Category: Climate Act Cap & Invest

Paul Fundingsland has been sending me his thoughts on the implementation of Washington State’s experiences with their cap-and-invest scheme.  His latest correspondence points to a local news article that confirms our suspicions that companies will simply pass additional costs on to their consumers. Furthermore, the companies will not be allowed to clearly explain why the costs are going up.

Paul describes himself as “An Obsessive Climate Change Generalist”.   Although he is a retired professor, he say he has no scientific or other degrees specific to these kinds of issues that can be cited as offering personal official expertise or credibility. What he does have is a two decades old avid, enthusiastic, obsession with all things Climate Change related. 

New York Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act  

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan recommendations were finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations are supposed to be implemented through regulation and legislation.  New York’s cap-and-invest program is supposed to address one of those recommendations.

The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) has developed an official website for cap and invest.  It states:

An economywide Cap-and-Invest Program will establish a declining cap on greenhouse gas emissions, limit potential costs to New Yorkers, invest proceeds in programs that drive emission reductions in an equitable manner, and maintain the competitiveness of New York businesses and industries. Cap-and-Invest will ensure the state meets the greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements set forth in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

Washington Climate Commitment Act

Washington’s Climate Commitment Act appears to be even more aspirational than California or New York.  The Washington Department of Ecology (“Ecology”) web page explains:

The Climate Commitment Act (CCA) caps and reduces greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from Washington’s largest emitting sources and industries, allowing businesses to find the most efficient path to lower carbon emissions. This powerful program works alongside other critical climate policies to help Washington achieve its commitment to reducing GHG emissions by 95% by 2050.

The state plans in Washington, California, and New York all aim for net-zero emissions where greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are equal to the amount of GHG that are removed.  Washington’s emission reduction target is 95% by 2050.  California is shooting for 85% by 2045 while New York’s target is 85% by 2050 but covers the whole economy.  In addition to the target levels and dates there are differences in what GHG emissions are included, how the mass quantities are calculated, and which sectors of the economy must comply.  Nonetheless, I am sure a case can be made that Washington is the most aspirational.

According to the Washington State Department of Ecology description of their cap-and-invest program:

In 2021, the Washington Legislature passed the Climate Commitment Act (or CCA) which establishes a comprehensive, market-based program to reduce carbon pollution and achieve the greenhouse gas limits set in state law. The program started on Jan. 1, 2023, and the first emissions allowance auction was held on Feb. 28.

Businesses covered by the program must obtain allowances equal to their emissions and submit them to Ecology according to a staggered four-year compliance schedule. The first compliance deadline is Nov. 1, 2024, at which time businesses need to have allowances to cover just 30% of their 2023 emissions.

Washington State Implementation

I published several articles (Washington State Gasoline Prices Are a Precursor to New York’s Future, Do Washington State Residents Know Why Their Gasoline Prices Are So High Now?, and Washington State Gasoline Prices and Public Perceptions) about the experiences of Washington State as they implement their cap-and-invest program because I think it is likely that New York’s experiences will be similar.   I posted material by Paul based on his  “bit of research with some comments, thoughts and a more or less rough idea of what seems to be going on in the Washington State cap-and-invest scheme” that addressed the impact of their cap-and-invest scheme on gasoline prices.  Subsequently he wrote up more research results in a second article.  He concluded:

At the end of the day, the goal of any meaningful, measurable reduction of CO2 emissions or theoretical effective pathway to stop “climate change” looks to become a glazed over afterthought in this quagmire of a Washington State bureaucratic money-making machine. 

With this scheme, Washington State Government now joins the lucrative profit side of the climate industrial complex at the expense of its constituents while giving a completely different connotation to the term “Net Zero”.

In this post Fundingsland provides another update. I provide his thoughts with my commentary below.

Cap and Hidden Tax

Earlier this year I described the book Making Climate Policy Work that shows how the politics of creating and maintaining market-based policies render them ineffective nearly everywhere they have been applied.  Despite these warning signs these programs are much in favor.  Washington’s program began this year and the cost signals are showing up.  Fundingsland writes:

Here is a local news update example on how Washington’s “Cap & Invest” (Tax & Reallocate) scheme is currently functioning. Natural Gas company Puget Sound Energy (PSE) just announced a 3% rate price hike due to their mandated “Cap & Invest” auction allowance costs. 

Just as surmised, the companies required to participate in the auction allowances are simply passing these costs to their bottom line along to their customers. In essence, the State taxes the company and the company taxes its customers. 

I believe that New York utilities asked the Public Service Commission to include cost details for state mandated programs.  Not surprisingly that request was denied.  The same thing is playing out in Washington.  Fundingsland explains what is happening and the ramifications:

What makes this particular example more disgusting than usual is the fact that PSE wanted to simply include a line item on the customer’s bill identifying this cost but the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (UTC) actually made it illegal to do so claiming that would make for a “lengthy confusing” bill. 

I just looked at my latest PSE bill. It has only three line items for charges: Electric Charges, Natural Gas Charges and Total Charges. There is plenty of room for one more line item called “Cap & Invest” charges. 

There are rightful allegations that preventing PSE from including this one line item is deceptive, dishonest, lacks transparency, and smacks of censorship while giving the perception that PSE is just raising the prices to gouge their customers to make more money. 

Contradictorily UTC requires PSE to include in their bills extra line item charges and credits beneficial to some of their customers such as “carbon reduction credits”, whatever those are.

In other words, UTC would have us believe adding one factual consumer financially detrimental line item to the bill would make it lengthy and confusing but adding beneficial line items for some consumers to the same bill would not. This reeks of deliberately deceptive, opaque practices.

Paragraph 19 under “Discussion and Decision” from DOCKET UG-230470 Order 01

“Second, we agree with Public Counsel that PSE should not include the proposed “carbon reduction charge” as a line item on customer bills. Public Counsel correctly observes that including all program charges on customer bills would quickly result in lengthy and confusing bills. Additionally, only those charges or credits that inure to the benefit of customers should be included as line items on customer bills. For that reason, we require the Company to include the “carbon reduction credit on customer bills, which will also signal an economic incentive for consumers to reduce their own carbon emissions.”

There is plenty of room on the PSE bill for all the line items deemed necessary to give customers a fair, comprehensive, transparent understanding of what all the charges and credits are. I’m sure any number of PSE employees or their junior high school aged kids possess the necessary skills to successfully modify the look of their one page bill in less than an hour including all the pertinent line items making it factual, legible, understandable and transparent.

New York State has prevented transparent pricing for previous government mandates.  They are unlikely to start clearly admitting the costs for the New York Cap-and-Invest boondoggle now.  The similarities to Washington are clear.  Paul writes:

It’s fairly obvious that UTC is aggressively censoring the fact that the “Cap & Invest” scheme is costing Washington State PSE customers money. 

This fits right in with our Governor’s claim that the recent jump in Washington State gasoline prices has nothing to do with the “Cap & Invest” scheme. Rather it is just big oil gouging the public. In fact these companies are just pragmatically passing along the business costs of their state mandated financial participation in “auction allowance purchases” to their customers just like PSE is doing. 

PSE is only one company among the multitude in Washington State that has been forced to purchase “emission allowances”. There are most many more stories involving these companies simply making the most logically, sensible, efficient business adjustment when they are confronted with additional mandated costs to their bottom line: just pass their added costs on to their consumers. 

Fundingsland concludes:

It just got more expensive to live in Washington State. And based on how this “Cap & Invest” scheme is actually playing out in the real world, it looks like this scheme will continue to make it more expensive with each passing year.

The original idea that this scheme would significantly reduce CO2 emissions is turning out to be just another way for the State Government to extract considerable monies from the general public, sweeping those monies into their coffers by washing it through companies who have been forced to buy emission allowances and are merely passing along their state mandated costs while rendering an imperceptible if any reduction of emissions.

Discussion

The Climate Act requires the Public Service Commission (PSC) to provide a summary of the implementation status.  In July the first annual informational report was published but there hasn’t been a lot of coverage.  This report notes that Climate Act costs that have been authorized and were in the 2022 residential bills total $1.2 billion.  The Report notes that in 2022 the costs already associated with the Climate Act increased the Upstate residential monthly electric bills 7.6% or $7.15 per month for NYSE&G customers; 7.7% or $7.54 for RG&E customers; and 9.8% or $9.38 for Niagara Mohawk customers.   The report does not attempt to project future ratepayer costs of the authorized Climate Act funding to date that total another $43.8 billion so this is just the start of expected costs.    There is no comparison between the transparency that putting this specific information on ratepayer bills relative to burying it in an obscure PSC proceeding.  This approach also reeks of deliberately deceptive, opaque practice.

I have not been able to keep up with all the cost increase news associated with the net zero transition.  The New York Post notes that “In a fresh sign that New York’s state climate agenda is pure fantasy, contractors key to making good on a major piece of the so-called plan just filed to charge 54% more to build their offshore wind farms. “  I have heard that other projects are also saying that inflation and supply chain issues means that they too need more money.  These are all costs that show up in ratepayer bills as part of the delivery component.  The cap-and-invest costs will show up in the supply component and we have no idea how much that will be.  The only thing that I am sure of is that the Hochul Administration will go to great lengths to hide the cause of the inevitable increased costs and blame the innocent just like Washington State regulators are doing.

Conclusion

I am grateful to Fundingsland for his research and commentary on the rollout of the Washington State cap-and-invest program.  Everything that is happening there will very likely happen here.  He notes that “It just got more expensive to live in Washington State”.  That is the inevitable outcome in New York too.

One of the planned implementation components of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is a cap-and-invest program that sets a price on Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions.  The first round of stakeholder comments were due in early July and this post provides an update on the process. There also is another upcoming advocacy dogma and reliability conundrum that must be addressed.  I recently noted that the retirement of peaking power plants is considered non-negotiable by environmental justice advocates but those facilities are needed for electric system reliability.  The same advocates are demanding removal of certain components that are in every emissions trading program variation, such as the New York cap-and-invest, that must be included or the claimed affordability and cost-effectiveness benefits will not be produced.

I have been following the Climate Act since it was first proposed. I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 350 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  I have extensive experience with air pollution control theory, implementation, and evaluation having worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including the Acid Rain Program, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs since the inception of those programs. I follow and write about the RGGI cap and invest CO2 pollution control program so my background is particularly suited for the cap-and-invest plan.   I have devoted a lot of time to the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and an interim 2030 target of a 40% reduction by 2030. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric grid with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan.  After a year-long review the Scoping Plan recommendations were finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations are supposed to be implemented through regulation and legislation.  The cap and invest initiative is one of those recommendations.

The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and NYSERDA have developed an official website for cap and invest.  It states:

An economywide Cap-and-Invest Program will establish a declining cap on greenhouse gas emissions, limit potential costs to New Yorkers, invest proceeds in programs that drive emission reductions in an equitable manner, and maintain the competitiveness of New York businesses and industries. Cap-and-Invest will ensure the state meets the greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements set forth in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

I have written other articles that provide background on NYCI.  I recently posted a Commentary overview for the New York Cap & Invest (NYCI) program that was written for a non-technical audience. In late March I summarized my previous articles on the New York cap and invest proposal in a post designed to brief politicians about the proposal if you want more technical information.  There also is a page that describes all my carbon pricing initiatives articles that includes a section listing articles about the New York Cap and Invest (NYCI) proceeding.

NYCI Status

Recently there was an update on the status of the NYCI process at the Equity & Climate Justice Roundtable (Equity and Climate Justice Roundtable Presentation [PDF] and Session Recording).  Jonathan Binder showed the regulation development timeline that shows that DEC is near the end of the “assess input and develop pre-proposal phase” shown in the slide below.  I think there are two takeaways from this update. To date DEC has not given any indication of any particulars regarding implementation and there will be an opportunity to provide comments on the preproposal details.  This is important because once the official regulatory proposal is released the agencies can no longer discuss the contents.  The other point is that this timeline confirms that there is no way this program is going to be issued this year.  Binder said the goal is to have revenue coming in during 2025.

In June DEC hosted a series of webinars designed to spur discussion and get input on specific questions.  The comments received are available and now DEC is assessing the input.  After giving an overview of the general plans Binder described what they have heard in the comments.  His presentation listed the following points that they have been hearing from environmental justice, climate justice, and equity-related shareholders.  Note that there was no substantive discussion of the following in the presentation:

• Prohibit or limit emissions trading solutions
• Set caps with timetables
• Minimize cost, emissions, and other impacts on DACs
• Ensure adequate investments
• Ensure emission reductions are verifiable & enforceable
• Track GHG and co-pollutant emissions from all sources
• Provide transparent demonstration of emissions and investments
• Ensure Disadvantaged Community representation in oversight and program review
• Consider burdens and job impacts on businesses located in or near DACs

In addition. he noted that stakeholders had proposed the following recommended steps:

1. Identify stakeholder groups
2. Establish robust communication
3. Implement target programs based on stakeholder feedback
4. Track and measure progress
5. Conduct regular reviews

The primary point I want to make in this post is that there are tradeoffs that I do not think the environmental justice, climate justice, and equity-related shareholders understand.  Binder mentioned that stakeholder expectation setting is important but the rhetoric of these stakeholders is at odds with that goal.  Binder emphasized that DEC is trying to prioritize disadvantaged community (DAC) concerns saying that they need to “ensure emission reductions are prioritized in DACs while also:

•            Raising revenue to adequately fund investments into DACs,
•            Keeping high quality jobs and businesses available within DACs, and
•            Decreasing energy burden and maintaining reliability.

He went on to summarize a few of the specific regulatory provisions and options being considered.  He said the following are under consideration:

• Prohibit DAC sources from purchasing allowances from outside of the DAC.
  • Set source specific caps on DAC sources (declining caps)
  • Require DAC sources to surrender allowances at some multiple of GHG emissions rather than 1:1

He did note that there have been requests to prohibit allowance trading but that DEC expects that  there will be some allowance trading.  Allowance trading is a key to ensure “overall affordability and cost effectiveness of the program”.

Emissions Market Program Overview

Earlier this year I published an overview of cap-and-invest programs and the proposed New York program.  I concluded that New York policy makers have glommed on to Cap and Invest because they think it is a solution that will easily provide revenues  and compliance certainty.  Unfortunately, that presumption is based on poor understanding of market-based emissions programs.  The reality is that successful programs used emissions reduction strategies that are not available in the quantity or quality necessary for New York to meet its emission targets.

The deference being given to environmental justice, climate justice, and equity-related shareholders further endangers any hopes that the program will work. The proposed New York Cap-and-Invest policy is a type of an emission trading pollution control program.  EPA explains that:

Emissions trading programs have two key components: a limit (or cap) on pollution, and tradable allowances equal to the limit that authorize allowance holders to emit a specific quantity (e.g., one ton) of the pollutant. This limit ensures that the environmental goal is met and the tradable allowances provide flexibility for individual emissions sources to set their own compliance path. Because allowances can be bought and sold in an allowance market, these programs are often referred to as “market-based”.

Points Heard

In this section I will address the environmental justice, climate justice, and equity-related shareholders points that DEC has been hearing. 

At the top of the list was  “prohibit or limit emissions trading solutions”.  Binder did note that DEC expects that there will be some allowance trading.  EPA notes that this is a key component of any market-based program.  Binder admitted that allowance trading is a key to ensure “overall affordability and cost effectiveness of the program”.  Obviously if there is no trading then this cannot be called a cap-and-invest program and it won’t work as expected.

The suggestion that there will be “some” trading necessarily means that there will be “some” limitations.  One slide notes that the following are under consideration:

• Prohibit DAC sources from purchasing allowances from outside of the DAC.
• Set source specific caps on DAC sources (declining caps)
• Require DAC sources to surrender allowances at some multiple of GHG emissions rather than 1:1

It is one thing to consider these options but it is an entirely different thing to implement any of them.  For starters note that there are several thousand DACs.   In order to prohibit DAC sources from purchasing allowances from outside of the DAC it would be necessary to label the ownership of each allowance which is unprecedented.  Setting source specific caps on DAC sources is another can of worms; what basis for each cap would be used and would there be different caps for different sectors within the DAC.  A requirement that DAC sources would have to surrender allowances at some multiple of GHG emissions rather than 1:1 sounds simple enough but the unintended consequences on the market would be immense.  In my opinion implementing something to address these options would necessitate an independent market for each DAC.  That way you could limit trading from outside the DAC, set source specific caps, and structure the market to address the multiple surrender concept.   However, given that there are several thousand DACs this clearly is not workable.

There are unappreciated problems associated with setting caps with timetables.  I have previously written about setting caps that do not account for potential strategies for making the reductions.  In other programs such as the EPA Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) the cap was set based on historical emissions, existing control technology, and potential improvements or additions for all the sources in the CSAPR-affected states.  The CSAPR cap was determined using this control technology evaluation to set a feasible limit.  The NYCI will be a binding cap set by the Climate Act mandates that did not include any such feasibility evaluation.  GHG emissions are closely associated with energy use so a NYCI binding cap essentially limits energy use.

Another of the recommendations heard was to “minimize cost, emissions, and other impacts on DACs”.  I think this is a general goal that should apply  to the entire state.  The tradeoff between trying to address past injustices while meeting these goals will be challenging. 

The “ensure adequate investments” recommendations is important.  In order to address it the first thing needed is to define what to fund.  Presumably, the priority is providing the funds necessary to implement the control strategies necessary to make the emission reductions.  The Hochul Administration must provide an estimate of how much these investments will cost in order determine how much money must be raised by the Cap-and-Invest program.  If the investments are insufficient then the energy system will fail to meet the cap limits.  Also needed is a feasibility analysis for the transition schedule that considers supply chain and trained labor constraints.  Even if the money is available, it may not be possible to build it fast enough to meet the arbitrary CLCPA schedule.

There are several recommendations that are all characterized by a lack of understanding of what regulatory requirements are already in place.  The “ensure emission reductions are verifiable & enforceable”; “track GHG and co-pollutant emissions from all sources”; and “provide transparent demonstration of emissions and investments” all fall into this category.  There are regulations in place such that affected sources report GHG and co-pollutant emissions that are verifiable and enforceable and in the case of power plant emissions the CO2 data are completely transparent.  The whole economy requirements of the Climate Act mean that additional reporting will be necessary.  I agree that transparency for emissions and investments is important and have recommended that in my comments.

I do not disagree that the program should “ensure Disadvantaged Community representation in oversight and program review”.  Unfortunately, from what I have observed to date, environmental justice, climate justice, and equity-related shareholders believe this means that they get to set the policies.  They should have a voice but their unconditional demands have no place in the development of a pragmatic program.  Simply put there are tradeoffs that must be incorporated in a rational program.

The Bider presentation emphasized the need to “ensure emission reductions are prioritized in DACs while also: “keeping high quality jobs and businesses available within DACs, and “decreasing energy burden and maintaining reliability”.  These are related to the last recommendation, “consider burdens and job impacts on businesses located in or near DACs”.  These statements exemplify my concern about tradeoffs.   All of the proposed trading limitations mentioned above necessarily impact businesses located in or near DACs and would increase the costs to do business relative to the costs of businesses outside of DACs.  How can those affected businesses keep high quality jobs and stay in business when confronted with extra costs inherent in the allowance limitations?

There is another aspect of the emphasis on emissions within DACs that is apparently not recognized by the environmental justice, climate justice, and equity-related shareholders.  While emissions are related to the air quality impacts in a particular location, there are other factors that affect impacts.  Air quality is determined by the transport and diffusion of emissions.  At any one time, the wind direction determines which areas are impacted while the state of the atmosphere (stable or otherwise) and the characteristics of the emissions (height of release, type of release (stack or over an area), and temperature of the effluent determines how much of an impact is observed.  Importantly, there are laws in place that ensure that all sources consider these factors when proving compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards.  It is unclear how these stakeholders can be placated in this regard.

Discussion

I do not think that NYCI is going to live up to the expectations of its proponents.   This program is supposed to provide funding for Climate Act implementation and ensure compliance with the Climate Act emission targets.  Earlier this year I described the book Making Climate Policy Work that shows how the politics of creating and maintaining market-based policies render them ineffective nearly everywhere they have been applied.  I think that proponents of NYCI should read that book to understand what needs to be done to make the proposed program work.

In my earlier post I noted that I agreed with the authors that the results of RGGI and other programs suggest that the NYCI will generate revenues.  However, we also agree that the amount of money needed for decarbonization is likely more than New Yorkers will accept.  The problem confronting the Administration is that in order to make the emission reductions needed they have to invest between $15.5 and $46.4 billion per year.  I don’t think that range is politically palatable.

The use of Cap and Invest as a compliance mechanism is more of a problem.  The Hochul Administration has not acknowledged or figured out that the emission reduction ambition of their Climate Act targets is inconsistent with technology reality.  Because GHG emissions are equivalent to energy use, limiting GHG emissions before there are technological solutions that provide zero-emissions energy means that compliance will only be possible by restricting energy use.  Unless a miracle occurs in 2030 when there are insufficient allowances someone must choose who gets to operate.

When the concerns of the environmental justice, climate justice, and equity-related shareholders are layered on top of these design flaws, the challenge to make a workable cap-and-invest program is increased.  I fear that the louder voices among these stakeholders will demand that their concerns be incorporated.  If that happens then I am sure that the program will fail.  Allowance costs will soar and those costs will get passed on to consumers disproportionally affecting the DACs.  If the insane idea to limit allowances within specific DACs is implemented then an artificial energy shortage within DACs is possible.

Conclusion

The New York cap-and-invest program is slowly coming together.  Implementation of something this complicated takes time (California took several years to set up their program) and must be developed by people with technical expertise.  Unfortunately, as was the case with the Scoping Plan development, the State’s approach is to excessively defer to ideologues with little relevant background experience. 

Consider this example from the Scoping Plan.  The Scoping Plan electric system recommendations rely on the ideological belief that existing technology is sufficient for the transition.  The Hochul Administration allowed a few ideologues to push that narrative despite conflicting information in the Integration Analysis and arguments from the New York Independent System Operator to the contrary.  The New York State Public Service Commission (PSC) recently initiated an “Order initiating a process regarding the zero-emissions target” that will “identify innovative technologies to ensure reliability of a zero-emissions electric grid” that recognizes a new technology that can be dispatched without generating emissions is necessary if the state is to not go nuclear.  Failing to acknowledge this requirement means that there is no “Plan B” if this new resource cannot be developed and deployed as needed to maintain the Climate Act schedule.

The Hochul Administration appears to be doing it again in the cap-and-invest process.  Presuming that past performance of emissions trading programs would be indicative of future reduction success and establishing an arbitrary emissions target that is incompatible with realistic emission reduction trajectories has established a very difficult challenge.  Addressing ideological concerns about emissions trading programs and trying to incorporate social justice concerns makes the challenge that much more difficult.  The environmental justice, climate justice, and equity-related shareholders are demanding removal of certain components that are in every emissions trading program and that were essential to past success.  Deferring to ideology rather than historical precedent can only end in failure.

In June 2023, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and New York State Energy Research & Development Authority hosted a series of webinars addressing Governor Hochul announced plan to use a market-based program to raise funds for the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  The webinars posed a number of questions for stakeholder comment.  This post describes my comments.

I submitted personal comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 320 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  I also follow and write about the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) market-based CO2 pollution control program for electric generating units in the NE United States.   Over the last three decades I have had extensive experience with air pollution control theory, implementation, and evaluation having worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including the Acid Rain Program, RGGI, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions from a 1990 baseline) by 2050 and an interim 2030 target of a 40% reduction by 2030. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric grid with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan.  After a year-long review the Scoping Plan recommendations were finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations are supposed to be implemented through regulation and legislation.  One of these initiatives is the cap and invest program.

According to the New York Cap and Invest (NYCI) website:

An economywide Cap-and-Invest Program will establish a declining cap on greenhouse gas emissions, limit potential costs to New Yorkers, invest proceeds in programs that drive emission reductions in an equitable manner, and maintain the competitiveness of New York businesses and industries. Cap-and-Invest will ensure the state meets the greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements set forth in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

NYCI Webinars

In June 2023 a series of webinars  was hosted by DEC and NYSERDA “to gather feedback on the program as we develop regulations to implement the Cap-and-Invest Program.”  They asked for responses to questions posed (compiled here) during the webinars by July 1.  However, that is not a hard deadline and they still are accepting comments.  I submitted comments that addressed the major topics but did not attempt to respond to individual questions. 

In a departure from the public comment process for the Draft Scoping Plan the invitation to provide comments on the development of the regulations is much more structured. DEC and NYSERDA developed a template document [PDF] to “assist commenters in providing feedback on these topics”.   Actually, this approach is being used to categorize responses from the public to assist the agencies documenting the comments received.  The comments go to a third-party vendor, Comment Management.  In my opinion, the submittal methodology also includes extensive requests for location, constituencies, and interests which I worry could be used to prioritize attention to the comments.  For example, in response to the question: Which of the following constituencies do you most closely identify with, the first three options are:  Environmental justice or underserved communities, Labor unions/union training centers and Environment or conservation advocates.  Consumer advocacy is not even mentioned and the three categories correspond to political constituencies that are a key demographic to Governor Hochul.  It is disappointing that there aren’t any questions related to experience and background.  As a result, I fear that even though the approach is different, the Hochul Administration is again merely going through the motions for public comment.  The answer is in the back of the book and no comments that run contrary to the pre-conceived notion of the Administration will be considered seriously.

I think this is a mistake.  The industry people I work with in the electric generating sector have more experience with emission marketing programs than anyone at the state agencies.  I know my colleagues had hoped that we could have some frank discussions about our experiences and concerns.  That has not happened and our requests for meetings have been ignored.  As part of the implementation and program review for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative a series of technical meetings were held that I believe led to a better product.  There is no sign that similar meetings are planned.  Personally, given what appears to be happening, there is very little incentive to provide detailed and referenced comments because I think they will simply be counting responses to specific questions by constituency and not by quality of the comments themselves. 

The following sections summarize my comments at a high level.  I submitted overarching comments and will follow up with more detail on my arguments in later posts.  This summary does not address my technical comments on the analysis inputs and methods.

NYCI Goals

I submitted overarching comments because I think that the Hochul Administration is not paying sufficient attention to what made previous emissions marketing programs work.  As a result, they are rushing ahead with implementation without considering fundamental issues.

The NYCI implementation plan is to “Advance an economywide Cap-and-Invest Program that establishes a declining cap on greenhouse gas emissions, limits potential costs to economically vulnerable New Yorkers, invests proceeds in programs that drive emission reductions in an equitable manner, and maintains the competitiveness of New York industries.”  These are political talking points and there will be significant consequences if the dynamics between these stated goals are not resolved.  In order to fund the control strategies necessary to reduce emissions on the schedule required by the Climate Act investments will be required.  The Hochul Administration has not admitted how much money will be needed but I believe that it is so large that the likely cost to “economically vulnerable New Yorkers” is incompatible with the idea that they will not be adversely impacted.  However, the Administration could pick a revenue target that is politically palatable but insufficient to fund the reductions needed.  If the emphasis is on equity rather than effective reductions then it is also possible that insufficient reductions will occur and the targets will not be met.  They can include all the politically correct language they want but in order to reduce the emissions necessary to meet the targets, then the costs will make New York industries uncompetitive with jurisdictions that do not have those requirements. There is no indication that tradeoffs between these goals are even being considered. 

There also is a scheduling problem.  Implementation of this sophisticated and complicated economy-wide program is handicapped by the aspirational legislative schedule constraints.  I understand that it took California five years with many more staff dedicated to the effort to implement their program.  New York is supposed to get this program in place by the end of the year and that is simply absurd.

If the influential book Making Climate Policy Work  had been considered by the Climate Action Council or Governor’s Office I believe that there would have been substantive changes to the plan.  Authors Danny Cullenward and David Victor show how the politics of creating and maintaining market-based policies render them ineffective nearly everywhere they have been applied.  They recognize the enormity of the challenge to transform industry and energy use on the scale necessary for deep decarbonization.  They write that the “requirements for profound industrial change are difficult to initiate, sustain, and run to completion.”  Because this is hard, they call for “realism about solutions.” 

I evaluated the Making Climate Policy Work analysis of RGGI.  I agree with the authors that the results of RGGI and other programs suggest that programs like the NYCI proposal will generate revenues.  However, we also agree that the amount of money needed for decarbonization is likely more than any such market can bear.  The problem confronting the Administration is that in order to make the emission reductions needed I estimate they have to invest between $15.5 and $46.4 billion per year.  The first fundamental issue that NYCI implementation must address is the revenue target relative to what is needed for investments to meet the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) 2030 GHG emission reduction target.  Without that information it is impossible to plan to implement the control strategies necessary to decarbonize New York.

The use of NYCI as a compliance mechanism is another problem.  The NYCI webinars have not acknowledged or figured out that the emission reduction ambition of the Climate Act targets is inconsistent with technological reality of the Climate Act schedule.  Because GHG emissions are equivalent to energy use, limiting GHG emissions before there are technological solutions that provide zero-emissions energy means that compliance will only be possible by restricting energy use.  It is essential that compliance enforcement consider this problem.  The second fundamental issue that NYCI implementation must address is a feasibility analysis whether there will be sufficient reductions to avoid limits on power plant operations, gasoline availability, and natural gas for residential use for the 2030 Climate Act 40% GHG emission reduction target.  

My comments also argued that there is no excuse to not consider changes to the schedule.  While the NYCI webinars have not acknowledged that there are relevant conditions relative to meeting the Climate Act targets, New York Public Service Law  § 66-p. “Establishment of a renewable energy program” has safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability that are directly related to the two issues described above.   § 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. 

Applicability and Thresholds

The webinars requested comments related to affected sources and what emissions thresholds sources should be covered by the regulations, who must report emissions and which entities must obtain and surrender allowances equal to their GHG emissions.  I made the point that regulatory obligations should be based on the potential for realistic and meaningful emission reductions.  For example, there is no realistic opportunity to replace aviation fuel for long-distance flights so the only option to reduce emissions is restricting flights.  I suggested excluding those emissions.  To their credit, the webinars did broach the subject of excluding various sectors.   The whole-economy target mandate of the Climate Act is inconsistent with the reality that there are limited financial resources such that it might be appropriate to phase in allowance obligations for sources based on the relative magnitude of emissions and the cost per ton reduced.

Allowance Allocations

The webinars asked how allowances should be allocated.  I commented that the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) provided most of the allowances through an auction system and concluded that because this aspect of RGGI works the NYCI proposal should be consistent with this aspect and any variations or exceptions to the RGGI allocation process should be avoided.

The webinars also asked for recommendations for rules in market and trading of allowances.  I am particularly concerned about comments made by environmental justice activists and environmental advocates on this topic. This economy-wide strategy is supposed to be a market-based program but the suggestions that limitations on trading and site-specific constraints in the Climate Action Council recommendations are incompatible with a market-based program. To on one hand claim the benefits of existing cap-and-invest programs but on the other hand to exclude the components that provided those benefits is a mistake.

The first component is trading.  The ability for market participants to buy, sell, or trade allowances is a prerequisite.  The RGGI Secondary Market Reports (e.g., Q1 2023) explain how the trading of physical allowances and financial derivatives, such as futures, forward, and option contracts, enable affected sources to manage risks and reduce costs to their customers.  If there is no trading then this is not an emissions market program,  it is simply a tax.

My second concern are the requests for site-specific constraints.  A prerequisite for a trading program is that it is designed to control pollutants that have regional or global impacts not local impacts.  The Climate Action Council and Climate Act emphasis on environmental justice in disadvantaged communities has raised the idea that NYCI can also be used to address local impacts.  In the first place there is no obvious way to limit allowance use for a particular area.  Allowances are not labelled for specific areas.   Excess allowance surrender proposals ignore the fact that air quality impacts are not solely based on emissions but also local transport and diffusion.  The poster child for this particular problem is a peaker power plant, but I have shown that the alleged peaker power plant problems are based on selective choice of metrics, poor understanding of air quality health impacts,  and ignorance of air quality trends. Power plants are not the only sources affecting dis-advantaged communities and it is not clear how, for example, transportation sector allowance requirements could be traced to any location.  I stated that there should be no site-specific constraints on allowances in NYCI.

This issue is most concerning in the context of the apparent approach for stakeholder comments.  I am convinced that there will be many comments from environmental justice activists and environmental advocates demanding limits on trading and requiring site-specific allowance constraints.  However strong the emotional attachment to those demands, the fact is that those constraints are incompatible with an emissions trading system.  If ten people argue the facts and thousands argue the emotions, it is likely that the Hochul Administration will simply use the numbers to establish the policy.

Program Ambition

The webinars requested input on the cap and the allowance budget for how many allowances will be available year-by-year to reach the Climate Act GHG limits. As noted in my discussion of the goals, I commented that NYCI implementation must should include a feasibility analysis to inform the allowance cap ambitions.    I also suggested that NYCI follow the approach used by RGGI wherever possible because that system has worked.  I made the point that the California Air Resources Board 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality (2022 Scoping Plan) that “lays out a path to achieve targets for carbon neutrality and reduce included an Uncertainty Analysis that addressed the feasibility issues I believe should be considered.

My primary interest is the electric energy system.  Because of its importance, I recommended that DEC and NYSERDA convene a panel to review electric grid reliability that includes the New York State Independent System Operator, New York State Reliability Council, Public Service Commission, and representatives from the generation and transmission industry.

Program Stability Mechanisms

The webinars asked for comments on automatic and planned program adjustments to moderate costs and sustain program ambition if emissions are higher or lower than anticipated.  RGGI has developed program adjustments and I recommended that similar adjustments be included in NYCI.

Compliance, Enforcement and Penalties

The webinars also asked for comments on compliance periods and types of enforcement mechanisms.  I suggested using a three-year compliance period because it addresses inter-annual variability.

There is an important consideration related to compliance mechanisms.  My analysis of the current state of emissions relative to the 2030 Climate Act goals leads me to believe that compliance with the arbitrary schedule is impossible.   The ultimate compliance strategy for any GHG emission limitation program is stop using fossil fuels.  If there is no replacement energy available that means that compliance will lead to an artificial energy shortage unless there is a safety valve or affected sources pay a penalty. 

If no safety valve is included then in order to prevent artificial energy shortages, the other option is for affected sources to pay penalties.  I recommended a penalty of two times the average cost of allowances over the compliance period.  That provides an incentive to meet the Climate Act target as opposed to creating an artificial energy shortage.  I said that any allowance surrender options will only exacerbate the allowance shortage so they should not be included.

Use of Proceeds

As noted in the first section, there is an unacknowledged dynamic between the use of proceeds for political goals and funding the control strategies necessary to make the required reductions.  The New York Independent System Operator has stated that the Climate Act net-zero transition is “driving the need for unprecedented levels of investment in new generation to achieve decarbonization and maintain system reliability”.  The first step for determining the use of the auction proceeds should be to provide an estimate of how much these investments will cost in order determine how much money must be raised by the Cap-and-Invest program.  If the investments are insufficient then the energy system will fail to meet the cap limits. 

Dedicating auction proceeds to the limiting potential costs to New Yorkers is a politically expedient goal.  However not only does it divert funding needed to reduce GHG emissions it also perversely discourages emissions reductions.  Higher energy costs are supposed to make changes to behavior that reduce emissions but rebates do not encourage those changes.

The Climate Act focus on environmental justice in disadvantaged communities’ mandates at least 35% of the proceeds be dedicated to those areas.  While this is entirely appropriate because the inevitable increased costs of the energy transition will have regressive impacts, it is also necessary to prioritize the investments to provide emission reductions.  Energy conservation and energy efficiency investments that reduce energy burdens for low- and middle- income citizens should be the priority for the disadvantaged  community revenues.

Emission reductions must be a priority or the oft-touted compliance certainty feature could cause artificial energy shortages

Conclusion

The allure of a source of revenues and compliance certainty using climate policies that apparently have worked in the past led the Council and Governor to put the cart before the horse.  The Cap-and-Invest Program recommended by the Climate Action Council’s final Scoping Plan and proposed in Governor Kathy Hochul’s 2023 State of the State Address and Executive Budget has not paid adequate attention to what made previous policies work and whether there are significant differences between the Climate Act requirements and previous policy goals in those other programs that might impact NYCI.  If the tradeoffs are not resolved then this program will do more harm than good.

I published Washington State Gasoline Prices Are a Precursor to New York’s Future a couple of days ago that was a variation of an article published at Watts Up With That – Do Washington State Residents Know Why Their Gasoline Prices Are So High Now?.  The Watts Up With That article asked for feedback from Washington residents about the cost impacts of this cap-and-invest program policy.

Recent reports note that gasoline prices in the State of Washington are now higher than California.  This is also the first year of Washington’s cap-and-invest program  a “comprehensive, market-based program to reduce carbon pollution and achieve the greenhouse gas limits” set in the Climate Commitment Act.  The posts show that there is an obvious link between Washington’s new cap and trade program and gasoline prices.  This article discusses the comments on the Watts Up With That article.

I have been following the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) since it was first proposed. I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 300 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  I have extensive experience with air pollution control theory, implementation, and evaluation having worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including the Acid Rain Program, RGGI, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs since the inception of those programs. I follow and write about the RGGI cap and invest CO2 pollution control program so my background is particularly suited for this proposal.   I have devoted a lot of time to the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

I refer readers to either previous article Washington State Gasoline Prices Are a Precursor to New York’s Future or Do Washington State Residents Know Why Their Gasoline Prices Are So High Now? for background information on the New York and Washington cap-and-invest programs. 

The articles explained that “The average cost of regular gasoline in Washington state has jumped by 32 cents over the past month to $4.93 a gallon, according to AAA” according to an article

California is no longer America’s most expensive state for gas.  Another article says that some experts connected the dots to the new legislation.  In my opinion, the key point is that the cost of Washington gasoline has risen more relative to the price increases elsewhere so that now Washington has the highest prices in the nation.  The first two auctions for the Washington cap-and-invest program sold 14,770,222 allowances and raised $780,829,117 averaging $52.87 per allowance.  According to the US Energy Information Administration 17.86 lbs of CO2 are emitted per gallon of finished motor gasoline which means that 112 gallons burned equals one ton.  That works out to $0.47 a gallon needed to cover the cost of allowances necessary to purchase the allowances and that is a unique Washington cost adder. 

I concluded that there is a clear link between the pass-through cost that gasoline suppliers must pay and the fact that Washington State gasoline prices have increased more than other states.  One of the reasons for my obsession following similar policies in New York is that observed significant cost increases with little real benefits should engender a political response.  If it can be shown that there are real and significant costs as opposed to the “no real impact” claims made by net-zero proponents the politicians who supported these policies should be held accountable.  The question is whether the residents of Washington have figured out that their gasoline prices are so high because of the politicians who promulgated this policy.  I closed that I would appreciate any feedback from Washington residents about the cost impacts of this cap-and-invest program policy.

Comments

The article was published in the middle of the night in the USA so the first comments were from Great Britain where it was pointed out that the Washington costs of gasoline were a fraction of the costs there. 

Ron Long and ToldYouSo  brought up the overarching issue.  Washington and New York emissions are so low relative to global emissions that nothing they will do will have any chance of affecting climate change even if there is a relationship between GHG emissions and global warming.

Alex Long submitted the first comment relative to accountability.  He argued that abortion is an overriding issue for many democrats. 

The point of this is simple: It does not matter how high gasoline will cost, it does not matter how bad crime gets, it does not matter if people’s rights are taken away because of a virus — the democrat can safely get re-elected only because they support abortion. A politician’s only concern is to get elected or re-elected. The democrats know a significant number of people will blindly vote for them because abortion. Thus, all the democrats have to do is keep abortion legal and they will safely win the election. That was the lesson I learned in 2022.

Accountability Comments

Steve Oregon said that Washington residents are clueless about the politician’s gas price hike.  He went on:

An associate of mine owns a major gas station in southern Washington and raises the issue with his customers often. The have no idea their legislature and governor raised the price of gas as the did.

ALL of the Washington media parrots the politicians with NEVER any additional clarification or truth provided.

The short of it is Washington State is a thoroughly Democrat cesspool of public deceit and dysfunction.

Jebstang66 pointed out that Washington’s hydro power is a tremendous and clean asset.  He described Washington politics.

The State is run by extreme Leftist politicians who have the majority in every important place in government here including the WA State Supreme Court. So they pass draconian climate laws without viable opposition. Cap and trade along with “The Clean Energy Transformation Act (CETA) in 2019 which requires that all utilities eliminate coal by 2025 and provide carbon neutral electricity by 2030. Many stakeholders, utility officials and industry leaders warned that losing baseload sources like coal would increase the probability of brownouts and blackouts if demand increased, a likely occurrence in the next ten years.”  It is tax scheme to increase the size and control of State Government. The media here controls the narrative so most people are misinformed.

A comment from kvt1100 described the cost difference between Washington and Oregon:

I live in Eastern WA and gas here today is $4.75/gallon and 30 miles south in Oregon it is $4.35/gallon. Last year the prices in Oregon and Washington were near equal. WA is abusing its constituents by taxing us to pay for our Governor’s pet environmental projects. None of which will amount to any meaningful decrease in wicked CO2. Neighbors and family members are unaware of the price gouging by our governor.

Waforests summarized the situation well:

I am *extremely* aware of what’s causing the price hike (in part because i pay attention; I also follow the WPC’s analysis).

This is a perfect example of politicians not understanding the policies they put in place. Inslee said it would simply be an increase of “pennies” (unless he meant 50 of them).

And it doesn’t even *do* anything: it doesn’t help the planet in a meaningful way, and it just hurts poor and rural folk the most.

John Hultquist described the situation in Washington and raised the point that this will disproportionately hit the poor:

 Without looking stuff up:
A Washington State initiative was passed a few years ago to raise taxes by about 25¢/gallon for each of two years. Roads and bridges were in need of repair and cost of labor and materials were increasing. Work around the State is noticeable. That is good.

Washington has no internal sources of petroleum. Imports have come from Alaska and B.C. to the Cherry Point Refinery. Also, gasoline reaches central WA at Moses Lake via the 531 mile Yellowstone Pipeline from Billings, MT. From Moses Lake, it is delivered by truck to farther destinations, such as where I live 71 miles west. All not so good.

I do not think most people in Washington State are aware of the cap-and-invest program. The State is about 60% Democrat affiliated and the elites from the Inslee administration on down are pleased with themselves. Summarizing: WA is leading in the green movement to save the Planet.
If the poor suffer – we don’t give a schist.Dreadful.

There were a couple succinct responses.  I liked Janice Moore’s response to the question whether residents are aware of the problem and the reason: “Yes, some of us do. Answer: Democrats.” 

Alexei stated: “The “cap & invest” program is clearly a carbon tax and promoted by our departing governor Inslee but I doubt it will be met with much resistance by the credulous climate electorate here that have kept him in office for so long.”

Beta Blocker gave a detailed response:

I live in a rural area of the southeastern corner of the state in a place which is a wide spot in the road you would miss altogether if you didn’t already know it was there.

Concerns are being raised inside the local public utility districts, and among knowledgeable people familiar with energy issues in the US Northwest, that the coal plants which serve the region are being closed faster than they are being replaced.

A decade ago, the plan was to replace those coal plants with gas-fired power plants. Ten years later, new-build gas-fired power generation is completely off the table as an alternative to coal.

Nuclear hasn’t been formally rejected in Washington State, but the hard reality is that new-build nuclear couldn’t be delivered in a time-frame which would make any real difference to the emerging situation.

This trend towards closing coal-fired plants without replacement by equivalent generation is certain to continue and is even likely to accelerate as the Biden Administration and the EPA put more pressure on the region’s politicians and on the power utilities to reduce their carbon emissions in accordance with the EPA’s new emission rules.

The Western Electricity Coordination Council and the Northwest Power and Conservation Council are both downplaying the risks of electricity shortages in the US west and in the US northwest.

Inside the power planning models, megawatt-hours saved through energy conservation measures are being employed as fully equivalent to megawatt-hours generated and consumed. This is the means by which the risk of blackouts is being pencil-whipped away.

The bottom line is that the risk of blackouts occurring in the US Northwest is increasing rapidly. One independent risk analysis cited in a recent behind-the-paywall article in ANS Nuclear News sees our blackout risk increasing from 5% today in the year 2023 to greater than 25% after 2025.

Just like it is in California and in New York State, there isn’t one person in a hundred living in the US Northwest who has a clue about what is now happening with the reliability of our electricity supply.

Finally, Major Meteor describes the ultimate response to this kind of program:

The impact this is having on Washington residents is that some of them are moving to states that have common sense. So moving to Tennessee I figure my cost of living is easily $5K to $6K less with about $500 per year of that being gas taxes and I don’t even drive much. So if I am handing them $6K per year, I just want to know what they do with that extra money. Doesn’t look like society or my family benefits from the extra burden at all. I’m out.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, these responses are completely consistent with my experiences in New York.  Very few people know about these programs and the potential ramifications.  I am disappointed that even when Washington residents are confronted with inarguable proof that the programs are leading to significant cost increases that many of those affected still have not caught on.

I think the problem is that this issue and the programs to address it are just background noise.  Every day there is another story claiming it is climate change is here now and once in a while there is a political statement bragging about doing something.  When the time comes to vote, other issues are more important and the Progressives still get elected.  The point is that they did not get elected to pursue the cockamamie climate change control programs even if they think that they did.  How about a referendum to ask the people whether they want to proceed down this path?