Author: rogercaiazza

I am a meteorologist (BS and MS degrees), was certified as a consulting meteorologist and have worked in the air quality industry for over 40 years. I author two blogs. Environmental staff in any industry have to be pragmatic balancing risks and benefits and (https://pragmaticenvironmentalistofnewyork.blog/) reflects that outlook. The second blog addresses the New York State Reforming the Energy Vision initiative (https://reformingtheenergyvisioninconvenienttruths.wordpress.com). Any of my comments on the web or posts on my blogs are my opinion only. In no way do they reflect the position of any of my past employers or any company I was associated with.

Final New York State 2026 RGGI Operating Plan Amendment

In early January I described my comments on the 2026 Operating Plan Amendment (“Amendment”) for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This post summarizes the responses to comments and the CO2 emissions through 2025 because last year’s data just became available.

Dealing with the RGGI regulatory and political landscapes is challenging enough that affected entities seldom see value in speaking out about fundamental issues associated with the program. I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program. I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs, since the inception of those programs. I also participated in RGGI Auction 41 successfully winning allowances and holding them for several years. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Factsheet). It has been a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector since 2008. New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021, withdrew and is going to join again, and Pennsylvania recently decided not to join. According to a RGGI website:

The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances that are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs.

Proceeds were invested in programs including energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy, beneficial electrification, greenhouse gas abatement and climate change adaptation, and direct bill assistance. Energy efficiency continued to receive the largest share of investments.

NYSERDA Final 2026 Operating Plan

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) designed and implemented a process to develop and annually update an Operating Plan which summarizes and describes the initiatives to be supported by RGGI auction proceeds. I am not going to rehash the contents of the Draft 2026 RGGI Operating Plan Amendment. Check out my article and comments for details.

My primary concern with the draft amendment was that RGGI is an electric sector emissions reduction program, but NYSERDA does not prioritize emission reduction investments. My comments showed that the fuel switching reductions that have been responsible for most of the observed reductions are no longer available and it is not clear where future reductions will come from. Therefore, programs that materially decrease electric sector emissions directly or indirectly through energy use reductions should be a priority because affected sources have limited compliance options. There are programs in the amendment that do not meet these criteria. I argued that it is only appropriate to fund the non-priority programs if sufficient funding has been allocated to make the emission reductions necessary to meet RGGI compliance mandates.

I did not describe all the comments I made in summary article. I also complained about the stakeholder process and the lack of a summary of comments submitted by stakeholders. I also specifically addressed the need to determine how many dispatchable emissions-free resources (DEFR) will be needed in the future..

Summary of Public Feedback

I was very happy to see that NYSERDA included a Summary of Public Comments for the first time when they released the final document. I applaud NYSERDA for providing this information, but they really did not say much. Moreover, it was not comprehensive, so stakeholders like me are left to wonder why their comments were not addressed. For example, as I noted I commented on the need for DEFR research and the Environmental Energy Alliance of New York, an ad hoc organization representing New York generating and transmission operators, also recommended funding to explicitly address DEFR issues. Neither recommendation was acknowledged.

The Summary of Public Comments described the most numerous comments. I find it frustrating that New York State public comment responses emphasize quantity and not quality of stakeholder responses. It also seems that responses are highlighted if they are consistent with the political narrative. In the following quote the reference to the “Clean Energy Communities Program” refers to a disadvantaged community effort that is a political priority:

The majority of commenters communicated a strong support for the investments in EmPower+ and the Offshore Wind Predevelopment Support Program under Large-Scale Generation. In addition, targeted commenters expressed support for NYS’s plans to undertake activities to further advanced nuclear under the Large-Scale Generation funding allocation. Finally, some targeted commenters expressed satisfaction with the continued RGGI investment in the Clean Energy Communities Program, with some wanting it increased.

There were specific responses to the following programs.

NY-Sun and energy storage: Targeted commenters expressed disappointment with the level of investment in NY-Sun (solar) and energy storage.
Large generation technologies: Targeted commenters requested that the Operating Plan Amendment funding allocations include a greater emphasis on research focused on new, large generation technologies.
Advanced fuels: Targeted commenters expressed support for the RGGI investments in advanced fuels, with special interest in additional funding being dedicated to renewable natural gas (RNG)and sustainable aviation fuel (SAF).
Mechanical insulation maintenance and repair: One commenter requested NYSERDA recognize mechanical insulation maintenance and repair as an approved efficiency category for RGGI funds.
Refrigerant study: Two commenters requested NYSERDA conduct a study of the energy conservation benefits of adopting natural refrigerants in the large-scale refrigeration systems.

It seems odd to me that there is an explicit response to mechanical insulation maintenance and repair because that is a relatively minor program in the overall net-zero transition. It is almost as if the internal request to NYSERDA staff to provide responses to stakeholder comments was taken seriously by only a few of the staff responsible for RGGI-funded programs.

The Response ended with the following:

Having reviewed all comments received, NYSERDA finds that the investment allocations put forward in the Operating Plan were well supported and have taken into account many of the themes presented in public comments. To the extent that certain commenters sought changes outside of NYSERDA’s regulatory obligations and limitations, such changes were not considered. NYSERDA has incorporated the following actions in response to public feedback:

If NYSERDA realizes additional proceeds above the base estimates identified in the Operating Plan Amendment, NYSERDA may consider channeling the percentage of additional proceeds available to NYSERDA to NY-Sun and energy storage.

NYSERDA will continue exploring opportunities to improve the RGGI stakeholder engagement process, including potential enhancements to NYSERDA’s public website to better connect the Operating Plan Amendment, stakeholder meeting materials, and public comments received.

Funding Re-Allocations

There was no mention of any changes to the funding allocations. I compared the Cumulative Revenues and Program Funding Allocations table in the draft and final amendments in Table 1. Only changes in the Energy Innovation and Economic Development category were made as shown in the table. It is not clear why there were substantive differences between the cumulative to date FY24-25 expenditures. Future funding for the Clean Energy Economy and Innovation Ecosystem Support, Clean Transportation, and Energy Markets Intelligence and Statewide Planning and Implementation programs decreased The decrease in those funds were re-allocated to the Economic Development Growth Extension and Grant Program Match Opportunities programs. No explanation of why those funds were shifted was included.

Table 1: Cumulative Revenues and Program Funding Allocations Comparison of Draft Amendment and Final Amendment.

Carbon Dioxide Emission Reduction Status

Since I submitted my comments the 2025 annual emissions data have become available. Electric generating units in the RGGI program report CO2 emissions on a quarterly basis. This status summary uses the data from the EPA Clean Air Markets Program Data (CAMPD) database. Table 2 lists the annual CO2 emissions data by coal, oil, and natural gas primary fuel types and the heat input. The CAMPD “heat input” parameter is the hourly thermal energy input expressed in million British thermal units (mmBtu) and represents the rate at which fuel energy is supplied to the combustion unit over an operating hour. For comparison purposes the heat input data are divided by ten. Figure 1 plots these data. There is no change in the general trends with the addition of 2025 annual data. There was a significant decrease in total CO2 emissions caused by fuel switching from coal and oil to natural gas until 2019. At that time, opportunities for additional fuel switching ended and the Indian Point nuclear station started shutting down. Since then, emissions have gone up. I included the heat input to make the point that CO2 emissions and the amount of fuel used are closely linked. Future reductions will necessarily require reductions in fuel use. Based on these data I believe that the failure of NYSERDA to prioritize programs that directly or indirectly reduce emissions eventually will cause compliance problems.

Table 2: NY Electric Generating Unit CO2 Emissions and Heat Input

Figure 1: NY Electric Generating Unit CO2 Emissions and Heat Input

I also updated my summary of emissions for the RGGI states. Figure 2 graphs the CO2 emissions by fuel type and heat input for the nine states in RGGI that have been in the program since its inception. The reduction pattern is similar to New York. Emission reductions occurred because of fuel switching and when those opportunities were no longer available emissions began to rise.

Figure 2: Nine-State RGGI

The compliance implications are significant. According to the RGGI website: “in 2025: the RGGI cap was 81,347,784 and the adjusted cap was 66,586,609 tons”. Emissions from all the active RGGI states were 87,042,982 tons in 2025. Compliance was only possible because of banked allowances. Eventually the bank will be used up and the most recent model rule calls for a further annual reduction of 8.5 million tons per year. Something must change regarding these emission trajectories or there will be issues. The RGGI cap on emissions essentially rations energy use because if there are insufficient permits to emit (aka allowances) affected generating units have no other options to reduce emissions. Therefore, they can only shut down to comply with the law. That will create an artificial energy shortage.

Conclusion

It was encouraging that NYSERDA finally provided a summary of comments received. Unfortunately, the descriptions were limited and my arguments that investments that reduce emissions should be a priority were ignored. The 2025 emissions data showed another increase in CO2 emissions both in New York and across all the RGGI states. This is a worrisome trend.

Ellenbogen on Utility Scale Lithium Based Energy Storage System Issues

This post describes a recently completed white paper by Richard Ellenbogen M.E.E. titled The Intrinsic Danger of Siting Utility Scale Lithium Based Energy Storage Systems In Densely Populated Areas. Ellenbogen and I collaborated on an article about the potential impacts of a fire like the Moss Battery Plant fire if it were to occur in New York City. This report finds that the local conditions at the proposed large Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) facility at 220 Rabro Drive, Hauppauge, NY would magnify the impacts of a BESS fire in Nassau and Suffolk counties. The following two sections are lightly edited direct quotes from the report.

Executive Summary

This report was written at the request of the Hauppauge Fire Department because of their concerns about a proposed large Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) facility at 111 Rabro Drive. This would be located within 3500 feet of an elementary school, a much less than ideal siting for such a volatile and potentially dangerous facility.

Research on that issue revealed, in addition, that the proposed location is close to streams and has a high water table. In a location with these characteristics, a lithium-ion battery fire, of the type that frequently has occurred at BESS facilities, could produce long-term, catastrophic environmental damage. This is in addition to the more immediate, very serious threat to people and structures at the school and in nearby neighborhoods from heat and toxic gases in the event of a fire. The body of this report explains these threats in detail and also provides background that shows why the occurrence of fire at a BESS facility, like the one proposed, presents such a high level of risk. The readers should be aware in reading this report, that the author received no compensation or payment in kind for the research and writing, but willingly invested the hundreds of hours of work required for its preparation strictly as a result of his great concern for the Hauppauge community, Nassau and Suffolk Counties, the downstate region, and the State of New York in general, inspired by the high level of threat and risk arising from the proposed BESS facility. The report is designed to be read on a network connected device and is arranged with hyperlinks providing backup documentation for each issue should readers wish to learn more about the statements made within.

Introduction

Utility scale electrical energy storage has been a recognized need in the New York Metropolitan Area for over sixty years. For example, Con Ed first proposed the Storm King Mountain Pumped Storage facility in the early 1960’s to address this. However, that facility was never built because of potentially negative environmental impacts and community opposition. However, the need for energy storage has not gone away and has recently been exacerbated by a growing trend toward electrification to reduce carbon emissions, along with several years of state energy policies that have left the New York state critically short of electric generation.

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) recently released their 2025 – 2034 Reliability Study that determined that electric generation capacity margins could go below zero as early as 2027 with the risk increasing even more each year through 2034. Figure 1 from page 10 of that document clearly shows the problem.

This crisis has resulted from state policies, many associated with New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (CLCPA), that have blocked the construction or retooling of new gas generation plants for the past seven years, while simultaneously closing a 2 Gigawatt nuclear plant without having a viable operating alternative to replace the lost energy. As a result, NY State officials are moving hastily to find solutions to bridge the gaps. Among these hasty measures, the consequences of which do not seem to have been carefully thought out, is the proposed development and addition to its electrical grid of a number of lithium-ion-battery-based electrical energy storage facilities. To expedite this process, these officials have been attempting to override local zoning laws and their own Department of Environmental Conservation, via the six-year-old Office of Renewable Energy Siting (ORES).

One of these hastily conceived and poorly thought through BESS facilities is proposed for Long Island, within the town of Islip, in Suffolk County. This siting of an intrinsically dangerous BESS facility, in such a densely populated and environmentally sensitive area, having a high water table and close proximity to many streams and the ocean, would seem to defy logic. This is especially true given the very recent catastrophic history of a similar BESS siting at Moss Landing, near Monterey Bay in California.

Figure 1: Plausible Range of Statewide System Generation Margins 2025 – 2034. Source: NYISO 11/2025

Whatever help a BESS facility in Islip might promise for the NY state electrical grid is certainly offset by the risks of such a move and the likelihood of accidents with long-term very negative consequences that would impact millions of people and large geographic areas of the state and its waters. These risks follow from three categories of intrinsic dangerous characteristics of lithium ion batteries and the large number of them housed within a BESS facility. These categories of risks are as follows:

Lithium metal, when brought into contact with any water, creates an exothermic reaction that generates a great deal of heat which can drive the batteries into a state of thermal runaway. So Li-ion batteries and BESS facilities that contain them are very subject to fires, especially if they are located near large bodies of water and exposed to significant humidity or moisture. Lithium Batteries can also burst into flame if they overheat and enter thermal runaway under heavy load.
Li-ion battery fires are very hot and damaging. They burn at temperatures between 2600 – 5000 degrees-F making these fires, even small ones, very difficult and costly to put out, even if a fire department is well-prepared, which most are not. These fires spread rapidly within a BESS facility, quickly resulting in a conflagration. In addition to the great heat from them, there is release of toxic gases during the fires.
In the aftermath of large-scale Li-ion battery fires, there is significant, nearly impossible to remediate environmental pollution of land and water with heavy metals and other toxins. This will be particularly damaging in areas with surface water or a high water table, and particularly on Long Island which has a history of water issues and highly permeable soil..

Sections of this report explain in detail, with reference to each of these risk categories, why siting utility-scale lithium battery facilities in densely populated areas, like Nassau and Suffolk Counties, is a problem, in general. Also, it will be detailed why this is made especially problematic in coastal areas because of the hydrology and soil composition in this part of Long Island, as well as its proximity to the ocean.

Report Sections

The report has four sections: The issues with lithium storage, the aftermath of Moss Landing, negative impacts of ingesting heavy metals, and groundwater leaching issues on Long Island. I summarized Ellenbogen’s main points below and refer you to the report for more details.

There are substantive issues associated with lithium energy storage systems. It is necessary to keep water away from the batteries because lithium is volatile in the presence of water. Water causes lithium batteries to overheat and enter thermal runaway and catch fire. These fires are not unusual. Appendix 1 has a list of the fires, locations, and dates along with a link to the EPRI Battery Storage Fire Database. Once started the fires are so difficult to extinguish that they must left to burn out but during a fire there is release of toxic gases. To reduce the spread of the fire water is used to cool nearby batteries. As a result, in the aftermath of Li-ion battery fires, there is significant heavy metal and other toxin pollution of land and water from the smoke and water used to control the fire.

In another section Ellenbogen describes the aftermath of a BESS fire at Moss Landing California. On January 16, 2025, the Moss Landing 300 Megawatt – 1200 Megawatt-Hour Vistra BESS facility caught fire. A description of the fire and its aftermath is provided in Appendix 2. He explains that researchers from San Jose State had been working in the marshes around Moss Landing since 2018 and had measurements of the levels of certain chemicals in the ground and water around the BESS Site for at least two years prior to the battery fire. Their research on the effects of the fire on the ground and marshes around the BESS Site appear in the document Coastal wetland deposition of cathode metals from the world’s largest lithium-ion battery fire. It is also attached as Appendix 3. Ellenbogen includes the following quote from the paper:

The 2025 fire at the Moss Landing, California, battery energy storage system (BESS)—the world’s largest—released approximately 55,000 pounds (25 metric tons) of toxic cathode metals (nickel, manganese, cobalt) into surrounding Elkhorn Slough coastal wetlands. This airborne particulate matter formed a thin, widespread layer (<<5 mm) in surface soils, creating a “fingerprint” of the NMC-type batteries.

• Environmental Impact: The metals, particularly cobalt and manganese, are toxic to aquatic and terrestrial organisms. They pose risks to the ecosystem by potentially bioaccumulating through the food chain, from small invertebrates to shellfish, crabs, and top predators like sea otters.

• Fate of Contaminants: While initially settling in the soil, heavy metals have been mobilized into the estuary through tidal action and rain, spreading the risk beyond the initial deposition zone.

• Detection and Monitoring: Researchers from San Jose State University’s Moss Landing Marine Laboratories utilized field-portable X-ray fluorescence (FpXRF) to map the contamination.

• Long-Term Concerns: The long-term impacts on the restored tidal marsh ecosystem are under investigation, as the contaminants may cause lasting, subtle damage to the food web.

Ellenbogen also included a section describing the negative impacts of ingesting heavy metals contained in Lithium-Ion batteries. He used an AI search to ask which health effects are linked to nickel, manganese, and cobalt exposure in soil and water from BESS fire runoff over extremely porous soil with a shallow aquifer. The response explained: that exposure to nickel, manganese, and cobalt from battery fire runoff in porous soil and shallow aquifers heightens risks due to rapid leaching into groundwater, amplifying ingestion and dermal contact pathways. These metals, common in lithium-ion batteries, can contaminate drinking water and crops, leading to bioaccumulation in the food chain. Health agencies like Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry note that such scenarios mirror industrial pollution patterns where soil pH and redox conditions accelerate mobility.

In his final section Ellenbogen describes the particular issues of local conditions at the proposed large Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) facility on Long Island, NY. Long Island is a terminal moraine formed during from the melting of the Laurentide ice sheet, specifically the Wisconsin Glacier, around 60,000 years ago. Ellenbogen explains that Long Island has a long history of water quality issues due to the resulting porous soils and its shallow aquifer which is used to provide its drinking water. A history of Long Island environmental advocacy, initiated by water quality concerns, appears here. There are numerous instances of specialized treatment being given to Long Island regarding chemicals that can leach into the aquifer. A history of chemical bans on Long Island can be found in Appendix 4. His report includes maps of aquifer depths that show that if a fire occurred at the proposed location that it would cause problems from the heavy metals.

Conclusion

Ellenbogen’s conclusion notes that he has no monetary interest either way in Lithium Storage technologies. He views the issue entirely from a perspective of, “Would he want one of these facilities near him based upon what he knows, and if not, why not?” his analysis leads him to clearly believe that he would not want one located near him.

He believes that if you combine the hazardous emissions and the potential environmental damage, it becomes apparent that the suitable locations for these types of systems have to be restricted to areas where there are very few people and no surface water or ground water. Anything less than that will lead to a high probability of increased public health issues.

Ellenbogen Background

Richard Ellenbogen is the President [BIO] of Allied Converters and frequently copies me on emails that address various issues associated with the New York Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act). I have published other articles by Ellenbogen including a description of his keynote address to the Business Council of New York 2023 Renewable Energy Conference Energy titled: “Energy on Demand as the Life Blood of Business and Entrepreneurship in the State -video here: Why NY State Must Rethink Its Energy Plan and Ten Suggestions to Help Fix the Problems”. He comes to the table as an engineer who truly cares about the environment and as an early adopter of renewable technologies at both his home and business two decades ago.

Stalling the New York Climate Act Pause Evaluation

On January 28, 2026, the New York State Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding a petition for a hearing to suspend or temporarily modify the Renewable Energy Program. While on one hand I should be celebrating official recognition of something I have long advocated, on the other hand, the timing is problematic. The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming and this request for comments simply postpones the inevitable hearing.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue. Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources. The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates. However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations. It includes provisions stating that the PSC is empowered to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service. Today’s announcement is the first PSC response to numerous calls to address this requirement.

Announcement

The following is the text of the announcement requesting comments:

The Public Service Commission (Commission) is considering a petition, filed on January 6, 2026 (the Petition), by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) requesting that the Commission hold a hearing, pursuant to Section 66-p of the Public Service Law, to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

The Coalition, which describes itself as a group consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce, and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers, and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council, affirmatively contends that the Renewable Energy Program and its associated renewable energy targets may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service. In support of its request for such a review by the Commission, the Coalition points to information that it claims suggests that the State will not achieve the Climate Act targets that, by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems, and that, by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. The Coalition also suggests the existence of decreasing reliability margins and aging fossil-fueled generation resources, referencing statements by the New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that interested stakeholders are invited to submit comments by March 30, 2026, on the Petition filed by the Coalition.

Comments provided in response to this Notice should reference “Case 15-E-0302.” Comments should be submitted electronically by going to http://www.dps.ny.gov, clicking on “File Search” (located under the heading “Commission Files”), entering “15-E-0302” in the “Search by Case Number” field, and then clicking on the “Post Comments” box located at the top of the page. Those unable to file electronically may mail their comments to the Hon. Michelle L. Phillips, Secretary, New York State Public Service Commission, Three Empire Plaza, Albany, New York 12223-1350; however, electronic filing of comments is strongly encouraged.

Basis for the Hearing Summary

New York Public Service Law § 66-p Section (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” includes safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability. Section 66-p (4) states:

The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program.

My recent post summarized multiple independent analyses, audits, litigation findings, and party filings in DPS proceedings that document that the Climate Act transition will exacerbate energy affordability issues such that this PSL 66-P hearing is appropriate. I also used Perplexity AI to generate a chronology of the recommendations made to hold a hearing that provides an overview of the suggestions for the hearing.

The chronology described three independent pathways to trigger PSL66-p(4) anyone of which can justify a hearing:

Pathway 1: Reliability – “Program Impedes Safe and Adequate Electric Service”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find that the Renewable Energy Program “impedes” (not merely “risks” or “threatens”) the provision of safe and adequate service.

Evidence Presented:

NYISO 2024 RNA identifies actionable reliability need in NYC beginning 2033 (17-97 MW deficiency)

Statewide resource adequacy approaching limits with “no surplus power” remaining by 2034 without further development

Net capacity loss of 2,000 MW since Climate Act passage (retirements outpacing additions)

NYISO official statement that emission-free technologies to replace fossil generation “are not yet available on a commercial scale”

NERC highest-level alert documenting systemic deficiencies in modeling Inverter Based Resources and >15,000 MW of unexpected generation reductions in major events

Multiple NYISO high-risk scenarios showing NYC deficiency could begin as early as 2025 and grow to >1,000 MW by 2034

Assessment: The reliability evidence is substantial and comes from authoritative technical sources (NYISO, NERC). The case for a hearing under the reliability criterion is strong.

Pathway 2: Contractual – “Program Likely to Impair Existing Obligations”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find the program is “likely” to impair existing obligations and agreements.

Evidence Presented:

Repowering disincentive: Current Climate Act targets effectively discourage repowering existing facilities because developers face 2040 forced retirement risk, “undermining investment recovery”

Offshore wind contract renegotiations: Multiple offshore wind developers have sought contract amendments due to changed economic conditions

Tier 1 REC contract attrition: Biennial Review acknowledged 30% attrition rate in renewable energy contracts

Assessment: The evidence on contractual impairment is moderate. This criterion appears to be less central to the petitioners’ arguments than reliability and affordability.

Pathway 3: Affordability – “Significant Increase in Arrears or Disconnections”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find (1) a “significant” increase in arrears or service disconnections and (2) determine the increase is “related to the program.”

Evidence Presented:

Statistical significance established: Independent Intervenors demonstrated increases exceeding 2× standard deviation for statewide totals and 4 of 10 utilities

Magnitude: $1.8 billion in arrears affecting 1.2 million households

Trend: NMPC 17% increase (33,840 customers), Con Ed 59% increase (173,398 customers)

The Perplexity AI summary also lists two examples of evidence that does not support the claim that need to be explained. For the “Causation not established” description the AI program referenced an article written before the latest DPS annual informational report came out that said it was impossible to determine if increases are “related to the program”. A more recent report is now available, but DPS staff did not try to link the observed increases to this PSL 66-P requirement so it still is impossible to attribute significant changes to the Climate Act. The other example gave an alternative explanation for the number of customers in arrears: “Post-pandemic economic impacts, inflation, and energy price increases due to factors beyond Climate Act (e.g., natural gas price volatility, supply chain disruptions)”

The Perplexity AI Assessment description stated:

The affordability evidence meets the first criterion (statistical significance) but cannot satisfy the second criterion (program causation) until DPS provides the mandated cost reporting. This represents a data gap, not necessarily a failure of the substantive argument. A hearing could establish causation through discovery and testimony.

The conclusion in this section notes that the reliability pathway has the strongest evidentiary weight:

Among the three pathways, the reliability criterion presents the most compelling case for a hearing:

Evidence comes from independent technical authorities (NYISO, NERC) with statutory responsibility for reliability

Deficiencies are quantified with specific MW shortfalls and timeframes

High-risk scenarios demonstrate sensitivity to plausible uncertainties

NYISO’s statement that required technologies “are not yet available on a commercial scale” directly supports finding that the program “impedes” safe and adequate service

Net capacity loss since Climate Act passage (2,000 MW) demonstrates actual, not theoretical, impact

The affordability criterion faces an evidentiary gap on program causation, though the statistical significance of arrears increases is well-established. Importantly, this gap exists because the PSC/DPS have failed to comply with their own reporting mandates—the very accountability failure the petitioners criticize.

Discussion

In this discussion I liberally paraphrased the Perplexity AI response. Ultimately, the Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability emerging as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world supply chain, permitting, interconnection, and technological readiness constraints.

In response to the petitions ACE-NY and WEACT filed a response that urged the PSC to reject the petition suggesting that all progress would stop if the heating was held. However, the provision for a hearing does not require abandoning climate goals—it authorizes temporary suspension or modification to ensure safe, adequate, and affordable service while the transition continues. This represents pragmatic management, not capitulation.

I have long warned of the consequences if the current aspirational ambition and schedule of the Climate Act is not changed. The PSC’s decision extends beyond energy policy:

If reliability suffers, the result could be rolling blackouts, industrial curtailments, and catastrophic economic disruption
If affordability spirals, the political backlash could undermine not just Climate Act but climate policy more broadly
If the safety valve remains unused, the precedent may discourage future legislatures from including adaptive management mechanisms in ambitious policy frameworks

Conclusion

Clearly it is no longer possible for the Hochul Administration to ignore the adverse impacts of Climate Act Implementation. I have long argued that PSL 66-P was a logical excuse to reconsider the ramifications of the Climate Act so I should be happy that the potential of this requirement has been recognized at last.

However, this response is more evidence that the Climate Act has always been more about political catering to constituencies than about saving the planet. The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming so I believe that the PSC should have moved to hold the hearing at this time. That would infuriate the proponents of the Climate Act that Hochul needs for her re-election campaign. This request for comments pushes the hearing and any decision related to the hearing beyond the election next November. The question is whether New Yorkers will catch on that the Hochul Administration is risking reliability and affordability in an effort to appease Climate Act proponents.

Stay tuned because there I will undoubtedly be writing about this more before the comments are due,

New York Climate Act Affordability Status

In my opinion the biggest problem with the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) is that it will inevitably lead to extraordinary cost increases. My last article described the recent rate case decisions that have markedly increased residential customer electric bills. These rate increases arrive amid an escalating affordability crisis, as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion. This article documents unresolved affordability issues associated with the Climate Act.

Background

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates. However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations. It includes provisions stating that the PSC is empowered to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service. This requirement has been noted but, unfortunately, establishing a methodology to resolve the mandate has been ignored.

Petitions for a Hearing

The first unresolved affordability issue is the petitions by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy and the Independent Intervenors submitted to PSC Proceeding Case 22-M-0149 that called for a hearing. There has been no indication by the PSC that they will respond to those petitions.

The recent filings argued that the PSC should convene a hearing. On August 11, 2025 “Independent Intervenors” Roger Caiazza, Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton petitioned the PSC arguing that safety valve provisions for customers in arrears trends in PSL 66-p(4) have been exceeded which should trigger a hearing. On January 6, 2026 the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filed a petition with the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting that the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4). Both filings make similar arguments. The Independent Intervenors argued that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded. The Coalition makes a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.

In addition, last summer two members of the Climate Action Council, Donna DeCarolis and Dennis Elsenbeck, sent a letter to Rory Christian, Chair & Chief Executive Officer of the New Yok State Public Service Commission (PSC) that made a similar argument that there are more than sufficient circumstances to warrant the PSC commencing a hearing process to “consider modification and extension of New York Renewable Energy Program timelines pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4).

Agency Affordability Findings

There also have been New York Agency findings that argue that observed issues with schedule and costs suggest a pause to reconsider the mandates is appropriate.

The Draft Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) Staff and NYSERDA “details the numerous factors, including inflation, transmission constraints, shifting federal energy and trade policies and interconnection and siting challenges that have adversely impacted renewable development and the state’s trajectory towards achieving the Program’s 2030 target.” The Biennial Review “concludes that a delay in achieving the 70% goal may be unavoidable.”

The recently completed New York State Energy Plan (SEP) found that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient to meet statutory targets, and that external constraints continue to impede progress.” Volume 2 “Our Energy Systems” explains that “Considering resource build limitations and increased loads, the model aligns with the CES Biennial Review, projecting the procurement schedule of CES resources through 2035.” In other words, the SEP acknowledges that the Climate Act schedule is impossible to meet. The SEP found that Climate Act costs are expected to require $120 billion in annual energy system investments through 2040, equivalent to $1,282 per month per household. This baseline includes what the authors of the SEP characterizes as costs “no matter which future path we take” but I believe that framing is fundamentally deceptive because that scenario includes substantial greenhouse gas reduction programs implemented before 2019 that are necessary to meet the Climate Act goals.

The July 2024 New York State Comptroller Status report “Climate Act Goals – Planning, Procurements, and Progress Tracking” audited PSC and NYSERDA efforts to achieve the Climate Act mandates. It found that “While PSC and NYSERDA have taken considerable steps to plan for the transition to renewable energy in accordance with the Climate Act and CES, their plans did not comprise all essential components, including assessing risks to meeting goals and projecting costs.” The report recommended that the agencies begin the comprehensive review of the Climate Act, “continuously analyze” existing and emerging risks and known issues, conduct a detailed analysis of cost estimates, and “assess the extent to with ratepayers can reasonably assume the responsibility” of the implementation costs. This is the information necessary for the PSL 66-P hearing.

My last article summarized recent residential electric utility customers rate case decisions approved between March 2025 and January 2026. The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) “approved new multi-year rate plans for five major utilities—Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, and Orange & Rockland—while two additional utilities (New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG) and Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) have pending rate cases seeking significantly larger increases”.

Kris Martin from NY Solar Divide pointed out:

When we look at those modest Climate Act (CLCPA) percentages on “typical” electric bills, it’s important to understand that we have incurred only a small fraction of Climate Act expenses to date. The bulk of those expenses will really start to impact us in another 5-10 years as we start to seriously build out onshore and offshore wind and grid-scale solar, implement policy changes (e.g., school bus electrification), and deal with increases in demand.

Department of Public Service (DPS) staff is supposed to provide Climate Act information. On September 18, 2025 the PSC announced that they “received an update from DPS staff regarding progress toward the clean energy goals of the Climate Act”. The Second Informational Report prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff “focuses on Commission actions from January 2023 through August 2025, and includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.” According to the Summary of Ratepayer Impact for Electric Utilities table, residential impacts of the Climate Act range from 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 total monthly electric bills. In my opinion, those estimates are conservative because there is immense pressure on agency staff to minimize the costs of the Climate Act. In addition, the costs necessary to implement the Climate Act were ramping up in 2023. As Martin notes these costs are just the tip of the iceberg.

Affordability Metrics

PSL law Section 66-p (4) states that the hearing could “temporarily suspend or modify the obligations” of the Renewable Energy Program if the PSC makes a finding that “there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. This refers to affordability limits, but they are not specific enough. I believe the PSC must establish specific affordability limits.

This issue was also raised to the DPS last year. On March 26, 2025, Jessica Waldorf, Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Implementation for the Department of Public Service (DPS) posted a letter responding to a letter from Michael B. Mager Counsel to Multiple Intervenors that had been submitted earlier in March to Chair of the Public Service Commission Rory Christian regarding the affordability standard. I agreed with the comments submitted by Multiple Intevenors and was disappointed with the DPS response so I submitted a letter to Christian.

As described in my article My Comments on the NYS Affordability Standard: I believe that as part of the Scoping Plan the Climate Action Council should have developed criteria for the PSC to consider affordability and reliability. That did not happen. Based on issues observed with the transition it is incumbent upon the Commission to define “safe and adequate electric service” and “significant increase in arrears or service disconnections” as part of this Proceeding. My letter stated that this is necessary so that there is a clearly defined standard for the temporarily suspending or modifying the provisions of Section 66-p (4).

The Public Service Commission has an existing target energy burden set at or below 6 percent of household income for all low-income households in New York State. Reviewing it raises questions about its suitability for defining energy affordability acceptability.

The six percent target was included as part of Public Service Commission (PSC) Case Number: 14-M-0565, the Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers. According to the PSC: “The primary purposes of the proceeding are to standardize utility low-income programs to reflect best practices where appropriate, streamline the regulatory process, and ensure consistency with the Commission’s statutory and policy objectives.” On May 20, 2016 the Order Adopting Low Income Program Modifications and Directing Utility Findings adopted “a policy that an energy burden at or below 6% of household income shall be the target level for all 2.3 million low income households in New York.”

The order notes that:

There is no universal measure of energy affordability; however, a widely accepted principle is that total shelter costs should not exceed 30% of income. For example, this percentage is often used by lenders to determine affordability of mortgage payments. It is further reasonable to expect that utility costs should not exceed 20% of shelter costs, leading to the conclusion that an affordable energy burden should be at or below 6% of household income (20% x 30% = 6%). A 6% energy burden is the target energy burden used for affordability programs in several states (e.g., New Jersey and Ohio), and thus appears to be reasonable. It also corresponds to what U.S. Energy Information Administration data reflects is the upper end of middle- and upper-income customer household energy burdens (generally in the range of 1 to 5%). The Commission therefore adopts a policy that an energy burden at or below 6% of household income shall be the target level for all low-income customers. The policy applies to customers who heat with electricity or natural gas.

The utility companies submit quarterly reports documenting the number of low-income customers receiving discounts and the amount of money distributed. However, I have been unable to find any documentation describing how many customers meet the 6% energy burden criteria, much less any information on how those numbers are changing. The biggest problem with this energy burden program is that it only applies to electric and gas utility customers. Citizens who heat with fuel oil, propane, or wood are not covered. Moreover, it only considers utility costs but the economy-wide provisions of the CLCPA include transportation energy burdens.

Clearly, if this parameter is to be used for a CLCPA affordability standard, then defining what is acceptable and what is not acceptable is necessary. Whatever affordability standard is chosen a clear reporting metric must be provided and frequent updates of the status of the implementation relative to the affordability standard provided.

It is also notable that Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted correspondence related to the litigation associated with Climate Act implementation. The State’s submittal to the petition addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’s (the Climate Act) goals in a timely manner.”

The submittal means that the State of New York argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”. The following paragraph concedes that there are significant upfront cost issues that out-weigh other benefits.

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

Conclusion

It is impossible to ignore that multiple independent analyses, audits, litigation findings, and party filings in DPS proceedings document that the Climate Act transition will exacerbate energy affordability issues at a time when more than a million New York households are already in arrears on their energy bill. Unfortunately, the Hochul Administration and Legislature have not adopted clear affordability metrics, a transparent tracking system, or mandatory corrective actions when affordability thresholds are exceeded. Of course, these are bright line accountability metrics, and no political supporter of the Climate Act wants to admit their role in the New York affordability crisis.

New York Recent Rate Case Impacts on Residential Customers

In my opinion the biggest problem with the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is that it will inevitably lead to extraordinary cost increases. This post summarizes recent residential electric utility customers rate case decisions approved between March 2025 and January 2026. I do not discuss gas rate cases. The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) “approved new multi-year rate plans for five major utilities—Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, and Orange & Rockland—while two additional utilities (New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG) and Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) have pending rate cases seeking significantly larger increases”. These rate increases arrive amid an escalating affordability crisis, as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

Trying to decipher rate case decisions is a difficult task because of the volume of materials associated with each rate case. The PSC maintains a database that compiles all the filed documents and public comments for each rate case. The Matter Master file for the current NYSEG rate case lists 913 filed documents and 1967 public comments. To compile this summary, I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document. Assume all the results shown are referenced to the original Perplexity response.

Rate Case Results

Figure 1 summarizes the recent rates cases for Con Edison, National Grid, Central Hudson, and Orange & Rockland that have been completed since 2025. NYSEG and RG&E have pending rate cases, so their results shown are not directly comparable.

Figure 1: New York Utility Rate Cases Impact on Residential Customer (2025-2026) – Perplexity

The NYSEG and RG&E cases are pending and the results shown represent their initial offer. All the results shown for the other utilities had much higher initial rates. For example, Con Edison initially requested annual revenue increases of $1.612 billion for electric service (18.0 percent increase in base delivery revenues) and $440 million for gas service (18.8 percent increase in base delivery revenues). Following intense public opposition, intervention by Governor Kathy Hochul, and even comments by President Trump, and extensive settlement negotiations, the PSC approved a dramatically reduced three-year rate plan on January 22, 2026. The approved joint proposal represents an 87 percent reduction from Con Edison’s initial request.

Utility Summaries

Con Edison’s service territory covers New York City and Westchester County with 3.6 million residential customers. For typical NYC residential customers using 280 kilowatt-hours monthly, electric bills will increase by approximately $4 per month (3.9 percent) in 2026, $3.55 per month in 2027, and $4.22 per month in 2028, resulting in a cumulative 10.4 percent increase over three years. Westchester County residential customers using 425 kWh monthly face increases of $5.25 (2.6 percent) in year one, $4.84 (2.3 percent) in year two, and $4.95 (2.2 percent) in year three, totaling 10.1 percent over the period

National Grid’s rate case was approved on August 13, 2025. The service territory covers 1.7 million electric customers across 25,000 square miles in Upstate New York. For residential electric customers using an average of 625 kilowatt-hours per month National Grid’s three-year upstate rate plan includes a $14.32 per month increase in year 1, a $6.44 per month increase in year 2, and a $4.34 per month increase in year 3 with an expected total increase over three years of 31%.

Central Hudson 315,000 residential customers in its Hudson Valley and Mid-Hudson region service territory. Central Hudson’s rate case followed a unique trajectory, proceeding through litigation rather than settlement, ultimately resulting in a one-year rate plan approved on July 18, 2024, followed by a subsequent multi-year joint proposal filed on May 13, 2025, and approved on August 14, 2025. Typical residential electric customers will experience total bill increases of approximately 7.85 percent, equating to approximately $12.65 per month.

Orange & Rockland serves 233,000 residential electric customers in Rockland, Orange, and Sullivan counties. On March 19, 2025, the PSC adopted a three-year rate plan for Orange & Rockland that substantially reduced the utility’s initial request, keeping electric revenue flat for the first year while authorizing incremental increases in subsequent years. For residential electric customers using 600 kilowatt-hours per month the 2025 total bill increase will be 4.6 percent, in 2026 the total bill increase will be 3.3 percent and in 2027 the total bill increase will be 3.5 percent total bill increase .

New York State Electric & Gas (NYSEG) and Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) filed rate case proposals on

June 30, 2025. The case is currently under review. I am an active party in the rate cases and am unsure what I can say about the status. I don’t think it is inappropriate to note that an evidential hearing is scheduled for early February. The service territories of the two utilities are all over the state but is primarily located in Central and Western New York. NYSEG serves 921,000 customers and RG&E serves 392,00 customers. The initial NYSEG electric request asked for an amount that works out for a typical residential customers (600 kWh electric usage) to a $33.12 per month increase (23.7 percent increase to total bill). The initial RG&E electric request asked for an amount that works to a $33.01 per month increase (26.0 percent increase to total bill).

Climate Act Impacts

It is unfortunate that the utilities fail to provide a breakdown of how much implementation of the Climate Act adds to these rate case costs. I used a Perplexity AI search of the National Grid rate case to provide Climate Act cost estimates. It found that the approved rate plans do not contain explicit breakdowns of specific dollar amounts or percentages of the rate increases allocated specifically to the Climate Act projectsand state mandated programs. The query response included the following:

CLCPA-Related Investments Identified

While specific cost breakdowns are not provided, the orders identify several CLCPA-related investment categories within the approved rate plans:

Electric System CLCPA Investments

Transmission Infrastructure:

CLCPA Phase 2 Transmission Projects

Smart Path Connect

Grid Modernization

Distribution System Enhancements:

Enhanced grid capabilities for solar, wind, and energy storage interconnection

Smart grid technologies to manage intermittent renewable resources

Electric vehicle infrastructure support programs

Historical CLCPA Investment Context

Previous utility filings and planning documents provide context for CLCPA-related costs across New York utilities:

Statewide CLCPA Transmission Investments:

Phase 1 Projects: Approximately $4.16 billion in transmission investments and $2.64 billion in distribution investments across all New York utilities

Phase 2 Conceptual Estimates: $7.62 billion in transmission and $2.16-$2.85 billion in distribution investments (conceptual estimates)

National Grid’s Historical CLCPA Share:

Phase 2 Transmission: $1.37 billion estimated for National Grid transmission projects

Phase 2 Distribution: $510 million to $1.2 billion estimated for National Grid distribution projects

Discussion

The Perplexity summary of the rate cases raised some overarching issues. New York residential utility bills consist of two primary components, each subject to different pricing mechanisms and contributing to overall cost increases through distinct channels.

Delivery Charges account for approximately two-thirds of bills. These charges represent what customers pay utilities to build, maintain, and operate the physical infrastructure that transmits electricity and natural gas to homes and businesses. Delivery charges remained relatively stable historically but have increased substantially in recent years to fund:

Infrastructure Modernization and Replacement: Utilities must replace aging equipment that has reached the end of its useful life, including transformers, substations, transmission lines, and distribution networks.

Grid Hardening and Storm Resiliency: Utilities must enhance system resiliency to manage severe weather events. This includes vegetation management, reinforced poles and wires, and backup systems.

Clean Energy Integration Infrastructure: The Climate Act mandates necessitate substantial transmission and distribution system upgrades to connect renewable energy resources, accommodate distributed generation, manage bi-directional power flows, and handle increased electrification of transportation and heating.

Property Taxes: Utility companies pay significant property taxes on their infrastructure, which are passed through to customers. Note that the clean energy infrastructure increases the property tax burden.

Return on Equity (Profit Margin): Regulated utilities earn a PSC-approved rate of return on their capital investments. Approved returns on equity in recent cases range from 9.4 percent (Con Edison) to 9.5 percent (National Grid).

Supply Charges account for approximately one-third of bills. They represent the actual cost of purchasing electricity or natural gas in wholesale markets. These charges fluctuate based on market conditions and are typically adjusted monthly. These have increased for the following reasons:

Explosive Demand Growth: New York and the broader Northeast region are experiencing unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by several factors that are fundamentally reshaping the supply-demand balance. The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) reports that the pace of new energy sources coming online is insufficient to keep pace with demand growth.

Wholesale electricity prices have responded predictably to this supply-demand imbalance. The average monthly wholesale electricity price in New York soared by 67 percent over the past year according to NYISO data.

Thermal Generation Fuel Costs: Natural gas remains the marginal fuel setting electricity prices in New York’s wholesale markets during most hours. Natural gas commodity prices have increased due to growing domestic demand (particularly for heating during cold winters), export demand for liquefied natural gas, and supply constraints.

Weather-Driven Consumption: The 2025-26 winter has proven particularly severe, with temperatures 15-20 percent colder than the prior year. Colder weather increases heating demand, driving up both consumption (measured usage) and market prices due to heightened competition for available supply.

Conclusion

These rate case results are unsustainable. For all the noise made by politicians about affordability, the fact remains that the New York State Legislature or Administration has not defined affordable energy. The Public Service Commission has an existing target energy burden set at or below 6 percent of household income for all low-income households in New York State. I have been unable to find any documentation describing how many customers meet the 6% energy burden criteria, much less any information on how those numbers are changing. The biggest problem with this energy burden program is that it only applies to electric and gas utility customers. Citizens who heat with fuel oil, propane, or wood are not covered. There is a clear need for an affordability metric that can be tracked.

Investments for New York’s Future

According to a new report from Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, New Yorkers will “realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative.” This article explains why this report is bogus on multiple levels.

I have extensive experience with market-based pollution control programs. I have been involved in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the details of the RGGI program. I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. I have also been following the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program and other similar programs in New York The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated

Clean Air Initiative

My first thought when I read this was what is the Clean Air Initiative? The report states: “state agencies have developed proposals for an economy-wide cap-and-invest program – known as the Clean Air Initiative (CAI).” I have been following the economy-wide cap-and-invest program and I was unaware of any agency calling the economy-wide program anything other than the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program. So, I used Perplexity AI to ask if any New York agencies used CAI instead of NYCI. The response stated:

No New York State agency officially refers to the cap-and-invest program as the “Clean Air Initiative.” Throughout all Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) official documentation, press releases, regulatory proposals, and public communications from 2023 through early 2026, the program is consistently designated as:

New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) – the primary official name

Cap-and-Invest Program – the standard reference

I believe the answer to why these organizations use this nomenclature is directly related to the mission of the organizations. Greenline Insights “provides non-partisan research to drive smart decision-making. We specialize in modeling, analysis, and policy design to maximize positive outcomes for local workforces, businesses, and communities.” Their description of services provided states: “We work with clients to develop compelling research questions and build the right mix of tools to answer them.” Reading between that line I think it means that if a client wants a particular answer, they will get that result.

EDF claims “Guided by science and economics, and committed to climate justice, we work in the places, on the projects and with the people that can make the biggest difference.” According to another Perplexity AI query EDF has “strongly supported the economy-wide cap and invest program proposal included in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) Scoping Plan” finalized in 2022 and since then “has engaged in extensive and sustained lobbying and advocacy efforts to advance New York’s economy-wide cap-and-invest program since early 2023.” EDF has a vested interest in the success of an economy-wide program.

The Perplexity AI “Deep Research” response to my query about the use of CAI the AI program concluded “The Environmental Defense Fund and allied advocacy organizations strategically adopted “Clean Air Initiative” as alternative branding to frame the program around air quality and public health benefits in their campaigns to pressure Governor Hochul to finalize and implement the regulations.”

In other words, the Clean Air Initiative terminology is all about the messaging.

Clean Air Initiative Claims

The January 8, 2026 CAI report announcement states:

NEW YORK — New Yorkers will realize significant economic benefits, including household savings and new job creation, with the Clean Air Initiative, a new report from Environmental Defense Fund and Greenline Insights finds.

The report comes as New Yorkers continue to await the launch of the Clean Air Initiative: an economywide cap-and-invest program that works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.” At the same time, energy affordability remains an issue that’s top of mind for New York voters.

“Our analysis shows that the vast majority of New Yorkers are missing out on savings and economic opportunities across the state due to delays in implementing the Clean Air Initiative,” said Kate Courtin, Senior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy. “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.”

The report finds that, over its first decade, the Clean Air Initiative would deliver:

$6.9 billion in net savings, or an average of $1,060 per household earning $200k per year or less — about 85% of households in the state.

Over 300,000 new jobs, with job growth strongest in fields like construction and transit as a result of investments in clean transportation services, decarbonization of buildings, and the build-out of clean energy infrastructure.

$48 billion in economic growth supported by program investments across the state.

“The data is clear that the Clean Air Initiative is a potent job creator and economic development tool.” said Jonah Kurman-Faber, Founder and Principal at Greenline Insights. “The program’s investments play to the state’s economic strengths and provide meaningful financial benefits to an overwhelming majority of the population.”

Pollution Control

EDF claims without any evidence that setting a cap ensures compliance with the arbitrary limits of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act). The report claims that the “economywide cap-and-invest program works by simultaneously putting a limit on the tons of pollution companies can emit — “cap” — while requiring them pay for each ton of emissions, funding clean energy projects that create health and cost-saving benefits for communities — “invest.” That is the theory.

I recently published several articles about RGGI, the existing New York cap-and-invest program for electric utility generating units that shows reality is different. I showed that the reason NY utility emissions have dropped is because NY power plants switched from using coal and oil to using natural gas. Natural gas emits less CO2 and was cheaper, so the observed reductions are mostly because of economic fuel switching not RGGI. I compared the observed reductions and RGGI investment emission savings and found that the total cumulative annual emission savings represents a reduction of only 4.2% from the pre-RGGI baseline. That comparison also found that the observed cost per ton of emissions removed is $583. None of these results suggest that the CAI will work as claimed.

GHG emissions are directly related to energy generation. When a GHG pollution control program caps emissions it caps energy use so capping emissions essentially rations energy use. Combined with the RGGI results, that means that compliance with the cap can only occur if energy use is rationed

Economic Benefits

According to the announcement, Kate Courtin, Senior Manager for State Climate Policy & Strategy said that “The sooner this program is implemented, the sooner communities will see billions in investments that will expand access to cleaner, cheaper energy, cut pollution and create healthier, more resilient communities.” I am not an economist so I submitted another Perplexity AI query asking about opportunity costs and the Greenline Insights analysis. The summary notes:

The “Investments for New York’s Future” report by Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Greenline Insights, released in January 2026, projects that New York’s Clean Air Initiative (cap-and-invest program) would generate $6.9 billion in household savings, create over 300,000 jobs, and support $48 billion in economic growth over the program’s first decade (2026-2035). While the specific methodological details of this report remain inaccessible through the provided URL, extensive research into Greenline Insights’ comparable analyses, standard input-output (I-O) modeling practices, and economic impact assessment literature reveals fundamental concerns about the treatment—or more precisely, the omission—of opportunity costs in such economic analyses.

Even a non-economist like me understands that if an analysis does not consider how the money raised by NYCI might have been used elsewhere is not considered, then that is a problem:

Opportunity cost represents “the value of the alternative foregone by choosing a particular activity”—the benefits that could have been realized if the same resources were deployed differently. In climate policy analysis, this concept is essential because government spending and regulatory mandates redirect capital, labor, and productive resources from alternative uses. A comprehensive economic evaluation must compare not just the projected benefits of a policy against its direct costs, but also assess what economic activity would have occurred absent the intervention—the counterfactual baseline.

The response to my query raised the following issues with the Greenline Insights methodology:

1. The “Missing Peter” Problem

As economists from the Beacon Hill Institute articulated in critiquing renewable energy economic impact studies: “They are robbing Peter [existing economic activities] to pay Paul [the supported sector], and claiming the program increased total spending because now Paul spends more, but they ignore accounting for Peter”.

Every dollar collected through allowance auctions or allocated to climate investments is a dollar unavailable for alternative economic uses—whether private consumption, business investment in other sectors, or different government priorities. Standard I-O models “cannot compute possible reductions in output and jobs elsewhere in the economy, due to the reallocation of resources towards the supported project”.

2. Assumption of Idle Resources

The typical economic impact study assumes “that the dollar that flows through the industries identified by model’s I-O tables, and the resources that they are commanding, would not otherwise be used”. This assumption may be defensible during severe recessions with high unemployment and underutilized productive capacity, but becomes increasingly problematic as economies approach full employment.

New York State added over 1 million private sector jobs since April 2020 and reached record employment levels as of September 2024. In this context, labor and capital redirected to clean energy investments necessarily displace activity in other sectors. One analysis noted explicitly: “IMPLAN cannot be used to model nonresidential sector opportunity costs, so those were not included”—a tacit acknowledgment of the methodology’s inherent limitation.

3. No Counterfactual Baseline

Rigorous policy evaluation requires comparing outcomes under the policy scenario against a well-specified counterfactual: what would have happened in the policy’s absence. This counterfactual must account for:

Alternative deployment of capital: If the $61-126 billion in projected cap-and-invest revenues were instead left with households and businesses, what consumption and investment would occur?

Baseline economic trajectories: What job growth, wage increases, and economic output would materialize under business-as-usual conditions?

Displaced economic activity: Which sectors contract as resources shift toward clean energy, and what are the productivity implications?

Standard I-O models do not construct this counterfactual. They measure gross economic activity associated with program spending but do not subtract the economic activity that would have occurred with alternative resource allocation.

4. The Economist’s Critique

The academic economics community has long criticized the misapplication of I-O analysis for policy advocacy. As one prominent critique states: “There’s a joke among economists who look at economic impact studies, and we say ‘Define all costs as benefits, and double them'”. This captures the tendency of such analyses to:

Present gross job creation without netting out job displacement

Calculate multiplier effects on program spending without comparable analysis of opportunity cost multipliers

Report total economic output without addressing whether this represents additional output or reallocated output

The response to my query concludes:

For policymakers and stakeholders evaluating the economic case for New York’s Clean Air Initiative, this means:

The reported economic benefits are overstated to the extent they represent reallocation of economic activity rather than net additions

The true net economic impact depends on the relative productivity of clean energy investments versus displaced alternatives—a comparison the analysis does not make

The strongest case for the policy rests on climate and health benefits, not the economic multiplier effects emphasized in the report’s communications

More rigorous analysis following a similar Resources for the Future approach or comprehensive cost-benefit frameworks would provide better-informed decision-making

Conclusion

This report is simply a lobbying presentation that was commissioned by EDF to support their arguments that NYCI is a good idea. One common aspect of all these analyses is that the benefits are overstated, the costs are minimized if not ignored, and the methodology is sketchy. I do not think that any of the job estimates and economic projections are credible.

New York Nuclear Renaissance

Governor Hochul plans to pursue “the most ambitious development of nuclear power in America, setting a new goal to build five gigawatts of new nuclear capacity”. I believe that nuclear power is the best option to reduce electric system GHG emissions but there are issues. This post includes Richard Ellenbogen’s description of practical deployment issues and my observations relative to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy. He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where it has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system. I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because the energy density of wind and solar energy is too low and the resource intermittency too variable to ever support a reliable electric system relying on those resources. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Hochul Proposal

Hochul’s State of the State Book describes the nuclear proposal in the following two sections:

Establishing a Nuclear Reliability Backbone for a Zero-Emission Grid

As New York transitions to a zero-emission electric grid, the State must ensure reliable and cost effective baseload power to keep homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure running at all hours. Governor Hochul will ensure that New York State leads in the race to harness safe and reliable advanced nuclear energy to power homes and businesses with zero-emission electricity for generations to come.

To catalyze progress towards those goals, the Governor will advance a new initiative, the Nuclear Reliability Backbone, directing state agencies to establish a clear pathway for additional advanced nuclear generation to support grid reliability. The Nuclear Reliability Backbone will be developed by a new Department of Public Service (DPS) process to consider, review, and facilitate a cost-effective pathway to four gigawatts of new nuclear energy that will combine with existing nuclear generation and the New York Power Authority’s (NYPA) previously announced one gigawatt project, to create an 8.4 gigawatt “backbone” of reliable energy for New Yorkers.

This effort will provide firm, clean power that complements renewable energy resources and reduces reliance on fossil fuel generation. By creating a stable foundation of always-on energy, the Backbone will allow renewable resources to operate more efficiently and flexibly. Together, these actions will support a resilient, flexible, and zero-emission grid that meets New York’s growing energy needs.

Ensuring New York’s Nuclear Power Future is Built By and For New Yorkers

As New York expands advanced nuclear energy, the State must ensure that New Yorkers benefit from these jobs and investments, including making sure New Yorkers are prepared to build, operate, and sustain this emerging industry. Governor Hochul will launch NextGen Nuclear New York to develop a skilled, in-state nuclear workforce through coordinated education and training pathways.

The initiative will expand partnerships across K–12 schools, higher education institutions, labor organizations, and training programs to align curricula, credentials, and career pathways with industry needs. It will also support workforce transitions for existing energy workers and increase public awareness of nuclear career opportunities. By investing in people and skills, New York will ensure its nuclear future is powered by New Yorkers, for New Yorkers.

Practical Deployment Issues – Ellenbogen

Ellenbogen recently sent an email that described his concerns about the proposal to add 5 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear to NY State’s generation fleet that forms the basis for this article. Because we are closely aligned on our thoughts I am not going to try to differentiate between his material and my supplemental information. However, I take responsibility for the contents of this article and accept that I may have misquoted or misrepresented Ellenbogen’s beliefs.

For background consider New York’s nuclear power plants (Table 1). Five gigawatts of nuclear is basically equivalent to building five new traditional reactors like Nine Mile 2, the last completed plant in New York. Note that Shoreham was completed, tested, and then shut down before it operated in the mid 1980’s.

Table 1: New York Nuclear Generating Plants

We agree on one thing completely: It’s a step in the right direction but it is too little, too late. Building this amount of capacity will take a long time. Nine Mile 2 construction took 13 years, and the most recent reactors built in the US at Vogtle, Georgia took 15 years from the start of initial site work.

According to a Perplexity AI query, The new Vogtle units are Westinghouse AP1000 designs with passive safety systems; The capacity of each unit is on the order of 1.1 GW. Construction went over schedule and budget “as the first new U.S. nuclear build in decades, became a protracted megaproject with schedule slips and cost growth to roughly the mid‑$30‑billion range, widely characterized as one of the most expensive infrastructure projects in U.S. history”. These issues were caused by a “combination of incomplete design and planning, contractor and supply‑chain problems, first‑of‑a‑kind AP1000 implementation issues, weak project management and oversight, and the 2017 Westinghouse bankruptcy, which disrupted construction and financing”.

Most of these underlying factors will be problems for New York State. If new technology is used the design and planning will have to evolve as the plants are built. There are contractor and supply-chain problems with existing infrastructure construction so this will be more of a problem for the new technology. If the deployment goes so far as to mandate that the facilities are “built by and for New Yorkers”, then there will be delays because there are insufficient skilled trade workers available today.

Climate Act Schedule and Reliability Issues – Ellenbogen

The Climate Act has a requirement for zero emissions electric generation by 2040. There is no possibility that all the nuclear capacity proposed by Hochul could be built by 2040 and there is a low probability that any new nuclear could be built by then. Last June Hochul ordered the New York Power Authority (NYPA) to develop at least on gigawatt of nuclear capacity. NYPA has not even announced where they might consider siting new nuclear capacity. In my experience with power plant permitting, it takes at least three years to secure permits for existing design equipment. There have been indications that New York would favor new designs which would slow down permitting substantially. Finally, “Nuclear” has been a four-letter word in New York State for about 45 years so we expect opponents to try to delay permitting in every way possible.

Last November the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) released its 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP). The report found that “the electric grid is at an inflection point driven by the convergence of three major trends: the rapid growth of large loads, (e.g.: microchip manufacturing and AI-related data centers); the aging generation fleet; and a lack of new dispatchable generation resources being added to the system.” The description of the CRP went on to say:

The CRP highlights that the future reliability of the grid depends on the development of flexible generation capable of performing during extended periods of high consumer demand and extreme weather. The report examines lessons-learned from the June 2025 heatwave and the need for a planning framework that better reflects present challenges of operating the grid while anticipating plausible future risks.

“The system requires additional dispatchable generation to serve forecasted increases in consumer demand,” said Zach Smith, Senior Vice President, System and Resource Planning. “We also need to refine and evolve our planning processes to better reflect this period of great change on the grid and a broader range of plausible future outcomes.”

The CRP demonstrates that due to emerging reliability challenges, traditional planning methods built around a single forecast are no longer sufficient. To maintain system reliability and protect public safety, the economy and quality of life, the CRP recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment before reliability margins disappear.

Our biggest concern is the reliability margin crisis described in the CRP. The NYISO plausible range of reliability margins illustrates the problem (Figure 1). The CRP doesn’t explain what is going to keep the lights on after 2033, and possibly as early as 2027 if replacement capacity does not keep up with retirements. My Perplexity AI search found that there are no new fossil-fired capacity proposed. While adding new nuclear capacity is appropriate, replacement of existing capacity must also be considered. The youngest of the 3.4 GW of existing nuclear in NY State will be reaching 60 years of age by 2040.

Figure 1: Plausible Range of Statewide System Margins NYISO 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan

Reason to Pause – Caiazza

Over the last year I have written many articles describing various reasons to pause implementation and reconsider the schedule and scope of the Climate Act. The State Energy Plan and the CRP both include multiple future energy projections that include estimates of capacity and grid infrastructure additions. The CRP “recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment”. The State Energy Plan advocates massive deployment of as much wind, solar, and energy storage capacity as possible as fast as possible hoping that it will work out.

Wind and solar energy resources are diffuse, intermittent, and correlated. Because they are diffuse, utilizing wind and solar means that transmission and distribution systems must be upgraded. Because they are intermittent, that means that energy storage is needed on daily to seasonal scales. Because wind and solar are correlated, new dispatchable emissions-free resources (DEFR) are needed to make the electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. I believe the only likely viable DEFR backup technology is nuclear generation because it is the only candidate resource that is technologically ready, can be expanded as needed, and does not suffer from limitations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Every day that the resolving the DEFR requirement is delayed the costs associated with what may be a false solution increase. If the only viable DEFR solution is nuclear, then the wind, solar, and energy storage approach cannot be implemented without nuclear power. Nuclear power works best as a baseload resource so using it solely as DEFR backup is inappropriate. Developing baseload nuclear eliminates the need for a huge DEFR backup resource and means that the “build as much as we can as fast as we can” wind and solar buildout currently in progress is unnecessary. Climate Act implementation should be paused until the most appropriate path forward is determined.

Discussion

Both Ellenbogen and I have been harping about reliability for years. Unfortunately, no one at the state level seems to be ready to confront the problem. It is absolutely necessary to come to grips with it. The state government keeps trying to defy physical law by pushing technologies that can’t keep the lights on. They need to get out of their bubble because the time frame required to fix what has become a massive problem is getting increasingly small. The rapidly decreasing margins and negative capacity margins appear likely before new generation of any type can be built.

One of the biggest takeaways from this latest political energy proposal is the danger of political interference in energy policy. New York politicians now claim that we need 5 GW of nuclear generating capacity. New York politicians shut down 3.1 GW of nuclear capacity since 1984. Hochul’s announcement is encouraging but until it must be accompanied by a pause in Climate Act implementation to be credible. If timely decarbonization using nuclear power is appropriate, then a restart at Indian Point should be considered because it is the cheapest and quickest option. However, that would be politically toxic so I cannot imagine that ever being proposed by the Hochul Administration.

Conclusion

In my opinion, nuclear power should be part of New York’s electric system future. However, Hochul’s proposal is too little, too late as part of the Climate Act implementation without revising the schedule. It is necessary first to pause implementation and reassess the schedule and ambition of the Act so that it can play a meaningful role.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy Petition

On January 6, 2026 the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filed a petition with the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting that “the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.” Last August I described a filing and supporting documentation that I prepared with Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (Independent Intervenors) submitted to the same PSC Proceeding (Case 22-M-0149). Our filing made a similar argument. This article compares the filings.

Background

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two electric sector targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy

According to their petition the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) is “a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council”. Clearly, they have a vested interest in affordability because it affects their competitiveness. Coalition members include:

Buffalo Niagara Builders Association
Buffalo Niagara Manufacturing Alliance
Buffalo Niagara Partnership
Builders Exchange of the Southern Tier
Business Council of Westchester
Capitol Region Chamber of Commerce
Center for Economic Growth
Commercial Real Estate Development Association – Upstate Chapter
Construction Exchange of Buffalo and Western New York
Engineers Labor Employer Cooperative 825
Greater Binghamton Chamber of Commerce
Greater Rochester Association of REALTORS
Greater Rochester Chamber of Commerce
Manufacturers Alliance of New York
Manufacturers Association of Central New York
Manufacturers Association of the Southern Tier
Multiple Intervenors – An unincorporated association of approximately 55 large industrial, commercial, and institutional energy consumers with manufacturing and other facilities located throughout New York State
National Federation of Independent Businesses
New York State Association of Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors
New York State Builders Association
New York State Economic Development Council
Niagara USA Chamber of Commerce
North Country Chamber of Commerce
Northeastern Retail Lumber Association
Northeast Hearth, Patio and Barbecue Association
Power for Economic Prosperity – An active coalition of manufacturing companies that depend on low-cost hydropower from the New York Power Authority in order to maintain their operations in the Buffalo/Niagara Region.
Rochester Technology and Manufacturing Association
The Business Council of New York State – The leading business organization in New York State, representing the interests of large and small firms throughout the state. Its membership is made up of approximately 3,500 member companies, local chambers of commerce and professional and trade associations.
The Council of Industry, Manufacturers Association of the Hudson Valley
The Manufacturers Alliance of New York
Western New York Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors
Also included in the Coalition are Donna L. DeCarolis and Dennis W. Elsenbeck, both members of the state’s Climate Action Council established by the CLCPA.

The Coalition petition provides a description of each of its members

Independent Intervenor Filing

For comparison purposes I will describe the Independent Intervenor filing submitted on August 12, 2025, first. My first post described our main argument and the second post described the supporting exhibits. In brief, Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. We argued the hearing was necessary because of the significant increase in arrears threshold has been exceeded.

Independent Intervenors – Affordability

Exhibit 3 – Affordability-Focused Recommendations documents references to affordability and reliability recommendations in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) Document and Matter Management (DMM) System. Rather than wading through the system I acknowledge the use of Perplexity (https://www.perplexity.ai/) to generate summaries and references included in the document.

The Perplexity summary provided the following key takeaway:

Since 2022, at least six concrete safeguards have been proposed in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) record to keep the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act affordable for households and businesses. They call for (1) rigorous public cost reporting, (2) objective “safety-valve” triggers under Public Service Law §66-p(4), (3) systematic pursuit of alternative funding, (4) expansion of low-income bill-protection programs, (5) transparent data dashboards, and (6) stricter benefit-cost and rate-design standards.

In my opinion, these safeguards haven’t been implemented well enough to ensure affordability. There has been no DPS staff response to any of the calls to develop affordability triggers.

Independent Intervenors – Reliability

The biggest unresolved reliability risk associated with Climate Act implementation is addressed in Case 15-E-0302 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Implement a Large-Scale Renewable Program and Clean Energy Standard. Responsible New York agencies all agree that new Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR) technologies are needed to make a solar and wind-reliant electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability.

Two exhibits addressed these reliability concerns. To adequately address the amount of DEFR required it is necessary to determine how much is needed. Exhibit 4 – Resource Gap Characterization describes the challenges of defining the frequency, duration, and intensity of low wind and solar resource availability (known as dark doldrums) events. One fundamental flaw in the Climate Act is the mistaken belief by the authors of the law that existing wind, solar, and energy storage resources would be sufficient and that no new technology would be required. Exhibit 5 – Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources explains that this presumption is not correct. There is a need for a resource that is not currently commercially available. This reliance on unknown solutions risks investments in false solutions and poses significant reliability risks.

Coalition Filing

The Coalition petition states:

The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council (hereinafter referred to as the “Coalition”), hereby petitions the New York State Public Service Commission to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.

The preceding statement includes a footnote referencing the Independent Intervenor filing and another regulatory action that argued a heating was appropriate. The Coalition lays out the basic argument:

This Petition seeks Commission action authorized by the CLCPA. Recent evidence suggests that the Renewable Energy Program, and its associated renewable energy targets, may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service and upset the necessary balance of reliable, economic and sustainable energy in New York State. This evidence justifies commencement of the hearing process in PSL § 66-p (4), which will allow the Commission to determine whether the temporary suspension or modification of the Renewable Energy Program obligations is necessary to ensure the continued provision of safe and adequate electric service. Further, the Coalition believes that any hearing held pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) should examine the relationship between Renewable Energy Program costs and customer arrears.

The Executive Summary provides an excellent overview of the status of Climate Act implementation.

The CLCPA set extraordinarily ambitious targets for renewable energy generation in New York State, requiring that by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems and that by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. Recent data from the Commission demonstrates that New York will not achieve – or even come close to achieving – the 70% target by 2030. In addition, recent developments at the federal level impacting clean energy are likely to have a negative impact on renewable energy in the near term. With respect to the target of zero emissions by 2040, the necessary emission-free generation resources are not currently available at commercial scale. The inability of New York to develop the amount of renewable energy generation necessary to meet the 70% target by 2030, the increasing retirement of aging fossil-fuel generators due to the CLCPA, and the uncertainty surrounding the development of resources necessary to meet the zero emissions target by 2040, presents a reliability concern.

This concern is exacerbated by the fact that it may take more than two times the amount of certain forms of renewable generation to make up for the loss of one megawatt of fossil-fuel generation, and by expected increases in electric demand driven by the combination of new large loads and electrification.

Pursuant to the PSL, the Commission is required to ensure the provision of “safe and adequate” electric service. Renewable energy development has not kept pace with generator retirements, which has resulted in declining reliability margins across New York, jeopardizing electric reliability and safe and adequate service. In recognition that the Renewable Energy Program might negatively impact electric reliability, the CLCPA includes a safeguard that allows the Commission to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the program, after a hearing, if it makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service. Given recent evidence regarding delayed renewable energy generation and risks to reliability, the Commission should hold a hearing pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) to determine whether safe and adequate electric service in New York is impeded by the Renewable Energy Program and, if so, to appropriately modify or suspend the program’s obligations.

Discussion

Both filings argue that the PSC should convene a hearing to determine whether it is appropriate to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the Climate Act. The Independent Intervenors argued that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded. The Coalition makes a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.

The other difference is that the Independent Intervenors represent the views of four individuals whose credibility lies in our technical expertise. The Coalition consists primarily of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state whose credibility is based on its political and economic clout.

Hopefully, the Coalition filing for a hearing will engender a response from the PSC. There has been no hint of a response to the Independent Intervenor filing. Perhaps the Coalition represents too big a constituency to ignore.

Some may say that the Coalition position is economically self-interested and therefore should be discounted. They could also argue that the Independent Intervenors are not qualified to speak. I think I can speak for both parties when I say we believe our concerns have never been openly discussed and addressed by the Hochul Administration. All we want is the chance to make our case for the need to define affordability and reliability metrics that ensure safe, affordable, and adequate service.

Conclusion

I am encouraged that there is another group making similar arguments that the time has come to convene a hearing. All my attempts have failed but maybe the Coalition will succeed in getting the PSC to convene a hearing.

My New York State 2026 RGGI Operating Plan Amendment Comments

I submitted comments on the 2025 Operating Plan Amendment (“Amendment”) for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This is the sixth time I have comments on Operating Plan amendments and this post summarizes my latest submittal.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Factsheet). It has been a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector since 2008. New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021 but has since withdrawn, and Pennsylvania recently decided not to join. According to a RGGI website:

The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances that are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs.

Proceeds were invested in programs including energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy, beneficial electrification, greenhouse gas abatement and climate change adaptation, and direct bill assistance. Energy efficiency continued to receive the largest share of investments.

NYSERDA Operating Plan

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) designed and implemented a process to develop and annually update an Operating Plan which summarizes and describes the initiatives to be supported by RGGI auction proceeds. The latest Draft RGGI Operating Plan Amendment explains that

New York State uses RGGI proceeds to promote and implement programs for energy efficiency, renewable or non-carbon emitting technologies, and innovative carbon emissions abatement technologies with significant carbon reduction potential, in accordance with 21 NYCRR Part 507 and in compliance with the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).

This year, consistent with authorized RGGI uses, and to highlight the link between RGGI programmatic investments and core state priorities, we have organized our RGGI programmatic investments in terms of four themes, which are the following:

Affordability: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on creating affordable, efficient, healthy, and comfortable homes and workplaces by deploying commercially available energy efficiency, building electrification, and renewable energy technologies.

Energy abundance, diversity, and reliability: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on understanding and building out diverse energy options, including responsible renewable generation and storage, as well as modernizing energy system infrastructure, planning, and markets.

Energy innovation and economic development: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on supporting economic growth and competitiveness, including enabling job, tax revenue, and supply chain growth; stimulating entrepreneurship and company growth in New York; and expanding public-private partnerships and investments.

Thriving communities and environments: The programmatic investments under this theme focus on helping New Yorkers equitably participate and share in the benefits of the clean energy future; ensuring the energy transition provides meaningful benefits to local communities and disadvantaged communities; and improving climate resiliency and adaptation and public and environmental health.

Investment Priorities and RGGI Compliance

As far as I can tell I have submitted comments on six amendments to the Operating Plan. Given my decades-long emission and allowance reporting responsibilities in the electric sector, it is not surprising that the primary concern in all my comments has been related to compliance obligations. In my opinion, NYSERDA ignores the fact that RGGI is not just a pot of money to exploit but is at its core a pollution control program that includes compliance obligations for electric generating units in the program. This year is particularly important because of the more stringent RGGI caps proposed in the 6 NYCRR Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program amendments that I discussed recently.

The compliance challenge is illustrated in Figure 1. Relative to the three baseline years before RGGI started New York RGGI emission are down 33%. The primary reason for the observed reduction is due to fuel switching from coal and oil to natural gas. I believe that the fuel price differential for natural gas use was much greater than the added cost of RGGI allowances, so the main driver of the observed reductions was economic fuel switching. Also note that this option is not available anymore.

Figure 1: New York State Emissions by Fuel Type

NYSERDA RGGI Funding Emission Savings

The estimated emission savings from historical NYSERDA investments are described in the Semi-Annual Status Report through December 2024. The description states that:

This report is prepared pursuant to the State’s RGGI Investment Plan (2024 Operating Plan) and provides an update on the progress of programs through the quarter ending December 31, 2024. It contains an accounting of program spending; an estimate of program benefits; and a summary description of program activities, implementation, and evaluation. An amendment providing updated program descriptions and funding levels for the 2024 version of the Operating Plan was approved by NYSERDA’s Board in January 2025.

Table 1 is a copy of Table 1 in the latest full-year Semi-Annual Status Report. It summarizes the effectiveness of the NYSERDA investments and lists expected cumulative portfolio benefits including emissions savings.

Table 1. Summary of Expected Cumulative Portfolio Benefits through December 31, 2024

Comparison of NYSERDA Cumulative Emissions Savings to Observed Emission Reductions

Table 2 presents the relevant data to compare the observed reductions and NYSERDA RGGI investment emission savings. I list the last five years of data starting in 2019 when the emissions went up because of the closure of Indian Point. Reductions from the 2006-2008 average baseline are listed. The emissions savings listed are cumulative annual emissions. If the RGGI proceeds were invested, then the total emissions would be higher by the amount of the savings. The total cumulative annual emission savings through the end of 2023 is only 1,976,101 tons and that represents a reduction of 4.2% from the pre-RGGI baseline. Emission reductions by fuel type clearly show that fuel switching is the primary cause of reductions.

Table 2: NY Electric Generating Unit Emissions, NYSERDA GHG Emission Savings from RGGI Investments, and Emissions by Fuel Type

New York RGGI Program Investment Reductions

Another finding that has been ignored or possibly covered up by NYSERDA is the poor emission reduction cost effectiveness of NYSERDA investments. Table 3 lists data from Semi-Annual Status Report through December 2024 Table 2. The report presents “expected quantifiable benefits related to carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) reductions, energy savings, and participant energy bill savings with expended and encumbered funds” but I only considered the CO2e reductions. Note that the emission savings evaluated in the report include carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide that are not included in RGGI. I did not use “lifetime” savings data because I am trying to compare the RGGI program benefits emission savings reductions to the RGGI compliance metric of an annual emission cap. Lifetime reductions are clearly irrelevant. The observed cost per ton of emissions savings is $583.

Table 3: RGGI Funding Status Report Table 2: Summary of Total Expected Cumulative Annual Program Benefits

Program Benefit Impacts on RGGI

I categorized programs relative to RGGI compliance obligation support based on the Semi-Annual Status Report through December 2024. The table breaks down the program allocations and expected annualized CO2 savings for three categories: direct reductions to RGGI sources, indirect reductions, and those programs that will increase electric generating emissions. An example of a program that increases RGGI emissions is NYSERDA’s Clean Transportation Program that “has been pursuing five strategies to promote EV adoption by consumers and fleets across New York”. The emission reductions claimed are from decreased internal combustion engine vehicles, so the reductions do not reflect reductions in RGGI electric generating units. In addition, increased electricity for charging will require RGGI facilities to operate more thus increasing their emissions.

The results in the Funding Status reports summarized in Table 4 show that since the start of the program NYSERDA has allocated $101.6 million to programs that directly reduce utility emissions achieving emission savings of 202,422 tons, $1,007.6 million for programs that indirectly reduce utility emissions savings by 1,634,000 tons, and $178.5 million for programs that will increase utility emissions by 395,152 tons. When emissions savings from non-RGGI sources are removed, total savings are 1,827,575 tons instead of 2,221,757.

Table 4: Summary of Expected Cumulative Annualized Program Benefits through 31 December 2024 for Programs that Directly, Indirectly, or Do Not Affect RGGI CO2 Emissions

Reduction Potentials

I evaluated the potential effectiveness of the proposed funding allocations relative to RGGI compliance support. I reviewed each proposed program and classified each program into six categories of potential RGGI source emission reductions. The first three categories covered programs that directly, indirectly or could potentially decrease RGGI-affected source emissions. I also included a category for programs that will add load that could potentially increase RGGI source emissions such as programs to incentivize electrification. The two other categories considered programs that do not affect emissions and administrative costs respectively.

The results are in Table 5. The first three categories cover programs that directly, indirectly, or could potentially decrease RGGI-affected source emissions and account for 53% of investments which is up sharply from the 2025 Amendment which only allotted 31% of the investments. This positive development occurred because Empower+ funding doubled and the Retrofit Challenges Programs funding increased sharply. Programs that will add load that could potentially increase RGGI source emissions and whose emissions savings are unrelated to the electric sector total 20% of the investments. Programs that do not affect emissions are funded with 18% of the proceeds and administrative costs total another 9%. The increased preference for funding that could reduce RGGI emissions is a good development. On the other hand, Administration costs are 8.8% of the total and programs that have nothing to do with emissions total 18%. In my opinion, those are programs that should be funded from other sources.

Table 5: Potential for RGGI Reductions for Funding Allocations for 2025 Operating Plan Amendments

RGGI Compliance Summary

Figure 1 shows that no further fuel switching emission reductions are available. Affected sources have no remaining options to comply with RGGI mandates other than limiting operations. Future emission reductions are only possible if zero-emission resources displace the generation of RGGI-affected sources. However, there is a complicating factor that makes emphasis on reducing RGGI-affected emissions more important. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) recently announced revisions to 6 NYCRR Part 242 – CO2 Budget Trading Program the regulation that sets the New York RGGI allowance cap.

Comparison of the revised cap starting in 2027 with the New York State Energy Plan shows that in 2029 projected emissions are double the RGGI cap. Table 10 lists projections starting in 2027 that range from 49.3 to 40.3 MMT. The 2023 observed emissions from RGGI sources was 28.7 MMT. Table 6 lists the proposed RGGI cap or limit on tons of CO2 permitted. There is a big difference between the Pathways Analysis projection and the RGGI cap. There are some mitigating factors because of the Climate Act accounting methodology, but I believe that the Pathways Analysis emissions are well more than the cap.

Table 6: Comparison of RGGI Proposed Part 242 Cap and State Energy Plan Pathways Analysis Electric Power Scenario Projections

Discussion

My primary concern is that RGGI is an electric sector emissions reduction program. I have shown that the observed electric sector emission trends indicate that the observed reductions occurred because of fuel switching from coal and oil to natural gas and that there are no more fuel switching opportunities. Therefore, programs that materially decrease electric sector emissions directly or indirectly through energy use reductions should be a priority because affected sources have no other compliance options. There are programs in the amendment that do not meet these criteria. It is only appropriate to fund the non-priority programs if sufficient funding has been allocated to make the emission reductions necessary to meet RGGI compliance mandates.

These results should be used to determine funding priorities. There are significant differences in the expected emission reductions for different programs and that should also be considered when allocating revenues. While the fraction of funding allocations that could potentially decrease RGGI source emissions has gone up I think that more emphasis is needed to assure compliance and avert compliance problems.

Conclusion

NYSERDA has treated RGGI allowance auction revenues as a convenient slush fund totaling 18% of total funding for whatever politically connected program needs money. As a result, investments that reduce emissions and support those most impacted by increased costs received less funding.