margins illustrates the problem (Figure 1).  The CRP doesn’t explain what is going to keep the lights on after 2033, and possibly as early as 2027 if replacement capacity does not keep up with retirements.  My Perplexity AI search found that there are no new fossil-fired capacity proposed.  While adding new nuclear capacity is appropriate, replacement of existing capacity must also be considered.  The youngest of the 3.4 GW of existing nuclear in NY State will be reaching 60 years of age by 2040.

Figure 1: Plausible Range of Statewide System Margins NYISO 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan     

Reason to Pause – Caiazza

Over the last year I have written many articles describing various reasons to pause implementation and reconsider the schedule and scope of the Climate Act.  The State Energy Plan and the CRP both include multiple future energy projections that include estimates of capacity and grid infrastructure additions.  The CRP “recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment”. The State Energy Plan advocates massive deployment of as much wind, solar, and energy storage capacity as possible as fast as possible hoping that it will work out.

Wind and solar energy resources are diffuse, intermittent, and correlated.  Because they are diffuse, utilizing wind and solar means that transmission and distribution systems must be upgraded.  Because they are intermittent, that means that energy storage is needed on daily to seasonal scales.  Because wind and solar are correlated, new dispatchable emissions-free resources (DEFR) are needed to make the electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability.  I believe the only likely viable DEFR backup technology is nuclear generation because it is the only candidate resource that is technologically ready, can be expanded as needed, and does not suffer from limitations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Every day that the resolving the DEFR requirement is delayed the costs associated with what may be a false solution increase.  If the only viable DEFR solution is nuclear, then the wind, solar, and energy storage approach cannot be implemented without nuclear power.  Nuclear power works best as a baseload resource so using it solely as DEFR backup is inappropriate.  Developing baseload nuclear eliminates the need for a huge DEFR backup resource and means that the “build as much as we can as fast as we can” wind and solar buildout currently in progress is unnecessary.  Climate Act implementation should be paused until the most appropriate path forward is determined.

Discussion

Both Ellenbogen and I have been harping about reliability for years.  Unfortunately, no one at the state level seems to be ready to confront the problem.  It is absolutely necessary to come to grips with it.  The state government keeps trying to defy physical law by pushing technologies that can’t keep the lights on.  They need to get out of their bubble because the time frame required to fix what has become a massive problem is getting increasingly small.  The rapidly decreasing margins and negative capacity margins appear likely before new generation of any type can be built.

One of the biggest takeaways from this latest political energy proposal is the danger of political interference in energy policy.  New York politicians now claim that we need 5 GW of nuclear generating capacity.  New York politicians shut down 3.1 GW of nuclear capacity since 1984.  Hochul’s announcement is encouraging but until it must be accompanied by a pause in Climate Act implementation to be credible.  If timely decarbonization using nuclear power is appropriate, then a restart at Indian Point should be considered because it is the cheapest and quickest option.  However, that would be politically toxic so I cannot imagine that ever being proposed by the Hochul Administration. 

Conclusion

In my opinion, nuclear power should be part of New York’s electric system future.  However, Hochul’s proposal is too little, too late as part of the Climate Act implementation without revising the schedule.  It is necessary first to pause implementation and reassess the schedule and ambition of the Act so that it can play a meaningful role.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy Petition

On January 6, 2026 the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filed a petition with the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting that “the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.”  Last August I described a filing and supporting documentation that I prepared with Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (Independent Intervenors) submitted to the same PSC Proceeding (Case 22-M-0149).  Our filing made a similar argument.  This article compares the filings.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two electric sector targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040.

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable bounds and New York energy policy has not openly reassessed where we stand relative to acceptable affordability and reliability risk.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy

According to their petition the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) is “a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council”. Clearly, they have a vested interest in affordability because it affects their competitiveness.  Coalition members include:

  • Buffalo Niagara Builders Association
  • Buffalo Niagara Manufacturing Alliance
  • Buffalo Niagara Partnership
  • Builders Exchange of the Southern Tier
  • Business Council of Westchester
  • Capitol Region Chamber of Commerce
  • Center for Economic Growth
  • Commercial Real Estate Development Association – Upstate Chapter
  • Construction Exchange of Buffalo and Western New York
  • Engineers Labor Employer Cooperative 825
  • Greater Binghamton Chamber of Commerce
  • Greater Rochester Association of REALTORS
  • Greater Rochester Chamber of Commerce
  • Manufacturers Alliance of New York
  • Manufacturers Association of Central New York
  • Manufacturers Association of the Southern Tier
  • Multiple Intervenors – An unincorporated association of approximately 55 large industrial, commercial, and institutional energy consumers with manufacturing and other facilities located throughout New York State
  • National Federation of Independent Businesses
  • New York State Association of Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors
  • New York State Builders Association
  • New York State Economic Development Council
  • Niagara USA Chamber of Commerce
  • North Country Chamber of Commerce
  • Northeastern Retail Lumber Association
  • Northeast Hearth, Patio and Barbecue Association
  • Power for Economic Prosperity – An active coalition of manufacturing companies that depend on low-cost hydropower from the New York Power Authority in order to maintain their operations in the Buffalo/Niagara Region.
  • Rochester Technology and Manufacturing Association
  • The Business Council of New York State – The leading business organization in New York State, representing the interests of large and small firms throughout the state. Its membership is made up of approximately 3,500 member companies, local chambers of commerce and professional and trade associations.
  • The Council of Industry, Manufacturers Association of the Hudson Valley
  • The Manufacturers Alliance of New York
  • Western New York Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors
  • Also included in the Coalition are Donna L. DeCarolis and Dennis W. Elsenbeck, both members of the state’s Climate Action Council established by the CLCPA. 

The Coalition petition provides a description of each of its members

Independent Intervenor Filing

For comparison purposes I will describe the Independent Intervenor filing submitted on August 12, 2025, first.  My first post described our main argument and the second post described the supporting exhibits.  In brief, Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  We argued the hearing was necessary because of the significant increase in arrears threshold has been exceeded.

Independent Intervenors – Affordability 

Exhibit 3 – Affordability-Focused Recommendations documents references to affordability and reliability recommendations in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) Document and Matter Management (DMM) System.  Rather than wading through the system I acknowledge the use of Perplexity (https://www.perplexity.ai/) to generate summaries and references included in the document.

The Perplexity summary provided the following key takeaway:

Since 2022, at least six concrete safeguards have been proposed in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) record to keep the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act affordable for households and businesses. They call for (1) rigorous public cost reporting, (2) objective “safety-valve” triggers under Public Service Law §66-p(4), (3) systematic pursuit of alternative funding, (4) expansion of low-income bill-protection programs, (5) transparent data dashboards, and (6) stricter benefit-cost and rate-design standards.

In my opinion, these safeguards haven’t been implemented well enough to ensure affordability.  There has been no DPS staff response to any of the calls to develop affordability triggers.

Independent Intervenors – Reliability

The biggest unresolved reliability risk associated with Climate Act implementation is addressed in Case 15-E-0302 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Implement a Large-Scale Renewable Program and Clean Energy Standard.  Responsible New York agencies all agree that new Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR) technologies are needed to make a solar and wind-reliant electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. 

Two exhibits addressed these reliability concerns.  To adequately address the amount of DEFR required it is necessary to determine how much is needed. Exhibit 4 – Resource Gap Characterization describes the challenges of defining the frequency, duration, and intensity of low wind and solar resource availability (known as dark doldrums) events.  One fundamental flaw in the Climate Act is the mistaken belief by the authors of the law that existing wind, solar, and energy storage resources would be sufficient and that no new technology would be required.  Exhibit 5 – Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources explains that this presumption is not correct. There is a need for a resource that is not currently commercially available.  This reliance on unknown solutions risks investments in false solutions and poses significant reliability risks. 

Coalition Filing

The Coalition petition states:

The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council (hereinafter referred to as the “Coalition”), hereby petitions the New York State Public Service Commission to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.

The preceding statement includes a footnote referencing the Independent Intervenor filing and another regulatory action that argued a heating was appropriate.  The Coalition lays out the basic argument:

 This Petition seeks Commission action authorized by the CLCPA. Recent evidence suggests that the Renewable Energy Program, and its associated renewable energy targets, may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service and upset the necessary balance of reliable, economic and sustainable energy in New York State. This evidence justifies commencement of the hearing process in PSL § 66-p (4), which will allow the Commission to determine whether the temporary suspension or modification of the Renewable Energy Program obligations is necessary to ensure the continued provision of safe and adequate electric service. Further, the Coalition believes that any hearing held pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) should examine the relationship between Renewable Energy Program costs and customer arrears.

The Executive Summary provides an excellent overview of the status of Climate Act implementation.

The CLCPA set extraordinarily ambitious targets for renewable energy generation in New York State, requiring that by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems and that by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. Recent data from the Commission demonstrates that New York will not achieve – or even come close to achieving – the 70% target by 2030. In addition, recent developments at the federal level impacting clean energy are likely to have a negative impact on renewable energy in the near term. With respect to the target of zero emissions by 2040, the necessary emission-free generation resources are not currently available at commercial scale. The inability of New York to develop the amount of renewable energy generation necessary to meet the 70% target by 2030, the increasing retirement of aging fossil-fuel generators due to the CLCPA, and the uncertainty surrounding the development of resources necessary to meet the zero emissions target by 2040, presents a reliability concern.

This concern is exacerbated by the fact that it may take more than two times the amount of certain forms of renewable generation to make up for the loss of one megawatt of fossil-fuel generation, and by expected increases in electric demand driven by the combination of new large loads and electrification.

Pursuant to the PSL, the Commission is required to ensure the provision of “safe and adequate” electric service. Renewable energy development has not kept pace with generator retirements, which has resulted in declining reliability margins across New York, jeopardizing electric reliability and safe and adequate service. In recognition that the Renewable Energy Program might negatively impact electric reliability, the CLCPA includes a safeguard that allows the Commission to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the program, after a hearing, if it makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service. Given recent evidence regarding delayed renewable energy generation and risks to reliability, the Commission should hold a hearing pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) to determine whether safe and adequate electric service in New York is impeded by the Renewable Energy Program and, if so, to appropriately modify or suspend the program’s obligations.

Discussion

Both filings argue that the PSC should convene a hearing to determine whether it is appropriate to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the Climate Act.  The Independent Intervenors argued that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded.  The Coalition makes a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.

The other difference is that the Independent Intervenors represent the views of four individuals whose credibility lies in our technical expertise. The Coalition consists primarily of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state whose credibility is based on its political and economic clout. 

Hopefully, the Coalition filing for a hearing will engender a response from the PSC.  There has been no hint of a response to the Independent Intervenor filing.  Perhaps the Coalition represents too big a constituency to ignore.

Some may say that the Coalition position is economically self-interested and therefore should be discounted.  They could also argue that the Independent Intervenors are not qualified to speak.  I think I can speak for both parties when I say we believe our concerns have never been openly discussed and addressed by the Hochul Administration.  All we want is the chance to make our case for the need to define affordability and reliability metrics that ensure safe, affordable, and adequate service.

Conclusion

I am encouraged that there is another group making similar arguments that the time has come to convene a hearing.  All my attempts have failed but maybe the Coalition will succeed in getting the PSC to convene a hearing.

My New York State 2026 RGGI Operating Plan Amendment Comments

I submitted comments on the 2025 Operating Plan Amendment (“Amendment”) for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).  This is the sixth time I have comments on Operating Plan amendments and this post summarizes my latest submittal.

Dealing with the RGGI regulatory and political landscapes is challenging enough that affected entities seldom see value in speaking out about fundamental issues associated with the program.  I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs, since the inception of those programs. I also participated in RGGI Auction 41 successfully winning allowances and holding them for several years.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Factsheet). It has been a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector since 2008.  New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021 but has since withdrawn, and Pennsylvania recently decided not to join. According to a RGGI website:

The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances that are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs.

Proceeds were invested in programs including energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy, beneficial electrification, greenhouse gas abatement and climate change adaptation, and direct bill assistance. Energy efficiency continued to receive the largest share of investments.

NYSERDA Operating Plan

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) designed and implemented a process to develop and annually update an Operating Plan which summarizes and describes the initiatives to be supported by RGGI auction proceeds.  The latest Draft RGGI Operating Plan Amendment explains that

 New York State uses RGGI proceeds to promote and implement programs for energy efficiency, renewable or non-carbon emitting technologies, and innovative carbon emissions abatement technologies with significant carbon reduction potential, in accordance with 21 NYCRR Part 507 and in compliance with the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).

This year, consistent with authorized RGGI uses, and to highlight the link between RGGI programmatic investments and core state priorities, we have organized our RGGI programmatic investments in terms of four themes, which are the following:

  • Affordability: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on creating affordable, efficient, healthy, and comfortable homes and workplaces by deploying commercially available energy efficiency, building electrification, and renewable energy technologies.
  • Energy abundance, diversity, and reliability: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on understanding and building out diverse energy options, including responsible renewable generation and storage, as well as modernizing energy system infrastructure, planning, and markets.
  • Energy innovation and economic development: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on supporting economic growth and competitiveness, including enabling job, tax revenue, and supply chain growth; stimulating entrepreneurship and company growth in New York; and expanding public-private partnerships and investments.
  • Thriving communities and environments: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on helping New Yorkers equitably participate and share in the benefits of the clean energy future; ensuring the energy transition provides meaningful benefits to local communities and disadvantaged communities; and improving climate resiliency and adaptation and public and environmental health.

Investment Priorities and RGGI Compliance

As far as I can tell I have submitted comments on six amendments to the Operating Plan.  Given my decades-long emission and allowance reporting responsibilities in the electric sector, it is not surprising that the primary concern in all my comments has been related to compliance obligations.  In my opinion, NYSERDA ignores the fact that RGGI is not just a pot of money to exploit but is at its core a pollution control program that includes compliance obligations for electric generating units in the program.   This year is particularly important because of the more stringent RGGI caps proposed in the 6 NYCRR Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program amendments that I discussed recently.

The compliance challenge is illustrated in Figure 1.  Relative to the three baseline years before RGGI started New York RGGI emission are down 33%.  The primary reason for the observed reduction is due to fuel switching from coal and oil to natural gas.  I believe that the fuel price differential for natural gas use was much greater than the added cost of RGGI allowances, so the main driver of the observed reductions was economic fuel switching.   Also note that this option is not available anymore.

Figure 1: New York State Emissions by Fuel Type

NYSERDA RGGI Funding Emission Savings

The estimated emission savings from historical NYSERDA investments are described in the Semi-Annual Status Report through December 2024.  The description states that:

This report is prepared pursuant to the State’s RGGI Investment Plan (2024 Operating Plan) and provides an update on the progress of programs through the quarter ending December 31, 2024. It contains an accounting of program spending; an estimate of program benefits; and a summary description of program activities, implementation, and evaluation. An amendment providing updated program descriptions and funding levels for the 2024 version of the Operating Plan was approved by NYSERDA’s Board in January 2025.

Table 1 is a copy of Table 1 in the latest full-year Semi-Annual Status Report.  It summarizes the effectiveness of the NYSERDA investments and lists expected cumulative portfolio benefits including emissions savings.

Table 1. Summary of Expected Cumulative Portfolio Benefits through December 31, 2024

Comparison of NYSERDA Cumulative Emissions Savings to Observed Emission Reductions

Table 2 presents the relevant data to compare the observed reductions and NYSERDA RGGI investment emission savings.  I list the last five years of data starting in 2019 when the emissions went up because of the closure of Indian Point.  Reductions from the 2006-2008 average baseline are listed.  The emissions savings listed are cumulative annual emissions.  If the RGGI proceeds were invested, then the total emissions would be higher by the amount of the savings.  The total cumulative annual emission savings through the end of 2023 is only 1,976,101 tons and that represents a reduction of 4.2% from the pre-RGGI baseline.  Emission reductions by fuel type clearly show that fuel switching is the primary cause of reductions.

Table 2: NY Electric Generating Unit Emissions, NYSERDA GHG Emission Savings from RGGI Investments, and Emissions by Fuel Type

New York RGGI Program Investment Reductions

Another finding that has been ignored or possibly covered up by NYSERDA is the poor emission reduction cost effectiveness of NYSERDA investments.  Table 3 lists data from Semi-Annual Status Report through December 2024 Table 2.  The report presents “expected quantifiable benefits related to carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) reductions, energy savings, and participant energy bill savings with expended and encumbered funds” but I only considered the CO2e reductions.  Note that the emission savings evaluated in the report include carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide that are not included in RGGI.  I did not use “lifetime” savings data because I am trying to compare the RGGI program benefits emission savings reductions to the RGGI compliance metric of an annual emission cap.  Lifetime reductions are clearly irrelevant.  The observed cost per ton of emissions savings is $583.

Table 3: RGGI Funding Status Report Table 2: Summary of Total Expected Cumulative Annual Program Benefits

Program Benefit Impacts on RGGI

I categorized programs relative to RGGI compliance obligation support based on the Semi-Annual Status Report through December 2024.  The table breaks down the program allocations and expected annualized CO2 savings for three categories: direct reductions to RGGI sources, indirect reductions, and those programs that will increase electric generating emissions. An example of a program that increases RGGI emissions is NYSERDA’s Clean Transportation Program that “has been pursuing five strategies to promote EV adoption by consumers and fleets across New York”.   The emission reductions claimed are from decreased internal combustion engine vehicles, so the reductions do not reflect reductions in RGGI electric generating units.  In addition, increased electricity for charging will require RGGI facilities to operate more thus increasing their emissions.

The results in the Funding Status reports summarized in Table 4 show that since the start of the program NYSERDA has allocated $101.6 million to programs that directly reduce utility emissions achieving emission savings of 202,422 tons, $1,007.6 million for programs that indirectly reduce utility emissions savings by 1,634,000 tons, and $178.5 million for programs that will increase utility emissions by 395,152 tons.  When emissions savings from non-RGGI sources are removed, total savings are 1,827,575 tons instead of 2,221,757.

Table 4: Summary of Expected Cumulative Annualized Program Benefits through 31 December 2024 for Programs that Directly, Indirectly, or Do Not Affect RGGI CO2 Emissions

Reduction Potentials

I evaluated the potential effectiveness of the proposed funding allocations relative to RGGI compliance support.  I reviewed each proposed program and classified each program into six categories of potential RGGI source emission reductions.  The first three categories covered programs that directly, indirectly or could potentially decrease RGGI-affected source emissions.  I also included a category for programs that will add load that could potentially increase RGGI source emissions such as programs to incentivize electrification.  The two other categories considered programs that do not affect emissions and administrative costs respectively.

The results are in Table 5.  The first three categories cover programs that directly, indirectly, or could potentially decrease RGGI-affected source emissions and account for 53% of investments which is up sharply from the 2025 Amendment which only allotted 31% of the investments. This positive development occurred because Empower+ funding doubled and the Retrofit Challenges Programs funding increased sharply.  Programs that will add load that could potentially increase RGGI source emissions and whose emissions savings are unrelated to the electric sector total 20% of the investments.  Programs that do not affect emissions are funded with 18% of the proceeds and administrative costs total another 9%.  The increased preference for funding that could reduce RGGI emissions is a good development.  On the other hand, Administration costs are 8.8% of the total and programs that have nothing to do with emissions total 18%.  In my opinion, those are programs that should be funded from other sources.

Table 5: Potential for RGGI Reductions for Funding Allocations for 2025 Operating Plan Amendments

RGGI Compliance Summary

Figure 1 shows that no further fuel switching emission reductions are available.  Affected sources have no remaining options to comply with RGGI mandates other than limiting operations.  Future emission reductions are only possible if zero-emission resources displace the generation of RGGI-affected sources.  However, there is a complicating factor that makes emphasis on reducing RGGI-affected emissions more important.  The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) recently announced revisions to 6 NYCRR Part 242 – CO2 Budget Trading Program the regulation that sets the New York RGGI allowance cap. 

Comparison of the revised cap starting in 2027 with the New York State Energy Plan shows that in 2029 projected emissions are double the RGGI cap.  Table 10 lists projections starting in 2027 that range from 49.3 to 40.3 MMT.  The 2023 observed emissions from RGGI sources was 28.7 MMT.  Table 6 lists the proposed RGGI cap or limit on tons of CO2 permitted.  There is a big difference between the Pathways Analysis projection and the RGGI cap.  There are some mitigating factors because of the Climate Act accounting methodology, but I believe that the Pathways Analysis emissions are well more than the cap.

Table 6: Comparison of RGGI Proposed Part 242 Cap and State Energy Plan Pathways Analysis Electric Power Scenario Projections

Discussion

My primary concern is that RGGI is an electric sector emissions reduction program.  I have shown that the observed electric sector emission trends indicate that the observed reductions occurred because of fuel switching from coal and oil to natural gas and that there are no more fuel switching opportunities. Therefore, programs that materially decrease electric sector emissions directly or indirectly through energy use reductions should be a priority because affected sources have no other compliance options. There are programs in the amendment that do not meet these criteria.  It is only appropriate to fund the non-priority programs if sufficient funding has been allocated to make the emission reductions necessary to meet RGGI compliance mandates.  

These results should be used to determine funding priorities.  There are significant differences in the expected emission reductions for different programs and that should also be considered when allocating revenues.  While the fraction of funding allocations that could potentially decrease RGGI source emissions has gone up I think that more emphasis is needed to assure compliance and avert compliance problems.

Conclusion

NYSERDA has treated RGGI allowance auction revenues as a convenient slush fund totaling 18% of total funding for whatever politically connected program needs money.  As a result, investments that reduce emissions and support those most impacted by increased costs received less funding.

Economic Justification for Installing Rooftop Solar Arrays in Downstate New York

Richard Ellenbogen has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County.  His factory has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system.   This post describes  his recent report: “An Economic Justification for Installing Rooftop Solar Arrays in The Con Ed Service Area – Even Without The Investment Tax Credit” (“Economic Justification”).

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy.  I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen.  He has no financial interest in any solar fabrication or installation company, so has no monetary interest in the results.

Caveat:  I acknowledge that the following article includes section plagiarized from the Economic Justification document.

Overview

Richard Ellenbogen is President of Allied Converters, a plastic packaging converter that manufactures flexible plastic bags, sheets, rolls, and related film products, primarily for food and gift packaging markets.  Allied installed one of the first commercial solar arrays in the downstate region in 2007 with a 50-Kilowatt (KW) DC rated array being activated on September 29, 2007.  When the system was installed, he added monitoring and data collection systems so that he has 18 years of operational data.

Based on that information he has prepared a comprehensive Economic Justification showing how installing rooftop solar arrays on medium and large buildings operated in New York City and Long Island will be cost effective, even after the recent cancellation of the investment tax credit for solar arrays.  He shows that “Returns on Investment (ROI) comparable to the 10% – 12% ROI promised by Bernie Madoff are achievable, except it is legal.”  He explains that the justification works for customers in downstate New York because the rate increases

have been so egregious over the past 18 years.

The analysis is based on a few assumptions.  The analysis assumes a $3.00 per watt installed cost for the array, minimal shading of the solar array, and the ability to use all the energy within the location where it is generated or have solar net metering so retail cost is applied to all electric energy generated. The calculations also are based upon no government monetary support for the installation beyond solar net metering and a tax rate of 30% to calculate depreciation of the asset. However, the numbers show that the installations will be cost effective even for entities that cannot depreciate the assets.

The document includes a twelve page economic justification description and four appendices. 

Appendix 1 provides the depreciation schedule for a $150,000 solar array for a business with a 30% tax rate.  Appendix 2 explains Line Loss.  Appendix 3 – documents the 2008 Allied Converter Solar Net Metering Tariff Petition for a Declaratory Ruling on the administration of solar net metering provisions at locations where multiple (hybrid) energy efficient generation technologies are installed.  Finally, Appendix 4  provides the data for Figure 8

Allied Solar Array

Allied Converters is in New Rochelle, NY in the Consolidate Edison (Con Ed) service area, about 17 miles from Times Square. It is a 55,000 square foot building with a 23,000 Square foot upper roof. Allied installed a 50 KW DC rated array in 2007 (Figure 1).  Ellenbogen explains:

When the solar array was installed, the cost ($10/watt) made the total array cost $500,000 before rebates and tax credits. NYSERDA (NY State Energy Research and Development Authority) rebates at that time were very generous as were Federal and State Tax Credits. If they hadn’t been, no one would have installed an array and NYSERDA wanted data on the arrays. 18 years ago, NYSERDA actually did cutting edge energy research, as its name implies, and did not do science devoid energy proselytizing. The net cost of arrays installed on commercial facilities can be depreciated, after subtracting the tax credits and rebates. The depreciated cost of the 50 KW array at the factory was approximately $180,000.

Figure 1: Allied Factory and Solar Array

As a business owner Ellenbogen recognized that installing the array was not a good business decision but as an engineer he was curious about capability of the technology.   Under normal circumstances, the investment would not have been a positive investment until this year 18 years after it was installed. However, Ellenbogen took advantage of a Washington D.C. Solar Renewable Energy Credit (SREC) program for out of District solar arrays.  He applied as soon as the offer opened and became one of five out of District arrays with access to the SREC payments. Even though this source of income is no longer available the situation has changed.   Array costs have decreased by 70% and utility costs per KWh in the Con Ed service area have increased by 66% since 2007 from 14.9 cents to 24.75 cents for commercial entities.

The analysis described below is based on data recorded since the installation of the array.  This is not a theoretical assessment because it uses data that reflects weather conditions and maintenance issues.

Responsible Solar Development

I am publicizing this report because I think it represents responsible solar development.  Ellenbogen describes several advantages of this type of development.  Rooftop solar arrays on  medium and large buildings use the energy where it is generated which eliminates line loss.  Line loss occurs because wires are not perfect conductors.  As is the case with many aspects of the energy transition, line loss becomes more of a problem when energy is needed most because when wire gets hotter the resistance that causes line loss increases.  Appendix 2 in the Economic Justification explains line loss in detail.  He points out that summer peak loads occur when temperatures are highest making on-site generation more advantageous.

He describes three other advantages.  There is no need to build additional transmission infrastructure.  Medium and large buildings can use all the power produced so there is no need for storage to provide usable energy.  Finally, using rooftops means that there is no loss of farmland or environmentally sensitive land for solar development.

I would add another advantage.  In areas with a lot of solar generation, output at peak times is frequently large enough that it stresses grid operations, can force renewable curtailment at midday, and complicates economics for dispatchable plants needed when solar is unavailable.  These installations will typically not cause negative net-metering impacts because they use the power generated and displace load from the grid. 

Array Degradation and Utility Costs

Ellenbogen’s justification is based on his observed solar array data and utility costs.  I found the solar array data interesting:

It is well known that solar arrays lose their effectiveness as they age. During its first year of operation in 2008, the array produced 60,000 KWh. This past year, 18 years after it was installed, the annual output has dropped to 46,500 KWh. That is an average decrease of 1.5% per year, or 760 KWh/year. The graph in Figure 3 shows the 365-day output over time. It starts in September 2008, 365 days after the array was turned on. Each data point is the sum of the prior 365 days of solar output. The steep vertical lines are either snow on the array, a period of high cloud cover (falling), or the effect of normal array operation a year later with no snow or cloud cover (rising).

Ellenbogen provides detailed utility cost information.  In brief, he notes:

Just the opposite of falling solar array output has been the increase in utility costs over the same period. Commercial utility bills have two components. There is a “Demand” charge that reflects the maximum Kilowatt Usage over two 15-minute periods during the billing month. Then there is a “Usage” charge that is based upon how many Kilowatt-Hours (KWh) are used in a given month. Many of the surcharges are based upon KWh usage also. Because solar arrays are intermittent, they do not affect the demand charge. They only reduce the KWh usage. In 2009, subtracting the demand charge from the total electric bill yielded a KWh cost of $0,149 per KWh, including surcharges and related taxes. Doing the same calculation in 2025 resulted in a per KWh cost of $0.2475. That is an average increase in the KWh cost of 3% annually each year for the past 17 years. Because the array output is dropping by 1.5% annually and the utility rates are increasing by 3% annually, the dollar energy savings per year from the array’s output is actually increasing.

Solar Array Cost Justification

I am not going to discuss the details of the economic justification.  I don’t have the appropriate economic background to provide any insight, but the numbers seem to speak for themselves.  I will note that he mentions that his original intent was only to demonstrate the analysis for taxable corporations but later determined that the utility rate increases have been so high that the deploying solar arrays will be “cost effective for anyone in the downstate area that can use the full energy output of their solar array or benefit from solar net metering and can install the array for $3.00/watt.” 

Discussion

Ellenbogen found that “Over a period of 28 years, a 13% annual return on investment is possible in the Con Ed Service Area from installing rooftop solar and if energy costs increase as they have for the past five years, higher returns than that will be likely. “  His analysis assumed no Investment Tax Credit and no government financial assistance of any kind beyond solar net metering.

There are couple of implications of this conclusion.  I am not a fan of solar net metering because of its negative effects on the grid and the fact that ratepayers who do not have their own arrays subsidize the resources necessary to keep the grid operating.  Buildings with sufficient load will typically not cause negative net-metering impacts because they use the power generated.  They save money by displacing the energy that they would have had to purchase from the utility equivalent to the net-metering price. 

The second implication is that it is no longer necessary to provide installation subsidies in Downstate New York.  Ellenbogen’s justification is based on actual data.  The calculations err on the conservative side based upon a higher rate of array degradation than is likely to occur with a new array. The results clearly show that “without government assistance of any kind, those that can install a rooftop solar array under conditions near those used for the model will see a significant annual return on investment.”  I must emphasize the point that this works for “conditions near those used for the model”.  I can assure you that solar availability is significantly better than anywhere Upstate that is influenced by lake-effect clouds and snow.  I doubt that same cost-effectiveness results in the lake-effect cloud belt.

Ellenbogen makes the case for solar deployment as investments.  He explains:

Past performance is no guarantee of future results; however NY State policy makers have proven to be reliably bad in this regard which will likely guarantee the higher utility rates.  As a comparison, the S&P has returned 10% – 10.5% over the past 30 years and the Dow Jones has had an ROI of between 9.3% and 10.4% over that time frame. NY State’s predictability at implementing policies that will increase energy costs makes the solar arrays a more risk-free investment than the financial markets for anyone that has a shade free roof.

Conclusion

On one hand rooftop solar proponents could be encouraged that the Economic Justification demonstrates a strong case for deploying rooftop solar on large Downstate roofs that are not shaded.  This helps the electric grid because these installations will shave peak loads because these facilities will require last energy.  On the other hand, the primary driver of cost effectiveness is what I think are unsustainable electric rates now and increasing in the future. Ellenbogen’s concludes: “The models should also be a warning to state policy makers to show how their regulations are driving utility rates to a point where they will be entirely unaffordable within two decades.”