January February 2026 Winter Weather Proves the Need for DEFR

Last month I took an initial look at the impact of the January 23-27 winter storm on wind and solar energy production.  I showed that  dispatchable  emissions free  resources (DEFR) are necessary to achieve net-zero in New York.  This post extends my analysis through the end of the cold snap ending on February 9, 2026.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.

In a recent article I noted instances where Governor Hochul and Public Service Commission Chair Rory Christian have raised the possibility for limited changes to the Climate Act interim targets.  A recent article by Emily Pontecorvo summarizes the Green Energy Blob take on decarbonization but does not mention reliability risks of renewable energy.  Those folks do not understand that electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind and wintertime solar resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

I summarized the weather and load impacts of the January 23 – February 9 extreme weather episode in a recent post that was based on two New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) documents: a presentation titled Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations (“Winter Operations”) by Aaron Markham, NYISO Vice President Operations and the February 2026 Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  This post relies on two additional NYISO sources of data:    New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard and the January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report.

NYISO Daily Energy Production

Figure 1 combines the net wind and solar performance data figures from the Operations Performance Metrics reports for the 2026 Winter episode.  It shows that solar energy production was near zero during and immediately after the snowstorm.  I interpolated data off this figure for the analysis described below.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January and FebruaryOperations Performance Metrics Monthly Reports

©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

Table 1 combines data from the dashboard and the Operations Performance Metric reports.  I have previously described my use of the dashboard real-time fuel mix data to calculate daily energy use (MWh).  The generator types include real-time fuel mix data base “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil. Two renewables are shown. “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind from the NYISO real-time fuel mix data base.  That source is also used for “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood.  The performance metric reports break out the wind, utility-scale solar, also known as Front of the Meter (FTM) solar, and the rooftop top solar, also known as Behind the Meter (BTM) solar total daily production and capacity factors.  In this table, I subtracted the FTM solar data from the Performance Metric Report data. 

Table 1: Daily NYISO Energy Production (MWh) January 23 to February 9, 2026

Table 2 includes two data sets.  The top table lists resource capacity (MW) from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report for solar and wind resources.  The main body of the table lists the calculated renewable daily energy (MWh) for each parameter and the renewable percentage of the total system energy based on my analysis of the real-time fuel mix data.  Note that wind and solar produced less than 10% of the total energy production for 17 consecutive days during an extremely cold period with high loads and seven of those days had renewable production under 5% of the total generation.

Table 2: Resource Capacity (MW) from Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report, Calculated Renewable Daily Energy (MWh), and Realtime Total System Energy (MWh)

Table 3 combines a table from Markham’s Winter Operations presentation that summarizes the load and weather from January 23 through February 9 and the daily capacity factors calculated using Table 2 data.  Markham pointed out that:

  • Highest peak load (24,317 MW) occurred on Saturday, 2/7, aligning with the lowest HB18 temperature (6.1oF) and highest wind speed (19.3 mph) during the period
  • SCR/EDRP was called, which reduced the measured peak load by an estimated 400 MW

NYISO documents are heavy on jargon.  HB18 temperatures means the load‑weighted average New York Control Area temperature during hour beginning 18:00 (6–7 PM).  “SCR/EDRP” refers to two reliability-based demand response programs: Special Case Resources (SCR) and the Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP).  Were it not for those programs the peak loads would have been around 400MW higher.

The capacity factor results are particularly important for the Public Service Law 66-P renewable energy program component of the Climate Act.  This law mandates increased use of renewable energy.  For the days when the electric system was stressed enough that the NYISO requested demand response programs note that on the renewable capacity factor on the best day was 18%. That result is because of weather conditions and will not change appreciably however much new renewable capacity is added.  As a result, if, for example, the NYISO determines that they need another 1,000 MW of energy, then providing that using renewables will require at least 5,000 MW of capacity.  That is for the best case!  To cover the 24th of January 10,000 MW of additional renewable energy capacity is needed.

Table 3: New York Control Area Weather and Peak Load Statistics and Renewable Capacity Factors for January 23 to February 9, 2026

Dark Doldrum

This episode is a great example of what the Germans call “Dunkelflaute” and I have called the dark doldrums.    This refers to episodes when solar resource availability is reduced due to the length of day or clouds and there are light winds.  Based on this episode we know that dark doldrums impacts can be exacerbated by the snow that covered solar panels with enough snow to eliminate production (Figure 1).  Note that most rooftop solar in New York City is essentially flat so snow cover is this is a significant issue there.  I am going to have to amend my worst weather label to “snowy dark doldrums”.

DEFR and Peaking Units

In an article last month I showed earlier that these conditions are the fundamental driver of the need for DEFR.  It is disappointing that clean energy advocates have continued to argue that the size of the DEFR gap has been overstated even after all the agencies responsible for electric system reliability argue otherwise.  These results should put those arguments to rest.  In this analysis, I take a slightly different approach to demonstrate both the need for DEFR and dispute arguments that things like Virtual Power Plants can replace the need for DEFR and existing electric system peaking power plants.

In New York State, peaking power plants have been vilified by environmental advocates because they emit more pollutants and are expensive to operate during peak demand periods. However, their essential role in providing power when the grid is most strained is often overlooked, as some proponents argue that their output can be replaced by expanded demand response programs, energy storage systems, and Virtual Power Plants (VPPs)

My analysis of the January data and VPP showed that the lack of renewable energy recharge means that the short-term energy storage systems will be completely exhausted early in a snowy, dark doldrum event and will not be recharged for days.  This raises the question why we would want to invest in something that may save some short tern money, but when it inevitably fails the costs will be greater than the savings and potentially threaten lives in the ensuing blackout.

One rationale for virtual power plants (VPPs) is that they could reduce or even eliminate the need for peaking power plants. Estimating how much electricity peaking units produce compared to other fossil-fired plants involves considerable interpretation. However, it is clear that oil-fired power plants operate as peaking units—the high cost of oil relative to natural gas ensures they are dispatched only when needed to meet peak demand.

Figure 2 from the Winter Operations presentation lists the Real-Time Dispatch schedule of alternative fueled units during the 2026 extreme winter weather episode.  In other words, this represents the shows the use of oil-fired units.  Two fuels stand out: Ultra Low Sulfur Oil (ULSO) and Oil #6.  ULSO is burned in New York City at several of the vilified peaking power plants.  There are a small number of oil-fired steam boilers that use residual oil (#6).  The Winter Operations report notes that an estimated 2 million MWh were produced from liquid fuels during this period.

Figure 2: Alternative Fuel Mix Plot for January 23 – February 9, 2026

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

These observations allow us to estimate how much additional renewable capacity would be required to replace the 2 million MWh supplied by oil. The total renewable energy produced over this period was 469,308 MWh.   During peak load periods with limited renewable output, it is likely that all short-term energy storage would be depleted early, leaving insufficient renewable generation to both meet demand and recharge storage systems. The overall renewable capacity factor in this episode was only 10% so replacing the oil-fired generation would require expanding renewable capacity from the current 10,389 MW to approximately 100,000 MW. This level of expansion is clearly unrealistic, reinforcing the conclusion that DEFR is essential.

Discussion

Large wind and solar capacities do no good when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow.  This period exemplifies a period where that situation is evident.  Addressing this problem is a major concern of the NYISO resource planners. 

I wish I could say that Governor Hochul understands the magnitude of this challenge.  Alas,  Governor Hochul recently claimed that “Since I have been Governor, more than $88.7 billion has been invested in clean energy through programs that have made us an example for the rest of the nation.”  I am not sure that investments that produced less than 10% of the total energy production for 17 days during an extremely cold period with high loads is an example anyone else would want to emulate.

My last concern is that DEFR is indispensable for a renewables heavy system, yet there is still no concrete plan to commercialize and deploy any DEFR technology at the scale required. Significant technical, economic, and regulatory uncertainties remain for all proposed DEFR options, so assuming that a viable solution will simply emerge in time amounts to taking an extraordinary reliability risk with the bulk power system.

If nuclear ultimately proves to be the only practical DEFR candidate, then a grid architecture centered on wind, solar, and short duration storage cannot be implemented reliably without large scale nuclear generation. However, nuclear power is best suited to continuous, high capacity factor operation, so holding it in reserve as an infrequently used DEFR “backup” misuses the technology and wastes its economic advantages.

Nuclear generation instead should serve as the backbone of a decarbonized electric system, providing the bulk of firm capacity and energy, with wind, solar, and storage playing complementary roles. In that case, the only realistically workable path to deep decarbonization may be a nuclear centered system model, implying that large scale investment in a wind , solar , and storage only strategy would amount to pursuing a “false solution” that cannot stand on its own without nuclear support.

Conclusion

The extreme winter weather episode of January 23 – February 9, 2026, has major implications for New York Climate Act implementation.  The current debate about the possibility for limited changes to the Climate Act interim targets has focused on cost impacts.  However these unacknowledged  findings of reliability risks make an equally strong case for consideration of changes to the Climate Act.

NYISO Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations – Weather and Loads

Last month I wrote a couple of articles about the January 23-27 winter storm and its ramifications on a future electric system that depends upon wind and solar and how it demonstrated that Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR) will be needed.  This article describes New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) documents that extend the previous analysis through February 9.  The following documents were on the agenda for the NYISO Operating Committee March 19, 2026 meeting: a presentation titled Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations by Aaron Markham, NYISO Vice President Operations and the February 2026 Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  This article is limited to the description of the weather and resulting loads.  I will follow up on the implications to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) later.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040. 

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated weather-dependent resource variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

January and February Winter Weather

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

Markham’s presentation summarized the cold weather event from January 23 through February 9:

  • Coldest stretch of the 2025/2026 winter season with a daily average temperature of 15.2oF.
  • Central Park was below freezing from 1/24 to 2/1 (9 days); longest consecutive day stretch since December 2017-January 2018 (14 days)
  • Albany was below freezing from 1/23 to 2/10 (19 days); longest consecutive day stretch since January 2011 (21 days)
  • Minimum temperature (-0.1o F) occurred on Sunday, February 8th and was the lowest of the season
  • Essentially equal to the Winter 90th percentile design condition (0oF)
  • Average season minimum: 3.8o F (2004-2005 to 2024-2025)

Figure 1: Observed Hourly Temperature and Wind Speed 1/23/26 to 2/9/26

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

NYISO Real-Time Fuel Mix

New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  These data include links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State.  I processed that data to calculate hourly averages.  The generator types include “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind; “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil.  Note, my calculated values are not completely compatible with the final NYISO values. 

Figure 1 graphs all the fuel mix hourly data and Table 1 summarizes the data. The relative average fuel mix energy provided over these ten days was nuclear 19%, hydro 14%, and fossil fuels 62% totaling 94% of the total.   

Figure 1: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix (MW) January 24 to February 9, 2026

Table 1: Summary of Daily NYISO Realtime Fuel Data Mix (MWh) January 24 to February 9, 2026

These data do not show the contribution of wind and solar well.  “Other Renewables” includes solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood. The methane, refuse and wood facilities show up as the relatively constant base in Figure 3.  Assuming that the 63 MW of energy storage is too small to show up, that means that the utility-scale “front-of-the-meter” solar shows up as the daily green peaks.  The snow arrived in New York on the night of 24 January and continued through the next day.  Note that utility solar was essentially zero on the 25th and did not return to the level of the 24th until February 2nd.

Figure 3: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix Other Renewables and Wind January 24 to February 9, 2026

Loads Markham’s presentation summarized the load from January 23 through February 9:

  • Highest peak load (24,317 MW) occurred on Saturday, 2/7, aligning with the lowest HB18 temperature (6.1oF) and highest wind speed (19.3 mph) during the period
  • SCR/EDRP was called, which reduced the measured peak load by an estimated 400 MW

NYISO documents are heavy on jargon.  HB18 temperatures means the load‑weighted average New York Control Area temperature during hour beginning 18:00 (6–7 PM).  “SCR/EDRP” refers to two reliability-based demand response programs: Special Case Resources (SCR) and the Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP).

Table 1: NYCA Weather and Peak Load Statistics For January 23 to February 9, 2026

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

This article is not going to describe the SCR/EDRP resources and what these results mean but I will define what they mean.  Special Case Resources (SCR) are demand response or behind-the-meter generation resources enrolled in the ICAP market that commit to be available to reduce load when NYISO calls an emergency event.  Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP) is an emergency-only demand response program that pays for voluntary load reductions during NYISO-declared emergencies but does not provide capacity payments.

These resources do impact observed load as shown in Figure 4.  The blue bars represent the observed load and the light green the estimated reduction in load due to the SCR/EDRP programs.  The dotted lines represent the projected daily peak load from the NYISO annual load and capacity data report universally known as the “Gold Book”.  The P50 load forecast is the “most likely” baseline forecast.  Tt represents the expected New York Control Area (NYCA) load under expected future weather conditions, with the load-modifying impacts already included. The P90 estimate is the weather-uncertainty “stressed weather” forecast case for a colder-than-expected winter peak episode.  Demand during three days during the cold snap were about equal to the baseline peak load forecast of 24,200 MW.  If the SCR/EDRP demand response programs were not available, then five days would have exceeded the baseline forecast topping out at 24,717 MW on 2/7/26. 

Figure 4: Daily Peak Load and Estimated SCR/EDRP Impact

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

Figure 5 puts the peak loads in perspective. The cold weather this winter was the second lowest winter average since 2010-2011.  The winter 2025–2026 peak load (24,317 MW) occurred on February 7th and was the highest winter peak since 2018-2019.  Note that the SCR/EDRP demand reduction programs reduced the peak by an estimated 400 MW and was activated eight days.  There were 33 daily peak loads in excess of 22,000 MW which is the most since winter 2014–2015

Figure 5: Winter 2025–2026 Daily Peak Loads In Perspective

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

Renewables vs. Load

The NYISO Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations summarizes the NYCA renewables and load for the January and February portions of the cold snap in Figures 6 and 7.  Relative to the total load it is clear that wind and solar under performed during the event.  By 25 January solar output was essentially zero and did not provide much support until 4 February. 

Figure 6: NYCA Renewables vs. Load – January 23 – 31, 2026

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

Figure 7: NYCA Renewables vs. Load – February 2 – 9, 2026

Source: Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations Presentation to NYISO Operations Committee March 19, 2025 ©Copyright NYISO 2026. All rights reserved.

The observed lack of solar is an important result.  It shows that when there was a large snowstorm, all the solar resources in New York produced virtually nothing to support the system when there were significant peak loads.  Wind performed better but still was only a small component of the total generation.  It is impossible to resolve this by building more solar and wind because all New York weather-reliant generating resources ares correlated.  One way to resolve this is to build energy storage but the amount of storage necessary is overwhelming.  All the responsible projections for future energy resources that rely on solar and wind resources agree that a new dispatchable emissions-free resource (DEFR) is needed for these situations.

Discussion

This article simply describes the observed renewable energy production and loads during the episode with the day with this winter’s coldest temperature and peak load.  Solar resources performed poorly during the episode and on the days when the wind gave out the need for DEFR is unquestionable.  I intend to follow up with another post describing the implications to future electric resource planning.  I expect that NYISO will incorporate their observations of this winter’s weather in their planning.  I would not be surprised if revisions result in substantive changes.

Conclusion

The results provided confirm my prior assertions that wind and solar fail to support the system when needed most. Proponents of the Climate Act fail to recognize that electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand and that this winter’s weather shows how risky the dependence on wind and solar will be without DEFR. 

Time to Reconsider New York’s Climate Act

New Yorkers now have hard numbers showing that the Climate Act is not just ambitious environmental policy – it is a massive, regressive cost shift onto households that Albany never honestly explained.  The good news is New Yorkers can demand that the Public Service Commission consider Public Service Law 66‑p(4), which explicitly authorizes the Commission to temporarily suspend or modify Renewable Energy Program obligations if they impede safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.  Clearly the Climate Act impedes affordable electric service and this article explains how you can submit a comment.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for approving the Scoping Plan prepared by New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” NYSERDA also prepared the recent State Energy Plan that was approved by Energy Planning Board (EPB).  Three recent events call the timeline and ambition into doubt. 

Safety Valve

New York Public Service Law § 66-p (4) “Establishment of a renewable energy program” includes safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability.   Section 66-p (4) states: “The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”. 

The Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world constraints. The Commission has both the authority and the obligation to act.

New York Cap-and-Invest

A leaked NYSERDA memo to the Hochul administration finally quantifies what the Climate Act economy-wide New York Cap-and-Invest program would mean for everyday energy prices. By 2031, the memo projects that cap‑and‑invest could add $2.23 to a gallon of gas on top of whatever motorists are already paying at the pump. It also warns that upstate oil and natural gas households could face gross annual cost increases in excess of $4,000, with New York City gas households seeing around $2,300 more per year.

The response from supporters has been negative.  On March 5, 2026, a group of 29 New York Democratic state senators responded with a letter (“Democratic Letter”) to Governor Hochul saying they “categorically oppose any effort to roll back New York’s nation leading climate law” and urging Hochul to “stand strong in the face of misinformation” about affordability.  The letter states that the memo is “based on a specific Cap & Invest program design that has not been shared with the public and clearly does not include any price guardrails, with a completely unrealistic carbon price.”  I agree that this is a new design scenario but what the senators fail to understand is that this design forces compliance.

Those numbers do not come from critics of the law; they come from the state’s own modeling of a cap-and-invest program that includes no guardrails for high carbon allowance prices.  The modeling shows that allowance prices starting around $120 per ton and rising toward $180 per ton by 2031 are necessary to force emissions cuts fast enough to comply with the Climate Act mandates. In other words, the policy path required by the statute to meet Climate Act goals is intentionally designed to drive up fossil fuel prices until families change behavior, whether they can afford to or not.

State Energy Plan Affordability

While there has been much discussion about the cap-and-invest costs, the household costs buried in the NYSERDA Energy Affordability analysis underpinning the 2025 State Energy Plan have not made the news. In public‑facing materials, the agency emphasized that electrification and efficient equipment could lower monthly utility bills for many households when you look only at energy expenditures. But a close look at the data annex and the underlying analysis reveals a very different story once the cost of buying the required equipment is included.

For an upstate, moderate‑income household that uses natural gas for heat, NYSERDA’s own analysis shows that the levelized costs to replace fossil fuel systems and vehicles with the “zero‑emission” equipment required to comply with Climate Act goals adds about $594 per month—roughly a 43% increase in monthly energy‑related costs in 2031 compared to a conventional replacement path. That equates to $7,000 per year and reflects the combined impact of new electric heating systems, building envelope upgrades, and electric vehicles necessary to match the state’s mandated trajectory. When people ask what “decarbonization” means for their pocketbook, an extra $7,000 a year for a moderate‑income upstate family is a concrete, sobering answer.

Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy Petition

The Public Service Commission’s recent notice on the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy’s petition is a major crack in the façade. That petition invokes Public Service Law §66‑p(4), which explicitly authorizes the Commission to temporarily suspend or modify Renewable Energy Program obligations if they impede safe, adequate, and affordable electric service. In response, the PSC issued a formal notice on January 28, 2026, soliciting comments on whether the Climate Act’s 66‑p renewable targets should be suspended or adjusted.

That step is not routine housekeeping; it is a legal acknowledgment that the Legislature included a safety valve into the statute because it recognized that rigid mandates could collide with grid reliability and affordability. The Coalition—representing businesses and civic groups—argues that current renewable procurement obligations, layered on top of rising costs and reliability concerns flagged by the New York Independent System Operator, meet exactly that standard. When the agency charged with keeping the lights on invites public input on whether to invoke the safety valve it is effectively admitting that “full speed ahead” on the current timeline may no longer be responsible public policy.

Discussion

Taken together, these three developments paint a consistent picture that should worry anyone who cares about both the environment and ordinary New Yorkers’ standard of living. NYSERDA’s cap‑and‑invest memo admits that hitting statutory targets on the current schedule requires fuel price shocks and thousands of dollars per year in added household energy costs. The PSC’s notice shows that the state’s own regulator is now weighing whether renewable mandates under the Climate Act have crossed the line into threatening safe, adequate, and affordable service—the core mission it cannot ignore. And NYSERDA’s Energy Affordability analysis, once you include levelized capital costs, demonstrates that “electrify everything” is not a free lunch but a sustained 40‑plus percent increase in monthly costs for a representative upstate family.

Supporters will argue that long‑term climate benefits justify near‑term pain and that subsidies or future technology breakthroughs will ease the burden. But the state’s own documents show that the current design front‑loads costs onto today’s ratepayers and motorists, with no guarantee that promised benefits will materialize on schedule or be distributed fairly. Given that New York emissions are less than half a percent of global emissions there is no reason to expect any climate benefits.  When an environmental law collides this sharply with affordability, reliability, and public acceptance, clinging to the original timetable becomes less about science and more about political stubbornness.

Nothing in the Climate Act’s text requires New York to ignore new information or double down on obvious implementation problems. In fact, §66‑p(4) explicitly anticipates the need to pause or modify obligations when they jeopardize safe, adequate, and affordable service. The leaked NYSERDA memo, the PSC’s comment solicitation, and the energy affordability findings together meet that threshold: they show that the current path imposes disproportionate burdens on moderate‑income households, risks higher fuel and power prices statewide, and may stress a grid already wrestling with reliability warnings.

What You Can Do

The Commission  invited interested stakeholders to submit comments by March 30, 2026, on the Petition filed by the Coalition.  Comments provided in response to the notice should reference “Case 22-M-0149.” Comments should be submitted electronically by going to http://www.dps.ny.gov, clicking on “File Search” (located under the heading “Commission Files”), entering “22-M-0149” in the “Search by Case Number” field, and then clicking on the “Post Comments” box located at the top of the page.

If you do not want to develop your own comments please consider the following that can be copied into the post comment prompt.

I support the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy’s petition requesting that the Commission hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-p(4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).

PSL 66-p(4) provides that the Commission “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  A PSL 66-p(4) hearing is essential to evaluate whether the Renewable Energy Program, as currently implemented, is compatible with safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.

Safe and adequate service is imperiled by declining reliability margins documented by the New York Independent System Operator.  Acceptable reliability risks associated with the Renewable Energy Program have not been defined so the public has no assurance that the declining margins are safe.

Transmission deficiencies threaten reliable delivery.  New transmission is needed to get the renewable energy collected to where it is needed.  If this transmission is not available, then the energy supply will not be adequate.

The affordability crisis demands a hearing because safe and adequate is only possible if it is affordable.  A PSL 66-p(4) hearing is needed to define acceptable affordability metrics that can be tracked.

Multiple independent sources confirm the need for a hearing.  State agencies, the Attorney General Office, the NYISO and others have identified schedule and ambition issues associated with the Climate Act implementation that affect the viability of the Renewable Energy Program.

The Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world constraints. The Commission has both the authority and the obligation to act.

Conclusion

Reconsidering the Climate Act does not mean abandoning climate goals; it means aligning them with reality. A hearing should find that that the program as currently structured impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.  Then it could layout a path going forward that would include revisiting timelines, allowing a broader range of low‑carbon technologies, and explicitly capping household cost impacts so that climate policy does not become a de facto energy tax on working families. New Yorkers were promised a “clean, resilient, and affordable” energy future; now that the state’s own analysis shows how far current plans fall from that promise, it is not only appropriate but necessary for the Public Service Commission to address their obligation to provide safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.

Calling Questions “Climate Denial” Won’t Keep the Lights On

On February 26, 2026 the Hochul Administration “leaked” a New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that said that “full compliance with New York’s 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act could cost upstate households more than $4,000 a year – on top of what they are already paying today”. On March 5, 2026, a group of 29 New York Democratic state senators responded with a letter (“Democratic Letter”) to Governor Hochul saying they “categorically oppose any effort to roll back New York’s nation leading climate law” and urging Hochul to “stand strong in the face of misinformation” about affordability.  The letter insists that any pushback on the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) amounts to “climate denial” and that only their “bold” agenda will save New Yorkers money, clean the air, and protect a livable climate for our grandchildren. That framing gets the politics right, but the facts are wrong.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for approving the Scoping Plan prepared by New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” NYSERDA also prepared the recent State Energy Plan that was approved by Energy Planning Board (EPB).  Both the CAC and the EPB were composed of political appointees . 

I am not a climate denier.  The climate is always changing, and greenhouse gases affect climate, but the authors of the Democratic Letter do not acknowledge that climate uncertainty, natural variability, or observational constraints call for a realistic response. . I spent my 50-year career as an air pollution meteorologist working with real emissions, real regulations, and real power plants. The most disappointing aspect of the letter is that there is no recognition that as Dr. Matthew Wielcki has said  “energy is not merely an input to the economy, but the foundation of human flourishing”.  The question before New York is not whether climate change exists, but whether the package of mandates in the Climate Act is feasible, affordable, and effective. When it comes to those practical issues, the facts don’t sit well with the people throwing around the “denier” accusation.

Costs

Start with costs. When the Climate Act was passed, there was no honest, front‑end feasibility and cost analysis. Only after the targets were locked into law did agencies begin publishing scenarios showing the scale of spending required. Those scenarios all assume massive expansion of the electric grid, rapid electrification of heating and transportation, and large‑scale deployment of wind, solar, and batteries. None of this comes free. We are already seeing rising bills, growing arrears, and households struggling with basic energy costs, even before the most aggressive requirements take hold.

These lawmakers do not understand that NYSERDA’s cost estimates for the Climate Act Scoping Plan and the State Energy Plan are built on modeling choices that systematically understate the burden on New Yorkers: they embed Climate Act programs inside opaque “system” totals, use a “No Action” baseline that already includes other greenhouse‑gas policies, and present small percentage changes instead of the several‑hundred‑dollar‑per‑month increases that households will actually face. 

For example, the NYSERDA memo notes “absent changes, by 2031” that “Upstate oil and natural gas households would see costs in excess of $4,000 a year”.  I believe that these costs are underestimated.  Using State Energy Plan December 2025 data I determined costs to buy the equipment to meet the Climate Act household mandates for an Upstate New York moderate income household that uses natural gas for heat.  NYSERDA’s Affordability Analysis Overview Fact Sheet claims that the use of new, efficient equipment can cut energy spending by $100 to over $300 per month, but those estimates do not include the costs of equipment.  When equipment costs are included, the difference in monthly energy costs and levelized equipment costs between replacement with conventional equipment and electrification equipment consistent with Climate Act goals is $594 a month or $7,200 per year. For the only scenario where NYSERDA included equipment costs sum of those costs and those in the NYSERDA memo total compliance costs are $11,200 a year.

If these policies truly “saved New Yorkers money,” we would not need to hide behind slogans and carefully worded “average household savings” claims that depend on subsidies and optimistic modeling assumptions. We would see transparent accounting of rate impacts, program costs, and who pays when things go wrong. Instead, we get talking points and attacks on anyone who asks for a balance sheet.

Pollution

The pollution story is similarly oversold. New York dramatically cleaned up its air decades ago. We now live in one of the cleanest air basins in the country by traditional criteria pollutants. Additional greenhouse gas reductions here may be desirable, but they do not magically translate into big local health improvements when we are already near the floor. On climate itself, New York’s emissions are a tiny fraction of the global total. Even if we somehow hit every target in the Climate Act on time, the effect on global temperature would be too small to measure.

That does not mean “do nothing.” It does mean we should stop pretending that blowing up our energy system on an unrealistic timeline is a gift to the world’s climate and will have sufficient societal co-benefits to offset the actual costs. New York can and should reduce emissions, but it must do so in ways that maintain reliability, preserve affordability, and respect the limits of what one state can accomplish.

Reliability

The biggest gap in the “bold policy” rhetoric is reliability. A livable climate for our children and grandchildren does not include routine blackouts, shuttered industries, and a grid that fails under stress. Yet the very same politicians who decry “denial” are remarkably casual about the technical challenge of running a winter‑peaking system in a cold climate on weather‑dependent generation backed by storage that does not yet exist at the necessary scale.

Many lawmakers do not understand the electric system and advocate for a flexible electric grid.  They don’t understand that the electric system must be built around reliability during peak demand because that is when it is needed the most.  That is why utilities must invest so much in preparation for peak times.   While that adds to costs it  is also why ratepayers are assured power is always available.

The Climate Act proposes a weather-dependent electric system.  We already know what happens when extended periods of low wind and sun line up with high demand. Europe has experienced it and this winter’s weather showed what will happen in New York when there is a dark doldrum period where both wind and solar underperform for days. NYISO data clearly shows that the January 24-27 snowstorm caused both the utility-scale and rooftop solar resources to go to essentially zero on January 25th at the height of the storm.  The subsequent period of cold weather prevented melting of the snow covered panels through the end of the month.  On January 31, the winds tailed off and the total renewable energy resources only provided 2% of the total energy.  The current plans still have no proven, affordable solution for these worst‑case conditions, even as dispatchable fossil units are pushed toward early retirement. That is not bold; it is reckless.

Discussion

Calling anyone who raises these concerns a “denier” is a way of avoiding the hard work of fixing the plan. It flips reality on its head. The truly irresponsible position is to insist that the laws of politics can overrule the laws of physics and economics, and to dismiss the engineers, grid operators, and analysts who point out the contradictions.

New Yorkers deserve better than this false choice between blind faith in an untested transition and caricatures of anyone who dissents. A responsible path forward would:

  • Admit that the current schedule and mandates are not aligned with demonstrated technology and cost.
  • Use existing safety‑valve and review provisions to pause, reevaluate, and correct course where needed.
  • Prioritize reliability and affordability as co‑equal goals with emissions reduction, not afterthoughts.
  • Be honest about New York’s tiny share of global emissions and focus on scalable innovations that others might actually adopt.

You can call that pragmatism, skepticism, or just basic due diligence. What it is not, under any honest definition, is “climate denial.” If New York’s climate agenda is as strong as its supporters claim, it should be able to survive tough questions from people who pay the bills and rely on the grid. If it cannot, the problem is not the questions.

Virtual Power Plant Misinformation

A recent article in New York Focus, How a More Flexible Grid Could Save New York Billions, received widespread New York media coverage.  Unfortunately, the claims that VPP can provide reliable power falls apart under close examination.  I believe it was misinformation because it presents false information that was not created or shared with intention of causing harm.  I wrote this article because this kind of false information is leading New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) transition to net-zero efforts towards a false solution.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Implementation plans have called for a cleaner, more distributed system that minimizes load variations consistent with the virtual power plant (VPP) approach.

VPP terminology was used in the predecessor Reforming the Energy Vision program.  In the Climate Act Scoping Plan and last year’s State Energy Plan the concept has been repackaged as Distributed Energy Resources”.  In draft Energy Plan comments, the New York Solar Energy Industries Association stated:  “By doubling down on distributed energy resources, New York can lower costs, strengthen the grid, and sustain one of its most successful clean energy industries.”

This article describes errors that I think support my belief that this clean-energy industry promise is another miracle technology that will not support the system when needed most.  All the promised savings and good intentions will vanish when people freeze or suffer in the dark.

How a ‘Flexible’ Grid Works

The New York Focus article was written by Jack Carroll and Colin Kinniburgh.  Kinniburgh has a knack for explaining technical concepts well for the general public.  The article describes VPP:

In a traditional electric grid, power flows essentially in one direction: from central power plants to homes and businesses. In a “flexible” grid, powered in part by virtual power plants, those homes and businesses take on a new role. Not only can they supply power back to the grid with rooftop solar and batteries, but their devices — smart thermostats and electric vehicles, for example — can communicate with each other and with grid operators to respond to the system’s demands.

Under the traditional model, utilities have to keep an army of power plants, substations, and wires on standby at all times, in preparation for peak times like hot summer days. The costs of maintaining that system show up on every energy bill, even when customers are using less energy.

“It’s built for the hottest couple of days or hours of the year, but customers are paying for it all year long,” said Richard Kauffman, who served as the state’s energy czar from 2013 to 2019 and chaired the board of the energy authority NYSERDA until last year.

The more you use technology to spread out demand and adapt to the grid’s needs, the less utilities rely on costly infrastructure to meet the peak — and the less utility spending shows up on customers’ bills.

I think this is a good description of the concept, but it contains a fundamental flaw.  The electric system must be built around reliability during peak demand because that is when it is needed the most.  That is why utilities must “keep an army of power plants, substations, and wires on standby at all times, in preparation for peak times”.   While the “costs of maintaining that system show up on every energy bill” that is also why ratepayers are assured power is always available.  This is the first mistake.

Many VPP advocates have the naïve belief that if there are enough distributed energy resources that peaks will be eliminated and there will be no need for peaking resources.  Others know better but continue to argue otherwise.  There is no better example of those who should know better than the politically connected former New York energy czar Richard Kaufmann.  He parrots the talking point that building the system for peaks costs money and insinuates that there is a better way.  In my opinion he cannot be trusted because he has a massive personal financial interest in this false information.  I used Perplexity AI to research his connection to the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act “gold bars” controversy.  The Perplexity AI report describing his connection includes the following quotes:

Richard Kauffman did join one of the organizations that received IRA “gold bars” funding. He became CEO of the Coalition for Green Capital (CGC) in January 2025 — a nonprofit that had been awarded $5 billion from the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund under the Inflation Reduction Act.

Kauffman’s career trajectory — from Obama DOE advisor, to New York energy czar under Cuomo, to NYSERDA board chair, to CGC board member, and finally to CEO of a $5 billion GGRF recipient — illustrates the tight interconnection between government clean energy policymakers and the nonprofit organizations that subsequently received billions in IRA-funded grants.

In April 2024, the EPA selected CGC as a recipient of $5 billion under the National Clean Investment Fund. Coalition for Green Capital (CGC) had originally requested $10 billion in its application. Career EPA reviewers flagged several concerns during the application process:

  • CGC had “only expended $1.42 million in 2023 before receiving a $5 billion award”
  • “Of the 71 expected hires, more than 20% would be making salaries more than approximately $450,000”
  • CGC’s “assumption of deploying $10 billion in the first fiscal year of performance seems unattainable”
  • “FY2022 and 2021 financials show a net loss with declining fees for service income”

In my opinion, the value of a reference from a crony capitalist with a salary of more than $450,000 is worthless because of his vested interest in a particular response.  This quote is the second mistake in this article.

Pilot Study

Orange and Rockland (O&R) initiated the Innovative Storage Business Models (ISBM) pilot with Sunrun as a REV Demonstration Project approved by the Public Service Commission (PSC) that was referenced in the Carroll and Kinniburgh article.  The goal of the pilot is to test an innovative residential solar-plus-storage VPP business model to “optimize and deliver clean energy, provide dispatchable grid services and reduce costs for customers.”

I used Perplexity AI to also document the technical specifications. It found that the program deploys residential solar-plus-storage systems across O&R’s service territory in Orange and Rockland counties, aggregating them into a dispatchable virtual power plant that provides grid services during peak demand periods.  The ISBM Project’s design specifications, as established in O&R’s June 2020 Initial Filing Letter to the PSC, include:

  • Customer installations: Approximately 300 residential solar-plus-storage (Brightbox) systems
  • Solar capacity: Approximately 2.9 MW of distributed rooftop solar
  • Energy storage capacity: Approximately 2.1 MW / 4.7 MWh of distributed battery storage
  • Aggregate VPP size (after 3-year deployment): 2 MW / 4 MWh
  • Program duration: 10-year demonstration period with 25-year customer lease agreements
  • Target deployment locations: 15 distribution circuits identified by O&R as having distribution value

The solar array panel at each home was designed to provide 110 percent of the annual average and the battery was designed to provide between 8 and 12 hours of essential load for the homeowner. The battery energy more than the homeowner’s needs contributes to the 2.1 MW VPP that can provide 4.7 MWh.  The VPP pilot could provide 2.1 MW for a little over two hours. 

According to the Perplexity summary, the VPP achieved the following milestones in Summer 2024:

  • Enrolled systems: 325 O&R customers contributing approximately 2 MW of aggregated capacity
  • Dispatch events (summer 2024): Called on 18 times to provide electricity to the grid during peak demand events
  • Dispatch events (2025 heat wave): In June 2025, Sunrun completed its fourth dispatch event in a single week in New York, helping relieve stress on congested circuits
  • The VPP was described as having supported dozens of peak electricity demand events during the summer of 2024, with home batteries supplying stored solar energy to help stabilize the electric grid.

Carroll and Kinniburgh state that: “The 350 households participating can deliver close to 50 megawatts of power to the grid at peak times — about enough to supply Calderon’s entire small town of Warwick for a couple of hours.”  This is the third mistake.  The actual capacity is about 2 megawatts so the quotation is off by 25 times.

Virtual Power Plants Reliability Support

The third mistake is minor but the claims that VPP are a viable solution to reliability problems is serious.  The following quote from the article claims that some experts have demonstrated that the VPP network can replace an average sized gas plant.

The New York Independent System Operator, the nonprofit that manages the state’s grid, has warned that New York may not have enough energy to meet demand over the next decade, as large energy users like data centers come online and the state electrifies homes and transportation. New York City, it said, could face a gap as soon as next summer. Even last summer, NYISO had to activate emergency protocols during a worse-than-expected heat wave. 

In response (and to some controversy), NYISO recommended the state delay the retirement of multiple fossil fuel plants, including high-polluting peaker plants in New York City, and strongly consider the construction of new ones.

Some experts argue that virtual power plants offer a cheaper, cleaner way to close the gap. A 2023 Brattle analysis found that the networks can backstop the grid as reliably as an average-sized gas peaker plant, for about half the price.

Renewable advocates focus on energy production, but power systems are built around reliability during peak demand. If you look at the grid through the lens of accredited capacity, that is, capacity that can be relied upon during peak demand – instead of average energy, the resource allocations for different technologies look radically different. 

Because I don’t have time to read and evaluate every article referenced, I again used Perplexity to review the Brattle Group’s 2023 analysis.  The Executive Summary of the response states:

The Brattle Group’s May 2023 “Real Reliability: The Value of Virtual Power” report—prepared for Google—compared the cost and reliability of virtual power plants (VPPs), natural gas peakers, and utility-scale batteries in providing 400 MW of resource adequacy for an illustrative mid-sized utility. Rather than explicitly modeling extreme multi-day renewable droughts (sometimes called “Dunkelflaute” events), the analysis addressed low renewable availability indirectly through its net load methodology and deliberate selection of operationally challenging system conditions. This approach has significant implications for interpreting the study’s reliability conclusions

The fatal flaw in the Brattle analysis is that the approach used did not address the extreme events that affect peak demand adequately.  The analysis focused on individual peak hours/days, not sustained multi-day low-output periods that are associated with peak demand.  The inevitable problem can be illustrated using observations from the January 2026 winter storm.

January 2026 Winter Storm

I recently described the effects of this storm on the New York grid over the last ten days of January.  Wind and solar resources during the January 24 to January 27, 2026 winter storm were impacted during the storm.   The NYISO January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report includes a graph of net statewide wind and solar performance total daily production and capacity factors (Figure 1).  The data clearly show that the snowstorm caused both the utility-scale and rooftop solar resources to go to essentially zero on January 25th at the height of the storm.  Utility-scale generation came back slowly but had not returned to before storm levels by the end of the month.  Rooftop solar never exceeded more than 5% energy availability over the ten days and was only 2% the last four days of the month.  The period of prolonged sub-freezing weather prevented snow covered rooftop solar panels from clearing and caused a peak in the electric load.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO JanuaryOperations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

VPP during the January 2026 Winter Storm

There is insufficient data available to quantitatively assess what would happen if New York were to rely on VPP technology.  However, we can look at the energy production at the end of January 2026 and see serious problems both for the homeowners participating in the program and the grid.

Recall that the solar array panel at each home was designed to provide 110 percent of the annual average energy and the battery was designed to provide between 8 and 12 hours of essential load for the homeowner.  The promise to homeowners is that these systems will provide essential support during outages.  If there is an outage at the same time rooftop solar panels are covered with snow, then there will be no essential support for an outage greater than 12 hours.  That is an admittedly a rate event but when it occurs the homeowner would be desperate for electric power.

There are also problems on the grid level.  Table 1 lists the daily energy production by fuel-type documented in my first article about this event.  VPP technology is supposed to smooth peak loads and eliminate the need for peaker power plants.  Oil fired units are used almost exclusively as peaker unit in New York so we can assume that their load during this event is “peak” energy.  The Brattle analysis only looks at individual peak days.  The peak daily oil energy production was 18,252 MWh on 1/26.  If New York expanded the O&R VPP pilot producing 2.1 MW VPP that can provide 4.7 MWh to a 9,000 MW system that would produce over 20,000 MWh.  That would be sufficient for the maximum daily peak.  However, looking at the entire episode, it is obvious that a VPP that relies on distributed rooftop solar would run out of energy on the day after the snowstorm.  The sum of the solar resources is not greater than the oil generation for the remainder of the episode.  The VPP would have no value to the system after the second day.

Table 1: Daily NYISO Energy Production (MWh) January 22 to January 31, 2026

Discussion

The January 2026 storm proves that VPP solar plus storage technology has no value during extended periods of light winds, low solar availability, and snow-covered solar panels.   It simply cannot provide necessary power to replace an existing peaking power plant during these periods. 

The VPP proposal introduces yet another threat to grid reliability. New York’s own agencies agree that Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFRs) must be developed to backstop wind and solar when those resources falter for days at a time. The January 2026 winter storm made that reality unmistakable. Every delay in pursuing DEFRs compounds the risk and economic burden of clinging to an unproven wind–solar–storage–VPP strategy.

I view nuclear generation as the only realistically viable DEFR backup option, despite its costs, because it is uniquely technologically mature, can be scaled as needed, and is not constrained by the thermodynamic limits that burden storage‑based approaches. However, nuclear plants are best suited to operate as baseload resources, so using them solely for DEFR backup duty would be an inappropriate application of the technology.

If the only viable DEFR technology is nuclear power that implies that large expenditures on wind, solar, battery storage, and VPPs that cannot reliably supply electricity during periods of greatest system stress are unnecessary. When the full lifecycle and system costs of the Scoping Plan’s wind‑, solar‑, and storage‑centric strategy are weighed against a nuclear‑based electric system, I believe that nuclear will be the lower‑cost option, particularly once asset lifetimes are taken into account.

Conclusion

Advocates for VPP claim one of the benefits is that it can replace an army of power plants.  However, you can’t shut down the old power plants until you’re sure the new system actually works under all conditions. If it doesn’t, the lights go out, costs rise, and people get hurt.  The NY Focus article on VPP misses the fundamental VPP flaw. 

South Fork Wind Malinformation

Christopher Walsh’s latest article in the Easthampton Star, South Fork Wind’s Electricity Generation Proves Reliable repeats claims from the developer that the facility provides reliable energy.  An infographic prepared for the U.S. Department of War’s Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency, defines malinformation as  sabotage because it is based on fact but is used out of context to mislead, harm, or manipulate.  Walsh’s article is based on fact but the information presented is used out of context to mislead readers into believing that the South Fork offshore wind facility provided reliable electric generation to the grid during this winter’s extreme period. 

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes a specific target for 9,000 MW of offshore wind capacity by 2035.   

Ørsted’s South Fork Wind is the only New York operational offshore wind facility.  It has 12 turbines with 132 MW of capacity.  There are two other New York offshore wind facilities under construction but both had work suspended in December when the Trump administration issued a stop-work order suspending the lease. A federal judge issued a temporary injunction in January 2026 allowing construction to resume while the legal case proceeds.

​Empire Wind 1 (810 MW), developed by Equinor, is the first offshore wind project that will deliver power directly into New York City.  The project was approximately 60% complete when work was suspended. Empire Wind aims to deliver first electricity by late 2026 and reach commercial operation by 2027.  Supporting transmission support is proceeding.  As of late 2025, export cable installation was actively underway. Equinor reported that trenching, cable-laying, and cable pulling were ongoing on the outer continental shelf, and the export cable was brought onshore in 2025. The onshore substation at SBMT was under construction with transformer delivery completed in early 2025. An offshore substation was scheduled for installation in early 2026.

Sunrise Wind (924 MW), developed by Ørsted, also suspended work in December but work was cleared to resume in early February.  Approximately 44 of 84 monopile foundations were installed, and the HVDC offshore substation arrived from Norway and was installed in September 2025. The project is expected to be completed and operational in 2027. It is the first U.S. offshore wind project to use High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission, which reduces the number of cables needed and improves efficiency.  As of December 2025, onshore transmission work — including the converter station and duct bank — was over 90% complete. Offshore, the export cable was being tunneled through the surf zone (at 11–60 ft deep), with nearshore installation to follow.

The prices for offshore wind are significantly higher than land-based renewables.  Empire Wind 1 and Sunrise Wind contracts were repriced by the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSEDA) in early 2024 to prevent cancellation.  Their combined weighted average price is $150.15/MWh.  The 2024 NYSERDA Tier 1 solicitation average strike price was $94.73 for 23 projects totaling ~3.5GW.  That makes the offshore wind costs 59% higher.

Clearly, the Climate Act mandate for 9,000 MW of offshore wind is in jeopardy.  The question is whether that is a bad thing or not.  Walsh’s article argues that it is a bad thing.

“Reliable” South Fork Wind

Christopher Walsh’s article in the Easthampton Star, South Fork Wind’s Electricity Generation Proves Reliable is quoted below with my annotations.  

As the Trump administration pledges to appeal all five court rulings that sided with offshore wind farms under construction on the Eastern Seaboard, and Canadian officials call on the industry to shun the United States in favor of the ocean off its shores, developers of South Fork Wind, the nation’s first commercial-scale offshore wind farm, are pointing to its reliable generation of electricity in its second year of operation and during this winter’s extreme cold.

Renewable advocates focus on energy production, but power systems are built around reliability during peak demand. If you look at the grid through the lens of accredited capacity, that is, capacity that can be relied upon during peak demand – instead of average energy, the resource allocations for different technologies look radically different.  This is the energy vs. power capacity distinction that Walsh ignored.

The 12-turbine, 132-megawatt farm, electricity from which makes landfall in Wainscott, achieved a 46.3-percent capacity factor in 2025. “Capacity factor” refers to real-world performance, or the ratio of energy generated versus the maximum theoretical output of an installation running at its full rated capacity around the clock. For offshore wind, typical values are between 20 and 40 percent, reflecting intermittent wind speeds, maintenance downtime, and site efficiency.

In January of this year, South Fork Wind delivered a 52-percent capacity factor, comparable to New York State’s most efficient gas plants. Output at offshore wind farms in the Northeast — South Fork Wind, the smaller Block Island Wind, and Vineyard Wind 1, which is still under construction — is typically at its strongest during winter months, when energy supplies on Long Island are often constrained.

I take exception to the claim that the 52% capacity factor is comparable to gas plants.  If a gas plant was only limited by maintenance downtime  it can easily achieve an 85-percent annual capacity factor but more importantly they can be dispatched by the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) as necessary to match loads including peak load conditions.

The NYISO January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report includes a graph of net statewide wind and solar performance total monthly production and capacity factors (Figure 1).  These data show that the January 2026 monthly capacity factors for all New York State wind facilities was 38%, Behind the Meter (BTM) rooftop solar was 3% and  the Front of the Meter (FTM) utility-scale solar was 6%.  Offshore wind facilities are expected to perform better than onshore wind facilities and this is clearly shown by the South Fork Wind performance.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Monthly Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

The article goes on:

Over the course of 2025, South Fork Wind generated electricity on 99 percent of all days and across 90 percent of all hours, according to its developers, the Danish energy company Orsted and the German company Skyborn Renewables. The developers assert that the wind farm generates electricity sufficient to power 70,000 average-size residences.

These claims have the reliability challenge exactly backwards.  South Fork Wind did not generate electricity on 1 percent of all days or at least 3 whole days and across 10 percent or 876 of all hours.  The problem is that peak loads are commonly associated with high-pressure systems that suppress wind generation.  As a result South Fork Wind was likely unavailable when needed most.

This effect was seen during the January 24 to January 27, 2026 winter storm.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather that caused a peak in the electric load.  Table 1 lists daily extrapolated statewide capacity factors from Figure 2.  Consider January 31 when the statewide capacity factors were BTM solar 2%, FTM solar 9%, and wind 12%.  The total daily renewable energy capacity factor was 10% and only provided 2% of the system’s daily load.  Data from individual facilities are not available but the hourly statewide data indicate that wind capacity was less than 10% for 13 hours including the morning and evening peak loads.

Table 1: Renewable Resource Capacity Factors

Figure 2: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Wind Farm Status

The remainder of the article goes on:

Earlier this month, a federal judge handed the Trump administration a fifth consecutive loss in court challenges to its December 2025 order pausing construction of five wind farms along the East Coast. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction sought by Sunrise Wind L.L.C., another Orsted project, regarding the suspension order issued by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. The move allows the construction of Sunrise Wind in federal waters about 30 miles east of Montauk Point to resume immediately while the underlying lawsuit challenging the administration’s order progresses.

The 924-megawatt wind farm’s export cable is to make landfall at Smith Point County Park in Shirley and is to generate electricity sufficient to power nearly 600,000 residences.

The decision follows successful challenges to the administration’s order by the developers of Empire Wind 1, a 54-turbine, 810-megawatt project being built by the Norwegian company Equinor and which is to send electricity to New York City; Revolution Wind, a joint venture between Orsted and Skyborn that is to send electricity sufficient to power 350,000 residences in Connecticut and Rhode Island; Vineyard Wind 1, jointly developed by Avangrid Renewables and Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, which is nearly complete and has already sent electricity to Massachusetts, and Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind, under development by Dominion Energy.

An Orsted official delivered the statistics on the South Fork Wind farm at the advocacy organization Oceantic Network’s annual International Partnering Forum in Manhattan. It was there that Tim Houston, the premier of Nova Scotia, made a pitch to business executives to invest in offshore wind projects off his province rather than in the United States, where the federal government has repeatedly attempted to kill the nascent offshore wind industry while promoting fossil fuel-derived energy, which scientists say is causing dangerous and accelerating warming of the atmosphere.

“We are a predictable and reliable regulatory jurisdiction,” David MacGregor, associate deputy minister of the Nova Scotia Department of Energy, said at the conference, as quoted in The New Bedford Light, a Massachusetts digital news outlet.

Perhaps demonstrating that the United States under the Trump administration is equally predictable, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum told Bloomberg News that the administration will appeal the five court rulings that thwarted its effort to halt construction of the five offshore wind farms. The administration had cited vague national security concerns, and its December order pausing the wind farms’ construction prompted Gov. Kathy Hochul and the governors of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts to demand that the federal government rescind the order, and prompted the wind farms’ developers to sue the government.

Construction has since resumed on all five wind farms.

In my opinion, the rest of the article is a marketing plea by an offshore wind advocate. I don’t want to waste my time responding.

Discussion

If the New York electric system were to rely primarily on wind, solar, and energy storage then this extended period of light winds, low solar availability, and snow-covered solar panels simply cannot provide the power when needed the most.  State agencies responsible for electric system reliability agree that a new dispatchable, emissions free resource is needed for these periods but admit that there isn’t any such resource available today.  Given that there is no such technology available, proceeding under the assumption that one will magically appear is an enormous risk for reliability. 

New York currently has an energy affordability crisis because as of December 2024, over 1.3 million households are behind on their energy bills by sixty-days-or-more, collectively owing more than $1.8 billion.  Climate Act costs are already between 8.5 and 13.7% of monthly electric bills. The combined weighted average price revised contracts for the offshore wind projects under construction is $150.15/MWh.  NYISO reports that the average New York wholesale electric price in 2025 was about 74.40 dollars per MWh, up from 41.81 dollars per MWh in 2024.  Those costs do not include the price of dedicated transmission lines to get the energy to where it is needed.  Adding offshore wind at costs double the current cost of electricity will only exacerbate the energy crisis.

Conclusion

Claiming that South Fork Wind is a reliable source of electricity is based on fact but is used out of context to manipulate readers into believing that offshore wind is a viable generating resource for New York’s future.  Offshore wind is the most expensive source of electricity. Continued funding for a resource that cannot provide energy when needed most is a poor investment.

January 23-27 Winter Storm NY Grid Impacts Prove DEFR is Necessary

My last post took an  initial look at the impact of the January 23-27 winter storm on wind and solar energy production.  This post shows that this type of weather event shows  dispatchable  emissions free  resources (DEFR) are necessary to achieve net-zero in New York.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.. 

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

I relied on two sources of New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data for this analysis.  New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  The second source of data is the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report prepared by the NYISO Operating Committee.  I looked at data from January 22-31, 2026 to bound conditions before the storm and after.  Note that the cold weather went into February but the Metrics Report data for February are not available yet.

NYISO Daily Energy Production

As noted in my previous post, the dashboard real-time fuel mix data includes links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State that I used to calculate daily energy use (MWh).  I also used the NYISO  January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  Figure 1 from that document breaks out the wind, utility-scale solar, also known as Front of the Meter (FTM) solar, and the rooftop top solar, also known as Behind the Meter (BTM) solar total daily production and capacity factors.  Multiplying the capacity factor by the current capacity determines the daily energy production.

Figure 1: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Table 1 combines data from the two NYISO sources to list daily energy production.  The generator types include real-time fuel mix data base “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil. Two renewables are shown. “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind from the NYISO real-time fuel mix data base.  That source is also used for “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood.  However,  in this table, I subtracted the FTM solar data from the January Performance Metric Report.  Both the BTM solar and FTM solar are derived from that report.  As an aside, I contacted NYISO to get the actual data for these parameters but did not get a response so I extractoplated values from Figure 1.

Table 1: Daily NYISO Energy Production (MWh) January 22 to January 31, 2026

Table 2 consists of three smaller tables.  On the left,  capacity factors obtained from Figure 1 are listed for each day of the episode.  At the top, resource capacity (MW) from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report are listed for solar and wind resources.  The main body of the table lists the calculated renewable daily energy (MWh) for each parameter and the renewable percentage of the total system energy that I calculated using the real-time fuel mix data.  The most notable finding in this table is the observation that there were eight consecutive days when the total wind and solar production was 6% or less than maximum possible energy production.

Table 2: Capacity Factors Derived from Figure 5, Resource Capacity (MW) from Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report, and Calculated Renewable Daily Energy (MWh)

Note the differences in wind production in these tables.  Table 1 uses the estimated real-time fuel mix data and Table 2 the Performance Metrics Monthly Report.  The differences are due to my real-time averaging assumptions and crude interpolation of values from Figure 1.  While these energy production values are not precise, using the correct values will not change the conclusions.

Projections

These results can be used to evaluate projections made for the generating resources necessary to meet the 2040 100% zero emissions electric generation mandate. Table 3 lists the projected 2040 capacity (MW) for four scenarios.  I have included one from the NYISO, the primary projection from the Scoping Plan, and two “Net Zero” scenarios from the draft Energy Plan last summer.  These scenarios represent four ways to achieve the 2040 mandate.

Table 3: Projected Electric Resource Capacity in 2040.

I estimated the daily energy production for the projected generating resources in Table 3. Daily production equals the capacity in MW times the capacity factor times 24 hours in the day. Capacity factors were derived from the real-time fuel mix or taken from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report data in Table 2.  I estimated the 2040 daily energy production for each scenario by multiplying those factors by the Table 3 resource capacities.

Table 4 is an example of the daily production for January 22, 2026.  Note that consistent with the zero-emissions mandate there are no fossil fuel (Gas and Fuel Oil) emissions.  Consistent with the NYISO projection for the winter peak no imported hydro generation is included.  I calculated the battery storage energy production by multiplying the projected capacity times four hours (the current default discharge time).  This assumption is included every day but note that if the batteries need to be charged using renewables there are instances where there would not be insufficient energy to recharge the batteries.  This is a good example of the nuances that a NYISO detailed analysis can include.

Table 4: Daily Production (MWh) for January 22, 2026

The goal was to compare the observed daily observed energy load in Table 1 against the projected energy projection in Table 4 to see if the resources provided enough energy to cover the observed generation load from the real-time fuel mix data during the conditions of the January 2026 storm.  I did not have ready access to imports and exports so could not calculate the total system load.  The results are presented in the following three tables.  Each table lists the estimated total daily production minus the observed daily energy load for each scenario.  If there is a deficit, then the results are highlighted in red.  That means there would be a resource availability crisis which would require imports beyond what occurred on those days and load shedding to prevent a blackout.  

Table 5 lists daily projected energy production minus the observed load on each day during this episode.  Because there are no existing dispatchable emissions free resources (DEFR) the methodology assumes no production from those resources.  There are five days when none of the projected resource scenarios prevent a deficit.

Table 5: Projected Daily Energy Production Minus Current Energy Load (MWh) – Without DEFR Capacity

Table 6 lists daily projected energy production minus the estimated 2040 load on each day during this episode. The 2025 Load & Capacity Data Report aka Gold Book states that:

The New York electric system is projected to become a winter peaking system in future decades due to electrification, primarily from space heating and EVs. The timing of a crossover to a dual-peaking or winter peaking system is uncertain, and mainly influenced by the timing and composition of heating electrification.

 I estimated the 2040 future load by prorating the observed load by the 2025-26 baseline winter coincident peak demand forecast and the 2040-41 forecast loads using Table I-1d: Summary of NYCA Baseline Winter Coincident Peak Demand Forecasts in the Gold Book.  Because there are no existing dispatchable emissions free resources (DEFR) the methodology assumes no production from those resources.  Not surprisingly, after the storm hit on January 24 none of the projected resource scenarios prevent a deficit of energy production without DEFR resources..

Table 6: Projected Daily Energy Production Minus 2040 Projected Energy Load (MWh) – Without DEFR Capacity

This preliminary analysis shows that DEFR is necessary. Table 7 lists daily projected energy production with the projected DEFR capacity operating minus the estimated 2040 load on each day during this episode. For the results shown, I assumed the capacity factor was 85%.  Because no DEFR technology has been identified the capacity factor value is arbitrary.  I found that if the capacity factor was equal or greater than 85% all the emissions-free mandate scenarios except “Net Zero B” shows a surplus of energy production.  Net Zero B never shows a surplus even with a 100% capacity factor.

Table 7: Projected Capacity Daily Energy Totals (MWh) – Projected 2040 Loads with DEFR Capacity at 85%

Dark Doldrum and DEFR

The most notable finding in Table 2 is the observation that there were eight consecutive days when the total New York wind and solar production was 6% or less than maximum possible energy production.  This is a perfect example of what the Germans call “Dunkelflaute”.  That term refers to dark doldrums period when solar is reduced due to the length of day or clouds and there are light winds.  This event was exacerbated by the snowstorm that covered solar panels with enough snow to eliminate production (Figure 1).  Note that most rooftop solar in New York City is essentially flat so snow cover is a significant issue.  In this case the episode was exacerbated by the snow depth, a crust of ice from a glaze of freezing rain that occurred at the end of the storm ,and the subsequent period of prolonged sub-freezing weather. Perhaps we should amend the worst weather label to “snowy dark doldrums”.

These conditions are the fundamental driver of the need for DEFR.  It is disappointing that the clean energy advocates have continued to argue that the size of the DEFR gap has been overstated even after all the agencies responsible for electric system reliability argue otherwise.  These results should put those arguments to rest.

Discussion

Isaac Orr and Mitch Rolling explain that there is another planning issue besides DEFR:

Most public discussions about renewables focus on energy production, but power systems are built around reliability during peak demand. Once you look at the grid through the lens of accredited capacity, that is, capacity that can be relied upon during peak demand—instead of annual energy, the resource allocations for different technologies look radically different.  This is the energy vs. capacity distinction that most renewable resource debates miss.

The large projected wind and solar capacities do no good when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow.  This period exemplifies a period where that situation is evident even in this preliminary assessment.  I have no doubt that NYISO staff will eventually evaluate these data in a more refined analysis because of its importance to planning policy.  Their results will only differ in degree but I believe will conclusively show that DEFR is necessary.  They may also show when DEFR is necessary as more renewables come online and existing dispatchable resources are shut down.

Conclusion

On January 31, 2026, the total renewable energy production was 2% of the potential amount available because of the weather conditions and there were at least eight consecutive days when the production was less than 6%.  These are the conditions that require DEFR.  Without that resource, intermittent, diffuse, and correlated electric generating resources are not viable.

January 23-27 Winter Storm NY Grid Impacts

The recent winter storm stressed electric systems across the country. It also offers electric resource planners an opportunity to examine the impacts of future increased use of renewable energy during high-load conditions.  This article takes an initial look at the potential impact of such a weather event on the existing New York renewable resources.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim 2030 targets is a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and 100% zero emissions electric generation in 2040.. 

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act weather-reliant renewable energy mandates is correlated variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging. 

From January 23 to January 27, 2026, a very large and expansive winter storm caused deadly and catastrophic ice, snow, and cold impacts from Northern Mexico across the Southern and Eastern United States and into Canada.  In New York total snow/sleet accumulation ranged from 8-13” near the coast and 12-17” across the interior.  As the precipitation ended a glaze of freezing rain occurred.  Following the storm there was a period of prolonged sub-freezing weather.

This is a good case study for a New York extreme event that must be addressed by electric system planners.  Although the data are for New York, this is a universal problem.  It is only a matter of degree.

I relied on two sources of New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data for this analysis.  New York fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  The second source of data is the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report prepared by the NYISO Operating Committee.  I looked at data from January 22-31, 2026 to bound conditions before the storm and after.  Note that the cold weather went into February but the Metrics Report data for February are not available yet.

NYISO Real-Time Fuel Mix

The dashboard real-time fuel mix data includes links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State.  I processed that data to calculate hourly averages.  The generator types include “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind; “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil.

Figure 1 graphs all the fuel mix hourly data and Table 1 summarizes the data. The relative average fuel mix energy provided over these ten days was nuclear 18%, hydro 14%, and fossil fuels 61%.  New York’s efforts to transition to renewables yielded only 7% of the total.  In addition, the wind capacity ranged from 6% of the possible production to 96%, but 25% of the time the production was less than a quarter of possible production.

Figure 1: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix January 22 to January 31, 2026

Table 1: Summary of Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Data Mix January 22 to January 31, 2026

These data do not show the contribution of wind and solar well.  “Other Renewables” includes solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood. The methane, refuse and wood facilities show up as the relatively constant base in Figure 3.  Making the assumption that the 63 MW of energy storage is too small to show up on this graph, that means that the utility-scale “front-of-the-meter” solar shows up as the daily peaks on the first three days.  The snow arrived in New York on the night of 24 January and continued through the next day.  Note that utility solar was essentially zero on the 25th and did not return to the level of the 22nd until the 31st.

Figure 3: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix Other Renewables and Wind January 22 to January 31, 2026

Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

I used the January  Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report for this analysis.  There is a lot of information in these reports that is relative to the prospects for a successful Climate Act transition.  So much that I am going to defer that discussion for a later post.  For this post I am only going to highlight a couple of results presented in the report.

The report includes a graph of net wind and solar performance total monthly production and capacity factors (Figure 4).  On average the higher solar output in the summer balances out the lower wind resources in the summer.  Winter total renewable resources are lower, and wind does somewhat offset the low solar output. 

Figure 4: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Monthly Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Figure 5 is most important for this analysis because it breaks out the wind, utility-scale solar, also known as Front of the Meter (FTM) solar, and the rooftop top solar, also known as Behind the Meter (BTM) solar total daily production and capacity factors.  Note that these data support the assumption that the daily peaks represent utility-scale production output in Figure 3.  These data show that FTM solar has a higher output than the BTM solar.  There is no question that the January snowstorm severely impacted solar output for days. 

Figure 5: Net Wind and Solar Performance Total Daily Production and Capacity Factors

Source: NYISO January Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report

Table 2 consists of three smaller tables.  On the left,  capacity factors derived from Figure 5 are listed for each day of the episode.  At the top, resource capacity (MW) from the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report are listed for solar and wind resources.  The main body of the table lists the calculated renewable daily energy (MWh) for each parameter and the renewable percentage of the total system energy that I calculated using the real-time fuel mix data. 

Table 2: Capacity Factors Derived from Figure 5, Resource Capacity (MW) from Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report, and Calculated Renewable Daily Energy (MWh)

The total renewable output in Table 2 is an important finding.  On average, wind resources counterbalance low winter solar resource availability.  However, during dark doldrums when the wind fails renewable resources plummet.  This storm also shows that the critical renewable resource period is best described as snowy dark doldrums.

Discussion

I contacted NYISO to get the actual data for these parameters but did not get a response.  I have no doubt that NYISO staff will eventually evaluate these data in a similar fashion because of its importance to planning policy.  Their results will only differ in degree but will conclusively show that DEFR is necessary.  They may also show when DEFR is necessary as more renewables come on line and existing dispatchable resources are shut down.

The NYISIO “Gold Book” has noted that New York will become a winter peaking system depending upon the timing and composition of heating electrification.  This will exacerbate the correlation problem between peak loads and dark doldrum low renewable resource availability.  There has not been a similar snowstorm since the deployment of significant amounts of BTM solar in New York City so this is the first unsurprising confirmation that snow can severely impact solar production when the solar panels are installed on flat roofs.

Figure 6: View of BTM Solar in New York City

Conclusion

On January 31, 2026 the total renewable energy production was 2% of the potential amount available.  That was because of the weather conditions.  No amount of additional capacity is going to be able to substantively improve that percentage.  Intermittent, diffuse, and correlated electric generating resources are incompatible with electric system reliability when needed most.

On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.  Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  These results are another indication that it is time to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

NYISO Climate Act Concerns

I was recently asked to give a briefing about Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) issues. While preparing my presentation I used Perplexity AI to generate a review of the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) concerns with the Climate Act.  This article provides background documentation based on the response to that query.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Among its interim targets is a 2030 70% renewable energy electricity mandate and a 2040 zero emissions requirement that are of particular concern to the NYISO.

I prepared a power point presentation for the briefing with supporting documentation that discussed Climate Act issues that need to be addressed.  The New York’s Legislative annual session revolves around  enacting the state’s April 1 budget.  The budget is an executive‑budget model which means that the Governor can stick in policy legislation like the Climate Act.  In my last post I described issues that the legislature should address this session.  This article describes concerns that the NYISO has with the Climate Act that supports my belief that the Public Service Commission (PSC) should conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act because there are observed threats to reliability that threaten safe and adequate service.

Perplexity Summary

I used Perplexity AI to generate the following summaries of NYISO concerns.

Tightening reliability margins and resource adequacy

NYISO’s long‑term reliability and resource adequacy studies show that reserve margins are thinning as fossil units retire faster than new, firm replacement capacity and transmission arrive.

They point to:

  • A net loss of dispatchable capacity since the CLCPA was passed: several gigawatts of fossil capacity have retired while additions are largely intermittent renewables and limited-duration storage.
  • Projections in their Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP) and Reliability Needs Assessments that show:
    • Declining reliability margins in New York City and downstate.
    • Potential statewide shortfalls later in the 2020s/early 2030s if retirements continue at the current pace and clean resources, storage, and transmission are delayed.
  • Concern that the system is increasingly reliant on emergency procedures (demand response, voltage reductions, etc.) to meet resource adequacy criteria on peak days, which is not a sustainable operating strategy.

In short, CLCPA‑driven retirements and environmental constraints (e.g., peaker rule) are moving faster than the build‑out of firm, deliverable alternatives, tightening margins to what NYISO characterizes as “concerning” levels.

Coordination of fossil retirements with new entry

NYISO has repeatedly emphasized that fossil generator retirements must be carefully coordinated with the timing and performance of new resources:

  • They support the CLCPA recommendation to “retire fossil resources gradually and safely,” but warn that mandatory retirement schedules or environmental rules that force large blocks of capacity off the system by fixed dates, without assured replacement, can create reliability violations.
  • In New York City in particular, they highlight that:
    • Peaker rule and other environmental closures remove capacity that is both local and fast‑responding.
    • Replacement capacity must satisfy local transmission security and deliverability constraints, not just nameplate MW.
  • NYISO worries that policy and permitting processes affecting existing plants are often decided without a concrete, tested replacement portfolio in place, leaving them to fill gaps reactively through backstop reliability arrangements.

Their concern is not simply “don’t retire fossil,” but “do not retire fossil faster than the system can absorb given actual, not theoretical, replacements.”

Dependence on a few critical transmission projects

CLCPA strategies assume large amounts of new clean generation, including upstate renewables and Canadian hydro, will be deliverable to downstate load via specific major transmission projects. NYISO’s reliability plans highlight:

  • Heavy reliance on timely completion of projects like Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) and other major bulk upgrades.
  • Findings that, without these projects in service on schedule, New York City’s reliability margins become extremely small or turn deficient for much of the 10‑year planning horizon.
  • Concern that delays or cancellations of such projects (or of offshore wind transmission solutions) leave the state with policy commitments that cannot be supported by the physical grid.

So one core concern is that the CLCPA architecture implicitly assumes a best‑case transmission build‑out path; NYISO’s studies are essentially saying, “If those assumptions slip, reliability breaks.”

Operational challenges from high levels of intermittent renewables

NYISO accepts that the CLCPA implies a massive increase in weather‑dependent resources, but highlights that:

  • High penetrations of wind and solar increase uncertainty in net load forecasts, requiring:
    • More operating reserves.
    • New reserve products (e.g., “uncertainty” or “dynamic” reserves) to cover forecast error and fast ramps.
  • Studies of high‑renewables scenarios show:
    • Substantial increases in required installed reserve margins to maintain the same loss‑of‑load expectation.
    • Need for significant quantities of flexible, fast‑ramping resources, including storage and responsive demand, to manage multi‑hour ramps and multi‑day low‑renewables events.
  • The system will be more exposed to extreme weather—heat waves and cold snaps—at the same time that dispatchable fossil capacity is reduced, increasing the risk that the system crosses a “tipping point” where it cannot serve load during stress events.

In other words, the CLCPA’s heavy reliance on intermittent resources forces a fundamental redesign of operating reserve and capacity constructs; NYISO’s concern is that policy timelines assume this redesign and the necessary resources will be ready and deliverable in time.

Need for “firm, zeroemissions” and longduration solutions (technology gap)

NYISO has started to stress that, to meet CLCPA’s 2040 zero‑emissions grid requirement while staying reliable, New York will need:

  • Significant quantities of “firm, zero‑emission” capacity (e.g., hydrogen‑capable turbines, advanced nuclear, long‑duration storage, carbon capture, or other technologies that can run through multi‑day renewable droughts).
  • Far more total installed capacity by 2040 than today—often characterized as roughly three times current capacity—once electrification (buildings, transport, industry) and higher reserve needs are included.

Their concern is that:

  • The CLCPA and Scoping Plan implicitly assume large volumes of such technologies will be available, cost‑effective, and sited in New York by 2040, but there is no clear, concrete procurement or market framework yet that ensures they appear.
  • Current market designs and state programs are heavily tuned to 20‑year REC‑backed wind and solar, not to capital‑intensive firm resources with different risk profiles.

So NYISO is effectively warning of a technology and market design gap between what CLCPA requires in the 2030s–2040s and what is actually under contract or in queues today.

Documentation for NYISO Issues

The Perplexity AI response to my concerns of NYISO about Climate Act goals also generated a spreadsheet table of specific issues that lists the Issue Area, NYISO Document, Specific NYISO Finding/Concern, CLCPA Statutory Provision, CAC Scoping Plan Assumption/Strategy, Gap/Disconnect, and Talking Point for identified problems.  The following sections describe the NYISO documents that address specific NYISO findings and concerns listed in the spreadsheet.

NYISO has identified issues with resource adequacy associated with declining margins in multiple reports.  The 2025 Power Trends noted that there has been a net loss of 2,041 MW since the Climate Act was enacted (4,315 MW retired, 2,274 MW added).  The Executive Summary in the 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) Report explains that statewide resource margins are declining so fast that by 2034 there will be no surplus power without further development.  The 2025 Q3 Short-Term Assessment of Reliability (STAR) Report identified a New York City (NYC) Zone J reliability need beginning in summer 2027 that requires peaker units that have been scheduled for retirement to be retained.

The timing of fossil retirements vs new entry timing is also an NYISO concern.  The 2025 Power Trends document noted that fossil retirements are outpacing new supply additions since 2021.

The 2024 RNA Report notes that the NYC reliability need in 2033 is driven by faster generator retirements than replacement resource development.  The 2025 Q3 STAR Report noted that the NYC Peaker Rule that forces retirement by 2027-2029 is impossible unless local replacement resources are developed.

NYISO also noted that dependence on a few critical transmission projects has risks. The 2024 RNA Report notes that the base case assumes timely completion of Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) and Clean Path NY (CPNY) by 2027-2028.  The 2025 Power Trends report transmission section states that without major transmission (CHPE, CPNY) project completion that NYC reliability margins will become deficient.  The NYISO submitted comments on the Scoping Plan also noted that there will be a heavy dependence on specific transmission projects that may not get built as scheduled.

NYISO has raised intermittency and operating reserves concerns.  The 2024 RNA Report resource adequacy study explains that a high penetration of intermittent renewables requires new reserve products.  The 2025 Power Trends includes an intermittency discussion that notes that wind/solar variability will increase reserve requirements and ramp capability needs.  The

NYISO Uncertainty Reserve Requirement filing defines FERC approved Uncertainty Reserve Requirement for the forecast error from renewables.

There is a clear need for a new dispatchable emissions free resource (DEFR).  NYISO has addressed this requirement in its reports.  The 2024 RNA Report, scenarios analysis states that meeting 2040 zero-emissions requires “firm zero-emission” resources not yet identified. 

The 2025 Power Trends describes this technology gap explaining that the grid needs three times current capacity by 2040 with electrification and higher reserve margins.  NYISO comments on the Scoping Plan also described the technology gap stating that long-duration storage, hydrogen, advanced nuclear are not yet commercial at scale.

New York electric load is increasing and will increase more as Climate Act electrification programs progress.  NYISO addressed load trends in several reports.  The 2025 Power Trends, load forecast section notes that large loads (data centers  and semiconductors) will add 2,567 MW demand by 2035.  The 2024 RNA Report includes large loads assumptions that predict peak demand growth accelerating due to electrification and economic development.  The 2025 Load & Capacity Data Report aka Gold Book load forecast notes that load forecast uncertainty is higher than historical due to policy-driven electrification driven by the Climate Act.

New York City presents special challenges to the grid and for the Climate Act mandates.  NYISO found in the 2025 Q3 STAR Report, Zone J findings that the Zone J (NYC) summer 2027 reliability need is driven by load growth and retirements.  The 2024 RNA Report discussion of

NYC reliability needs 2033 found that the reliability need requires compensatory MW because there are limited local alternatives.  The 2025 Q2 STAR Report Peaker Rule analysis notes that the DEC Peaker Rule removes capacity exactly when NYC needs an increase.  This means that NYISO must delay the rule’s retirement dates.

The NYISO has also noted that there are market design and investment signals that affect their response to the Climate Act mandates.  The 2025 Power Trends, market design section explains that State procurement (ORECs, Tier 1 RECs) policies reduces market price signals. 

NYISO FERC filings on the capacity market notes that capacity market suppression from state-contracted resources undermines flexibility value. 

The political manipulation of the electric market mandated by the Climate Act creates issues with planning process coordination.  The NYISO comments on the Scoping Plan noted that the

State’s Climate Act Policy planning (NYSERDA Integration Analysis) uses different assumptions than NYISO reliability planning.  The 2024 RNA Report planning assumptions notes the lack of alignment between the Scoping Plan scenarios and NYISO base case reliability studies.

The Climate Act and Department of Environmental Conservation interpretation of it have eliminated the backlog of new fossil generating units. As a result the fossil fleet is aging.  The 2025 Power Trends notes that 11% of 2024 energy production is from generators greater than 50 years old.  The existing fleet analysis in the 2024 RNA Report states that 10,000+ MW (25% of total capacity) has been in operation  greater than 50 years.

There are risks related to the implementation pace required to meet the arbitrary Climate Act targets.  The 2024 RNA Report Executive Summary notes the narrowing margins driven by statewide resource shortfalls and the rapid change pace.  The 2025 Power Trends conclusion states that there is a risk that cumulative factors (retirements, electrification, delays) will create reliability metric violations.

The NYSERDA projections do not incorporate the reliability requirements that the NYISO must address.  The 2024 RNA Report capacity accreditation description notes that the NYSERDA Climate Act analyses focus on energy (MWh) but NYISO projections must ensure resource adequacy (MW capacity available).  The 2025 Power Trends description of reliability margin metrics notes that Intermittent resources have low capacity value and the NYISO must account for reliability contribution

Discussion

Please excuse the structure of this document.  If I had time, I would have combined the two sections into a single referenced description of NYISO concerns.

This article is intended to be a resource documenting NYISO concerns with Climate Act implementation.  It demonstrates that there are real problems that Climate Act apologists ignore..  Per Public Service Law 66-P two petitions have been filed calling for a hearing that stated that NYISO’s concerns are persuasive arguments that there are sufficient observed threats to reliability that a hearing is necessary to ensure safe and adequate service.  On 1/28/26 the Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy petition.  Comments on the Coalition petition are due on 3/30/26.  This information will be useful to document the NYISO concerns.

Conclusion

These concerns about electric system reliability and resource adequacy are another indication that it is time to demand that the PSC conduct a hearing to consider suspending or modifying the obligations of the Climate Act by submitting comments on the Coalition petition. 

Stalling the New York Climate Act Pause Evaluation

On January 28, 2026, the New York State Public Service Commission issued a notice soliciting comments regarding a petition for a hearing to suspend or temporarily modify the Renewable Energy Program. While on one hand I should be celebrating official recognition of something I have long advocated, on the other hand, the timing is problematic.  The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming and this request for comments simply postpones the inevitable hearing.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Background

There is a fundamental Climate Act implementation issue.  Clearly there are bounds on what New York State ratepayers can afford and there are limits related to reliability risks for a system reliant on weather-dependent resources.  The problem is that there are no criteria for acceptable affordability bounds.

Proponents of the Climate Act argue that the transition strategies in the law must be implemented to meet the net-zero mandates.  However, they do not acknowledge that Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a Renewable Energy Program, is also a law. PSL 66-P requires the Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 Climate Act obligations.  It includes provisions stating that the PSC is empowered to temporarily suspend or modify these obligations if, after conducting an appropriate hearing, it finds that PSL 66-P impedes the provision of safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.  Today’s announcement is the first PSC response to numerous calls to address this requirement.

Announcement

The following is the text of the announcement requesting comments:

The Public Service Commission (Commission) is considering a petition, filed on January 6, 2026 (the Petition), by the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy (Coalition) requesting that the Commission hold a hearing, pursuant to Section 66-p of the Public Service Law, to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).

The Coalition, which describes itself as a group consisting generally of associations, chambers of commerce, and other groups representing various businesses, industries, manufacturers, and constituencies from across the state, as well as two members of the state’s Climate Action Council, affirmatively contends that the Renewable Energy Program and its associated renewable energy targets may impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service. In support of its request for such a review by the Commission, the Coalition points to information that it claims suggests that the State will not achieve the Climate Act targets that, by 2030, 70% of statewide electricity generation be from renewable energy systems, and that, by 2040, the electric grid be zero emissions. The Coalition also suggests the existence of decreasing reliability margins and aging fossil-fueled generation resources, referencing statements by the New York Independent System Operator, Inc.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that interested stakeholders are invited to submit comments by March 30, 2026, on the Petition filed by the Coalition.

Comments provided in response to this Notice should reference “Case 15-E-0302.” Comments should be submitted electronically by going to http://www.dps.ny.gov, clicking on “File Search” (located under the heading “Commission Files”), entering “15-E-0302” in the “Search by Case Number” field, and then clicking on the “Post Comments” box located at the top of the page. Those unable to file electronically may mail their comments to the Hon. Michelle L. Phillips, Secretary, New York State Public Service Commission, Three Empire Plaza, Albany, New York 12223-1350; however, electronic filing of comments is strongly encouraged.

Basis for the Hearing Summary

New York Public Service Law § 66-p Section (4). “Establishment of a renewable energy program” includes safety valve conditions for affordability and reliability.   Section 66-p (4) states:

The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program. 

My recent post summarized multiple independent analyses, audits, litigation findings, and party filings in DPS proceedings that document that the Climate Act transition will exacerbate energy affordability issues such that this PSL 66-P hearing is appropriate.  I also used Perplexity AI to generate a chronology of the recommendations made to hold a hearing that provides an overview of the suggestions for the hearing.

The chronology described three independent pathways to trigger PSL66-p(4) anyone of which  can justify a hearing:

Pathway 1: Reliability – “Program Impedes Safe and Adequate Electric Service”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find that the Renewable Energy Program “impedes” (not merely “risks” or “threatens”) the provision of safe and adequate service.

Evidence Presented:

  • NYISO 2024 RNA identifies actionable reliability need in NYC beginning 2033 (17-97 MW deficiency)
  • Statewide resource adequacy approaching limits with “no surplus power” remaining by 2034 without further development
  • Net capacity loss of 2,000 MW since Climate Act passage (retirements outpacing additions)
  • NYISO official statement that emission-free technologies to replace fossil generation “are not yet available on a commercial scale”
  • NERC highest-level alert documenting systemic deficiencies in modeling Inverter Based Resources and >15,000 MW of unexpected generation reductions in major events
  • Multiple NYISO high-risk scenarios showing NYC deficiency could begin as early as 2025 and grow to >1,000 MW by 2034

Assessment: The reliability evidence is substantial and comes from authoritative technical sources (NYISO, NERC). The case for a hearing under the reliability criterion is strong.

Pathway 2: Contractual – “Program Likely to Impair Existing Obligations”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find the program is “likely” to impair existing obligations and agreements.

Evidence Presented:

  • Repowering disincentive: Current Climate Act targets effectively discourage repowering existing facilities because developers face 2040 forced retirement risk, “undermining investment recovery”
  • Offshore wind contract renegotiations: Multiple offshore wind developers have sought contract amendments due to changed economic conditions
  • Tier 1 REC contract attrition: Biennial Review acknowledged 30% attrition rate in renewable energy contracts

Assessment: The evidence on contractual impairment is moderate. This criterion appears to be less central to the petitioners’ arguments than reliability and affordability.

Pathway 3: Affordability – “Significant Increase in Arrears or Disconnections”

Evidence Standard: The Commission must find (1) a “significant” increase in arrears or service disconnections and (2) determine the increase is “related to the program.”

Evidence Presented:

  • Statistical significance established: Independent Intervenors demonstrated increases exceeding 2× standard deviation for statewide totals and 4 of 10 utilities
  • Magnitude: $1.8 billion in arrears affecting 1.2 million households
  • Trend: NMPC 17% increase (33,840 customers), Con Ed 59% increase (173,398 customers)

The Perplexity AI summary also lists two examples of evidence that does not support the claim that need to be explained.  For the “Causation not established”  description the AI program referenced an article written before the latest  DPS annual informational report came out that said it was impossible to determine if increases are “related to the program”.  A more recent report is now available, but DPS staff did not try to link the observed increases to this PSL 66-P requirement so it still is impossible to attribute significant changes to the Climate Act.  The other example gave an alternative explanation for the number of customers in arrears: “Post-pandemic economic impacts, inflation, and energy price increases due to factors beyond Climate Act (e.g., natural gas price volatility, supply chain disruptions)”

The Perplexity AI Assessment description stated:

The affordability evidence meets the first criterion (statistical significance) but cannot satisfy the second criterion (program causation) until DPS provides the mandated cost reporting. This represents a data gap, not necessarily a failure of the substantive argument. A hearing could establish causation through discovery and testimony.

The conclusion in this section notes that the reliability pathway has the strongest evidentiary weight:

Among the three pathways, the reliability criterion presents the most compelling case for a hearing:

  • Evidence comes from independent technical authorities (NYISO, NERC) with statutory responsibility for reliability
  • Deficiencies are quantified with specific MW shortfalls and timeframes
  • High-risk scenarios demonstrate sensitivity to plausible uncertainties
  • NYISO’s statement that required technologies “are not yet available on a commercial scale” directly supports finding that the program “impedes” safe and adequate service
  • Net capacity loss since Climate Act passage (2,000 MW) demonstrates actual, not theoretical, impact

The affordability criterion faces an evidentiary gap on program causation, though the statistical significance of arrears increases is well-established. Importantly, this gap exists because the PSC/DPS have failed to comply with their own reporting mandates—the very accountability failure the petitioners criticize. 

Discussion

In this discussion I liberally paraphrased the Perplexity AI response. Ultimately, the Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability emerging as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world supply chain, permitting, interconnection, and technological readiness constraints. 

In response to the petitions ACE-NY and WEACT filed a response that urged the PSC to reject the petition suggesting that all progress would stop if the heating was held.  However, the provision for a hearing does not require abandoning climate goals—it authorizes temporary suspension or modification to ensure safe, adequate, and affordable service while the transition continues. This represents pragmatic management, not capitulation.

I have long warned of the consequences if the current aspirational ambition and schedule of the Climate Act is not changed.  The PSC’s decision extends beyond energy policy:

  • If reliability suffers, the result could be rolling blackouts, industrial curtailments, and catastrophic economic disruption
  • If affordability spirals, the political backlash could undermine not just Climate Act but climate policy more broadly
  • If the safety valve remains unused, the precedent may discourage future legislatures from including adaptive management mechanisms in ambitious policy frameworks

Conclusion

Clearly it is no longer possible for the Hochul Administration to ignore the adverse impacts of Climate Act Implementation.  I have long argued that PSL 66-P was a logical excuse to reconsider the ramifications of the Climate Act so I should be happy that the potential of this requirement has been recognized at last.

However, this response is more evidence that the Climate Act has always been more about political catering to constituencies than about saving the planet. The evidence of the need for a hearing is overwhelming so I believe that the PSC should have moved to hold the hearing at this time.  That would infuriate the proponents of the Climate Act that Hochul needs for her re-election campaign.  This request for comments pushes the hearing and any decision related to the hearing beyond the election next November.  The question is whether New Yorkers will catch on that the Hochul Administration is risking reliability and affordability in an effort to appease Climate Act proponents.

Stay tuned because there I will undoubtedly be writing about this more before the comments are due,