Category: Climate Act Feasibility

NYISO Climate Act Concerns

I was recently asked to give a briefing about Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) issues. While preparing my presentation I used Perplexity AI to generate a review of the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) concerns with the Climate Act.  This article provides background documentation based on the response to that query.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim targets is a 2030 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and a 2040 zero emissions requirement that are of particular concern to the NYISO.

I prepared a power point presentation for the briefing with supporting documentation that discussed Climate Act issues that need to be addressed.  The New York’s Legislative annual session revolves around  enacting the state’s April 1 budget.  The budget is an executive‑budget model which means that the Governor can stick in policy legislation like the Climate Act.  In my last post I described issues that the legislature should address this session.  This article describes concerns that the NYISO has with the Climate Act that supports my belief that the Public Service Commission (PSC) should conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act because there are observed threats to reliability that threaten safe and adequate service.

Perplexity Summary

I used Perplexity AI to generate the following summaries of NYISO concerns.

Tightening reliability margins and resource adequacy

NYISO’s long‑term reliability and resource adequacy studies show that reserve margins are thinning as fossil units retire faster than new, firm replacement capacity and transmission arrive.

They point to:

  • A net loss of dispatchable capacity since the CLCPA was passed: several gigawatts of fossil capacity have retired while additions are largely intermittent renewables and limited-duration storage.
  • Projections in their Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP) and Reliability Needs Assessments that show:
    • Declining reliability margins in New York City and downstate.
    • Potential statewide shortfalls later in the 2020s/early 2030s if retirements continue at the current pace and clean resources, storage, and transmission are delayed.
  • Concern that the system is increasingly reliant on emergency procedures (demand response, voltage reductions, etc.) to meet resource adequacy criteria on peak days, which is not a sustainable operating strategy.

In short, CLCPA‑driven retirements and environmental constraints (e.g., peaker rule) are moving faster than the build‑out of firm, deliverable alternatives, tightening margins to what NYISO characterizes as “concerning” levels.

Coordination of fossil retirements with new entry

NYISO has repeatedly emphasized that fossil generator retirements must be carefully coordinated with the timing and performance of new resources:

  • They support the CLCPA recommendation to “retire fossil resources gradually and safely,” but warn that mandatory retirement schedules or environmental rules that force large blocks of capacity off the system by fixed dates, without assured replacement, can create reliability violations.
  • In New York City in particular, they highlight that:
    • Peaker rule and other environmental closures remove capacity that is both local and fast‑responding.
    • Replacement capacity must satisfy local transmission security and deliverability constraints, not just nameplate MW.
  • NYISO worries that policy and permitting processes affecting existing plants are often decided without a concrete, tested replacement portfolio in place, leaving them to fill gaps reactively through backstop reliability arrangements.

Their concern is not simply “don’t retire fossil,” but “do not retire fossil faster than the system can absorb given actual, not theoretical, replacements.”

Dependence on a few critical transmission projects

CLCPA strategies assume large amounts of new clean generation, including upstate renewables and Canadian hydro, will be deliverable to downstate load via specific major transmission projects. NYISO’s reliability plans highlight:

  • Heavy reliance on timely completion of projects like Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) and other major bulk upgrades.
  • Findings that, without these projects in service on schedule, New York City’s reliability margins become extremely small or turn deficient for much of the 10‑year planning horizon.
  • Concern that delays or cancellations of such projects (or of offshore wind transmission solutions) leave the state with policy commitments that cannot be supported by the physical grid.

So one core concern is that the CLCPA architecture implicitly assumes a best‑case transmission build‑out path; NYISO’s studies are essentially saying, “If those assumptions slip, reliability breaks.”

Operational challenges from high levels of intermittent renewables

NYISO accepts that the CLCPA implies a massive increase in weather‑dependent resources, but highlights that:

  • High penetrations of wind and solar increase uncertainty in net load forecasts, requiring:
    • More operating reserves.
    • New reserve products (e.g., “uncertainty” or “dynamic” reserves) to cover forecast error and fast ramps.
  • Studies of high‑renewables scenarios show:
    • Substantial increases in required installed reserve margins to maintain the same loss‑of‑load expectation.
    • Need for significant quantities of flexible, fast‑ramping resources, including storage and responsive demand, to manage multi‑hour ramps and multi‑day low‑renewables events.
  • The system will be more exposed to extreme weather—heat waves and cold snaps—at the same time that dispatchable fossil capacity is reduced, increasing the risk that the system crosses a “tipping point” where it cannot serve load during stress events.

In other words, the CLCPA’s heavy reliance on intermittent resources forces a fundamental redesign of operating reserve and capacity constructs; NYISO’s concern is that policy timelines assume this redesign and the necessary resources will be ready and deliverable in time.

Need for “firm, zero‑emissions” and long‑duration solutions (technology gap)

NYISO has started to stress that, to meet CLCPA’s 2040 zero‑emissions grid requirement while staying reliable, New York will need:

  • Significant quantities of “firm, zero‑emission” capacity (e.g., hydrogen‑capable turbines, advanced nuclear, long‑duration storage, carbon capture, or other technologies that can run through multi‑day renewable droughts).
  • Far more total installed capacity by 2040 than today—often characterized as roughly three times current capacity—once electrification (buildings, transport, industry) and higher reserve needs are included.

Their concern is that:

  • The CLCPA and Scoping Plan implicitly assume large volumes of such technologies will be available, cost‑effective, and sited in New York by 2040, but there is no clear, concrete procurement or market framework yet that ensures they appear.
  • Current market designs and state programs are heavily tuned to 20‑year REC‑backed wind and solar, not to capital‑intensive firm resources with different risk profiles.

So NYISO is effectively warning of a technology and market design gap between what CLCPA requires in the 2030s–2040s and what is actually under contract or in queues today.

Documentation for NYISO Issues

The Perplexity AI response to my concerns of NYISO about Climate Act goals also generated a spreadsheet table of specific issues that lists the Issue Area, NYISO Document, Specific NYISO Finding/Concern, CLCPA Statutory Provision, CAC Scoping Plan Assumption/Strategy, Gap/Disconnect, and Talking Point for identified problems.  The following sections describe the NYISO documents that address specific NYISO findings and concerns listed in the spreadsheet.

NYISO has identified issues with resource adequacy associated with declining margins in multiple reports.  The 2025 Power Trends noted that there has been a net loss of 2,041 MW since the Climate Act was enacted (4,315 MW retired, 2,274 MW added).  The Executive Summary in the 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) Report explains that statewide resource margins are declining so fast that by 2034 there will be no surplus power without further development.  The 2025 Q3 Short-Term Assessment of Reliability (STAR) Report identified a New York City (NYC) Zone J reliability need beginning in summer 2027 that requires peaker units that have been scheduled for retirement to be retained.

The timing of fossil retirements vs new entry timing is also an NYISO concern.  The 2025 Power Trends document noted that fossil retirements are outpacing new supply additions since 2021.

The 2024 RNA Report notes that the NYC reliability need in 2033 is driven by faster generator retirements than replacement resource development.  The 2025 Q3 STAR Report noted that the NYC Peaker Rule that forces retirement by 2027-2029 is impossible unless local replacement resources are developed.

NYISO also noted that dependence on a few critical transmission projects has risks. The 2024 RNA Report notes that the base case assumes timely completion of Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) and Clean Path NY (CPNY) by 2027-2028.  The 2025 Power Trends report transmission section states that without major transmission (CHPE, CPNY) project completion that NYC reliability margins will become deficient.  The NYISO submitted comments on the Scoping Plan also noted that there will be a heavy dependence on specific transmission projects that may not get built as scheduled.

NYISO has raised intermittency and operating reserves concerns.  The 2024 RNA Report resource adequacy study explains that a high penetration of intermittent renewables requires new reserve products.  The 2025 Power Trends includes an intermittency discussion that notes that wind/solar variability will increase reserve requirements and ramp capability needs.  The

NYISO Uncertainty Reserve Requirement filing defines FERC approved Uncertainty Reserve Requirement for the forecast error from renewables.

There is a clear need for a new dispatchable emissions free resource (DEFR).  NYISO has addressed this requirement in its reports.  The 2024 RNA Report, scenarios analysis states that meeting 2040 zero-emissions requires “firm zero-emission” resources not yet identified. 

The 2025 Power Trends describes this technology gap explaining that the grid needs three times current capacity by 2040 with electrification and higher reserve margins.  NYISO comments on the Scoping Plan also described the technology gap stating that long-duration storage, hydrogen, advanced nuclear are not yet commercial at scale.

New York electric load is increasing and will increase more as Climate Act electrification programs progress.  NYISO addressed load trends in several reports.  The 2025 Power Trends, load forecast section notes that large loads (data centers  and semiconductors) will add 2,567 MW demand by 2035.  The 2024 RNA Report includes large loads assumptions that predict peak demand growth accelerating due to electrification and economic development.  The 2025 Load & Capacity Data Report aka Gold Book load forecast notes that load forecast uncertainty is higher than historical due to policy-driven electrification driven by the Climate Act.

New York City presents special challenges to the grid and for the Climate Act mandates.  NYISO found in the 2025 Q3 STAR Report, Zone J findings that the Zone J (NYC) summer 2027 reliability need is driven by load growth and retirements.  The 2024 RNA Report discussion of

NYC reliability needs 2033 found that the reliability need requires compensatory MW because there are limited local alternatives.  The 2025 Q2 STAR Report Peaker Rule analysis notes that the DEC Peaker Rule removes capacity exactly when NYC needs an increase.  This means that NYISO must delay the rule’s retirement dates.

The NYISO has also noted that there are market design and investment signals that affect their response to the Climate Act mandates.  The 2025 Power Trends, market design section explains that State procurement (ORECs, Tier 1 RECs) policies reduces market price signals. 

NYISO FERC filings on the capacity market notes that capacity market suppression from state-contracted resources undermines flexibility value. 

The political manipulation of the electric market mandated by the Climate Act creates issues with planning process coordination.  The NYISO comments on the Scoping Plan noted that the

State’s Climate Act Policy planning (NYSERDA Integration Analysis) uses different assumptions than NYISO reliability planning.  The 2024 RNA Report planning assumptions notes the lack of alignment between the Scoping Plan scenarios and NYISO base case reliability studies.

The Climate Act and Department of Environmental Conservation interpretation of it have eliminated the backlog of new fossil generating units. As a result the fossil fleet is aging.  The 2025 Power Trends notes that 11% of 2024 energy production is from generators greater than 50 years old.  The existing fleet analysis in the 2024 RNA Report states that 10,000+ MW (25% of total capacity) has been in operation  greater than 50 years.

There are risks related to the implementation pace required to meet the arbitrary Climate Act targets.  The 2024 RNA Report Executive Summary notes the narrowing margins driven by statewide resource shortfalls and the rapid change pace.  The 2025 Power Trends conclusion states that there is a risk that cumulative factors (retirements, electrification, delays) will create reliability metric violations.

The NYSERDA projections do not incorporate the reliability requirements that the NYISO must address.  The 2024 RNA Report capacity accreditation description notes that the NYSERDA Climate Act analyses focus on energy (MWh) but NYISO projections must ensure resource adequacy (MW capacity available).  The 2025 Power Trends description of reliability margin metrics notes that Intermittent resources have low capacity value and the NYISO must account for reliability contribution

Discussion

Please excuse the structure of this document.  If I had time, I would have combined the two sections into a single referenced description of NYISO concerns.

This article is intended to be a resource documenting NYISO concerns with Climate Act implementation.  It demonstrates that there are real problems that Climate Act apologists ignore..  Per Public Service Law 66-P two petitions have been filed calling for a hearing that stated that NYISO’s concerns are persuasive arguments that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.  On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.  Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  This information will be useful to document the NYISO concerns.

Conclusion

These concerns about electric system reliability and resource adequacy are another indication that it is time to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

Stalling the New York Climate Act Pause Evaluation

On January 28, 2026, the New York State Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding a petition for a hearing to suspend or temporarily modify the Renewable Energy Program. While on one hand I should be celebrating official recognition of something I have long advocated, on the other hand, the timing is problematic.  The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming and this request for comments simply postpones the inevitable hearing.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates.  However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations.  It includes provisions stating that the PSC is empowered to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.  Today’s announcement is the first PSC response to numerous calls to address this requirement.

Announcement

The following is the text of the announcement requesting comments:

The Public Service Commission (Commission) is considering a petition, filed on January 6, 2026 (the Petition), by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) requesting that the Commission hold a hearing, pursuant to Section 66-p of the Public Service Law, to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

The Coalition, which describes itself as a group consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce, and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers, and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council, affirmatively contends that the Renewable Energy Program and its associated renewable energy targets may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service. In support of its request for such a review by the Commission, the Coalition points to information that it claims suggests that the State will not achieve the Climate Act targets that, by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems, and that, by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. The Coalition also suggests the existence of decreasing reliability margins and aging fossil-fueled generation resources, referencing statements by the New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that interested stakeholders are invited to submit comments by March 30, 2026, on the Petition filed by the Coalition.

Comments provided in response to this Notice should reference “Case 15-E-0302.” Comments should be submitted electronically by going to http://www.dps.ny.gov, clicking on “File Search” (located under the heading “Commission Files”), entering “15-E-0302” in the “Search by Case Number” field, and then clicking on the “Post Comments” box located at the top of the page. Those unable to file electronically may mail their comments to the Hon. Michelle L. Phillips, Secretary, New York State Public Service Commission, Three Empire Plaza, Albany, New York 12223-1350; however, electronic filing of comments is strongly encouraged.

Basis for the Hearing Summary

New York Public Service Law § 66-p Section (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” includes safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability.   Section 66-p (4) states:

The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program. 

My recent post summarized multiple independent analyses, audits, litigation findings, and party filings in DPS proceedings that document that the Climate Act transition will exacerbate energy affordability issues such that this PSL 66-P hearing is appropriate.  I also used Perplexity AI to generate a chronology of the recommendations made to hold a hearing that provides an overview of the suggestions for the hearing.

The chronology described three independent pathways to trigger PSL66-p(4) anyone of which  can justify a hearing:

Pathway 1: Reliability – “Program Impedes Safe and Adequate Electric Service”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find that the Renewable Energy Program “impedes” (not merely “risks” or “threatens”) the provision of safe and adequate service.

Evidence Presented:

  • NYISO 2024 RNA identifies actionable reliability need in NYC beginning 2033 (17-97 MW deficiency)
  • Statewide resource adequacy approaching limits with “no surplus power” remaining by 2034 without further development
  • Net capacity loss of 2,000 MW since Climate Act passage (retirements outpacing additions)
  • NYISO official statement that emission-free technologies to replace fossil generation “are not yet available on a commercial scale”
  • NERC highest-level alert documenting systemic deficiencies in modeling Inverter Based Resources and >15,000 MW of unexpected generation reductions in major events
  • Multiple NYISO high-risk scenarios showing NYC deficiency could begin as early as 2025 and grow to >1,000 MW by 2034

Assessment: The reliability evidence is substantial and comes from authoritative technical sources (NYISO, NERC). The case for a hearing under the reliability criterion is strong.

Pathway 2: Contractual – “Program Likely to Impair Existing Obligations”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find the program is “likely” to impair existing obligations and agreements.

Evidence Presented:

  • Repowering disincentive: Current Climate Act targets effectively discourage repowering existing facilities because developers face 2040 forced retirement risk, “undermining investment recovery”
  • Offshore wind contract renegotiations: Multiple offshore wind developers have sought contract amendments due to changed economic conditions
  • Tier 1 REC contract attrition: Biennial Review acknowledged 30% attrition rate in renewable energy contracts

Assessment: The evidence on contractual impairment is moderate. This criterion appears to be less central to the petitioners’ arguments than reliability and affordability.

Pathway 3: Affordability – “Significant Increase in Arrears or Disconnections”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find (1) a “significant” increase in arrears or service disconnections and (2) determine the increase is “related to the program.”

Evidence Presented:

  • Statistical significance established: Independent Intervenors demonstrated increases exceeding 2× standard deviation for statewide totals and 4 of 10 utilities
  • Magnitude: $1.8 billion in arrears affecting 1.2 million households
  • Trend: NMPC 17% increase (33,840 customers), Con Ed 59% increase (173,398 customers)

The Perplexity AI summary also lists two examples of evidence that does not support the claim that need to be explained.  For the “Causation not established”  description the AI program referenced an article written before the latest  DPS annual informational report came out that said it was impossible to determine if increases are “related to the program”.  A more recent report is now available, but DPS staff did not try to link the observed increases to this PSL 66-P requirement so it still is impossible to attribute significant changes to the Climate Act.  The other example gave an alternative explanation for the number of customers in arrears: “Post-pandemic economic impacts, inflation, and energy price increases due to factors beyond Climate Act (e.g., natural gas price volatility, supply chain disruptions)”

The Perplexity AI Assessment description stated:

The affordability evidence meets the first criterion (statistical significance) but cannot satisfy the second criterion (program causation) until DPS provides the mandated cost reporting. This represents a data gap, not necessarily a failure of the substantive argument. A hearing could establish causation through discovery and testimony.

The conclusion in this section notes that the reliability pathway has the strongest evidentiary weight:

Among the three pathways, the reliability criterion presents the most compelling case for a hearing:

  • Evidence comes from independent technical authorities (NYISO, NERC) with statutory responsibility for reliability
  • Deficiencies are quantified with specific MW shortfalls and timeframes
  • High-risk scenarios demonstrate sensitivity to plausible uncertainties
  • NYISO’s statement that required technologies “are not yet available on a commercial scale” directly supports finding that the program “impedes” safe and adequate service
  • Net capacity loss since Climate Act passage (2,000 MW) demonstrates actual, not theoretical, impact

The affordability criterion faces an evidentiary gap on program causation, though the statistical significance of arrears increases is well-established. Importantly, this gap exists because the PSC/DPS have failed to comply with their own reporting mandates—the very accountability failure the petitioners criticize. 

Discussion

In this discussion I liberally paraphrased the Perplexity AI response. Ultimately, the Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability emerging as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world supply chain, permitting, interconnection, and technological readiness constraints. 

In response to the petitions ACE-NY and WEACT filed a response that urged the PSC to reject the petition suggesting that all progress would stop if the heating was held.  However, the provision for a hearing does not require abandoning climate goals—it authorizes temporary suspension or modification to ensure safe, adequate, and affordable service while the transition continues. This represents pragmatic management, not capitulation.

I have long warned of the consequences if the current aspirational ambition and schedule of the Climate Act is not changed.  The PSC’s decision extends beyond energy policy:

  • If reliability suffers, the result could be rolling blackouts, industrial curtailments, and catastrophic economic disruption
  • If affordability spirals, the political backlash could undermine not just Climate Act but climate policy more broadly
  • If the safety valve remains unused, the precedent may discourage future legislatures from including adaptive management mechanisms in ambitious policy frameworks

Conclusion

Clearly it is no longer possible for the Hochul Administration to ignore the adverse impacts of Climate Act Implementation.  I have long argued that PSL 66-P was a logical excuse to reconsider the ramifications of the Climate Act so I should be happy that the potential of this requirement has been recognized at last.

However, this response is more evidence that the Climate Act has always been more about political catering to constituencies than about saving the planet. The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming so I believe that the PSC should have moved to hold the hearing at this time.  That would infuriate the proponents of the Climate Act that Hochul needs for her re-election campaign.  This request for comments pushes the hearing and any decision related to the hearing beyond the election next November.  The question is whether New Yorkers will catch on that the Hochul Administration is risking reliability and affordability in an effort to appease Climate Act proponents.

Stay tuned because there I will undoubtedly be writing about this more before the comments are due,

New York Nuclear Renaissance

Governor Hochul plans to pursue “the most ambitious development of nuclear power in America, setting a new goal to build five gigawatts of new nuclear capacity”.  I believe that nuclear power is the best option to reduce electric system GHG emissions but there are issues.  This post includes Richard Ellenbogen’s description of practical deployment issues and my observations relative to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

Richard Ellenbogen has been speaking to NY State policy makers and regulators since 2019 regarding the deficiencies inherent in NY State Energy policy.  He has a proven record implementing carbon reduction programs at his own manufacturing business in Westchester County where it has reduced its electric utility load by 80% while reducing its carbon footprint by 30% – 40% below that of the downstate system.  I have previously published other articles by Ellenbogen including a summary description of his issues with the Climate Act.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because the energy density of wind and solar energy is too low and the resource intermittency too variable to ever support a reliable electric system relying on those resources. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Hochul Proposal

Hochul’s State of the State Book describes the nuclear proposal in the following two sections:

Establishing a Nuclear Reliability Backbone for a Zero-Emission Grid

As New York transitions to a zero-emission electric grid, the State must ensure reliable and cost effective baseload power to keep homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure running at all hours.  Governor Hochul will ensure that New York State leads in the race to harness safe and reliable advanced nuclear energy to power homes and businesses with zero-emission electricity for generations to come.

To catalyze progress towards those goals, the Governor will advance a new initiative, the Nuclear Reliability Backbone, directing state agencies to establish a clear pathway for additional advanced nuclear generation to support grid reliability. The Nuclear Reliability Backbone will be developed by a new Department of Public Service (DPS) process to consider, review, and facilitate a cost-effective pathway to four gigawatts of new nuclear energy that will combine with existing nuclear generation and the New York Power Authority’s (NYPA) previously announced one gigawatt project, to create an 8.4 gigawatt “backbone” of reliable energy for New Yorkers.

This effort will provide firm, clean power that complements renewable energy resources and reduces reliance on fossil fuel generation. By creating a stable foundation of always-on energy, the Backbone will allow renewable resources to operate more efficiently and flexibly. Together, these actions will support a resilient, flexible, and zero-emission grid that meets New York’s growing energy needs.

Ensuring New York’s Nuclear Power Future is Built By and For New Yorkers

As New York expands advanced nuclear energy, the State must ensure that New Yorkers benefit from these jobs and investments, including making sure New Yorkers are prepared to build, operate, and sustain this emerging industry. Governor Hochul will launch NextGen Nuclear New York to develop a skilled, in-state nuclear workforce through coordinated education and training pathways.

The initiative will expand partnerships across K–12 schools, higher education institutions, labor organizations, and training programs to align curricula, credentials, and career pathways with industry needs. It will also support workforce transitions for existing energy workers and increase public awareness of nuclear career opportunities. By investing in people and skills, New York will ensure its nuclear future is powered by New Yorkers, for New Yorkers.

Practical Deployment Issues – Ellenbogen

Ellenbogen recently sent an email that described his concerns about the proposal to add 5 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear to NY State’s generation fleet that forms the basis for this article.  Because we are closely aligned on our thoughts I am not going to try to differentiate between his material and my supplemental information.  However, I take responsibility for the contents of this article and accept that I may have misquoted or misrepresented Ellenbogen’s beliefs.

For background consider New York’s nuclear power plants (Table 1).  Five gigawatts of nuclear is basically equivalent to building five new traditional reactors like Nine Mile 2, the last completed plant in New York. Note that Shoreham was completed, tested, and then shut down before it operated in the mid 1980’s.

Table 1: New York Nuclear Generating Plants

We agree on one thing completely: It’s a step in the right direction but it is too little, too late.  Building this amount of capacity will take a long time.  Nine Mile 2 construction took 13 years, and the most recent reactors built in the US at Vogtle, Georgia took 15 years from the start of initial site work.

According to a Perplexity AI query, The new Vogtle units are Westinghouse AP1000 designs with passive safety systems; The capacity of each unit is on the order of 1.1 GW.  Construction went over schedule and budget “as the first new U.S. nuclear build in decades, became a protracted megaproject with schedule slips and cost growth to roughly the mid‑$30‑billion range, widely characterized as one of the most expensive infrastructure projects in U.S. history”. These issues were caused by a “combination of incomplete design and planning, contractor and supply‑chain problems, first‑of‑a‑kind AP1000 implementation issues, weak project management and oversight, and the 2017 Westinghouse bankruptcy, which disrupted construction and financing”. 

Most of these underlying factors will be problems for New York State.  If new technology is used the design and planning will have to evolve as the plants are built.  There are contractor and supply-chain problems with existing infrastructure construction so this will be more of a problem for the new technology.  If the deployment goes so far as to mandate that the facilities are “built by and for New Yorkers”, then there will be delays because there are insufficient skilled trade workers available today.

Climate Act Schedule and Reliability Issues – Ellenbogen

The Climate Act has a requirement for zero emissions electric generation by 2040.  There is no possibility that all the nuclear capacity proposed by Hochul could be built by 2040 and there is a low probability that any new nuclear could be built by then.  Last June Hochul ordered the New York Power Authority (NYPA) to develop at least on gigawatt of nuclear capacity.  NYPA has not even announced where they might consider siting new nuclear capacity.  In my experience with power plant permitting, it takes at least three years to secure permits for existing design equipment.  There have been indications that New York would favor new designs which would slow down permitting substantially.  Finally, “Nuclear” has been a four-letter word in New York State for about 45 years so we expect opponents to try to delay permitting in every way possible.

Last November the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) released its 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP).  The report found that “the electric grid is at an inflection point driven by the convergence of three major trends: the rapid growth of large loads, (e.g.: microchip manufacturing and AI-related data centers); the aging generation fleet; and a lack of new dispatchable generation resources being added to the system.”   The description of the CRP went on to say:

The CRP highlights that the future reliability of the grid depends on the development of flexible generation capable of performing during extended periods of high consumer demand and extreme weather. The report examines lessons-learned from the June 2025 heatwave and the need for a planning framework that better reflects present challenges of operating the grid while anticipating plausible future risks.

“The system requires additional dispatchable generation to serve forecasted increases in consumer demand,” said Zach Smith, Senior Vice President, System and Resource Planning. “We also need to refine and evolve our planning processes to better reflect this period of great change on the grid and a broader range of plausible future outcomes.”

The CRP demonstrates that due to emerging reliability challenges, traditional planning methods built around a single forecast are no longer sufficient. To maintain system reliability and protect public safety, the economy and quality of life, the CRP recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment before reliability margins disappear.

Our biggest concern is the reliability margin crisis described in the CRP.  The NYISO plausible range of reliability margins illustrates the problem (Figure 1).  The CRP doesn’t explain what is going to keep the lights on after 2033, and possibly as early as 2027 if replacement capacity does not keep up with retirements.  My Perplexity AI search found that there are no new fossil-fired capacity proposed.  While adding new nuclear capacity is appropriate, replacement of existing capacity must also be considered.  The youngest of the 3.4 GW of existing nuclear in NY State will be reaching 60 years of age by 2040.

Figure 1: Plausible Range of Statewide System Margins NYISO 2025-2034 Comprehensive Reliability Plan     

Reason to Pause – Caiazza

Over the last year I have written many articles describing various reasons to pause implementation and reconsider the schedule and scope of the Climate Act.  The State Energy Plan and the CRP both include multiple future energy projections that include estimates of capacity and grid infrastructure additions.  The CRP “recommends actions that will strengthen planning processes across a broad spectrum of system conditions and advance needed investment”. The State Energy Plan advocates massive deployment of as much wind, solar, and energy storage capacity as possible as fast as possible hoping that it will work out.

Wind and solar energy resources are diffuse, intermittent, and correlated.  Because they are diffuse, utilizing wind and solar means that transmission and distribution systems must be upgraded.  Because they are intermittent, that means that energy storage is needed on daily to seasonal scales.  Because wind and solar are correlated, new dispatchable emissions-free resources (DEFR) are needed to make the electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability.  I believe the only likely viable DEFR backup technology is nuclear generation because it is the only candidate resource that is technologically ready, can be expanded as needed, and does not suffer from limitations of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Every day that the resolving the DEFR requirement is delayed the costs associated with what may be a false solution increase.  If the only viable DEFR solution is nuclear, then the wind, solar, and energy storage approach cannot be implemented without nuclear power.  Nuclear power works best as a baseload resource so using it solely as DEFR backup is inappropriate.  Developing baseload nuclear eliminates the need for a huge DEFR backup resource and means that the “build as much as we can as fast as we can” wind and solar buildout currently in progress is unnecessary.  Climate Act implementation should be paused until the most appropriate path forward is determined.

Discussion

Both Ellenbogen and I have been harping about reliability for years.  Unfortunately, no one at the state level seems to be ready to confront the problem.  It is absolutely necessary to come to grips with it.  The state government keeps trying to defy physical law by pushing technologies that can’t keep the lights on.  They need to get out of their bubble because the time frame required to fix what has become a massive problem is getting increasingly small.  The rapidly decreasing margins and negative capacity margins appear likely before new generation of any type can be built.

One of the biggest takeaways from this latest political energy proposal is the danger of political interference in energy policy.  New York politicians now claim that we need 5 GW of nuclear generating capacity.  New York politicians shut down 3.1 GW of nuclear capacity since 1984.  Hochul’s announcement is encouraging but until it must be accompanied by a pause in Climate Act implementation to be credible.  If timely decarbonization using nuclear power is appropriate, then a restart at Indian Point should be considered because it is the cheapest and quickest option.  However, that would be politically toxic so I cannot imagine that ever being proposed by the Hochul Administration. 

Conclusion

In my opinion, nuclear power should be part of New York’s electric system future.  However, Hochul’s proposal is too little, too late as part of the Climate Act implementation without revising the schedule.  It is necessary first to pause implementation and reassess the schedule and ambition of the Act so that it can play a meaningful role.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy Petition

On January 6, 2026 the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy filed a petition with the Public Service Commission (PSC) requesting that “the Commission act expeditiously to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.”  Last August I described a filing and supporting documentation that I prepared with Richard Ellenbogen, Constatine Kontogiannis, and Francis Menton (Independent Intervenors) submitted to the same PSC Proceeding (Case 22-M-0149).  Our filing made a similar argument.  This article compares the filings.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two electric sector targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040.

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable bounds and New York energy policy has not openly reassessed where we stand relative to acceptable affordability and reliability risk.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy

According to their petition the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) is “a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council”. Clearly, they have a vested interest in affordability because it affects their competitiveness.  Coalition members include:

  • Buffalo Niagara Builders Association
  • Buffalo Niagara Manufacturing Alliance
  • Buffalo Niagara Partnership
  • Builders Exchange of the Southern Tier
  • Business Council of Westchester
  • Capitol Region Chamber of Commerce
  • Center for Economic Growth
  • Commercial Real Estate Development Association – Upstate Chapter
  • Construction Exchange of Buffalo and Western New York
  • Engineers Labor Employer Cooperative 825
  • Greater Binghamton Chamber of Commerce
  • Greater Rochester Association of REALTORS
  • Greater Rochester Chamber of Commerce
  • Manufacturers Alliance of New York
  • Manufacturers Association of Central New York
  • Manufacturers Association of the Southern Tier
  • Multiple Intervenors – An unincorporated association of approximately 55 large industrial, commercial, and institutional energy consumers with manufacturing and other facilities located throughout New York State
  • National Federation of Independent Businesses
  • New York State Association of Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors
  • New York State Builders Association
  • New York State Economic Development Council
  • Niagara USA Chamber of Commerce
  • North Country Chamber of Commerce
  • Northeastern Retail Lumber Association
  • Northeast Hearth, Patio and Barbecue Association
  • Power for Economic Prosperity – An active coalition of manufacturing companies that depend on low-cost hydropower from the New York Power Authority in order to maintain their operations in the Buffalo/Niagara Region.
  • Rochester Technology and Manufacturing Association
  • The Business Council of New York State – The leading business organization in New York State, representing the interests of large and small firms throughout the state. Its membership is made up of approximately 3,500 member companies, local chambers of commerce and professional and trade associations.
  • The Council of Industry, Manufacturers Association of the Hudson Valley
  • The Manufacturers Alliance of New York
  • Western New York Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Contractors
  • Also included in the Coalition are Donna L. DeCarolis and Dennis W. Elsenbeck, both members of the state’s Climate Action Council established by the CLCPA. 

The Coalition petition provides a description of each of its members

Independent Intervenor Filing

For comparison purposes I will describe the Independent Intervenor filing submitted on August 12, 2025, first.  My first post described our main argument and the second post described the supporting exhibits.  In brief, Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  We argued the hearing was necessary because of the significant increase in arrears threshold has been exceeded.

Independent Intervenors – Affordability 

Exhibit 3 – Affordability-Focused Recommendations documents references to affordability and reliability recommendations in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) Document and Matter Management (DMM) System.  Rather than wading through the system I acknowledge the use of Perplexity (https://www.perplexity.ai/) to generate summaries and references included in the document.

The Perplexity summary provided the following key takeaway:

Since 2022, at least six concrete safeguards have been proposed in the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) record to keep the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act affordable for households and businesses. They call for (1) rigorous public cost reporting, (2) objective “safety-valve” triggers under Public Service Law §66-p(4), (3) systematic pursuit of alternative funding, (4) expansion of low-income bill-protection programs, (5) transparent data dashboards, and (6) stricter benefit-cost and rate-design standards.

In my opinion, these safeguards haven’t been implemented well enough to ensure affordability.  There has been no DPS staff response to any of the calls to develop affordability triggers.

Independent Intervenors – Reliability

The biggest unresolved reliability risk associated with Climate Act implementation is addressed in Case 15-E-0302 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Implement a Large-Scale Renewable Program and Clean Energy Standard.  Responsible New York agencies all agree that new Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR) technologies are needed to make a solar and wind-reliant electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. 

Two exhibits addressed these reliability concerns.  To adequately address the amount of DEFR required it is necessary to determine how much is needed. Exhibit 4 – Resource Gap Characterization describes the challenges of defining the frequency, duration, and intensity of low wind and solar resource availability (known as dark doldrums) events.  One fundamental flaw in the Climate Act is the mistaken belief by the authors of the law that existing wind, solar, and energy storage resources would be sufficient and that no new technology would be required.  Exhibit 5 – Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources explains that this presumption is not correct. There is a need for a resource that is not currently commercially available.  This reliance on unknown solutions risks investments in false solutions and poses significant reliability risks. 

Coalition Filing

The Coalition petition states:

The Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy, a diverse coalition consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council (hereinafter referred to as the “Coalition”), hereby petitions the New York State Public Service Commission to hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law § 66-p (4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.

The preceding statement includes a footnote referencing the Independent Intervenor filing and another regulatory action that argued a heating was appropriate.  The Coalition lays out the basic argument:

 This Petition seeks Commission action authorized by the CLCPA. Recent evidence suggests that the Renewable Energy Program, and its associated renewable energy targets, may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service and upset the necessary balance of reliable, economic and sustainable energy in New York State. This evidence justifies commencement of the hearing process in PSL § 66-p (4), which will allow the Commission to determine whether the temporary suspension or modification of the Renewable Energy Program obligations is necessary to ensure the continued provision of safe and adequate electric service. Further, the Coalition believes that any hearing held pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) should examine the relationship between Renewable Energy Program costs and customer arrears.

The Executive Summary provides an excellent overview of the status of Climate Act implementation.

The CLCPA set extraordinarily ambitious targets for renewable energy generation in New York State, requiring that by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems and that by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. Recent data from the Commission demonstrates that New York will not achieve – or even come close to achieving – the 70% target by 2030. In addition, recent developments at the federal level impacting clean energy are likely to have a negative impact on renewable energy in the near term. With respect to the target of zero emissions by 2040, the necessary emission-free generation resources are not currently available at commercial scale. The inability of New York to develop the amount of renewable energy generation necessary to meet the 70% target by 2030, the increasing retirement of aging fossil-fuel generators due to the CLCPA, and the uncertainty surrounding the development of resources necessary to meet the zero emissions target by 2040, presents a reliability concern.

This concern is exacerbated by the fact that it may take more than two times the amount of certain forms of renewable generation to make up for the loss of one megawatt of fossil-fuel generation, and by expected increases in electric demand driven by the combination of new large loads and electrification.

Pursuant to the PSL, the Commission is required to ensure the provision of “safe and adequate” electric service. Renewable energy development has not kept pace with generator retirements, which has resulted in declining reliability margins across New York, jeopardizing electric reliability and safe and adequate service. In recognition that the Renewable Energy Program might negatively impact electric reliability, the CLCPA includes a safeguard that allows the Commission to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the program, after a hearing, if it makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service. Given recent evidence regarding delayed renewable energy generation and risks to reliability, the Commission should hold a hearing pursuant to PSL § 66-p (4) to determine whether safe and adequate electric service in New York is impeded by the Renewable Energy Program and, if so, to appropriately modify or suspend the program’s obligations.

Discussion

Both filings argue that the PSC should convene a hearing to determine whether it is appropriate to temporarily suspend or modify the obligations of the Climate Act.  The Independent Intervenors argued that there was an explicit requirement for the hearing because the customers in arrears threshold has been exceeded.  The Coalition makes a persuasive argument that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.

The other difference is that the Independent Intervenors represent the views of four individuals whose credibility lies in our technical expertise. The Coalition consists primarily of associations, chambers of commerce and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers and constituencies from across the state whose credibility is based on its political and economic clout. 

Hopefully, the Coalition filing for a hearing will engender a response from the PSC.  There has been no hint of a response to the Independent Intervenor filing.  Perhaps the Coalition represents too big a constituency to ignore.

Some may say that the Coalition position is economically self-interested and therefore should be discounted.  They could also argue that the Independent Intervenors are not qualified to speak.  I think I can speak for both parties when I say we believe our concerns have never been openly discussed and addressed by the Hochul Administration.  All we want is the chance to make our case for the need to define affordability and reliability metrics that ensure safe, affordable, and adequate service.

Conclusion

I am encouraged that there is another group making similar arguments that the time has come to convene a hearing.  All my attempts have failed but maybe the Coalition will succeed in getting the PSC to convene a hearing.

Time to Reconsider the Climate Act Press Release

UPDATE: Two weeks after this was published I can safely now say that nobody I contacted responded. I thought that showing that $593 per month in added energy expenses would have prompted some kind of response.

A recent court decision and findings presented at the 1 December 2025 State Energy Planning (SEP) Board meeting present overwhelming evidence that implementing the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act)  as mandated will be unaffordable and the 2030 CLCPA 40% emission reduction target and 70% renewable energy in the electric system mandate will not be achieved.  I don’t think that most New Yorkers are aware of the Climate Act much less its potential impacts, so I prepared a press release that I distributed to various New York press outlets explaining why it is time to reconsider the Climate Act.   This article documents the findings included in the press release and refers to recent articles published on this blog.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two interim 2030 targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy and GHG emissions must be reduced 40%.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantified the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation. 

Note there is a second implementation law.  Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a renewable energy program, that requires the Public Service Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 electric system Climate Act requirements.  

Energy Plan Overview

In 2025 another overarching evaluation of the energy system was initiated.  According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) released the Draft Energy Plan last summer.  Stakeholder comments were accepted until early October.  The Energy Planning Board has the responsibility to approve the document. At the November 13, 2025 Board meeting there was a perfunctory description of the comments received.  There was another meeting on December 1 that presented results from additional analyses.  During the wrap up for the latest meeting Chair Doreen Harris said the Board will meet later this month to approve the plan. I have provided background information and a list of relevant articles on my Energy Plan page. 

Court Decision

On Oct. 24, 2025, there was an Albany County New York Supreme Court decision ordering the Department of Environmental Conservation to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed.   On November 3, I published an article providing detailed information about the decision. 

In another article I explained that during the legal process the State submitted a letter that addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Act.”  The letter argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”. 

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

The Judge acknowledged that this information was relevant but ruled that DEC must promulgate regulations implementing a law however persuasive their arguments it is inappropriate are. The Hochul Administration and DEC appealed the decision on November 25, 2025 claiming that “it is impossible for the Department to simultaneously comply with both the Court’s order and its substantive statutory obligations.” 

Energy Affordability

In addition to the Attorney General’s supplemental letter arguing that the Climate Act is unaffordable, there were findings presented at the State Energy Planning (SEP) Board meeting on December 1, 2025 that present extraordinary cost estimates.  My article on the Energy Affordability presentation at the meeting documents the projections for a moderate-income household in Upstate New York that uses natural gas.  My article found the difference between replacement of conventional existing equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment necessary for CLCPA compliance increases monthly average energy expenditures $593 when capital costs are considered. That number was in a slide but there was only passing mention of the cost.

I derived explanatory numbers from information presented at the SEP Board meeting.  The following energy affordability analysis slide summarizes the projection approach.  It explains that for eleven household profiles, NYSERDA evaluated future household and transportation energy expenditures for four cases involving different technology mixes and fuel types.  These “Illustrative Household Journeys” include:

  • Starting Point: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with average existing equipment
  • Conventional Replacement: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with new, more efficient equipment
  • Moderate Efficient Electrification: Some electrification of heating and transportation, with basic building envelope efficiency measures
  • High Efficient Electrification: More electrification of heating and transportation, with basic or medium building envelope efficiency measures, and efficient electric appliances

Slides were presented that describe the four journeys for several profiles.   My numbers were derived from the typical Upstate moderate-income household that uses natural gas for heat household profile.  This was the only profile that included all the information needed to project total cost.  In the following slide,  three projected “household journeys” reduce monthly energy expenditures relative to the current starting point.  However, buried at the bottom of the page is the notation that these values are “Average monthly expenditures. Does not include equipment costs”. 

It turns out that including equipment costs makes a difference as shown in the next slide.

I extracted information from these slides to prepare Table 1.  Rows 1-4 list the monthly energy expenditures with the total in row 5 from the first slide.  The increase in efficiency decreases monthly energy costs for all three journeys but that changes when CapEx is considered.  The CapEx monthly total cost in row 6 is available on the second slide.  However, the breakdown between the costs of a new plugin hybrid electric vehicle (moderate electrification) in row 7 and a battery electric vehicle (high efficiency electrification) relative to home energy electrification row 8 is not listed on the included slides.  I estimated the percentage of home electrification from the size of the blue bars on the right side of the second slide. (Row 10). When the CapEx costs are included all the projected alternative journeys are more expensive.  Row 9 lists the total monthly energy costs including the costs of equipment from the second slide.  The cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment.  Row 12 lists the $593 difference  necessary for Climate Act compliance and row 11 lists the 43% increase in energy costs. 

Table 1: Upstate New York Moderate Income Household That Uses Natural Gas for Heat Projected Monthly Costs and Costs Necessary to Comply with the Climate Act

The affordability messaging is embedded in this table.  I prepared an annotated transcript for this presentation that includes a heading for questions made during the meeting with a link to each person who commented or asked a question. I believe that this presentation and the questions asked was scripted to further the messaging of the Administration.  Chair Doreen Harris of the Energy Planning Board asked NYSERDA presenter James Wilcox about energy price uncertainty.  He admitted that the key driver of change over the next five years is “change in energy price”.  The modeling shows that this could increase household energy spending 3% to 8% in the starting point base case but could go up to as much as 14% to 19% even if they do nothing.  Chair Harris elicited a response from him that summarizes the public messaging: “That is what I was trying to elicit: What does doing nothing get you?”  Even if you do nothing costs could rise as much as 19%.  That is misleading because the equipment costs are the main causes of future cost not changes in energy prices.

The presentations emphasized that Climate Act costs are not the primary energy cost increase driver and that multiple factors beyond climate policy contribute to expected costs.  The other implementation cost message in the NYSERDA presentations is that the additional costs to meet the Climate Act mandates are smaller than expected cost increases.  This table quantifies that claim.  If this example household replaces its internal combustion car with another one and replaces household appliances with natural gas appliances total costs will go up $868 from $506 to $1,374.  The cost to meet the Climate Act mandates beyond conventional replacement is “only”  $593 more which is less than the cost of conventional replacement. 

I think the magnitude of these impacts are being downplayed as much as possible.  After I published my analysis I went to the Draft Energy Plan supporting documentation page and reviewed the Energy Affordability Outputs and Input Data spreadsheet.  The equipment costs are only provided as a sensitivity for one household. I think that this is by design because these costs are so extraordinary.  I believe these numbers indicate a serious energy affordability crisis is coming.  In my opinion, including an additional 43% cost increase is unconscionable.  New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.  New York cannot solve global warming by itself. 

Implementation Timing

I summarized my initial thoughts about the Pathways Analysis presentation at the December SEP Planning Board meeting.  The presentation found that neither the CLCPA 40% GHG emission reduction target nor the electric system 70% renewable energy mandate would be achieved on time.  The “Key Takeaways (3/3)” Slide (#31) in the meeting presentation states that “the state is currently not on track to meet the 2030 emission limit – Current Policies is estimated to hit 40% reduction in 2038 while Additional Action is estimated to hit 40% reduction in 2037.” 

The Electric Sector Results: Additional Action slide (#21) states that “Pace of additions leads to delayed achievement of 70% renewable to 2036-2040”.

Discussion

The Court Decision and the Energy Plan findings are not the only reasons given by state agencies that it would be appropriate to reconsider the Climate Act.  I described three other findings in an article last month. The New York State Comptroller Office audit of the NYSERDA and PSC  implementation efforts for the Climate Act was an early acknowledgement that the implementation plan needs to be revised.  The Public Service Commission (PSC) compared the renewable energy deployment progress relative to the Climate Act goal to obtain 70% of New York’s electricity from renewable sources by 2030. The final Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review Report document found that 2030 goal will likely not be achieved until 2033.  Finally, The Second Informational Report prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff described four feasibility concerns: the 2030 renewable energy target is “likely unattainable”, offshore wind faces major obstacles, transmission remains a “critical bottleneck”, and grid reliability challenges are mounting

There have been other recent articles arguing that New York has impossible targets.  David Wojick recently published an article explaining implementation issues that I backed up with observed data.  Tom Shepstone describes a New York Post editorial that cites a Progressive Policy Institute article that calls the Climate Act an “undeniable” failure.

These findings should inspire the Hochul Administration to amend the  Climate Act.  It is troubling that the SEP Board meeting presentations did not mention these ramifications in the presentation.  Furthermore, there has been no sign that the Hochul Administration or the majority leadership in the Legislature are amenable to considering amendments to the Climate Act.

Conclusion

I was motivated to publish this and distribute it to the media because these findings have significant implications for the future New York energy system.  In the near term, something must be done to reconcile the reality that the CLCPA schedule is too ambitious to have any hope of compliance.  More importantly, the findings described should become the basis for a discussion of more New Yorkers.  As it stands now New York energy policy is being guided by a small but extremely vocal and motivated constituency that does not understand the physics of the energy system.  Thomas Sowell has been quoted as saying: “It is hard to imagine a more stupid or more dangerous way of making decisions than by putting those decisions in the hands of people who pay no price for being wrong”.  In this instance, there is nothing more stupid or dangerous than ignoring the people who will pay the price if there are problems with the energy system.

Energy Affordability at Energy Planning Board Meeting on 12/1/2025

On December 6, 2025, I published an article describing my initial thoughts about the State Energy Planning Board (SEP) meeting on December 1 that discussed updated Pathways modeling for the State Energy Plan.  This post describes the presentations at the meeting that covered energy affordability.  I will cover the health benefits and employment analysis in another post.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Energy Plan Overview

According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) prepared the Draft Energy Plan last summer.  Stakeholder comments were accepted until early October.  The Energy Planning Board has the responsibility to approve the document. At the November 13, 2025 Board meeting there was a perfunctory description of the comments received.  During the wrap up for this meeting Chair Doreen Harris said the Board will meet later this month to approve the plan before the end of the year. I have provided background information and a list of previous articles on my Energy Plan page. 

Meeting Overview

There were three items on the agenda: approval of last meeting minutes, discuss analyses conducted for the Energy Plan, and consider any new business.  The recording of the meeting available here included a transcript.  I created an edited transcript for the Pathways Analysis presentation and a separate transcript for the energy affordability, health benefits, and employment presentations. These annotated versions include tables and headings.

In this meeting NYSERDA described the updated Pathways Analysis—the modeling exercise that underpins New York’s triennial State Energy Plan. In my opinion, the entire Energy Planning Board process is political theater.  The members of the Board were chosen mostly for political reasons and not technical expertise.  Everyone involved is going through the motions. 

My last post explained that the updated Pathways Analysis described in the first part of this meeting found that the 2030 Climate Act goals will not be achieved on time.  The aspirational schedule of the Climate Act was never realistic, and these results are simply acknowledgement of that fact.  The topics featured in the remaining sessions support the positive spin narrative that the Hochul administration is trying to convey to the public to save some face regarding Climate Act implementation.  This post will highlight key points of the narrative.  I want to emphasize that this narrative is based mostly on political messaging, so it is appropriate to assume that every NYSERDA point has been approved by the Hochul Administration.

Energy Affordability

James Wilcox presented the Household Energy Affordability Analysis Update. He said that NYSERDA “reviewed key analysis structure and assumptions based on stakeholder feedback and new data availability”.  The claim regarding review of stakeholder feedback is the first narrative speaking point.  There will be a subsequent post detailing how New York State agency claim that all stakeholder feedback was considered is unsupported by evidence.  While there are indications that some feedback from outside NYSERDA was incorporated in the updated analyses, later I will detail instances where comments inconsistent with the intended story line were ignored.

Wilcox summarized the updates:

  • For Base Case, moved to an electric and gas price forecast based on the trend of total bills from bill history
  • Added a higher energy price growth sensitivity based on the trend of total bills from recent bill history combined with recent DPS/utility projections
  • Although numbers have shifted, key takeaways remain the same
  • Net result from changes is a higher growth rate for electricity and gas rates

The affordability messaging has been consistent.  NYSERDA acknowledges that there are energy affordability challenges.  The Climate Act embeds environmental justice principles throughout its implementation framework, so descriptions include low- and moderate- income household impacts that are consistent with this narrative talking point,  Unsurprisingly, those households are “more likely to experience energy affordability challenges”.

The following energy affordability analysis slide explains that for eleven household profiles, NYSERDA evaluated future household and transportation energy expenditures for four cases involving different technology mixes and fuel types.  These “Illustrative Household Journeys” include:

  • Starting Point: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with average existing equipment
  • Conventional Replacement: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with new, more efficient equipment
  • Moderate Efficient Electrification: Some electrification of heating and transportation, with basic building envelope efficiency measures
  • High Efficient Electrification: More electrification of heating and transportation, with basic or medium building envelope efficiency measures, and efficient electric appliances

Slides were presented that describe the four journeys for several profiles.   The following example describes monthly expenditures for a typical Upstate moderate-income household that uses natural gas for heat.  Relative to the current starting point all three projected “household journeys” reduce monthly energy expenditures.  However, buried at the bottom of the page is the notation that these values are “Average monthly expenditures. Does not include equipment costs”. 

It turns out that including equipment costs makes a difference as shown in the next slide.

The Hochul/NYSERDA story is that monthly energy expenditures will go down when investments in moderate electrification or high efficiency electrification necessary for Climate Act compliance are made.  The public release sound bite press releases will emphasize that point and barely acknowledge that the costs that include the capital expenses (CapEx) for the equipment costs tell a different story.  I summarized all this information in Table 1.  The first four rows list the monthly energy expenditures with the total in the fifth line.  The CapEx monthly total cost is listed but the breakdown between the costs of a new plugin hybrid electric vehicle (moderate electrification) and a battery electric vehicle (high efficiency electrification) relative to home energy electrification is not provided.  I estimated the percentage of home electrification from the bars in the previous figure.  When those CapEx costs are included all the projected alternative journeys are more expensive.  Note that the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment necessary for Climate Act compliance increases monthly average energy expenditures $593, a whopping 43% increase in energy costs.  That is the cost of Climate Act compliance.

Table 1: Upstate New York Moderate Income Household That Uses Natural Gas for Heat Projected Monthly Costs and Costs Necessary to Comply with the Climate Act

The following key takeaways slide summarizes the messages that NYSERDA and Hochul want the Energy Planning Board and public to accept.  The first statement suggests that if households continue to use existing equipment that energy spending will increase.  But households “see gradually declining rates of energy consumption and total energy spending as more efficient equipment is adopted” then that “can help to offset energy price increases”.  That advocates going forward despite a tacit acknowledgement that it may not save money, just reduce the increase.  The final takeaway points out that according to their numbers transportation energy spending could offset incremental cost increases for home heating.  I cannot overemphasize enough that results from this kind of modeling are completely dependent upon input assumptions.  That means that the modelers can get any answer they want.  It is therefore very telling that these takeaways cannot avoid the conclusion that the transition will incur significant costs. The modelers could not completely avoid reality.

Ultimately, the question is how much will all this cost. During his presentation Wilcox stated: “What we can take away is that the net costs for efficient electrification journeys could be 35% to 40% higher than conventional replacement when accounting for equipment, reinforcing the importance of action to address upfront equipment costs so that households are able to access the benefits of these systems.”   NYSERDA is left hoping that there will be a magical solution that will reduce upfront costs so that the projections might be palatable.

The conclusions sums up the energy affordability messaging.  There is an energy affordability problem that impacts low- and moderate-income households more with the implication that focus on those households will improve the situation.  Energy costs impact both household and transportation spending.  This needs to be emphasized because NYSERDA cannot claim monthly energy benefits for many household profiles if transportation costs are not included.  Wilcox concludes the obvious point that “expected increases in energy prices highlight the importance of actions that can lower energy costs”.  In my opinion the point that doing nothing is the least impactful action is not acknowledged.  The importance of energy savings measures is highlighted.  However, I don’t think this will provide as many benefits as they do because this has been emphasized for decades so the simple fixes and obvious solutions have already been implemented.  It is easy to say that “Policy and market solutions that focus on lowering up-front costs” may make this more affordable, but no suggestions how that can be done or why anyone would expect that this may happen are offered.  Finally, there is the recommendation of all analysts that have no clue how to get the preferred answer to “do further research”.

Presentation Discussion Topics

The annotated transcript for this presentation includes a heading for questions made during the meeting with a link to each person who commented or asked a question. 

Chair Doreen Harris asked about the differences between Upstate and Downstate.  Wilcox explained that there are climatic differences, transportation patterns are different, and the predominant type of housing is different.  Harris followed up stating:

I think that’s important because that’s one of the reasons why we had to produce so many variations, right? Like, it reflects the diversity of our state in a way that means that the answer isn’t the same for everyone, depending on their own experience and the way they live.

Because I believe that this presentation was scripted to further the messaging of the Administration, I think it is telling that she wanted to emphasize impacts are not the same for everyone.  I am not sure why, however. 

The rationale for her second question about what happens if households do not upgrade is obvious.  The projections show that all replacement scenarios doubles costs so doing nothing is an attractive option.  Not only is that a great argument against an implementation schedule, but it establishes a significant public acceptance hurdle.  Wilcox admitted that the key driver of change over the next five years is “change in energy price”.  The modeling shows that this will increase household energy spending 3% to 8% in the starting point base case but could go up to as much as 14% to 19% even if they do nothing. 

The questions and answers went on:

Harris: “And then, James, maybe to kind of take those percentages in context, was it in that higher price sensitivity, a household that did nothing could see as much as one hundred dollars a month increased costs. Is that about right?

Wilcox: “Yeah. That’s correct.”

Harris: “So there’s a substantial increase with these energy prices for folks who don’t take any action. Thank you. That is what I was trying to elicit: What does doing nothing get you?

To summarize, the Chair of the Energy Planning Board was trying to elicit a specific point from her staff that there will be a substantial increase in energy prices even if people don’t take any action.  Her staff person Wilcox could have destroyed his career if he had pointed out that the minimum increase in any of the scenarios that replaced household and transportation equipment is 1.7 times greater than current costs which is far greater than the greatest impact of doing nothing which was 0.19 times greater.

After that the rest of the questions were a comedown.  There were suggestions that the new technologies might offer new opportunities that might somehow, someway, mitigate the cold equations that show this is unaffordable.  There was also a suggestion made that all would work out if New Yorkers used public transit.

Discussion

Presumably the Attorney General Office supplemental letter  that argued that promulgating regulations for the Climate Act target would cause “undue harm” used in the New York Supreme Court litigation was developed with the assistance of NYSERDA.  That letter claimed that the Climate Act mandates are infeasible due to excessive costs that are “unaffordable for consumers”.  All these numbers confirm that there are affordability issues.

This finding sums up Climate Act affordability.  For a moderate-income household in Upstate New York that uses natural gas the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment necessary for Climate Act compliance increases monthly average energy expenditures $593, a whopping 43% increase in energy costs. 

There are ten other household profiles.  The presentation did not provide sufficient information for a similar assessment of any of those other profiles.  The State Energy Plan document web page does not list any updates to the draft materials from last summer so I am not able to develop an overview of all the household profile results.  Also note that the documentation does not provide backup to the graphs and tables presented in the Energy Plan reports so this is no small task.

Conclusion

Any argument that the Climate Act transition will not be extraordinarily expensive can be refuted by using the data included in this presentation.  Coupled with the Pathways Analysis presentation described previously that found that neither 2030 Climate Act target will be met before 2036, the only appropriate course of action is to reconsider the Climate Act.  Given that it will require accountability by the politicians who got New York into this mess I am not optimistic.

Initial Thoughts on Energy Planning Board Meeting on 1 December 2025

Note: Updated on 12/10/2025 to add a slide 32 from the presentation

On November 13 I published an article describing my initial thoughts about the State Energy Planning Board meeting that day that discussed public comments on the Draft State Energy Plan document.  I had intended to follow up with another post providing more detail, but other projects got in the way.  This post describes the latest meeting held on December 1.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.  The focus of this article is how the results of the Pathways Analysis relate to Climate Act goals.  Note that I went so far as to request that the response be written up.

Energy Plan Overview

According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

I have provided background information and a list of previous articles on my Energy Plan page. 

Meeting Overview

There were three items on the agenda: approval of last meeting minutes, discuss analyses conducted for the Energy Plan, and consider any new business.  The recording of the meeting available here included a transcript.  I created an edited transcript that has headings and includes the slides.

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) prepared a Draft Energy Plan last summer.  Stakeholder comments were accepted until early October.  At the last Energy Planning Board meeting there was a perfunctory description of the comments received.  In this meeting NYSERDA described the updated Pathways Analysis—the modeling exercise that underpins New York’s triennial State Energy Plan.

Implementation Timing

Under New York’s own Climate Act accounting framework—the methodology that matters for compliance—no scenario modeled by NYSERDA hits the 40% economy-wide GHG reduction target by 2030. Not the “current policies” case. Not the “additional action” case. None of them.  Instead, the core planning cases achieve the 40% GHG emission reduction by 2030 mandate in roughly 2037–2038, a full 7–8 years later than the statute requires.  The 70% renewable electricity target by 2030 is also behind schedule.  Offshore wind permitting delays push that into the 2036–2040 window.

This is not a surprise to anyone closely tracking federal policy and state implementation. However, this is the first time that it is not necessary to read between the lines of the NYSERDA presentations.  NYSERDA laid it out in black-and-white.  The State is no longer pretending the Climate Act is on schedule.

Federal Rollbacks and Deployment Headwinds

The updated modeling incorporates two major factors that were not included in the draft plan.

The draft plan was counting on extensive Federal support but there have been policy changes. The modeling breaks this down by sector:

  • Across the electric sector: $25 billion in lost investment tax credit (ITC) and production tax credit (PTC) for renewables and related credits.
  • Buildings: ~$1.5 billion in lost heat pump and efficiency incentives by 2040.
  • Transportation: ~$4.5 billion in lost EV incentives, plus higher long-term fuel costs if the Advanced Clean Car and Advanced Clean Truck programs are also repealed.
  • Offshore wind deployment delays. Federal permitting obstruction and supply-chain headwinds are slowing the pace of offshore wind additions.
  • Offshore wind deployment delays. Federal permitting obstruction and supply-chain headwinds are slowing the pace of offshore wind additions. The 2035 offshore wind capacity in the modeling is below the 9 GW target, which cascades into delays across the entire renewable timeline.

The second factor is that issues with siting constraints are slowing the physical deployment of wind and solar deployment relative to the unrealistic presumptions in the Draft plan.  Offshore wind deployment delays because of changes in Federal permitting and supply-chain issues are slowing the pace of offshore wind additions. The 2035 offshore wind capacity in the modeling is below the 9 GW target, which cascades into delays across the entire renewable timeline.

Policy Implications

The Perplexity AI summary listed six takeaways.

  1. NYSERDA plainly states that the 2030 targets cannot be met using the Climate Act’s accounting as shown on the Key Takeaways (3/3) Slide 32 shown below.. However, the presentation just described this analysis result and not the implication that this means that the Climate Act must be amended to shift the schedule.
  • The building sector urgently need more aggressive policy actions to achieve Climate Act goals. The gap between current-policy building decarbonization and a net-zero-consistent path is large, and it’s growing. Stronger codes, more financing, larger direct-install programs, and targeted support for renters and low-income owners are all needed.
  • The transition of the gas system requires active management and investment. This isn’t a “let the market sort it out” situation. Utilities, the PSC, and the state need coordinated strategies for how gas infrastructure evolves over time—including decisions about when and where to invest in network modernization versus when to accelerate targeted electrification.
  • The presentation noted the importance of Dispatchable Emissions Free Resources (DEFR).  I disagree with the optionality adjective, however. There is nothing optional about the need for these new and unproven resources.  The description of green hydrogen illustrates why it won’t solve the problem. The presentation argues the state should be actively exploring, piloting, and supporting a portfolio of zero-carbon dispatchable technologies. RNG, long-duration storage, ammonia, and others all deserve serious development support.
  • Federal policy is now a binding constraint. New York can optimize its own policies, but it cannot outrun federal rollbacks. The state’s energy strategy increasingly needs to figure out how to replace Federal funding, procure projects to lock in tax credits before phase-outs, and re-structure policy design that works even if federal support evaporates.
  • Nuclear is back in the conversation, and that’s not a bad thing. The modeling shows that nuclear power, where available and deployable, reduces system costs and relieves pressure on renewables and DEFR. The presentation argues that the state should pursue the NYPA project, explore other Small Modular Reactor and advanced reactor opportunities, and think carefully about lifecycle extension of existing assets.

Stakeholder Comments

I am extremely disappointed with the stakeholder process.  In my comments at the first virtual public hearing and a subsequent written comment I explained that the lack of documentation on the disposition of stakeholder comments undermined the credibility of the process and the opportunity to improve the Energy Plan.  The only acknowledgment of the comments received is a promise that “all comments will be posted on the State Energy Plan website as soon as practicable”.  It has been two months since that promise was posted and the comments still are not posted.

This matters because the presentation at this meeting claimed the Pathways Analysis finds that the additional-action case generates net societal benefits of about $18 billion by 2040, with roughly $19 billion in aggregate net-present-value benefits through 2040, when carbon and health benefits are factored in.  However, in my unacknowledged comments I pointed out that the cost accounting in the Pathways Analysis “No Action” scenario only includes costs associated with the Climate Act law, not the cost to meet the Climate Act targets.  The misleading “No Action” scenario is not a baseline that excludes all programs necessary to achieve the Climate Act targets because it includes legacy programs in place prior to the Climate Act.  Furthermore, in other comments I identified issues that reduced the alleged benefits.  If costs and benefits were properly addressed, then I suspect that there would not be net societal benefits.

Discussion

I recently described the Oct. 24, 2025 New York Supreme Court decision and order in a case pitting environmental organizations against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC).  The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed. Importantly, during the trial , the Attorney General Office submitted a supplemental letter  that argued that promulgating regulations for the Climate Act target would cause “undue harm” because the Climate Act mandates are infeasible due to excessive costs that are “unaffordable for consumers” to bear.  Subsequently, DEC appealed the decision which postpones resolution of the problem.

The rationale for the Judge’s decision coupled with the acknowledgement that the costs are unaffordable and the updated Pathways Analysis finding that the 2030 targets cannot be met using the Climate Act’s accounting methodology should mean that the Climate Act itself needs to be amended.  This important finding was not mentioned in the presentation.  Furthermore, there has been no sign that the Hochul Administration or the majority leadership in the Legislature are amenable to considering amendments to the Climate Act.

There is another aspect to this.  The Climate Act is not the only law that includes the mandates for the net-zero transition.  New York Public Service Law § 66 “Establishment of a renewable energy program” describes energy systems that are prohibit some of the findings in the updated Pathways Analysis.  It appears to me that this legislation also needs to be amended.

I will follow up with another post on this meeting because there are more issues that I did not address.

Conclusion

Reality bats last.  The findings of the updated Pathways Analysis reflect that fact.  The aspirational schedule of the Climate Act was never realistic, and these results are simply acknowledgement of that fact.  It remains to be seen how the identified problems and the implicit feasibility concerns described will be addressed.  Given that it will require accountability by the politicians who got New York into this mess I am not optimistic.

Implications of New York State 2025 GHG Emissions Inventory

This post describes the latest New York State (NYS) GHG emission inventory report that provides data through 2023.  A recent post explained why the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) 2030 target for a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 1990 levels was impossible.  It included GHG emissions data through 2022 so this report updates that assessment.  It also describes implications of other aspects of the inventory results.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  In addition GHG emissions are supposed to be 40% lower than the 1990 baseline.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation. 

NYS GHG Emissions

The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) released the 2025 statewide GHG emissions report (2025 GHG Report) at the end of November, a month earlier than recent releases.  DEC is required by the Climate Act to follow unique inventory requirements.  Four years ago I published an overview post of this greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory that described things that maximize emissions in an apparent attempt to make GHG emissions as large as possible. 

The 2025 GHG Report includes the following documents:

The Summary Report for the GHG Inventory gives an overview of the highlights.

In 2023, statewide gross GHG emissions were 354.06 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent GHGs (mmt CO2e) using CLCPA accounting. Total gross emissions in 2023 were 14.8% lower than the 1990 baseline in this report and 13.6% below the 1990 statewide emission baseline adopted in regulation in 2020. Carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) comprised the largest portion of emissions by gas, 58% and 35% respectively, and energy was the largest source of emissions (73%). Net emissions were 316.58 mmt CO2e in 2023, which includes a net 37.48 mmt CO2e removed.

Note that the 1990 total gross emissions calculated in this analysis were different than the those calculated when the 1990 statewide emission baseline was adopted in regulation in 2020.  The implications of this will be discussed later in this post.  The Summary Report goes on:

Emissions in New York State in 2023 have mostly recovered from the effects of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. As noted in the two previous versions of this report, 2020 emissions were not considered representative and were expected to normalize to broader trends in future reports. Annual gross emissions in 2023 were less than 0.1% higher than in 2022 and 4% lower than the pre-pandemic levels in 2019. This trend is primarily the result of energy sector changes. Energy emissions in 2023 were 10% higher than in 2020, and 1% lower than in 2022. Within the energy sector, these trends were driven by the gradual recovery of energy sector subsectors such as transportation and a change in electricity generation sources. Some of the trends in energy emissions are also affected by seasonal weather patterns and interannual differences in the demand for heating or cooling.

When a New York state agency says “change in electricity generation sources” they cannot state the obvious that this is the result of poor energy policy.  The changes in sources were caused by the politically motivated decisions to shut down two zero emissions Indian Point nuclear units and reject the permits to repower old and inefficient natural gas fired power plants.  The Draft Energy Plan and multiple New York Independent System Operator reports clearly show that both nuclear power and fossil generation resources are needed to maintain electric system reliability.

The Summary Report goes on:

Greenhouse gas emissions from the extraction, processing, and transmission of imported natural gas greatly decreased for years 2020-2022 relative to the 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report due to updated data and methodology. This report uses an updated fuel lifecycle analysis model made available by the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL 2025) that estimates GHG emissions from natural gas systems based on year 2020 operating conditions. Note that use of the updated model reduced statewide greenhouse gas emission totals for years 2020-2022 compared to the totals included in the 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report. More details about the changes to the data and methodology underlying imported natural gas emissions are included in Sectoral Report #1: Energy.

Two points to keep in mind about this paragraph.  New York’s unique GHG emission accounting methodology not only includes the use of different global warming potential but also includes upstream emissions.  This means that most results cannot be compared to other jurisdictions.  The second point is that this inventory relies on emission factors instead of direct emission measurements.  As a result, updates to data and methodology mean that emission totals change.  This will be discussed below.

2023 GHG Emissions

Table ES.2 in the Summary Report presents emissions for different sectors and different greenhouse gases.  There are four Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sectors and there are four  sectoral reports for energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, forestry and land use, and waste.  The table also includes United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) totals that use the “conventional accounting used by other governments, applies a 100-year GWP (IPCC 2014), omits biogenic CO2, and does not include emissions outside of New York State.”  These are the only data that can be compared to other jurisdictions. 

In my recent post I claimed that the 2030 40% emission reduction target was impossible. According to the Final DEC Part 496 regulation, 1990 emissions were 409.78 MMTCO2e.  I used DEC’s 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report, covering data through 2022, that revealed that New York emissions as of 2022 were 371.08 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2e) from Table ES.2 in the 2024 report.  Using these numbers NYS had only achieved a 9.3% reduction in gross GHG emissions from 1990 levels.  Table ES.2 in the 2025 report states that NY emissions were 354.06 MMTCO2e) at the end of 2023. 

2030 40% Reduction Mandate

The Climate Act requires a 40% reduction of GHG emissions by 2030.  Table 1 compares the current GHG inventories performance relative to th4 40% reduction mandate.  At the end of 2023 the reductions since 1990 using the Part 496 state limit were only 14% lower.  The fact that 2022 had slightly higher emissions reinforces the observation that the 2030 goal is impossible.

Table 1: Statewide GHG Emission Inventory Report Emissions Relative to Climate Act 2030 Mandate (mmt CO2e GWP20)

Emission Reduction Trend

The 2025 GHG Report describes emission trends:

Total statewide gross emissions in 2023 were 14.8% below 1990 and 24.5% below 2005 levels, when assessed using CLCPA accounting and the most up-to-date methodologies. Figure ES.1 shows overall trends in statewide emissions by gas on an annual basis, including gross and net emission totals, as well as the emission limits for 2030 and 2050 pursuant to ECL § 75-0107 and 6 NYCRR Part 496. Statewide emissions are 13.6% below the 1990 baseline used in the Part 496 regulation. Statewide emissions for 2020 are also described in this report but are not representative of historic nor current conditions due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Currently, the data for Figure ES.1 are not available.  When it becomes available, I will dive into the trends.  In the meantime, Table 3 extracts individual trend tables from each of the sectoral reports for energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, forestry and land use, and waste.  The only emission categories that have reduced emissions in excess of 40% are the energy “other fossil fuel use” and “electricity transmission” categories but both total only 1% of the inventory.  Total emissions increased in the Industrial Process and Product Use Sector “product use” category; the AFOLU Agriculture Emission Sector “livestock” category; and the Waste Sector “waste combustion” and “wastewater” categories.  The increases in emissions were in categories that total 14% of the inventory.

Table 3: Summary of Sectoral Emission Trends

Annual Variation of the GHG Emission Inventory

I previously mentioned that 1990 total gross emissions calculated in this analysis were different than the those calculated when the 1990 statewide emission baseline was established by ECL 75-0107 and reflected in 6 NYCRR Part 496. It is important to understand that GHG emission inventories are not based completely on measured emissions.  The power plant emissions used in EPA trading programs are based on direct measurements, but the estimates in this inventory are derived using emission factors and estimates of activities such as fuel use or vehicle miles traveled. 

Table 3 illustrates how this affects the status relative to the 2030 emission limit.  All the emission inventories have estimated a different 1990 value than the regulatory limit in Part 496.  The Sum 1990 Gross Total row lists the different numbers.  The rest of the table shows how these differences affect the comparison of current emissions to the 2030 limit.

Table 3: Annual Statewide GHG Emission Inventory Report Emissions Relative to Climate Act 2030 Mandate (mmt CO2e GWP20)

The variation in the emissions estimates is significant.  The sectoral GHG emission reports list data for 1990, 2005, and the last five years.  Table 4 presents the standard deviation and range of observed data for 1990, 2005, and 2019 for the last five reports for different sector emission categories.  Note that the total range of variation for 2019 emissions is 12.18 million metric tons of CO2e.  In this report the total 2019 emissions were 367.25 million metric tons of CO2e so variations in methodology are about 3% of the total estimated emissions.

If you take the time to dive into the details of Table 4 one thing stands out.  The main driver of the observed variation range is the estimate for the “out of state energy” category in the energy sector. The 2019 variation range was 13.47 million metric tons of CO2e.

Table 4: Standard Deviation and Range of Observed Emissions from Last Five GHG Emission Reports

Implications Discussion

There are several implications for the GHG inventory.  Most important relates to the Climate Act target for a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 1990 levels by 2030.  In 2023 statewide emissions were only 14% lower than 1990 and there is no suggestion that the rate is increasing so this confirms that the achieving the 2030 goal is impossible.

This article quantifies the variation of emissions estimates. This emission inventory relies on emission factors instead of direct emission measurements, so future variations are to be expected.  Changes due to reporting sources and improvement of the emission factors used will be a feature of program going forward.  The question is how it gets handled.  The report notes “The 6 NYCRR Part 496 regulation may be revised at a later date using updated information.”  For any affected source trying to determine their control strategy this uncertainty complicates planning.  Worse, in the face of changing numbers, New York Cap-and-Invest Program compliance will be more challenging.  Finally, when there is a price on carbon, say $10 per ton, the methodology changes will affect millions of dollars of costs.

Finally, I want to emphasize that this report illustrates that New York “follows the science” when it is convenient but ignores the consensus when politically expedient.  In particular, the GHG emissions accounting is inconsistent with the UNFCCC.  Note that the largest driver of the observed variation in emission estimates across reports is the “out of state energy” category in the energy sector.  There are reasons that the UNFCCC methodology does not include upstream emissions and one of them is the challenge of estimating those emissions consistently.

Conclusion

The 2025 GHG emission inventory reports is another warning regarding Climate Act implementation.  It is clear that the 2030 GHG emission reduction target cannot be met.  There are unacknowledged challenges inherent in the emission inventory approach that will make the Cap-and-Invest program implementation more challenging.

New York’s Impossible 2030 GHG Emissions Target

David Wojick recently published an article describing why New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) 2030 GHG emission mandate to reduce New York State 1990 GHG emissions 40% by 2030.  This article supplements his article with numbers and additional context.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

David Wojick is an independent policy analyst and senior advisor to Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT). As a civil engineer with a Ph.D. in logic and analytic philosophy of science, he brings a unique perspective to complex policy issues. His specializes in science and technology intensive issues.  I correspond regularly with him on New York issues.

Supplemental Number for the Article

Wojick’s article is an overview of the challenge and impossibility of the Climate Act 2030 interim GHG emission reduction goal. He explains:

New York Governor Hochul has told the Court her administration cannot write the regulations required to enforce the Climate Act’s 2030 emission reduction targets because they would be infeasible and ruinously expensive to New Yorkers. For all practical purposes, they are actually impossible, so the law must be changed. The legal situation is explained in my article “New York’s climate law hits the wall” here:

He provides a brief qualitative analysis of the impossibility.

The law calls for a 40% reduction in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions from the 1990 levels by 2030. According to state data, the emissions have already been reduced by 10% leaving a whopping 30% to go in just four years.

The Department of Environmental Conservation’s 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report, covering data through 2022, revealed that New York emissions as of 2022 were 371.08 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2e) from Table ES.2 in the report.  According to the Final Department of Environmental Conservation Part 496 regulation, 1990 emissions were 409.78 MMTCO2e.  Using these numbers NYS has achieved only a 9.3% reduction in gross GHG emissions from 1990 levels.

Table ES-2: 2022 New York State GHG Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by IPCC Sector

Click to access summaryreportnysghgemissionsreport.pdf

Table ES-2 lists data in four CLCPA sector categories.  I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to describe and summarize these sectors.  The Energy sector is the dominant source (75%) of GHG emissions in New York State, accounting for about 282 MMTCO₂e in 2022. The Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU) sector covers emissions from manufacturing processes and the use of manufactured products, accounting for approximately 6% of total gross emissions (24.29 mmt CO₂e in 2022).  The

Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) Sector encompasses emissions from agricultural activities, livestock management, and soil practices, as well as carbon sequestration from forests, wetlands, and harvested wood products. In 2022, agricultural emissions totaled 21.49 mmt CO₂e (6% of gross emissions).  The Waste sector covers emissions from managing and treating waste materials, accounting for approximately 12% of total gross emissions (43.45 mmt CO₂e in 2022). This sector is unique in New York’s inventory because it includes emissions from waste exported to out-of-state facilities, addressing potential emission leakage.

Wojick describes the reasons for the observed reductions. 

Most of the reductions occurred in just two ways that are similar to America as a whole. Foremost, is a switch from coal to natural gas in electric power generation. Second, is the loss of manufacturing, helping to make China the industrial center of the world. Neither of these reduction measures is available or feasible to help hit the remaining 30%.

Table 1 from the Part 496 Revised Regulatory Impact Statement lists 1990 emissions for the CLCPA sectors used in ES-2.  The following table has been supplemented with the 2022 observed emissions.  Note that there have been reductions in the energy and waste sectors but increases in the IPPU and AFPLU sectors.   This supports Wojick’s assertions that observed reductions have come from the energy sector.

Table 1. Total Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1990 by IPCC Sector and Gas, in GWP20.

Click to access revisedris496.pdf

Wojick breaks down the potential for additional emission reductions.

According to EIA, roughly 50% of New York’s energy consumption is from petroleum. About 80% of this is transportation fuel, especially gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. It is clearly impossible to reduce transportation by 30%. In some cases, electrification is technologically feasible, but it cannot possible be done at the needed scale in just four years.

This is especially true given much of the transportation is from out of state vehicles. New York stands between New England and the rest of America, so it gets a huge amount of through traffic.

In addition, an estimated 20% of New York households heat with fuel oil. Winters are very cold, so we are not about to cut that by 30%.

The next biggest source is natural gas, which accounts for about 30% of energy consumption, not counting electricity generation. Roughly 60% of households are heated with natural gas as are most larger buildings, such as apartments, co-ops, offices and stores. Here again, while electrification is theoretically possible, it cannot possibly be done in just four years.

Table ES-3 from the most recent emission inventory lists emissions by economic sector.  The type of fuels used are not included but this table supports Wojick’s arguments.

Table ES-3: 2022 New York State GHG Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by Economic Sector

Click to access summaryreportnysghgemissionsreport.pdf

Wojick points out that the Climate Act accounting includes unique provisions to account for imported fuels and imported electricity.

A big extra complication is that the emissions to be reduced by 30% include those out of state emissions created by producing imported electricity and fossil fuels. This might include emissions from things like Texas refineries and Pennsylvania coal fired power plants. New York obviously has no control over these sources.

Here is the Climate Law’s incredible definition of the emissions that need to be reduced: “”Statewide greenhouse gas emissions” means the total annual emissions of greenhouse gases produced within the state from anthropogenic sources and greenhouse gases produced outside of the state that are associated with the generation of electricity imported into the state and the extraction and transmission of fossil fuels imported into the state.”

New York imports almost all of the huge amounts of petroleum and natural gas that it uses. These out of state emissions are likely to be a significant fraction of those that are required to be reduced 30% in just four years.

Plus of course, there are the emissions from electric power generation. Roughly 40% of the natural gas consumed in New York is used to generate electricity. About 54% of the generated electricity is powered by natural gas versus just 15% from renewables, mostly hydro. These numbers can be little changed in just four years.

The sum of the imported fuels and imported electricity category GHG emissions in Table ES-3 is 63 MMT CO2e or 17% of the total emissions.  Those emissions are beyond the control of New York to reduce. 

Climate Act Global Warming Potential

There is one aspect of the impossible target not addressed by Wojick.  The Climate Act uses a unique GHG accounting methodology.  This is a particular problem for me. I used Perplexity AI to provide a summary of the reasons I have described on this blog why I think the use of 20-year global warming potential emissions accounting is inappropriate.  The reason that these values are used is because the authors of the Climate Act had an irrational obsession with methane because they thought that the global warming potential of methane is much greater than carbon dioxide.  However, as the summary shows, the use of a 20-year global warming potential is scientifically flawed and politically motivated. ​In brief, the parameter measures the ability of a molecule of a greenhouse gas to reduce long wave radiation (the greenhouse effect) in the laboratory.  In the atmosphere where proponents worry about greenhouse effects on global warming, saturation effects, relative impacts on black body radiation and actual concentrations make the global warming potential relative of methane to CO2 insignificant.

Tables ES-2 and ES-3 from the 2024 GHG report list the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) GHG emissions.  This is the International Treaty aimed at addressing climate change.  It includes established specific guidelines to report and compare emissions data using a global warming potential measured over 100 years instead of the 20 year parameter used in the Climate Act.  New York proponents for climate change claim to follow the science but in this instance, they chose to ignore the established science.  As a result, it is impossible to track New York’s progress relative to the rest of the world.

As a practical matter the Climate Act accounting increases emissions.  In 2022, total GHG emissions using the GWP-20 units were 371.08 MMT CO2e but are only 192.13 MMT CO2e using the UNFCC GWP-100 units. Table 2 from the Part 496 Revised Regulatory Impact Statement lists 1990 emissions for the CLCPA sectors used in ES-2.  Note that 1990 emissions were 317.92 MMT CO2e compared to 409.78 MMT CO2e using GWP-20.  Furthermore, when compared to the 2022 emissions total emissions are down 39.6% – very near to the 40% 2030 mandate!

Table 2. Total Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1990 by IPCC Sector and Gas, in GWP100

Click to access revisedris496.pdf

Discussion

Wojick concludes:

New York State cannot cut emissions by the required 30% in just four years, so the 2030 target of the Climate Act is impossible. The legislature must change the law, and the Court has given them until February 6 to do so. After that, the Court says it will impose the Climate Law, which would be incredibly harmful.

When the reported numbers are considered the conclusion that New York State cannot make the 2030 40% GHG emission reduction target is confirmed.  However, if the GWP-100 GHG emission accounting methodology is used a 40% reduction from 1990 by 2030 only needs a further 1% reduction from current emissions.  There is a caveat to this observation.  While this suggests that the 2030 reduction target is possible, the fuel switching and loss of manufacturing emission reductions that were the cause of the observed reductions will not provide significant future reductions.  Future reductions will require replacement with zero emissions resources no matter what the accounting methodology.  Those strategies are much more difficult and costly.

Although changing the accounting methodology would be a potential political approach to achieve compliance for the Hochul Administration, this is unlikely.  In the spring of 2023, her Administration floated the idea of changing the metric undoubtedly because of these numbers.  Climate Act activists melted down when that was proposed and the idea was shelved.

In my opinion, Wojick correctly points out that the law must be changed in response to the recent legal decision he referenced.  These data are just one of a long list of other reasons that I think that Climate Act implementation should be paused and the lessons learned since 2019 incorporated in a new implementation schedule.  I believe that evidence is overwhelming that the aspirational targets should also be modified to include affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions constraints.

Conclusion

David Wojick and I agree that the Climate Act 40% reduction by 2030 target cannot be met using the existing GHG accounting methodology.  My numbers confirm everything he said in his article.

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment Implications

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA ) recently announced the completion of its Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment (Zero by 40 Report).  The report directly addresses what I think is the biggest reliability risk of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero electric system transition.  I previously summarized the report and described the technologies evaluated in a second article. This post describes the implications of the report findings relative to the future of the Climate Act.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate a summary of the report used to outline this commentary and to provide references included in this document. 

Overview

The current focus of Climate Act implementation is on meeting the interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030 and the all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040 mandate. My previous post provides more background. 

The Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated a process to “identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target.”  This class of technologies has been dubbed Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR).  The Zero by 40 Report responds to that order.

An overview of Climate Act compliance must also consider Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-P (Renewable Energy Program).  That law establishes the 70% by 2030 renewable energy mandate and zero-emissions by 2040 target under the Climate Act. It establishes which technologies qualify as “renewable energy systems”.  Those technologies include solar thermal, photovoltaics, onshore and offshore wind, hydroelectric, geothermal electric, geothermal ground source heat, tidal energy, wave energy, ocean thermal, and hydrogen fuel cells (excluding fossil fuel-based generation).

There is one other Climate Act consideration.  On Oct. 24, 2025, the New York Albany County Supreme Court issued a decision on litigation against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC).  The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026, or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act modified.  At the time of this writing, the Hochul Administration has not indicated how it will respond. 

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment

I admit that I was not familiar with the term “technoeconomic”.  When I looked it up, I found that there is another similar term “techno-economic analysis”.   The difference is relevant.  Technoeconomic assessment is an adjective that describes an analysis that includes both technical and economic factors.  A techno-economic analysis is a formal process that compares the technical and economic performance that informs decision making.  This report is a technoeconomic assessment but what we need is a techno-economic analysis.

The Zero by 40 Report is like the Scoping Plan and Draft Energy Plan because they all address technical and economic factors but do not include a feasibility analysis supporting a particular proposed pathway.  None of these reports provide comprehensive, technology-specific cost estimates that would allow direct comparison of technologies to each other and to conventional alternatives.  There are also technological considerations that are noted but not resolved in all three reports.  A techno-economic analysis would provide the details necessary to determine feasibility of a future system meeting the legal mandates of PSL 66-P.

DEFR Definition

The Zero by 40 Report expands the situations where DEFR technology will be needed to close the gap between available resources and load projections in the zero-emission electric system.  Prior to this report, DEFR requirements focused on extended periods during coldest and hottest weather events where there will be insufficient generation from renewable energy systems.  This addressed the inconvenient fact that observed peak loads occurred during periods of low renewable resource availability.  The additional DEFR concerns noted in the report reflect increased acknowledgment that there is more to a zero-emissions electric system than the technologies listed in PSL 66-P.

In this report the DEFR technologies were classified into three categories:

  1. Low-capacity factor resources that can be deployed during periods of high demand and low renewable generation, offering reliability, fast-ramping capabilities, and no duration limitations, assuming fuel availability, but are not operated as baseload units due to plant economics.
  2. High-capacity factor resources operate the majority of the year and can provide reliable baseload power, including power during challenging events, but are less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops.
  3. Gap-rightsizing resources can help balance supply and demand to adjust the capacity gap. While they do not generate electricity directly, they enhance the utilization of other clean resources.

The original DEFR concern focused only on the peaking hours.  The Zero by 40 Report explains that high-capacity factor DEFR is best suited to operate most of the year providing reliable baseload power.  The report notes that these technologies can provide power during challenging events, but these resources are “less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops.”  This means that to provide the required backup for the PSL 66-P renewable energy systems this category of DEFR will not be used as designed.  When resources are used inefficiently it necessarily means higher costs.

Timing Considerations

An important implication is the lack of urgency with this process.  The report states that “electric system modeling will be needed to understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions, which falls outside the scope of this study.”  The PSC order that directed NYSERDA to address this problem was initiated in May 2023.  The Department of Public Service (DPS) convened a two-day technical conference on December 11,  2023, but other than the process that defined “zero emissions” and now the release of this report nothing else happened in this proceeding related to DEFR.

The PSC, New York Independent System Operator and independent analysts all agree that DEFRs are needed.  Before we can determine how to implement the Climate Act electric system consistent with PSL 66-P renewable energy resources it is necessary to determine if it is feasible.  Every day the plan for DEFR backup is delayed the costs associated with what may be a false solution increase.  If there is no viable DEFR solution, then the PSL 66-P renewable energy resources approach cannot be implemented. 

There is another timing consideration.  The conclusions in the Zero by 40 Report describe actions that can facilitate the readiness of DEFR to achieve the scale needed for 2040.  Those actions include:

  • Pursue a diverse set of resources to minimize the risk of overreliance on individual technologies
  • Start early to increase the likelihood of readiness by 2040.
  • Invest in grid-enhancing technologies early to minimize the need for backstop resources.
  • Invest in innovation to enhance resource viability
  • Develop strategies across industries for unlocking key resources with infrastructure hurdles.
  • Engage early with technology developers, end users, and other stakeholders.
  • Conduct grid modeling to understand tradeoffs of relying on different resources.
  • Conduct a regular reassessment of options and remain flexible as new technology options come online.

In my opinion, there is very little reason to expect that the required DEFR support will be available in 2040.  It is not necessary to spend a lot of time referencing quotes in the Zero by 40 Report supporting that position because these recommended actions support that conclusion.  References to early action and the need for innovation are all you need to know that the report implicitly admits the schedule is in doubt. Importantly, if there are delays addressing these recommendations then successful DEFR deployment needed to achieve the 2040 mandate is impossible.

Feasibility

The Zero by 40 Report is proof that DEFR technologies are needed to make the PSL 66-P renewable resource electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability.  Clearly a feasibility analysis is needed to determine if acceptable DEFR technologies are possible.  However, before one can begin, definitions for affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions need to be established because acceptability standards determine “feasibility”.

The New York Albany County Supreme Court decision requires the DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026, or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act modified.  Given all the evidence suggesting that the 2030 GHG emission target cannot be met, establishing regulations that cannot be achieved is inappropriate.  If DEC goes to the Legislature, then both the schedule and the aspirations of the Act should be reassessed based on what has happened since the Climate Act was enacted.  The Zero by 40 Report supports changing the aspirations of the Act. 

If there is a reassessment of the Climate Act, then the Legislature should establish definitions for affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions, mandate a feasibility analysis, and require that implementation only proceed if feasibility relative to the constraints is proven.  Once implementation begins, status relative to those metrics should be assessed regularly and if the boundary conditions are exceeded, then implementation should be halted.

Discussion

There is a lot of useful information in this report.  I did not address the specifics issues associated with the DEFR technologies evaluated.  The conclusions in the report support my position that DEFR technologies are not ready to support the PSL 66-P renewable energy resources mandated by politicians. 

Importantly, there is still no plan to propose a specific resource mix based on feasibility.  The Zero by 40 Report calls for electric system modeling to “understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions” but does not admit that the DEFR technologies might fail a comprehensive feasibility assessment based on affordability, reliability risks, and environmental impacts.

Even if feasible DEFR technologies are found, the Climate Act schedule needs to be re-assessed.  This report calls for additional work, but there is no urgency by the PSC to offer a plan to get there.  The Order that initiated this report was filed 28 months ago in May 2023.  If it takes another 28 months before the recommendations to take early action are evaluated, defined, and implemented that could too late to ensure these resources are available when needed.

Conclusion

This report provides multiple reasons that New York State needs to pause Climate Act implementation.  Future action should only proceed if reliability requirements are ensured and this report identifies issues that may make that impossible.