Category: Climate Act

January 23-27 Winter Storm NY Grid Impacts Prove DEFR is Necessary

My last post took an  initial look at the impact of the January 23-27 winter storm on wind and solar energy production.  This post shows that this type of weather event shows  dispatchable  emissions free  resources (DEFR) are necessary to achieve net-zero in New York.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.. 

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

I relied on two sources of New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data for this analysis.  New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  The second source of data is the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report prepared by the NYISO Operating Committee.  I looked at data from January 22-31, 2026 to bound conditions before the storm and after.  Note that the cold weather went into February but the Metrics Report data for February are not available yet.

NYISO Daily Energy Production

As noted in my previous post, the dashboard real-time fuel mix data includes links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State that I used to calculate daily energy use (MWh).  I also used the NYISO  January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  Figure 1 from that document breaks out the wind, utility-scale solar, also known as Front of the Meter (FTM) solar, and the rooftop top solar, also known as Behind the Meter (BTM) solar total daily production and capacity factors.  Multiplying the capacity factor by the current capacity determines the daily energy production.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Table 1 combines data from the two NYISO sources to list daily energy production.  The generator types include real-time fuel mix data base “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil. Two renewables are shown. “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind from the NYISO real-time fuel mix data base.  That source is also used for “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood.  However,  in this table, I subtracted the FTM solar data from the January Performance Metric Report.  Both the BTM solar and FTM solar are derived from that report.  As an aside, I contacted NYISO to get the actual data for these parameters but did not get a response so I extractoplated values from Figure 1.

Table 1: Daily NYISO Energy Production (MWh) January 22 to January 31, 2026

Table 2 consists of three smaller tables.  On the left,  capacity factors obtained from Figure 1 are listed for each day of the episode.  At the top, resource capacity (MW) from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report are listed for solar and wind resources.  The main body of the table lists the calculated renewable daily energy (MWh) for each parameter and the renewable percentage of the total system energy that I calculated using the real-time fuel mix data.  The most notable finding in this table is the observation that there were eight consecutive days when the total wind and solar production was 6% or less than maximum possible energy production.

Table 2: Capacity Factors Derived from Figure 5, Resource Capacity (MW) from Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report, and Calculated Renewable Daily Energy (MWh)

Note the differences in wind production in these tables.  Table 1 uses the estimated real-time fuel mix data and Table 2 the Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  The differences are due to my real-time averaging assumptions and crude interpolation of values from Figure 1.  While these energy production values are not precise, using the correct values will not change the conclusions.

Projections

These results can be used to evaluate projections made for the generating resources necessary to meet the 2040 100% zero emissions electric generation mandate. Table 3 lists the projected 2040 capacity (MW) for four scenarios.  I have included one from the NYISO, the primary projection from the Scoping Plan, and two “Net Zero” scenarios from the draft Energy Plan last summer.  These scenarios represent four ways to achieve the 2040 mandate.

Table 3: Projected Electric Resource Capacity in 2040.

I estimated the daily energy production for the projected generating resources in Table 3. Daily production equals the capacity in MW times the capacity factor times 24 hours in the day. Capacity factors were derived from the real-time fuel mix or taken from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report data in Table 2.  I estimated the 2040 daily energy production for each scenario by multiplying those factors by the Table 3 resource capacities.

Table 4 is an example of the daily production for January 22, 2026.  Note that consistent with the zero-emissions mandate there are no fossil fuel (Gas and Fuel Oil) emissions.  Consistent with the NYISO projection for the winter peak no imported hydro generation is included.  I calculated the battery storage energy production by multiplying the projected capacity times four hours (the current default discharge time).  This assumption is included every day but note that if the batteries need to be charged using renewables there are instances where there would not be insufficient energy to recharge the batteries.  This is a good example of the nuances that a NYISO detailed analysis can include.

Table 4: Daily Production (MWh) for January 22, 2026

The goal was to compare the observed daily observed energy load in Table 1 against the projected energy projection in Table 4 to see if the resources provided enough energy to cover the observed generation load from the real-time fuel mix data during the conditions of the January 2026 storm.  I did not have ready access to imports and exports so could not calculate the total system load.  The results are presented in the following three tables.  Each table lists the estimated total daily production minus the observed daily energy load for each scenario.  If there is a deficit, then the results are highlighted in red.  That means there would be a resource availability crisis which would require imports beyond what occurred on those days and load shedding to prevent a blackout.  

Table 5 lists daily projected energy production minus the observed load on each day during this episode.  Because there are no existing dispatchable emissions free resources (DEFR) the methodology assumes no production from those resources.  There are five days when none of the projected resource scenarios prevent a deficit.

Table 5: Projected Daily Energy Production Minus Current Energy Load (MWh) – Without DEFR Capacity

Table 6 lists daily projected energy production minus the estimated 2040 load on each day during this episode. The 2025 Load & Capacity Data Report aka Gold Book states that:

The New York electric system is projected to become a winter peaking system in future decades due to electrification, primarily from space heating and EVs. The timing of a crossover to a dual-peaking or winter peaking system is uncertain, and mainly influenced by the timing and composition of heating electrification.

 I estimated the 2040 future load by prorating the observed load by the 2025-26 baseline winter coincident peak demand forecast and the 2040-41 forecast loads using Table I-1d: Summary of NYCA Baseline Winter Coincident Peak Demand Forecasts in the Gold Book.  Because there are no existing dispatchable emissions free resources (DEFR) the methodology assumes no production from those resources.  Not surprisingly, after the storm hit on January 24 none of the projected resource scenarios prevent a deficit of energy production without DEFR resources..

Table 6: Projected Daily Energy Production Minus 2040 Projected Energy Load (MWh) – Without DEFR Capacity

This preliminary analysis shows that DEFR is necessary. Table 7 lists daily projected energy production with the projected DEFR capacity operating minus the estimated 2040 load on each day during this episode. For the results shown, I assumed the capacity factor was 85%.  Because no DEFR technology has been identified the capacity factor value is arbitrary.  I found that if the capacity factor was equal or greater than 85% all the emissions-free mandate scenarios except “Net Zero B” shows a surplus of energy production.  Net Zero B never shows a surplus even with a 100% capacity factor.

Table 7: Projected Capacity Daily Energy Totals (MWh) – Projected 2040 Loads with DEFR Capacity at 85%

Dark Doldrum and DEFR

The most notable finding in Table 2 is the observation that there were eight consecutive days when the total New York wind and solar production was 6% or less than maximum possible energy production.  This is a perfect example of what the Germans call “Dunkelflaute”.  That term refers to dark doldrums period when solar is reduced due to the length of day or clouds and there are light winds.  This event was exacerbated by the snowstorm that covered solar panels with enough snow to eliminate production (Figure 1).  Note that most rooftop solar in New York City is essentially flat so snow cover is a significant issue.  In this case the episode was exacerbated by the snow depth, a crust of ice from a glaze of freezing rain that occurred at the end of the storm ,and the subsequent period of prolonged sub-freezing weather. Perhaps we should amend the worst weather label to “snowy dark doldrums”.

These conditions are the fundamental driver of the need for DEFR.  It is disappointing that the clean energy advocates have continued to argue that the size of the DEFR gap has been overstated even after all the agencies responsible for electric system reliability argue otherwise.  These results should put those arguments to rest.

Discussion

Isaac Orr and Mitch Rolling explain that there is another planning issue besides DEFR:

Most public discussions about renewables focus on energy production, but power systems are built around reliability during peak demand. Once you look at the grid through the lens of accredited capacity, that is, capacity that can be relied upon during peak demand—instead of annual energy, the resource allocations for different technologies look radically different.  This is the energy vs. capacity distinction that most renewable resource debates miss.

The large projected wind and solar capacities do no good when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow.  This period exemplifies a period where that situation is evident even in this preliminary assessment.  I have no doubt that NYISO staff will eventually evaluate these data in a more refined analysis because of its importance to planning policy.  Their results will only differ in degree but I believe will conclusively show that DEFR is necessary.  They may also show when DEFR is necessary as more renewables come online and existing dispatchable resources are shut down.

Conclusion

On January 31, 2026, the total renewable energy production was 2% of the potential amount available because of the weather conditions and there were at least eight consecutive days when the production was less than 6%.  These are the conditions that require DEFR.  Without that resource, intermittent, diffuse, and correlated electric generating resources are not viable.

January 23-27 Winter Storm NY Grid Impacts

The recent winter storm stressed electric systems across the country. It also offers electric resource planners an opportunity to examine the impacts of future increased use of renewable energy during high-load conditions.  This article takes an initial look at the potential impact of such a weather event on the existing New York renewable resources.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.. 

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

This is a good case study for a New York extreme event that must be addressed by electric system planners.  Although the data are for New York, this is a universal problem.  It is only a matter of degree.

I relied on two sources of New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data for this analysis.  New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  The second source of data is the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report prepared by the NYISO Operating Committee.  I looked at data from January 22-31, 2026 to bound conditions before the storm and after.  Note that the cold weather went into February but the Metrics Report data for February are not available yet.

NYISO Real-Time Fuel Mix

The dashboard real-time fuel mix data includes links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State.  I processed that data to calculate hourly averages.  The generator types include “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind; “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil.

Figure 1 graphs all the fuel mix hourly data and Table 1 summarizes the data. The relative average fuel mix energy provided over these ten days was nuclear 18%, hydro 14%, and fossil fuels 61%.  New York’s efforts to transition to renewables yielded only 7% of the total.  In addition, the wind capacity ranged from 6% of the possible production to 96%, but 25% of the time the production was less than a quarter of possible production.

Figure 1: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix January 22 to January 31, 2026

Table 1: Summary of Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Data Mix January 22 to January 31, 2026

These data do not show the contribution of wind and solar well.  “Other Renewables” includes solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood. The methane, refuse and wood facilities show up as the relatively constant base in Figure 3.  Making the assumption that the 63 MW of energy storage is too small to show up on this graph, that means that the utility-scale “front-of-the-meter” solar shows up as the daily peaks on the first three days.  The snow arrived in New York on the night of 24 January and continued through the next day.  Note that utility solar was essentially zero on the 25th and did not return to the level of the 22nd until the 31st.

Figure 3: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix Other Renewables and Wind January 22 to January 31, 2026

Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

I used the January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report for this analysis.  There is a lot of information in these reports that is relative to the prospects for a successful Climate Act transition.  So much that I am going to defer that discussion for a later post.  For this post I am only going to highlight a couple of results presented in the report.

The report includes a graph of net wind and solar performance total monthly production and capacity factors (Figure 4).  On average the higher solar output in the summer balances out the lower wind resources in the summer.  Winter total renewable resources are lower, and wind does somewhat offset the low solar output. 

Figure 4: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Monthly Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Figure 5 is most important for this analysis because it breaks out the wind, utility-scale solar, also known as Front of the Meter (FTM) solar, and the rooftop top solar, also known as Behind the Meter (BTM) solar total daily production and capacity factors.  Note that these data support the assumption that the daily peaks represent utility-scale production output in Figure 3.  These data show that FTM solar has a higher output than the BTM solar.  There is no question that the January snowstorm severely impacted solar output for days. 

Figure 5: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Table 2 consists of three smaller tables.  On the left,  capacity factors derived from Figure 5 are listed for each day of the episode.  At the top, resource capacity (MW) from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report are listed for solar and wind resources.  The main body of the table lists the calculated renewable daily energy (MWh) for each parameter and the renewable percentage of the total system energy that I calculated using the real-time fuel mix data. 

Table 2: Capacity Factors Derived from Figure 5, Resource Capacity (MW) from Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report, and Calculated Renewable Daily Energy (MWh)

The total renewable output in Table 2 is an important finding.  On average, wind resources counterbalance low winter solar resource availability.  However, during dark doldrums when the wind fails renewable resources plummet.  This storm also shows that the critical renewable resource period is best described as snowy dark doldrums.

Discussion

I contacted NYISO to get the actual data for these parameters but did not get a response.  I have no doubt that NYISO staff will eventually evaluate these data in a similar fashion because of its importance to planning policy.  Their results will only differ in degree but will conclusively show that DEFR is necessary.  They may also show when DEFR is necessary as more renewables come on line and existing dispatchable resources are shut down.

The NYISIO “Gold Book” has noted that New York will become a winter peaking system depending upon the timing and composition of heating electrification.  This will exacerbate the correlation problem between peak loads and dark doldrum low renewable resource availability.  There has not been a similar snowstorm since the deployment of significant amounts of BTM solar in New York City so this is the first unsurprising confirmation that snow can severely impact solar production when the solar panels are installed on flat roofs.

Figure 6: View of BTM Solar in New York City

Conclusion

On January 31, 2026 the total renewable energy production was 2% of the potential amount available.  That was because of the weather conditions.  No amount of additional capacity is going to be able to substantively improve that percentage.  Intermittent, diffuse, and correlated electric generating resources are incompatible with electric system reliability when needed most.

On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.  Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  These results are another indication that it is time to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

NYISO Climate Act Concerns

I was recently asked to give a briefing about Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) issues. While preparing my presentation I used Perplexity AI to generate a review of the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) concerns with the Climate Act.  This article provides background documentation based on the response to that query.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim targets is a 2030 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and a 2040 zero emissions requirement that are of particular concern to the NYISO.

I prepared a power point presentation for the briefing with supporting documentation that discussed Climate Act issues that need to be addressed.  The New York’s Legislative annual session revolves around  enacting the state’s April 1 budget.  The budget is an executive‑budget model which means that the Governor can stick in policy legislation like the Climate Act.  In my last post I described issues that the legislature should address this session.  This article describes concerns that the NYISO has with the Climate Act that supports my belief that the Public Service Commission (PSC) should conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act because there are observed threats to reliability that threaten safe and adequate service.

Perplexity Summary

I used Perplexity AI to generate the following summaries of NYISO concerns.

Tightening reliability margins and resource adequacy

NYISO’s long‑term reliability and resource adequacy studies show that reserve margins are thinning as fossil units retire faster than new, firm replacement capacity and transmission arrive.

They point to:

  • A net loss of dispatchable capacity since the CLCPA was passed: several gigawatts of fossil capacity have retired while additions are largely intermittent renewables and limited-duration storage.
  • Projections in their Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP) and Reliability Needs Assessments that show:
    • Declining reliability margins in New York City and downstate.
    • Potential statewide shortfalls later in the 2020s/early 2030s if retirements continue at the current pace and clean resources, storage, and transmission are delayed.
  • Concern that the system is increasingly reliant on emergency procedures (demand response, voltage reductions, etc.) to meet resource adequacy criteria on peak days, which is not a sustainable operating strategy.

In short, CLCPA‑driven retirements and environmental constraints (e.g., peaker rule) are moving faster than the build‑out of firm, deliverable alternatives, tightening margins to what NYISO characterizes as “concerning” levels.

Coordination of fossil retirements with new entry

NYISO has repeatedly emphasized that fossil generator retirements must be carefully coordinated with the timing and performance of new resources:

  • They support the CLCPA recommendation to “retire fossil resources gradually and safely,” but warn that mandatory retirement schedules or environmental rules that force large blocks of capacity off the system by fixed dates, without assured replacement, can create reliability violations.
  • In New York City in particular, they highlight that:
    • Peaker rule and other environmental closures remove capacity that is both local and fast‑responding.
    • Replacement capacity must satisfy local transmission security and deliverability constraints, not just nameplate MW.
  • NYISO worries that policy and permitting processes affecting existing plants are often decided without a concrete, tested replacement portfolio in place, leaving them to fill gaps reactively through backstop reliability arrangements.

Their concern is not simply “don’t retire fossil,” but “do not retire fossil faster than the system can absorb given actual, not theoretical, replacements.”

Dependence on a few critical transmission projects

CLCPA strategies assume large amounts of new clean generation, including upstate renewables and Canadian hydro, will be deliverable to downstate load via specific major transmission projects. NYISO’s reliability plans highlight:

  • Heavy reliance on timely completion of projects like Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) and other major bulk upgrades.
  • Findings that, without these projects in service on schedule, New York City’s reliability margins become extremely small or turn deficient for much of the 10‑year planning horizon.
  • Concern that delays or cancellations of such projects (or of offshore wind transmission solutions) leave the state with policy commitments that cannot be supported by the physical grid.

So one core concern is that the CLCPA architecture implicitly assumes a best‑case transmission build‑out path; NYISO’s studies are essentially saying, “If those assumptions slip, reliability breaks.”

Operational challenges from high levels of intermittent renewables

NYISO accepts that the CLCPA implies a massive increase in weather‑dependent resources, but highlights that:

  • High penetrations of wind and solar increase uncertainty in net load forecasts, requiring:
    • More operating reserves.
    • New reserve products (e.g., “uncertainty” or “dynamic” reserves) to cover forecast error and fast ramps.
  • Studies of high‑renewables scenarios show:
    • Substantial increases in required installed reserve margins to maintain the same loss‑of‑load expectation.
    • Need for significant quantities of flexible, fast‑ramping resources, including storage and responsive demand, to manage multi‑hour ramps and multi‑day low‑renewables events.
  • The system will be more exposed to extreme weather—heat waves and cold snaps—at the same time that dispatchable fossil capacity is reduced, increasing the risk that the system crosses a “tipping point” where it cannot serve load during stress events.

In other words, the CLCPA’s heavy reliance on intermittent resources forces a fundamental redesign of operating reserve and capacity constructs; NYISO’s concern is that policy timelines assume this redesign and the necessary resources will be ready and deliverable in time.

Need for “firm, zero‑emissions” and long‑duration solutions (technology gap)

NYISO has started to stress that, to meet CLCPA’s 2040 zero‑emissions grid requirement while staying reliable, New York will need:

  • Significant quantities of “firm, zero‑emission” capacity (e.g., hydrogen‑capable turbines, advanced nuclear, long‑duration storage, carbon capture, or other technologies that can run through multi‑day renewable droughts).
  • Far more total installed capacity by 2040 than today—often characterized as roughly three times current capacity—once electrification (buildings, transport, industry) and higher reserve needs are included.

Their concern is that:

  • The CLCPA and Scoping Plan implicitly assume large volumes of such technologies will be available, cost‑effective, and sited in New York by 2040, but there is no clear, concrete procurement or market framework yet that ensures they appear.
  • Current market designs and state programs are heavily tuned to 20‑year REC‑backed wind and solar, not to capital‑intensive firm resources with different risk profiles.

So NYISO is effectively warning of a technology and market design gap between what CLCPA requires in the 2030s–2040s and what is actually under contract or in queues today.

Documentation for NYISO Issues

The Perplexity AI response to my concerns of NYISO about Climate Act goals also generated a spreadsheet table of specific issues that lists the Issue Area, NYISO Document, Specific NYISO Finding/Concern, CLCPA Statutory Provision, CAC Scoping Plan Assumption/Strategy, Gap/Disconnect, and Talking Point for identified problems.  The following sections describe the NYISO documents that address specific NYISO findings and concerns listed in the spreadsheet.

NYISO has identified issues with resource adequacy associated with declining margins in multiple reports.  The 2025 Power Trends noted that there has been a net loss of 2,041 MW since the Climate Act was enacted (4,315 MW retired, 2,274 MW added).  The Executive Summary in the 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) Report explains that statewide resource margins are declining so fast that by 2034 there will be no surplus power without further development.  The 2025 Q3 Short-Term Assessment of Reliability (STAR) Report identified a New York City (NYC) Zone J reliability need beginning in summer 2027 that requires peaker units that have been scheduled for retirement to be retained.

The timing of fossil retirements vs new entry timing is also an NYISO concern.  The 2025 Power Trends document noted that fossil retirements are outpacing new supply additions since 2021.

The 2024 RNA Report notes that the NYC reliability need in 2033 is driven by faster generator retirements than replacement resource development.  The 2025 Q3 STAR Report noted that the NYC Peaker Rule that forces retirement by 2027-2029 is impossible unless local replacement resources are developed.

NYISO also noted that dependence on a few critical transmission projects has risks. The 2024 RNA Report notes that the base case assumes timely completion of Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) and Clean Path NY (CPNY) by 2027-2028.  The 2025 Power Trends report transmission section states that without major transmission (CHPE, CPNY) project completion that NYC reliability margins will become deficient.  The NYISO submitted comments on the Scoping Plan also noted that there will be a heavy dependence on specific transmission projects that may not get built as scheduled.

NYISO has raised intermittency and operating reserves concerns.  The 2024 RNA Report resource adequacy study explains that a high penetration of intermittent renewables requires new reserve products.  The 2025 Power Trends includes an intermittency discussion that notes that wind/solar variability will increase reserve requirements and ramp capability needs.  The

NYISO Uncertainty Reserve Requirement filing defines FERC approved Uncertainty Reserve Requirement for the forecast error from renewables.

There is a clear need for a new dispatchable emissions free resource (DEFR).  NYISO has addressed this requirement in its reports.  The 2024 RNA Report, scenarios analysis states that meeting 2040 zero-emissions requires “firm zero-emission” resources not yet identified. 

The 2025 Power Trends describes this technology gap explaining that the grid needs three times current capacity by 2040 with electrification and higher reserve margins.  NYISO comments on the Scoping Plan also described the technology gap stating that long-duration storage, hydrogen, advanced nuclear are not yet commercial at scale.

New York electric load is increasing and will increase more as Climate Act electrification programs progress.  NYISO addressed load trends in several reports.  The 2025 Power Trends, load forecast section notes that large loads (data centers  and semiconductors) will add 2,567 MW demand by 2035.  The 2024 RNA Report includes large loads assumptions that predict peak demand growth accelerating due to electrification and economic development.  The 2025 Load & Capacity Data Report aka Gold Book load forecast notes that load forecast uncertainty is higher than historical due to policy-driven electrification driven by the Climate Act.

New York City presents special challenges to the grid and for the Climate Act mandates.  NYISO found in the 2025 Q3 STAR Report, Zone J findings that the Zone J (NYC) summer 2027 reliability need is driven by load growth and retirements.  The 2024 RNA Report discussion of

NYC reliability needs 2033 found that the reliability need requires compensatory MW because there are limited local alternatives.  The 2025 Q2 STAR Report Peaker Rule analysis notes that the DEC Peaker Rule removes capacity exactly when NYC needs an increase.  This means that NYISO must delay the rule’s retirement dates.

The NYISO has also noted that there are market design and investment signals that affect their response to the Climate Act mandates.  The 2025 Power Trends, market design section explains that State procurement (ORECs, Tier 1 RECs) policies reduces market price signals. 

NYISO FERC filings on the capacity market notes that capacity market suppression from state-contracted resources undermines flexibility value. 

The political manipulation of the electric market mandated by the Climate Act creates issues with planning process coordination.  The NYISO comments on the Scoping Plan noted that the

State’s Climate Act Policy planning (NYSERDA Integration Analysis) uses different assumptions than NYISO reliability planning.  The 2024 RNA Report planning assumptions notes the lack of alignment between the Scoping Plan scenarios and NYISO base case reliability studies.

The Climate Act and Department of Environmental Conservation interpretation of it have eliminated the backlog of new fossil generating units. As a result the fossil fleet is aging.  The 2025 Power Trends notes that 11% of 2024 energy production is from generators greater than 50 years old.  The existing fleet analysis in the 2024 RNA Report states that 10,000+ MW (25% of total capacity) has been in operation  greater than 50 years.

There are risks related to the implementation pace required to meet the arbitrary Climate Act targets.  The 2024 RNA Report Executive Summary notes the narrowing margins driven by statewide resource shortfalls and the rapid change pace.  The 2025 Power Trends conclusion states that there is a risk that cumulative factors (retirements, electrification, delays) will create reliability metric violations.

The NYSERDA projections do not incorporate the reliability requirements that the NYISO must address.  The 2024 RNA Report capacity accreditation description notes that the NYSERDA Climate Act analyses focus on energy (MWh) but NYISO projections must ensure resource adequacy (MW capacity available).  The 2025 Power Trends description of reliability margin metrics notes that Intermittent resources have low capacity value and the NYISO must account for reliability contribution

Discussion

Please excuse the structure of this document.  If I had time, I would have combined the two sections into a single referenced description of NYISO concerns.

This article is intended to be a resource documenting NYISO concerns with Climate Act implementation.  It demonstrates that there are real problems that Climate Act apologists ignore..  Per Public Service Law 66-P two petitions have been filed calling for a hearing that stated that NYISO’s concerns are persuasive arguments that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.  On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.  Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  This information will be useful to document the NYISO concerns.

Conclusion

These concerns about electric system reliability and resource adequacy are another indication that it is time to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

February 2026 Climate Act Issues

I was recently asked to give a briefing about Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) issues. The New York’s Legislature works on a two‑year term with annual sessions from January to (roughly) mid‑June, and the centerpiece of each year is enacting the state’s April 1 budget through an executive‑budget model.  This is relevant because the Climate Act was enacted during this process and there are aspects of the law that should be considered this session.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a reduction target of 40% less GHG emissions and a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”   Since the Scoping Plan was finalized in 2022, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.  As part of the implementation, the State updated its Energy Plan in 2024.

Climate Act Issues

My Climate Act issues briefing described the following key issues that need to be addressed:

  • The schedule and affordability impacts of the Climate Act can no longer be ignored
  • DEC needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements
  • PSC must address safety valve provisions
  • Recent news stories suggest that Hochul may propose revising GHG accounting again

Climate Act Implementation Schedule

It is no longer debatable that New York has fallen behind on its Climate Act transition plan 2030 mandates.  There is no question that the 70% renewable electricity by 2030 target will not be met because the percentage of renewable energy (28% of total generation) has stayed the same since 2019.  The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) annual load and capacity data report universally known as the “Gold Book” data over the last six years is shown in Table 1.  Note that the renewable percentage shown in the table is an overestimate because the NYISO references to renewable resources do not necessarily align with the New York State Clean Energy Standard definition. 

Table 1: NYISO Gold Book Annual Total and Renewable Summer Capability  and Generation

There is supposed to be a 40% reduction in economy‑wide GHG emissions by 2030.  I reviewed the 2025 NYS GHG Emission Inventory Report in my article Implications of New York State 2025 GHG Emissions Inventory.  I found that GHG emissions through 2023 are 14% less than the 1990 baseline and emissions have been basically unchanged since 2022. That makes meeting 2030 GHG emission reduction target of a 40% reduction impossible. 

Affordability and Rate Impacts

New York currently has an energy affordability crisis because as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.  My recent status summary of Climate Act affordability referenced an article about the observed rate impacts to date.  Kris Martin published a similar post that included a table ratepayer impacts. Table 2 summarizes recent electric rate cases (Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, O&R, NYSEG, and RG&E with an estimate of the Climate Act proportion.

Table 2: Typical 2024 Residential Electric Costs from What it costs

Department of Public Service (DPS) staff provides estimates of the impact of the Climate Act on electric rates.  The Second Informational Report “includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.”  According to the Summary of Ratepayer Impact for Electric Utilities table, residential impacts of the Climate Act range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 total monthly electric bills. 

In my opinion, those estimates are conservative because there is immense pressure on agency staff to minimize the costs of the Climate Act.  In addition, the costs necessary to implement the Climate Act were ramping up in 2023.  I expect that these costs will continue to climb.  Kris Martin also noted that the DPS estimates for future costs don’t include all the Renewable Energy Credits (REC) and OREC (offshore wind REC) costs that would be required to reach Climate Act targets—or even what they might realistically expect to complete. 

Also note that the State Attorney General Office is on the record that the current implementation schedule has an affordability liability.  Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted correspondence related to the litigation associated with Climate Act implementation that addressed affordability.  The State’s submittal  argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.  The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable: “Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.”

All these analyses have focused on utility rate case costs. The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSEDA) has not been forthcoming about total household costs but did offer a glimpse of those costs in the State Energy Plan as described in my post Energy Affordability Fact Sheet. 

The Fact Sheet summarizes selected results in the Energy Plan Energy Affordability Impacts Analysis.   NYERDA claimed that the use of “new, efficient equipment and electrification can cut energy spending by $100 to $300 every month for many New York households” in the Fact Sheet.  However, these projections do not cover the costs of the equipment to make the reductions.  Table 3 is derived from the NYSERDA supporting documentation and shows the monthly energy costs when equipment costs are included.

Table 3: Total Monthly Energy Costs Including Levelized Equipment Costs for an Upstate New York moderate income household that uses natural gas for heat projected monthly costs and hardware costs

NYSERDA modeled four household profiles ranging from doing nothing from the starting point to a 2031 “high efficient electrification” scenario that upgrades the building shell and electrifies conventional appliances, furnace and automobiles in an Upstate home that uses natural gas in 2025. The improvements in efficiency decreases monthly energy costs for all three journeys but when capital expenditures (CapEx) is considered that changes.  The cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment.  Row 10 shows this difference.  It lists the $594 increase in costs necessary for Climate Act compliance and row 11 lists the percentage increase as 43%.  The shortcomings of this analysis are described in my review of the Fact Sheet. It is even worse than shown here.

NYSERDA’s messaging for these results is that costs are going to go up anyway and that the increase in costs due to the Climate Act are small in comparison.  I think that additional costs will add more households to the already unacceptable number living in energy poverty.

Cap‑and‑Invest and GHG Regulatory Architecture

There are two aspects of the Climate Act mandate to implement an economy-wide cap-and-invest program by January 1, 2024 that must be addressed by the Legislature and Governor Hochul.   I have described the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) regulations in many articles.  Currently DEC has only finalized the Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule.  There have been no suggestions when the two other regulations will be proposed.  The Cap-and-Invest Rule defines affected sources, binding caps, and allowance allocations.  DEC also needs an auction rule that implements the auction that will be used to distribute allowances.

This is problematic.  On 3/31/25 a group of environmental advocates filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 alleging that DEC had failed to comply with the timeframe for NYCI because DEC missed the January 1, 2024 date.  I explained that on 10/24/25 Supreme Court Judge Julian Schreibman’s decision stated that by 2/6/26 shall “promulgate rules and regulations to ensure compliance with the statewide missed statutory deadlines and ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.  On 11/24/25 DEC appealed the decision.  On 1/8/26  the Albany County judge rejected the request for “reargument or reconsideration” but that does end the process.   The State has appealed to the Appellate Division.   This means that the deadline of Feb 6 is suspended until the Appellate Division rules.  Therefore, the State has no risk of being held in contempt and can safely ignore the deadline — which appears to be what is happening.   However, kicking the can down the road ignores the responsibility to reconsider what is obviously a failed prescription for energy policy.

The other NYCI issue is the DEC regulations.  The Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting Rule was finalized December 1, 2025, but is so poorly written that I would be surprised if it gets litigated.  The auction rule regulation should not be an issue.  However, the Cap-and-Invest Rule will be controversial because there are non-trivial problems that have political consequences.  The rule will set the price trajectory for the costs of an allowance, but what price will be chosen.  There will be an increase in prices due to this rule that will have competitiveness impacts on industry.  The provision that 35 to 40% of revenues are supposed to benefit disadvantaged communities needs to address implementation logistics.  Will the funds be dispersed by direct rebates or targeted program spending?  The biggest DEC NYCI issue is the timing.  When will DEC propose these rules?

PSL 66-P Safety Valve

There is another important issue that must be resolved.  Climate Act proponents constantly state that the mandates are required by law no matter what but ignore the other associated law that includes safety valve provisions.  New York Public Service Law § 66-p “renewable energy systems” mandates define which generating sources are “renewable”.  Section 66-p (4) “Establishment of a renewable energy program” states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. 

Unfortunately, the PSC has not yet considered conducting a hearing.  Two petitions have been filed calling for such a hearing.  The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filing on 1/6/26 made a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.  On 8/12/25 the Independent Intervenors filing argued that there were affordability and reliability issues and that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded

On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.

Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  Stay tuned to this space for more information on how readers can force the State to be accountable for the issues described.

GHG Emission Accounting

There is another issue in the news.  In early February the Governor said that she is specifically interested in reconsidering the methodology by which the state tallies its emissions, explaining that New York’s unique 20-year metric puts the state at a disadvantage over other states that use a 100-year methodology to count their emissions. At the time the Climate Act was written it incorporated unique emissions accounting requirements that inflate the emission totals by increasing the effect of methane pollution. In my opinion, this irrational obsession with methane is misguided because, the higher impacts of methane are a laboratory artifact.  In the atmosphere, methane has less of an effect than CO2 on global warming.

In the 2023 Budget Season changing the accounting methodology was proposed because it would reduce the total GHG emissions and when NYCI kicks in that will translate to lower costs to New Yorkers.  In addition, using a unique methodology eliminates the possibility that the New York cap and invest program can be integrated into other jurisdictions’ programs.  In theory that would increase market efficiency and reduce costs. 

I applaud this pragmatic modification but shudder to think how climate advocates who got us into this mess will react.  Moreover, this is a peripheral issue compared to the others described.

Discussion

I have previously noted that decisions about the future of the Climate Act must be addressed.  The ideologues who fervently supported the promulgation of the Climate Act also zealously reject the possibility that changes are needed.  However, reality can no longer be ignored.  David Wojick recently described his report “Severe Climate Act impacts threaten New York State”.  His analysis addresses these issues and provides additional support explaining why action is needed.

Conclusion

There are significant Climate Act issues that can no longer be ignored.  Most targets are behind schedule, and the increased costs of the Climate Act will exacerbate the existing energy affordability crisis.  DEC needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements and will have to eventually respond to the litigation.  PSC must address safety valve provisions of PSL 66-P. 

Unfortunately, to be resolved all these Climate Act issues require political accountability.  The Climate Act has always been about political pandering to specific constituencies under the guise of saving the planet.  Therefore, I expect that all the inconvenient issues described will be ignored until after the election in hopes that the electorate will not catch on that the reliability of the state’s energy system is at risk and the energy system crisis will be aggravated by the Climate Act  for political gain. New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.  Implementing the Climate Act will have no effect on global warming and the purported co-benefits are illusory. 

I doubt that the Legislature or Governor will act on these issues this year as they try to placate those who deny reality by demanding no changes to the Climate Act and the rest of us. It is time for the rest of us to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

Recommended Resource: Kris Martin’s Solar Divide Blog

Since November 2023 Kris Martin has been producing great articles at the Solar Divide blog documenting issues associated with the buildout of solar in New York associated with the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  I highly recommend her website archive as a resource about issues associated with the irresponsible buildout of solar in New York and signing up alerts for her articles by subscribing to her Substack.

Background

Kris Martin is a retired software engineer in Western NY who writes about solar and wind buildout in rural communities.  At first glance her background does not appear to be applicable to renewable topics but it is my experience that 90% of the effort writing about renewable deployment in New York is tracking down state documentation.  As a software engineer, she has temperament to sift through reams of clutter to find the nuggets of relevant information necessary to show what is happening with complicated topics. 

Overview

Martin’s archive includes 28 articles (Table 1).  Most of the articles were published in the past year.  If you have a particular question about solar issues, I think just scanning through this list or the website archive itself will enable you to find information about most of the solar issues confronting New York.  Also note that many of her articles also provide a link to a pdf copy for download.

Table 1: Archive List of Solar Divide Articles

In the following sections I recommend specific articles covering several topics.

Costs

Kris Martin has done several articles about the costs of solar. 

One of my favorite articles explained solar subsidies because I wanted to know how this works but understood that unpacking how it works would be a long and frustrating effort.  I am indebted to her for figuring it out and then writing a clear and concise description.  She used a table to describe the entities playing the games in New York.

The article went on to describe the acronyms and why they matter, where developers can get loans from the state, how the Federal tax credits work, and  forms of tax relief.  Then summed up some of the major public funding sources for solar developers and who ultimately pays for each one on the following table.

She concludes:

Is NYS building out wind and solar on the backs of those who can least afford it? This question should concern those seeking to protect vulnerable populations from predatory corporate behaviors. After all, solar developers aren’t trying to save us from climate change—they’re profiting from it.

The post What it costs was another laudable cost-related effort that dug through many documents to uncover numbers that gubernatorial candidate Hochul does not want you to know.  This post looked at three issues:

  1. How much more renewable capacity we’ll need in 2040
  2. What it all costs: now and in the future
  3. What happens if we fail to meet the requirements of the Climate Act

One of the best characteristics of her articles is her use of graphics to explain issues.  The following figure shows how much renewable capacity is needed by 2040 based on one estimate from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO).

Her next graphic shows where we stand today relative to the expected need.

This post has another example of analysis she did that I was planning to do but never got around to doing.  She described the expected costs in the DPS informational report and why they came up with suspiciously low numbers. 

Her analysis found that these estimates for future costs don’t include all the Renewable Energy Credits (REC) and OREC (offshore wind REC) costs that would be required to reach Climate Act targets—or even what they might realistically expect to complete. 

In another post discussing solar costs she discussed the possibility that the developers are fudging the numbers that project whether a solar project will ever generate enough energy to earn its keep.  While she tries to minimize using numbers for her articles this is one instance where the capacity factor number must be considered.  She defined capacity factor as “the percentage of the time it generated electricity at full capacity, compared with how much it could produce if it operated at full capacity 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.” That is not exactly correct.  It is the actual electricity produced at any capacity compared to the full capacity, but it shouldn’t make a difference because she relied on published capacity factors and did not calculate them herself.

She found that the expected energy output in the bids and the observed output were significantly less.  This has significant ramifications.  NYSERDA estimates of the renewable capacity needed are too low because they assumed unrealistic capacity factors.  The developer projections of expected energy projection determine if the project will be viable.  If those estimates are wrong, I am positive that they will go back to NYSERDA and ask for more money.  NYSERDA cannot afford for them to stop operating so they will pay up and consumers will end up footing the bill.

Land Use

One of my issues associated with solar deployment is the fact that New York State does not have a requirement for solar developers to minimize the use of prime farmland.  I highly recommend Martin’s look at the land requirements for solar buildout in upstate NY between now and 2050 as described in this post.  The original analysis was described in a white paper called Enough Land that was documented in her first post.  In August 2025 she updated the white paper.

Her analysis documents the fact that NYS experienced a 5.3% loss in farmland and 5% loss in cropland between 2017 and 2022.  She points out that this loss is before much utility scale solar was deployed.  She estimates how much solar capacity will need to be deployed to meet Climate Act goals and concludes:

More than a quarter of the state’s present farmland and a third of its cropland may be at risk from combined solar and non-solar development by 2050. These numbers mean we must look hard at all proposals that remove farmland from production.

As a born and raised Upstate New Yorker I have always resented the restrictions on land use imposed by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYC DEP)  through its Watershed Rules and Regulations.  Martin describes the conflict between Upstate NY and the downstate region over the renewable energy buildout.  She explains that folks like me have noted that the upstate/downstate relationship reflects a pattern of neocolonialism in which NYC has dictated upstate land use. Historically, when NYC needed upstate land resources, upstate residents have had no say in the decisions.  She notes:

The goal of procuring clean energy for NYC has become a state priority, which has created an alliance between the city, state government, and renewable energy corporations. Consequently, today NYC is effectively establishing what amounts to an energy plantation on upstate land with the full support of state government. Individual property owners may choose whether to lease or sell their land for conversion to grid-scale renewable energy facilities, but communities and adjacent landowners have no decision-making role in siting them.

Two other articles also address land use problems.  Solar vs. trees addresses the issues associated with solar development in forests.  The article Seeing all the Sites discusses the alternatives to building out solar on farmland.  This is a good example of her in-depth analysis because she evaluates the arguments of responsible solar siting advocates and concludes that there simply is not enough “responsible” solar siting area to meet the solar capacity projections.

Retirements

Martin addressed the fate of the solar panels when they stop operating because of old age, damage, or owner insolvency.  She notes that the good news is that most facilities have decommissioning plans but that means the bad news s there are facilities that do not.  In another post she explained the other alternative that when a facility is past its prime that it will be re-powered.  She also prepared a two page summary addressing recycling of solar panels.

These posts define another example of what I have found regarding every Climate Act issue.  The reality is that every problem is more complicated, resolution more uncertain, and the costs are higher than the state has planned for or admitted.  These articles are great examples illustrating the problems with what will happen when these facilities stop operating. She concluded:

NYS urgently needs a statewide requirement that all solar installations—both residential and utility-scale—must have decommissioning plans. Decommissioning funds must be provided for utility-scale projects of all sizes. ORES should respect the host community’s efforts to protect itself and not waive local laws that are more protective than the state requires. Given that communities are often selected in part because they are economically disadvantaged, they deserve all the protection the state can give them.

Overviews

Finally, because she has a knack for explaining complicated topics simply, I want to recommend the following overview articles that describe the Climate Act itself and two components in the implementation plans. 

Martin’s description of community solar is very good.  She describes these facilities as follows:

Most community solar in NYS consists of 1-5 MWac utility-scale solar projects with multiple subscribers: residential, commercial, and other electricity consumers. Most sign up to get discounts of up to 10% on their electric bills. Unlike with residential solar installations, customers typically don’t own or lease the solar panels directly. Usually, these small plants are owned by solar developers, who receive various incentives and assistance to build and operate those facilities. One of the state’s goals is to sign up customers who can’t install residential solar because they can’t manage the up-front cost, don’t have an appropriate site, or don’t own their homes. A certain percentage of a project’s subscribers must be residential users, but commercial users may also take advantage of the discounts offered.

The article describes the characteristics, locations, battles between developers and local jurisdictions about these facilities, costs, and project performance.  She explains that “By providing generous assistance and favorable, predictable conditions for developing and selling electricity from community solar, the state has made itself an appealing choice for companies wanting to build small solar projects.”  She concludes:

As seems typical with state energy transition goals, we’ve invested an awful lot of money without demanding much accountability. It’s possible that community solar is contributing to resilience and reducing bills, but we don’t actually know it.

NYS’s 2030 goal of 10,000 MWdc of distributed solar may be one of the few we will meet on time. The state deserves bragging rights over building a large amount of community solar in a short time. It has created a favorable environment for developers, in which they can earn steady revenue despite mediocre performance. But buildout has sometimes taken place at the expense of rural communities, who may lack the knowledge and resources to evaluate these projects effectively and ensure compliance during and after construction.

Martin recently published an overview of battery energy storage systems (BESS) in New York.  Again, it is a well-researched, readable, and comprehensive summary of one aspect of the Climate Act.  She concludes:

Advocates of BESS insist that “the latest” li-ion technology is safe, that incidents are extremely rare, and communities are being misled by activists who find inaccurate information on the Internet. Most of what I have presented here comes from industry, government, news, and academic sources. While we would all like to say that the chance of a BESS fire occurring is so remote that it can be dismissed; five fires in NYS in the last three years suggest otherwise.

While proponents assert that utility-scale BESS deployments are crucial for NYS’s energy goals, the economic, environmental, and safety risks remain profound. The high costs of facilities, questions about adequate emergency response, environmental threats, and real-world incidents highlight the need for a cautious, community-first approach to battery storage. Policymakers should address these challenges before endorsing a large-scale BESS rollout across NYS.

Conclusion

I have a solar isses page that discusses many of the same issues covered by Marting, but her work should be a primary resource for anyone concerned about New York solar siting issues.  Her website archive is a great resource about issues associated with the irresponsible buildout of solar in New York.  If you are interested in any of these topics then I suggest signing up for alerts her articles are published by subscribing to her Substack.

Stalling the New York Climate Act Pause Evaluation

On January 28, 2026, the New York State Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding a petition for a hearing to suspend or temporarily modify the Renewable Energy Program. While on one hand I should be celebrating official recognition of something I have long advocated, on the other hand, the timing is problematic.  The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming and this request for comments simply postpones the inevitable hearing.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates.  However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations.  It includes provisions stating that the PSC is empowered to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.  Today’s announcement is the first PSC response to numerous calls to address this requirement.

Announcement

The following is the text of the announcement requesting comments:

The Public Service Commission (Commission) is considering a petition, filed on January 6, 2026 (the Petition), by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) requesting that the Commission hold a hearing, pursuant to Section 66-p of the Public Service Law, to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

The Coalition, which describes itself as a group consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce, and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers, and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council, affirmatively contends that the Renewable Energy Program and its associated renewable energy targets may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service. In support of its request for such a review by the Commission, the Coalition points to information that it claims suggests that the State will not achieve the Climate Act targets that, by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems, and that, by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. The Coalition also suggests the existence of decreasing reliability margins and aging fossil-fueled generation resources, referencing statements by the New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that interested stakeholders are invited to submit comments by March 30, 2026, on the Petition filed by the Coalition.

Comments provided in response to this Notice should reference “Case 15-E-0302.” Comments should be submitted electronically by going to http://www.dps.ny.gov, clicking on “File Search” (located under the heading “Commission Files”), entering “15-E-0302” in the “Search by Case Number” field, and then clicking on the “Post Comments” box located at the top of the page. Those unable to file electronically may mail their comments to the Hon. Michelle L. Phillips, Secretary, New York State Public Service Commission, Three Empire Plaza, Albany, New York 12223-1350; however, electronic filing of comments is strongly encouraged.

Basis for the Hearing Summary

New York Public Service Law § 66-p Section (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” includes safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability.   Section 66-p (4) states:

The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program. 

My recent post summarized multiple independent analyses, audits, litigation findings, and party filings in DPS proceedings that document that the Climate Act transition will exacerbate energy affordability issues such that this PSL 66-P hearing is appropriate.  I also used Perplexity AI to generate a chronology of the recommendations made to hold a hearing that provides an overview of the suggestions for the hearing.

The chronology described three independent pathways to trigger PSL66-p(4) anyone of which  can justify a hearing:

Pathway 1: Reliability – “Program Impedes Safe and Adequate Electric Service”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find that the Renewable Energy Program “impedes” (not merely “risks” or “threatens”) the provision of safe and adequate service.

Evidence Presented:

  • NYISO 2024 RNA identifies actionable reliability need in NYC beginning 2033 (17-97 MW deficiency)
  • Statewide resource adequacy approaching limits with “no surplus power” remaining by 2034 without further development
  • Net capacity loss of 2,000 MW since Climate Act passage (retirements outpacing additions)
  • NYISO official statement that emission-free technologies to replace fossil generation “are not yet available on a commercial scale”
  • NERC highest-level alert documenting systemic deficiencies in modeling Inverter Based Resources and >15,000 MW of unexpected generation reductions in major events
  • Multiple NYISO high-risk scenarios showing NYC deficiency could begin as early as 2025 and grow to >1,000 MW by 2034

Assessment: The reliability evidence is substantial and comes from authoritative technical sources (NYISO, NERC). The case for a hearing under the reliability criterion is strong.

Pathway 2: Contractual – “Program Likely to Impair Existing Obligations”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find the program is “likely” to impair existing obligations and agreements.

Evidence Presented:

  • Repowering disincentive: Current Climate Act targets effectively discourage repowering existing facilities because developers face 2040 forced retirement risk, “undermining investment recovery”
  • Offshore wind contract renegotiations: Multiple offshore wind developers have sought contract amendments due to changed economic conditions
  • Tier 1 REC contract attrition: Biennial Review acknowledged 30% attrition rate in renewable energy contracts

Assessment: The evidence on contractual impairment is moderate. This criterion appears to be less central to the petitioners’ arguments than reliability and affordability.

Pathway 3: Affordability – “Significant Increase in Arrears or Disconnections”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find (1) a “significant” increase in arrears or service disconnections and (2) determine the increase is “related to the program.”

Evidence Presented:

  • Statistical significance established: Independent Intervenors demonstrated increases exceeding 2× standard deviation for statewide totals and 4 of 10 utilities
  • Magnitude: $1.8 billion in arrears affecting 1.2 million households
  • Trend: NMPC 17% increase (33,840 customers), Con Ed 59% increase (173,398 customers)

The Perplexity AI summary also lists two examples of evidence that does not support the claim that need to be explained.  For the “Causation not established”  description the AI program referenced an article written before the latest  DPS annual informational report came out that said it was impossible to determine if increases are “related to the program”.  A more recent report is now available, but DPS staff did not try to link the observed increases to this PSL 66-P requirement so it still is impossible to attribute significant changes to the Climate Act.  The other example gave an alternative explanation for the number of customers in arrears: “Post-pandemic economic impacts, inflation, and energy price increases due to factors beyond Climate Act (e.g., natural gas price volatility, supply chain disruptions)”

The Perplexity AI Assessment description stated:

The affordability evidence meets the first criterion (statistical significance) but cannot satisfy the second criterion (program causation) until DPS provides the mandated cost reporting. This represents a data gap, not necessarily a failure of the substantive argument. A hearing could establish causation through discovery and testimony.

The conclusion in this section notes that the reliability pathway has the strongest evidentiary weight:

Among the three pathways, the reliability criterion presents the most compelling case for a hearing:

  • Evidence comes from independent technical authorities (NYISO, NERC) with statutory responsibility for reliability
  • Deficiencies are quantified with specific MW shortfalls and timeframes
  • High-risk scenarios demonstrate sensitivity to plausible uncertainties
  • NYISO’s statement that required technologies “are not yet available on a commercial scale” directly supports finding that the program “impedes” safe and adequate service
  • Net capacity loss since Climate Act passage (2,000 MW) demonstrates actual, not theoretical, impact

The affordability criterion faces an evidentiary gap on program causation, though the statistical significance of arrears increases is well-established. Importantly, this gap exists because the PSC/DPS have failed to comply with their own reporting mandates—the very accountability failure the petitioners criticize. 

Discussion

In this discussion I liberally paraphrased the Perplexity AI response. Ultimately, the Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability emerging as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world supply chain, permitting, interconnection, and technological readiness constraints. 

In response to the petitions ACE-NY and WEACT filed a response that urged the PSC to reject the petition suggesting that all progress would stop if the heating was held.  However, the provision for a hearing does not require abandoning climate goals—it authorizes temporary suspension or modification to ensure safe, adequate, and affordable service while the transition continues. This represents pragmatic management, not capitulation.

I have long warned of the consequences if the current aspirational ambition and schedule of the Climate Act is not changed.  The PSC’s decision extends beyond energy policy:

  • If reliability suffers, the result could be rolling blackouts, industrial curtailments, and catastrophic economic disruption
  • If affordability spirals, the political backlash could undermine not just Climate Act but climate policy more broadly
  • If the safety valve remains unused, the precedent may discourage future legislatures from including adaptive management mechanisms in ambitious policy frameworks

Conclusion

Clearly it is no longer possible for the Hochul Administration to ignore the adverse impacts of Climate Act Implementation.  I have long argued that PSL 66-P was a logical excuse to reconsider the ramifications of the Climate Act so I should be happy that the potential of this requirement has been recognized at last.

However, this response is more evidence that the Climate Act has always been more about political catering to constituencies than about saving the planet. The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming so I believe that the PSC should have moved to hold the hearing at this time.  That would infuriate the proponents of the Climate Act that Hochul needs for her re-election campaign.  This request for comments pushes the hearing and any decision related to the hearing beyond the election next November.  The question is whether New Yorkers will catch on that the Hochul Administration is risking reliability and affordability in an effort to appease Climate Act proponents.

Stay tuned because there I will undoubtedly be writing about this more before the comments are due,

New York Climate Act Affordability Status

In my opinion the biggest problem with the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) is that it will inevitably lead to extraordinary cost increases.  My last article described the recent rate case decisions that have markedly increased residential customer electric bills. These rate increases arrive amid an escalating affordability crisis, as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.  This article documents unresolved affordability issues associated with the Climate Act.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates.  However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations.  It includes provisions stating that the PSC is empowered to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.  This requirement has been noted but, unfortunately, establishing a methodology to resolve the mandate has been ignored.

Petitions for a Hearing

The first unresolved affordability issue is the petitions by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy and the Independent Intervenors submitted to PSC Proceeding Case 22-M-0149 that called for a hearing.  There has been no indication by the PSC that they will respond to those petitions.

The recent filings argued that the PSC should convene a hearing. On August 11, 2025 “Independent Intervenors” Roger Caiazza, Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton petitioned  the  PSC arguing that safety valve provisions for customers in arrears trends in PSL  66-p(4) have been exceeded  which should trigger a hearing.  On January 6, 2026 the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filed a petition with the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting that the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4).  Both filings make similar arguments.  The Independent Intervenors argued that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded.  The Coalition makes a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.

In addition, last summer two members of the Climate Action Council, Donna DeCarolis and Dennis Elsenbeck, sent a letter to Rory Christian, Chair & Chief Executive Officer of the New Yok State Public Service Commission (PSC) that made a similar argument that there are more than sufficient circumstances to warrant the PSC commencing a hearing process to “consider modification and extension of New York Renewable Energy Program timelines pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4).

Agency Affordability Findings

There also have been New York Agency findings that argue that observed issues with schedule and costs suggest a pause to reconsider the mandates is appropriate.

The Draft Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) Staff and NYSERDA  “details the numerous factors, including inflation, transmission constraints, shifting federal energy and trade policies and interconnection and siting challenges that have adversely impacted renewable development and the state’s trajectory towards achieving the Program’s 2030 target.”  The Biennial Review “concludes that a delay in achieving the 70% goal may be unavoidable.”

The recently completed New York State Energy Plan (SEP) found that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient to meet statutory targets, and that external constraints continue to impede progress.”  Volume 2 “Our Energy Systems” explains that “Considering resource build limitations and increased loads, the model aligns with the CES Biennial Review, projecting the procurement schedule of CES resources through 2035.”  In other words, the SEP acknowledges that the Climate Act schedule is impossible to meet.  The SEP found that Climate Act costs are expected to require $120 billion in annual energy system investments through 2040, equivalent to $1,282 per month per household. This baseline includes what the authors of the SEP characterizes as costs “no matter which future path we take” but I believe that framing is fundamentally deceptive because that scenario includes substantial greenhouse gas reduction programs implemented before 2019 that are necessary to meet the Climate Act goals.

The July 2024 New York State Comptroller Status report “Climate Act Goals – Planning, Procurements, and Progress Tracking” audited PSC and NYSERDA efforts to achieve the Climate Act mandates.  It found that “While PSC and NYSERDA have taken considerable steps to plan for the transition to renewable energy in accordance with the Climate Act and CES, their plans did not comprise all essential components, including assessing risks to meeting goals and projecting costs.”  The report recommended that the agencies begin the comprehensive review of the Climate Act, “continuously analyze” existing and emerging risks and known issues, conduct a detailed analysis of cost estimates, and “assess the extent to with ratepayers can reasonably assume the responsibility” of the implementation costs.  This is the information necessary for the PSL 66-P hearing.

My last article summarized recent residential electric utility customers rate case decisions approved between March 2025 and January 2026.  The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) “approved new multi-year rate plans for five major utilities—Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, and Orange & Rockland—while two additional utilities (New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG) and Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) have pending rate cases seeking significantly larger increases”.

Kris Martin from NY Solar Divide pointed out:

When we look at those modest Climate Act (CLCPA) percentages on “typical” electric bills, it’s important to understand that we have incurred only a small fraction of Climate Act expenses to date. The bulk of those expenses will really start to impact us in another 5-10 years as we start to seriously build out onshore and offshore wind and grid-scale solar, implement policy changes (e.g., school bus electrification), and deal with increases in demand.

Department of Public Service (DPS) staff is supposed to provide Climate Act information. On September 18, 2025 the PSC announced that they “received an update from DPS staff regarding progress toward the clean energy goals of the Climate Act”.  The Second Informational Report prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff “focuses on Commission actions from January 2023 through August 2025, and includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.”  According to the Summary of Ratepayer Impact for Electric Utilities table, residential impacts of the Climate Act range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 total monthly electric bills.  In my opinion, those estimates are conservative because there is immense pressure on agency staff to minimize the costs of the Climate Act.  In addition, the costs necessary to implement the Climate Act were ramping up in 2023.  As Martin notes these costs are just the tip of the iceberg.

Affordability Metrics

PSL law Section 66-p (4) states that the hearing could “temporarily suspend or modify the obligations” of the Renewable Energy Program if the PSC makes a finding that “there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.   This refers to affordability limits, but they are not specific enough.  I believe the PSC must establish specific affordability limits.

This issue was also raised to the DPS last year.  On March 26, 2025, Jessica Waldorf, Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Implementation for the Department of Public Service (DPS) posted a letter responding to a letter from Michael B. Mager Counsel to Multiple Intervenors that had been submitted earlier in March to Chair of the Public Service Commission Rory Christian regarding the affordability standard.       I agreed with the comments submitted by Multiple Intevenors and was disappointed with the DPS response so I submitted a letter to Christian.

As described in my article My Comments on the NYS Affordability Standard: I believe that as part of the Scoping Plan the Climate Action Council should have developed criteria for the PSC to consider affordability and reliability.  That did not happen.  Based on issues observed with the transition it is incumbent upon the Commission to define “safe and adequate electric service” and “significant increase in arrears or service disconnections” as part of this Proceeding.  My letter stated that this is necessary so that there is a clearly defined standard for the temporarily suspending or modifying the provisions of Section 66-p (4).

The Public Service Commission has an existing target energy burden set at or below 6 percent of household income for all low-income households in New York State.  Reviewing it raises questions about its suitability for defining energy affordability acceptability.

The six percent target was included as part of Public Service Commission (PSC) Case Number: 14-M-0565, the Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers.  According to the PSC: “The primary purposes of the proceeding are to standardize utility low-income programs to reflect best practices where appropriate, streamline the regulatory process, and ensure consistency with the Commission’s statutory and policy objectives.”  On May 20, 2016 the Order Adopting Low Income Program Modifications and Directing Utility Findings adopted “a policy that an energy burden at or below 6% of household income shall be the target level for all 2.3 million low income households in New York.” 

The order notes that:

There is no universal measure of energy affordability; however, a widely accepted principle is that total shelter costs should not exceed 30% of income. For example, this percentage is often used by lenders to determine affordability of mortgage payments. It is further reasonable to expect that utility costs should not exceed 20% of shelter costs, leading to the conclusion that an affordable energy burden should be at or below 6% of household income (20% x 30% = 6%). A 6% energy burden is the target energy burden used for affordability programs in several states (e.g., New Jersey and Ohio), and thus appears to be reasonable. It also corresponds to what U.S. Energy Information Administration data reflects is the upper end of middle- and upper-income customer household energy burdens (generally in the range of 1 to 5%). The Commission therefore adopts a policy that an energy burden at or below 6% of household income shall be the target level for all low-income customers.  The policy applies to customers who heat with electricity or natural gas. 

The utility companies submit quarterly reports documenting the number of low-income customers receiving discounts and the amount of money distributed.  However, I have been unable to find any documentation describing how many customers meet the 6% energy burden criteria, much less any information on how those numbers are changing.  The biggest problem with this energy burden program is that it only applies to electric and gas utility customers.  Citizens who heat with fuel oil, propane, or wood are not covered.  Moreover, it only considers utility costs but the economy-wide provisions of the CLCPA include transportation energy burdens.

Clearly, if this parameter is to be used for a CLCPA affordability standard, then defining what is acceptable and what is not acceptable is necessary.  Whatever affordability standard is chosen a clear reporting metric must be provided and frequent updates of the status of the implementation relative to the affordability standard provided.

It is also notable that Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted correspondence related to the litigation associated with Climate Act implementation.  The State’s submittal  to the petition addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’s (the Climate Act) goals in a timely manner.” 

The submittal means that the State of New York argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.  The following paragraph concedes that there are significant upfront cost issues that out-weigh other benefits.

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

Conclusion

It is impossible to ignore that multiple independent analyses, audits, litigation findings, and party filings in DPS proceedings document that the Climate Act transition will exacerbate energy affordability issues at a time when more than a million New York households are already in arrears on their energy bill.  Unfortunately, the Hochul Administration and Legislature have not adopted clear affordability metrics, a transparent tracking system, or mandatory corrective actions when affordability thresholds are exceeded.  Of course, these are bright line accountability metrics, and no political supporter of the Climate Act wants to admit their role in the New York affordability crisis.

New York Recent Rate Case Impacts on Residential Customers

In my opinion the biggest problem with the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is that it will inevitably lead to extraordinary cost increases.  This post summarizes recent residential electric utility customers rate case decisions approved between March 2025 and January 2026. I do not discuss gas rate cases.  The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) “approved new multi-year rate plans for five major utilities—Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, and Orange & Rockland—while two additional utilities (New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG) and Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) have pending rate cases seeking significantly larger increases”. These rate increases arrive amid an escalating affordability crisis, as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Trying to decipher rate case decisions is a difficult task because of the volume of materials associated with each rate case. The PSC maintains a database that compiles all the filed documents and public comments for each rate case.  The Matter Master file for the current NYSEG rate case lists 913 filed documents and 1967 public comments.  To compile this summary, I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.  Assume all the results shown are referenced to the original Perplexity response.

Rate Case Results

Figure 1 summarizes the recent rates cases for Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, and Orange & Rockland that have been completed since 2025.  NYSEG and RG&E have pending rate cases, so their results shown are not directly comparable.

Figure 1: New York Utility Rate Cases Impact on Residential Customer (2025-2026) – Perplexity

The NYSEG and RG&E cases are pending and the results shown represent their initial offer.  All the results shown for the other utilities had much higher initial rates. For example, Con Edison initially requested annual revenue increases of $1.612 billion for electric service (18.0 percent increase in base delivery revenues) and $440 million for gas service (18.8 percent increase in base delivery revenues). Following intense public opposition, intervention by Governor Kathy Hochul, and even comments by President Trump, and extensive settlement negotiations, the PSC approved a dramatically reduced three-year rate plan on January 22, 2026.   The approved joint proposal represents an 87 percent reduction from Con Edison’s initial request.

Utility Summaries

Con Edison’s service territory covers New York City and Westchester County with 3.6 million residential customers.  For typical NYC residential customers using 280 kilowatt-hours monthly, electric bills will increase by approximately $4 per month (3.9 percent) in 2026, $3.55 per month in 2027, and $4.22 per month in 2028, resulting in a cumulative 10.4 percent increase over three years. Westchester County residential customers using 425 kWh monthly face increases of $5.25 (2.6 percent) in year one, $4.84 (2.3 percent) in year two, and $4.95 (2.2 percent) in year three, totaling 10.1 percent over the period

National Grid’s rate case was approved on August 13, 2025.  The service territory covers 1.7 million electric customers across 25,000 square miles in Upstate New York. For residential electric customers using an average of 625 kilowatt-hours per month National Grid’s three-year upstate rate plan includes a $14.32 per month increase in year 1, a $6.44 per month increase in year 2, and a $4.34 per month increase in year 3 with an expected total increase over three years of 31%.

Central Hudson 315,000 residential customers in its Hudson Valley and Mid-Hudson region service territory.  Central Hudson’s rate case followed a unique trajectory, proceeding through litigation rather than settlement, ultimately resulting in a one-year rate plan approved on July 18, 2024, followed by a subsequent multi-year joint proposal filed on May 13, 2025, and approved on August 14, 2025.  Typical residential electric customers will experience total bill increases of approximately 7.85 percent, equating to approximately $12.65 per month.

Orange & Rockland serves 233,000 residential electric customers in Rockland, Orange, and Sullivan counties.  On March 19, 2025, the PSC adopted a three-year rate plan for Orange & Rockland that substantially reduced the utility’s initial request, keeping electric revenue flat for the first year while authorizing incremental increases in subsequent years. For residential electric customers using 600 kilowatt-hours per month the 2025 total bill increase will be 4.6 percent, in 2026 the total bill increase will be 3.3 percent and in 2027 the total bill increase will be 3.5 percent total bill increase.

New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG) and Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) filed rate case proposals on

June 30, 2025.  The case is currently under review.  I am an active party in the rate cases and am unsure what I can say about the status.  I don’t think it is inappropriate to note that an evidential hearing is scheduled for early February.  The service territories of the two utilities are all over the state but is primarily located in Central and Western New York.  NYSEG serves 921,000 customers and RG&E serves 392,00 customers. The initial NYSEG electric request asked for an amount that works out for a typical residential customers (600 kWh electric usage) to a $33.12 per month increase (23.7 percent increase to total bill).  The initial RG&E electric request asked for an amount that works to a $33.01 per month increase (26.0 percent increase to total bill).

 Climate Act Impacts

It is unfortunate that the utilities fail to provide a breakdown of how much implementation of the Climate Act adds to these rate case costs.  I used a Perplexity AI search of the National Grid rate case to provide Climate Act cost estimates.   It found that the approved rate plans do not contain explicit breakdowns of specific dollar amounts or percentages of the rate increases allocated specifically to the Climate Act projectsand state mandated programs. The query response included the following:

CLCPA-Related Investments Identified

While specific cost breakdowns are not provided, the orders identify several CLCPA-related investment categories within the approved rate plans:

Electric System CLCPA Investments

Transmission Infrastructure:

  • CLCPA Phase 2 Transmission Projects
  • Smart Path Connect
  • Grid Modernization

Distribution System Enhancements:

  • Enhanced grid capabilities for solar, wind, and energy storage interconnection
  • Smart grid technologies to manage intermittent renewable resources
  • Electric vehicle infrastructure support programs

Historical CLCPA Investment Context

Previous utility filings and planning documents provide context for CLCPA-related costs across New York utilities:

Statewide CLCPA Transmission Investments:

  • Phase 1 Projects: Approximately $4.16 billion in transmission investments and $2.64 billion in distribution investments across all New York utilities
  • Phase 2 Conceptual Estimates: $7.62 billion in transmission and $2.16-$2.85 billion in distribution investments (conceptual estimates)

National Grid’s Historical CLCPA Share:

  • Phase 2 Transmission: $1.37 billion estimated for National Grid transmission projects
  • Phase 2 Distribution: $510 million to $1.2 billion estimated for National Grid distribution projects

Department of Public Service (DPS) staff is supposed to provide Climate Act information. On September 18, 2025 the PSC announced that they “received an update from DPS staff regarding progress toward the clean energy goals of the Climate Act”.  The Second Informational Report prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff “focuses on Commission actions from January 2023 through August 2025, and includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.”  According to the Summary of Ratepayer Impact for Electric Utilities table, residential impacts of the Climate Act range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 total monthly electric bills.  In my opinion, those estimates are conservative because there is immense pressure on agency staff to minimize the costs of the Climate Act.  In addition, the costs necessary to implement the Climate Act were ramping up in 2023.  I expect that these costs will continue to climb.

Discussion

The Perplexity summary of the rate cases raised some overarching issues.  New York residential utility bills consist of two primary components, each subject to different pricing mechanisms and contributing to overall cost increases through distinct channels.

Delivery Charges account for approximately two-thirds of bills. These charges represent what customers pay utilities to build, maintain, and operate the physical infrastructure that transmits electricity and natural gas to homes and businesses. Delivery charges remained relatively stable historically but have increased substantially in recent years to fund:

  • Infrastructure Modernization and Replacement: Utilities must replace aging equipment that has reached the end of its useful life, including transformers, substations, transmission lines, and distribution networks.
  • Grid Hardening and Storm Resiliency: Utilities must enhance system resiliency to manage severe weather events. This includes vegetation management, reinforced poles and wires, and backup systems.
  • Clean Energy Integration Infrastructure: The Climate Act mandates necessitate substantial transmission and distribution system upgrades to connect renewable energy resources, accommodate distributed generation, manage bi-directional power flows, and handle increased electrification of transportation and heating.
  • Property Taxes: Utility companies pay significant property taxes on their infrastructure, which are passed through to customers. Note that the clean energy infrastructure increases the property tax burden.
  • Return on Equity (Profit Margin): Regulated utilities earn a PSC-approved rate of return on their capital investments. Approved returns on equity in recent cases range from 9.4 percent (Con Edison) to 9.5 percent (National Grid).

Supply Charges  account for approximately one-third of bills.  They represent the actual cost of purchasing electricity or natural gas in wholesale markets. These charges fluctuate based on market conditions and are typically adjusted monthly. These have increased for the following reasons:

  • Explosive Demand Growth: New York and the broader Northeast region are experiencing unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by several factors that are fundamentally reshaping the supply-demand balance. The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) reports that the pace of new energy sources coming online is insufficient to keep pace with demand growth.
  • Wholesale electricity prices have responded predictably to this supply-demand imbalance. The average monthly wholesale electricity price in New York soared by 67 percent over the past year according to NYISO data.
  • Thermal Generation Fuel Costs: Natural gas remains the marginal fuel setting electricity prices in New York’s wholesale markets during most hours. Natural gas commodity prices have increased due to growing domestic demand (particularly for heating during cold winters), export demand for liquefied natural gas, and supply constraints.
  • Weather-Driven Consumption: The 2025-26 winter has proven particularly severe, with temperatures 15-20 percent colder than the prior year. Colder weather increases heating demand, driving up both consumption (measured usage) and market prices due to heightened competition for available supply.

Conclusion

These rate case results are unsustainable.  For all the noise made by politicians about affordability, the fact remains that the New York State Legislature or Administration has not defined affordable energy.  The Public Service Commission has an existing target energy burden set at or below 6 percent of household income for all low-income households in New York State.  I have been unable to find any documentation describing how many customers meet the 6% energy burden criteria, much less any information on how those numbers are changing.  The biggest problem with this energy burden program is that it only applies to electric and gas utility customers.  Citizens who heat with fuel oil, propane, or wood are not covered.  There is a clear need for an affordability metric that can be tracked.

Investments for New York’s Future

According to a new report from Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, New Yorkers will “realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative.”  This article explains why this report is bogus on multiple levels.

I have extensive experience with market-based pollution control programs.  I have been involved in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program.  I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I have also been following the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program and other similar programs in New York   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated

Clean Air Initiative

My first thought when I read this was what is the Clean Air Initiative?   The report states: “state agencies have developed proposals for an economy-wide cap-and-invest program – known as the Clean Air Initiative (CAI).”  I have been following the economy-wide cap-and-invest program and I was unaware of any agency calling the economy-wide program anything other than the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program.  So, I used Perplexity AI to ask if any New York agencies used CAI instead of NYCI.    The response stated:

No New York State agency officially refers to the cap-and-invest program as the “Clean Air Initiative.” Throughout all Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) official documentation, press releases, regulatory proposals, and public communications from 2023 through early 2026, the program is consistently designated as:

  • New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) – the primary official name
  • Cap-and-Invest Program – the standard reference

I believe the answer to why these organizations use this nomenclature is directly related to the mission of the organizations. Greenline Insights “provides non-partisan research to drive smart decision-making. We specialize in modeling, analysis, and policy design to maximize positive outcomes for local workforces, businesses, and communities.” Their description of services provided states: “We work with clients to develop compelling research questions and build the right mix of tools to answer them.”  Reading between that line I think it means that if a client wants a particular answer, they will get that result.

EDF claims “Guided by science and economics, and committed to climate justice, we work in the places, on the projects and with the people that can make the biggest difference.”  According to another Perplexity AI query EDF has “strongly supported the economy-wide cap and invest program proposal included in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) Scoping Plan” finalized in 2022 and since then “has engaged in extensive and sustained lobbying and advocacy efforts to advance New York’s economy-wide cap-and-invest program since early 2023.”  EDF has a vested interest in the success of an economy-wide program.

The Perplexity AI “Deep Research” response to my query about the use of CAI the AI program concluded “The Environmental Defense Fund and allied advocacy organizations strategically adopted “Clean Air Initiative” as alternative branding to frame the program around air quality and public health benefits in their campaigns to pressure Governor Hochul to finalize and implement the regulations.”

In other words, the Clean Air Initiative terminology  is all about the messaging.

Clean Air Initiative Claims

The January 8, 2026 CAI  report announcement states:

NEW YORK — New Yorkers will realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative, a new report from Environmental Defense Fund and Greenline Insights finds.  

The report comes as New Yorkers continue to await the launch of the Clean Air Initiative: an economywide cap-and-invest program that works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.” At the same time, energy affordability remains an issue that’s top of mind for New York voters.  

“Our analysis shows that the vast majority of New Yorkers are missing out on savings and economic opportunities across the state due to delays in implementing the Clean Air Initiative,” said Kate Courtin, Senior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy. “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.” 

The report finds that, over its first decade, the Clean Air Initiative would deliver: 

$6.9 billion in net savings, or an average of $1,060 per household earning $200k per year or less — about 85% of households in the state.  

Over 300,000 new jobs, with job growth strongest in fields like construction and transit as a result of investments in clean transportation services, decarbonization of buildings, and the build-out of clean energy infrastructure.

$48 billion in economic growth supported by program investments across the state. 

“The data is clear that the Clean Air Initiative is a potent job creator and economic development tool.” said Jonah Kurman-Faber, Founder and Principal at Greenline Insights. “The program’s investments play to the state’s economic strengths and provide meaningful financial benefits to an overwhelming majority of the population.” 

Pollution Control

EDF claims without any evidence that setting a cap ensures compliance with the arbitrary limits of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  The report claims that the “economywide cap-and-invest program works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.”  That is the theory.

I recently published several articles about RGGI, the existing New York cap-and-invest program for electric utility generating units that shows reality is different.  I showed that the reason NY utility emissions have dropped is because NY power plants switched from using coal and oil to using natural gas.  Natural gas emits less CO2 and was cheaper, so the observed reductions are mostly because of economic fuel switching not RGGI.  I compared the observed reductions and RGGI investment emission savings and found that the total cumulative annual emission savings represents a reduction of only 4.2% from the pre-RGGI baseline.  That comparison also found that the observed cost per ton of emissions removed is $583.  None of these results suggest that the CAI will work as claimed.

GHG emissions are directly related to energy generation.  When a GHG pollution control program caps emissions it caps energy use so capping emissions essentially rations energy use.   Combined with the RGGI results, that means that compliance with the cap can only occur if energy use is rationed

Economic Benefits

According to the announcement, Kate Courtin, Senior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy said that “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.”   I am not an economist so I submitted another Perplexity AI query asking about opportunity costs and the Greenline Insights analysis.  The summary notes:

The “Investments for New York’s Future” report by Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, released in January 2026, projects that New York’s Clean Air Initiative (cap-and-invest program) would generate $6.9 billion in household savings, create over 300,000 jobs, and support $48 billion in economic growth over the program’s first decade (2026-2035). While the specific methodological details of this report remain inaccessible through the provided URL, extensive research into Greenline Insights’ comparable analyses, standard input-output (I-O) modeling practices, and economic impact assessment literature reveals fundamental concerns about the treatment—or more precisely, the omission—of opportunity costs in such economic analyses.

Even a non-economist like me understands that if an analysis does not consider how the money raised by NYCI might have been used elsewhere is not considered, then that is a problem: 

Opportunity cost represents “the value of the alternative foregone by choosing a particular activity”—the benefits that could have been realized if the same resources were deployed differently. In climate policy analysis, this concept is essential because government spending and regulatory mandates redirect capital, labor, and productive resources from alternative uses. A comprehensive economic evaluation must compare not just the projected benefits of a policy against its direct costs, but also assess what economic activity would have occurred absent the intervention—the counterfactual baseline.

The response to my query raised the following issues with the Greenline Insights methodology:

1. The “Missing Peter” Problem

As economists from the Beacon Hill Institute articulated in critiquing renewable energy economic impact studies: “They are robbing Peter [existing economic activities] to pay Paul [the supported sector], and claiming the program increased total spending because now Paul spends more, but they ignore accounting for Peter”.

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Every dollar collected through allowance auctions or allocated to climate investments is a dollar unavailable for alternative economic uses—whether private consumption, business investment in other sectors, or different government priorities. Standard I-O models “cannot compute possible reductions in output and jobs elsewhere in the economy, due to the reallocation of resources towards the supported project”.

2. Assumption of Idle Resources

The typical economic impact study assumes “that the dollar that flows through the industries identified by model’s I-O tables, and the resources that they are commanding, would not otherwise be used”. This assumption may be defensible during severe recessions with high unemployment and underutilized productive capacity, but becomes increasingly problematic as economies approach full employment.

New York State added over 1 million private sector jobs since April 2020 and reached record employment levels as of September 2024. In this context, labor and capital redirected to clean energy investments necessarily displace activity in other sectors. One analysis noted explicitly: “IMPLAN cannot be used to model nonresidential sector opportunity costs, so those were not included”—a tacit acknowledgment of the methodology’s inherent limitation.

3. No Counterfactual Baseline

Rigorous policy evaluation requires comparing outcomes under the policy scenario against a well-specified counterfactual: what would have happened in the policy’s absence. This counterfactual must account for:

  • Alternative deployment of capital: If the $61-126 billion in projected cap-and-invest revenues were instead left with households and businesses, what consumption and investment would occur?
  • Baseline economic trajectories: What job growth, wage increases, and economic output would materialize under business-as-usual conditions?
  • Displaced economic activity: Which sectors contract as resources shift toward clean energy, and what are the productivity implications?

Standard I-O models do not construct this counterfactual. They measure gross economic activity associated with program spending but do not subtract the economic activity that would have occurred with alternative resource allocation.

4. The Economist’s Critique

The academic economics community has long criticized the misapplication of I-O analysis for policy advocacy. As one prominent critique states: “There’s a joke among economists who look at economic impact studies, and we say ‘Define all costs as benefits, and double them'”. This captures the tendency of such analyses to:

  • Present gross job creation without netting out job displacement
  • Calculate multiplier effects on program spending without comparable analysis of opportunity cost multipliers
  • Report total economic output without addressing whether this represents additional output or reallocated output

The response to my query concludes:

For policymakers and stakeholders evaluating the economic case for New York’s Clean Air Initiative, this means:

  • The reported economic benefits are overstated to the extent they represent reallocation of economic activity rather than net additions
  • The true net economic impact depends on the relative productivity of clean energy investments versus displaced alternatives—a comparison the analysis does not make
  • The strongest case for the policy rests on climate and health benefits, not the economic multiplier effects emphasized in the report’s communications
  • More rigorous analysis following a similar Resources for the Future approach or comprehensive cost-benefit frameworks would provide better-informed decision-making

Conclusion

This report is simply a lobbying presentation that was commissioned by EDF to support their arguments that NYCI is a good idea.  One common aspect of all these analyses is that the benefits are overstated, the costs are minimized if not ignored, and the methodology is sketchy.  I do not think that any of the job estimates and economic projections are credible.

New York Nuclear Renaissance

Governor Hochul plans to pursue “the most ambitious development of nuclear power in America, setting a new goal to build five gigawatts of new nuclear capacity”.  I believe that nuclear power is the best option to reduce electric system GHG emissions but there are issues.  This post includes Richard Ellenbogen’s description of practical deployment issues and my observations relative to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy.  He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where it has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system.  I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because the energy density of wind and solar energy is too low and the resource intermittency too variable to ever support a reliable electric system relying on those resources. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Hochul Proposal

Hochul’s State of the State Book describes the nuclear proposal in the following two sections:

Establishing a Nuclear Reliability Backbone for a Zero-Emission Grid

As New York transitions to a zero-emission electric grid, the State must ensure reliable and cost effective baseload power to keep homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure running at all hours.  Governor Hochul will ensure that New York State leads in the race to harness safe and reliable advanced nuclear energy to power homes and businesses with zero-emission electricity for generations to come.

To catalyze progress towards those goals, the Governor will advance a new initiative, the Nuclear Reliability Backbone, directing state agencies to establish a clear pathway for additional advanced nuclear generation to support grid reliability. The Nuclear Reliability Backbone will be developed by a new Department of Public Service (DPS) process to consider, review, and facilitate a cost-effective pathway to four gigawatts of new nuclear energy that will combine with existing nuclear generation and the New York Power Authority’s (NYPA) previously announced one gigawatt project, to create an 8.4 gigawatt “backbone” of reliable energy for New Yorkers.

This effort will provide firm, clean power that complements renewable energy resources and reduces reliance on fossil fuel generation. By creating a stable foundation of always-on energy, the Backbone will allow renewable resources to operate more efficiently and flexibly. Together, these actions will support a resilient, flexible, and zero-emission grid that meets New York’s growing energy needs.

Ensuring New York’s Nuclear Power Future is Built By and For New Yorkers

As New York expands advanced nuclear energy, the State must ensure that New Yorkers benefit from these jobs and investments, including making sure New Yorkers are prepared to build, operate, and sustain this emerging industry. Governor Hochul will launch NextGen Nuclear New York to develop a skilled, in-state nuclear workforce through coordinated education and training pathways.

The initiative will expand partnerships across K–12 schools, higher education institutions, labor organizations, and training programs to align curricula, credentials, and career pathways with industry needs. It will also support workforce transitions for existing energy workers and increase public awareness of nuclear career opportunities. By investing in people and skills, New York will ensure its nuclear future is powered by New Yorkers, for New Yorkers.

Practical Deployment Issues – Ellenbogen

Ellenbogen recently sent an email that described his concerns about the proposal to add 5 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear to NY State’s generation fleet that forms the basis for this article.  Because we are closely aligned on our thoughts I am not going to try to differentiate between his material and my supplemental information.  However, I take responsibility for the contents of this article and accept that I may have misquoted or misrepresented Ellenbogen’s beliefs.

For background consider New York’s nuclear power plants (Table 1).  Five gigawatts of nuclear is basically equivalent to building five new traditional reactors like Nine Mile 2, the last completed plant in New York. Note that Shoreham was completed, tested, and then shut down before it operated in the mid 1980’s.

Table 1: New York Nuclear Generating Plants

We agree on one thing completely: It’s a step in the right direction but it is too little, too late.  Building this amount of capacity will take a long time.  Nine Mile 2 construction took 13 years, and the most recent reactors built in the US at Vogtle, Georgia took 15 years from the start of initial site work.

According to a Perplexity AI query, The new Vogtle units are Westinghouse AP1000 designs with passive safety systems; The capacity of each unit is on the order of 1.1 GW.  Construction went over schedule and budget “as the first new U.S. nuclear build in decades, became a protracted megaproject with schedule slips and cost growth to roughly the mid‑$30‑billion range, widely characterized as one of the most expensive infrastructure projects in U.S. history”. These issues were caused by a “combination of incomplete design and planning, contractor and supply‑chain problems, first‑of‑a‑kind AP1000 implementation issues, weak project management and oversight, and the 2017 Westinghouse bankruptcy, which disrupted construction and financing”. 

Most of these underlying factors will be problems for New York State.  If new technology is used the design and planning will have to evolve as the plants are built.  There are contractor and supply-chain problems with existing infrastructure construction so this will be more of a problem for the new technology.  If the deployment goes so far as to mandate that the facilities are “built by and for New Yorkers”, then there will be delays because there are insufficient skilled trade workers available today.

Climate Act Schedule and Reliability Issues – Ellenbogen

The Climate Act has a requirement for zero emissions electric generation by 2040.  There is no possibility that all the nuclear capacity proposed by Hochul could be built by 2040 and there is a low probability that any new nuclear could be built by then.  Last June Hochul ordered the New York Power Authority (NYPA) to develop at least on gigawatt of nuclear capacity.  NYPA has not even announced where they might consider siting new nuclear capacity.  In my experience with power plant permitting, it takes at least three years to secure permits for existing design equipment.  There have been indications that New York would favor new designs which would slow down permitting substantially.  Finally, “Nuclear” has been a four-letter word in New York State for about 45 years so we expect opponents to try to delay permitting in every way possible.

Last November the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) released its 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP).  The report found that “the electric grid is at an inflection point driven by the convergence of three major trends: the rapid growth of large loads, (e.g.: microchip manufacturing and AI-related data centers); the aging generation fleet; and a lack of new dispatchable generation resources being added to the system.”   The description of the CRP went on to say:

The CRP highlights that the future reliability of the grid depends on the development of flexible generation capable of performing during extended periods of high consumer demand and extreme weather. The report examines lessons-learned from the June 2025 heatwave and the need for a planning framework that better reflects present challenges of operating the grid while anticipating plausible future risks.

“The system requires additional dispatchable generation to serve forecasted increases in consumer demand,” said Zach Smith, Senior Vice President, System and Resource Planning. “We also need to refine and evolve our planning processes to better reflect this period of great change on the grid and a broader range of plausible future outcomes.”

The CRP demonstrates that due to emerging reliability challenges, traditional planning methods built around a single forecast are no longer sufficient. To maintain system reliability and protect public safety, the economy and quality of life, the CRP recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment before reliability margins disappear.

Our biggest concern is the reliability margin crisis described in the CRP.  The NYISO plausible range of reliability margins illustrates the problem (Figure 1).  The CRP doesn’t explain what is going to keep the lights on after 2033, and possibly as early as 2027 if replacement capacity does not keep up with retirements.  My Perplexity AI search found that there are no new fossil-fired capacity proposed.  While adding new nuclear capacity is appropriate, replacement of existing capacity must also be considered.  The youngest of the 3.4 GW of existing nuclear in NY State will be reaching 60 years of age by 2040.

Figure 1: Plausible Range of Statewide System Margins NYISO 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan     

Reason to Pause – Caiazza

Over the last year I have written many articles describing various reasons to pause implementation and reconsider the schedule and scope of the Climate Act.  The State Energy Plan and the CRP both include multiple future energy projections that include estimates of capacity and grid infrastructure additions.  The CRP “recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment”. The State Energy Plan advocates massive deployment of as much wind, solar, and energy storage capacity as possible as fast as possible hoping that it will work out.

Wind and solar energy resources are diffuse, intermittent, and correlated.  Because they are diffuse, utilizing wind and solar means that transmission and distribution systems must be upgraded.  Because they are intermittent, that means that energy storage is needed on daily to seasonal scales.  Because wind and solar are correlated, new dispatchable emissions-free resources (DEFR) are needed to make the electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability.  I believe the only likely viable DEFR backup technology is nuclear generation because it is the only candidate resource that is technologically ready, can be expanded as needed, and does not suffer from limitations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Every day that the resolving the DEFR requirement is delayed the costs associated with what may be a false solution increase.  If the only viable DEFR solution is nuclear, then the wind, solar, and energy storage approach cannot be implemented without nuclear power.  Nuclear power works best as a baseload resource so using it solely as DEFR backup is inappropriate.  Developing baseload nuclear eliminates the need for a huge DEFR backup resource and means that the “build as much as we can as fast as we can” wind and solar buildout currently in progress is unnecessary.  Climate Act implementation should be paused until the most appropriate path forward is determined.

Discussion

Both Ellenbogen and I have been harping about reliability for years.  Unfortunately, no one at the state level seems to be ready to confront the problem.  It is absolutely necessary to come to grips with it.  The state government keeps trying to defy physical law by pushing technologies that can’t keep the lights on.  They need to get out of their bubble because the time frame required to fix what has become a massive problem is getting increasingly small.  The rapidly decreasing margins and negative capacity margins appear likely before new generation of any type can be built.

One of the biggest takeaways from this latest political energy proposal is the danger of political interference in energy policy.  New York politicians now claim that we need 5 GW of nuclear generating capacity.  New York politicians shut down 3.1 GW of nuclear capacity since 1984.  Hochul’s announcement is encouraging but until it must be accompanied by a pause in Climate Act implementation to be credible.  If timely decarbonization using nuclear power is appropriate, then a restart at Indian Point should be considered because it is the cheapest and quickest option.  However, that would be politically toxic so I cannot imagine that ever being proposed by the Hochul Administration. 

Conclusion

In my opinion, nuclear power should be part of New York’s electric system future.  However, Hochul’s proposal is too little, too late as part of the Climate Act implementation without revising the schedule.  It is necessary first to pause implementation and reassess the schedule and ambition of the Act so that it can play a meaningful role.