Governor Kathy Hochul’s announcement of a comprehensive Advanced Nuclear Master Plan acknowledges that New York needs dependable electricity that does not depend on the weather. However, her explanation of nuclear power’s place in the State’s electricity strategy raises a fundamental question about affordability: “Expanding emission-free, round-the-clock nuclear power is a cornerstone of my all-of-the-above approach to ensure we have enough energy to keep the lights on and costs down for New Yorkers.”
I agree that nuclear generation should be the backbone of a reliable, low-emissions electric system. My concern is “all of the above.” If that means evaluating every resource and selecting the combination that provides reliable electricity at the lowest total cost, fine. If it means building the enormous wind, solar, storage, and transmission system envisioned by State planners and then adding nuclear, I disagree.
This post shows why I think New York should develop nuclear as an alternative to much of that renewable-heavy buildout, not another expense layered on top. The Governor cannot demonstrate that her approach will keep costs down without identifying the investments nuclear would allow us to avoid.
I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to provide research used in this article.
What the announcement provides
The November 18 announcement describes a roadmap for developing five gigawatts of new nuclear generation, supplementing New York’s existing 3.4 gigawatts. Co-authored by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority and Department of Public Service, the Master Plan contains 30 recommendations supported by 12 studies and more than 1,000 pages of research and analysis. Subjects include commercial viability, siting, community partnerships, regulatory processes, workforce development, and supply chains.
DPS also released a White Paper recommending policies to support commercial viability and cost reductions. Meanwhile, the New York Power Authority continues efforts to develop at least one gigawatt of new nuclear generation. That initiative is part of the statewide objective, not another gigawatt to add to the total.
These are useful activities addressing real barriers. However, a master plan is not a licensed, financed, operating power plant. The emphasis on commercial viability underscores the challenges ahead. The question is whether New York will use the nuclear development master plan to reconsider its Climate Act electricity strategy or merely establish another procurement program.
Dark doldrums determine what the system needs
I have repeatedly discussed dispatchable emissions-free resources, or DEFR, in a weather-dependent electric system. My January 2024 “NYISO DEFR Summary” explained that these resources must provide dependable electricity through extended periods of inadequate wind and solar production, not simply bridge the hours between sunset and sunrise.
Electricity supply must continuously match demand. Annual renewable-generation totals cannot demonstrate that adequate electricity will be available during a prolonged winter period with little wind and limited sunlight. Short-duration batteries shift available electricity between hours; they do not create the energy needed to bridge an extended renewable shortfall. My review of NYISO’s Resource Outlook described this distinction between supplying electricity during ordinary conditions and maintaining reliability during difficult conditions.
These “dark doldrums” cannot be treated as a detail to resolve after the turbines and panels are installed. They establish a fundamental design requirement. There must be enough dependable capacity, supported by sufficient energy, to carry demand when weather-dependent production is inadequate.
The scale is substantial. NYISO’s July 2026 2025-2044 System & Resource Outlook indicates that fully zero-emissions pathways could require upwards of 30,000 MW of hydrogen-powered generation to supply firm capacity in its conditional planning scenarios. The latest study models specific technologies rather than the generic “dispatchable emissions-free resources” used in the 2023–2042 System & Resource Outlook, which estimated at least 20,000 MW and potentially more than 40,000 MW of DEFR capacity by 2040. Nevertheless, the missing resource is not a minor addition. Nor does the Governor’s five-gigawatt nuclear objective demonstrate that the entire firm-capacity problem has been solved.
A resource category is not a deployment plan
DEFR describes what planners need. It is not a product developers can order in whatever quantity the State requires.
NYISO has considered hydrogen-fueled generation, advanced nuclear, and long-duration storage, recognizing that the required services could come from several technologies. However, identifying candidates does not establish a commercially viable, scalable solution to the full requirement.
Nuclear generation is commercially proven, but every proposed advanced reactor design is not commercially mature. Hydrogen combustion does not establish an affordable low-emissions hydrogen supply, storage network, and delivery system. A promising storage concept does not demonstrate the economics of supplying electricity through a prolonged, system-wide energy deficit. My September 2024 review of NYISO’s DEFR analysis discussed these implementation uncertainties.
The Master Plan is a concrete step toward addressing nuclear development. It is not yet a demonstrated program to finance, license, construct, and operate the entire DEFR fleet a renewable-heavy system could require. Technical, economic, regulatory, and scheduling uncertainties remain.
In my view, committing to that architecture while assuming an affordable solution will emerge at the necessary scale takes an extraordinary reliability risk with the bulk power system. A resource represented in a planning model is not necessarily a resource available when customers need electricity.
Nuclear changes the planning question
I consider nuclear the strongest practical candidate for providing substantial additional quantities of dependable, long-duration, emissions-free electricity in New York. That is my assessment, not a claim that NYISO has identified nuclear as the only possible solution. NYISO considers multiple technologies and combinations.
The conditional argument is nevertheless unavoidable. If nuclear ultimately proves to be the only practical DEFR candidate capable of providing the required firm energy at scale, then a system centered on wind, solar, and short-duration batteries cannot meet reliability and zero-emissions objectives without substantial nuclear support.
That conclusion should change the architecture.
In “New York Nuclear Renaissance,” I argued that treating nuclear solely as backup for wind and solar is an inappropriate application of the technology. My earlier discussion, “Filling the Gap in New York’s Decarbonization Plan,” described the alternative: use nuclear as the baseload electricity source throughout the year rather than primarily calling upon it when intermittent generation falls short.
The distinction is between building dependable generation to support a weather-dependent system and designing the system around dependable generation from the outset. If nuclear can provide the foundation, why prescribe the renewable buildout before determining how much is needed?
Nuclear should produce electricity, not wait for shortages
Nuclear economics reinforce this argument. Nuclear plants require substantial capital investment. Their economic advantage depends on spreading those costs over large quantities of electricity, supported by relatively low operating costs. NYISO’s DEFR analysis recognizes the importance of high utilization in mitigating nuclear power’s capital costs.
As quoted in my September 2024 review, NYISO explains: “Like large-scale nuclear power plants, SMRs can mitigate the risk of high capital costs with lower operating costs and operating with high utilization rates.”
This does not mean nuclear plants cannot change output. It means building an expensive resource and using it infrequently is economically different from operating it at a high-capacity factor.
Consider only annual fixed costs. At a 90 percent capacity factor, those costs are distributed over nine times as much electricity as at a 10 percent capacity factor. Fixed cost per megawatt-hour is therefore nine times higher at the lower utilization. That is not a complete system comparison, but it illustrates the issue.
NYISO does not assume every DEFR operates rarely. One modeled 2040 result had a high-capital-cost, low-operating-cost fleet running at a 63 percent capacity factor, compared with approximately 2 percent for a low-capital-cost, high-operating-cost fleet. Different resources have different economic roles.
New York should exploit nuclear power’s year-round production, not force it into the residual role left by predetermined renewable mandates.
“All of the above” risks overlapping expenditures
Once nuclear power’s dependable production is recognized, the State must determine how much other infrastructure remains necessary.
My September 2026 article, “New York Nuclear Reliability Backbone: Potential and Probability,” discussed Independent Intervenor comments calling for nuclear to be evaluated as an alternative to part of the renewable-heavy plan. The comparison should identify renewable, storage, hydrogen, backup-generation, and transmission investments that nuclear could avoid.
This does not mean one megawatt of nuclear automatically eliminates one megawatt of another resource. Technologies supply different combinations of energy, dependable capacity, flexibility, and locational value. Avoided investments must be established through consistent modeling.
But assuming existing renewable targets should remain untouched regardless of nuclear development is equally unjustified. Ratepayers could otherwise finance a large weather-dependent fleet, storage and transmission to improve its usefulness, and substantial dependable generation for periods when renewable production is inadequate.
Combining resources can be sensible. The question is how much of each is justified after accounting for the others. A portfolio is not affordable simply because every technology has supporters.
The comparison must examine total system costs for equivalent reliability: financing, construction risk, transmission, interconnection, storage, fuel infrastructure, curtailment, backup capacity, and difficult winter conditions. Nuclear power’s overruns, outages, and scheduling risks belong in that comparison too.
I expect a nuclear-centered system could avoid substantial ancillary infrastructure. However, the announcement does not establish a quantified least-cost result. My criticism is that the Governor’s affordability claim remains unproven, not that these documents demonstrate a particular amount of savings.
Environmental impacts depend on avoided construction
The same reasoning applies to environmental consequences. My previous discussions have emphasized nuclear power’s relatively compact generating footprint and the opportunity to reduce extensive renewable and transmission environmental impacts.
If dependable nuclear generation allows New York to avoid utility-scale wind and solar projects, storage installations, or transmission corridors, those avoided developments belong in the environmental comparison. Building everything and evaluating cumulative consequences afterward defeats the purpose of considering alternatives.
Nuclear is not impact-free. The State’s background material identifies separate studies addressing waste, siting, regulatory issues and safety, and environmental and climate justice. Those issues require serious examination, alongside the land-use, cumulative environmental impacts, and infrastructure consequences of a renewable-heavy alternative.
The question is not which technology receives a “clean” label. It is which complete system supplies dependable electricity at acceptable cost with the least overall environmental burden. The answer requires comparing alternatives, not assuming every proposed project is necessary.
Make dependable generation the starting point
I support nuclear as the backbone of a low-emissions electric system, providing the bulk of firm capacity and a substantial share of annual electricity. That does not mean reactors alone. Nuclear does not eliminate peaking requirements, operational flexibility, reserves, or transmission constraints.
It means reversing the planning hierarchy. Start with dependable supply, then determine which complementary investments lower total costs or solve demonstrated operating problems and can do so without necessarily being “zero emissions”.
The State’s planning and procurement proceedings should answer four questions:
- What portfolio maintains reliability during prolonged renewable shortfalls, winter peaks, generator outages, and transmission constraints?
- How much renewable generation, storage, hydrogen infrastructure, and transmission can a nuclear-centered portfolio avoid?
- Which remaining investments provide measurable incremental value?
- How will customers be protected against construction overruns, delays, nonperformance, and overlapping subsidies in all portfolio scenarios?
These requirements follow the portfolio comparisons and consumer protections discussed in my September article. Supporting nuclear does not justify a blank check, but is past time for the State to provide transparent costs for the renewable portfolio.
Wind, solar, and batteries should demonstrate their value in a comprehensive planning comparison, not retain a fundamental role because the politicians who passed the Climate Act said so. Existing dependable resources should remain available until adequate replacements are operating.
Conclusion
Governor Hochul deserves credit for recognizing nuclear power’s importance. Her Nuclear Reliability Backbone could support a more realistic electricity strategy. But a backbone should shape the system around it, not be added after the remaining architecture has already been prescribed.
New York cannot afford an “all-of-the-above” policy that treats every proposed buildout as necessary and affordability as an assumed outcome.
If nuclear is required to make a renewable-heavy system reliable, the State must determine how much of that renewable-heavy system is worth building. Otherwise, customers risk financing extensive weather-dependent infrastructure and the dependable generation required when that infrastructure cannot deliver.
That is why I consider a wind, solar, and short-duration-storage-centered strategy a “false solution”: it does not independently resolve the prolonged shortfalls that establish the need for firm supply.
Just go nuclear—and stop pretending that building everything is a plan to keep costs down.
