Climate Act Comments Submitted – Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York

My Comments on the NYPA 2025 Draft Strategic Renewable Plan

The New York Power Authority (NYPA) recently published for public comment the draft first update to its inaugural Strategic Plan for “developing new renewable energy generation projects to supply New Yorkers with affordable, reliable, and emissions-free electricity.” This post describes my comments on the draft.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 550 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Net-Zero Aspirations

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two electric sector targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The electric sector mandates are implemented in Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a renewable energy program. PSL 66-P also includes often overlooked safety valve provisions. The PSC is empowered by this statute to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that the PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service. Despite my best efforts, there has been no response to this requirement.

NYPA Strategic Plan

I described how NYPA was saddled with a renewable development responsibility in an earlier post describing comments submitted by Dennis Higgins. In short legislation forced NYPA to develop a strategic plan to deploy more renewable energy. They describe this update as follows:

NYPA published a draft of its Updated Strategic Plan on July 29, 2025, which details NYPA’s efforts to develop, own and operate renewable generation and energy storage projects to improve the reliability and resiliency of New York’s grid. The draft Updated Strategic Plan includes 20 new renewable generation projects and four energy storage projects. The plan also includes three new project portfolios that contain 152 storage systems. The new projects are located in every region throughout the state and represent a combined capacity of more than 3.8 gigawatts (GW). Including the first tranche of projects identified in the inaugural strategic plan—approved by the NYPA Board of Trustees in January—NYPA’s draft Updated Strategic Plan includes 64 projects and portfolios representing nearly seven gigawatts of capacity—enough electricity to power nearly seven million homes.

My Comments

My comments argue that the NYPA Draft Plan must develop its own affordability and reliability boundary conditions to ensure that its plans ensure adequate and reliable electric supply consistent with the requirements in PSL 66-P. Technical staff at NYPA understand the impacts of renewable energy on the electric system whereas the legislators that promulgated the law requiring NYPA to advance renewable energy do not. Establishing constraints based on a comprehensive understanding of the electric system is a commonsense safeguard.

I argued that there have been two things since NY politicians expanded NYPA’s renewable energy responsibilities that should be reflected in the 2025 Draft Plan. It has become clear that the costs to implement the Climate Act are significantly more than expected. There was a blackout on the Iberian Peninsula that was associated with solar generation. The Draft Plan should address both.

My overarching concern with Climate Act implementation is affordability. Since the last update to the NYPA strategic renewable energy plan even Governor Hochul has acknowledged this problem. This is relevant for the Draft Plan because the Governor recognizes the goal of “affordable, reliable, emission-free electricity”. Posts on this blog have repeatedly made the point that affordable and reliable electricity goals are meaningless unless those terms are defined. My comments said the Draft Plan must acknowledge the PSL 66-P boundary conditions and recognize that the definitions are imprecise and need to be to be refined to properly protect New Yorkers. The fact that there is insufficient guidance should not mean that NYPA does not have the responsibility to address this problem. NYPA has the technical expertise to define its own criteria for affordable, reliable electricity that should be incorporated into the Draft Plan.

Affordability will likely be the primary driver for changes in the current energy policies because the impacts are directly observable. Reliability concerns are more complex and have not been observed yet in New York. As a result, the problem is not as well recognized. On April 28, 2025, a problem at a photovoltaic plant in Spain triggered a blackout over the Iberian Peninsula. Without a course correction similar issues are inevitable here. The Draft Plan must address the ramifications of this blackout that I described in a recent post where I described several recent articles that explained why increased reliance on renewables threaten reliability.

The first article looked at the physics of power grids and the general behavior of both synchronous generation (gas, hydro and nuclear) and inverter-based generation (wind, solar and batteries). Inverter-based resources like wind, solar, and energy storage do not inherently provide transmission support such as voltage control and reactive power services as the spinning turbine generators relied on today. The overarching problem is that not only do inverter-based resources not provide necessary support functions, but they can also de-stabilize the grid in certain, poorly understood circumstances.

The second post explained that the Spanish blackout “demonstrated the importance of voltage control and reactive power, and how a weak grid, with poor controls, was brought down by a single faulty solar inverter.” The basis of the blog post was a report produced by Red Eléctrica de España (“REE”), the Spanish Transmission System Operator (“TSO”). The key messages in the REE report are:

The blackout was triggered by a solar photo voltaic inverter–induced voltage oscillation

Inappropriate disconnections of wind and solar generation, and widespread failure of reactive power support, escalated the disturbance

The collapse exposes systemic risks in low-inertia grids with high levels of inverter-based resources (“IBRs”) and inadequate voltage control

I think the findings in third article should be should be considered in the Draft Plan because Spanish blackout shows that “the true cost of solar can no longer be hidden from the public.” It explained that:

Last week, an expansive article in Bloomberg Green—confessionally titled “The Fix For Solar Blackouts Is Already Here”—captured this sentiment. It lamented that the penetration of solar and wind has outpaced the buildout of stabilization technologies such as synchronous condensers and grid-forming inverters. In other words, the renewables worked as designed, but the infrastructure to integrate them safely at such high percentages of supply lagged far behind:

“The result is huge spending on new wind and solar capacity, but not enough on grids. The 27 members of the European Union and the UK invest on average $0.7 in grids for every dollar spent on renewables, according to BloombergNEF. Spain ranks the lowest, with only $0.3 spent for every dollar.

Blackouts are causing political backlashes against renewables that politicians cannot afford right now. ‘Here’s the problem: Investments in the right infrastructure are not keeping up,’ said António Guterres, head of the United Nations, in a July speech. ‘That ratio should be one to one.’”

With respect to the NYPA Draft Plan this means that simply building renewable capacity is a flawed policy that will lead to similar problems. The lesson from Europe is that investments in the renewable capacity must be accompanied by investments to maintain reliability in an electric system dependent upon inverter-based resources. If renewable energy capacity is expanded beyond the ability of the transmission system to use it, then blackouts are inevitable.

Other Comments

One lesson learned about this process is that environmental organizers can rally their supporters to submit comments. My comments noted that NYPA needs to confront the emotion-driven rhetoric of clean energy advocates when their claims do not meet technical standards necessary for policy decisions. Many of the numeous comments submitted begin with the demand that NYPA must double its efforts and build the 15GW that New York needs “to comply with the Climate Act, lower electricity bills, create 25,000 green union jobs, and end our fossil fuel dependence.” My comments responded to these claims.

The comments that demand that NYPA “must build 15 GW of public renewable energy by 2030” ignore reality. Numerous implementation issues have delayed deployments to the point where the Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review admits that the 70% renewable energy by 2030 target could be delayed. For the same reasons, there should be no expectation that NYPA can accelerate its deployment substantially.

The myth that wind and solar will lower electricity bills is evaporating as described in the section addressing the Spanish blackout. There are two relevant implications for the NYPA Draft Plan. It is not enough to just build renewable energy. Investment in transmission upgrades cited by the head of the United Nations must be included. Secondly NYPA must include the grid infrastructure investments and necessary energy storage required to back up the intermittent wind and solar deployed to meet legislative requirements.

Commenters claimed without any evidence that building 15 GW of renewables would “create 25,000 green union jobs”. Too often New York’s energy policies have ignored experiences in other jurisdictions are further down the net-zero transition path. David Turver has described the cost of green energy jobs in the United Kingdom. One of the points he makes is that number of green jobs means that the energy sector is becoming less productive. Most of these jobs are utterly dependent upon subsidies which adds another inefficiency. Based on his projections the average subsidy across all three sectors is over $259,000 per job. This leads to the question that the Draft Plan must address. Who is going to pay for those subsidies?

The claim that deploying more renewables will “end our fossil fuel dependence” ignores society’s broader dependency on fossil fuels. Ronald Stien has made the point that “the world’s 8 billion are dependent on more than 6,000 products made from the oil derivatives manufactured from crude oil”. Furthermore, until dispatchable, emissions-free resources are deployed New York’s electric grid has to rely on dispatchable fossil fuel generators. Deploying excess renewable energy affects the economic viability of the backup fossil fuel generators and will likely lead to subsidies to maintain that necessary support.

Discussion

NYPA has the technical expertise to define criteria for reliability standards necessary to address the observed problems that led to the Spanish blackout. My comments assert that the Draft Plan must define safety valve criteria for affordability and reliability metrics. If the safety valve criteria are exceeded, then the Draft Plan should be paused until alternatives that will not adversely affect affordability and reliability are identified and proved feasible in a demonstration project. This approach is the only way to ensure that the Draft Plan programs do not cause unaffordable and unreliable energy.

Conclusion

I think that mixing energy policy and politics is a recipe for disaster. The hubris of the politicians who enabled this legislation knows no bounds. It is not only that their legislation mandates the impossible, but they also hamstring organizations in the state responsible for providing affordable, clean, and reliable electricity. Upset that the deployment of renewable energy was not progressing fast enough to save the planet, the legislation forced NYPA to develop a strategic plan to deploy more renewable energy without any consideration of the consequences.

Virtual Hearing Personal Comments on the Draft Energy Plan

Update 9/19/25 Meeting Materials

Hearing Transcript [PDF]
Hearing Presentation [PDF]
Hearing Recording (opens in new window) My oresentation begins at 19:00

This post documents the oral comment I submitted at the Draft State Energy Plan Public Hearing on August 19, 2025. The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) only allocated two minutes per person, so this article documents the statements that I made.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 550 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Net-Zero Aspirations

According to the New York State Energy Plan website: “The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers.” The New York State Energy Planning Board is a “multi-agency entity established under Article 6 of the Energy Law, playing a core role in the State Energy Plan process”. Among its responsibilities is adopting the State Energy Plan: The Board has the authority to adopt the comprehensive statewide energy plan, and the stakeholder process should be an important component of that responsibility.

The driving factor for the updated Energy Plan is net-zero ambitions of the Climate Act. This is the first update of the Energy Plan since the Climate Act was passed in 2019. I have provided more background information and a list of previous articles on my Energy Plan page. Because of the importance of this process on the future energy system of New York I am following it closely and will be submitting oral and written comments.

Comments

This section documents the comments I made on August 19. I used bullets to differentiate my comments from the explanations.

My name is Roger Caiazza. Documentation for my comments will be posted on my Pragmatic Environmentalist of NY blog

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I started the blog in 2017, it documents my posts on the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act Scoping Plan and various implementation plans, and have written over 550 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in my comments do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

This process appears to be similar to the Scoping Plan stakeholder process which is not a good sign

NYSERDA claimed that there was “robust public input” during the draft Scoping Plan process that “included 11 public hearings across the State and more than 35,000 written comments” that supposedly were read, summarized, and presented to the Climate Action Council. The problem is that Agency staff screened the comments for the Climate Action Council and there is no publicly available documentation of their work. They only presented generalities at meetings and did not summarize specific comments. I am convinced that any comments that questioned the narrative espoused by Climate Act proponents were ignored and there is no evidence that I am wrong. I think that NYSERDA is following the same script where the numbers were tortured to provide the desired results then tied up into a pretty package. Now they will go through the motions of accepting public input and will not respond to comments submitted.

Two minutes for comments indicates NYSERDA is going through the motions of dealing of stakeholder input

My background as an industry air pollution meteorologist required that I back up any analyses submitted to regulatory agencies and reference my findings in paper presentations. Obviously, that is not possible when only two minutes is allotted for comments. It also means that NYSERDA does not care if detailed information is provided and that leads me to believe that the answer is in the back of the book. This whole process is a charade whose only intent is to be able to check the box that there was a stakeholder process.

The stakeholder process for the Draft Energy Plan will fail if NYSERDA and other state agencies treat it as an obligation and not an opportunity to improve the final plan

I understand that the New York Independent System Operator and the New York State Reliability Council have provided expert input to the Draft Energy Plan Pathways Analysis. However, that interaction is not documented and there are substantial differences between NYISO projections of future electric system capacity and the Pathways Analysis. The differences in Table 1 are important for the Energy Planning Board to understand. The stakeholder process should reconcile the differences in an open and transparent public forum. In my opinion, NYSERDA should host a technical meeting to address this technical issue and others. Such a meeting could include a dialogue between staff and stakeholders where questions could be asked.

Table 1: Comparison of 2040 Fuel Mix Capacity (MW) Projections by NYISO and NYSERDA

This process will have no credibility if NYSERDA does not summarize each comment received and explains how they were resolved to Energy Planning Board

A credible stakeholder process treats responds to comments. For example, the Santa Clara County Rapid Transit Development Project includes a master plan for transportation for Silicon Valley. An interview with the founding manager notes: “Part of the plan is a four-year public stakeholder review process. In the reviews, if the public came up with good ideas, the ideas went into the plan. If an idea wasn’t good, we had the responsibility of explaining why” from California’s High-Speed Rail Visionary Bill Buchanan, Trains, Volume 85, No. 1, January 2025, pages 30-37. Their process also included public outreach meetings that included the opportunity to ask questions.

The Scoping Plan stakeholder process did not document their response to comments. There is nothing that indicates that the Draft Energy Plan process will be any different. Availability of the draft was announced after a series of Planning Board meetings earlier this year. There hasn’t been any opportunity for stakeholders to ask questions about the assumptions and methodologies used. If the State was serious about considering public input for an energy plan that affects every New Yorker, then they would hold a series of meetings to cover specific technical topics. A stakeholder process that does not allow for interaction between stakeholders and NYSERDA staff is nearly useless.

The Pathways analysis includes some of the flaws of the integration analysis. For example, none of the existing solar and wind generators are retired

This is one example of an obvious issue in the Pathways Analysis. The “Retirement Input” tab in the Pathways Analysis Technical Supplement: Key Drivers and Outputs spreadsheet is shown in Figure 1. It states that the expected lifetimes for wind, solar, and storage are indefinite. Most of the existing wind and solar and all of the existing storage will have to be replaced by 2040. This is an absurd assumption.

Figure 1: Retirement Inputs Table

The fact that this error was pointed out years ago means that NYSERDA does not care about public input. On June 16, 2022 I submitted a Comment on Retirement Input Assumptions used in the Draft Scoping Plan.

In what appears to be an egregious attempt to reduce the published costs of wind, solar, and battery storage, the Integration Analysis assumes that the expected lifetimes of those technologies are indefinite. As a result, units are assumed to remain online throughout the study period and no costs for replacements between now and 2050 are included. However. that is a poor assumption because it is totally unreasonable to expect that, for example, the existing land-based resources will still be in operation in 2050.

I estimated the potential impact of this assumption. Using an indefinite retirement date for these resources underestimates the total builds needed for 2050. For land-based wind between 3,814 MW and 4,600 MW are not included and for offshore wind between 6,200 and 6,600 MW are not included. The amount of solar not included ranges between 22,639 MW and 19,983 MW. Finally, battery storage between 10,713 MW and 12,207 MW of additional resources will need to be developed to meet the 2050 projected value.

The Draft Energy Plan only covers the next 15 years to 2040, so these projections are not completely compatible. Nonetheless, this is still a uncontestably incorrect assumption. This error will cause an underestimate of the costs to comply with the Climate Act 2040 mandates. It is a matter of credibility if it is not acknowledged.

The biggest problem is that the Pathways “No Action” scenario is not a baseline that excludes all programs necessary to achieve the Climate Act targets. It includes legacy programs in place prior to the Climate Act. This hides the true costs of the net-zero transition. A no GHG emission reduction program scenario is needed

This is another issue that I raised in the Scoping Plan stakeholder process in verbal and written comments. As was the case with the Integration Analysis and Scoping Plan, NYSERDA is interpreting the “No action” scenario as one that includes all legacy programs in place prior to the passage of the Climate Act. The appropriate baseline scenario is one that excludes all programs that were promulgated to reduce GHG emissions because that is the only way to determine the costs to achieve the “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and the two electric sector targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. I provided more details in this post.

Without assurances that this process will respond to input there is no sense in developing detailed comments. If you are serious then hold a technical conference where the public can ask questions.

I developed an extensive set of comments on the Draft Scoping Plan that took an enormous amount of time. Many others invested similar time and effort. The lack of documentation that proved that someone had read the comments along with the lack of a summary document that summarized each comment and explained how NYSERDA reconciled the comment in the Final Scoping Plan for the Climate Action Council indicates to me that the whole process is rigged. If the Energy Planning Board members responsible for “approving” the Draft Energy Plan are not given all the stakeholder information regarding the plan then it is reasonable to believe that informed approvals were never expected. The plan was always to get a rubber stamp approval and check the box that there was a stakeholder process.

Given the tremendous uncertainty related to Federal programs the comment period for the Draft Energy Plan should be extended. If that is not done, then it is likely that the Energy Plan will be obsolete as soon as it is completed.

There is no question that there will be changes in Federal policies that will have enormous impact on the Draft Energy Plan. Even before the change in Washington, state agencies highlighted other factors that have delayed the planned schedules including supply chain challenges, inflation, canceled projects, outdated data/miscalculations, permitting issues, and the need to balance reliability, costs, and equity. The Draft Energy Plan must acknowledges that there are significant outside factors

Finally, the Energy Plan will only be credible if it establishes specific affordability, reliability, and environmental impact acceptability criteria, mandates that a tracking mechanism is established for each, and formulates a mandatory course of action when the criteria are exceeded.

The overview fact sheet for the Draft Energy Plan claims that it “advances abundant, reliable, affordable, and clean energy for all New Yorkers.” That is just a slogan unless those terms are defined. I have long argued that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, “Establishment of a renewable energy program”, includes bounds on implementation that have not been considered to date. I have shown that one of the provisions of that regulation and other circumstances warrant the PSC commencing a hearing process to “consider modification and extension” of New York Renewable Energy Program timelines. Clearly this has an impact on the Draft Energy Plan and must be considered. In my opinion, the Climate Action Council should have defined acceptable reliability, affordability, and environmental impact metrics. Their failure to do so means that the responsibility falls upon the Energy Planning Board.

Discussion

I fear that the Hochul Administration is going to direct NYSERDA to follow the stakeholder template used in the Scoping Plan. In so doing the Administration can continue to avoid responsibility for the impacts of the Climate Act. The Draft Energy Plan is too important to rely on emotion and political pandering to specific constituencies to not do this process right.

Conclusion

One of the things I do in my retirement is to play stakeholder process games. The State agencies pretend that they will consider public input, and I pretend that they will actually listen to me. The thing is that I have reality on my side. The low energy density of wind and solar and their intermittent availability are insurmountable hurdles to a affordable and reliable electric energy system. The Draft Energy Plan must recognize that challenge.

Climate Act Safety Valve Filing – Customers in Arrears Trigger

My last post described a filing that I made with Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton to New York Public Service Commission Case 22-M-0149 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission Assessing implementation of and Compliance with the Requirements and Targets of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act. We argued that this Proceeding is the appropriate venue to address the safety valve provisions in Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P. This post explains that a requirement for the Public Service Commission to hold a hearing to consider whether it is appropriate to temporarily suspend or modify PSL 66-P obligations has been triggered.

Background

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two electric sector targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda” was based on an Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA).

The summary post describing the filing includes a summary of the safety valve requirement and the rationale for submitting the filing. In brief, Ellenbogen, Kontogiannis, Menton, and I believe that the Public Service Commission (PSC or Commission) has not adequately addressed their broad mandate to ensure access to safe, reliable utility service at just and reasonable rates relative to all the Climate Act mandates incorporated in recent rate cases. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 mandate that a minimum of 70% of the statewide electric generation in 2030 is generated by renewable energy systems and the 2040 requirement that the statewide electrical demand system will be zero emissions also includes safety valve provisions. The Commission is empowered by this statute to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service. However, in response to those arguments Department of Public Service (DPS) staff have stated that the rate cases are not the appropriate venue to determine whether a hearing is necessary.

Our filing to a generic proceeding responds to that argument. It explains that the statewide utility customers in arrears provision has been exceeded so it would be appropriate to conduct a hearing. This post will describe Exhibit 1 – Trend in Company Customers in Arrears that documents increasing trends in statewide utility customer payment delinquencies, providing baseline data for the customers in arrears safety valve trigger. The filing includes the Exhibit 2 – Customers in Arrears spreadsheet that contains the detailed analytical data on utility arrears across New York’s major distribution companies.

Utility Customers In Arrears

Exhibit 1 of the filing documents my analysis of residential customer in arrears data to estimate whether there has been a significant increase in arrears consistent with New York Public Service Law 66-p (4) for the ten largest electric and gas distribution utility companies regulated by the Public Service Commission. The spreadsheet used for the calculations is available. The first tab in the spreadsheet describes the other tabs in the spreadsheet.

Residential Collection Data

Utilities file a monthly report in the PSC Case 91-M-0744 docket that details their arrears and service terminations. There is a data set in New York Open Data that provides this information that was used to determine the number of residential customers in arrears. The “Quarterly snapshot of residential collection dataset” contains the following information:

This dataset provides a quarterly snapshot of residential bill collection activity for New York State’s ten largest electric and gas distribution utility companies regulated by the Public Service Commission. Included in this dataset are each utility’s total number of residential customers, residential customers with arrears (overdue bills) greater than 60 days, residential final service termination notices issued, residential accounts terminated (service shut off for nonpayment), active residential deferred payment agreements and the number of uncollectible residential accounts. Also included are the corresponding utility sales figures for each metric above, showing the dollar figure represented.

The “Documentation” tab in the spreadsheet lists the Data Dictionary in the New York Open Data source record. For this analysis, the data were exported in May 2025 to the “Input” tab in the spreadsheet. The original data is available by quarter, but the data labels are listed as month and year, so the input data is converted to quarterly labels in the “Quarterly” tab. The “Statewide” tab sums data for all the utilities by quarter.

Company Residential Customer Summary – Quarterly Data

Table 1 lists the sum of the quarterly data for the Summary Snapshot for all ten utilities for the statewide number of residential customers, residential customers with arrears (overdue bills) greater than 60 days, and the percentage of residential customers with overdue bills relative to the total number of customers. The final termination notices and number of service disconnections (not shown) are not good estimates of the effect of the Climate Act because other mandates have affected the data, e.g., service disconnections were suspended during COVID.

Table 1: Ten Largest Electric and Gas Distribution Utilities Summary Snapshot Quarterly Residential Collection Data

Table 2 summarizes these data relative to the PSL 66-P(4) trigger. The annual average number of statewide customers in arrears greater than 60 days was 1,040,664 in 2019, the last year before the CLCPA was implemented. The average in 2024 was 1,385,119 customers in arrears which is an increase of 344,455 or a 33% increase. The Public Safety Law section 66-p (4) criteria for consideration of suspension or modification is a “significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. The standard deviation of the number of customers in arrears from 2010 to 2019 is 64,333. Because the observed difference, 344,455 is greater than two times the standard deviation, the increase in statewide customers in arrears is statistically “significant”.

Table 2: Combined Ten Largest Electric and Gas Distribution Utilities Summary Snapshot Quarterly Residential Collection Data Summary of Customers in Arrears Greater than 60 Days

There are ten tables in the spreadsheet in a similar format but only include data from each of the ten largest utility companies that are included in the New York Open Data quarterly snapshot of residential collection data. Table 3 summarizes the results listed in the PSL 66-p(4) tab in the spreadsheet. In addition to the statewide significance finding, four of the ten utilities had a statistically significant increase in customers in arrears since the start of the CLCPA: Consolidated Edison, Central Hudson Gas & Electric, National Grid Metro – Natural gas to Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island, and National Grid Upstate: the former Niagara Mohawk service territory.

Table 3: Summary of Analyses of Customers in Arrears More Than 60 Days Difference Before the Climate Act and Since Implementation Showing Whether the Difference in the Number of Customers Changed Significantly Before 2019 and After 2020

Discussion

Our filing included a description of the DPS staff response to this argument that was based on a post here. There were two arguments. DPS stated that the proper place to address this was in a generic proceeding and our filing addresses that argument. It is anybody’s guess if and when the PSC will respond to our filing.

The other argument was that our analysis was incomplete. The Public Safety Law section 66-p (4) criteria for consideration of suspension or modification is a “significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. DPS argued that we did not prove that the significant increase was due to the Climate Act. That response overlooks the fact that the information necessary to determine whether the costs are due to the program is not available because DPS has not fulfilled its obligations. The information in the DPS informational report required as part of Case 22-M-0149 is needed to determine if the increase is related to the CLCPA program. The DPS has not provided that report since July 2023 so only information through 2022 is available. That is too short a period to be used for this evaluation.

Conclusion

Utility affordability is a major issue as reflected by the PSC decision for the National Grid request. According to the press release: “The Commission’s action will significantly reduce the company’s request for total electric delivery revenues by over $340 million (67% decrease from request) and total gas delivery revenues by nearly $100 million (63% decrease from request) in the first year.” This post explains that the requirement for the Public Service Commission to hold a hearing to consider whether it is appropriate to temporarily suspend or modify PSL 66-P obligations has been triggered. The significant reduction in the National Grid rate case implicitly acknowledges that Climate Act costs are contributing to unacceptable cost increases. However, the decision was driven by the political imperative to reduce energy costs and not the rational decision to pause the Climate Act. At some point the politicians supporting the Climate Act must be called out to defend the costs of the net-zero transition. This filing demonstrates that the rationale to hold a hearing to determine if the schedule should be temporarily suspended exists.

My Climate Act Safety Valve Filing

My last post described a letter sent by two members of the Climate Action Council, Donna DeCarolis and Dennis Elsenbeck, to Rory Christian, Chair & Chief Executive Officer of the New Yok State Public Service Commission (PSC) that argued that there are more than sufficient circumstances to warrant the PSC commencing a hearing process to “consider modification and extension of New York Renewable Energy Program timelines.. This post describes a filing that I made with Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton to New York Public Service Commission Case 22-M-0149 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission Assessing implementation of and Compliance with the Requirements and Targets of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act that makes the same point.

Background

The Donna DeCarolis and Dennis Elsenbeck letter argued that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a renewable energy program, includes bounds on implementation. Their letter described two circumstances that they believe warrant a hearing Firstly, the Draft Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) Staff and NYSERDA “details the numerous factors, including inflation, transmission constraints, shifting federal energy and trade policies and interconnection and siting challenges that have adversely impacted renewable development and the state’s trajectory towards achieving the Program’s 2030 target.” The Biennial Review that “concludes that a delay in achieving the 70% goal may be unavoidable.”

The second circumstance noted is the recently released Draft New York State Energy Plan that “further affirms that current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient to meet statutory targets, and that external constraints continue to impede progress.” They include this quote: “Consistent with the findings of the CES biennial review, the [Draft Energy Plan’s] modeling shows achievement of a 70% renewable grid in 2033.” However, the letter points out that the Draft Energy Plan goes on to “acknowledge that the anticipated buildout of renewables could be limited by external factors and the 70% target by 2030 may not be met until much later in the decade.”

There are two other relevant reports not mentioned in the letter. The New York State Comptroller Status report “Climate Act Goals – Planning, Procurements, and Progress Tracking” audited PSC and NYSERDA efforts to achieve the Climate Act mandates. It found that “While PSC and NYSERDA have taken considerable steps to plan for the transition to renewable energy in accordance with the Climate Act and CES, their plans did not comprise all essential components, including assessing risks to meeting goals and projecting costs.” The report recommended that the agencies begin the comprehensive review of the Climate Act, “continuously analyze” existing and emerging risks and known issues, conduct a detailed analysis of cost estimates, and “assess the extent to with ratepayers can reasonably assume the responsibility” of the implementation costs.

The second relevant report is the Annual Informational Report on Climate Act status. This report is required to explicitly describe ratepayer costs. The last report was released in July 2023 and covers data through 2022. There hasn’t been a report since then. I have not doubts that the release of this information was delayed because the costs would be politically detrimental to the Hochul Administration.

Our filing described other circumstances and a provision within PSL 66-P itself that warrant the PSC holding a hearing to consider modification and extension of the Climate Act timelines.

Submittal

Roger Caiazza, Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (“Independent Intervenors”) have filed testimony in the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) dba National Grid and the Consolidated Edison Company of New York rate cases. We made the same argument as the letter. Section 66-P, Establishment of a renewable energy program, noting that this law includes bounds on implementation that have not been considered in the rate cases. The Department of Public Service (DPS) staff response to our arguments boils down to “rate cases are not the appropriate forum to consider limitations of the renewable energy program”. The filing submitted on August 12 argues that Case 22-M-0149 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission Assessing implementation of and Compliance with the Requirements and Targets of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act is the appropriate forum and should address this issue.

I teamed up with three gentlemen who share the common opinion that the Climate Act net-zero transition simply cannot work as proposed and will do far more harm than good. Ellenbogen is an electrical engineer who is President of Allied Converters where he has pioneered how “green” manufacturing can work. Constantine Kontogiannis is an engineer who has decades of experience providing energy consulting services. Menton is a retired lawyer and now writes articles at his Manhattan Contrarian blog that analyze New York’s energy transition. We have all been arguing that the net-zero transition cannot work for years to no avail. We decided to combine forces and become involved with utility rate cases because we do not think that our messaging has been acknowledged, much less addressed and because all of us are directly affected by either of the cases. Yesterday’s filing is another attempt to force the Public Service Commission to consider safety valve provisions in the PSL Section 66-P component of Climate Act implementation.

Our Argument

The Public Service Commission (PSC or Commission) has not adequately addressed their broad mandate to ensure access to safe, reliable utility service at just and reasonable rates relative to all the Climate Act mandates incorporated in recent rate cases. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 mandate that a minimum of 70% of the statewide electric generation in 2030 is generated by renewable energy systems and the 2040 requirement that the statewide electrical demand system will be zero emissions also includes safety valve provisions. The Commission is empowered by this statute to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service. This filing explains that the utility customers in arrears provision has been exceeded so it would be appropriate to conduct a hearing.

Our filing is extensive. It includes the primary filing, two exhibits documenting the customers in arrears safety valve trigger, and five supporting exhibits. The primary filing argues that Public Service Law Section 66-p(4) contains the aforementioned safety valve provisions. Exhibit 1 – Trend in Company Customers in Arrears documents increasing trends in utility customer payment delinquencies, providing baseline data for the customers in arrears safety valve trigger. I intend to do a separate post on that next. Exhibit 2 – Customers in Arrears is a spreadsheet that contains the detailed analytical data on utility arrears across New York’s major distribution companies.

The remainder of the exhibits support the need for the filing, additional circumstances that demonstrate that the broad mandate to ensure access to safe, reliable utility service at just and reasonable rates has not been addressed in the current implementation process, a demonstration that the current approach is actually increasing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, and a recommendation for an alternative approach. Exhibit 3 – Affordability-Focused Recommendations outlines specific policy recommendations to address energy affordability concerns, likely including proposals for cost transparency, alternative funding mechanisms, and enhanced low-income programs. Exhibit 4 – Resource Gap Characterization analyzes gaps between CLCPA mandates and available resources, potentially addressing both financial and infrastructure capacity constraints. Exhibit 5 – Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources explains that the need for a resource that is not currently commercially available risks investments in false solutions. Exhibit 6 – Electrification Increases Emissions presents analysis demonstrating that certain electrification strategies may paradoxically increase emissions. Finally, Exhibit 7 – Alternative Approach proposes alternative implementation pathways that could achieve climate goals while maintaining affordability and reliability.

Discussion

Our filing advances five key arguments that the Commission should conduct a hearing to temporarily suspend or modify the PSL 66-P obligations because the present approach impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service. Current data on customer arrears and service disconnections demonstrates that New York may already meet thresholds for invoking PSL Section 66-p(4) safety valves. With utility arrears reaching $1.8 billion and affecting 1.2 million households, CLCPA implementation is creating significant affordability burdens. The Commission has failed to provide comprehensive cost reporting required under its own orders, making it impossible to assess true ratepayer impacts. The proposed transition to weather-dependent renewable resources poses unacceptable reliability risks that warrant safety valve consideration.

We believe that the Climate Act’s selective choice of metrics for affordability, reliability, and sustainability/environmental impacts fail to provide a complete picture of the impacts associated with the net-zero transition. Our intervention to date has focused on the technical aspects of implementation. We accept that challenging the CLCPA itself in a rate case is inappropriate. However, it is now clear that technical problems make implementation of the Climate Act mandates inappropriate because of the observed challenges. There are significant costs and reliability impacts associated with implementing the CLCPA in the rate cases but there are no criteria for acceptable affordability, reliability, or environmental impacts. This must change and this Proceeding appears to be the appropriate venue.

Conclusion

The Climate Act is and always will be political theater. New York has never done a feasibility analysis because the politicians and the activists who wrote the law naively believed that the net-zero transition was only a matter of political will. It has always been inevitable that New York’s net-zero transition would collapse because of physics and costs issues that would have been flagged in a proper feasibility analysis. Now that the consequences of ignoring the fundamentals are becoming so evident that they cannot be ignored, the search is on for an excuse to pause implementation. This filing argues that there are already provisions in place to reconsider the schedule. When a hearing is held, the ambition of the transition will be exposed to reality as well.

I will follow up this post with posts that describe the individual elements of the filing as time permits.

Summary of Con Ed Rate Case Intervention

I believe that Governor Hochul’s Administration has forced New York utilities to incorporate programs to try to meet the goals of the Climate Act despite never proving that it is feasible, never defining what is affordable, and mounting evidence that implementation is not working out as planned. My frustration that no one is acting on those concerns led me to join Constantine Kontogiannis in a submittal in the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation dba National Grid (NMPC) rate case proceeding in May. In June we submitted testimony in the Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Con Ed) rate case with Richard Ellenbogen and Francis Menton. This article outlines our concerns and describes our testimony.

I have followed the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 500 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

I have never paid much attention to utility rate cases until this spring. My frustration that no one has reacted to my concerns about the pitfalls of the Climate Act forced me into participating. Kontogiannis and I got to the NMPC rate case late in the process. Briefly, the utility Con Ed outlines its rate case plan; intervenors react; a Joint Proposal (JP) is hammered out between the utility, the Department of Public Service (DPS), and intervenors; the JP is submitted to the Public Service Commission (PSC); and they decide on the fate of the rate case. Kontogiannis and I intervened in the NMPC rate case by submitting a statement in opposition to the JP settlement plan. Kontogiannis, Ellenbogen, Menton, and I (“Independent Intervenors”) intervened in the Con Ed rate case by submitting testimony regarding the draft JP, essentially one step before in the process than our intervention in the NMPC rate case.

My role in both interventions was to pull together our concerns in the NMPC statement in opposition and the Con Ed testimony documents. Both rate cases are now in a phase that is beyond my comprehension so I cannot begin to explain what is going on and how we will interact with the parties. Moreover, in the Con Ed case all discussions are confidential. I have no idea how this will turn out.

Con Ed Testimony

Our submittal included a testimony (formatted as questions and answers) along with seven exhibits.

In the testimony we first described our backgrounds. I stated that I was a retired utility meteorologist, described my career, and mentioned that I write this blog. Ellenbogen is an electrical engineer who is President of Allied Converters where he has pioneered how “green” manufacturing can work. Constantine Kontogiannis is an engineer who has decades of experience providing energy consulting services. Menton is a retired lawyer and now writes articles at his Manhattan Contrarian blog that analyze New York’s energy transition.

We explained we are participating in the rate case because we share the common concern that there are unacknowledged thresholds associated with Climate Act affordability, reliability and environmental impacts. We believe that wind and solar cannot adequately supply the grid, cannot maintain reliability without redundant backup, and will drive up costs dramatically for consumers. The building and transportation electrification initiatives proposed by Con Ed in the rate proceedings will dramatically compound these detrimental impacts. Our testimony describes our concerns and makes recommendations to address them.

Our testimony argued that it has become apparent that the goals of the Climate Act are not feasible and are putting the health and safety of New Yorkers at risk, while simultaneously adding huge costs to the electrical system. We made four arguments:

It is time for the PSC to invoke PSL Section 66-P(4) and, under that authority, suspend CLCPA obligations contained in this rate case.
Our testimony addresses problems related to CLCPA obligations confronting Con Ed specifically as they apply to these rate proceedings.
The rate case includes programs and initiatives needed to comply with the requirements of the CLCPA, but they are incompatible with the mandates for safe, reliable and affordable service.
The Independent Intervenors propose pausing implementation of CLCPA aspects of the rate case that are not cost-effective on their own and redirect funding to interim solutions to reduce carbon emissions and costs while improving reliability that are cost-effective.

Our testimony also included an estimate of the impact of the rate case on global warming.

We found that the New York emissions reductions possible are negligible relative to global emissions and the resulting global temperature change is infinitesimally small. This does not mean that we should not do something, but it does mean that concerns about the schedule and pace of emission reductions are misplaced.

Safety Valve

This issue is an obsession of mine so I was the primary author of the description and the related exhibit. Clearly there are limits to how much Climate Act implementation can cost. It frustrates me to no end that Public Service Law (PSL) 66-p(4) is a safeguard mechanism that could define that limit but it has been ignored. PSL Section 66-p charges the Commission with implementing renewable energy programs but includes feasibility safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability. In this proceeding and the NMPC rate case, I pointed out that the safety valve criterion for a significant increase in the number of customers in arrears has been exceeded. There hasn’t been a response yet in this case but I described the DPS response to the same argument in the NMPC case. I expect DPS to similarly argue that they must follow the Climate Act law conveniently overlooking the fact that PSL 66 is a law too. They argued that addressing this is beyond the scope of a rate case proceeding. The DPS response to the need for affordability and reliability safety valves clearly is a failure to support their broad mandate to ensure consumer access to safe, reliable utility service at just and reasonable rates.

Affordability and Environmental Impacts

We acknowledge that Con Ed is in a difficult position. They must meet CLCPA obligations even though there is mounting evidence that implementation will have negative consequences.

Our testimony noted that energy costs are affecting affordability and that has housing security implications. There is another aspect of affordability affecting New York City residents. One of our exhibits addressed Local Law 97, the New York’s legislation mandating building electrification Ellenbogen found that until the New York City electric generators are zero emissions, the forced conversion will actually increase emissions. Ellenbogen’s personal experience electrifying his manufacturing facility and home has convinced him that New York City has underestimated the logistical challenge of citywide conversions with new technologies. Ellenbogen evaluated costs and argues that LL97 is unaffordable. Finally, because his electric system monitors electric use and characteristics, he has data proving that electrified buildings will require Con Ed to upgrade its electric service.

Feasibility

The rate case includes programs and initiatives needed to comply with the requirements of the CLCPA. We believe they are incompatible with the mandates for safe, reliable and affordable service because the schedule and ambition of the mandates were not based on feasibility. We referenced the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 2025 Power Trends report and enumerated specific issues raised that should be considered in this rate case.

Another obsession of mine is the need to back up weather-dependent resources during periods of extended low wind and solar availability. In our testimony we pointed out that a new resource that is dispatchable and emissions-free (DEFR) is needed to address this challenge. Acknowledging the problem is only the first step in resolving it. Electric planners are still trying to figure out how to incorporate the need for DEFR into reliability planning criteria. Determining how much DEFR will be needed requires extensive analysis of historical observations. The biggest challenge is that there are no commercially viable DEFR technologies available.

At present, the only mature technology that can act as a DEFR in New York is nuclear. Conventional nuclear has been met with a great deal of resistance in NY State and even with the recent change of mindset, development of additional nuclear plants will take at least 15 – 20 years based upon the last two nuclear plants built, Vogtle 3 & 4 in Georgia. It is estimated that Small Modular Reactors will not be available for deployment until well after 2035. We asked what technologies will be available to support the wind and solar buildout presumed in the Company rate case?

Misplaced Priorities

We explained that the Climate Act includes priorities that detract from a pragmatic decarbonization plan. The demonization of natural gas by the Climate Action Council (CAC) that was responsible for the Scoping Plan outline of implementation strategies precludes what we believe is part of the best decarbonization approach. An exhibit is included that concludes that reducing the use of natural gas is irrational at this time.

Ellenbogen’s experience with cost effectively reducing his own Con Ed utility bills while simultaneously reducing its carbon footprint is a clear example of what can be done with proper planning and an adherence to science-based solutions. Ellenbogen’s manufacturing plant currently generates or offsets 72% of its electrical energy use onsite with a building carbon footprint 30% – 40% lower than the electricity supplied by Con Ed. Not only does the facility reduce Con Ed load by generating on-site power, but the facility also reduces reactive loads that increases grid capacity and reduces transmission and distribution system energy losses. Unfortunately, there is a problem with the approach. The low energy cost was accomplished using a natural gas-powered high efficiency Combined Heat and Power System (CHP) and a large solar array. The aspirational goal of zero emissions and the irrational vilification of methane precludes replicating these proven results.

Primary Concern

We are very concerned that the rate case JP ignores the grid integrity concerns identified in NYISO Power Trends 2025 and has not reconciled the significant shortfall in renewable generation identified in the Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review. The PSC order announcing the release of the Biennial Review acknowledges that the renewable generation goal of seventy percent in the year 2030 is not just impossible, but that we’re actually headed in the wrong direction – statewide renewable energy production was slightly over forty six percent of the total in the year 2022, but is actually projected to drop to less than forty four and one-half percent in the year 2030. This is in large part due to building and transportation electrification load growth outpacing new generation coming online. At the same time, the NYISO is warning of significant reliability issues due to both load growth and CLCPA-induced natural gas constraints. As currently designed, this rate proceeding will dramatically increase ratepayer cost and decrease electric grid reliability, while failing to produce any tangible lifecycle sustainability benefit.

Recommendations

The Independent Intervenors offered specific recommendations. There were three primary recommendations.

We recommend that the Con Ed rate case contribution to CLCPA transportation sector investments should be limited to improving traction power regeneration across the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) with a specific focus on the New York City Transit subway system. We estimated that focusing all transportation electrification efforts within this rate proceeding on improving subway traction power regeneration will save more than 400 gigawatt hours annually, and the electric cost savings alone will contribute roughly 80 million dollars per year towards the cost of this project. More importantly, this project will reduce coincident peak load between 0.6 and 0.9 gigawatts across the subway system and also provide voltage and frequency regulation and support in many load pockets throughout New York City. Directing all rate case transportation electrification funding will also provide the greatest return on investment and net sustainability benefits for ratepayers, many of whom are also regular users of the subway system.

Our second recommendation was to focus all building electrification efforts within this rate case solely on transitioning approximately one thousand five hundred existing customers of Con Ed’s steam system to electric cooling and hybrid heating solutions. This focus will provide the biggest bang for the buck in efficiency improvements, will reduce water use, and reduce impacts on the municipal sewer system, while also decreasing the overall load on waste treatment facilities. Directing all building electrification funding in this rate proceeding to this subset of the New York City building stock will provide the greatest reliability, affordability, and sustainability benefits to ratepayers.

Based on our finding that Local Law 97 used blatantly false and fictitious emission improvement projections we recommended a fuel-neutral approach to the local law is advisable. A particular emphasis should be placed on ensuring Cob Ed’s local electric distribution system headroom is maintained and not diminished solely for the purpose of building and/or transportation electrification. Moreover, in order to ensure ratepayer affordability, no energy efficiency project should be promoted that has a benefit to cost ratio of less than two.

Conclusion

Our experience with energy efficiency programs, electric energy systems, and fossil fuel operations led us to propose an interim decarbonization solution that avoids the risk of a costly false solution. We proposed pausing implementation of CLCPA aspects of the rate case and concentrate on interim solutions to reduce carbon emissions and costs while improving reliability.

DPS Response to Safety Valve Recommendations

In May I described my Personal Statement on Niagara Mohawk Rate Case Joint Proposal (JP). The article mentioned that the statement argued that the JP does not acknowledge New York Public Service Law safety valves. This article describes the response to that argument by the Department of Public Services (DPS).

The New York Department of Public Service (DPS) “has a broad mandate to ensure access to safe, reliable utility service at just and reasonable rates.” The New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) DPS implementation process proceeds because the law says so while at the same time DPS ignores another law that says that there are limits. This is an update to an earlier post about Climate Act Safety Valves.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because the energy density of wind and solar energy is too low and the resource intermittency too variable to ever support a reliable electric system relying on those resources. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 540 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.

Safety Valves

My previous article about safety valves described Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P Establishment of a renewable energy program that provides for bounds on implementation. Section 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.

A couple of months ago I joined Constantine Kontogiannis in a submittal in the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation dba National Grid (NMPC) rate case proceeding. I posted an article describing our statement in opposition to the Joint Proposal (JP) settlement plan. In one of our arguments, we addressed these safety valve provisions. It was included to force the PSC to acknowledge that the safety valves must be addressed. The submittal included an attachment that was summed up in my analysis that showed that the number of people in arrears has significantly increased since the start of the Climate Act transition which I believe should trigger the DPS to consider a Section 66-p (4) hearing. Our statement concluded that it is inappropriate to invest in Climate Act programs until the PSC defines the criteria for the Section 66-p(4) safety valves, institutes a tracking system, and determines if the Climate Act implementation should be suspended or modified.

The DPS Staff Reply Statement in Support of the JP addressed issues raised in my Statement in Opposition to the Joint Proposal dated May 14, 2025. The following quotes the relevant text in the Reply Statement with my annotated comments. For readability the footnotes are not included. The following is the introduction to the response.

A Statement in Opposition to the Joint Proposal filed by Roger Caiazza and Constantine Kontogiannis (Caiazza and Kontogiannis) raises various issues, which will be address in turn, below. However, the issues alleged by Caiazza and Kontogiannis largely concern the CLCPA. The CLCPA, adopted in 2019, established a nation-leading effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and respond to the effects thereof across New York State.

As discussed in Staff’s Initial Statement in Support, the text of the CLCPA includes directives for the Commission. CLCPA §7(2) requires the Commission to consider whether its decisions are inconsistent with or will interfere with the attainment of the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits established in article 75 of the environmental conservation law.

The following text makes the point that DPS must follow the law. However, they ignore the inconvenient fact that PSL-66(p) is a law too. By not acknowledging that provision DPS fails their “broad mandate to ensure access to safe, reliable utility service at just and reasonable rates.”

Further, pursuant to CLCPA §7(3), the Commission shall not disproportionately burden disadvantaged communities and shall prioritize reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and co-pollutants in disadvantaged communities. Caiazza and Kontogiannis’ arguments regarding the CLCPA ignore the fact that the aforementioned provisions of the CLCPA are statutory requirements that the Commission is obligated to comply with.

The next statement refers to an argument that we made noting that the items that give priority to certain classes of ratepayers necessarily increases costs for everyone else. This will exacerbate the costs of the program for the other ratepayer classes and likely increase the number who need support to survive. In the absence of an update to the mandatory Informational Report that documents ratepayer impacts, it is impossible to quantify those impacts.

Moreover, as discussed throughout the Joint Proposal, and in Staff’s Statement in Support, the items that would help meet the goals of the CLCPA have been included to support ratepayers and are not a “substantial detriment” to ratepayers.

The next statement passes the buck of responsibility for affordability to another proceeding:

Finally, the issues raised by Caiazza and Kontogiannis regarding the CLCPA are beyond the scope of this rate case. The Commission has instituted a proceeding to address the CLCPA, and Caiazza and Kontogiannis’ statewide concerns are more appropriately addressed in that proceeding.

The following quotes Section D of the DPS reply. The first paragraph acknowledges my analysis that showed that the number of people in arrears has significantly increased since the state of the Climate Act. The reference to the fact that it is “not clear how much the CLCPA costs affected the number of customers in arrears” devalues the analysis without recognizing that the reason it is not clear is because DPS has not updated its mandated reports in over a year.

D. The Provisions of PSL § 66-p Are Not Applicable to This Proceeding

In their Statement, Caiazza and Kontogiannis assert that the Joint Proposal does not acknowledge PSL § 66-p(4). The subject of PSL §66-p is the requirement for the Commission to establish a renewable energy program. Caiazza and Kontogiannis contend that they have significant reliability and affordability concerns related to the programs that support the CLCPA in the Joint Proposal. To support this claim, Caiazza and Kontogiannis cite to an increased number of customers in arrears; however, they note that it is “not clear how much the CLCPA costs affected the number of customers in arrears.” Ultimately, Caiazza and Kontogiannis conclude that their concern supports the suspension of the CLCPA and any CLCPA-related programs in the Joint Proposal, pursuant to PSL §66-p(4).

The DPS Staff made several other points in response to our Statement. There are unmentioned conflicting obligations in the following. Both the DPS and the company seeking the rate increases do have an obligation to provide a safe, reliable utility service at just and reasonable rates. Apparently DPS staff are not willing to establish the criteria for what that means.

First, the assertion that the Joint Proposal does not acknowledge PSL §66-p(4) is not a failing of the Joint Proposal. Neither the Joint Proposal nor the Signatory Parties have the power or authority to direct the Commission to conduct a hearing to consider a suspension of the CLCPA or CLCPA-related programs pursuant to PSL §66-p(4).

Second, there are numerous generic proceedings that were initiated or expanded to comply with the directive for the Commission to establish a renewable energy program.

In the preceding paragraph, the DPS staff response deflected responsibility for addressing PSL §66-p(4) by saying that there are other proceedings. I used Perplexity AI to prepare a white paper documenting references to affordability and reliability recommendations in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) Document and Matter Management (DMM) System. The search found the following relevant references ; four stakeholder letters and comments, two business and industry filings, six government and oversight filings, and note that the PSC imposed affordability provisions in four rate cases. I believe the requirement in the NYSE&G/RG&E for a mandated Benefit-Cost table in future filings showing the share of new revenue that funds Climate Act mandates vs. core reliability should be included in all cases.

The affordability references white paper document notes that:

The July 2024 Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) audit warns that neither DPS nor NYSERDA has produced a comprehensive estimate of total CLCPA implementation cost, leaving ratepayers the de-facto funders. OSC recommends that PSC:

“assess the extent to which ratepayers can reasonably assume responsibility”;

“identify alternative funding sources” (federal, State budget, carbon revenues);

craft a backup plan should affordability thresholds be exceeded.

The affordability references white paper showed a disturbing lack of urgency by DPS to address affordability issues related to the renewable energy program. DPS did not respond to the OSC audit for six months and then referenced an existing program. That response could have been sent a couple of weeks after the OSC audit came out. Moreover, there has been no action on the commitment to address the OSC tasks mentioned below:

DPS Chair Rory Christian’s January 2025 response commits the Commission to those tasks and highlights the existing 6% energy-burden target as its affordability yardstick.

The DPS reply tries to explain away my analysis finding that the number of customers in arrears has increased significantly since the start of the Climate Act by saying that there are outreach programs. That is treating the symptoms and not the disease.

Additionally, regarding Caiazza and Kontogiannis’ statements regarding arrears, the Joint Proposal includes provisions that require additional outreach to customers who have unresolved arrears.

The final paragraph passes the buck for safety valve responsibility. As shown in the reliability references white paper the issue has been raised but DPS has not addressed the clear need to address PSL §66-p(4).

Finally, the concerns raised by Caiazza and Kontogiannis are likely not limited to the Niagara Mohawk service territory and the programs implemented by Niagara Mohawk and are potentially state-wide concerns. Caiazza and Kontogiannis’ position that the Commission should suspend the CLCPA-related programming is outside the scope of the rate case and more properly addressed in the generic proceedings that are related to the renewable energy programs.

Conclusion

The DPS response to the need for affordability and reliability safety valves clearly is a failure to support the broad mandate to ensure access to safe, reliable utility service at just and reasonable rates. Utility costs are the most significant manifestation of Climate Act implementation to ratepayers. DPS staff responsible for rate cases defer to someone else. Despite numerous filings and explicit OSC recommendations DPS has not updated the costs of implementation much less whether observed costs are affordable.

Without quantifiable bounds DPS claims that they recognize the “obligation to provide safe, reliable utility service at just and reasonable rates” is no more than a slogan, How much longer will the DPS facilitate the “build as much as possible as quickly as possible” Hochul Administration Climate Act plan without considering affordability and reliability limits. Crossing fingers and hoping things work out is not a recipe for a successful energy plan.

Personal Statement on Niagara Mohawk Rate Case Joint Proposal

I have followed the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 500 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. I believe that Governor Hochul’s Administration has forced New York utilities to incorporate programs to try to meet the goals of the Climate Act despite never proving that it is feasible and mounting evidence that implementation is not working out as planned. My frustration that no one is acting on those concerns led me to join Constantine Kontogiannis in a submittal in the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation dba National Grid (NMPC) rate case proceeding. This post describes our statement in opposition to the Joint Proposal (JP) settlement plan.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. It includes a requirement to make the electric grid zero-emissions by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation. The NMPC rate case is one example of these efforts.

NMPC Rate Case

This rate case has been moving slowly. On May 28, 2024, NMPC filed revised tariffs, supporting testimony, and exhibits for new rates and charges for electric and gas service to be effective July 3, 2024. The new tariffs were designed to increase electric and gas delivery revenues by approximately $525 million and $148 million, respectively. On July 22, 2024 NMPC filed corrections and updated testimony and exhibits decreasing the electric revenue requirement to approximately $509.6 million and increasing the gas revenue requirement to approximately $156.5 million.

On October 21, 2024, NMPC notified the active parties that settlement negotiations were starting. Settlement negotiations were held from October 30, 2024, to April 15, 2025. On April 25, 2025, a Joint Proposal (“JP”) that would establish a three-year rate plan running from April 1, 2025 through March 31, 2028, was filed by the following parties: NMPC; trial staff of the New York State Department of Public Service; Multiple Intervenors; Walmart; the Alliance for a Green Economy; the New York Solar Energies Industry Association; Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc. (IPPNY); the United States Department of Defense and all other Federal Executive Agencies; the New York Geothermal Energy Organization; Turning Stone Enterprises, LLC; Fedrigoni Special Papers North America; Empire National Gas Corporation; New Yorkers for Clean Power; the New York Power Authority, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union No. 97.

Initial statements on the JP were due on May 14, 2025. Reply statements are due on May 23, 2025, and on June 3 there will be an Evidentiary Hearing. I cannot explain all this because I have ignored rate cases in the past.

Caiazza and Kontogiannis Initial Statement

Kontogiannis shares my frustration with the Climate Act transition plan. We are convinced that the current plan is dangerous and will lead to extraordinary price increases. We decided that submitting a statement in opposition to the JP would force a response to our concerns that have been ignored to date.

The rate request filing states that NMPC is focused on three priorities: (1) continuing to deliver safe, reliable energy service to its more than two million customers, (2) enabling customers to affordably meet their energy needs while improving NMPC’s customer service, and (3) supporting the goals of the Climate Act. Kontogiannis and I referred to the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction transition plan described in the Climate Act Scoping Plan as the “CLCPA Electrification Mandate”. We defined “CLCPA Generation Plan” as the projected electric grid changes described in the Climate Act Scoping Plan that relies on wind, solar, energy storage, and Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR) resources to achieve the 2040 Climate Act mandate for a zero-emissions electric system.

Our primary concern is ensuring reliable, affordable, and environmentally responsible service to ratepayers while at the same time supporting the goals of the Climate Act is impossible. Simply stated, the goals of Climate Act are in direct contradiction to the statutory and regulatory obligations of NMPC and Public Service Commission.

Five arguments were included. I will highlight some of the key points in our arguments. I also need to apologize for the length of the post but providing all the background was necessary. I encourage interested readers to follow up and read the entire submittal.

Argument 1

The first argument made in our Statement is that the “JP burdens the ratepayers with additional Climate Act-related costs that sacrifice reliability for unproven sustainability benefits.” Kontogiannis described several examples of Climate Act electrification initiatives imposed on NMPC ratepayers that have created significant cost and reliability safety issues without a tangible environmental benefit.

NMPC and NYSERDA have jointly promoted building electrification using heat pumps, but without properly vetting the applicable technologies and host site suitability. Many of the installations have replaced efficient natural gas-fired equipment, with those ratepayers now subject to substantially higher heating costs that are not nearly offset by program incentives and tax credits for air source heat pumps and ground source heat pumps. Less than 15% of those ratepayers decommissioned their old heating equipment and many likely returned to using it after experiencing the higher operating costs of the heat pumps, negating most of the GHG savings claimed by the program administrators. Moreover, nearly all of the heat pumps installed through this program to date utilize a high global warming potential (GWP) refrigerant that is currently being phased out, which will likely necessitate early replacement instead of routine mid-life servicing.

There is one provision that illustrates the futility of the heat pump transition plan. The rate case includes an effort to minimize the need to repair leak prone pipelines by offering non-pipeline alternatives. This program includes heat pump incentives for disadvantaged communities with the intention to eliminate the gas service rather than repair it. After all, this will eventually be required anyway, so the reasoning goes. However, the JP admits that the heat pump conversion will not save money because their proposed solution is to offer a monthly credit after installation. The payoff is only for five years, does not cover all the conversion and operating costs of the conversion, will likely not be available for everyone who needs it, and will increase costs for everyone else.

Argument 2

The second argument says that the JP does not acknowledge New York Public Service Law § 66-p (4). In no small part this triggered my desire to submit a statement in opposition to the JP because I have been arguing for years that New York Public Service Law § 66-p (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” includes safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability that must be addressed. The provision states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter”, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of:

safe and adequate electric service;
the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or
that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.

This argument was included to force the PSC to acknowledge that the safety valves must be addressed. The submittal included an attachment that was summed up my analysis that showed that the number of people in arrears has significantly increased since the state of the Climate Act. Our statement argued that it is inappropriate to invest in Climate Act programs until the PSC defines the criteria for the Section 66-p(4) safety valves, institutes a tracking system, and determines if the Climate Act implementation should be suspended or modified.

Argument 3

The third argument is that dispatchable emissions free resources (DEFR) must be resolved to ensure safe and adequate supply. Until this issue is resolved it is imprudent to invest in any support of the Climate Act Generation Plan. An attachment was included based on my many articles on DEFR. The attachment documents the need for DEFR, explains the requirements for this new resource, describes potential options, and notes the challenges associated with specifying how much capacity and energy will be needed to prevent a reliability crisis.

The JP does not adequately address the fact that a new category of Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR) must be identified, tested, and deployed to provide energy during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. There is a very real chance that nothing will be feasible. Furthermore, because the DEFR technologies have not been identified it is impossible to determine if they are affordable.

In our opinion, the most promising DEFR backup technology is nuclear generation because it is the only candidate resource that is technologically ready, can be expanded as needed and does not suffer from limitations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. If the only viable DEFR solution is nuclear, then renewables cannot be implemented without it. But nuclear works best as a baseline resource rather than as backup so nuclear power can replace renewables, eliminating the need for a massive DEFR backup resource. Therefore, all the JP investments included to support renewable energy development are imprudent because nuclear generation may be the only viable path to zero emissions making all those investments worthless.

Argument 4

The fourth argument pointed out that the JP does not properly consider alternatives to the Climate Act Generation Plan that provide similar environmental benefits without the reliability risks of dependency upon intermittent and diffuse renewable energy. To maintain adequate system reliability, the CLCPA Generation Plan must include substantial overbuilding of renewable sources, energy storage, and equipment for ancillary grid support. The JP does not address the fact that the Climate Act fails to consider other options that would largely satisfy its sustainability target without as many ratepayer reliability and affordability risks.

Kontogiannis and I agree with Richard Ellenbogen’s pragmatic approach described at the March 18, 2025 NYS Senate Energy and Telecommunications Committee meeting. We all believe that substantial interim reductions can be achieved simply by deploying natural gas fired combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT). For large sources of new load, a CCGT power plant requires no additional ancillary service support infrastructure, can provide process heat, and when coupled with an agricultural park, can further lower CO2 emissions by using the CO2 to boost plant productivity. CCGTs will last longer than any wind, solar, or energy storage infrastructure, can be used for peaking support when a better long term zero emissions technology is developed and deployed, and converted to burn hydrogen if necessary. Moreover, if it becomes economical to produce and store hydrogen this approach eliminates the need to develop ways to transport it because it can be stored and used in one location.

Unfortunately, this rational approach is not lawful at this time. However, the approach is emerging as a preferred low carbon solution in other areas of the U.S. and abroad. The significant tradeoffs of the CLCPA Generation Plan must be reevaluated by NMPC and the Public Service Commission as part and parcel of the JP to ensure protection of the ratepayers.

Argument 5

The fifth argument addressed the electric system planning risks that are inherent in the transition to weather-dependent generating resources. The DEFR argument mentioned the difficulties associated with figuring out how much DEFR will be required because the assessment must account for weather variability. This argument and the associated attachment explained all the challenges of defining the frequency, duration and intensity of low wind and solar resource availability events. Two reliability metrics were evaluated with respect to weather variability. The argument concluded that the associated uncertainties may not be reconcilable.

The presumption in the JP that the CLCPA Generation Plan will be safe does not stand up to scrutiny. Grid planners recognize that unanticipated adverse events—such as line outages, generator trips, substation failures, and major faults—will continue to impact power grids. Their challenge is to ensure the grid is robust enough to withstand and recover from such disturbances without major consequences. Kontogiannis and I believe that it is unrealistic to expect that the grid planners will be able to anticipate all the additional adverse events that will occur when the electric system depends on weather-reliant resources. It would be prudent to pause the Climate Act projects within the JP until grid planning improves.

Conclusion

Kontogiannis and I submitted the Statement of Opposition because of our concern that, with its disproportionate efforts to support the goals of the Climate Act, the JP does not properly balance NMPC and Public Service Commission responsibilities to ensure reliable, affordable, and environmentally responsible energy generation and delivery to ratepayers.

With so many legacy hydroelectric and nuclear assets, by all accounts New York State should have some of cleanest, most reliable, and affordable energy in the United States – but we are failing on all counts. Special interests have effectively hijacked what should be a relatively straightforward exercise of prudent engineering – shuttering a critical nuclear asset, denying legacy fossil fuel powerplants permission to repower as CCGT generators, and forsaking cost-effective and fuel-neutral building and transportation energy efficiency initiatives – all for the well-intentioned but sorely misguided fantasies of climate scientists in academia and policy advocates who have no idea of the complexities involved in the safe and reliable production and delivery of arguably the most essential commodity for the modern world. As if the failure isn’t complete, the stated sustainability targets are nothing more than smoke and mirrors – an honest accounting of the lifecycle carbon impacts shows no improvement compared to what solid engineering and standard industry practice afford.

Even if the Climate Act was to fully achieve its sustainability objectives, the effect on global emissions is negligible and the resulting global temperature change is infinitesimally small. If New York were able to eliminate all its GHG emissions, the effect of global emission increases elsewhere would supplant our efforts in one year. New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990. Furthermore, New York’s impact on global warming is unmeasurable. A Perplexity AI query “What is the expected change in global warming per ton of CO2 reduced” found that “Current estimates suggest that reducing 1 gigaton (1 billion tons) of CO₂ emissions prevents approximately 0.00045°C of warming”. That conversion was applied to the expected NMPC GHG emission reductions expected in Exhibit CLCPA-2 included in NMPC’s Climate Act Panel testimony on May 8, 2024 as well as historical emissions (Table 1). Emissions attributable to the Climate Act and historical emissions predict no measurable changes in global warming.

Table 1: Potential Warming Savings for JP Emission Reductions and Historical Emissions

NMPC’s NY Climate Resiliency Plan website states that: ”National Grid is committed to urgent action to address climate change as we’ve outlined in our vision for a fossil free future, but we all must recognize that climate change is no longer a future threat, but a current threat based on the extreme climate hazards we are witnessing today.” Kontogiannis and I believe that the crisis facing NMPC customers is not from the changing climate, but rather the irrevocably flawed climate policy. Kontogiannis and I concluded that a properly conceived statewide energy plan can achieve essentially the same sustainability target at a much lower cost to ratepayers and with no diminishment of system reliability.

Personal Comments on National Grid Long-Term Gas System Plan Report

The New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net zero transition has unleashed an avalanche of Public Service Commission (PSC) proceedings. I submitted comments on Case 24-G-0248 Review of the Long-Term Gas System Plan for National Grid because they provide the natural gas I use for heating, cooking hot water, and my backup generator. There are so many issues coming up with the schedule and ambition of the Climate Act that it is obvious that we need to pause implementation and figure out how best to proceed. The National Grid Long-Term Plan (“LT Plan”) is a perfect example of a component that should be paused.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because the proposed green energy programs are crimes against physics. The energy density of wind and solar energy is too low and the resource intermittency too variable to ever support a reliable electric system relying on those resources. If this reality is not acknowledged soon and these policies paused, then the enormous costs of this futile gesture to control the climate will bankrupt the state.

I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 500 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.

I submitted comments on the LT Plan as a National Grid customer who relies on natural gas to provide affordable, reliable and resilient energy to my home. My comments showed that there is insufficient consideration of the enormous challenge of the Climate Act transition to a zero-emissions energy system in the LT Plan. I also included a technical comment on the incorrect calculation of the societal cost calculation of avoided GHG emissions.

Safety Valve Criteria

I believe it is premature to implement the transition plan outlined in the LT Plan until metrics for affordability and reliability are established. The LT Plan does not acknowledge the safety valve requirements in New York Public Service Law § 66-p (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program”. Section 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.

I believe that as part of the Scoping Plan process the Climate Action Council should have developed criteria for the Public Service Law affordability and reliability mandates in Public Service Law Section 66-p (4). That did not happen, so it is incumbent upon the Commission to define “safe and adequate electric service” and “significant increase in arrears or service disconnections” before the LT Plan is implemented. It is irresponsible to begin replacing the existing resilient, reliable and affordable natural gas system without assurances that New York has a viable zero emissions electric system transition plan.

Reliability

I am particularly concerned about reliability. I moved to Liverpool, NY in June 1981 and lived through two extended electricity outages: the Labor Day storm of 1998 and an ice storm in April 2003. I have never had a natural gas outage since 1981. As I write this there are still electric over 3,000 customers in Michigan in the dark after an ice storm 17 days ago. Keeping the heat on in cold weather is a life and death requirement and natural gas is a resilient resource. During our ice storm I relied on the natural gas-fired furnace, stove, and hot water using a portable generator to provide power. Because of this concern, I have installed a whole-house generator so that I can survive when another ice storm inevitably occurs.

The LT Plan does not mention that the replacement of natural gas with electric systems will be viable only if the electric system is reliable. As noted above, there are electricity deliverability issues associated with extreme weather events that are not present with natural gas delivery. The biggest unacknowledged reliability risk associated with glacial pace of agency progress is addressed in Case 15-E-0302 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Implement a Large-Scale Renewable Program and Clean Energy Standard. New York agencies all agree that new Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR) technologies are needed to make a solar and wind-reliant electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. Case 15-E-0302 is supposed to address this technology because no such technology is currently available. I believe the only likely viable DEFR backup technology is nuclear generation despite its shortcomings because it is the only candidate resource that is technologically ready, can be expanded as needed, and does not suffer from limitations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

My comments described inherent weather variability planning risks associated with non-nuclear DEFR technology that is problematic as long as New York continues to champion an electric system dependent upon wind and solar resources. It is necessary to determine how much DEFR capacity is needed for wind and solar resource lulls using as long record of weather data as possible. That has not been done and there is nothing in place for it yet, but analyses done to date suggest that resource capacity equivalent to existing fossil resources will be needed. I used information from my recent post on the assessment of extreme renewable resource lulls to comment on other issues that need to be resolved before the LT Plan is implemented.

Affordability

One advantage of developing comments is that I can use my articles as source material. In this instance my comments raised affordability issues that were included in a recently submitted a letter in relation to Public Service Commission (PSC) Proceeding 22-M-0149 “Assessing Implementation of and Compliance with the Requirements and Targets of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act” regarding an affordability standard. I described those comments in this post.

I did some original work for my comments about costs. It was a holy crap moment when I found the projected costs in the LT Plan for three scenarios. The scenarios include a reference case, CEV or “clean energy vision”, and AE or “accelerated electrification”. The 2030 average monthly increase for National Grid customers in the former Niagara Mohawk service territory ranges from a 50% increase to a 96% increase. The 2030 average monthly increase for National Grid customers in the former Brooklyn Union Gas service territory ranges from a 65% increase to a 148% increase. The 2030 average monthly increase for National Grid customers in the former Key Span service territory on Long Island ranges from a 41% increase to a 90% increase.

Table 12-11: Niagara Mohawk Bill Impacts by Scenario

Table 12-12: Brooklyn Union Gas Company Bill Impacts by Scenario

Table 12-13: KeySpan Gas (LILCO) Bill Impacts by Scenario

It is inconceivable that those costs when combined with similar increases in electric costs will not result in a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that exceeds the Public Service Law Section 66-p (4) safety valve. It is long overdue for National Grid and the PSC to acknowledge these costs to ratepayers and for the PSC recognize that its mission to ensure “affordable, safe, secure, and reliable access” to electric and gas services is incompatible with the Climate Act mandates.

The DEFR requirement and weather variability risk described in the previous section also have affordability implications. Until a DEFR strategy is proposed we have no idea how much this will all cost so any claims that the Climate Act will be “affordable” are incomplete. Because any DEFR backup resource will be used so little and will be so expensive there will be inevitable tradeoff considerations for the rarely used backup resource. The result will be pressure to minimize the costs associated with DEFR backup capacity which will increase the probability of a catastrophic blackout. If natural gas has been shut off the blackout effects will be exacerbated.

Societal Cost Test (“SCT”)

I also included a technical comment on the incorrect calculation of the societal cost calculation of avoided GHG emissions.

I believe the SCT methodology over-estimates the benefits of the societal impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. As far as I can tell, the National Grid Long-Term Gas System Plan report calculates the societal benefits based on avoided emissions. I believe the reference to “avoided” emissions means that the emission reductions for the different scenarios are accumulated out to a specific date. I also evaluated the latest NYS GJG emissions inventory and found that the New York State total GHG emissions from the buildings and industry sectors were 84.5 million metric tons in 2021. In that year the NYSERDA Patterns and Trends report showed that National Grid sold roughly half the natural gas in New York. Based on that I assume that National Grid emitted 42.2 million metric tons in 2021. Table 8-8: GHG Emissions Reductions by Scenario and Operating Company in the LT Report lists emissions ranging from 223.8 to 1,239 million metric tons which far exceeds the observed 2021 emissions.

Calculations of avoided emissions benefits consider reductions over some time frame. It is inappropriate to claim the benefits of an annual reduction of a ton of greenhouse gas over any lifetime or to compare it with lifetime avoided emissions. The value of a GHG emission reduction is based on all the damage predicted to occur from the year that the ton of carbon is reduced out to 2300. The correct societal benefit can be no more than the current GHG emissions times the social cost of carbon. Clearly, using cumulative values for this parameter is incorrect because it counts those values over and over. That is equivalent to me saying I lost 25 pounds because I lost 5 pounds five years ago and kept it off. I contacted social cost of carbon expert Dr. Richard Tol about my interpretation of the use of lifetime savings and he confirmed that “The SCC should not be compared to life-time savings or life-time costs (unless the project life is one year)”.

Conclusion

National Grid has developed a long-term plan to replace natural gas with electricity. The projected costs are enormous and the benefits overstated. The plan does not acknowledge that this is a safe and viable approach only if the future electric system is reliable. In my opinion, the feasibility of a reliable electric system that relies on wind and solar has not been proven. The Scoping Plan zero emissions electric system needs a new resource, we don’t know how much of that resource is needed, what it will be, or how much it will cost.

I concluded that it is imprudent for the Commission and National Grid to continue this long-term plan to eliminate natural gas until the affordability and reliability mandates in Public Service Law Section 66-p (4) are defined and evaluated. I have no doubts that the mandated evaluation will find that the Climate Act impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service and will cause a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that result in suspension or modification of the Climate Act mandates including the long-term shutdown of the natural gas system. It is therefore irresponsible to begin the replacement of the existing resilient, reliable and affordable natural gas system until New York has a viable zero-emissions electric system available. The LT Plan should acknowledge this prerequisite to implementation.

Conclusion

National Grid has developed a long-term plan to replace natural gas with electricity. Their plan does not acknowledge that this is a safe and viable approach only if the future electric system is reliable. In my opinion, the feasibility of a wind and solar dependent electric system has not been proven. The Scoping Plan zero emissions electric system needs a new resource, we don’t know how much of that resource is needed, what it will be, or how much it will cost, and that whatever we do eventually it won’t be enough so people will die in a catastrophic blackout.

It is imprudent for the Commission and National Grid to continue this long-term plan to eliminate natural gas until the affordability and reliability mandates in Public Service Law Section 66-p (4) are defined and evaluated. I have no doubts that the mandated evaluation will find that the Climate Act impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service and will cause a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that result in suspension or modification of the Climate Act mandates including the long-term shutdown of the natural gas system. It is therefore irresponsible to begin the replacement of the existing resilient, reliable and affordable natural gas system until New York has a viable zero-emissions electric system available. The LT Plan should acknowledge this prerequisite to implementation.

My Comments on the New York Affordability Standard

On March 26, 2025, Jessica Waldorf, Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Implementation for the Department of Public Service (DPS) posted a letter responding to a letter from Michael B. Mager Counsel to Multiple Intervenors that had been submitted earlier in March to Chair of the Public Service Commission Rory Christian regarding the affordability standard. I agreed with the comments submitted by Multiple Intevenors and was disappointed with the DPS response so I submitted a letter to Christian today. This article summarizes my letter and why I was disappointed by the DPS letter and the overall DPS response to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (CLCPA) implementation to date.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 500 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

PSC Proceeding 22-M-0149

This proceeding is an example of the implementation programs currently underway. Public Service Commission (PSC) Proceeding 22-M-0149 “Assessing Implementation of and Compliance with the Requirements and Targets of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act” order for the Proceeding describes all the actions underway as of May 2022. To their credit, the PSC commissioners realized that a proceeding that formally required tracking of progress was needed:

The Commission has quickly taken action related to items within its jurisdiction to help put the State on a path to meet the aggressive CLCPA targets. However, in consideration of the scope of the CLCPA and the extensive work necessary to achieve its mandates, continuous monitoring of the progress made will be crucial to ensure the State remains on track to achieve these objectives. In addition, there are existing policies that will need to be reviewed, and new policies that will need to be developed, to further the enablement of the CLCPA. This proceeding will be the forum for such policy development. By this Order, the Commission institutes this new proceeding to both track and assess the advancements made towards meeting the CLCPA mandates and provide policy guidance, as necessary, for the additional actions needed to help achieve the objectives of the CLCPA.

The primary focus of the Multiple Intervenor letter (“MI Letter”) was on affordability and they noted that the Commission order establishing the Proceeding said: “Since investments required to implement the CLCPA are becoming a significant driver of utility rate increases, it is critical for DPS Staff to provide the Commission and the public with specific cost-based information to understand the impact of these capital investments on ratepayers as part of our core obligation to ensure just and reasonable rates.”

MI Letter

It comes as no surprise to anyone who understands the monumental challenge of an electric system net-zero transition that New York is falling behind on the progress needed to achieve the Climate Act mandates. Given the complexities of the net-zero transition it is inevitable that Agency staff would be unable to fulfill the reporting annual report mandates.

After describing the mandate of the Proceeding order, the MI letter goes on to quote the requirement that directs DPS staff to present information on CLCPA costs annually. The MI Letter shows that DPS is behind schedule:

On July 20, 2023, DPS Staff presented its “First Annual Informational Report on Overall Implementation of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act” (“First Annual Report”) in compliance with the Commission’s Order in Case 22-M-0149. While Multiple Intervenors could take issue with numerous costs that were excluded from quantification in the First Annual Report, DPS Staff estimated (at page 29) that by the end of 2022, the Commission already had authorized an eye-popping $43.756 billion in CLCPA-related costs.

Unfortunately, however, there has been no second report from DPS Staff providing public information as to CLCPA implementation costs, in clear violation of the Order. Inasmuch as the First Annual Report was filed on July 20, 2023, the second such report was expected sometime in July 2024. On December 17, 2024 – approximately five months past the report’s expected due date – DPS Staff filed a letter in this proceeding informing of a delay. In the letter, Staff states that it “anticipates presenting this report in 2025.” To date, the Commission has taken no action in response to the letter, and the public is left wondering whether a report that was directed to be filed annually – and, therefore, was due in July 2024 – will be filed at any point in 2025.

I welcomed the Multiple Intervenor letter because I hoped that it would prompt a reply addressing affordability issues and the schedule for the required reports. Unfortunately, the reply letter was unresponsive to these concerns.

DPS Reply Letter

The March 26, 2025 response from Jessica Waldorf of DPS was disappointing because it is condescending, was treated as an obligation, and does not address the cost issues. It is condescending because Mr. Mager and Multiple Intervenors are aware of the history and where to find the Integration Analysis. The description of the first draft Clean Energy Standard (CES) Biennial Review opens with the clause “Earlier this year” for a document released last summer which suggests that the text was copied from another document to fulfill the obligation to provide a response. The typographical error suggests that the response was not considered an opportunity to address the affordability problems raised.

Even though the DPS response letter did not adequately respond to affordability issues, some of the statements were revealing. The letter stated that the report does not “disaggregate funding that would have incurred under programs that existed prior to the CLCPA.” I have been complaining about the implications of this important caveat since my scenarios comment on the draft Scoping Plan because it is part of a shell game in the Integration Analysis designed to hide the costs. I have shown that most of the results presented in the Integration Analysis spreadsheet were relative to a reference case. In this type of analysis, the purpose is to consider the impacts of proposed policies relative to a business-as-usual case without those policies. The Integration Analysis did not include a modeling scenario that excludes all the costs of CLCPA implementation. Instead, costs presented are relative to a Reference Case that is described as “Business as usual plus implemented policies.

This is important because the Hochul Administration mantra developed by the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) that the “costs of inaction are more than the costs of action” is deliberately misleading. It relies in part on excluding the costs of the programs that existed before the CLCPA, which is important in this context. I believe that I represent most New Yorkers when I say I want to know the costs to meet the CLCPA goals like the 100% zero emissions electricity by 2040 and 40% lower GHG emissions by 2030 mandates. The particular program that gets New York there does not matter. I want to know the total costs to meet the mandates not just the costs of the unique CLCPA components. This letter afforded me the opportunity to make this argument in a formal proceeding where it will be more difficult to ignore.

The last substantive paragraph of the DPS response letter stated:

In addition to the First Informational Report, the integration analysis performed for the CLCPA Scoping Plan contains detailed cost information related to the implementation of the CLCPA. The integration analysis can be found on the Climate Act website. Additionally, the next State Energy Plan that is currently under development, will include an update to this prior analysis from the Scoping Plan, and incorporate new information on the potential effects of the policies included in the State Energy Plan on energy costs for consumers.

Integration Analysis Annex 2 provides the “detailed cost information”. Jim Shultz referred to the Scoping Plan as “a true masterpiece in how to hide what is important under an avalanche of words designed to make people never want to read it.” The Integration Analysis cost information is in a massive spreadsheet that is the quantitative equivalent to the Scoping Plan avalanche of words. It may be detailed but it most certainly does not provide an easily accessible compilation for all the energy use and emission reduction strategies proposed that includes assumptions, expected costs, and projected emission reductions. In particular, the documentation does not provide explicit information to determine what costs are specifically included in the Reference Case or provide sufficient information to “disaggregate funding that would have incurred under programs that existed prior to the CLCPA.” As a result, it is impossible to parse out the total expected cost to meet Climate Act goals.

Recommendations

I included three recommendations in my letter that addressed my long-standing issues.

My comments explained why I believe the DPS response letter illustrates the broken stakeholder process exemplified by the lack of responsiveness by all the agencies regarding any comments that questioned the narrative espoused by CLCPA proponents. NYSERDA and other state agencies treat the stakeholder process as an obligation and not an opportunity. NYSERDA claims that there was “robust public input” during the draft Scoping Plan process that “included 11 public hearings across the State and more than 35,000 written comments” that supposedly were read, summarized, and presented to the Climate Action Council. The problem is that Agency staff screened the comments for the Climate Action Council and there is no publicly available documentation of their work. They only presented generalities at meetings and did not address any specific comments.

My first recommendation argued that NYSERDA and DPS should prepare documentation that lists all the issues raised in submitted comments so that the Climate Action Council, the Energy Planning Board, the Commission, and stakeholders can be assured that all issues raised have been considered. The documentation should list issues, describe their relevance, explain disposition of comments, and provide the rationale if there is a difference of opinion between the agency and a commenter. If there is inadequate documentation, then there is no assurance that stakeholder concerns have been considered.

My second recommendation is a personal example of an ignored comments. I recommended that the PSC define acceptable affordability criteria, publicly track the parameters for the criteria, and be prepared to pause implementation if the criteria are exceeded for the safety valve conditions in Public Service Law in my Draft Scoping Plan comments and in other Proceedings. There has never been a response to my comments describing safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability in New York Public Service Law § 66-p (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” Section 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.

I believe that as part of the Scoping Plan the Climate Action Council should have developed criteria for the PSC to consider affordability and reliability. That did not happen. Based on issues observed with the transition it is incumbent upon the Commission to define “safe and adequate electric service” and “significant increase in arrears or service disconnections” as part of this Proceeding. This is necessary so that there is a clearly defined standard for the temporarily suspending or modifying the provisions of Section 66-p (4).

Finally, I recommended that affordability metrics and reports on costs should include all costs necessary to meet CLCPA mandates including programs implemented before the CLCPA. This would address the shell game shenanigans used by NYSERDA in the Scoping Plan. Clear documentation that lists all the emission strategies, the expected reductions, implementation schedule and expected costs is necessary.

I also expressed my disappointment that DPS staff appear to be more interested in the political narrative than fulfilling their mission to ensure “affordable, safe, secure, and reliable access” to electric services for New York State’s residential and business consumers. For example, at the December 18, 2024 New York Assembly Committee on Energy public hearing the author of the letter, Jessica Waldorf, claimed that there are other reasons “to build renewable energy resources in New York that are not just related to emissions.” Her response claimed reduced price volatility would reduce costs. I evaluated that claim and found that it does not stand up to scrutiny. My letter made that point.

Conclusion

I submitted my letter to reiterate several of the issues that I have raised previously regarding the Climate Act implementation process. I also pointed out that the stakeholder process is broken because impactful issues like those that I described have never been acknowledged much less addressed. I make no claims that my concerns must be reconciled for the process to be acceptable. However, I did point out that the differences between the New York Independent System Operator future projections and the Scoping Plan projections have never been reconciled publicly. It is unacceptable to dismiss differences in the analyses from the organization responsible for electric system reliability.

Ellenbogen and Caiazza Comments on DPS Definitions for Renewable Energy Program

On November 4, 2024, the Department of Public Service (DPS) staff proposed definitions for two key components of the 2040 zero emissions Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) target. Recently I described the electric industry response comments that suggest that there will be consequences if there is no plan and recommend a re-assessment of the schedule. This post describes comments that Richard Ellenbogen and I filed that recommends the implementation process be paused until certain issues are resolved.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 500 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article only reflect my position and not necessarily those of Richard Ellenbogen.

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy. He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system. I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.

I believe that the biggest shortcoming of the Hochul Administration’s implementation of the Climate Act is the lack of a plan. For example, to implement a transition to meet the mandate that all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040 it is first necessary to define “zero emissions”. Amazingly, draft definitions were not proposed for over four years. On November 4, 2024, the DPS staff proposal concerning definitions for key terms (Staff Proposal) in Public Service Law §66-p that finally defined “zero emissions”. The Introduction of the Staff Proposal explains:

In this proposal, the Department of Public Service Staff (Staff) suggests interpretations of key terms in the provisions of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act), codified in Section 66-p of the Public Service Law (PSL), which directs the Public Service Commission (Commission) to establish a renewable energy program and design it to achieve particular targets. At issue in this proposal is the language of PSL §66-p(2)(b), which directs the Commission to establish a program pursuant to which, by the year 2040, the “statewide electrical demand system will be zero emissions.” Of particular note, neither of the terms “statewide electrical demand system” nor “zero emissions” are expressly defined in the Climate Act or in the PSL. This lack of statutory definition requires the Commission’s interpretation of these terms to ensure proper regulatory implementation.

This post describes the comments that Ellenbogen and I filed for this proceeding.

Electric Industry Filings

We endorsed the filings made by the New York Independent System Operator and the Joint Utilities in response to the proposed definitions of “statewide electrical demand system” and “zero emissions” that I summarized earlier. We agreed that it is necessary to draft implementing regulations that rely on consistent and clear definitions to satisfy the zero emissions by the 2040 standard and to maintain electric system reliability. It is also essential that imported energy is treated consistently and transparently. Moreover, to maintain system reliability in a zero emissions electric system that meets the aspirational Climate Act schedule, new technologies and expanded existing technologies must be deployed on an unprecedented scale.

The theme of our comments is that the implementation process should be paused until certain issues are resolved to prevent a waste of effort on false solutions. One example reason is that a plan must be in place first and that is consistent with this Joint Utility recommendation:

Given the potential for New York’s clean energy resources to fall short of demand, or suffer from delayed entry for various reasons, and the challenges associated with the commercial availability and maturity of new energy technologies, the Commission should require Staff to develop a plan for the development of incremental renewables, the retirement of non-compliant resources, and methodologies to address gaps between existing resources and the reliability needs of the system, while also ensuring that reliability and resource adequacy do not suffer. Staff should also consider the development status and lead time of new and existing technologies from research and development to their commercial deployment. It is imperative to address these issues, set expectations and identify needs for the journey towards the 2040 zero emissions target.

Criteria for Pausing

The overarching reason to pause the process is that the safety valve provisions for affordability and reliability that are directly related to the zero emissions resource in New York Public Service Law § 66-p (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” are not defined. The implementation process should be paused for anything beyond Behind the Meter (BTM) generation sources and load reductions until criteria are defined and a tracking process established for “safe and adequate electric service” and “significant increase in arrears or service disconnections”. Without established criteria it is impossible to fulfill this legal mandate.

Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR)

Responsible New York agencies all agree that new DEFR technologies are needed to make a solar and wind-reliant electric energy system work reliably. No one knows what those technologies are. We believe the only likely viable DEFR backup technology is nuclear generation because it is the only candidate resource that is technologically ready, can be expanded as needed, and does not suffer from limitations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

This situation is a fundamental reason why a pause is necessary. If the only viable DEFR solution is nuclear, then the wind, solar, and energy storage approach cannot be implemented without nuclear power. Using nuclear solely as a backup is inappropriate because it works best as a baseload resource. Developing baseload nuclear eliminates the need for a huge DEFR backup resource and massive buildout of wind turbines and solar panels sprawling over the state’s lands and water. Although nuclear power is expensive when compared to the resources needed for a wind, solar, energy storage, and DEFR system that all have shorter expected operational life spans it is likely that it would be cheaper.

NYSERDA and DPS have mentioned a related five-year plan presumably to determine what technology should be used going forward. It is obviously prudent to pause renewable development until some DEFR technology is proven feasible. The choice and even the viability of any DEFR technology will affect the entire design of the future electric structure necessary to meet the Climate Act net-zero energy system.

Lithium-Ion Storage Safety Concerns

The Climate Act “Resilient and Distributed Grid goal is 1,500MW of energy storage, expanding to 3,000 MW by 2030”. The Peak Coalition has recommended that battery storage replace peaking power plants and have endorsed the Rise Light & Power Renewable Ravenswood initiative that proposes to transition Ravenswood Generating Station into a clean energy hub. The plan involves the replacement of Ravenwood’s remaining peaking capacity with “a mix of offshore wind, upstate renewables, district heating, and large-scale battery storage”.

However, there are substantive safety concerns. These Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) must overcome space constraint issues and are not proven technology. When a leading expert on batteries says: “Everybody has to be educated how to use these batteries safely”, we think the best course of action is to follow his advice. It is not appropriate to make the residents of the disadvantaged communities near a BESS become unwilling lab rats to test whether a technology that can generate toxic gases, cause fires, and create explosions is appropriate in an urban setting.

A recent incident reinforces this energy storage safety issue and is another reason to pause implementation. Our comments argued that it is appropriate to consider what would happen if there was a fire at Ravenswood like the fire at the Moss Landing energy storage facility in California. Our comments were based on the analysis described in my Implications of the Moss Landing Battery Plant Fire article. At Moss Landing, there were 7,676 acres under evacuation with only 1,214 people living there. Richard Ellenbogen described the impacts of a fire at Ravenswood if it required a similar evacuation zone. A similar fire would require at least a shelter in place order and possibly an evacuation order for nearly a million people to say nothing about shutting down highways within the entire area circled by Routes 278 and 495 as well as the East River. Our comments posed questions about the ramifications within this area and the Roosevelt Island community in the East River opposite Ravenswood. Clearly, these safety concerns must be addressed before BESS facilities are built to replace peaking power plants in New York City.

BESS Timing

There are deployment timing issues that also should be addressed. Our comments posed the question why these facilities are even needed at this time. As Ravenswood is being redeveloped as a “Clean Energy Hub” it is not clear how much clean energy will there be to charge the batteries in the foreseeable future. The Clean Path NY transmission line designed to bring renewables to NY City from Central NY is up in the air. The termination of offshore wind by the Trump administration is another roadblock. Even if it weren’t threatened by the Trump administration it is likely that significant offshore wind is likely more than 10 years away due to high costs, supply chain constraints and a lack of Jones Act compliant Jack ships needed for the installations. We concluded that it will be years before sufficient zero-emissions energy is available for this facility.

A BESS facility built today will be storing fossil fuel-based generation with an average carbon footprint of approximately 950 pounds of CO2 per MWh as per EPA figures for the downstate NY utility system. With 15% – 20% charge-discharge losses added that carbon footprint is increased to over 1100 pounds of CO2 per MWh for any BESS System in the downstate area. In comparison, a highly polluting 60-year-old generating plant like EF Barrett or any of the peaking power plants that the Peak Coalition wants replaced could be replaced with a Combined Cycle gas plant with CO2 emissions of about 800 pounds per MWh, 30% lower than the battery facilities and will have a lifetime five to six times longer.

This is another reason to pause the process. New York State and New York City are not California where renewable development is much further along. Solar arrays generate far less energy per acre in NY State and as a result, the state is many years away from needing these BESS facilities. By the time that there are sufficient renewables available in NY State to create the Duck Curve and a need to charge the batteries, any Li-ion batteries installed now will have deteriorated past their 8 – 10-year operating life. As a result, NY State ratepayers will be saddled with hundreds of millions of dollars of expenses on their utility bills that had the net effect of raising New York City and state carbon footprint more than the peaker plants that they are designed to replace

Conclusion

We concluded our comments by endorsing the Joint Utility statement recommendation that the Commission direct Staff to develop a clear roadmap that addresses, among other things, clean energy technology readiness. This recommendation would not be necessary if there was a clear roadmap available. In the absence of such a plan the Hochul Administration’s approach to meet the Climate Act targets has been to push ahead without consideration of technological ramifications. The Moss Landing BESS fire underscores the risk of such an approach. It would be inappropriate to proceed with BESS installations in New York City and the other densely populated regions of New York State until the full scope of safety risks are understood. Additionally, the entire process should be paused until the state has a clear understanding of what resources will be needed to safely implement a sound energy plan. This will prevent the squandering of resources on technologies that will not reduce GHG emissions and will help to ensure safety and economic vitality for New York State residents.