Climate Act Feasibility – Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York

Time to Reconsider the Climate Act Press Release

UPDATE: Two weeks after this was published I can safely now say that nobody I contacted responded. I thought that showing that $593 per month in added energy expenses would have prompted some kind of response.

A recent court decision and findings presented at the 1 December 2025 State Energy Planning (SEP) Board meeting present overwhelming evidence that implementing the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) as mandated will be unaffordable and the 2030 CLCPA 40% emission reduction target and 70% renewable energy in the electric system mandate will not be achieved. I don’t think that most New Yorkers are aware of the Climate Act much less its potential impacts, so I prepared a press release that I distributed to various New York press outlets explaining why it is time to reconsider the Climate Act. This article documents the findings included in the press release and refers to recent articles published on this blog.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and has two interim 2030 targets: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy and GHG emissions must be reduced 40%. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantified the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies. After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.

Note there is a second implementation law. Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P, Establishment of a renewable energy program, that requires the Public Service Commission to establish a program to ensure the State meets the 2030 and 2040 electric system Climate Act requirements.

Energy Plan Overview

In 2025 another overarching evaluation of the energy system was initiated. According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) released the Draft Energy Plan last summer. Stakeholder comments were accepted until early October. The Energy Planning Board has the responsibility to approve the document. At the November 13, 2025 Board meeting there was a perfunctory description of the comments received. There was another meeting on December 1 that presented results from additional analyses. During the wrap up for the latest meeting Chair Doreen Harris said the Board will meet later this month to approve the plan. I have provided background information and a list of relevant articles on my Energy Plan page.

Court Decision

On Oct. 24, 2025, there was an Albany County New York Supreme Court decision ordering the Department of Environmental Conservation to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate schedule changed. On November 3, I published an article providing detailed information about the decision.

In another article I explained that during the legal process the State submitted a letter that addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Act.” The letter argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”.

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

The Judge acknowledged that this information was relevant but ruled that DEC must promulgate regulations implementing a law however persuasive their arguments it is inappropriate are. The Hochul Administration and DEC appealed the decision on November 25, 2025 claiming that “it is impossible for the Department to simultaneously comply with both the Court’s order and its substantive statutory obligations.”

Energy Affordability

In addition to the Attorney General’s supplemental letter arguing that the Climate Act is unaffordable, there were findings presented at the State Energy Planning (SEP) Board meeting on December 1, 2025 that present extraordinary cost estimates. My article on the Energy Affordability presentation at the meeting documents the projections for a moderate-income household in Upstate New York that uses natural gas. My article found the difference between replacement of conventional existing equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment necessary for CLCPA compliance increases monthly average energy expenditures $593 when capital costs are considered. That number was in a slide but there was only passing mention of the cost.

I derived explanatory numbers from information presented at the SEP Board meeting. The following energy affordability analysis slide summarizes the projection approach. It explains that for eleven household profiles, NYSERDA evaluated future household and transportation energy expenditures for four cases involving different technology mixes and fuel types. These “Illustrative Household Journeys” include:

Starting Point: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with average existing equipment
Conventional Replacement: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with new, more efficient equipment
Moderate Efficient Electrification: Some electrification of heating and transportation, with basic building envelope efficiency measures
High Efficient Electrification: More electrification of heating and transportation, with basic or medium building envelope efficiency measures, and efficient electric appliances

Slides were presented that describe the four journeys for several profiles. My numbers were derived from the typical Upstate moderate-income household that uses natural gas for heat household profile. This was the only profile that included all the information needed to project total cost. In the following slide, three projected “household journeys” reduce monthly energy expenditures relative to the current starting point. However, buried at the bottom of the page is the notation that these values are “Average monthly expenditures. Does not include equipment costs”.

It turns out that including equipment costs makes a difference as shown in the next slide.

I extracted information from these slides to prepare Table 1. Rows 1-4 list the monthly energy expenditures with the total in row 5 from the first slide. The increase in efficiency decreases monthly energy costs for all three journeys but that changes when CapEx is considered. The CapEx monthly total cost in row 6 is available on the second slide. However, the breakdown between the costs of a new plugin hybrid electric vehicle (moderate electrification) in row 7 and a battery electric vehicle (high efficiency electrification) relative to home energy electrification row 8 is not listed on the included slides. I estimated the percentage of home electrification from the size of the blue bars on the right side of the second slide. (Row 10). When the CapEx costs are included all the projected alternative journeys are more expensive. Row 9 lists the total monthly energy costs including the costs of equipment from the second slide. The cost of Climate Act compliance is the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment. Row 12 lists the $593 difference necessary for Climate Act compliance and row 11 lists the 43% increase in energy costs.

Table 1: Upstate New York Moderate Income Household That Uses Natural Gas for Heat Projected Monthly Costs and Costs Necessary to Comply with the Climate Act

The affordability messaging is embedded in this table. I prepared an annotated transcript for this presentation that includes a heading for questions made during the meeting with a link to each person who commented or asked a question. I believe that this presentation and the questions asked was scripted to further the messaging of the Administration. Chair Doreen Harris of the Energy Planning Board asked NYSERDA presenter James Wilcox about energy price uncertainty. He admitted that the key driver of change over the next five years is “change in energy price”. The modeling shows that this could increase household energy spending 3% to 8% in the starting point base case but could go up to as much as 14% to 19% even if they do nothing. Chair Harris elicited a response from him that summarizes the public messaging: “That is what I was trying to elicit: What does doing nothing get you?” Even if you do nothing costs could rise as much as 19%. That is misleading because the equipment costs are the main causes of future cost not changes in energy prices.

The presentations emphasized that Climate Act costs are not the primary energy cost increase driver and that multiple factors beyond climate policy contribute to expected costs. The other implementation cost message in the NYSERDA presentations is that the additional costs to meet the Climate Act mandates are smaller than expected cost increases. This table quantifies that claim. If this example household replaces its internal combustion car with another one and replaces household appliances with natural gas appliances total costs will go up $868 from $506 to $1,374. The cost to meet the Climate Act mandates beyond conventional replacement is “only” $593 more which is less than the cost of conventional replacement.

I think the magnitude of these impacts are being downplayed as much as possible. After I published my analysis I went to the Draft Energy Plan supporting documentation page and reviewed the Energy Affordability Outputs and Input Data spreadsheet. The equipment costs are only provided as a sensitivity for one household. I think that this is by design because these costs are so extraordinary. I believe these numbers indicate a serious energy affordability crisis is coming. In my opinion, including an additional 43% cost increase is unconscionable. New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990. New York cannot solve global warming by itself.

Implementation Timing

I summarized my initial thoughts about the Pathways Analysis presentation at the December SEP Planning Board meeting. The presentation found that neither the CLCPA 40% GHG emission reduction target nor the electric system 70% renewable energy mandate would be achieved on time. The “Key Takeaways (3/3)” Slide (#31) in the meeting presentation states that “the state is currently not on track to meet the 2030 emission limit – Current Policies is estimated to hit 40% reduction in 2038 while Additional Action is estimated to hit 40% reduction in 2037.”

The Electric Sector Results: Additional Action slide (#21) states that “Pace of additions leads to delayed achievement of 70% renewable to 2036-2040”.

Discussion

The Court Decision and the Energy Plan findings are not the only reasons given by state agencies that it would be appropriate to reconsider the Climate Act. I described three other findings in an article last month. The New York State Comptroller Office audit of the NYSERDA and PSC implementation efforts for the Climate Act was an early acknowledgement that the implementation plan needs to be revised. The Public Service Commission (PSC) compared the renewable energy deployment progress relative to the Climate Act goal to obtain 70% of New York’s electricity from renewable sources by 2030. The final Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review Report document found that 2030 goal will likely not be achieved until 2033. Finally, The Second Informational Report prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff described four feasibility concerns: the 2030 renewable energy target is “likely unattainable”, offshore wind faces major obstacles, transmission remains a “critical bottleneck”, and grid reliability challenges are mounting

There have been other recent articles arguing that New York has impossible targets. David Wojick recently published an article explaining implementation issues that I backed up with observed data. Tom Shepstone describes a New York Post editorial that cites a Progressive Policy Institute article that calls the Climate Act an “undeniable” failure.

These findings should inspire the Hochul Administration to amend the Climate Act. It is troubling that the SEP Board meeting presentations did not mention these ramifications in the presentation. Furthermore, there has been no sign that the Hochul Administration or the majority leadership in the Legislature are amenable to considering amendments to the Climate Act.

Conclusion

I was motivated to publish this and distribute it to the media because these findings have significant implications for the future New York energy system. In the near term, something must be done to reconcile the reality that the CLCPA schedule is too ambitious to have any hope of compliance. More importantly, the findings described should become the basis for a discussion of more New Yorkers. As it stands now New York energy policy is being guided by a small but extremely vocal and motivated constituency that does not understand the physics of the energy system. Thomas Sowell has been quoted as saying: “It is hard to imagine a more stupid or more dangerous way of making decisions than by putting those decisions in the hands of people who pay no price for being wrong”. In this instance, there is nothing more stupid or dangerous than ignoring the people who will pay the price if there are problems with the energy system.

Energy Affordability at Energy Planning Board Meeting on 12/1/2025

On December 6, 2025, I published an article describing my initial thoughts about the State Energy Planning Board (SEP) meeting on December 1 that discussed updated Pathways modeling for the State Energy Plan. This post describes the presentations at the meeting that covered energy affordability. I will cover the health benefits and employment analysis in another post.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Energy Plan Overview

According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) prepared the Draft Energy Plan last summer. Stakeholder comments were accepted until early October. The Energy Planning Board has the responsibility to approve the document. At the November 13, 2025 Board meeting there was a perfunctory description of the comments received. During the wrap up for this meeting Chair Doreen Harris said the Board will meet later this month to approve the plan before the end of the year. I have provided background information and a list of previous articles on my Energy Plan page.

Meeting Overview

There were three items on the agenda: approval of last meeting minutes, discuss analyses conducted for the Energy Plan, and consider any new business. The recording of the meeting available here included a transcript. I created an edited transcript for the Pathways Analysis presentation and a separate transcript for the energy affordability, health benefits, and employment presentations. These annotated versions include tables and headings.

In this meeting NYSERDA described the updated Pathways Analysis—the modeling exercise that underpins New York’s triennial State Energy Plan. In my opinion, the entire Energy Planning Board process is political theater. The members of the Board were chosen mostly for political reasons and not technical expertise. Everyone involved is going through the motions.

My last post explained that the updated Pathways Analysis described in the first part of this meeting found that the 2030 Climate Act goals will not be achieved on time. The aspirational schedule of the Climate Act was never realistic, and these results are simply acknowledgement of that fact. The topics featured in the remaining sessions support the positive spin narrative that the Hochul administration is trying to convey to the public to save some face regarding Climate Act implementation. This post will highlight key points of the narrative. I want to emphasize that this narrative is based mostly on political messaging, so it is appropriate to assume that every NYSERDA point has been approved by the Hochul Administration.

Energy Affordability

James Wilcox presented the Household Energy Affordability Analysis Update. He said that NYSERDA “reviewed key analysis structure and assumptions based on stakeholder feedback and new data availability”. The claim regarding review of stakeholder feedback is the first narrative speaking point. There will be a subsequent post detailing how New York State agency claim that all stakeholder feedback was considered is unsupported by evidence. While there are indications that some feedback from outside NYSERDA was incorporated in the updated analyses, later I will detail instances where comments inconsistent with the intended story line were ignored.

Wilcox summarized the updates:

For Base Case, moved to an electric and gas price forecast based on the trend of total bills from bill history
Added a higher energy price growth sensitivity based on the trend of total bills from recent bill history combined with recent DPS/utility projections
Although numbers have shifted, key takeaways remain the same
Net result from changes is a higher growth rate for electricity and gas rates

The affordability messaging has been consistent. NYSERDA acknowledges that there are energy affordability challenges. The Climate Act embeds environmental justice principles throughout its implementation framework, so descriptions include low- and moderate- income household impacts that are consistent with this narrative talking point, Unsurprisingly, those households are “more likely to experience energy affordability challenges”.

The following energy affordability analysis slide explains that for eleven household profiles, NYSERDA evaluated future household and transportation energy expenditures for four cases involving different technology mixes and fuel types. These “Illustrative Household Journeys” include:

Starting Point: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with average existing equipment
Conventional Replacement: Fossil fueled heating and transportation with new, more efficient equipment
Moderate Efficient Electrification: Some electrification of heating and transportation, with basic building envelope efficiency measures
High Efficient Electrification: More electrification of heating and transportation, with basic or medium building envelope efficiency measures, and efficient electric appliances

Slides were presented that describe the four journeys for several profiles. The following example describes monthly expenditures for a typical Upstate moderate-income household that uses natural gas for heat. Relative to the current starting point all three projected “household journeys” reduce monthly energy expenditures. However, buried at the bottom of the page is the notation that these values are “Average monthly expenditures. Does not include equipment costs”.

It turns out that including equipment costs makes a difference as shown in the next slide.

The Hochul/NYSERDA story is that monthly energy expenditures will go down when investments in moderate electrification or high efficiency electrification necessary for Climate Act compliance are made. The public release sound bite press releases will emphasize that point and barely acknowledge that the costs that include the capital expenses (CapEx) for the equipment costs tell a different story. I summarized all this information in Table 1. The first four rows list the monthly energy expenditures with the total in the fifth line. The CapEx monthly total cost is listed but the breakdown between the costs of a new plugin hybrid electric vehicle (moderate electrification) and a battery electric vehicle (high efficiency electrification) relative to home energy electrification is not provided. I estimated the percentage of home electrification from the bars in the previous figure. When those CapEx costs are included all the projected alternative journeys are more expensive. Note that the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment necessary for Climate Act compliance increases monthly average energy expenditures $593, a whopping 43% increase in energy costs. That is the cost of Climate Act compliance.

Table 1: Upstate New York Moderate Income Household That Uses Natural Gas for Heat Projected Monthly Costs and Costs Necessary to Comply with the Climate Act

The following key takeaways slide summarizes the messages that NYSERDA and Hochul want the Energy Planning Board and public to accept. The first statement suggests that if households continue to use existing equipment that energy spending will increase. But households “see gradually declining rates of energy consumption and total energy spending as more efficient equipment is adopted” then that “can help to offset energy price increases”. That advocates going forward despite a tacit acknowledgement that it may not save money, just reduce the increase. The final takeaway points out that according to their numbers transportation energy spending could offset incremental cost increases for home heating. I cannot overemphasize enough that results from this kind of modeling are completely dependent upon input assumptions. That means that the modelers can get any answer they want. It is therefore very telling that these takeaways cannot avoid the conclusion that the transition will incur significant costs. The modelers could not completely avoid reality.

Ultimately, the question is how much will all this cost. During his presentation Wilcox stated: “What we can take away is that the net costs for efficient electrification journeys could be 35% to 40% higher than conventional replacement when accounting for equipment, reinforcing the importance of action to address upfront equipment costs so that households are able to access the benefits of these systems.” NYSERDA is left hoping that there will be a magical solution that will reduce upfront costs so that the projections might be palatable.

The conclusions sums up the energy affordability messaging. There is an energy affordability problem that impacts low- and moderate-income households more with the implication that focus on those households will improve the situation. Energy costs impact both household and transportation spending. This needs to be emphasized because NYSERDA cannot claim monthly energy benefits for many household profiles if transportation costs are not included. Wilcox concludes the obvious point that “expected increases in energy prices highlight the importance of actions that can lower energy costs”. In my opinion the point that doing nothing is the least impactful action is not acknowledged. The importance of energy savings measures is highlighted. However, I don’t think this will provide as many benefits as they do because this has been emphasized for decades so the simple fixes and obvious solutions have already been implemented. It is easy to say that “Policy and market solutions that focus on lowering up-front costs” may make this more affordable, but no suggestions how that can be done or why anyone would expect that this may happen are offered. Finally, there is the recommendation of all analysts that have no clue how to get the preferred answer to “do further research”.

Presentation Discussion Topics

The annotated transcript for this presentation includes a heading for questions made during the meeting with a link to each person who commented or asked a question.

Chair Doreen Harris asked about the differences between Upstate and Downstate. Wilcox explained that there are climatic differences, transportation patterns are different, and the predominant type of housing is different. Harris followed up stating:

I think that’s important because that’s one of the reasons why we had to produce so many variations, right? Like, it reflects the diversity of our state in a way that means that the answer isn’t the same for everyone, depending on their own experience and the way they live.

Because I believe that this presentation was scripted to further the messaging of the Administration, I think it is telling that she wanted to emphasize impacts are not the same for everyone. I am not sure why, however.

The rationale for her second question about what happens if households do not upgrade is obvious. The projections show that all replacement scenarios doubles costs so doing nothing is an attractive option. Not only is that a great argument against an implementation schedule, but it establishes a significant public acceptance hurdle. Wilcox admitted that the key driver of change over the next five years is “change in energy price”. The modeling shows that this will increase household energy spending 3% to 8% in the starting point base case but could go up to as much as 14% to 19% even if they do nothing.

The questions and answers went on:

Harris: “And then, James, maybe to kind of take those percentages in context, was it in that higher price sensitivity, a household that did nothing could see as much as one hundred dollars a month increased costs. Is that about right?

Wilcox: “Yeah. That’s correct.”

Harris: “So there’s a substantial increase with these energy prices for folks who don’t take any action. Thank you. That is what I was trying to elicit: What does doing nothing get you?

To summarize, the Chair of the Energy Planning Board was trying to elicit a specific point from her staff that there will be a substantial increase in energy prices even if people don’t take any action. Her staff person Wilcox could have destroyed his career if he had pointed out that the minimum increase in any of the scenarios that replaced household and transportation equipment is 1.7 times greater than current costs which is far greater than the greatest impact of doing nothing which was 0.19 times greater.

After that the rest of the questions were a comedown. There were suggestions that the new technologies might offer new opportunities that might somehow, someway, mitigate the cold equations that show this is unaffordable. There was also a suggestion made that all would work out if New Yorkers used public transit.

Discussion

Presumably the Attorney General Office supplemental letter that argued that promulgating regulations for the Climate Act target would cause “undue harm” used in the New York Supreme Court litigation was developed with the assistance of NYSERDA. That letter claimed that the Climate Act mandates are infeasible due to excessive costs that are “unaffordable for consumers”. All these numbers confirm that there are affordability issues.

This finding sums up Climate Act affordability. For a moderate-income household in Upstate New York that uses natural gas the difference between replacement of conventional equipment and the highly efficient electrification equipment necessary for Climate Act compliance increases monthly average energy expenditures $593, a whopping 43% increase in energy costs.

There are ten other household profiles. The presentation did not provide sufficient information for a similar assessment of any of those other profiles. The State Energy Plan document web page does not list any updates to the draft materials from last summer so I am not able to develop an overview of all the household profile results. Also note that the documentation does not provide backup to the graphs and tables presented in the Energy Plan reports so this is no small task.

Conclusion

Any argument that the Climate Act transition will not be extraordinarily expensive can be refuted by using the data included in this presentation. Coupled with the Pathways Analysis presentation described previously that found that neither 2030 Climate Act target will be met before 2036, the only appropriate course of action is to reconsider the Climate Act. Given that it will require accountability by the politicians who got New York into this mess I am not optimistic.

Initial Thoughts on Energy Planning Board Meeting on 1 December 2025

Note: Updated on 12/10/2025 to add a slide 32 from the presentation

On November 13 I published an article describing my initial thoughts about the State Energy Planning Board meeting that day that discussed public comments on the Draft State Energy Plan document. I had intended to follow up with another post providing more detail, but other projects got in the way. This post describes the latest meeting held on December 1.

I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document. The focus of this article is how the results of the Pathways Analysis relate to Climate Act goals. Note that I went so far as to request that the response be written up.

Energy Plan Overview

According to the New York State Energy Plan website (Accessed 3/16/25):

The State Energy Plan is a comprehensive roadmap to build a clean, resilient, and affordable energy system for all New Yorkers. The Plan provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision-making in the public and private sectors within New York State.

I have provided background information and a list of previous articles on my Energy Plan page.

Meeting Overview

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) prepared a Draft Energy Plan last summer. Stakeholder comments were accepted until early October. At the last Energy Planning Board meeting there was a perfunctory description of the comments received. In this meeting NYSERDA described the updated Pathways Analysis—the modeling exercise that underpins New York’s triennial State Energy Plan.

Implementation Timing

Under New York’s own Climate Act accounting framework—the methodology that matters for compliance—no scenario modeled by NYSERDA hits the 40% economy-wide GHG reduction target by 2030. Not the “current policies” case. Not the “additional action” case. None of them. Instead, the core planning cases achieve the 40% GHG emission reduction by 2030 mandate in roughly 2037–2038, a full 7–8 years later than the statute requires. The 70% renewable electricity target by 2030 is also behind schedule. Offshore wind permitting delays push that into the 2036–2040 window.

This is not a surprise to anyone closely tracking federal policy and state implementation. However, this is the first time that it is not necessary to read between the lines of the NYSERDA presentations. NYSERDA laid it out in black-and-white. The State is no longer pretending the Climate Act is on schedule.

Federal Rollbacks and Deployment Headwinds

The updated modeling incorporates two major factors that were not included in the draft plan.

The draft plan was counting on extensive Federal support but there have been policy changes. The modeling breaks this down by sector:

Across the electric sector: $25 billion in lost investment tax credit (ITC) and production tax credit (PTC) for renewables and related credits.
Buildings: ~$1.5 billion in lost heat pump and efficiency incentives by 2040.
Transportation: ~$4.5 billion in lost EV incentives, plus higher long-term fuel costs if the Advanced Clean Car and Advanced Clean Truck programs are also repealed.
Offshore wind deployment delays. Federal permitting obstruction and supply-chain headwinds are slowing the pace of offshore wind additions.
Offshore wind deployment delays. Federal permitting obstruction and supply-chain headwinds are slowing the pace of offshore wind additions. The 2035 offshore wind capacity in the modeling is below the 9 GW target, which cascades into delays across the entire renewable timeline.

The second factor is that issues with siting constraints are slowing the physical deployment of wind and solar deployment relative to the unrealistic presumptions in the Draft plan. Offshore wind deployment delays because of changes in Federal permitting and supply-chain issues are slowing the pace of offshore wind additions. The 2035 offshore wind capacity in the modeling is below the 9 GW target, which cascades into delays across the entire renewable timeline.

Policy Implications

The Perplexity AI summary listed six takeaways.

NYSERDA plainly states that the 2030 targets cannot be met using the Climate Act’s accounting as shown on the Key Takeaways (3/3) Slide 32 shown below.. However, the presentation just described this analysis result and not the implication that this means that the Climate Act must be amended to shift the schedule.

The building sector urgently need more aggressive policy actions to achieve Climate Act goals. The gap between current-policy building decarbonization and a net-zero-consistent path is large, and it’s growing. Stronger codes, more financing, larger direct-install programs, and targeted support for renters and low-income owners are all needed.

The transition of the gas system requires active management and investment. This isn’t a “let the market sort it out” situation. Utilities, the PSC, and the state need coordinated strategies for how gas infrastructure evolves over time—including decisions about when and where to invest in network modernization versus when to accelerate targeted electrification.

The presentation noted the importance of Dispatchable Emissions Free Resources (DEFR). I disagree with the optionality adjective, however. There is nothing optional about the need for these new and unproven resources. The description of green hydrogen illustrates why it won’t solve the problem. The presentation argues the state should be actively exploring, piloting, and supporting a portfolio of zero-carbon dispatchable technologies. RNG, long-duration storage, ammonia, and others all deserve serious development support.

Federal policy is now a binding constraint. New York can optimize its own policies, but it cannot outrun federal rollbacks. The state’s energy strategy increasingly needs to figure out how to replace Federal funding, procure projects to lock in tax credits before phase-outs, and re-structure policy design that works even if federal support evaporates.

Nuclear is back in the conversation, and that’s not a bad thing. The modeling shows that nuclear power, where available and deployable, reduces system costs and relieves pressure on renewables and DEFR. The presentation argues that the state should pursue the NYPA project, explore other Small Modular Reactor and advanced reactor opportunities, and think carefully about lifecycle extension of existing assets.

Stakeholder Comments

I am extremely disappointed with the stakeholder process. In my comments at the first virtual public hearing and a subsequent written comment I explained that the lack of documentation on the disposition of stakeholder comments undermined the credibility of the process and the opportunity to improve the Energy Plan. The only acknowledgment of the comments received is a promise that “all comments will be posted on the State Energy Plan website as soon as practicable”. It has been two months since that promise was posted and the comments still are not posted.

This matters because the presentation at this meeting claimed the Pathways Analysis finds that the additional-action case generates net societal benefits of about $18 billion by 2040, with roughly $19 billion in aggregate net-present-value benefits through 2040, when carbon and health benefits are factored in. However, in my unacknowledged comments I pointed out that the cost accounting in the Pathways Analysis “No Action” scenario only includes costs associated with the Climate Act law, not the cost to meet the Climate Act targets. The misleading “No Action” scenario is not a baseline that excludes all programs necessary to achieve the Climate Act targets because it includes legacy programs in place prior to the Climate Act. Furthermore, in other comments I identified issues that reduced the alleged benefits. If costs and benefits were properly addressed, then I suspect that there would not be net societal benefits.

Discussion

I recently described the Oct. 24, 2025 New York Supreme Court decision and order in a case pitting environmental organizations against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed. Importantly, during the trial , the Attorney General Office submitted a supplemental letter that argued that promulgating regulations for the Climate Act target would cause “undue harm” because the Climate Act mandates are infeasible due to excessive costs that are “unaffordable for consumers” to bear. Subsequently, DEC appealed the decision which postpones resolution of the problem.

The rationale for the Judge’s decision coupled with the acknowledgement that the costs are unaffordable and the updated Pathways Analysis finding that the 2030 targets cannot be met using the Climate Act’s accounting methodology should mean that the Climate Act itself needs to be amended. This important finding was not mentioned in the presentation. Furthermore, there has been no sign that the Hochul Administration or the majority leadership in the Legislature are amenable to considering amendments to the Climate Act.

There is another aspect to this. The Climate Act is not the only law that includes the mandates for the net-zero transition. New York Public Service Law § 66 “Establishment of a renewable energy program” describes energy systems that are prohibit some of the findings in the updated Pathways Analysis. It appears to me that this legislation also needs to be amended.

I will follow up with another post on this meeting because there are more issues that I did not address.

Conclusion

Reality bats last. The findings of the updated Pathways Analysis reflect that fact. The aspirational schedule of the Climate Act was never realistic, and these results are simply acknowledgement of that fact. It remains to be seen how the identified problems and the implicit feasibility concerns described will be addressed. Given that it will require accountability by the politicians who got New York into this mess I am not optimistic.

Implications of New York State 2025 GHG Emissions Inventory

This post describes the latest New York State (NYS) GHG emission inventory report that provides data through 2023. A recent post explained why the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) 2030 target for a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 1990 levels was impossible. It included GHG emissions data through 2022 so this report updates that assessment. It also describes implications of other aspects of the inventory results.

I am convinced that implementation of the New York Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. In addition GHG emissions are supposed to be 40% lower than the 1990 baseline. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.

NYS GHG Emissions

The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) released the 2025 statewide GHG emissions report (2025 GHG Report) at the end of November, a month earlier than recent releases. DEC is required by the Climate Act to follow unique inventory requirements. Four years ago I published an overview post of this greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory that described things that maximize emissions in an apparent attempt to make GHG emissions as large as possible.

The 2025 GHG Report includes the following documents:

Appendix: CLCPA Emission Factors (PDF)

The Summary Report for the GHG Inventory gives an overview of the highlights.

In 2023, statewide gross GHG emissions were 354.06 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent GHGs (mmt CO2e) using CLCPA accounting. Total gross emissions in 2023 were 14.8% lower than the 1990 baseline in this report and 13.6% below the 1990 statewide emission baseline adopted in regulation in 2020. Carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) comprised the largest portion of emissions by gas, 58% and 35% respectively, and energy was the largest source of emissions (73%). Net emissions were 316.58 mmt CO2e in 2023, which includes a net 37.48 mmt CO2e removed.

Note that the 1990 total gross emissions calculated in this analysis were different than the those calculated when the 1990 statewide emission baseline was adopted in regulation in 2020. The implications of this will be discussed later in this post. The Summary Report goes on:

Emissions in New York State in 2023 have mostly recovered from the effects of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. As noted in the two previous versions of this report, 2020 emissions were not considered representative and were expected to normalize to broader trends in future reports. Annual gross emissions in 2023 were less than 0.1% higher than in 2022 and 4% lower than the pre-pandemic levels in 2019. This trend is primarily the result of energy sector changes. Energy emissions in 2023 were 10% higher than in 2020, and 1% lower than in 2022. Within the energy sector, these trends were driven by the gradual recovery of energy sector subsectors such as transportation and a change in electricity generation sources. Some of the trends in energy emissions are also affected by seasonal weather patterns and interannual differences in the demand for heating or cooling.

When a New York state agency says “change in electricity generation sources” they cannot state the obvious that this is the result of poor energy policy. The changes in sources were caused by the politically motivated decisions to shut down two zero emissions Indian Point nuclear units and reject the permits to repower old and inefficient natural gas fired power plants. The Draft Energy Plan and multiple New York Independent System Operator reports clearly show that both nuclear power and fossil generation resources are needed to maintain electric system reliability.

The Summary Report goes on:

Greenhouse gas emissions from the extraction, processing, and transmission of imported natural gas greatly decreased for years 2020-2022 relative to the 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report due to updated data and methodology. This report uses an updated fuel lifecycle analysis model made available by the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL 2025) that estimates GHG emissions from natural gas systems based on year 2020 operating conditions. Note that use of the updated model reduced statewide greenhouse gas emission totals for years 2020-2022 compared to the totals included in the 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report. More details about the changes to the data and methodology underlying imported natural gas emissions are included in Sectoral Report #1: Energy.

Two points to keep in mind about this paragraph. New York’s unique GHG emission accounting methodology not only includes the use of different global warming potential but also includes upstream emissions. This means that most results cannot be compared to other jurisdictions. The second point is that this inventory relies on emission factors instead of direct emission measurements. As a result, updates to data and methodology mean that emission totals change. This will be discussed below.

2023 GHG Emissions

Table ES.2 in the Summary Report presents emissions for different sectors and different greenhouse gases. There are four Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sectors and there are four sectoral reports for energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, forestry and land use, and waste. The table also includes United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) totals that use the “conventional accounting used by other governments, applies a 100-year GWP (IPCC 2014), omits biogenic CO2, and does not include emissions outside of New York State.” These are the only data that can be compared to other jurisdictions.

In my recent post I claimed that the 2030 40% emission reduction target was impossible. According to the Final DEC Part 496 regulation, 1990 emissions were 409.78 MMTCO₂e. I used DEC’s 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report, covering data through 2022, that revealed that New York emissions as of 2022 were 371.08 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO₂e) from Table ES.2 in the 2024 report. Using these numbers NYS had only achieved a 9.3% reduction in gross GHG emissions from 1990 levels. Table ES.2 in the 2025 report states that NY emissions were 354.06 MMTCO₂e) at the end of 2023.

2030 40% Reduction Mandate

The Climate Act requires a 40% reduction of GHG emissions by 2030. Table 1 compares the current GHG inventories performance relative to th4 40% reduction mandate. At the end of 2023 the reductions since 1990 using the Part 496 state limit were only 14% lower. The fact that 2022 had slightly higher emissions reinforces the observation that the 2030 goal is impossible.

Table 1: Statewide GHG Emission Inventory Report Emissions Relative to Climate Act 2030 Mandate (mmt CO2e GWP20)

Emission Reduction Trend

The 2025 GHG Report describes emission trends:

Total statewide gross emissions in 2023 were 14.8% below 1990 and 24.5% below 2005 levels, when assessed using CLCPA accounting and the most up-to-date methodologies. Figure ES.1 shows overall trends in statewide emissions by gas on an annual basis, including gross and net emission totals, as well as the emission limits for 2030 and 2050 pursuant to ECL § 75-0107 and 6 NYCRR Part 496. Statewide emissions are 13.6% below the 1990 baseline used in the Part 496 regulation. Statewide emissions for 2020 are also described in this report but are not representative of historic nor current conditions due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Currently, the data for Figure ES.1 are not available. When it becomes available, I will dive into the trends. In the meantime, Table 3 extracts individual trend tables from each of the sectoral reports for energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture, forestry and land use, and waste. The only emission categories that have reduced emissions in excess of 40% are the energy “other fossil fuel use” and “electricity transmission” categories but both total only 1% of the inventory. Total emissions increased in the Industrial Process and Product Use Sector “product use” category; the AFOLU Agriculture Emission Sector “livestock” category; and the Waste Sector “waste combustion” and “wastewater” categories. The increases in emissions were in categories that total 14% of the inventory.

Table 3: Summary of Sectoral Emission Trends

Annual Variation of the GHG Emission Inventory

I previously mentioned that 1990 total gross emissions calculated in this analysis were different than the those calculated when the 1990 statewide emission baseline was established by ECL 75-0107 and reflected in 6 NYCRR Part 496. It is important to understand that GHG emission inventories are not based completely on measured emissions. The power plant emissions used in EPA trading programs are based on direct measurements, but the estimates in this inventory are derived using emission factors and estimates of activities such as fuel use or vehicle miles traveled.

Table 3 illustrates how this affects the status relative to the 2030 emission limit. All the emission inventories have estimated a different 1990 value than the regulatory limit in Part 496. The Sum 1990 Gross Total row lists the different numbers. The rest of the table shows how these differences affect the comparison of current emissions to the 2030 limit.

Table 3: Annual Statewide GHG Emission Inventory Report Emissions Relative to Climate Act 2030 Mandate (mmt CO2e GWP20)

The variation in the emissions estimates is significant. The sectoral GHG emission reports list data for 1990, 2005, and the last five years. Table 4 presents the standard deviation and range of observed data for 1990, 2005, and 2019 for the last five reports for different sector emission categories. Note that the total range of variation for 2019 emissions is 12.18 million metric tons of CO₂e. In this report the total 2019 emissions were 367.25 million metric tons of CO₂e so variations in methodology are about 3% of the total estimated emissions.

If you take the time to dive into the details of Table 4 one thing stands out. The main driver of the observed variation range is the estimate for the “out of state energy” category in the energy sector. The 2019 variation range was 13.47 million metric tons of CO₂e.

Table 4: Standard Deviation and Range of Observed Emissions from Last Five GHG Emission Reports

Implications Discussion

There are several implications for the GHG inventory. Most important relates to the Climate Act target for a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 1990 levels by 2030. In 2023 statewide emissions were only 14% lower than 1990 and there is no suggestion that the rate is increasing so this confirms that the achieving the 2030 goal is impossible.

This article quantifies the variation of emissions estimates. This emission inventory relies on emission factors instead of direct emission measurements, so future variations are to be expected. Changes due to reporting sources and improvement of the emission factors used will be a feature of program going forward. The question is how it gets handled. The report notes “The 6 NYCRR Part 496 regulation may be revised at a later date using updated information.” For any affected source trying to determine their control strategy this uncertainty complicates planning. Worse, in the face of changing numbers, New York Cap-and-Invest Program compliance will be more challenging. Finally, when there is a price on carbon, say $10 per ton, the methodology changes will affect millions of dollars of costs.

Finally, I want to emphasize that this report illustrates that New York “follows the science” when it is convenient but ignores the consensus when politically expedient. In particular, the GHG emissions accounting is inconsistent with the UNFCCC. Note that the largest driver of the observed variation in emission estimates across reports is the “out of state energy” category in the energy sector. There are reasons that the UNFCCC methodology does not include upstream emissions and one of them is the challenge of estimating those emissions consistently.

Conclusion

The 2025 GHG emission inventory reports is another warning regarding Climate Act implementation. It is clear that the 2030 GHG emission reduction target cannot be met. There are unacknowledged challenges inherent in the emission inventory approach that will make the Cap-and-Invest program implementation more challenging.

New York’s Impossible 2030 GHG Emissions Target

David Wojick recently published an article describing why New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act or CLCPA) 2030 GHG emission mandate to reduce New York State 1990 GHG emissions 40% by 2030. This article supplements his article with numbers and additional context.

David Wojick is an independent policy analyst and senior advisor to Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT). As a civil engineer with a Ph.D. in logic and analytic philosophy of science, he brings a unique perspective to complex policy issues. His specializes in science and technology intensive issues. I correspond regularly with him on New York issues.

Supplemental Number for the Article

Wojick’s article is an overview of the challenge and impossibility of the Climate Act 2030 interim GHG emission reduction goal. He explains:

New York Governor Hochul has told the Court her administration cannot write the regulations required to enforce the Climate Act’s 2030 emission reduction targets because they would be infeasible and ruinously expensive to New Yorkers. For all practical purposes, they are actually impossible, so the law must be changed. The legal situation is explained in my article “New York’s climate law hits the wall” here:

He provides a brief qualitative analysis of the impossibility.

The law calls for a 40% reduction in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions from the 1990 levels by 2030. According to state data, the emissions have already been reduced by 10% leaving a whopping 30% to go in just four years.

The Department of Environmental Conservation’s 2024 Statewide GHG Emissions Report, covering data through 2022, revealed that New York emissions as of 2022 were 371.08 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO₂e) from Table ES.2 in the report. According to the Final Department of Environmental Conservation Part 496 regulation, 1990 emissions were 409.78 MMTCO₂e. Using these numbers NYS has achieved only a 9.3% reduction in gross GHG emissions from 1990 levels.

Table ES-2: 2022 New York State GHG Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by IPCC Sector

Click to access summaryreportnysghgemissionsreport.pdf

Table ES-2 lists data in four CLCPA sector categories. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to describe and summarize these sectors. The Energy sector is the dominant source (75%) of GHG emissions in New York State, accounting for about 282 MMTCO₂e in 2022. The Industrial Processes and Product Use (IPPU) sector covers emissions from manufacturing processes and the use of manufactured products, accounting for approximately 6% of total gross emissions (24.29 mmt CO₂e in 2022). The

Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) Sector encompasses emissions from agricultural activities, livestock management, and soil practices, as well as carbon sequestration from forests, wetlands, and harvested wood products. In 2022, agricultural emissions totaled 21.49 mmt CO₂e (6% of gross emissions). The Waste sector covers emissions from managing and treating waste materials, accounting for approximately 12% of total gross emissions (43.45 mmt CO₂e in 2022). This sector is unique in New York’s inventory because it includes emissions from waste exported to out-of-state facilities, addressing potential emission leakage.

Wojick describes the reasons for the observed reductions.

Most of the reductions occurred in just two ways that are similar to America as a whole. Foremost, is a switch from coal to natural gas in electric power generation. Second, is the loss of manufacturing, helping to make China the industrial center of the world. Neither of these reduction measures is available or feasible to help hit the remaining 30%.

Table 1 from the Part 496 Revised Regulatory Impact Statement lists 1990 emissions for the CLCPA sectors used in ES-2. The following table has been supplemented with the 2022 observed emissions. Note that there have been reductions in the energy and waste sectors but increases in the IPPU and AFPLU sectors. This supports Wojick’s assertions that observed reductions have come from the energy sector.

Table 1. Total Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1990 by IPCC Sector and Gas, in GWP20.

Click to access revisedris496.pdf

Wojick breaks down the potential for additional emission reductions.

According to EIA, roughly 50% of New York’s energy consumption is from petroleum. About 80% of this is transportation fuel, especially gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. It is clearly impossible to reduce transportation by 30%. In some cases, electrification is technologically feasible, but it cannot possible be done at the needed scale in just four years.

This is especially true given much of the transportation is from out of state vehicles. New York stands between New England and the rest of America, so it gets a huge amount of through traffic.

In addition, an estimated 20% of New York households heat with fuel oil. Winters are very cold, so we are not about to cut that by 30%.

The next biggest source is natural gas, which accounts for about 30% of energy consumption, not counting electricity generation. Roughly 60% of households are heated with natural gas as are most larger buildings, such as apartments, co-ops, offices and stores. Here again, while electrification is theoretically possible, it cannot possibly be done in just four years.

Table ES-3 from the most recent emission inventory lists emissions by economic sector. The type of fuels used are not included but this table supports Wojick’s arguments.

Table ES-3: 2022 New York State GHG Emissions (mmtCO2e GWP20), by Economic Sector

Click to access summaryreportnysghgemissionsreport.pdf

Wojick points out that the Climate Act accounting includes unique provisions to account for imported fuels and imported electricity.

A big extra complication is that the emissions to be reduced by 30% include those out of state emissions created by producing imported electricity and fossil fuels. This might include emissions from things like Texas refineries and Pennsylvania coal fired power plants. New York obviously has no control over these sources.

Here is the Climate Law’s incredible definition of the emissions that need to be reduced: “”Statewide greenhouse gas emissions” means the total annual emissions of greenhouse gases produced within the state from anthropogenic sources and greenhouse gases produced outside of the state that are associated with the generation of electricity imported into the state and the extraction and transmission of fossil fuels imported into the state.”

New York imports almost all of the huge amounts of petroleum and natural gas that it uses. These out of state emissions are likely to be a significant fraction of those that are required to be reduced 30% in just four years.

Plus of course, there are the emissions from electric power generation. Roughly 40% of the natural gas consumed in New York is used to generate electricity. About 54% of the generated electricity is powered by natural gas versus just 15% from renewables, mostly hydro. These numbers can be little changed in just four years.

The sum of the imported fuels and imported electricity category GHG emissions in Table ES-3 is 63 MMT CO₂e or 17% of the total emissions. Those emissions are beyond the control of New York to reduce.

Climate Act Global Warming Potential

There is one aspect of the impossible target not addressed by Wojick. The Climate Act uses a unique GHG accounting methodology. This is a particular problem for me. I used Perplexity AI to provide a summary of the reasons I have described on this blog why I think the use of 20-year global warming potential emissions accounting is inappropriate. The reason that these values are used is because the authors of the Climate Act had an irrational obsession with methane because they thought that the global warming potential of methane is much greater than carbon dioxide. However, as the summary shows, the use of a 20-year global warming potential is scientifically flawed and politically motivated. In brief, the parameter measures the ability of a molecule of a greenhouse gas to reduce long wave radiation (the greenhouse effect) in the laboratory. In the atmosphere where proponents worry about greenhouse effects on global warming, saturation effects, relative impacts on black body radiation and actual concentrations make the global warming potential relative of methane to CO2 insignificant.

Tables ES-2 and ES-3 from the 2024 GHG report list the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) GHG emissions. This is the International Treaty aimed at addressing climate change. It includes established specific guidelines to report and compare emissions data using a global warming potential measured over 100 years instead of the 20 year parameter used in the Climate Act. New York proponents for climate change claim to follow the science but in this instance, they chose to ignore the established science. As a result, it is impossible to track New York’s progress relative to the rest of the world.

As a practical matter the Climate Act accounting increases emissions. In 2022, total GHG emissions using the GWP-20 units were 371.08 MMT CO₂e but are only 192.13 MMT CO₂e using the UNFCC GWP-100 units. Table 2 from the Part 496 Revised Regulatory Impact Statement lists 1990 emissions for the CLCPA sectors used in ES-2. Note that 1990 emissions were 317.92 MMT CO₂e compared to 409.78 MMT CO₂e using GWP-20. Furthermore, when compared to the 2022 emissions total emissions are down 39.6% – very near to the 40% 2030 mandate!

Table 2. Total Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 1990 by IPCC Sector and Gas, in GWP100

Click to access revisedris496.pdf

Discussion

Wojick concludes:

New York State cannot cut emissions by the required 30% in just four years, so the 2030 target of the Climate Act is impossible. The legislature must change the law, and the Court has given them until February 6 to do so. After that, the Court says it will impose the Climate Law, which would be incredibly harmful.

When the reported numbers are considered the conclusion that New York State cannot make the 2030 40% GHG emission reduction target is confirmed. However, if the GWP-100 GHG emission accounting methodology is used a 40% reduction from 1990 by 2030 only needs a further 1% reduction from current emissions. There is a caveat to this observation. While this suggests that the 2030 reduction target is possible, the fuel switching and loss of manufacturing emission reductions that were the cause of the observed reductions will not provide significant future reductions. Future reductions will require replacement with zero emissions resources no matter what the accounting methodology. Those strategies are much more difficult and costly.

Although changing the accounting methodology would be a potential political approach to achieve compliance for the Hochul Administration, this is unlikely. In the spring of 2023, her Administration floated the idea of changing the metric undoubtedly because of these numbers. Climate Act activists melted down when that was proposed and the idea was shelved.

In my opinion, Wojick correctly points out that the law must be changed in response to the recent legal decision he referenced. These data are just one of a long list of other reasons that I think that Climate Act implementation should be paused and the lessons learned since 2019 incorporated in a new implementation schedule. I believe that evidence is overwhelming that the aspirational targets should also be modified to include affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions constraints.

Conclusion

David Wojick and I agree that the Climate Act 40% reduction by 2030 target cannot be met using the existing GHG accounting methodology. My numbers confirm everything he said in his article.

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment Implications

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA ) recently announced the completion of its Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment (Zero by 40 Report). The report directly addresses what I think is the biggest reliability risk of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero electric system transition. I previously summarized the report and described the technologies evaluated in a second article. This post describes the implications of the report findings relative to the future of the Climate Act.

I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate a summary of the report used to outline this commentary and to provide references included in this document.

Overview

The current focus of Climate Act implementation is on meeting the interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030 and the all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040 mandate. My previous post provides more background.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated a process to “identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target.” This class of technologies has been dubbed Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR). The Zero by 40 Report responds to that order.

An overview of Climate Act compliance must also consider Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-P (Renewable Energy Program). That law establishes the 70% by 2030 renewable energy mandate and zero-emissions by 2040 target under the Climate Act. It establishes which technologies qualify as “renewable energy systems”. Those technologies include solar thermal, photovoltaics, onshore and offshore wind, hydroelectric, geothermal electric, geothermal ground source heat, tidal energy, wave energy, ocean thermal, and hydrogen fuel cells (excluding fossil fuel-based generation).

There is one other Climate Act consideration. On Oct. 24, 2025, the New York Albany County Supreme Court issued a decision on litigation against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026, or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act modified. At the time of this writing, the Hochul Administration has not indicated how it will respond.

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment

I admit that I was not familiar with the term “technoeconomic”. When I looked it up, I found that there is another similar term “techno-economic analysis”. The difference is relevant. Technoeconomic assessment is an adjective that describes an analysis that includes both technical and economic factors. A techno-economic analysis is a formal process that compares the technical and economic performance that informs decision making. This report is a technoeconomic assessment but what we need is a techno-economic analysis.

The Zero by 40 Report is like the Scoping Plan and Draft Energy Plan because they all address technical and economic factors but do not include a feasibility analysis supporting a particular proposed pathway. None of these reports provide comprehensive, technology-specific cost estimates that would allow direct comparison of technologies to each other and to conventional alternatives. There are also technological considerations that are noted but not resolved in all three reports. A techno-economic analysis would provide the details necessary to determine feasibility of a future system meeting the legal mandates of PSL 66-P.

DEFR Definition

The Zero by 40 Report expands the situations where DEFR technology will be needed to close the gap between available resources and load projections in the zero-emission electric system. Prior to this report, DEFR requirements focused on extended periods during coldest and hottest weather events where there will be insufficient generation from renewable energy systems. This addressed the inconvenient fact that observed peak loads occurred during periods of low renewable resource availability. The additional DEFR concerns noted in the report reflect increased acknowledgment that there is more to a zero-emissions electric system than the technologies listed in PSL 66-P.

In this report the DEFR technologies were classified into three categories:

Low-capacity factor resources that can be deployed during periods of high demand and low renewable generation, offering reliability, fast-ramping capabilities, and no duration limitations, assuming fuel availability, but are not operated as baseload units due to plant economics.

High-capacity factor resources operate the majority of the year and can provide reliable baseload power, including power during challenging events, but are less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops.

Gap-rightsizing resources can help balance supply and demand to adjust the capacity gap. While they do not generate electricity directly, they enhance the utilization of other clean resources.

The original DEFR concern focused only on the peaking hours. The Zero by 40 Report explains that high-capacity factor DEFR is best suited to operate most of the year providing reliable baseload power. The report notes that these technologies can provide power during challenging events, but these resources are “less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops.” This means that to provide the required backup for the PSL 66-P renewable energy systems this category of DEFR will not be used as designed. When resources are used inefficiently it necessarily means higher costs.

Timing Considerations

An important implication is the lack of urgency with this process. The report states that “electric system modeling will be needed to understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions, which falls outside the scope of this study.” The PSC order that directed NYSERDA to address this problem was initiated in May 2023. The Department of Public Service (DPS) convened a two-day technical conference on December 11, 2023, but other than the process that defined “zero emissions” and now the release of this report nothing else happened in this proceeding related to DEFR.

The PSC, New York Independent System Operator and independent analysts all agree that DEFRs are needed. Before we can determine how to implement the Climate Act electric system consistent with PSL 66-P renewable energy resources it is necessary to determine if it is feasible. Every day the plan for DEFR backup is delayed the costs associated with what may be a false solution increase. If there is no viable DEFR solution, then the PSL 66-P renewable energy resources approach cannot be implemented.

There is another timing consideration. The conclusions in the Zero by 40 Report describe actions that can facilitate the readiness of DEFR to achieve the scale needed for 2040. Those actions include:

Pursue a diverse set of resources to minimize the risk of overreliance on individual technologies

Start early to increase the likelihood of readiness by 2040.

Invest in grid-enhancing technologies early to minimize the need for backstop resources.

Invest in innovation to enhance resource viability

Develop strategies across industries for unlocking key resources with infrastructure hurdles.

Engage early with technology developers, end users, and other stakeholders.

Conduct grid modeling to understand tradeoffs of relying on different resources.

Conduct a regular reassessment of options and remain flexible as new technology options come online.

In my opinion, there is very little reason to expect that the required DEFR support will be available in 2040. It is not necessary to spend a lot of time referencing quotes in the Zero by 40 Report supporting that position because these recommended actions support that conclusion. References to early action and the need for innovation are all you need to know that the report implicitly admits the schedule is in doubt. Importantly, if there are delays addressing these recommendations then successful DEFR deployment needed to achieve the 2040 mandate is impossible.

Feasibility

The Zero by 40 Report is proof that DEFR technologies are needed to make the PSL 66-P renewable resource electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. Clearly a feasibility analysis is needed to determine if acceptable DEFR technologies are possible. However, before one can begin, definitions for affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions need to be established because acceptability standards determine “feasibility”.

The New York Albany County Supreme Court decision requires the DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026, or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Act modified. Given all the evidence suggesting that the 2030 GHG emission target cannot be met, establishing regulations that cannot be achieved is inappropriate. If DEC goes to the Legislature, then both the schedule and the aspirations of the Act should be reassessed based on what has happened since the Climate Act was enacted. The Zero by 40 Report supports changing the aspirations of the Act.

If there is a reassessment of the Climate Act, then the Legislature should establish definitions for affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions, mandate a feasibility analysis, and require that implementation only proceed if feasibility relative to the constraints is proven. Once implementation begins, status relative to those metrics should be assessed regularly and if the boundary conditions are exceeded, then implementation should be halted.

Discussion

There is a lot of useful information in this report. I did not address the specifics issues associated with the DEFR technologies evaluated. The conclusions in the report support my position that DEFR technologies are not ready to support the PSL 66-P renewable energy resources mandated by politicians.

Importantly, there is still no plan to propose a specific resource mix based on feasibility. The Zero by 40 Report calls for electric system modeling to “understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions” but does not admit that the DEFR technologies might fail a comprehensive feasibility assessment based on affordability, reliability risks, and environmental impacts.

Even if feasible DEFR technologies are found, the Climate Act schedule needs to be re-assessed. This report calls for additional work, but there is no urgency by the PSC to offer a plan to get there. The Order that initiated this report was filed 28 months ago in May 2023. If it takes another 28 months before the recommendations to take early action are evaluated, defined, and implemented that could too late to ensure these resources are available when needed.

Conclusion

This report provides multiple reasons that New York State needs to pause Climate Act implementation. Future action should only proceed if reliability requirements are ensured and this report identifies issues that may make that impossible.

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment – Resource Comparison

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA ) recently announced the completion of its Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment (Zero by 40 Report). The report directly addresses what I think is the biggest reliability risk of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero electric system transition. I summarized the report in my previous post. This is a companion article that does not include the background information in the first article and just compares the technologies evaluated

Overview

The previous post explains that the Zero by 40 report was prepared in response to the Public Service Commission (PSC) recognition that there is a “need for resources to ensure the reliability of the 2040 zero-emissions electric grid mandated by the Climate Act”. A May 2023 Order notes that the Climate Act directs the PSC to establish a program to ensure that the electric sector targets are achieved and explains that “there is a gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technology and expected future system reliability requirements.” It concludes: “This Order responds to the Petition and initiates a process to identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target.” This class of technologies has been dubbed Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR). This Zero by 40 Report responds to that order.

I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate a summary of the report used as an outline and to provide references included in this document.

Technologies Evaluated in the Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment

I had originally planned only a second companion article about the implications to the Climate Act to my summary post but decided that I needed to describe the technologies too. Section 1.4 in the Zero by 40 Report describes the technologies evaluated:

This report evaluates potential resources that can provide firm energy and capacity in a zero-emissions power sector. The study examines seven technology categories that could serve as DEFRs. These technologies are grouped into three resource groups based on their expected operational characteristics. While some resources can be configured to serve different roles, these groupings reflect constraints on costs, emissions, and availability in New York State, which are discussed later in the report.

Low-capacity factor resources can be deployed during periods of high demand and low renewable generation, offering reliability, fast-ramping capabilities, and no duration limitations, assuming fuel availability, but are not operated as baseload units due to plant economics. Low-capacity factor Resources include:

Hydrogen (H₂)

Renewable natural gas (RNG) and renewable diesel (RD)

High-capacity factor resources operate the majority of the year and can provide reliable baseload power, including power during challenging events, but are less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops. High-capacity factor resources include:

Advanced nuclear

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) on thermal plants

Geothermal

Gap-rightsizing resources can help balance supply and demand to adjust the capacity gap. While they do not generate electricity directly, they enhance the utilization of other clean resources. Gap-rightsizing resources include:

Long duration energy storage (LDES) – Note that this refers to interday storage 10-36 hours

Virtual power plants (VPP)

Figure 1 provides an illustrative example of the role of these different DEFR resource groups. While renewables play a significant role in overall power generation, the high-capacity factor resources supplement renewables by providing an additional source of baseload power. Low-capacity factor resources help to meet peak demand when renewables are insufficient. Gap-rightsizing resources can shift generation or load, increasing the value of renewable generation by mitigating intermittency to balance supply with demand.

Figure 1. Role of DEFR Resource Types in Meeting Electricity Demand

Source: New York State Energy and Research Development Authority (NYSERDA). 2025. “Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment, Final Report.” Prepared by Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment

Operational Characteristics

Figure 2 from the Zero by 2040 Report describes the characteristics of the three functional categories. It is instructive to consider these resources relative to three categories of generating resource production over time.

Figure 2. Functional Categories of DEFR Resource Types

Technology Assessment Technologies Summary

Chapter 9 in the Zero by 2040 report compares the potential DEFR technologies. The report uses the following criteria: performance attributes, readiness by 2040, infrastructure and supply chain readiness dynamics, project lead times, emissions and other considerations, cost, and scalability for 2040. Instead of looking at individual technologies the Chapter 9 summary describes the results for the three functional DEFR categories.

The Report describes Low-capacity factor resources as follows:

Low-capacity factor resources offer high flexibility and responsiveness to grid needs. They can be deployed during periods of high demand and low renewable generation, offering reliability and fast-ramping capabilities without duration limitations, assuming fuel availability. These resources are expected to be critical in any future zero-emission grid. However, they are expected to operate for only a limited number of hours per year due to a high operating-to-capital cost ratio, primarily driven by the cost of fuel, as well as fuel availability constraints. The low capacity factor resources evaluated in this study are H2, RNG, and RD.

The Low-Capacity resource summary states:

Low-capacity factor resources are expected to critical in any future zero-emission grid, offering reliability and fast-ramping capabilities on days with the most extreme system needs. Each technology evaluated has advantages and challenges. Infrastructure constraints and high costs may limit the widespread availability of H2 in 2040, but low GHG emissions, especially for green H2, will likely provide value across various industries in 2040 and beyond, making investments in pilot projects and eventual strategic infrastructure deployment important from an economywide perspective.

RNG and RD may be the most viable low-capacity factor resources for 2040 deployment given their technology readiness, existing fuel transport infrastructure, and ability to serve as drop-in fuels in existing plants. However, the combination of feedstock limitations, competition for fuels from other sectors and states, and GHG considerations necessitates limiting their use to low capacity factor applications.

High-capacity resources are described as follows:

High-capacity factor resources operate the majority of the year, providing reliable baseload power. These technologies can meet existing and growing load, reducing the need for both high-cost low-capacity factor DEFRs and some intermittent renewable deployment, often with a lower land footprint on a per-capacity basis. They also typically provide inertia and other ancillary grid services to support a grid increasingly dependent on variable renewables. While they have some ramping capabilities, they are less suitable for fast ramping or frequent starts and stops. This analysis compares LLWRs, lwSMRs, non-water-cooled reactors, NG combined cycle plants with 95% carbon capture and storage (CCS), and next-generation geothermal systems.

The High-Capacity resource summary states:

High-capacity factor resources are valuable for meeting existing load and expected load growth. While renewables are projected to supply most of the energy demand in 2040, high-capacity factor resources can provide firm power and grid services that support reliability in a predominantly renewable grid. Their high energy density also helps mitigate potential land-use challenges associated with large-scale renewable deployment. High-capacity factor resources could also reduce the need for low capacity factor resources, which are expensive and mostly idle. However, high-capacity factor resource technologies require long lead times, often 10 years or more. To ensure they are operational by 2040, stakeholders must take early action.

Each technology offers unique advantages and faces specific challenges. From a deployment-readiness perspective, LLWRs and CCS are the most prepared for near-term implementation. However, lwSMRs and non-water-cooled reactors could also become commercially viable by 2040. Geothermal, while promising, has lower readiness and limited scalability in New York State.

Gap-Rightsizing Resources are described as:

Gap-rightsizing resources help balance supply and demand, addressing the firm capacity gap. While these technologies do not generate electricity directly, they enhance the potential of other clean resources. They are expected to have significant value even today due to opportunities for energy arbitrage and infrastructure cost avoidance but will not be sufficient on their own to meet all grid needs due to duration limitations and because they do not generate electricity on their own. This study considers two main categories of Gap-Rightsizing Resources: LDES and VPPs. LDES includes mechanical, electrochemical, and thermal storage technologies. Within each of these buckets are several technologies with a range of attributes.

The Zero by 2040 report does not summarize this category. Both of the gap-rightsizing resources LDES and VPP are largely ready for deployment. Costs for VPP are lower than other technologies but depend on costumer participation which makes availability uncertain. Furthermore, there are limits to the energy potential of this technology. LDES batteries will be more expensive, but “has the potential for longer discharge durations and higher operational certainty, but it is also a net load on the grid due to the need to recharge and round trip efficiency losses.”

Discussion

There are two missing pieces to the path forward for the May 2023 Order. Someday some is going to have make recommendations about these technologies. The PSC needs another order specifying how it intends to “identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target”

The following caveat in Chapter 9 suggests the other component needed to move forward:

Most of the comparison focuses on comparing technologies within three resource groups: low capacity factor resources (hydrogen and biofuels), high capacity factor resources (advanced nuclear, carbon capture and storage, and next-generation geothermal), and gap-rightsizing resources (LDES and VPPs). Because technologies in different resource groups serve different functions, are expected to operate with very different profiles, and provide fundamentally different value to the grid, direct comparisons across resource groups are difficult and can be misleading. Ultimately, electric system modeling will be needed to understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions, which falls outside the scope of this study.

This report says more work is needed. It states that “electric system modeling will be needed to understand the least-cost mix of resources and each of their potential unique contributions, which falls outside the scope of this study.” In my opinion, it is not just the least-cost mix, but also the mix that minimizes reliability risks and environmental impacts. I think that New Yorkers need to know the impacts of this approach relative to impacts of continued use of fossil fuels, a lower-carbon approach that combines increased use of nuclear energy supplemented with fossil fuels where appropriate, and an all-in approach that uses nuclear as much as possible to reduce GHG emissions as much as possible. This report is committed to a mix of resources that includes massive amounts of wind, solar, and energy storage resources.

I also want to comment on the lack of urgency regarding this initiative. Responsible New York agencies all agree that the new Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resource (DEFR) technologies described in this report are needed to make a solar and wind-reliant electric energy system viable during extended periods of low wind and solar resource availability. Every day that a determination whether there is a viable DEFR approach is delayed means the costs, reliability risks, and environmental impacts associated with a wind and solar potentially false solution increase.

Conclusion

This is another reason that New York State needs to pause Climate Act implementation. The Legislature is required by a court decision to revisit the Climate Act to modify the schedule. It would also be appropriate for the politicians who insisted on this course of action to define affordability, reliability risk, and environmental impact boundary conditions that would frame a feasibility analysis be addressed. I further suggest that appropriate metrics be developed that ensure that implementation stops if those boundary conditions are exceeded. New Yorkers need to demand that the politicians who passed the Climate Act become accountable for its impact.

Zero by 2040 Technoeconomic Assessment Summary

The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA ) recently announced the completion of its Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment. This report directly addresses what I think is the biggest reliability risk of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero electric system transition so I believe understanding the implications of the report findings is important. This article provides a summary overview of the report. I will follow up with another post describing the implications.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target by 2050. It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” The Integration Analysis prepared by NYSERDA and its consultants quantified the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies. After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. Since then, the State has been trying to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations through regulations, proceedings, and legislation.

One fundamental flaw in the Climate Act is the mistaken belief by the authors of the law that existing wind, solar, and energy storage would be sufficient and that no new technology would be required. In May 2023 the Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated a process “to examine the need for resources to ensure the reliability of the 2040 zero-emissions electric grid mandated by the Climate Act” that directly contradicted that presumption. The Order notes that the Climate Act directs the PSC to establish a program to ensure that the electric sector targets are achieved. It goes on:

However, several studies indicate that renewable energy resources may not be capable of meeting the full range of electric system reliability needs that will arise as fossil generation is replaced. These studies suggest that there is a gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technology and expected future system reliability requirements.

The Order concludes: “This Order responds to the Petition and initiates a process to identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target.” This report responds to that order.

Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment

The announcement for the study stated:

NYSERDA is pleased to share that following yearslong thorough, deliberative analysis in partnership with State agency staff, it has completed its Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment, which is intended to help inform the State’s assessment of the readiness and timing for the introduction of new technologies. The Assessment has been filed with the New York State Public Service Commission to inform stakeholders engaged in the Commission’s proceeding investigating different technologies that could contribute to a zero-emission electricity system.

This article will summarize the report. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate a summary of the report and provide references included in this document.

The study was prepared by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) under contract to NYSERDA.

The NYSERDA Zero by 40 Technoeconomic Assessment evaluates technologies needed for New York’s goal of a zero-emissions electric grid by 2040. NYSERDA and Department of Public Service staff “provided guidance, review, and strategic prioritization for this project.”

The Summary of the report gives a good overview. I have annotated the following quotes from the Summary below.

The Summary explains the reason for the report:

In May 2023, the New York State (NYS) Public Service Commission (PSC) issued an order initiating a process “to identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of [New York State’s] Zero Emission by 2040 target.” New York State has engaged in this process by conducting a study to evaluate candidate technologies that could close the gap.

The authors of the Climate Act relied on analyses that used a simplistic model of the electric system to conclude that no new technologies would be needed. The Summary describes the nuances not considered by the Climate Act authors:

A 2040 zero-emission grid will require resources with a mix of attributes to maintain reliability requirements. These include resources that can provide energy and capacity for long durations, that are dispatchable and flexible with quick-start and fast ramping capabilities over multiple starts in a day, and that can provide inertial response, frequency control, dynamic reactive control, and high short circuit current contribution to the grid. Every resource does not need to provide every attribute, but the grid needs enough of each to maintain reliability.

Meeting these needs will require a diverse set of resources. This includes intermittent zero-emission energy resources such as solar and land-based and offshore wind, short-duration energy storage, legacy resources like hydropower and existing nuclear, dispatchable emissions free resources (DEFRs), transmission infrastructure, and other technologies that can provide grid services, like grid-forming (GFM) inverters. This report focuses on DEFRs.

The Summary describes the technologies evaluated in the report:

This report evaluates seven candidate DEFR technology categories that could provide clean, firm power to the NYS grid to achieve a zero-emissions power sector. The candidate resources include hydrogen, biofuels (such as renewable natural gas [RNG] and renewable diesel [RD]), advanced nuclear, carbon capture and storage on thermal power plants, next-generation geothermal, long-duration energy storage (LDES), and virtual power plants (VPPs).

The next paragraph in the Summary describes the problem. In my opinion, the statements also reveal the bias of the EPRI authors and the guidance from NYSERDA and DPS. There is no consideration of the potential finding that nothing might be affordable and technically feasible within the constraints of the Climate Act. The report is skewed towards optimism that technologies can solve this challenge within the constraints of a net-zero grid.

Given that these technologies are not currently deployed at scale, each is expected to require a varying degree of innovation and deployment support. However, all of these technologies can still contribute usefully to the grid, and any present challenges faced by an individual technology should not exclude it from consideration. Even as certain technologies may see structural deployment obstacles in some regions—for example, near urban settings—smaller and more targeted deployments remain possible.

I had difficulty interpreting the following paragraph. I think it ranks the options. Things like hydrogen that require pipelines and fuel storage facilities are less preferable than the other options.

To continue reliably serving New York State’s energy needs, the State will need to deploy resources with more limited infrastructure barriers in the near term. Technologies that require significant infrastructure build, such as new pipelines, fuel storage facilities, and additional transmission, add costs and complexity. Therefore, resources with fewer infrastructure needs will play a crucial role in reliably and cost-effectively providing zero-emission electricity.

The next paragraph supports my belief that they are ranking the options.

Each resource has characteristics that make it better suited for some use cases over others. Figures S-1 and S-2 show how these candidate resources were classified for comparison in this report. This classification is based on resource performance, as well as technology-specific supply, cost, and emission constraints that could affect availability. This resource classification approach is a simplification—in some configurations, technologies could fit into multiple classes.

I think Figure S-2 has important ramifications. However, if I started to address these categories it would make this document too long. I will hold off further discussion for a subsequent post.

Technologies Evaluated

The report assesses seven candidate DEFR technologies based on performance, readiness, emissions, costs, and other factors:

Hydrogen: Explored for use in combustion turbines and fuel cells. This was the place holder DEFR technology in the Scoping Plan.
Biofuels: Recognized for near-term availability but limited by supply constraints.
Advanced Nuclear: Including small modular reactors (SMRs), noted for high-capacity factors and flexibility in meeting energy demands.
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS): Evaluated for its potential to reduce emissions while utilizing existing fossil-fuel infrastructure.
Next-Generation Geothermal: Assessed for its capability to provide clean, firm power generation.
Long-Duration Energy Storage (LDES): Essential for addressing extended periods of low renewable output, beyond typical battery durations.
Virtual Power Plants (VPPs): Aggregated distributed energy resources that enhance grid flexibility and capacity.

Zero by 2050 Report Conclusions

In this summary article I will just list the conclusion highlights.

A 2040 zero-emission grid will require a mix of attributes to maintain reliability requirements, and meeting these needs will require diverse resources.
A mix of DEFR technologies within and across resource categories will best meet statewide needs, maximize benefits, and minimize the risk associated with overreliance on any one resource. The following three categories were identified:
Low capacity factor DEFR with fast ramping capabilities will play a vital role on days with the most extreme system needs and will be needed throughout New York State. Potential resources such as hydrogen and biofuels are expected to be needed throughout the State to support the grid during peaking events, but each type of fuel faces distinct geographic limitations and cost challenges.
High capacity factor DEFR can help meet growing loads, reduce the need for buildout of some intermittent renewables and mostly idle peaking plants, diversify the energy mix, and provide inertia and other critical grid services to support a grid increasingly dependent on variable renewables. Potential resources such as nuclear, Natural Gas combustion paired with carbon capture, and geothermal can increase energy diversity while meeting load growth, but projects face geographic limitations, high and uncertain capital costs per project, and timeline challenges.
Gap-rightsizing DEFR can balance supply and demand, reduce the need for upgrades to transmission and distribution infrastructure, and provide benefits to consumers even today. Regional variability may require different solutions in different locations. Potential resources such as VPPs and LDES can provide valuable support in balancing supply and demand and reducing infrastructure buildout needs, but they have inherent duration limitations.

The report described actions that can facilitate the readiness of these resources to achieve the scale needed for 2040.

Pursue a diverse set of resources to minimize the risk of overreliance on individual technologies.
Start early to increase the likelihood of readiness by 2040.
Invest in grid-enhancing technologies early to minimize the need for backstop resources.
Invest in innovation to enhance resource viability.
Develop strategies across industries for unlocking key resources with infrastructure hurdles.
Engage early with technology developers, end users, and other stakeholders.
Conduct grid modeling to understand tradeoffs of relying on different resources.
Conduct a regular assessment of options and remain flexible as new technology options come online.

Discussion

I think this report is a good first step towards addressing “the need for resources to ensure the reliability of the 2040 zero-emissions electric grid mandated by the Climate Act.” The question now is where do we go from here? Just like the Scoping Plan and the Draft Energy Plan, this document lists different technologies and their characteristics but does not include a feasibility analysis suitable for putting together an actual implementation plan. The Public Service Commission must propose a plan that can guide implementation, project the potential costs, and propose a realistic timeline. The Legislature should then revise the Climate Act to comply with those requirements.

I think there is a major issue with this report. The document is full of statements that when viewed objectively indicate that the schedule of the Climate Act is not realistic. That calls out for a re-assessment of the Climate Act itself. What is missing is that the authors did not address the presumption that an electric system reliant upon weather-dependent wind and solar resources can safely and affordably prevent a blackout during the worst-case renewable resource drought. I will address my arguments that this is not possible in my next post. In the meantime, I described the challenges just defining the worst case in a filing earlier this year.

Conclusion

In a rational world, New York politicians would announce that they wanted to develop regulations to achieve a zero emissions electric grid and then go to the organizations in New York responsible for the electric system and ask them for a plan. This report should be a component of a future plan to achieve zero emissions. There still is no feasibility analysis, comprehensive estimate of the costs, or realistic timeline to achieve the 2040 zero emissions goal. Instead, we have a Climate Act mandate to achieve a zero-emission electric grid by 2040 because the New York Legislature naively believed it was only a matter of political will. It is long past time that the Public Service Commission should break away from the ideology and admit that the Climate Act schedule and aspiration needs to be revisited.

Climate Act Fork in the Road

I recently described the Oct. 24, 2025, New York Albany Supreme Court decision pitting environmental organizations against the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). The judge ordered DEC to issue final regulations establishing economy-wide greenhouse gas emission (GHG) limits on or before Feb. 6, 2026 or go to the Legislature and get the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) 2030 GHG reduction mandate changed. I have argued for months that there are so many issues coming up with the schedule and ambition of the Climate Act that it is obvious that we need to pause implementation and consider modifications to the Climate Act. This post summarizes the findings by the State of New York that support that position.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

For this overview of New York State findings, I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.

Court Decision

The most important reason that the Legislature should consider revisions to the Climate Act is the recent court case. Environmental organizations initiated this lawsuit because the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) did not promulgate regulations as mandated by the Climate Act. The State agued that regulations were inappropriate but Judge Schreibman’s decision stated that:

DEC does not have the discretion to say no or to decide that it has the authority to choose not to follow the express legislative directive at issue. Under our system of separation of powers, upon concluding, based on its subject-matter expertise, that achieving the goals of the Climate Act might be “infeasible” for the reasons stated, DEC had two options. One, it could issue compliant regulations anyway, and let the chips fall where they may for the State’s political actors. Or, two, it could raise its concerns to the Legislature so that the State’s elected representatives could make a determination about what costs their constituents can or cannot bear in the pursuit of reining in climate change.

This decision should prompt the Legislature to address the concerns raised by DEC. Furthermore, there are other State analyses that indicate that changes are in order as described below.

State Supplemental Letter

As part of the legal wrangling associated with the trial Assistant Attorney General Meredith G. Lee-Clark submitted further correspondence related to the litigation. The State’s submittal addressed “two categories of new developments: (1) the publication of the 2025 Draft New York State Energy Plan by the New York State Energy Planning Board on July 23, 2025 and (2) additional actions by the federal government that impede New York’s efforts to achieve the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’s (the Climate Act) goals in a timely manner.”

The State of New York argued that it was inappropriate to implement regulations that would ensure compliance with the 2030 40% reduction in GHG emissions Climate Act mandate because meeting the target is “currently infeasible”. The following paragraph concedes that there are significant upfront cost issues that out-weigh other benefits.

Ordering achievement of the 2030 target would equate to even higher costs than the net zero scenarios and would affect consumers even sooner. Undoubtedly, greenhouse-gas reducing policies can lead to longer-term benefits such as health improvements. This does not, however, offset the insurmountable upfront costs that New Yorkers would face if DEC were forced to try to achieve the Legislature’s aspirational emissions reductions by the 2030 deadline rather than proceeding at an ambitious but sustainable pace.

The letter concluded that the Climate Act is unaffordable:

Petitioners have not shown a plausible scenario where the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction goal can be achieved without inflicting unanticipated and undue harm on New York consumers, and the concrete analysis in the 2025 Draft Energy Plan dispels any uncertainty on the topic: New Yorkers will face alarming financial consequences if speed is given preference over sustainability.

Comptroller Audit

The New York State Comptroller Office audit of the NYSERDA and PSC implementation efforts for the Climate Act was an early acknowledgement that the implementation plan needs to be revised. The report titled Climate Act Goals – Planning, Procurements, and Progress Tracking (“Comptroller Report”) found issues that question the current plan. The Perplexity AI summary concludes that “the audit reveals critical deficiencies in planning, cost assessment, risk management, and progress tracking” and notes that “With outdated data, calculation errors, project cancellations, technology limitations, transmission constraints, and escalating costs all threatening goal achievement, the audit calls for immediate action to improve planning and transparency.”

Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review

The Public Service Commission (PSC) released the draft Clean Energy Standard Biennial Review Report (“Biennial Report”) in July 2024. It compares the renewable energy deployment progress relative to the Climate Act goal to obtain 70% of New York’s electricity from renewable sources by 2030 (the 70% goal). The final document found that 2030 goal will likely not be achieved until 2033. The Perplexity AI summary describes seven key factors impeding progress.

Global economic pressures,

Transmission system inadequacies,

Interconnection delays,

Capacity accreditation changes,

Federal policy uncertainty,

Siting and permitting complexity, and

Increasing electric load.

All these factors are part of the lessons learned since the implementation of the Climate Act that began five years ago. I think this shows that the Legislature needs to address the schedule and ambition of the law.

Second Informational Report

The Climate Act requires the Department of Public Service (DPS) to prepare an annual report as described in the following slide from the presentation that summarizes the report.

The Second Informational Report (Report) prepared by Department of Public Service (DPS) staff “focuses on Commission actions from January 2023 through August 2025, and includes the estimated costs and outcomes from 2023 through 2029 to provide the most up to date information.” According to the Perplexity AI summary there are four feasibility concerns: the 2030 renewable energy target is “likely unattainable”, offshore wind faces major obstacles, transmission remains a “critical bottleneck”, and grid reliability challenges are mounting. There also are cost trajectory concerns. Despite the report’s careful messaging—”emphasizing that CLCPA costs are not the primary bill driver and that multiple factors beyond climate policy contribute to rate increases” – it cannot hide the magnitude of the challenges to meet the Climate Act requirements schedule.

Draft State Energy Plan

The Energy Plan process is currently underway. The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) is processing stakeholder comments on the draft document for the Energy Planning Board to consider when it decides whether to approve the draft. I recently highlighted New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) comments on the Draft Energy Plan recommendations. There are six extensive quotations from the Draft Energy Plan that NYISO supports that represent previously unacknowledged concerns about the Climate Act ambition and schedule:

The State will need to be strategic about the pace of combustion unit retirements and/or replacement

Combustion generating units will remain essential parts of electric grid reliability and affordability. Retirement of these units will not be able to occur until resources that provide the same grid reliability attributes are put in place.

A primary challenge for New York’s energy system is its advancing age, which creates unique risks for reliability.

The State will need to be strategic in identifying and integrating clean firm technologies that have the attributes necessary to support the achievement of a zero emissions electric grid by 2040.

For the electricity system, continue to incorporate the impacts of climate change into future reliability planning scenarios.

Consider whether the current reliability-related metrics should be supplemented given the evolving nature of the grid and increased risks of high-impact reliability events

The Perplexity AI summary concludes that:

The 2025 Draft State Energy Plan represents New York’s effort to reconcile the CLCPA’s statutory mandates with economic, technical, and political realities that have emerged since 2019. By acknowledging that key deadlines will be missed while maintaining long-term decarbonization objectives, the plan shifts from aspirational targets to pragmatic pathways.

Discussion

Judge Schreibman’s decision is very straightforward. The law says that regulations must be promulgated to meet the Climate Act mandates so DEC must either do that or get the Legislature to modify the law. If the Hochul Administration cynically appeals the decision, it is simply a politically-motivated delaying tactic to kick the resolution off until after the gubernatorial primary and state-wide election in late 2026. Because there is so much evidence that the schedule and ambition of the law are infeasible, the Legislature should address the law, however unpopular lessons learned reality will be to the environmentalist community.

Bill Gates recently argued that climate change is not going to wipe out humanity and that we need to “put human welfare at the center of our climate strategies.”. That is another argument for modifying the Climate Act. Even if the premise of the Climate Act that human emissions of greenhouse gases is a primary driver of observed warming is true, New York cannot solve climate change by itself. New York GHG emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and global emissions have been increasing on average by more than one half of one percent per year since 1990.

In my opinion, the best way to proceed is to modify the law. Revisions should couple a revised Climate Act schedule with clearly defined standards for affordability, reliability, and environmental impacts. A trackable metric for each should be developed and a tracking system put in place. The key point is that the law should be modified so that there are requirements to modify the mandates when those metrics are exceeded. In short, the safety valve provisions of Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-P should be modified and incorporated into the Climate Act.

The process to establish these metrics should incorporate extensive public participation. New Yorkers need to understand the range of costs, impacts on personal choice, and changes to lifestyles that are buried in the Scoping Plan and Energy Plan. If the safety valve metrics have reasonable limits, I expect that affordability, reliability, and environmental impact targets will be exceeded as soon as tracking begins. That is the point. Eliminating fossil fuels sounds has been portrayed as simple and cheap but the reality is very different. Accepting that and developing a new way forward is necessary.

Conclusion

There is overwhelming evidence that something must give in the energy transition. The Climate Act has always been about politics and money. The authors of the Climate Act mistakenly believed that the energy transition would be simple and cheap. Experience shows otherwise. It is long past time for the politicians to revisit the Climate Act and make the proposed energy transition accountable. Unfortunately, there is a politically connected constituency that is dependent upon the status quo for their business plans.

NYISO Short-Term Assessment of Reliability October 2025 – Peaker Recommendations

On October 13, 2025 the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) released its quarterly assessment of reliability of the bulk electric system. I recently published an overview of the report that mentioned I was uncomfortable about some aspects of the recommendations. This post describes the unique reliability rules for New York City that I think were not fully addressed relative to the replacement of New York City (NYC) peaker units.

STAR Report and New York City

The NYISO 2025 Quarter 3 Short-Term Assessment of Reliability (STAR report) was released on October 13, 2025. If you want background information about the report I refer you to my take and what Richard Ellenbogen had to say.

Environmental Justice organizations have made peaking power plants in New York City into an overblown issue, insisting that all peaking power plants must be shut down as soon as possible. Even though the presumption of egregious harm from these plants is based on selective choice of metrics, poor understanding of air quality health impacts, and ignorance of air quality trends, pressure by this special interest constituency resulted in the Build Public Renewables Act of 2023 (BPRA) that mandates shutdown of New York Power Authority peaking power plants by 2030. The NYPA units are state of the art, highly efficient, extremely low emissions, and only 27 years old.

The STAR report findings of interest for this post relate to two old, inefficient, and high emitting peaking turbine facilities that were supposed to be retired earlier based on a Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) rule if the shutdown did not threaten reliability. The STAR report explains:

In this 2025 Quarter 3 STAR, the Gowanus Gas Turbine 2-1 through 2-8, Gowanus Gas Turbine 3-1 through 3-8, Narrows Gas Turbine 1-1 through 1-8 and Narrows Gas Turbine 2-1 through 2-8 units (collectively “Gowanus and Narrows”) have completed their generator deactivation notices and are now all Initiating Generators, requiring the NYISO and Con Edison to evaluate in this STAR if there are any Generator Deactivation Reliability Needs.

The STAR report identified a short-term reliability need beginning in summer 2025 within New York City primarily driven by a combination of forecasted increases in peak demand and the assumed unavailability of certain generation in New York City affected by the DEC regulation to limit emissions of nitrogen oxides, known as the “DEC Peaker Rule”. The report states:

In accordance with the DEC Peaker Rule, the Gowanus and Narrows generators may extend operation for up to an additional two years (until May 1, 2029) if the NYISO or Con Edison determine that the reliability need still exists and a permanent solution has been identified and is in the process of construction but not yet online. The DEC Peaker Rule, however, does not provide for peaker generators to continue operating after this date without meeting the emissions requirements.

This STAR report concluded these facilities are needed until Bulk Power Transmission Facilities (BPTF) can replace them.

NYC Reliability Rules

Before discussing the Bulk Power Transmission Facilities (BPTF) solution it is necessary to understand the unique reliability rules in NYC. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate a summary of these rules. The reason for these rules is that NYC is a load pocket and within the City there are areas that are also considered load pockets. To keep the lights on the following rules have been implemented:

Locational Capacity Requirements Framework – This rule establishes a minimum amount of capacity relative to the expected peak load.
Reliability Rule G.1: New York City System Operations – This rule includes a set of more stringent requirements than used in the rest of the state.
Reliability Rule G.2: Loss of Gas Supply – New York City – This rule requires the system to be operated so that the loss of a single gas facility does not cause a blackout. To meet this rule gas-fired units in the City must be able to burn liquid fuel.

STAR Solutions

This STAR report concluded that the Gowanus and Narrows facilities are needed until BPTF can replace them. A BPTF is basically all the components of the transmission system (lines, transformers, and control systems) needed to move large amounts of electricity to where it is needed.

Consistent with the findings in 2023, this STAR continues to find that the New York City locality (Zone J) would be deficient in the summer through the entire five-year horizon without the completion and energization of future planned projects. This includes deficiencies on the BPTF and non-BPTF within Zone J.

Keep in mind that these facilities are needed to provide power during system peak loads. There are four future BPTF projects described as components of the solution.

Gowanus-Greenwood 345/138 kV feeder – This project will upgrade the electric grid to resolve a local problem in NYC. I do not see any issues with this project.

Champlain Hudson Power Express, 1,250 MW HVDC – This project brings hydropower from Quebec through a dedicated transmission line to NYC. When it first was proposed the peak loads were in the summer. The contract does not guarantee power from Hydro Quebec if it is needed within the province. In the future of the Climate Act, peak loads will shift to the winter when New York winter peak loads increase due to heating electrification. Because this is when Quebec peak loads occur there is a high probability that power will not be available when NYC needs it. I am not sure how the reliability rules will handle that contingency.

Empire Wind, 816 MW offshore wind – According to Perplexity AI, this project is “under active construction and approximately 40% complete as of fall 2025. The project is progressing toward its targeted commercial operation date of 2027.” Summer peak loads occur during heat waves and the meteorological conditions that favor the warmest temperatures are high pressure systems that cause light winds. Those conditions will undoubtedly reduce offshore wind output. Without sufficient storage this facility will not provide anywhere near 816 MW of power when it is needed most.

Propel NY Public Policy Transmission Project According to Perplexity AI, is a major electric transmission infrastructure initiative developed jointly by the New York Power Authority (NYPA) and New York Transco LLC to strengthen the electric grid and enable greater renewable energy delivery across southeastern New York State. The infrastructure creates transmission capacity to deliver at least 3,000 megawatts (MW) of offshore wind energy from Long Island into the broader New York grid, This has the same limitation as the Empire Wind project. Without storage it will not provide energy when needed most. In addition, there are issues associated with additional offshore wind development that suggest that 3,000 MW of offshore wind is unlikely.

The STAR report explains that these projects could address the identified reliability needs. Note however that there is a caveat that these projects must “demonstrate their planned power capabilities before the Gowanus and Narrows generating stations can be retired.” Even then the STAR report mentions potential issues:

The range in the demand forecast for expected weather is driven by key assumptions, such as

population and economic growth, energy efficiency, the installation of behind-the-meter renewable energy resources, and electric vehicle adoption and charging patterns.

Once CHPE, Empire Wind, and the Propel NY Public Policy Transmission Project enter service and demonstrate their planned power capabilities, the margins improve substantially assuming all existing generators remain available, but gradually erode as forecasted demand for electricity grows. Even with the future planned projects delivering power according to schedule, there remains a risk of a Zone J deficiency in summer 2029, following the deactivation of Gowanus and Narrows, assuming all other generators in Zone J are available.

In my overview article on the STAR report I noted that there were issues associated with timing issues associated with the DEC Peaker Rule retirement deadline of May 1, 2029. In my opinion,I think it is unlikely that in-kind replacements will be available by the May 1, 2029 deadline and that means the regulation must be modified.

The Build Public Renewables Act of 2023 compounds the problem requiring retirement of New York Power Authority (NYPA) peaking plants. The STAR report notes that “Beyond 2030, these deficiencies are further exacerbated with increasing demand for electricity and the planned deactivation of the NYPA small plants.”

Discussion

Although NYISO has become increasingly more vocal about the challenges meeting peaking load in the absence of natural gas peaker generating units, I am uncomfortable with the proposed BPTF projects proposed to solve the Gowanus and Narrows energy shortfall.

The primary reason for the unique NYC reliability rules is experience with blackouts. For example, the NYC blackout of July 1977 occurred when a storm knocked out transmission lines coming into the city and there was insufficient in-city generation to keep the system going. Reliability Rule G.1 includes provisions for special operating rules during severe weather, enhanced operating reserves, and operating the system for a more stringent shutdown contingency that address the problems that led to the blackout.

I have great respect for the state’s electric resource planners. The electric system has been called the most complex machine because it is an extraordinarily intricate and vast network involving thousands of generating plants, millions of miles of transmission and distribution lines, and hundreds of millions of users continuously relying on it. The NYISO operators balance load and generation on a second-by-second basis, and the resource planners have provided the resources necessary for them to prevent blackouts. Those peaking units s all provide dispatchable power without weather limitations and provide other ancillary electric system services precisely where needed. Losing those resources makes the challenges even more difficult.

The STAR report warns that the grid is at a “significant inflection point” with converging threats including an aging generation fleet, rapid load growth, and difficulty developing new supply resources due to policy constraints, supply chain issues, and rising equipment costs. In the future Climate Act grid, the renewable resources are going to require Dispatchable Emissions Free Resources (DEFR) during dark doldrums when wind and solar resources are low to non-existent for extended periods to ensure that sufficient energy is available. Complicating the challenge is the fact that those conditions are also associated with extreme temperatures and peak loads. These factors all tweak the system in complex ways that may be too complicated to anticipate.

I know the NYISO and New York State Reliability Council planners are considering the impact of increasing reliance on weather-dependent resources. However, in my opinion, NYISO is not adequately acknowledging the intractable problem with an electric system that relies on renewables. To date the primary concerns about the commercially unavailable DEFR technology are expected to occur in the late 2030’s as renewable penetration increases. This may give time to address the issue.

However, I worry that this problem could become an issue in NYC sooner. The CHPE, Empire Wind, and the Propel NY Public Policy Transmission Project projects are all weather dependent, and I think there is underappreciated correlation between the generating sources. For an intense wintertime dark doldrum CHPE would not provide power if Hydro Quebec needs it for its ratepayers. If the dark doldrum started with a strong snowstorm that ushered in a large high-pressure system, NYC’s rooftop solar units could be covered with snow reducing their output. At the same time, the offshore wind resources could be becalmed. In that scenario short-term energy storage will not be sufficient, DEFR would be needed.

In a recent Capital Tonight segment Susan Arbetter interviewed Earthjustice attorney Rachel Spector.. I made a transcript and added my comments because I think the responses to her questions exemplify the position of environmental organizations that support the Climate Act. It is troubling that in response to a question about the implications of the STAR report, Spector said “Well, this is a complicated issue, and I could talk for a while about what the NYISO put forward but I will say New York is not facing an energy crisis and the reports that are coming out are extremely conservative.”

Fortunately, the NYISO recognizes their responsibility to protect the citizens of New York requires conservative approaches based on decades of experience. The STAR report recognizes that the BPTF projects must demonstrate their planned power capabilities before the peaking units can be retired. Furthermore, the Draft State Energy Plan found that reliability considerations will prevent the shutdown of any of the peaking power plants for the foreseeable future. If the NYISO warnings are heeded and the ideological zealots are ignored the worst-case catastrophe should be avoided.

Conclusion

Keeping the lights on in NYC during peak load conditions is challenging. In the future, the problem will become even more challenging because the meteorological conditions that cause the peak loads also are associated with low wind resource availability. The STAR report lays the foundation to address these challenges but the usual suspects are whining that their recommendations are too conservative.

The NYC peak load problem addressed by the STAR report cannot be endangered by risky unproven environmentalist strategies. Keeping the lights on is incredibly challenging at the best of times and a rushed transition away from existing system components is too risky to consider. The STAR report describes a safe transition approach. I believe that there is adequate time to address my concerns about the over-reliance on weather-dependent resources in the BPTF projects proposed.