Implications of the NYISO 2025-2044 System & Resource Outlook

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) has released its 2025-2044 System & Resource Outlook (Outlook).  It’s a long-term planning assessment that finds New York will need “substantial new investment in reliable generation and transmission infrastructure to serve growing electricity demand and state policy targets.”  The report supports my contention that the rapid electric system transition to a zero‑emissions grid mandated by New York politicians is technically and institutionally constrained, and that reliability can be put at risk if policy timelines outrun feasible infrastructure and resource development.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability risks, unacceptable costs, and adverse environmental impacts.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.  I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document. 

Background

The NYISO is responsible for electric resource planning for New York State.  The Comprehensive System Planning Process (CSPP) consists of four components: the Local Transmission Planning Process (LTPP), the Reliability Planning Process (RPP), the Economic Planning Process, and the Public Policy Transmission Planning Process. My particular interest is the RPP.

Last December a NYISO update on the CSPP described the Reliability Planning Process.  It is a two‑year process that starts in even years and has two components. The Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) “evaluates the adequacy and security of the Bulk Power Transmission Facilities (BPTF)

over a seven-year Study Period (years four through ten of the next ten years) and identifies Reliability Needs defined as violations of Reliability Criteria” established by regulatory authorities.  The second component is the System & Resource Outlook that is developed in the years between RNA.s  It includes the following:

  • 20-year study of system and congestion
  • Identifies, ranks, and groups congested elements
  • Assesses the potential benefits of addressing the identified congestion
  • Provides information to developers and marketplace regarding future challenges in the New York power system

The current analysis covers 2025 to 2044, so it must consider the transition requirements of the Climate Act.  NYISO’s long‑term scenarios show that reaching very high levels of zero‑emissions generation is a serious challenge.  This post is an overview of the Outlook emphasizing key insights and recommendations.

NYISO Summary and Key Findings

The press release provides a good overview of the Outlook.

The Outlook is a scenario-based planning study intended to help policymakers, regulators, market participants, and developers understand how different policy choices can shape New York’s future resource mix, transmission needs, system costs, and reliability risks over the next 20 years.

Key findings from the Outlook include:

  • New York’s electricity demand is expected to grow over the next two decades, driven by electrification and emerging large loads that increase total energy needs and reshape when and where demand occurs.
  • All scenarios require significant new generation, and policy-driven scenarios require far more installed capacity than exists today to reliably meet demand.
  • Transmission capability is increasingly central to system performance, public policy achievement, congestion reduction, and the ability of new resources to serve consumers.
  • The Outlook also shows that the final increments of emissions reductions carry the greatest infrastructure challenges. Scenarios that move from 95 percent to 100 percent emissions-free electricity require substantially more investment in replacement resources and anticipate technologies not yet available at commercial scale. By comparison, other scenarios that also lower emissions significantly do so with much lesser investment in generation and transmission.

These analyses compare alternate projections of policy mandates against a business as usual or base case.  NYISO describes the modeling scenarios:

The Outlook is structured around three groups of scenarios that represent the various futures evaluated in the Outlook. The Base Case is a reference future that aligns with the NYISO’s Reliability Planning Process assumptions1 to define the load, generation, and transmission assumptions. The Contract Case builds on the Base Case by adding generation projects with financial commitments (e.g., NYSERDA and offshore wind REC contracts) and approved transmission projects, as well as incorporating projected fossil retirements, to evaluate near-term system conditions as renewables come online and aging thermal units exit. The Policy Case, which includes eighteen scenarios, reflects relevant state policy targets by modeling pathways to meet (existing or delayed) targets like 70% renewables and 100% zero-emissions electricity and evaluates alternative resource mixes—including potential new nuclear and/or fossil—to assess progress toward policy achievement and resulting system conditions.

The Outlook selects two core policy scenarios for detailed production‑cost analysis: one “Higher” pathway that reaches a fully zero‑emissions grid by 2044 and one “Baseline/Policy‑limited” pathway that only achieves roughly mid‑90s percent zero‑emissions by 2044.

Resource Planning

My primary Climate Act implementation concern is the disconnect between the naïve presumption of Climate Act authors that the zero emissions electric system transition was only a matter of political will because the technical, logistical, and economic challenges were small and the reality that those challenges are enormous.  I do concede that at the time the Climate Act was written there was no expectation of significant load growth but that is only one aspect of the problem  The Outlook outlines the real challenges and the approach:

Meeting New York’s future electricity needs will require a significant transformation of the generation fleet, driven by rising demand, evolving policy requirements, and the retirement of existing fossil generation. As conditions evolve, ensuring that sufficient energy and capacity resources are available to serve load becomes increasingly complex. In particular, tradeoffs emerge between the pace, scale, and timing of new resource development, the types of resources available, and the ability of those resources to meet both energy needs and firm capacity requirements across the system.

To explore these dynamics, the Outlook evaluates a range of potential resource pathways that reflect differing assumptions about policy achievement, development pace, and system conditions. These scenarios are not intended to predict a single outcome but rather to illustrate how different combinations of demand, policy, and resource availability can produce materially different system outcomes—and to highlight the implications of those differences for future grid planning.

NYISO explicitly uses alternative futures (including “Higher Demand” and scenarios with advanced nuclear) to highlight that different combinations of resources can hit similar CO₂ outcomes but with very different reliability and feasibility profiles. That is an important distinction.  The statute and agency rhetoric treat “100% zero emissions” as a single, deterministic path in their plans.  In practice resource mix and infrastructure choices matter enormously.

Resource adequacy and reliability risk

The Outlook focuses heavily on resource adequacy through 2044 and shows that preserving reliability under Climate Act‑consistent trajectories depends on how quickly firm capacity is replaced as fossil units retire. NYISO’s analysis indicates that without sufficient dispatchable zero‑emissions resources and/or substantial new nuclear or long‑duration storage, the system faces tighter margins and greater risk, especially under higher load or stressed conditions.

NYISO also examines scenarios where demand is higher and weather or electrification trends deviate from planning baselines, and under those cases the resource and infrastructure requirements to keep reliability within criteria become much more challenging. A long‑standing theme of this blog is that “electrify everything” plus aggressive fossil retirements is a reliability problem, not merely an emissions accounting problem.  Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act renewable energy mandates is weather variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  The Hochul Administration’s planning has emphasized central forecasts and has yet to grapple with the specific challenges associated with extreme cases.

Limits of “100% zero emissions” portfolios

The document notes that alternate scenarios can achieve CO₂ reductions comparable to “100% zero emissions” portfolios while using different mixes of nuclear, storage, and renewables. NYISO explicitly discusses an “Alternate” path and advanced nuclear build‑out with up to 5 GW, limited to Zones A, B, C, and E (Figure 1) as ways to provide firm, clean capacity that ease system stress compared to strictly constrained portfolios.

Figure 1: NYISO New York Control Area Load Zones

Source: NYISO 2025-2044 System & Resource Outlook

Those scenario results essentially validate my arguments that insisting on specific technologies (or excluding others) is a policy choice layered on top of the emissions objective, and that some technology‑constrained paths are significantly more brittle from a reliability and cost perspective. The Outlook’s willingness to model advanced nuclear as a serious resource option contrasts with the Climate Act mandate and lends technical credibility to my arguments about the need for firm zero‑emissions capacity beyond intermittent renewables.

The Outlook finds that “policy design significantly impacts the scale of new resource development”.  For example. “Outlook scenarios without clean energy targets require approximately ~10–35 GW, scenarios with relaxed or partial zero-emissions scenarios require ~30–60 GW, and scenarios targeting a fully zero-emissions system require substantially higher additions— approaching ~105 GW of new resources by 2044 under higher demand conditions.  The difference in costs for all the new resources necessary for zero emissions versus costs for the relaxed emission scenarios relative to the differences in emissions should be an energy policy discussion point.  Furthermore, relaxed emission scenarios eliminate the need for developing hydrogen-fueled generation capacity and infrastructure development that the Outlook estimates at upwards of 30 GW.

Infrastructure, siting, and transmission constraints

NYISO’s long‑range analysis implicitly underscores how much new transmission and bulk infrastructure is required to move large quantities of upstate renewable and nuclear output to downstate loads, and to integrate storage at scale. The scenarios with substantial new nuclear and renewables in upstate zones make clear that geography, siting limits, and zonal restrictions are binding constraints, not footnotes.

By identifying zonal limits NYISO is effectively quantifying some of the siting and societal impacts that disproportionately impact Upstate New York. The Outlook notes:

Downstate capacity requirements continue to shape where firm resources are needed. Because the highest and most constrained load centers remain in downstate New York, locational capacity requirements continue to drive firm and dispatchable resources near those areas. Even in futures with substantial upstate renewable development, additional firm capacity is often needed closer to load centers to satisfy capacity requirements that cannot be met through statewide totals alone.

Resource availability assumptions create a persistent tension between where clean energy is most developable and where it is most needed. Land-based wind and utility-scale solar are more available in upstate zones, while demand remains concentrated downstate. This creates a recurring planning challenge. The system may have strong opportunities to add clean energy where development potential is greatest, but it still requires transmission capability and additional downstate resources to ensure that energy and capacity can serve load.

This supports my concerns that Climate Act implementation treats land use, transmission corridors, and community opposition as solvable details, whereas the system modeling shows they materially shape feasible resource portfolios.

Recommendations

NYISO finds that growing demand and planned fossil retirements mean the system needs “substantial new investment in reliable generation and transmission infrastructure” across all futures. They recommend prioritizing timely development of new resources, especially in policy driven scenarios that require much more installed capacity than exists today.

A central recommendation is to “establish a viable path for the development of resources capable of providing firm capacity and operational flexibility as the generation mix evolves,” explicitly recognizing the need for dispatchable, firm resources even in highly decarbonized futures. NYISO also calls for coordinating the timing of resource additions, repowering, and retirements to reduce transition risk and avoid tightening system conditions during the Climate Act transition.

On the transmission side, the Outlook urges targeted enhancements to increase transfer capability across the Central East interface (e.g., dynamic voltage support) and bulk transmission upgrades to support zero emissions generation development in Northern New York. These are framed as necessary to reduce congestion, improve deliverability, and allow new renewables and firm resources to actually serve downstate load.

Conclusion

The NYISO recommendations address my concerns that: (1) reliability requires firm capacity (DEFRs or equivalent), not just wind/solar/storage; (2) the timing of retirements versus new builds is critical; and (3) transmission constraints are central to Climate Act implementation feasibility, and (4) it is long past time that a feasibility analysis be completed to define New York’s energy future. NYISO’s call for “a viable path” for firm resources and its acknowledgment that policy driven zero emissions futures demand far more capacity than today are similar to my warnings about the DEFR gap and the risk of retiring peakers without firm backup.  Until Climate Act implementation policy aligns with the NYISO Outlook the risks of reliability problems is a serious concern.  The difference in costs for all the new resources necessary for zero emissions versus costs for the relaxed emission scenarios relative to the differences in emissions for the two approaches should be an energy policy discussion point.

NYISO on the June-July Heat Wave

I recently analyzed how New York’s grid performed during the late-June/early-July 2026 heat wave.  This post updates that analysis with a  New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) presentation on the heatwave.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.  I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Although the original interim 2030 target of a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate has been modified, there still are requirements that require much greater use of wind and solar energy generation.

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act renewable energy mandates is weather variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging.  . 

My post on the performance of New York’s grid performance during the late-June/early-July 2026 heat wave described strong, persistent upper-level ridge and associated surface high forming a classic summer pattern—now branded a “heat dome”—that trapped hot, humid air and stressed electric systems across most of the country. 

I found that the fuel-mix profile over the heat wave showed nuclear at 16% and fossil fuels at 64%, meaning 80% of energy came from non-renewables; renewables provided 20%, but hydro alone was 15%. Those actual operations numbers contrast poorly with statutory mandates—70% renewables by 2030 and 100% zero-emissions by 2040. The data make clear that under classic high-load, low-wind conditions, New York remains heavily dependent on thermal generation, and that building a reliable peak system replacing that with wind, solar, and energy storage alone would be extremely challenging.

The NYISO has been flagging narrow reliability margins, growing dependence on emergency actions, and sensitivity to gas supply and extreme weather for several years.  For example:

  • Summer 2026 Capacity Assessment (Operations Committee): NYISO shows a baseline summer capacity margin of just 417 MW, the lowest in recent history, and warns that under plausible extreme‑heat scenarios the margin turns sharply negative, requiring up to 3,166 MW of emergency operating actions to maintain reliability.
  • NYISO press release “New York Electric Grid Faces Narrow Reliability Margin Heading Into Summer” (April 23, 2026): The NYISO cautions that “extreme weather and aging generation pose significant risks to reliability” and that, under a three‑day heatwave with average daily temperature of 95–98 °F, capacity margins would be ‑1,679 MW to ‑3,370 MW, forcing operators to rely on emergency procedures.

This post describes a presentation that summarizes issues that showed up in the July 2026 heatwave that push these concerns from theory to high-risk reality.

NYISO July 2026 Heatwave

Aaron Markham from the NYISO presented a summary of the July 2026 heatwave to the Operating Committee. While there was some overlap with my post, he had access to other relevant information.  We both addressed  weather and loads and the real-time fuel mix. His presentation discussed unavailable capacity, transmission outages, interchange flows with neighboring areas, and demand response.  Figure 1 lists five key observations about the electric system during the heat wave.

Figure 1: NYISO Presentation Key Observations

Source: NYISO July 2026 Heatwave Presentation

Weather and Loads

The first key observation in Figure 1 described the weather during the event.  Most of this is self-explanatory but the “peak CTHI of 87.1 °F” reference and the “90/10 assumptions” is not.  CTHI is NYISO’s Cumulative Temperature Humidity Index, a three‑day weighted temperature‑humidity metric used to represent heat stress on the system more accurately than regular temperature alone.  The reference “exceeds 90/10 assumptions” means that the observed CTHI during the heat wave was higher than the extreme‑weather (90th‑percentile) conditions NYISO uses in its summer capacity and peak‑load planning studies.

The NYISO presentation included a couple of interesting graphs describing the weather and load.  The summary of the heat wave compares this episode with the NYISO all time high load day (Figure 2).  The observed peak load of 31,097 MW occurred on July 2 which is pretty close to the baseline peak load projection of 31,578 MW.          

Figure 2: June 30 – July 4, 2026 Heat Wave Summary

Source: NYISO July 2026 Heatwave Presentation

In my analysis I mentioned that the loads could have been much worse.  Figure 3 details factors affecting load during the heat wave.

Figure 3: Key Weather and Load Observations

Source: NYISO July 2026 Heatwave Presentation

One of the key observations was that forced generation and transmission outages exceeded planning assumptions in the downstate region and resulted in challenging operating conditions.  Each stacked bar in Figure 4 represents total unavailable capacity on a given day, with the blue portion labeled Prior to DAM (Day Ahead Market) and the orange portion labeled DAM to RT (Real Time). Prior to DAM means units or resources that were already unavailable before the day-ahead market ran, so NYISO could at least account for those outages in its day-ahead commitment and dispatch plan.


DAM to RT means additional capacity that was available or expected in the day-ahead case but then became unavailable during the day.  The horizontal lines show the assumed unavailable-capacity levels from NYISO’s 2026 Summer Capacity Assessment under two planning cases.  It is concerning that downstate New York entered the July heat wave with far more power plants already out of service than planners normally expect and then lost still more capacity as the days  went on, making grid operations much tougher than the official summer assumptions anticipated.

Figure 4: Unavailable Generating Capacity in New York City and on Long Island

Source: NYISO July 2026 Heatwave Presentation

Figure 5 lists the transmission outages during the heat wave.  CHPE is the nearly commissioned Champlain Hudson Power Express transmission line that is supposed to bring 1,250 MW of emissions-free electricity from Quebec directly into New York City precisely to address summer peak loads.  It only worked for 32 hours during the heat wave and has yet to return to service at this time. (20 July 2100)

Figure 5: NYISO Transmission Line Outages

Source: NYISO July 2026 Heatwave Presentation

Figure 6 describes the flow of energy during the heat wave between New York and surrounding electric systems. It shows that, during the peak‑load hours of the June 30–July 4 heat wave, New York was leaning heavily on imports from its neighbors to keep the lights on. The stacked bars break out scheduled flows from Hydro‑Québec even without CHPE, New England, Ontario, and PJM, and the overlay line shows net interchange—imports minus exports—on each day’s peak hour.  Net imports are  consistently above the level assumed in NYISO’s Summer 2026 Capacity Assessment. The chart says that New York needed substantial help from surrounding regions at the exact hours when its own system was most stressed, and that actual reliance on imports was greater than the “normal” planning assumptions, underscoring how tight New York capacity margins have become.

Figure 6: Interchange Flows with Neighboring Areas

Source: NYISO July 2026 Heatwave Presentation

Figure 7 lists the SCR/EDRP Events June 30 – July 4, 2026.  SCR stands for Special Case Resources, and EDRP stands for the Emergency Demand Response Program, both of which are NYISO demand‑response programs that pay large customers to cut their electricity use when the grid is under stress. Figure 6 shows that these emergency tools had to be activated across most of the state on three consecutive days (July 1–3) and again in downstate zones on July 4, which means the system could not meet demand with available generation and imports alone and had to lean on voluntary or obligated load curtailments just to maintain reliability. This pattern is a clear sign of a fragile grid: instead of having enough built‑in capacity margin to ride through a fairly typical multi‑day heat wave, NYISO had to call on “last‑line‑of‑defense” customer cutbacks four days in a row, indicating that routine weather now pushes the system up against its limits.

Figure 7: SCR/EDRP Events June 30 – July 4, 2026

Source: NYISO July 2026 Heatwave Presentation

One of the key observations stated: “The NYISO issued an Energy Watch on July 2 due to forecasted reserves dropping below 2,620 MW for longer than 60 minutes.”  NYISO defines an “Energy Watch” as the point where operating reserves are forecast to fall below 2,620 MW for more than an hour, even though there are still enough resources on paper to meet demand. In practical terms, it’s a first level warning that the cushion of standby generation and imports the system relies on to ride through contingencies is getting uncomfortably thin.  During these conditions operators start lining up extra units, lean harder on demand response, and ask customers to conserve in order to avoid escalating into an “Energy Warning” or full emergency. The fact that NYISO had to issue an Energy Watch on July 2 because reserves were expected to dip below this threshold tells you that a fairly ordinary summer heat wave was enough to erode the safety margin the grid is supposed to maintain.  This is a clear sign that the system is operating closer to the edge than in the past.

Another key observation stated that “Natural Gas Pipeline and Local Gas Distribution Company (LDC) Operational flow Orders were observed during high load periods”.  Operational Flow Orders (OFOs) are directives that gas pipelines and local gas distribution companies issue when the gas system is under strain and they need customers – especially large users like power plants – to keep their gas use tightly in line with what they’ve scheduled, or face penalties and possible curtailments. When NYISO notes that OFOs were in effect during the July heat wave, it means gas operators were already worried about maintaining safe pressures and overloaded pipelines at the same time the electric grid was depending heavily on gas‑fired units to meet peak air‑conditioning load.

That combination is a red flag for the public because it shows both the gas and electric systems were being pushed close to their limits at once. Tight gas conditions can force generators to reduce output just when demand is highest, shrinking the real reserve margin and making the grid more vulnerable to a single large contingency. In the winter natural gas heating raises the demand, and power plants are required to switch fuels to more expensive fuels.  If this kind of gas constraint becomes a recurring feature of hot days, New Yorkers should expect more frequent price spikes, calls to conserve, and a higher risk that even routine heat waves could trigger emergency actions or outages.  There is a second-order impact as well.  Many power plants have limits on the number of hours that they can burn alternate, higher polluting fuels.  If this situation happens frequently enough then this could limit operations from the facilities that provide critically needed energy.

Figure 8 lists generation and import percentages at peak load.  My analysis found that the fuel-mix profile over the heat wave showed nuclear at 16% and fossil fuels at 64%, meaning 80% of energy came from non-renewables; renewables provided 20%, but hydro alone was 15%.  On July 3 renewables produced 41% of the power but on the previous day renewables only produced 20%.  The significant fraction of wind was made possible because the edge of the heat dome was close to New York.  If we were closer to the center, then the wind support at peak load would have been much smaller.  The other observation is that imports accounted for 10% of the energy at peak loads.  Because other electric systems are facing similar problems this may not be possible in the future.

Figure 8: Generation and Imports at Peak Load (%)

Source: NYISO July 2026 Heatwave Presentation

Conclusion Recent NYISO documents explicitly warned that the kinds of problems highlighted by the July 2026 heatwave—thin reserve margins, dependence on emergency actions, and fuel constraints—were coming.  These warnings are translating into observations.  The risks of a fragile electric system must be addressed, or contingencies or worse weather will occur that cause a blackout.  If the system becomes overly reliant on weather dependent resources that

Comparing the New York Energy Transition Against the World

Roger Pielke Jr. recently published an update of his annual review of the status of global energy transition away from fossil fuels based on the 2026 Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy (“2026 Energy Review”).  This post examines how well New York is doing relative to the transition results described by Pielke.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

It is ancient history now, but in August 2009 New York Governor Paterson issued Executive Order 24 formally establishing a state goal of reducing GHG emissions from all sources 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.  The  Climate Action Plan was never implemented in a meaningful, binding way because it remained a non‑statutory planning exercise and was then effectively sidelined by political, economic, and administrative priorities. The political calculus changed and in 2019 the Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  This year some of the components of the act were modified, but there still are requirements that eventually require a “zero emissions” electric system with the a net zero target.

I have been a fan of Roger Pielke Jr.’s book The Climate Fix: What Scientists and Politicians Won’t Tell You About Global Warming since it was published in 2010.  He described the “Kaya Identity” that was formulated in the 1980s by Yoichi Kaya in the book.   Pielke notes that the Kaya Identity was “originally developed to facilitate climate scenarios and projections, but it also turns out to be a very powerful tool for climate policy evaluation.”  It ““operationalizes the IPAT formulation, which holds that environmental impacts (I) are a result of the interactions of population (P), affluence (A), and technology (T) — hence, I = PAT.” 

While researching this article I discovered my Kaya Identity analysis of New York through 2008.  I updated this analysis for years but stopped doing so before I started this blog.  Pielke’s article prompted me to update my analysis so I could compare New York to the rest of the world.  Pielke provides a methods appendix and spreadsheet with documentation and data that I updated for this work.

New York Data

Pielke’s input data was from the 2026 Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy.  For equivalent New York energy data I used the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority Patterns and Trends most recent report covering data from 2009 -2023 and the edition covering 2007-2021.  The earlier edition provided data in a usable format.  For example, all the data tables listed 15 years of data but included a link to the complete data set.  The two reports since that report was released do not include as much information and are designed to support the political narrative more than to simply provide data.  I will follow up with a post about those changes someday.  In the meantime, the data used are available upon request.

Generation Trends

Pielke introduced his analysis by describing the carbon-free share of global energy consumption (Figure 1).  The 2026 Energy Review uses a longer and more recent data set.  Figure 2 overlays New York’s share of carbon-free generation from 1990 to 2023 to global emissions.  Note that New York’s share started at 16% and has increased to 25%.  This reflects New York’s geographical advantage for hydroelectric power generation and investments in nuclear.  Using these data there is no indication that the Climate Act has accelerated the carbon-free share of energy consumption.

Figure 1: Carbon-Free Share of Global Energy Consumption, 1965-2025

Source: Roger Pielke, Jr. Energy Transition: Yes, No, Maybe

Figure 2: Carbon-free Share of Global and New York State Energy Consumption 1990 – 2023

Pielke notes that “Total energy demand continues to increase, and fossil fuels have continued to meet the majority of that growth”.  Figure 3 lists his graph that shows that global fossil fuel consumption is still growing and includes New York’s contribution.  Not surprisingly, New York is such a small component that the data do not show a trend so I included another graph with just New York.  NY fossil fuel consumption has gone down but that trend started before the 2019 implementation of the Climate Act.

Figure 3: Global and New York State Fossil Fuel Consumption 1990 – 2023

Source for Global Data: Roger Pielke, Jr. Energy Transition: Yes, No, Maybe

Net-Zero Transition Projection

Pielke generated a graph showing what reductions are necessary to get the fossil fuel consumption to zero by 2050 (Figure 4).  Pielke notes:

Reaching zero by 2050 requires retiring ~21 exajoules of fossil energy every year, starting now. That annual reduction exceeds the total energy consumption of most countries on Earth. And every year the line fails to bend down, the required rate in the remaining years grows larger, just as a matter of math.

Figure 4:  Global Net-Zero By 2050 Requirement

Source: Roger Pielke, Jr. Energy Transition: Yes, No, Maybe

Figure 5 displays the New York requirement to reach the Climate Act 85% net-zero target using the same units and a different starting year.  The New York required decline is 0.5 Exajoules per year.  It appears to me that the existing reduction trend is flatter than what is required.

Figure 5: New York State Net-Zero By 2050 Requirement.  Required decline is 0.5 EJ /year.

Pielke described what is needed to meet the global requirement to replace fossil energy to reach net-zero:

Replacing 21 EJ of fossil energy per year, and retiring an equal amount of fossil supply alongside it, means building the equivalent of about one 1.75-gigawatt nuclear plant every day from now until 2050 — roughly 420 plants a year. Measured in wind turbines instead, at 3 megawatts and a 0.30 capacity factor, that comes to about 2,000 turbines a day, every day, for 25 years.

I estimated the resources needed in New York by simple proportions with Pielke’s analysis.  Replacing 0.5 EJ of fossil energy per year and retiring an equal amount of fossil supply alongside it, means building the equivalent of about nine 1.75-gigawatt nuclear plant every five years from now until 2050 for a total of 48 facilities. Measured in wind turbines instead, at 3 megawatts and a 0.30 capacity factor, that comes to over 3,000 turbines a year totaling over 83,000 turbines.  As Pielke notes net-zero by 2050 is infeasible by any practical standard for the globe and I believe that is also true for New York.

Pielke goes on to describe annual changes in global energy consumption.  I do not think that this is a meaningful statistic for just New York State so I did not reproduce his findings for comparison.

Decarbonization Trend

Figure 6 shows the carbon intensity of the global economy 1992-2025 — CO₂ per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Pielke has explained that the carbon intensity of GDP equals the product of two factors: how much energy the economy uses per dollar (energy intensity), and how much CO₂ that energy emits (carbon intensity of energy).  Pielke explains:

The global economy has decarbonized steadily since well before climate policy existed — back to at least the 1960s.

Two things follow.

  • First, global climate policy does not drive decarbonization as the decrease in carbon intensity of the global economy long pre-dates the climate movement (which started as coordinated global policy in 1992 with the Rio Earth Summit); economies growing wealthier and using more energy more productively have driven that trend.
  • Second, and less comfortably: since the climate-policy era began in 1992 the background rate shows no acceleration. Hitting deep-decarbonization targets requires this straight line to bend down. It has not done so.

Some economies cut their carbon intensity by about two-thirds since 1990 — China, the United Kingdom, Germany. Others moved the wrong way and grew more carbon-intensive, led by Iran. These differences track different starting points, energy mixes, and stages of development — not the presence or absence of climate ambition.

Figure 6: Global Decarbonization 1992-2025

Source: Roger Pielke, Jr. Energy Transition: Yes, No, Maybe

Figure 7 compares the global carbon intensity per unit of GDP to the New York carbon intensity per unit of Gross State Product (GSP). In 2023 the normalized to 1992 global value was 58 and the New York value was 48.  New York is decarbonizing faster than the world by this metric but Pielke’s criticism’s of climate policy are appropriate for New York as well.

Figure 7: New York and Global Decarbonization 1992-2023.

Figure 8: lists the energy intensity of GDP (energy ÷ GDP), carbon intensity of energy (CO2 ÷ energy), and carbon intensity of GDP (their product).  These component factors show how each has contributed to global decarbonization.  Pielke notes that:

The green line — the economy becoming less energy intensive per dollar of output — accounts for almost the entire decline in CO₂ per unit of GDP. The tan line — the carbon intensity of the energy that is consumed — has barely moved in 35 years, despite the impressive growth in carbon-free energy.

Figure 8: Factors Affecting Decarbonization 1990-2025

Source: Roger Pielke, Jr. Energy Transition: Yes, No, Maybe

I plotted the same parameters in Figure 8.  Global data are plotted in blue: energy intensity of GDP is lightest blue, carbon intensity of energy is darkest blue, and carbon intensity of GDP is medium blue.  New York data are plotted as follows: energy intensity of GDP is yellow, carbon intensity of energy is red, and carbon intensity of GDP is orange.  Globally the economy becoming less energy intensive per dollar of output accounts for almost the entire decline in CO₂ per unit of GDP. The global carbon intensity of the energy that is consumed is relatively steady.  New York is different.  The New York economy is also becoming less energy intensive per dollar of output at a rate consistent with the global data.  However, there also is a reduction in carbon intensity of energy so the combination of the two results in a greater decarbonization rate.  I believe that reflects New York’s fuel switching conversion away from goal and oil to natural gas in the electric and industrial sectors.  I believe those conversions were the result of economics as natural gas became the cheapest fuel, not because of climate policy.

Figure 8: Factors Affecting New York and Global Decarbonization 1990-2023

Pielke compares the change in carbon intensity of GDP from 2015 to 2025 in Table 1 for G20 economies and the world, ranked by largest reduction in CO2/GDP since the Paris Accord in 2015  New York’s reduction from 2015 to 2025 was 31.9% placing the state second to the countries Pielke evaluated.

Table 1: Change in Carbon Intensity of GDP from 2015 to 2025

Source: Roger Pielke, Jr. Energy Transition: Yes, No, Maybe

Discussion

Using the Kaya Identity methodology documented by Pielke I show that New York compares favorably with the world and other countries in the decarbonization race to net-zero.  There are two caveats. 

Pielke’s bottom line for the world is also appropriate for New York:

The 2026 update is fully consistent with the pattern I have documented here year after year. Carbon-free energy is growing. Decarbonization continues its long, slow, pre-policy downward trend. Global fossil fuel consumption continues to increase. The carbon intensity of energy has barely budged, drifting downward ever so slowly. The gap between the required rate of change to hit aggressive decarbonization targets and the observed rate in the real world widens every year.

If we are to achieve deep decarbonization this century, the lesson to take is that we should start thinking about some different options for how to get there. What we have been doing isn’t working.

The second caveat is that while New York’s carbon intensity was more of a factor in the state’s decarbonization,  I believe it was affected by fuel switching to natural gas and there are not many more opportunities for that to occur in the future. 

Conclusion

Pielke claims that the aspiration of net-zero is not impossible.  Based on these results I believe that even if New York’s net zero aspiration is not impossible, it is impractical. 

June 29 – July 4 2026 Heat Wave Weather Impacts to the New York Grid

Last week a strong, persistent upper‑level ridge and associated surface high formed a classic summer ridge (which the media now hypes as a heat dome)  over the central and eastern United States, acting as a subsident “lid” that trapped and reinforced hot, humid air over several days.  These conditions stressed electric systems across the country. This post offers examines the availability of New York renewable energy resources during classic high-load hot weather conditions. 

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  Although the original interim 2030 target of a 70% renewable energy electricity mandate has been modified, there still are requirements that require much greater use of wind and solar energy generation.

Electric systems must be built around reliability during peak demand.  One of my primary concerns with the Climate Act renewable energy mandates is weather variability because the conditions that characterize the highest loads also have the weakest expected wind resource availability.  That makes electric resource planning for reliability during the peak period especially challenging.  . 

Earlier this year I wrote multiple articles about the January 23-27 winter storm and subsequent cold snap that lasted until February 9.  This is a good case study for a New York extreme event that must be addressed by electric system planners.  I described the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) document Winter 2025-2026 Cold Weather Operations and the Climate Act transition implications.

For this assessment of the heat wave, I relied on the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) fuel-mix load data are available at the NYISO Real-Time Dashboard.  For last winter’s analysis I used the Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report prepared by the NYISO Operating Committee that data set is not available yet.  This article is limited to the description of the weather, generation mix, and resulting loads. 

NYISO Real-Time Fuel Mix

The dashboard real-time fuel mix data includes links to current and historical five-minute generation (MW) for energy generated in New York State.  I processed that data to calculate hourly averages.  The generator types include “Hydro” that includes pumped storage hydro; “Wind”, mostly land-based wind but does include 136 MW of offshore wind; “Other Renewables” that covers solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar”), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood; “Other Fossil Fuels” is oil; “Nuclear”; “Natural Gas”; and “Dual Fuel” which are units that burn both natural gas and oil.

Figure 1 graphs all the fuel mix hourly data and Table 1 summarizes the data. The relative average fuel mix energy provided over the heat wave was nuclear 16% and fossil fuels 64% for a total of 80%. Although renewables accounted for 20%, hydro made up 15% of that.  This year’s Budget Bill revised the Climate Act but the core power‑sector mandate—70 percent renewable electricity by 2030 and 100 percent zero‑emissions electricity by 2040—remains intact.  Clearly power generation during this heat wave is nowhere near these mandates.

Figure 1: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix June 29 – July 4, 2026

Table 1: Summary of Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Data Mix June 29 to July 4, 2026

These data do not show the contribution of wind and solar well.  “Other Renewables” includes solar energy (394 MW of “front-of-the-meter solar” at the end of 2025), energy storage resources (63 MW), methane, refuse, or wood. The methane, refuse and wood facilities show up as the relatively constant base in Figure 3.  If the 63 MW of energy storage is too small to show up, that means that the utility-scale “front-of-the-meter” solar shows up as the daily peaks each day.  It appears that there some component of “Other Renewables” is base load because the nighttime values all are approximately 300 MW

Figure 3: Hourly NYISO Realtime Fuel Mix Other Renewables and Wind June 29 to July 4, 2026

Weather

New York wind resource availability dodged a bullet during this episode.  Northeastern United States heat waves are typically associated with high pressure systems, the media hyped “heat dome”, and the location of the center of the dome makes all the difference.  I combined daily NYISO realtime fuel data mix data and the June 29 daily weather map in Figure 4 and Table 2 to show how bad it could have been.  The Weather Prediction Center National Center Environmental Prediction National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration provides daily weather mapsthat I used to describe the weather during this heat wave episode.

The daily weather map for June 29, 2026, shows that there was a high-pressure system centered over  New York.  The brown lines are isobars that show constant atmospheric pressure. Wind speed increases as the distance between isobars get smaller. Note that there are two closed 1020 isobar circles labeled with “H” in Quebec and western PA that are both labeled with pressures of 1021 millibars (mb).  I have added four orange arrows that highlight the location of the 1016 mb contour.  On an east to west basis the dome of air pressure greater than 1016 mb is over a 1000 miles with a peak at 1021.  North south the dome is even longer.  This weak pressure gradient led to extraordinarily weak wind production for New York’s land-based and offshore wind generators (Table 2). 

Figure 4: June 29, 2026 Weather Map at 7:00 AM EST

Table 2: Hourly Data for June 29, 2026

I maintain that New York dodged a bullet because the center of the high pressure system was mostly south of New York for the rest of the event as opposed to June 29.  Consider July 1 as shown in Figure 5.  The pressure gradient on this day between 1012 mb and 1016 mb is on the order of 300 miles as opposed to 500 miles on June 29. Table 3 lists the hourly data statistics for the two days. It is important to note that even though July 1 wind resources are better the average generation was only 1,000 MW which represents 35% of the total NYS wind capacity of 2,858 MW.  That is not terrible, but it surely is not good.

Figure 5: Jul 1, 2026 Weather Map at 7:00 AM EST

Table 3: Hourly Wind Statistics for June 29 and July 1

Figure 6 shows all the weather maps for the episode and I have prepared documentation with more details.  The location of the high pressure ridge or dome was far enough away from New York that wind speeds did not drop off like they did on the June 29.

Figure 6: June 29 – July 4, 2026 Weather Maps at 7:00 AM EST

Because Behind-the-Meter solar data are only provided in the NYISO Operations Performance Metrics Monthly Report I was not able to determine the solar resources available.  I would expect that they would be as good as they can get because the weather system had few clouds, the days were about as long as they can get and the solar angle maximized solar radiation to the panels.

Conclusion

There is no meteorological reason that the high-pressure system ridge or heat dome could not have been centered close enough to New York to replicate the poor wind resource availability or that these conditions could not have persisted longer.  The takeaway message from the 2026 extreme winter and summer weather observed is that in the winter solar can go to zero availability and wind availability can go to zero at any time.  This makes providing reliable electricity using an electric system that dependent upon wind and solar extremely challenging.  In my opinion the challenge is so large that it is more appropriate to rely on nuclear power as the backbone of the future electric system.

New York’s Climate Act Façade is Crumbling

Worldwide support for the net-zero energy transition is falling apart as the existential threat justification falls apart and the reality of the harms to affordability, reliability, and the environment become apparent.  The question now is not if but when New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) will be paused to account for reality.

As a retired air‑pollution meteorologist who has spent a career worrying about both the air people breathe and whether the lights stay on, I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. 

Impetus

I was prompted to write this article by Judith Curry’s announcement that her blog Climate Etc. is being euthanized.   She described the reasons that she will no longer support her blog:

  • Major progress has been made in the climate debate and the political climate has changed
  • My interests have evolved in other directions
  • The logistics and cost of keeping the blog running are substantial.

Her summary of the state of the climate debate prompted me to write about the situation in New York.  First, I want to acknowledge the impact her blog had on this one. I have great respect for Dr. Curry, and her writings influenced me greatly.  I also strongly admire her courage because she took the politically inconvenient position that the existential threat of climate change argument was not supportable and paid for it personally and professionally.   In addition, she published some of my guest posts and put my blog on the map so to speak when she added it to her blog roll.  For many years most of my visitors came from that list.  It also led to some collaboration related to the New York State Reliability Council’s Extreme Weather Working Group.  I am in her debt.

State of the Climate Debate

Kevin Killough wrote a good summary of Dr. Curry’s decision.  She waswas a member of the “Climate Working Group” with John Christy, Steve Koonin, Ross McKitrick, and Roy Spencer that prepared a draft report for U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright on the topic of climate change impacts on the United States.   The draft “Critical Review” remains publicly available and on DOE’s books, but the Climate Working Group that wrote it has been dissolved and a federal court has ruled that DOE violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) in the way it set up and used the group.  Earlier this year McKitrick cleared up some misconceptions about the report.

In my opinion, critics of the report ignore the fact that this process was more transparent and open than the process used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to produce its reports that are considered the “proof” that action on climate change is needed.  Therefore, I believe that the criticisms of the process are overblown and the Executive Summary arguments are valid:

  • CO₂ has substantial fertilization and “global greening” benefits and that these are underplayed in IPCC assessments.
  • CMIP-class climate models overstate historical and projected warming, especially in the troposphere, and therefore exaggerate risks.
  • Long‑term trends in most U.S. extreme weather metrics (hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, droughts, wildfires) are weak or absent in the historical record, and U.S. sea‑level rise shows little acceleration once local subsidence is accounted for.
  • Economically, plausible climate sensitivities imply relatively modest damages, uncertain and potentially low social cost of carbon, and U.S. mitigation policies with “undetectably small” direct effects on global climate.

Dr. Curry noted that the DOE report has influenced the climate debate by changing the arguments for the need to transition away from fossil fuels.  Another key argument in the debate is the widespread acknowledgement that the emissions scenario used to produce the most extreme impacts is an implausible emissions scenario. Over the past few years, climate scientists and assessment bodies have moved away from treating RCP8.5 as a realistic baseline or “business‑as‑usual” trajectory and now generally regard it as an implausible, low‑likelihood pathway whose coal‑heavy emissions profile no longer matches observed and projected energy trends. In updated scenario sets and popular explanations, RCP8.5 (and its successor SSP5‑8.5) is explicitly excluded from the range of plausible futures, yet retained as a worst‑case or “high‑end risk” scenario because its strong forcing signal is valuable for probing upper‑bound climate responses, local impacts, and model behavior.

I have long been a critic of this practice in New York regulatory proceedings, especially as it relates to Part 490 Sea-Level Rise. It remains to be seen whether New York will modify its analyses to exclude this emission scenario. 

State of the Transition Debate

Despite the massive investments the wind, solar, and energy storage approach advocated in the Climate Act is failing globally.  “A sea-change is occurring in energy policy as realism overtakes magical thinking” but Robert Bradley notes that folks who rely on social media for their information still rely on magical thinking for energy policy.  The reality is that no amount of clean energy media messaging can avoid the fact that wind and solar require so much backup support that they will never be affordable.

This has been acknowledged in at least one state.  In April 2026, North Carolina regulators ordered Duke Energy to pause its next round of solar projects while finalizing a broader energy plan.  North Carolina’s carbon‑plan results show that even with strong climate goals, a real‑world grid ends up needing more firm capacity—gas and nuclear—alongside renewables and storage to keep the lights on and bills tolerable. Because New York faces harsher winters, more aggressive statutory mandates, and similar emerging reliability concerns in NYISO and State Energy Plan modeling, it is very hard to see how New York avoids eventually making the same kind of course correction.

In North Carolina, once planners incorporated actual load growth, winter risk, project lead times, and customer‑bill impacts, the Commission’s “carbon plan” backed away from a renewables‑only path and embraced new gas builds and extended nuclear as the least‑cost, reliability‑constrained solution, while loosening the 2030 interim emissions requirement. New York’s own studies already tell a parallel story: NYISO’s winter assessments flag growing fuel‑security risk and winter adequacy concerns; the State Energy Plan acknowledge a need for roughly 20–25 GW of “clean‑firm” capacity by 2040, equivalent to most of today’s fossil fleet.  I have shown that wind and solar can be almost absent during peak winter demand, making dispatchable emission-free resources (DEFRs) non‑negotiable.

On the Other Hand

Unfortunately, there is so much invested in the clean energy transition that stamping out the nonsense is a big problem.  Climate‑ and environment‑focused nonprofits now constitute a large professionalized industry, and climate change activism sits at the center of that funding stream. In the United States alone, environmental organizations collectively report more than 30 billion dollars in annual revenue and tens of billions more in assets, with climate advocacy a dominant theme in their campaigns, communications, and grant proposals. A relatively small number of large national and international NGOs capture a disproportionate share of this money, reporting annual revenues in the hundreds of millions and in some cases over a billion dollars, much of it from major foundations and high‑net‑worth donors explicitly interested in climate policy and energy transition. By contrast, the thousands of small grassroots climate groups that are often highlighted in media coverage operate on comparatively modest budgets, together accounting for only a small fraction of the sector’s total income even though they make up the vast majority of organizations by number.  John Robson’s weekly Climate Discussion Nexus newsletter regularly documents the “Green Money Machine”.  He describes the revenues of the smaller non-governmental organizations dedicated to the proposition that they can save the planet if only people would donate more for their work.   

In addition, there are many people who’s careers depend on climate change being an issue.  Consider all the universities that have climate change related programs.  Anthony Watts describes former EPA regulatory staff who want to the climate movement to continue.  “According to a June 23 New York Times report, “Former NOAA Employees Revive Climate Site Shut by Trump Administration,” a small group of former NOAA employees has recreated much of the former Climate.gov website under a new domain, Climate.us, after the original site was effectively retired during the Trump administration. The project reportedly involved former NOAA staff, approximately $280,000 in crowdsourced funding, and the painstaking recataloging of more than a thousand reports, datasets, articles, and educational resources.”

I have no doubts that the same actors will advocate that New York continue the Climate Act as long as possible.

Conclusion

The rationale to transform the energy system because there is an existential threat due to climate change caused by GHG emissions is no longer justifiable.  Once policymakers can no longer ignore the electric system constraints—especially as retirements and electrification continue—New York will face the same fundamental choice North Carolina just confronted: either relax or reinterpret interim targets and incorporate substantial firm capacity (through gas, nuclear, or other DEFRs), or accept growing reliability risk and politically unsustainable rate and outage impacts. The only question that remains is when this reckoning will occur.     

Climate Act Status – June 2026

New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is now driving every major energy and climate decision in the state. I’ve grown increasingly concerned that the transition plan built around this law is not affordable, is risky for reliability, and will not deliver the environmental benefits people assume. This post provides an overview of my concerns.

As a retired air‑pollution meteorologist who has spent a career worrying about both the air people breathe and whether the lights stay on, I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.  I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate summaries and references included in this document. 

Climate Act Requirements

The Climate Act is often described in broad, aspirational terms, but its mandates are very specific. Public Service Law Section 66‑p requires the Public Service Commission, by June 30, 2021, to establish a program ensuring that at least 70% of statewide electric generation secured by jurisdictional load-serving entities in 2030 comes from “renewable energy systems” and that by 2040 the statewide electrical demand system is zero emissions. These statutory “targets” are the Climate Act’s headline electric-sector mandates translated into binding obligations on utilities and other load-serving entities, rather than being left as generalized policy goals.  On top of that, it sets a net‑zero statewide emissions target by mid‑century and directs a large share of climate and energy spending to “disadvantaged communities.”

To push enough wind, solar, and transmission projects through the pipeline to meet those dates, the state created new fast‑track siting regimes: first the Office of Renewable Energy Siting (ORES), and more recently the Renewable Action through Project Interconnection and Deployment (RAPID) Act, which folds big renewables and major transmission lines into a single accelerated process. In short, the law is not just a statement of long‑term goals; it has spawned a whole machinery of timelines, mandates, and permitting shortcuts to force the system in one direction. 

My over-riding concern is that the Climate Act set very aggressive goals without a realistic, step-by-step plan to get there.   We don’t have a plan; we have a wish list. The law sets big targets for cutting emissions, but there’s no practical roadmap that says who builds what, by when, and how we keep the lights on and bills affordable along the way.  This is declaring we’ll rebuild the whole electric system in 15 years without a construction schedule or budget.”

The law assumes everything will work out—technology, costs, and reliability—without proving it. No conditions have been defined.  There are no clear affordability limits, no defined reliability safeguards, and no trigger points where the state must slow down or change course if things start to go wrong.  I’m used to testing assumptions. Here, the assumptions are treated as facts.

The law ignores permitting reality. We make it harder and slower to permit both existing plants and new infrastructure, while at the same time assuming we can build massive amounts of renewables, storage, and transmission on a tight deadline. The timelines and the permitting system just don’t match. It can take many years to permit a single transmission line. The law acts as if we can permit and build dozens on a political timetable.

Affordability: what it looks like at the household level

From the beginning, the Climate Act’s architects asserted that the transition would be cost‑effective and could be done using technologies available a decade ago. In practice, when I look at the numbers through the lens of a typical upstate household, that claim is hard to square with the evidence.[

NYSERDA’s modeling and public messaging emphasize long‑term fuel and operating savings from electrification, but I believe they understate or obscure the full capital and retrofit costs that real people will face. A gas‑heated home in upstate New York is not starting from a blank slate; to electrify heat it may need a heat pump, electric panel upgrades, new wiring, backup systems, and often building shell improvements. When those costs are levelized over realistic lifetimes and added to electric bills that must also carry the cost of massive new generation, storage, and transmission, NYSERDA’s own calculations show annual costs rising by thousands of dollars compared to staying on gas.

That’s before we talk about vehicle electrification and the additional load that puts on both household budgets and local distribution systems. For low‑ and middle‑income families, especially in older housing stock, the up‑front burden is steep, and the promised payback periods are long and uncertain. The latest budget language envisions a cap‑and‑invest system that would raise revenue and then “share” proceeds with New Yorkers to offset bills, but that still means raising the underlying cost of energy to generate those funds in the first place. 

Previous energy transitions, for example, from coal town gas to natural gas, or from inefficient oil burners to modern gas boilers, succeeded because they saved consumers money and improved convenience. The Climate Act’s transition is different: it is enforced by law and regulation rather than emerging organically from better economics, and that is why I keep coming back to affordability as a core concern.

Reliability: weather‑dependent supply on a tight grid

My second major concern is reliability. The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) prepares an annual report on “forces shaping the electric grid and wholesale electricity markets.”  NYISO’s Power Trends 2026 is a notable document because it acknowledges that Climate Act related initiatives such as electrification, retirement of conventional resources, and weather-dependent generation combined with large new energy-intensive loads are making the system more uncertain and more fragile. It also says reliability margins are shrinking and that winter conditions are becoming a defining challenge.

The Climate Act’s targets effectively assume that New York can completely revamp the electric system to run largely on wind, solar, and storage, with something called “Dispatchable Emissions‑Free Resources” (DEFRs) appearing down the road to back them up. In the Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan, those DEFRs are more of a placeholder than a commercially available option today.

As a meteorologist, I am very aware that wind and solar are controlled by the weather, not by grid operators. They are intermittent, they don’t work all the time; they are diffuse, they require large land areas and new transmission to deliver the same energy as a single conventional plant; and their output is correlated over large regions due to large‑scale weather systems. That means a cold, calm high‑pressure system can reduce wind output over the whole Northeast just when electric heating demand is highest, and clouds can reduce solar output across a broad swath of the state at the same time. The Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan acknowledge that DEFR is necessary for this situation but there is no proposal how to address this requirement.

Batteries are valuable for smoothing and short‑duration balancing, but they become very expensive very quickly if you try to size them to cover multi‑day or seasonal shortfalls. Studies that look at the cost of backing up long, widespread wind lulls strictly with storage point to staggering cost numbers and large amounts of capacity that would sit idle much of the time. Despite repeated warnings from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) about resource adequacy and the risks of retiring fossil capacity faster than firm replacements are available, I don’t see those concerns fully reflected in the state’s official transition roadmap.

My worry is that we are treating weather‑dependent megawatt‑hours as if they are interchangeable with firm capacity on peak and in worst‑case conditions and filling the gap with optimistic assumptions about future technologies. That may look fine in a model, but on a winter evening with a regional cold snap and limited imports, the real‑world consequences of getting it wrong would be very serious.

Environmental impact and local siting

People understandably assume that a climate law must be environmentally beneficial. My view, informed by decades of air‑quality work, is that the answer depends on how we define and measure “benefit,” and on the local impacts of the projects required to meet statewide targets.

On the accounting side, the statute originally used 20‑year global warming potentials (GWP20) and included out‑of‑state, upstream emissions from fossil fuel production in New York’s inventory. That approach gave very high weight to methane and made New York’s near‑term targets particularly difficult to meet compared to jurisdictions using 100‑year GWPs and more conventional boundaries. I have long argued that this approach magnified the appearance of urgency without changing global physics and raised the risk that New York would push expensive policies for relatively modest climate impact while encouraging emissions to “leak” to other regions.

The 2026 budget revisions change that accounting. They move to 100‑year GWPs, drop out‑of‑state upstream emissions, and exclude biogenic CO₂. Those moves align New York’s bookkeeping more closely with federal and international practice and immediately reduce reported statewide emissions—without any physical change in the atmosphere. The new law also softens the near‑term target, replacing the 40 percent‑below‑1990 mandate for 2030 with a 60 percent reduction by 2040, qualified by “to the maximum extent feasible and cost effective,” and pushes the deadline for DEC regulations out to the end of 2028.  The changes simply push the inevitable reckoning down the road.

At the same time, ORES and the RAPID Act change how projects are sited on the ground. These frameworks centralize permitting for large renewables and major transmission in Albany, set tight timelines, and include “deemed complete” and “deemed approved” provisions if agencies miss deadlines. Town associations, landowners, and even some developers have flagged that combination as a problem: local governments lose leverage, procedural timelines are very tight, and the opportunity to raise and adjudicate substantive issues is narrow.

From an environmental perspective, I worry that we are trading thorough site‑specific review and local consent for speed, especially in rural upstate communities being asked to host industrial‑scale projects for benefits that are mostly diffuse and global. That doesn’t mean every project is harmful or that renewables have no place, but it does mean we should be honest about the trade‑offs and the cumulative impacts of covering large areas of the landscape with energy infrastructure.

In my opinion, the biggest flaw with ORES and the RAPID Act is that they do not include specific conditions for developers.  Because there are no specific limitations for prime farmland protections, wildlife habitat, noise, or technology constraints, projects are being approved that will have long lasting adverse environmental impacts, health effects, and will require even more development.  For example, utility-scale solar development should use tilting axis panels that maximize solar collection and should not be sited in areas severely affected by lake-effect snow.

The 2026 “Reset”

One reason I am skeptical that these trade‑offs are being weighed objectively is the way the Climate Action Council and Energy Planning Board were put together. A clear majority of Climate Action Council members were appointed by the Governor and legislative leaders, and only a minority have deep energy‑sector experience, particularly in utility operations and reliability. The Energy Planning Board had one non-voting industry expert.  Given the obvious affordability problems, the 2026 budget revisions included a “blue-ribbon” commission on affordability that will have the same makeup.  I think the most probable outcome is a final report that acknowledges bills are too high, recommends more rebates and cost‑shifting to taxpayers, proposes tougher oversight of utilities, and treats NYISO reliability concerns as justification for even more spending on renewables, storage, and transmission—not as a warning sign about the Climate Act transition.

In my comments and blog posts, I’ve argued that this structure makes it unlikely that the Council would squarely confront feasibility and cost issues raised by NYISO and others. Instead, the Scoping Plan tends to assume that technologies and projects will appear when needed, and that equity goals can be layered on top of mitigation without exploding costs.  

The 2026 budget changes are, in a sense, an indirect admission that the original timelines and accounting structure were not realistic. They soften near‑term targets, adjust the emissions inventory in ways that make the numbers easier to hit, and give regulators several more years before binding rules must be in place. To me, that looks less like a fundamental reexamination of the transition plan and more like a political‑relief valve designed to avoid an imminent collision between statutory deadlines, litigation, and physical reality.

Discussion

I think we are at a crucial crossroads for New York energy policy.  Advocates have demanded that the future energy system reduce GHG emissions to zero citing major co-benefits from improved air quality.  Over my career I have seen enormous improvements in air quality, but there have not been corresponding health benefits that are consistent with the co-benefit claims in the Scoping Plan and State Energy Plan from the small incremental improvements from further reductions .

What I want from New York’s energy policy is something more pragmatic: a plan that starts from reliability and affordability constraints, acknowledges technology and permitting limits, and is transparent about both costs and benefits. That would mean putting independent technical experts, especially from NYISO and utility engineers—at the center of planning, not at the margins. It would mean evaluating wind, solar, storage, nuclear, and cleaner fossil technologies on a level playing field based on reliability contribution and life‑cycle cost, rather than committing in advance to a narrow renewable energy portfolio. And it would mean being honest with the public about what this transition will cost households, businesses, and communities, rather than leading with best‑case scenarios and hidden caveats.

Conclusion

The existing transition plan built around the Climate Act is not affordable, is risky for reliability, and will not deliver the environmental benefits people assume. I’m not saying, ‘do nothing.’ I’m saying: be honest with people. We need a realistic, engineering‑grade plan that respects reliability, affordability, and permitting realities, instead of pretending they’ll take care of themselves. We must concede that we are not ready to rely completely on zero-emission renewable resources today.  We must act now to develop natural gas infrastructure to ensure that we have a reliable electric system that can be used as a bridge to the future.  When full system costs and infrastructure life expectancy are considered I expect that nuclear power should be used as the backbone of the electric system.

Budget Bill Revisions to the CLCPA

In late February the Hochul Administration “leaked” a New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) memo that said that “full compliance with New York’s 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act could cost upstate households more than $4,000 a year – on top of what they are already paying today and gas prices could jump over $2 a gallon.”  I believe they recognized that the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is so expensive that it would be a re-election campaign liability.  Sunce then there have been many hints during budget negotiations but nothing specific in the opaque New York budget process.  I got a copy of the relevant part of the budget bill and this is a summary of what is included.   

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

There are substantive issues that can no longer be ignored. Most targets are behind schedule, and the obvious increased costs of the Climate Act will exacerbate the existing energy affordability crisis.  New York State Department of Environmental Conservation needs to respond to the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) economy wide emission reduction initiative requirements and will have to eventually respond to the litigation saying that the State must implement the regulations or amend the law.  

Budget Bill CLCPA Revisions

The Climate Act revisions are in Part VV of the TED bill. 

The revisions specify specific amendments to Section 1. Subdivisions 2, 8 and 13 of section 75-0101 of the environmental conservation law, as added by chapter 106 of the laws of 2019. 

  • Subdivision 2 changes GHG accounting from 20GWP to 100GWP, making us comparable to everyone else.  This enables us to interact with other jurisdictions seamlessly and reduces impacts of the irrational methane obsession in the 2019 Climate Act.
  • Subdivision 8 changes exclude biogenic (e.g., organic matter like wood, although they don’t add a definition) emissions from our GHG limit (again matching other jurisdictions)
  • Subdivision 13 eliminates out of state extraction and transportation of fossil fuels from our state GHG limit emissions accounting.  It does not revise out of state emissions from generation of electric power imported to NYS as part of our inventory.

The Climate Action Council planning process is revised to modify the charge to the Climate Action Council to developing a plan “toward” rather than “for” achieving  the state’s GHG limits, requires an undated Climate Action Plan in 2008, then updates every six years, rather than an update every five years (under current law, the Plan would have been updated in 2026)

There is a technical correction that requires separate reporting for biogenic emissions “consistent with” treatment by the IPCC.

One of the big changes requires DEC, by 12/31/28 to adopt regulations that “to the maximum extent feasible and cost effective” to achieve a 60% reduction in GHG by 2040, from a 1990 baseline.   The current law requires a 40% reduction by 2030. 

Revisions also require DEC to consider the feasibility of a cap and invest program that could be linked to other jurisdictions, including its affordability for residents, business and other entities, its impact on economic development and energy costs, and other factors. 

There also is a revision that requires evaluation of the reduction measures.  DEC is required to issue a report on recommended GHG reduction measures four years after the adoption of these regulations.

There are changes to the environmental justice mandates. The revisions require that climate-related state funds be spent with a goal of 40% in or for the benefit of disadvantaged communities, with a goal of 45% (up from 30% and 35%, respectively.)

Impression

The budget bill makes several important technical changes to the CLCPA that intersect directly with concerns I have raised over the last few years. First, it finally abandons the outlier 20‑year global warming potential metric and redefines “carbon dioxide equivalent” using a 100‑year time frame, bringing New York’s accounting back in line with IPCC practice and most other jurisdictions.  The bill also narrows the definition of “statewide greenhouse gas emissions” by removing upstream emissions from the extraction and transmission of fossil fuels imported into the state, while continuing to count emissions associated with imported electricity.  Both changes move the law modestly toward a more conventional and transparent accounting framework, which I have argued is a necessary precondition for honest discussion of New York’s role in global emissions.

The revisions also adjust several process and timing provisions without changing the underlying statutory end‑points. The deadline for DEC’s implementing regulations is pushed back to December 31, 2028, and updates to the Climate Action Council plan are now scheduled for 2028 and every six years thereafter, rather than “at least once every five years.”  This effectively concedes that the original schedule was unrealistic but does not revisit the 2040 and 2050 outcome targets or introduce any formal safety valve tied to costs or reliability.  In that sense, the law’s ambition is unchanged; only the official calendar has been stretched.

On the regulatory design side, the bill adds more explicit direction around issues I have frequently highlighted—affordability, leakage, economic competitiveness, and the potential role of a cap‑and‑invest program. DEC is instructed to design rules that minimize costs and maximize benefits, ensure reductions are “real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, and enforceable,” incorporate measures to minimize leakage, and consider options such as an economy‑wide, market‑based cap‑and‑invest system that may include linkages and cost‑containment features.  However, all of this remains in the language of “considerations” and broad objectives; there are no hard affordability limits, no explicit reliability criteria, and no defined thresholds at which the state must slow down or change course if costs, leakage, or reliability impacts become unacceptable.

Finally, the bill strengthens the statutory commitment to disadvantaged communities by raising both the goal and minimum share of “overall benefits” that must accrue to those communities, from 40 to 45 percent (goal) and from 35 to 40 percent (floor) of spending on clean energy and energy efficiency programs.  As with the original CLCPA, these percentages are defined in terms of “benefits,” not costs, and the bill does not resolve the practical questions of how those benefits are measured or how these distributional targets interact with least‑cost system planning. 

Reliability Problem

I am particularly concerned that the revisions do not address the reliability issues associated with the Renewable Energy Program.  There is nothing included that addresses what happens to the emissions free generation sector by 2040. This might be a portent that this issue will be addressed by the safety valve hearing in New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p.  That would certainly be a political maneuver whereby they could get the necessary result but not take the blame for having to do it.

Unfortunately, this approach does not provide real solutions to the unfolding crisis.  The necessary technology to transition off fossil fuel generating resources is not available to address the extreme market events experienced during last winter’s cold snap.  At the same time,  the existing fossil resources that ensured the lights did not go out are aging and need to be replaced.  The business case for a developers to build new facilities and recover their costs with the existing timeline for zero emissions electric generation is very weak. The Governor needs to enact an interim solution that builds natural gas plants across the state until the ultimate future energy system is in place. 

Conclusion

Overall, the budget bill addresses some of the most egregious technical and accounting problems I have criticized, but it leaves my central concerns about feasibility, affordability, and reliability largely untouched.  Not surprisingly, the primary changes extend the deadlines for accountability beyond the election and avoids the hard decisions about the future of New York’s energy system untouched.

Stop Energy Sprawl Call for Action

I have been privileged to join Stop Energy Sprawl monthly meetings for some time.  I always learn something and have been impressed with the dedication of its members. This post describes a recent distribution to its members titled “Tell New York State ‘It’s Time to Pause the CLCPA!’ and save our communities”.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written nearly 650 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

Stop Energy Sprawl is a “coalition of community groups, municipalities, and elected officials from localities in New York State targeted by land-wasting large-scale wind & solar projects located far from where that energy is needed.”  They have warned that Climate Act‑driven reliance on large‑scale wind and solar could require hundreds of thousands acres of New York farmland and forest for generation, storage, and associated transmission infrastructure.

Stop Energy Sprawl (has provided comments supporting the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy’s petition requesting a hearing on suspending or modifying the CLCPA targets.  This post describes a recent distribution to their members where they recommend submitting comments supporting the petition and announced a survey they set up to document how renewable development has harmed their communities.

Petition Recommendation

New York Public Service Law (PSL) § 66-p establishes a renewable energy program for the Climate Act.  It  provides that the Commission “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  In a rare example of commonsense this safety valve was included because even the lawmakers realized that it may not be possible to transition the electric system to “zero-emissions” by relying on renewable energy.  New York State never followed up with a feasibility study proving that it could be done, never pointed to another jurisdiction that implemented such a system successfully, and has not provided clear and comprehensive cost estimates.  Conducting a hearing is a commonsense reality check and I encourage you to submit comments.

Comments were originally due on March 30 but have been delayed to May 1.  Stop Energy Sprawl recommended submitting comments on the petition.

The CLCPA targets for 2030 are based on a technology goal — not an environmental goal (and they’re making the electric grid less reliable and more expensive) !

These targets put our communities at risk by mandating poorly-performing large-scale wind and solar facilities that will overrun hundreds of thousands of acres of high-quality farmland and forest, imperil fisheries and shorelines, destroy agriculturally-based, maritime, and tourism-based economies, and severely damage community character, historic sites, and the quiet enjoyment of our homes and communities, as well as the value of those residences and communities.  

The State uses the RAPID Act to implement these wind & solar goals. New York State routinely places out-of-state and foreign developers ahead of its own citizens and stomps on communities’ Home Rule and self-determination by overriding nearly every local law the developers ask them to.

Help us fight back for your community and all our communities by submitting a comment:

  1. There are two cases.  Either go to this link at the Department of Public Service website:  https://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Comments/PublicComments.aspx?MatterCaseNo=15-E-0302  or this link https://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Comments/PublicComments.aspx?MatterCaseNo=22-M-0149   E-0302 is a huge proceeding so going to M-0149 will be faster.
  2. Enter your name, address, and email address.
  3. Copy and paste the message at the end of the post into the comments field (feel free to modify or add information about projects in your town)
  4. Click the “I understand…” box and the “I’m not a robot” Captcha box
  5. Wait until the Captcha completes and Click  Post Comment 
  6. That’s it. You’re done!

Stop Energy Sprawl also told readers to  share thismessage with others in your organization, friends, neighbors, and town and county officials.  The voices looking to defile our communities with these facilities are already loudly opposing this hearing — we need to make our voices known!

Harmful Impact Survey

In addition, the distribution asked readers to compile their stories from communities targeted by land-wasting and coast-endangering large-scale wind and solar projects located far from where that energy is needed.  They have prepared a survey that seeks to collect information about the impacts experienced by communities throughout New York State targeted be wind, solar and energy storage development.  The goal is to bring awareness to these issues and to fight back against ill-considered laws that enable these destructive policies.

New York readers who have experience with these projects are encouraged to respond to the survey “How Did Wind or Solar Harm Your Community?”  Whether it was fire, farmland desecration, habitat loss, or setting residents against one another, we want to hear about it.  Respond at https://forms.gle/DYxEpmTBFkAAp11M8

For more information, contact them at stopenergysprawl@gmail.com or check out our website, stopenergysprawl.org

Conclusion

I think we are at an inflection point relative to the Climate Act.  It appears that the Hochul Administration has caught on that the net-zero transition is unsustainable.  Unfortunately there are still many that fail to acknowledge that physics, engineering, and economics all indicate that the renewable-based electric system is impossible.  The PSL 66-P hearing will provide a venue for public debate on the capability for renewable energy to provide safe and adequate electricity.

I also think that careful documentation of the harmful impacts of renewables developments will prove that the Rapid Act is an environmental disaster scandal.  The failure of the state to establish siting standards has led to unacceptable impacts that very few people know about.  I look forward to the survey results and encourage everyone with first-hand knowledge to tell their story.

Comment Recommendation

The following are the suggested comments supporting the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy’s petition requesting a hearing on suspending or modifying the CLCPA targets

It’s time for a hearing.  I support the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy’s petition requesting that the Commission hold a hearing pursuant to Public Service Law (PSL) Section 66-p(4) to evaluate whether to temporarily suspend or modify the targets or provisions under the Renewable Energy Program established as part of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).

PSL 66-p(4) provides that the Commission “may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program”.  A PSL 66-p(4) hearing is essential to evaluate whether the Renewable Energy Program, as currently implemented, is compatible with safe, adequate, and affordable electric service.

Safe and adequate service is imperiled by declining reliability margins documented by the New York Independent System Operator.  Acceptable reliability risks associated with the Renewable Energy Program have not been defined so the public has no assurance that the declining margins are safe.

Transmission deficiencies threaten reliable delivery.  New transmission is needed to get the renewable energy collected to where it is needed.  If this transmission is not available, then the energy supply will not be adequate.

The affordability crisis demands a hearing because safe and adequate is only possible if it is affordable.  The PSL 66-p(4) hearing must define acceptable affordability metrics that can be tracked.

Multiple independent sources confirm the need for a hearing.  State agencies, the Attorney General Office, the NYISO and others have identified schedule and ambition issues associated with the Climate Act implementation that affect the Renewable Energy Program.

The Legislature included Section 66-p(4) precisely to address the situation New York now faces: implementation challenges that threaten reliability and affordability as the aggressive timelines and technology requirements of the Climate Act confront real-world constraints. The Commission has both the authority and the obligation to act.  The Commission must convene a hearing as soon as possible.

Senator Harkham Climate Act Mal-Information

New York State Sen. Peter Harckham argues that New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  will reduce high utility rates “if we let it.” He blames today’s affordability crisis entirely on fossil fuel volatility, dismisses nuclear as a “fantasy,” and claims that if we just double down on renewables and distributed solar, families will see “real, predictable savings.”  He is wrong on all three counts.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks.  I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition.  The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate an outline and draft for this post.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040.

In a recent post I described several initiatives that have led Governor Hochul to suggest that the timeline for the Climate Act electric sector goals needs to be revised.  Apparently, the proposed changes are part of the budget negotiations and there is very little information describing exactly what the Governor has proposed.  The most disappointing thing to me is that Climate Act proponents like Harkham refuse to acknowledge that there are any issues that cannot be resolved by doubling down on current policies.

The opinion piece by Harkham is mal-information.  Media Defence defines mal-information as information that is based on reality, but it is used to inflict harm on a person, organization or jurisdiction like New York.  Given the status of the Climate Act, it is necessary to refute the opinion piece because what he claims bears little resemblance to what the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA), the Public Service Commission (PSC), the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), and even the State Energy Plan are now saying.

Affordability Crisis: Not Just Fossil Volatility

Senator Harckham correctly notes that in 2025 more than 1.3 million New York customers were over 60 days behind on their bills, with arrears approaching $1.8 billion. Where we part company is the explanation.

Harckham says these customers are struggling only because of the “fossil fuel status quo” and “future green energy targets” are not to blame. I addressed this in my “New York Climate Act Affordability Status” article. But the arrears crisis is occurring while Climate Act implementation is driving up both utility and economy‑wide energy costs.  In recent rate cases approved between March 2025 and January 2026, residential electric bills at the major utilities increased markedly, and that was before most Climate Act capital spending shows up in rates. The PSC’s own staff “Second Informational Report” on Climate Act costs found that CLCPA‑related program impacts already account for 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 residential electric bills—numbers I consider conservative given the political pressure to minimize cost estimates.

And we are still at the front end of the cost curve. As Kris Martin from NY Solar Divide pointed out, only a small fraction of Climate Act expenses has hit bills so far; the bulk will land in the next 5–10 years as offshore wind, large‑scale solar, school‑bus electrification, and other mandates scale up.  So no, this is not just a “fossil fuel” affordability problem. It is also a policy‑driven cost‑loading problem, and the state’s own documents say so.

What NYSERDA and the State Energy Plan Actually Show

If the Climate Act were really a path to lower bills, NYSERDA and the State Energy Plan (SEP) would show that clearly. They don’t.

The 2025 State Energy Plan admits that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient” and that external constraints “continue to impede progress,” concluding that the Climate Act schedule is effectively impossible to meet. It also estimates that achieving the Climate Act goals will require about $120 billion per year in energy system investment through 2040—roughly $1,282 per month per household when you levelize those costs.

NYSERDA’s Energy Affordability analysis underlying the plan is even more revealing. The public‑facing fact sheets emphasize that electrification might lower operating energy expenses for some households. But when you examine the data tables and include the levelized capital cost of mandated equipment, the picture changes dramatically.  For a representative upstate moderate‑income gas‑heated household, NYSERDA’s own numbers show that replacing fossil systems and vehicles with the required “zero‑emission” alternatives adds about $594 per month in 2031 compared to a conventional replacement path—a 43% increase in total energy‑related costs. That is roughly $7,000 per year in additional costs that the glossy brochures don’t emphasize.

In other words, once you include what it actually costs to buy the heat pumps, envelope upgrades, and EVs that the mandates require, the Climate Act is not a bill‑cutting program. It is a massive, regressive cost shift onto households that Albany has never honestly explained.

Reliability: The Cost of Ignoring NYISO

Harckham frames the debate as a simple choice between “low‑cost” renewables and “volatile” fossil fuels. He never mentions grid reliability, even though NYISO has been warning for years that Climate Act timelines and technology assumptions are pushing the system toward unacceptable risk.  NYISO’s 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment shows statewide resource margins declining so quickly that by 2034 there is no surplus left without additional development. A 2025 Short‑Term Assessment of Reliability identified a Zone J (New York City) reliability need as early as summer 2027, requiring peaker units scheduled for retirement to be retained.  There has already been a net loss of dispatchable capacity—NYISO’s 2025 Power Trends notes that since the Climate Act passed, 4,315 MW of capacity have retired while only 2,274 MW of mostly intermittent resources have been added, a net loss of about 2,041 MW.  

These reports also point out that Climate Act planning assumes timely completion of critical transmission projects like Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) if this slips, New York City’s reliability margins become “deficient.” And their studies show that high penetrations of wind and solar require more operating reserves, new reserve products, and far more total installed capacity, including firm, zero‑emission resources that do not yet exist at required scale.

None of that shows up in Harckham’s breezy claim that renewables are “the cheapest new power source.” A system that must rely increasingly on emergency procedures, backstop contracts, and delayed environmental rules to keep the lights on is not a low‑cost system.

The “Cheapest Renewables” Talking Point

Harckham leans heavily on Energy Information Administration data and asserts that a kWh of solar is “consistently” cheaper than electricity from gas or nuclear.  I have addressed this “cheap renewables myth” at length. Project‑level levelized cost of energy (LCOE) comparisons ignore the system‑wide costs that NYISO must actually manage:

  • Backup and firming capacity to cover multi‑hour ramps and multi‑day renewable droughts.
  • New transmission to move remote resources to load centers.
  • Storage sized to reliability needs, not just to smooth daily solar output.
  • Curtailment and overbuild required as penetration rises.

At low penetration, subsidized wind and solar can appear cheap on paper. At high penetration, the cost of keeping the system reliable at all hours rises sharply, and those costs are socialized through rates and surcharges.

Nuclear: New York Policy Disaster

Harckham dismisses nuclear as a “fantasy” for bill relief, citing the long and expensive Vogtle expansion in Georgia. That is a convenient example, but ignores New York’s misguided nuclear policy  Cheered on by Harckham, New York chose to close Indian Point, a major source of zero‑emission, dispatchable power located near the New York City load center, and then tried to cover both that loss and growing demand with a mix of imports, gas, and promised future renewables. Emissions went up in the short term, and reliability margins tightened.

The fastest way to raise both emissions and costs is to shut down existing nuclear plants and then pretend that nuclear is irrelevant to affordability. New York State has not provided clear and transparent cost estimates for the Climate Act transition using renewables or an alternative approach using nuclear as the base load source.  As a result, it is simply false to claim that nuclear has no role in cost containment, especially if the alternative is building a massive overbuilt, weather‑dependent system plus long‑duration storage that does not yet exist commercially at scale.

Distributed Solar and the “$1 Billion” Promise

Harckham touts a Synapse Energy Economics study for the Accelerate Solar for Affordable Power Act, claiming “an estimated $1 billion in annual savings for ratepayers” by raising distributed solar goals and reforming interconnections.  I don’t doubt that a modeling exercise can produce that figure under optimistic assumptions. But New York’s record with these programs is that system‑level “savings” often mask who pays and who benefits.

Net metering and Value of Distributed Energy Resource credits shift revenue shortfalls onto non‑participants. Interconnection and distribution upgrade costs are socialized. Program administration and incentives are funded via surcharges. Those costs show up in the bills of the very households already in arrears.  Unless a study rigorously accounts for these rate‑base effects and distributional impacts, a headline “$1 billion in savings” can easily mean $1 billion in shifted costs, not genuine relief for the typical customer. Furthermore, I recently showed that the distributed solar failed to provide any meaningful energy during last winter’s extreme weather.  I doubt that the long-term costs will be cheaper if all the expenses necessary to support the system when solar is unavailable are included.

What PSL §66‑p(4) Is There For – And Why It Matters Now

One thing Harckham does not mention is that the Legislature itself anticipated a situation where Climate Act implementation might threaten affordability and reliability. Public Service Law §66‑p(4) explicitly authorizes the PSC to temporarily suspend or modify Renewable Energy Program obligations if it finds that the program:

  • Impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service,
  • Is likely to impair existing obligations, and/or
  • Is associated with a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections.

Two recent petitions—one from Independent Intervenors (including me), and one from the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy—ask the PSC to hold a §66‑p(4) hearing based on precisely these concerns. On January 28, 2026, the PSC issued a notice soliciting comments on whether Renewable Energy Program targets should be suspended or adjusted. That is not routine housekeeping. It is a legal acknowledgment that the current trajectory may be incompatible with safe, adequate, and affordable service.  The fact is that New York has never done a feasibility study proving that transitioning the electric system to depend on renewables will work.

Conclusion: Stop Pretending, Start Reviewing

Harckham urges New Yorkers to “reject misinformation” and “double down” on the Climate Act to lower bills. But the state’s own data tell a different story:

  • NYSERDA’s cap‑and‑invest modeling shows steep fuel price increases and thousands of dollars per year in added household costs.
  • Energy affordability analysis shows a 40+% increase in energy‑related costs for a representative upstate family once capital is included.
  • The State Energy Plan projects $120 billion per year in system investment, about $1,282 per month per household on a levelized basis.
  • NYISO warns of declining reliability margins, dependence on a few critical transmission projects, and a technology gap for firm, zero‑emission resources.
  • More than 1.3 million households already owe nearly $1.8 billion in arrears.

This is not what an affordable transition looks like.

Reconsidering the Climate Act’s timelines and mandates does not mean abandoning climate goals. It means using the tools the Legislature provided—especially PSL §66‑p(4)—to align ambition with reality, ensure that reliability is not sacrificed, and prevent climate policy from becoming an uncontrolled energy tax on working families.

New Yorkers were promised a “clean, resilient, and affordable” energy future. Now that NYSERDA, NYISO, the Comptroller, and the Attorney General’s office have all signaled serious cost and feasibility issues, the responsible course is not to “double down” on slogans, but to require a transparent §66‑p(4) hearing on whether the Renewable Energy Program is compatible with safe, adequate, and affordable service.

That is the conversation we should be having—not whether critics are guilty of “misinformation” for reading the state’s own numbers aloud.  It is frustrating that misinformation claims are grounded on information that is based on reality, but it is incorrect that it inflicts harm on the state.

Conclusion

Since the promulgation of the Climate Act we now know we must address what we have learned.  New York’s affordability crisis is being exacerbated by Climate Act‑driven costs, not just fossil volatility.  NYSERDA and the State Energy Plan show large household cost increases once capital is included, not bill reductions.  NYISO’s reliability warnings reveal that a high‑renewables system without firm backup is neither cheap nor risk‑free.  Claims that renewables are “the cheapest power” ignore system‑wide costs, rate‑base effects, and reliability needs. Finally, PSL §66‑p(4) exists as a safety valve and should be used now to review and, if necessary, modify Climate Act obligations.

No to an “All of the Above” Energy Policy

Both New York Democrats and Republicans are embracing an all-of-the-above Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) energy strategy that includes a role for wind and solar because it provides a “diversity of generation sources”.  I believe that wind is useless and solar should only be used on-site to reduce a structure’s energy use, so I have wanted to respond to this for a while.  However, providing an easily understood comprehensive explanation why dependency on wind and solar is flawed has given me pause.  Richard Lyon has written up exactly what I needed and this article describes his series of posts describing the core arguments of his forthcoming book The Energy Trap: Why the Renewable Energy Transition Can’t Work — And What Can.

I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  The Climate Action Council (CAC) was responsible for preparing the 2022 Scoping Plan that outlined how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In 2025, the State Energy Planning Board approved the 2025 Energy Plan that “provides broad program and policy development direction to guide energy-related decision making “.  The documents did not provide a complete, transparent accounting of the total costs to achieve the Climate Act mandates or a feasibility analysis that demonstrated that the proposed dependency on renewable energy would provide safe and adequate electricity.

Wind and solar are intermittent, diffuse, and correlated. I believe that those physical realities preclude their use as the backbone of New York’s electric system.  Explaining why those characteristics and others make a renewable energy transition impossible is a challenge, however.  Richard Lyon has provided the necessary documentation by describing his forthcoming book at The State of Britain Substack.

He is a former senior oil and gas operations manager with 35 years of international experience, and academic qualifications in electrical engineering and power systems, petroleum engineering, and energy economics. 

His series of posts: “walks through the core arguments of my book The Energy Trap: Why the Renewable Energy Transition Can’t Work — And What Can. Each post is self-contained, but they build on one another”. He suggests starting at the top and once you’ve read them all, use this page is your reference.  In this article I quote each post with some comments.

Renewables Cannot Work – Physics

Every electrical engineer has told me straight up that renewables won’t work because “physics”  In Chapter 1 — The Physics of Energy Lyons provides an analogy that explains why they all say that:

There is far more heat energy in a swimming pool than in a pan of boiling water. You can boil an egg in the pan. You cannot boil an egg in the pool. And if you doubled the size of the pool, you’d double the energy available — and still have a cold, raw egg.

This is not a riddle. It is the single most important concept in the energy debate, and almost nobody making energy policy understands it.

The difference is not quantity but quality: the gradient between hot and cold that makes work possible. This chapter introduces the three physical measures — energy gradient, energy density, and areal power density — that determine whether an energy source can sustain industrial civilisation. Every successful transition in history moved up on all three. The proposal to replace gas and nuclear with wind and solar reverses the direction.

When I said that renewables won’t work because they are diffuse, energy density is an example of that problem.  Lyons goes on to explain two other physical constraints:  gradient or the difference in energy availability  and power density or the amount of energy that can be extracted from a given area.  The weather related impacts that wind and solar are intermittent and correlated compound these issues.

Renewables Cannot Work – Chemistry

I always want to ask people who want to ban fossil fuels if they want to ban the use of fossil fuels for energy generation and as feedstock to society  In Chapter 2 — The Industrial Metabolism Lyons shows why we are not ready to go completely off fossil fuels.

Steel, cement, ammonia, and plastics: four materials that hold up virtually everything. Each requires hydrocarbons not merely as a fuel but as a chemical feedstock — the carbon and hydrogen atoms become part of the product itself. Electricity is an energy carrier, not a fuel, and each conversion from one to the other loses energy. “Electrify everything” is a slogan that ignores the chemistry. The industrial core of civilisation will continue to require hydrocarbons for the foreseeable future.

Renewables Life Cycle

New York’s Climate Act accounting mandates the life cycle of fossil-fired infrastructure be considered but ignores the life cycle of renewables.  In Chapter 4 — The renewables paradox Lyons eviscerates that approach:

The number that matters is not how much energy a turbine produces, but how much is left over after the system has fed itself. Add storage, grid infrastructure, and fossil-fueled backup to the headline figures and the system Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI} drops into the danger zone of the energy cliff — where small errors in the ratio can be civilisation-ending. The IEA calculates that onshore wind requires nine times more critical minerals than a gas plant, offshore wind thirteen times more. Every link in the supply chain is a hydrocarbon operation. And because wind and solar wear out in 20–30 years while a nuclear plant runs for 60–80, the entire system must be rebuilt two or three times within the life of the conventional plant it replaces.

Magical Solutions

Looking back at the Climate Act Council deliberations during the development of the Scoping Plan there was great faith in the ideas that energy efficiency would provide significant benefits, that hydrogen could replace fossil fuels for hard to electrify applications among other things, and that reducing energy use would not affect the economy  Lyons addresses these ideas in Chapter 5 — The escape hatches.

Three reasons for believing the transition can still work — efficiency, hydrogen, and decoupling — and why none of them survive the evidence. Efficiency triggers the Jevons Paradox: cheaper energy use produces more use, not less, and economy-wide rebound effects typically exceed 50%. Hydrogen is an energy carrier with a round-trip efficiency of 30–40%, requiring infrastructure that would need to be largely rebuilt from materials resistant to hydrogen embrittlement. And decoupling — the claim that GDP can grow while energy use shrinks — has never been achieved by any country except through recession or near-stagnation. The escape hatches are closed.

Economics

Richard Ellenbogen constantly points out to me that renewable energy proponents do not understand the economics of infrastructure development.  In Chapter 6 — Energy and your money Lyons points out that there is a more fundamental economic problem.

Money is a claim on future energy conversion. When the money supply grows while the energy supply contracts, each unit of money claims less — and what follows is not a policy choice but an arithmetic certainty. McKinsey estimates the transition at $275 trillion, or 7.5% of global GDP, likely an underestimate. No government can raise that from taxation, so the unspoken plan is to print it. But you cannot print energy. Since 2008 the global economy has added roughly $200 trillion in debt against a contracting energy supply. Every pension, every bond, every mortgage is a promise that the energy to honour it will be there. The physics says it will not.

Oil Depletion

I am not as pessimistic about oil depletion as Lyons.  In Chapter 3 — The depleting oil inheritance he argues:

Not all oil is equal. A barrel of Saudi crude costs $10 to extract and returns over 30:1 on energy invested. The Canadian oil sands yield bitumen so heavy it must be mined or melted with steam. Conventional crude peaked around 2006; the shale boom that appeared to disprove peak oil was financed by $28 trillion in central-bank balance-sheet expansion and was cash-flow negative for over a decade. Discovery peaked in the 1960s at roughly 50 billion barrels a year; in 2024 the world discovered under 2 billion while consuming 30 billion. Oil is the bridge fuel that builds the new energy system while keeping us alive: we can’t squander a single barrel on replacements that can’t work. It’s running out.

I am optimistic because when there were similar historical constraints solutions were found and I expect that to continue.  For example, if we simply exploit resources we know exist, like New York’s shale gas, that are off limits now for irrational reasons, then there will be additional resources.  Despite my optimism the fact is that transforming to a new energy system is an enormous challenge that will take decades.  I agree that we should not be squandering oil.

The Solution

Energy system realists have argued for a long time that society needs a rational discussion of the future energy system and that always includes a nuclear power component.  Lyons addresses this in Chapter 7 — Forging a new realism.

The energy trap: the renewable transition is consuming the very hydrocarbon surplus needed to build whatever comes next. The only proven way up the quality ladder is nuclear — two million times the energy density of coal, power density matching gas, sixty to eighty years of operation from a one-time construction investment. Even so, a gap of decades is unavoidable while the new system is built. A seven-point blueprint — start with the physics, protect the inheritance, fast-track nuclear, eliminate demand, redirect subsidies, anchor money to energy, trust the public with the truth — offers a framework for navigating a managed descent rather than an unmanaged collapse.

Discussion

Taken together, Lyons’ work makes it clear that an “all of the above” energy policy is not prudent policy  but a way to avoid addressing hard physical and economic limits. His articles show that modern society depends on high‑quality, high‑density energy sources that deliver large surplus energy after the system feeds itself.  He shows that utility‑scale wind and solar move us away from that path and toward the energy cliff once storage, backup, and grid costs are honestly counted. At the same time, fossil fuels remain indispensable chemical feedstocks for steel, cement, ammonia, plastics, and broader societal needs.  They cannot simply be swapped out by electricity or slogans like “electrify everything.” In that light, “all of the above” becomes a dangerously vague invitation to waste our finite fossil fuels on low‑return projects, under build nuclear, and pretend that efficiency, hydrogen, and using less energy while still growing the  GDP will magically close the gap.  New York must commit to physically credible options with nuclear at the center and stop making believe that wind and solar should be included.

Conclusion

As an outsider with no concerns about appeasing the special interests foisting wind and solar energy upon New York, I can stop pretending that an “all of the above” energy policy is appropriate.  In the series of posts that Richard Lyon uses to describe his forthcoming book The Energy Trap: Why the Renewable Energy Transition Can’t Work — And What Can he clearly explains why utility-scale and wind and solar are a distraction for a rational energy policy.  Besides the intractable problems described here, there are enormous costs and scandalous environmental impacts related to wind and solar energy resource development.  It is time to just say no.