Author: rogercaiazza

I am a meteorologist (BS and MS degrees), was certified as a consulting meteorologist and have worked in the air quality industry for over 40 years. I author two blogs. Environmental staff in any industry have to be pragmatic balancing risks and benefits and (https://pragmaticenvironmentalistofnewyork.blog/) reflects that outlook. The second blog addresses the New York State Reforming the Energy Vision initiative (https://reformingtheenergyvisioninconvenienttruths.wordpress.com). Any of my comments on the web or posts on my blogs are my opinion only. In no way do they reflect the position of any of my past employers or any company I was associated with.

New York Climate Act Scoping Plan Approved

First published at Watts Up With That

The New York Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) Scoping Plan framework for the net-zero by 2050 transition plan was approved by the Climate Action Council on December 19, 2022.  This is follow to my earlier description of the process explains some of the rationale for that decision.

Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will outline how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric grid with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used by staff from various State agencies to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council is finalized the Scoping Plan on schedule.

The December 19, 2022 meeting materials are available at the New York Climate meetings page including the meeting presentation and the meeting recording.  In my previous article I noted that the it was unlikely that the Climate Action Council would not vote to approve the Scoping Plan because all but two of the 22 members were picked by the Democrats who passed the legislation   I wondered if anyone would cast a symbolic “no” vote and was surprised that three members voted against approval.  After the formal vote each member of the Council gave a statement supporting their decision.  This post summarizes those statements in three categories: the Hochul Administration’s position, the at-large members who supported it and the three members who voted against approval.  I am not going to provide any commentary on these summaries.

New York State Leadership Statement

Co-chair of the Climate Action Council and President & CEO of the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority Doreen M. Harris summed up the position of the Hochul Administration.  Her statement said the plan “upholds three main principles of the work that we have advanced throughout this almost three-year process”:

Principle 1: Climate Action

This plan demonstrates that climate action is not only necessary, but that delay is to be avoided. Delaying climate action has been shown to cost New Yorkers more. Therefore, I am in favor of undertaking this action now so that we may begin delivering additional benefits to the New Yorkers we are acting on behalf of.

As we implement our climate actions, certainly we will consider the on-the-ground issues and immediate costs and concerns of citizens and businesses. This is how we implement policy in New York every day and will continue to do so.

But our eye is on the prize and we in New York are wise to take climate action and have it serve as a model to the rest of the country.

Principle 2: Climate Justice

We have a plan that demonstrates how success can only be claimed when we have been able to advance and implement our climate action in a manner that addresses the issues of past decisions.

Historically, underserved communities have not been included in the dialogue and that must change. Underserved communities have also not had sufficient access to clean energy in housing, education and career opportunities and that must also change.

This plan is demonstrating how all disciplines around this table – Energy, Environment, Education, Transportation, Labor, Health, Housing, Industry, Agriculture – have responsibilities to make sure that justice is an equal outcome to the changes in our day-in, day-out business operations.

To put it simply, business as usual is no longer an option.

Principle 3: Climate Economy

I do agree with comments made at previous meetings that the economic opportunities we are looking to create through our climate planning have often been an unspoken undercurrent in this process.

We simply do not succeed if our state economy is not better off for our activities in advancing this plan. I am beyond enthusiastic about the new industries and career opportunities that we are creating in New York. And, as a product of Upstate New York myself I have never seen the level of opportunity that is at our doorstep in all parts of the state.

But that is not to discount the attention that must be paid to New Yorkers – particularly my energy colleagues and workers – that will need to find their new opportunities in our decarbonizing economy. I pledge that I will do what I can to make sure we create all those opportunities and more so that you too can become part of the more than 200,000 jobs that we stand to gain.

At Large Member Supporters of the Scoping Plan

Four Council Members chosen for their ideology and not their energy system expertise all voted to approve the Scoping Plan.  Their comments beg for responses but that will have to wait until another time. 

The statement of Robert W. Howarth, Ph.D., the David R. Atkinson Professor of Ecology & Environmental Biology at Cornell University was very illuminating relative to the motives of the supporters.  It is also very difficult to quote this without responding.  For starters, Dr. Howarth basically takes credit for the law:

Assembly Person Steven Englebright was hugely instrumental in the passage of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act that established the Climate Action Council. I thank him for his leadership on this, and particularly for his support of the progressive approach on greenhouse gas emissions that is a central part of the CLCPA. I originally proposed this to Assembly Person Englebright in 2016, and he enthusiastically endorsed and supported it through multiple versions of the bill that finally led to passage of the CLCPA in 2019. In this accounting for greenhouse gases, a major government for the first time ever fully endorsed the science demonstrating that methane emissions are a major contributor to global climate change and disruption. Further, in passing the CLCPA New York recognized that consumption of fossil fuels (and not simply geographic boundaries) is what matters in addressing the climate crisis. New York wisely banned the use of high-volume hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) to develop shale gas in our State. But since the time of that ban, the use of fossil natural gas has risen faster in our State than any other in the Union. Methane emissions from this use of shale gas are high, but much of that occurs outside of our boundaries in the nearby states of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. Through the CLCPA, the citizens of New York are taking responsibility for these out-of-state emission caused by our use of fossil fuels, particularly for fossil natural gas. The way to reduce these emissions is to rapidly reduce our use of fracked shale gas.

He went to claim that the Scoping Plan development process ” brought in a large number of experts and key stakeholders who worked diligently to advise the Council on our Scoping Plan”.  After extolling the success of the stakeholder process and the staff members who contributed he explained why everything will work out:

I further wish to acknowledge the incredible role that Prof. Mark Jacobson of Stanford has played in moving the entire world towards a carbon-free future, including New York State. A decade ago, Jacobson, I and others laid out a specific plan for New York (Jacobson et al. 2013). In that peer-reviewed analysis, we demonstrated that our State could rapidly move away from fossil fuels and instead be fueled completely by the power of the wind, the sun, and hydro. We further demonstrated that it could be done completely with technologies available at that time (a decade ago), that it could be cost effective, that it would be hugely beneficial for public health and energy security, and that it would stimulate a large increase in well-paying jobs. I have seen nothing in the past decade that would dissuade me from pushing for the same path forward. The economic arguments have only grown stronger, the climate crisis more severe. The fundamental arguments remain the same.

Our final Scoping Plan from the Climate Action implicitly endorses the vision of the Jacobson et al. paper and is quite clear: we can meet the goals of the CLCPA and we can and will do so in way that is affordable and that will benefit all New Yorkers. Our State will be stronger as this plan is implemented, the health and well being of our citizens improved. Economic uncertainties and vulnerabilities will be reduced. Energy security will be enhanced. Our plan is also clear that the #1 priorities are to continue to move towards wind, solar, and hydro as our source of electricity; to move rapidly towards beneficial electrification as a source of heating and cooling in our homes and commercial buildings; and to move rapidly towards beneficial electrification in our personal and commercial vehicles.

Peter Iwanowicz is Executive Director, Environmental Advocates of New York.  His statement included the following comments:

When it was passed by the Legislature, The New York Times called the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) “One of the world’s most ambitious climate plans.”  While a bold pronouncement and attention-grabbing headline, it was by any measure an accurate depiction of the legislation. For the CLCPA is legislation written by those on the frontlines of the climate crisis for the benefit of those on frontlines of the climate crisis. At the time a novel approach and a testament to how policy should work.

The CLCPA provided us the promise and—through multiple provisions in the law—the guidance to make the right decisions on the pace and scale of the change needed.  At its core, the CLCPA is about establishing standards into law so that New York does its share to create a planet that is healthy enough for humans to inhabit.  What we learned through our process is that zeroing out all greenhouse gas emissions through a massive transformation of our economy is the only viable and certain path.

What truly makes the CLCPA the most ambitious of plans is the legal assurance that those disproportionately impacted by climate change and poor air quality will have their needs, health, and communities prioritized. That, and we will not leave any worker behind as the transition unfolds. 

What we have developed is a solid blueprint to guide the public and lawmakers on how to secure the promises of our climate law.

The plan shows the pathway forward to provide big benefits, including:

Reducing energy bills

Improving our health and lowering health care costs

Reversing decades of environmental injustice that has caused such harm to those who live, work, and play in our state’s disadvantaged communities.

The costs of acting are not trivial, but the analysis that the council has agreed to revealed that the cost of inaction is greater than the cost of acting.  Our plan shows that the quicker the public, the Governor and Legislature move to electrify all sectors, the faster we’ll realize the benefits.

Raya Salter Esq., Principal, Imagine Power LLC is “an attorney, consultant, educator and clean energy law and policy expert with a focus on energy and climate justice.”  Highlights from her statement reflected her background:

The true credit for this Plan belongs to the thousands of activists across New York who have rallied, marched, wrote letters and demanded that this be the people’s plan. In 2019 I stood with activists not far from where we sit now, who shut down then-Governor Cuomo’s office in an action to demand the passage of what ultimately became the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act. It is that law that required this process and plan.

The release of this final Scoping Plan is a landmark moment for climate action in New York State. The Plan, if implemented, will guide New York towards a just energy transition and away from fossil fuels.

I was a member of the Council’s Gas Transition Subgroup and worked on the Scoping Plan’s vision to retire fossil fuel plants and decarbonize the buildings sector. It includes a blueprint for the retirement of New York City’s most-polluting fossil fuel plants and their sites by 2030 that will inform broader planning to retire fossil fuel plants throughout the State. This is a win for environmental justice.

The Plan is not perfect. Ideas for market-based “cap and invest,” and biofuels schemes should be rejected if they can’t overcome design flaws and stakeholder concerns. While the state’s climate law should ultimately prohibit the use of most “alternative fuels,” like “renewable natural gas” and hydrogen for use in pipelines on an emissions basis, the Plan is wrong to contemplate these false solutions. Likewise, looks into so-called “advanced-nuclear” are a dangerous distraction.

The Scoping Plan, however, provides a comprehensive approach to reaching the state’s nation-leading climate goals with a focus on justice and equity. The next step is to see it fully implemented.

Dr. Paul Shepson, Dean, School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences at Stony Brook University only offered a short statement:

I will start by noting and asking us to remember that people around the world have not been paying the actual costs of burning fossil fuels to meet our energy needs; and so it is exciting and just and honorable that we are now embarking on a better way, with far fewer collateral costs to the environment, in support of ALL living things on the planet. And so, I enthusiastically endorse the December 19, 2022 final version of the New York State Climate Action Council Scoping Plan. While the Scoping Plan incorporates multiple compromises in wording and orientation, given the diverse and sometimes divergent interests of components of the CAC membership, it is nonetheless a great statement of New York State’s commitment to national and global leadership in the effort to achieve climate stabilization. The Scoping Plan, which supports the implementation of the CLCPA, is a document of which I am proud, and feel fortunate to have been able to contribute to its completion. I am impressed by and grateful for the hard work and dedication of the agency staff members who worked to bring this effort to completion, and the fantastic leadership of our co-chairs and of Sarah Osgood, and want to thank my fellow CAC members for helping to make this process enjoyable, and successful.

Council Members who Voted Against the Scoping Plan

I don’t think it is a coincidence that three members of the Climate Action Council with the most energy system practical experience voted against approval of the Scoping Plan.

Donna L. DeCarolis, President, National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation explained that she supported many aspects of the Scoping Plan.  However her statement described why she voted against it:

Throughout my tenure on the Council, and from my perspective as the President of a utility in western New York serving communities with more than 1.6 million people, I have continued to express concerns about the Scoping Plan’s consumer impacts – for residential homeowners, small businesses and industrial interests in the state – and to offer perspectives and alternatives that will allow us to meet the requirements of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) while preserving reliability (at both the wholesale power generation level and for homes and businesses), energy system resiliency and an affordable transition for consumers. I find the final Scoping Plan falls short in this regard, and there remain significant concerns that could jeopardize the reliable, resilient and affordable provision of energy for the state’s residents and businesses. Specifically, the Scoping Plan:

•             Fails to adequately ensure grid reliability for consumers;

•             Relies too heavily on a single energy source that is prone to weather-related disruption; and,

•             Does not include a full assessment of impacts on consumer energy affordability.

Gavin Donohue, President and CEO, Independent Power Producers of New York also voted against approving the Scoping Plan.  His statement overview is a good summary of his position:

Two years ago, I was appointed to the State’s Climate Action Council. The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (“CLCPA”) requires an economy-wide approach to addressing climate change and decarbonization, coupled with mandates to deliver 70% of New York’s energy from renewable resources by 2030 and 100% emissions-free electricity supply by 2040 (“100 by 40 target”). The Scoping Plan (“Plan”) was intended to inform New York residents and businesses about measures necessary to meet the requirements of the CLCPA. While the Council is required to update the Plan at least once every five years, it is essential that the inaugural Plan is practical, comprehensive, and contains provisions that send investment signals necessary to achieve the CLCPA’s requirements in a reliable and cost-effective manner. There is no backup plan to this one, and the manner in which the document is structured does not achieve the expectations set two years ago.

I am voting against the final Plan since it remains significantly lacking in these core areas, with additional concerns as discussed below:

Reliability is inadequately addressed, putting New York at risk for economy crushing blackouts and potential public safety risks.

High energy costs for energy consumers and the impact on their cost of living and on the competitiveness of New York businesses.

Insufficient programs to keep benefits of existing renewable facilities in this state.

Leaping to moratoriums and bans instead of developing innovative technologies.

Undefined wording and the lack of a glossary of terms creates ambiguity in some of the Plan’s language.

To help raise awareness for these concerns and ensure that New York’s clean energy transition is done in a more responsible manner, IPPNY, along with the New York State AFL-CIO, the New York State Building & Construction Trades Council, and Business Council of New York State, formed a unique coalition to develop a set of seven principles1 to advance New York’s clean energy goals and establish the criteria to be met by the Plan. This coalition put productive and positive ideas on the table to make the Plan better. Unfortunately, these principles were insufficiently addressed by the Council and the Plan.

Dennis Elsenbeck, Head of Energy and Sustainability, Phillips Lytle was the final Council member to vote against the Scoping Plan.  He explained that he voted against the Plan because “we have fundamentally missed the mark on balancing environmental and economic sustainability, choosing one over the other, thereby limiting the potential to achieve either goal.”  His statement included five key concerns that led to that decision.  The first two concerns are:

Limiting our solutions by losing sight of our climate challenges

We must not lose sight of the challenges we are working to solve. The CLCPA set ambitious climate and clean energy goals to safeguard our state’s resources for future generations while reinvesting in disadvantaged communities. Much of our discussions appeared to be more about shutting down the natural gas transmission and distribution network than on achieving the 85% Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reduction by 2050. Although they may appear similar, shutting down the natural gas network and achieving the CLCPA’s GHG goals are separate objectives requiring different technical paths. Our focus should be meeting our GHG reduction goals. Any discussions surrounding the natural gas transition should explore, with equal weight, what we are transitioning from and what we may be transitioning to. In my experience, limiting options also decreases the probability of meeting aggressive goals, such as our GHG objective.

Readiness of our Electric System

Much of the CLCPA outlines a transition from a fossil fuel to an all-electric economy. In my opinion, New York’s current electric distribution infrastructure cannot handle the projected 50% increase in demand. I have been adamant throughout Council discussions that without action, such as a PSC Order requiring utilities to respond, the electric distribution system is not equipped to accommodate such a transition without major investment-the cost, timing and implementability of which is yet to be determined. The Scoping Document begins to frame this challenge but falls short on how to resolve the matter_ As with most states and countries, climate initiatives begin on the supply side of the electric system. Large scale renewable energy projects appear to be focused on land (and water) availability and not as much on proximity to load centers resulting ina need for additional transmission investment; we must anticipate the impact of electrification on the distribution system to fully explore non-traditional utility investment by engaging market participants. Subject matter experts such as regulatory agencies, the NYISO, NERC and the electric utilities must be given the opportunity to respond to the Scoping Document before it reaches the Governor’s desk. We should have a more balanced and mandated planning strategy that aligns supply, demand and delivery and advances the CLCPA’s goals and our state’s economic development aspirations for business expansion, attraction and site readiness. We need to resolve the issue of dispatchable supply through continued exploration of the role of long duration storage, nuclear, hydrogen, renewable natural gas and other non-fossil-based approaches to ensure that we have a stable electric system in concert with how we progress with any gas transition strategy.

Conclusion

These statements give a good overview of the positions and motivations of Council membership.  Needless to say, I strongly endorse the statements of the three members who voted against the Scoping Plan.  When I find time I intend to address some of the more egregious claims of the proponents.

The Plan is just a framework that does not include a feasibility analysis to ensure the strategies proposed will maintain current standards of electric system reliability or the reliability of any other energy system components for that matter.  Readers of this blog are well aware of the affordability crises that similar programs at other jurisdictions that are further along are experiencing this winter.  The statements presented include a couple of references to a claim that the costs of inaction are greater than the cost of action.  Earlier this year I posted an article describing the machinations used to make that misleading and inaccurate claim.  I made those arguments to the Council in my verbal comments and followed up with detailed written comments but there was no acknowledgement of them by the Council.  This whole process has been rigged from the start to get the pre-ordained answer.

The proponents of the Climate Act Scoping Plan are bound and determined to dive into this net-zero transition plan.  Unfortunately, they don’t want to check to see if there is any water in the pool.

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Roger Caiazza blogs on New York energy and environmental issues at Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York.  More details on the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act are available here and an inventory of over 250 articles about the Climate Act is also available.   This represents his opinion and not the opinion of any of his previous employers or any other company with which he has been associated.

New York RGGI Funding Status Report CO2 Emission Reductions

I recently published a summary of the annual analysis of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) annual Investments of Proceeds report.  New York State publishes its own version that I have not bothered to analyze because the reporting metrics are not as clear as the RGGI report.  However, the Climate Action Council has recommended: a tax or fee establishing a carbon price or a “cap-and-invest” program similar to RGGI  to provide funding for the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  Supporters of RGGI claim that it is a successful model to emulate so I decided to evaluate how effective RGGI funding has been to reduce New York carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.

I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception.  I blog about the details of the RGGI program because very few seem to want to provide any criticisms of the program.   I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

This is a long and technical post so I have brought the discussion and conclusion to the beginning.

Discussion

This analysis wades through the New York RGGI funding reports prepared by the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA).  Those reports describe the expected emission (tons CO2e), load (MWhr), and heat input (mmBtu) savings from programs funded by RGGI proceeds.  I compared the emission savings to the observed RGGI emissions from 2013 to 2021.  The only two programs that directly affect CO2 emissions are the NY-Sun Initiative and NYSERDA Solar Electric programs.  All the other programs in the Green Jobs – Green New York, Energy Efficiency, Community Clean Energy, Clean Energy Communities, and Charge NY categories affect CO2 emissions indirectly so the emission savings reductions claimed do not necessarily affect RGGI source emissions.

The observed New York State emissions from RGGI-affected sources decreased between 2013 and 2021 by 5,397,135 tons.   If just the CO2 reduction savings that are listed for the NY-Sun Initiative and NYSERDA Solar Electric programs are considered over the years 2013 to 2021, the total investment is $565 million and the claimed savings are 861,442 tons of CO2e with a calculated cost benefit of 565 $/ton.  Those CO2 reductions account for 16% of the observed emission reduction.  Because observed CO2 emissions from coal-firing went from 5,463,637 tons in 2013 to zero in 2021 and CO2 emissions from oil-firing went from 3,871,162 tons to 313,115 tons, I conclude that the primary reason for the observed electric sector emission reductions in New York was due to fuel switching.  I believe that the RGGI cost adder to fuel costs is a much smaller component than the cost of fuel itself so fuel switching was not driven by the cost of RGGI allowances.

There are implications for future emission reduction requirements. Coal and oil emissions from the RGGI affected sources are as low as they are going to get without retirement of oil-fired sources.  The average CO2 emissions reduction per year has been 95,716 tons since 2013.  New York Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program specifies an annual reduction of RGGI allowances of 880,493 per year starting in 2022 and continuing to 2030.  That reduction is nearly ten times more than the reductions from RGGI auction proceed investments.  The Climate Act is going to require even more emission reductions.  It is not clear where those reductions will come from.

Conclusion

RGGI is supposed to be a CO2 emissions reductions control program.  Proponents of RGGI brag about the emission reductions observed and the value of auction proceed investments.  However, the observed emission reductions are primarily due to fuel switching in New York.  NYSERDA has not focused its RGGI proceed investments on emission reductions which has not been a problem to this point but that strategy is about to hit a wall.  The RGGI-affected sources have been running more the last two years because the State shut down 2,000 MW of zero-emissions nuclear generating capacity. Couple that with insignificant investment in new zero-emissions generating resources from the RGGI proceeds to ramp up actual electric generating emission reductions, the potential problem is that the RGGI-affected sources will not have sufficient allowances to operate. The RGGI allowance market is so confused now with states coming in and out, the potential problem of insufficient allowances to operate may be kicked down the road.  However, there are implications that, so far, have not been acknowledged by the state.

On December 19, 2022 the Climate Action Council approved and adopted the Final Scoping Plan that outlines a plan to make the New York electric system zero-emissions by 2040.  I expect that this mandate will be incorporated into the New York electric generating unit emission caps with even more stringent limits.  The Scoping Plan proposes to use a “cap and invest” program similar to RGGI to provide funds for the electric system zero-emissions transition by 2040 and the overall net-zero by 2050 target.  The ramifications of the poor RGGI-funded program investments record of actually reducing emissions has not been considered.  This is yet another example why the ambitions of the Climate Act will flounder on the shoals of reality.

Background

RGGI is a “cooperative effort among eleven Eastern states to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power plants within each participating state” (Factsheet). This market-base program among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont set a cap to reduce CO2 emissions starting in 2009.  New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021 and Pennsylvania has joined but is not actively participating in auctions due to on-going litigation. According to a RGGI website: “The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances which are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs. Programs funded with RGGI investments have spanned a wide range of consumers, providing benefits and improvements to private homes, local businesses, multi-family housing, industrial facilities, community buildings, retail customers, and more.” 

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will outline how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  The Scoping Plan was approved by the Council on December 19, 2022.  Chapter 17 in the Plan describes economywide strategies:

After initially identifying three options for consideration, the Council narrowed its consideration to two economywide GHG policies: a tax or fee establishing a carbon price and a program that caps emissions across the economy, or within particular sectors, and allocates emission allowances primarily through an auction mechanism that provide revenues for investment, known as “cap-and-invest.” The Council concluded that clean energy supply standards, which would require providers of energy across the economy to reduce the carbon intensity of fuels they introduce into commerce, can complement economywide structures as discussed in this chapter, but because such standards apply only to energy sources, they do not offer the same comprehensive coverage and opportunities for cross-sector efficiency. For this reason, the Council determined that clean energy supply standards (like the Clean Energy Standard [CES] for electricity and clean transportation standard) should be considered separately under sectoral chapters.

A carbon tax/fee would establish the price per ton of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that regulated entities would pay. Carbon tax/fee proposals have been considered by the New York State Legislature, and the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) put forward a proposal for a fee on every ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) emission from the electricity sector. A cap-and-invest program would also result in a price on emissions, but indirectly as the government entity establishes the emissions cap while the price is determined based on the available supply of and demand for emission allowances, rather than directly by the government entity. It would require regulated entities to purchase emission allowances, usually at an auction, to match their emissions. The difference from carbon tax/fee, however, is that a cap-and-invest program provides emissions certainty. A cap-and-invest program would limit the number of allowances sold, with the available amount decreasing year-by-year to ensure that overall aggregate emissions decline. Cap-and-invest programs have been implemented economywide in California and Quebec, and Washington recently passed legislation and adopted a rule to establish such a program. There are also existing sector-specific cap-and-invest programs, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), that cover emissions from the electricity sector and include New York as a participant. In contrast to a carbon tax or fee, which would have to be enacted by the Legislature, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) could promulgate regulations establishing a cap-and-invest program using its existing authority to adopt regulations that reduce emissions.

Both carbon tax/fee and cap-and-invest programs provide a price signal stimulating lower emission choices and a source of funding for public investment and incentive programs. Both would regulate the bulk of energy, industrial, and other emissions in New York, including both fossil fuels and alternative fuels consistent with the requirements of the Climate Act. Both would be structured to comply with Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) § 75-0117, which requires that at least 35% of the overall benefits of spending be directed to Disadvantaged Communities, with a goal of 40%. But they have one fundamental difference: while both types of programs place a charge on emissions and invest the revenues, only a cap-and-invest program would implement a declining, enforceable cap on emissions overall and a mechanism for State enforcement of such limits against individual sources, thus ensuring that aggregate emissions do not exceed the statewide emission limits.

RGGI Success Narrative

I have written multiple articles that argue that RGGI advocates mis-lead the public when they imply that RGGI programs were the driving force behind the observed over 50% reduction in power sector CO2 emissions since the start of the program.  In my latest evaluation I found that since 2009 RGGI funded control programs have been responsible for 5.6% of the observed reductions.  The Investment of RGGI Proceeds in 2020 report does not directly provide the numbers necessary to calculate that estimate which I have come to believe is deliberate.  When the sum of the RGGI investments is divided by the sum of the annual emission reductions the CO2 emission reduction efficiency is $818 per ton of CO2 reduced.  I concluded that RGGI is not an effective CO2 emission reduction program.

The latest New York RGGI funding report prepared by the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the Semi-Annual Status Report through June 30, 2022.  It states that:

This report is prepared pursuant to the State’s RGGI Investment Plan (2020 Operating Plan) and provides an update on the progress of programs through the quarter ending June 30, 2022. It contains an accounting of program spending; an estimate of program benefits; and a summary description of program activities, implementation, and evaluation. An amendment providing updated program descriptions and funding levels for the 2021 version of the Operating Plan was approved by NYSERDA’s Board in January 2022.

The State invests RGGI proceeds to support comprehensive strategies that best achieve the RGGI CO2 emission reduction goals. These strategies aim to reduce global climate change and pollution through energy efficiency, renewable energy, and carbon abatement technology.

New York Power Sector CO2 Emissions

The first step in evaluating the effect of RGGI on CO2 emissions is to determine the observed trend of New York electric utility emissions.  My background is in the electric generating sector and I have been involved in the reporting process for electric generating unit (EGU) continuous emissions monitoring system (CEMS) data since the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) mandated these systems for the Acid Rain Program.  EPA’s Clean Air Markets Division maintains a data base of all the emissions data collected by every power plant in the United States since the mid-1990’s.  Those data are used for RGGI program compliance and are used in this article.

The following graph shows New York State CO2 emissions since 2000 based on data in spreadsheet NY RGGI Funded Program Status Report Summary.  These data are the sum of all New York units that are required to submit CEMS data to EPA for any air pollution control program.  The EPA database includes supplemental information such as the primary fuel type of each generating unit and I have listed CO2 emissions by fuel type.  In 2000, New York EGU emissions were 57,114,438 tons and in 2021 they were 28,546,529 tons, a decrease of 50% (Table 1).  In NYS 2021 CO2 emissions are 39% lower than the three-year baseline emissions before RGGI started.  The reason that emissions have dropped is because coal and oil fuels have essentially gone to zero as shown in the following graph.  Natural gas has increased to cover the generation from those fuels but because it has lower CO2 emission rates the New York emissions have gone down.

New York RGGI Program Investment Reductions

In the RGGI funding reports Chapter Summary of Portfolio and Program Benefits describes the NYSERDA tracking process:

NYSERDA begins tracking program benefits once project installation is complete and provides estimated benefits for projects under contract that are not yet operational (pipeline benefits). Estimated benefits are based on the expected lifetime benefits from installed and pipeline savings. The metrics presented in this section are estimates and not evaluated unless otherwise noted. Future evaluation and status reports will present the results as they are available. NYSERDA expects verified net savings to be incorporated in the year-end 2022 report. Program benefits may be reported prior to the financial reporting of funds spent, as fund transfers may lag behind the installation date. At this time, the program benefits include some projects that are jointly supported by other non-RGGI funding sources administered by NYSERDA.

The NYSERDA RGGI funding report formats and material presented have changed over time.  I found that only since 2013 were the reports consistent enough for my purposes.  I do not understand the quote in the preceding paragraph: “metrics presented in this section are estimates and not evaluated unless otherwise noted.”  I used the numbers as they were presented in the report. 

The estimated cumulative annual net GHG emissions savings as of the end of the reporting period for each of the reports since 2013 are shown in Table 2.  I did not use the “lifetime” savings data because I have always felt that was inappropriate.  In this application I am trying to compare the RGGI program benefits reductions to the RGGI compliance metric of an annual emission cap.  Lifetime reductions are clearly irrelevant.  The document description “Estimated benefits are based on the expected lifetime benefits from installed and pipeline savings” suggests that the values shown are lifetime values but the table includes both power (MMBtu) and energy (MWhr) savings where lifetime values are more appropriate for energy efficiency program accounting. 

Emission trends over short periods are unreliable as indicators of policy implementation because there are other factors affecting the operation of generating units.  The biggest outside factor is weather.  If the year was abnormally hot or cold then the emissions would go up because the units operated more.  There also can be issues related other units going down to problems or retirements.  For example, the recent CO2 trend is New York is strongly affected by the closure of 2,000 MW of zero-emissions generating at Indian Point and I understand the units on Long Island have run more the last couple of years due to issues with transmission cables under Long Island Sound.  Keep this issue in mind when looking at Table 3 that compares New York CO2 emissions with the cumulative RGGI net GHG emission savings.  The emissions decrease between 2013 and 2021 is 5,397,135 tons but the RGGI investments claimed total 7,460,423 tons.  NYSERDA is claiming that RGGI investments were responsible for all the emission reductions!

I don’t believe that the RGGI investments could actually be responsible for all the observed reductions.  I think that fuel switching is more likely to be the cause of the emission reductions observed.  Over this time period the last coal units shut down and the oil-fired units reduced their emissions about as low as I expect they can go and still provide capacity support. Another possible reason is that I assumed that the annual installed and pipeline emission savings represented an actual annual projection and not lifetime emission savings.  That could account for the unrealistically high emission reduction claim.

There is another possible explanation.  Appendix A, Section A.2 in Semi-Annual Status Report through June 30, 2022  describes the CO2 reduction savings methodology:

Emissions factors translate the energy savings data into annual GHG emission reduction values. The GHGs evaluated in the report include carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. Because each of these gases has a different global warming potential, emissions for gases other than carbon dioxide are converted into carbon dioxide equivalent units (CO2e) through multiplication with their appropriate Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) global warming potential value, shown in Table A-1.

Therefore, the other possibility for the discrepancy is that the cumulative RGGI net GHG emission savings in Table 2 of the status reports is not just CO2 but also includes methane and nitrous oxide.  If that is the case then it would explain some of the inconsistency.  It also would be inappropriate.  RGGI is supposed to be a CO2 emissions reduction program.  This document should report on the efficacy of RGGI-program investments and provide evidence how it will work in the future.  In order to determine the value of the RGGI investments relative to the RGGI emission targets the only relevant GHG is CO2.  Including methane and nitrous oxides misleads readers because it suggests higher emissions than what can be expected for investments needed to meet the RGGI emission reduction targets.

Appendix A goes on to say:

NYSERDA uses the emission factors shown in Table A-2 to calculate emissions from on-site fuel combustion derived from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) emission coefficients. The CO2e values represent aggregate CO2, CH4, and N2O emissions. If a program covers more than one sector, then the estimated reduction is based on a calculated average emission factor for the affected sectors.

Without more documentation I will admit to being flummoxed.  This paragraph states that the emission factors used “represent aggregate CO2, CH4, and N2O emissions” but the values in the following paragraph are close to the observed CO2 only emission rates observed.  This suggests that if the methane and nitrous oxide components of the aggregate emission rates are included that they are very small.  It would be helpful if the documentation provided an example calculation showing how the aggregate factors were developed.

The final relevant section of Appendix A states:

For projects installed prior to 2016, a marginal emission factor of 1,160 pounds of CO2e/MWh estimates emission reductions associated with electricity use reductions for all sectors. When a project is installed and committed from 2016 onward, a marginal emission factor of 1,103 pounds of CO2e/MWh is applied to estimate emission reductions associated with electricity use reductions for all sectors. Although electricity savings may not lead to near-term emission reductions under the RGGI CO2 cap, savings will potentially reduce imports of electricity to NYS; the demand for CO2 allowances, leading to a possible future reduction in the cap; and the carbon footprint of end users, as they will be responsible for a smaller percent of the emissions associated with electricity production.

Even if the marginal emission factors represent aggregate rates for CO2 that incorporate methane and nitrous oxides, this is an over-estimate of current CO2 emission rates.  The following table lists the calculated marginal emission rate for New York State electric generating units subject to RGGI.  The fact is that current New York CO2 emissions are almost exclusively due to natural gas emissions that are significantly lower than the marginal emission factors quoted.  At a minimum, there should be another methodology adjustment to correct for this over-estimate of emission reductions that could be expected when RGGI investments reduce energy use.

Alternative RGGI Program Investment Reduction Methodologies

I calculated CO2 annual emissions in two alternative ways.  In the status reports Table 2: Summary of Expected Cumulative Annual Program Benefits lists the net energy savings (annual MMBtu) and net electricity savings or renewable energy generation (annual MWh).  The EPA emissions data includes those parameters so that an annual New York emission rate based on both parameters can be calculated.  Once the calculated emission rate is determined then it can be multiplied by the projected annual savings due to RGGI funded programs to get an annual total emissions estimate.

Table 4 uses the heat input (MMBtu) data to calculate annual CO2 emission “savings”.  Using this methodology, the cumulative total CO2 emissions expected from the RGGI-funding programs is 2,040,461 tons or 7.1% of the 2021 annual emissions.  Recall that the emissions decrease between 2013 and 2021 is 5,397,135 tons so at least this estimate is less than the observed emission reduction. 

Table 5 uses the load (MWhr) data to calculate annual CO2 emissions.  Using this methodology, the cumulative total CO2 emissions expected from the RGGI-funding programs is 6,663,077 tons or 23.3% of the 2021 annual emissions.  Recall that the emissions decrease between 2013 and 2021 is 5,397,135 tons so this estimate is greater than the observed emission reduction. 

RGGI-Funded Program Reductions

I believe that the underlying cause for the differences between the observed CO2 reductions using CO2 savings directly or the heat input (mmBtu) and generation (MWhr) data is that most of the RGGI-funded programs indirectly affect emissions.  All the programs in the Green Jobs – Green New York, Energy Efficiency, Community Clean Energy, Clean Energy Communities, and Charge NY categories affect CO2 emissions indirectly.  In the Renewable Energy category only the NY-Sun Initiative and NYSERDA Solar Electric programs fund programs that subsidize renewable energy projects that directly offset generation from fossil-fired generating units affected by RGGI.  All the other programs reduce energy use that indirectly reduces the need for RGGI-affected unit generation. 

Table 6 classifies the savings into two categories: direct and indirect effects on CO2 emissions for the latest year.  The only two programs (NY-Sun Initiative and NYSERDA Solar Electric) that directly affect emissions invested $90 million through June 30, 2022 and are responsible for 272,964 MWh and 139,729 tons of CO2e savings with a calculated cost benefit of $644 $/ton.  All the other programs listed in the latest NY RGGI Funding Status report invested $686 million through June 30, 2022 and are responsible for 1,663,357 MWh, 8,696,971 mmBtu and 1,516,469 tons of CO2e savings with a calculated cost benefit of $452 $/ton. Note that the report does not report heat input (mmBtu) savings for the direct CO2 reduction programs.

Table 6: Summary of Expected Cumulative Annualized Program Benefits through 30 June 2022

The key point of this long and technical article is to make the point that the total CO2 savings listed in the reports are not necessarily reductions that can be credited towards the observed emission reductions.  Energy efficiency programs reduce the fuel needed to heat homes and lead to direct emission reductions in the building sector if oil, gas, or propane are used for heating.  Energy efficiency reductions reduce electric generating load for cooling and homes that use electric heat but trying to figure out just how much that affects RGGI emissions is not straight-forward.  I have never seen a state report quantify that reduction.

If just the CO2 reduction savings that are listed for the NY-Sun Initiative and NYSERDA Solar Electric programs are considered over the years 2013 to 2021, the total investment is $565 million and the claimed savings are 1,684,616 MWh and 861,442 tons of CO2e with a calculated cost benefit of $565$/ton.  Recall that the emissions decrease between 2013 and 2021 is 5,397,135 tons so the only CO2 reductions that can conclusively be claimed account for 16% of the observed emission reduction.  Because observed coal CO2 emissions went from 5,463,637 tons in 2013 to zero in 2021 and oil CO2 emissions went from 3,871,162 tons to 313,115 tons, I conclude that the primary reason for the observed electric sector emission reductions in New York was due to fuel switching.

New York’s Climate Act Scoping Plan Process Template

This post was first published at Watts Up With That.

The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) Scoping Plan framework for the net-zero by 2050 transition plan has been under development for the last two years.  A meeting of the Climate Action Council to vote on the Draft Final New York State Climate Action Council Scoping Plan

will be held on Monday, December 19, 2022, at 1:00 p.m.  This post describes my overview impression of the process and the likely outcome of the vote.  I think it is relevant outside of New York because it gives a template for implementing a net-zero transition program.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will outline how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric grid with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used by staff from various State agencies to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council is required to finalize the Scoping Plan by the end of the 2022 so this meeting will meet that requirement.  If anyone has a masochistic desire to view the meeting, details are available at the Climate Act meetings and events page.

Legislation enacting net-zero targets by 2050 are political ploys catering to specific constituencies.  The prime narrative of the Climate Act is featured on their web page:

Our Future is at stake and that’s why New York State is committed to the most aggressive clean energy and climate plan in the country. Each of us has a role in protecting our communities and ensuring a sustainable future for every New Yorker. If we each do our part, we’ll lower harmful emissions in the air we breathe while transforming New York’s economy, creating new jobs, and building more resilient communities.

The authors of the Climate Act legislation believed that meeting the net-zero target was only a matter of political will.  I believe that any similar legislation will follow the script used in New York.  Despite the apparent objectivity of the implementation framework, it is just is a façade. The Climate Act established the Climate Action Council to direct the development of the Scoping Plan.  It consists of 22 members that were chosen by ideology not expertise.  There are 12 agency members: all appointed by the Governor, and 10 at-large members: two non-agency representatives appointed by the Governor, three representatives appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly, one representative appointed by the minority leader of the Assembly, three representatives appointed by the Temporary President of the Senate, and one representative appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.  Not surprisingly, the legislation passed when both the Senate and Assembly were controlled by the Democratic party so all but two Council members are slanted one way.  The upcoming vote on the Scoping Plan must pass by a super majority of 15 votes but it is purely a formality because of the makeup of the Council.  The only question is whether anyone will cast a symbolic “no” vote for approval.

Public Comments

Similar programs will make a big deal about public participation.  The Council has bragged about their stakeholder process noting that the comment period was longer than required.  The Climate Act public comment period covered six months and included eleven Public Hearings where 700 people spoke.  Approximately 35,000 comments were received but around 25,000 comments were “potentially the same or substantially similar”, i.e., form letters.  That left on the order of 10,000 unique comments.  It was obviously impossible for the Council members to read them all so agency staff had to read, categorize, and summarize all the comments. That filter certainly shaped the response to the comments because they got to pick and choose which comments received attention.

Agency staff presentations to the Council described themes of the comments with very little specificity.  There was clear bias in the theme presentations – anything inconsistent with the narrative was disparaged, downplayed, or ignored.  I recently noted that the Climate Action Council treatment of stakeholder comments basically ignored anything that conflicted with the narrative of the Climate Act.   I suspect that any similar program will also have a phony public participation process.

There is another problem I believe will be common with other initiatives.  The Council emphasis was on the language in the Draft Scoping Plan and not on any technical issues.  I spent an inordinate amount of time evaluating technical issues associated with the Integration Analysis this year and prepared a summary that described all my comments.  No comments associated with Integration Analysis technical methodology or errors were discussed at any of the Climate Action Council meetings and it is not clear that the Council members are even aware that specific integration analysis issues were raised.  I have no illusions that my comments were necessarily important but the fact that technical comments from organizations responsible for the New York electric grid were also ignored is beyond troubling. 

What’s Next

The political motivation for the Climate Act was we must do something to address the existential threat of climate change. In the political calculus the important thing was to establish a politically correct target and ignore implementation details.  In New York the biggest missing piece was how to fund all the necessary components of the net-zero transition.   When something similar comes to your state watch the bait and switch between supporting legislation that is subject to voter disapproval and agency regulation which is more or less at the whim of the Administration.

Next year the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) will promulgate enforceable regulations to ensure achievement of the Statewide GHG emission limits. The regulations will be based on the Scoping Plan framework. The Plan does not include a feasibility analysis so it is not clear how regulations can be promulgated when the implementation risks to reliability, affordability, and the environment are unknown.  When questions arose about those nasty little details came up at Council meetings the response by the leadership was that the Scoping Plan was just an outline and those issues would be addressed later.  I fully expect that when the regulations are discussed in the public consultatin process the nasty little details will be ignored because the Hochul Administration will say the Scoping Plan is a mandate of the legislation.  The circular argument can only end badly.

Conclusion

The New York Scoping Plan approval vote will be on December 19.  I predict that the vote will be overwhelmingly in favor of approving the Plan.  Each council member will be given the opportunity to make a statement when they vote.  I predict those statements will be laden with emotion and likely fact-free. I also predict that if the ideologues continue control the implementation process then  costs will sky rocket, that there will be a catastrophic blackout that causes death and destruction, and that blanketing the state with wind mills and solar panels will cause significant environmental harm. 

I will publish an update with the highlights of the meeting when they post the link to the meeting recording. 

Climate Act Narrative: Heat Pumps are the Answer

The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) final draft Scoping Plan framework for the transition plan has been released.  It has become clear recently that the Hochul Administration approach to the net-zero transition is to follow the narrative that meeting a net-zero by 2050 target is simply a matter of political will.  As with all political descriptions, the components of this narrative are overly simplified and conflicting information is ignored or disparaged.   This post discusses the heat pump “solution” to home heating.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will outline how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric gride with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council is required to finalize the Scoping Plan by the end of the 2022. 

I have published a couple of recent articles about this process.  I noted that the Climate Action Council treatment of stakeholder comments basically ignored anything that conflicted with the narratives of the Draft Scoping Plan so the Council lost the opportunity to correct any deficiencies.  The second article pointed out that the Hochul Administration has not included responses to stakeholder comments in the process.  As a result, it is not clear whether the issues raised were even considered.

The buildings sector is currently the largest source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in New York State.  As a result, reducing emissions from home heating is a key component of the Scoping Plan implementation framework.  Heat pumps are a prominent part of the state’s residential electrification plans and its narrative that installing a heat pump is easy, cost-effective, and will provide a satisifactory level of comfort.  If you are interested in more home heating background information, an article describing my interview with Susan Arbetter at Capital Tonight gave an overview of heat pump technology and described building shells.  In the energy efficiency world, building shells refer to the insulation, infiltration, window treatments and ventilation components of the building. 

Political narratives over-simplify their solutions and this is a major flaw in the heat pump story preached in the Scoping Plan and by its acolytes.  Last summer I did an article about heat pump technology that concluded that it can work in New York State.  However, I showed that it is not simply a matter of swapping out a fossil-fired furnace for a heat pump.  The potential for the conversion to be done improperly is high because there are numerous complications.  Based on a discussion with an expert HVAC technician I now understand that it is not just the furnace but the whole heating system and building shell that needs revisions too.  The air infiltration, inflow, interior duct, and exhaust requirements are much higher priorities than I realized.  Some of these issues are mentioned by the Hochul Administration in the Scoping Plan and the public education indoctrination public service advertising but the implications on heat performance are ignored. 

This article addresses one detail of the residential home heating challenge that I believe did not receive proper emphasis in the Draft Scoping Plan.  It is based on comments that I submitted that to this point have not been acknowledged.  The Council has recently repeated its promise that comments will be acknowledged but has not clarified what that means.  In particular, I am going to discuss the New York regional differences in climate presentation at the November 21, 2022 Climate Action Council meeting.

Council Presentation New York Regional Differences in Climate

During the buildings discussion of the staff response to Climate Action Council comments two slides were included.  The discussion of the first slide explained the importance of cold temperatures for heat pump performance.  Apparently, the Council asked why three regions were called out in the Draft Scoping Plan text as the coldest regions of the state.  The presentation noted that the Draft said that the North Country, Mohawk Valley, and Capital regions are the coldest and went to say that heating systems there are designed to keep buildings warm even when temperatures fall below zero Fahrenheit. 

The Hochul Administration narrative is that “These cold climate air source heat pumps do work well in New York’s climate” and this point was explicitly included in the presentation.  The presentation mentioned the appropriate qualifiers shown in the figure that equipment quality, proper design and installation, envelope efficiency, and the temperature difference between indoors and outdoors also impact performance.

The presentation explained that Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships (NEEP) maintains a specification and product list that identifies specific air source heat pumps that work during extreme cold weather.  The presentation noted that “in very cold conditions the heating capacity, or output from the heat pump efficiency drops.”  The explanation noted that the NEEP list includes equipment that report the heating capacity at 5o F and meets or exceed a specified efficiency at that temperature.

The discussion of the regional differences in temperature claimed that in southern and coastal regions and along the Great Lakes the minimum winter temperatures stay above 5o F.  The map on the preceding figure was used to show this visually.  The implication was that as long as you use an air source heat pump from the NEEP product list that meets the 5o F criterion that you are good to go.

The next slide includes a table with 99% design values for heating capacity calculations.  This is the outdoor temperature that a location stays above 99% of the hours in a year, based on a 30-year average.  The presentation claimed that the North Country, Mohawk Valley, and Capital regions had the lowest heating design temperatures so that was the basis for their being listed in the text as the coldest regions.

Caiazza Comments on Residential Heating Electrification

My residential heating electrification comments on the Draft Scoping Plan noted that home electrification is a primary concern for New Yorkers given the importance of affordability and the impact to every household.  The Draft Scoping Plan considers two aspects of residential heating electrification in Appendix G: Integration Analysis Technical Supplement.  The first aspect is conversion of furnaces.The second aspect is the energy efficiency and building shell improvements necessary.  In order to determine which technologies are needed for a particular location, the regional differences in climate within New York State must be considered.  The Appendix G documentation includes NYSERDA climate zone categories for each county.  As far as I can tell, these climate zones use the International Energy Conservation Code. As shown below there are only three climate zones and they are similar but not the same as the normal minimum January temperature map in the presentation described ablove. 

Figure 1:  New York State Climate Zones in the Integration Analysis

My written comments argued that there is a better, more detailed climate zone map for building shell upgrade estimates.  The United States Department of Agriculture plant hardiness map has nine zones for New York (Figure 2).  It uses the average annual extreme minimum temperature for its classification that I believe that is a better indicator for building shells when using heat pumps.  Notably there are prominent differences that I believe make a more refined classification system appropriate.  In my comments I argued that the average minimum is above zero for only two of the nine zones, corresponding roughly to Integration Analysis climate zone 3.   I categorized this as zone 4.   For the most part it appears that New York Climate zone 5 should correspond to NYSDA zones 6a and 6b.  As a result, I limited zone 5 to the lower Hudson Valley and counties along the Great Lakes.   I categorized all the counties in the Mid- and Upper Hudson Valley as zone 6 as well the counties along the Pennsylvania border except Chautauqua County along Lake Erie.  If the average annual extreme minimum temperature is less than equal to -10oF (USFDA zones 3b, 4a, 4b, 6a, and 6b) then I believe another climate zone should be included.  I categorized Allegheny and Cattaraugus counties as well as counties in the Adirondacks as climate zone 7 to meet this criterion. 

Figure 2: USDA Plant Hardiness Map

My comments used this more refined climate zone categorization and found that the building shell categorization used in the Draft Scoping Plan underestimates the level of building shell upgrades needed for effective air source heat pump installations.  The Draft Scoping Plan claims only 26% of New York residences need deep shell upgrades.  I estimate that more than half will need to have deep shell upgrades.  Consequently, the Integration Analysis cost estimates for electrifying residences significantly underestimates the costs and the ease of implementation for air source heat pumps.

Discussion

There has been no acknowledgement that my comments were made known to the Climate Action Council and certainly no indication that the Council considered them in their comments to the Agency Staff who are responsible for the final draft of the Scoping Plan. Nonetheless, there is a link between the response to the cold region question in the presentation at the November 21, 2022 meeting and my comments.  My comment that a different approach (such as Figure 2) to define the appropriate heating technology requirements than the climate zones shown in Figure 1 was inadvertently confirmed by this presentation.  In the presentation they showed a different graphic to describe the climatic differences and referenced an even better metric – the 99% design values.

I believe that a comparison of a map of the 99% design values and the plant hardiness zone map would show much better agreement than the NYSERDA climate map does to the 99% design values.  I do not believe that the Integration Analysis did not used the 99% design values when they estimated the cold-climate air source heat pump requirements or the appropriate building shell upgrades necessary to make air source heat pumps effective in New York’s climate.  I found that a better metric nearly doubled the number of residences that would have to be upgraded to a better building shell standard.  The presentation did not mention the relevant issue that I brought up in my comments.

The Hochul Administration narrative is that cold climate air source heat pumps work well in New York’s climate and that is true but with a whole host of caveats that make a difference.  Cold climate air source heat pumps all have a drop off in performance if the outside temperature gets cold enough.  If the only consideration was the quality of the heat pump, then I believe the overarching issue would be the acceptability criterion.  If the heat pump works acceptably 99% of the time that means there still are 87 hours a year when they will not provide sufficient heat.  It would be useful to the public if the differences between the 99% design values and the plant hardiness zone maps were explained because the county-wide 99% design value may not be appropriate everywhere in the county.  The greatest flaw in the Scoping Plan narratives is that “what if” questions are not addressed like what will happen when heat pumps are improperly installed and there isn’t sufficient heat. 

Another aspect of political narratives is over-simplification.  The presentation did include the appropriate qualifiers explaining that in addition to the heat pump other factors, like proper design and installation; appropriate specification of the design value; and envelope efficiency must be considered.  The impact of these considerations and any related stakeholder comments was not discussed.  In my opinion this furthers the incorrect impression that simply installing in a cold-climate air source heat pump is easy and effective.

Conclusion

The November 21, 2022 Climate Action Council meeting discussion of the cold regions of New York exposed several flaws in the Hochul Administration’s Draft Scoping Plan revision process.  In response to the question about the cold regions a different description of the New York cold temperature climatology was used than what was in the Integration Analysis documentation.  My comments on the Draft Scoping Plan argued that the Integration Analysis cold regions were not detailed enough and the choice of a different document supports that.  In my opinion the heating 99% heating design values are an even better indicator of cold regions in New York.

I believe that a comparison of a map of 99% design values and the plant hardiness zone map I porposed would show much better agreement than the NYSERDA climate map does to the 99% design values.  The important point is that the Integration Analysis did not use the 99% design values when they estimated the appropriate building shell upgrades necessary to make air source heat pumps effective in New York’s climate.  I found that a better metric nearly doubled the number of residences that would have to be upgraded to a better building shell standard.  The presentation did not mention the relevant issue that I brought up in my comments.

I conclude that the residential home heating plan proposed in the Scoping Plan under-estimates the degree of difficulty of this transition.  The political narrative suggests that residential heating electrification is mostly just about installing heat pumps.  However, proper design and installation, envelope efficiency, and the temperature difference between indoors and outdoors impact performance as much as the installation of a high-quality heat pump.  The State is doing a disservice to the residents by not clearly acknowledging the complications for an adequate electric heat source.  Finally, they have yet to propose a plan when heating is electrified and an ice storm knocks off power for days in the winter.  It is very disappointing that my comments in this regard have been ignored.

Agricultural and Farmland Viability and the Climate Act

The last several years I have spent an inordinate amount of time evaluating the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) and its legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050.  I recently published an article describing some of the overarching issues that have not been adequately addressed in the transition plan to meet the net-zero goal.  I used the Climate Action Council’s failure to protect prime farmland from utility-scale solar development as one example.  This post highlights recently signed legislation and an announcement by Governor Hochul that provides further proof that when the government says we are here to help it is likely a day late and a dollar short.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will outline how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council is required to finalize the Scoping Plan by the end of the 2022. 

In order to meet the net-zero target the general strategy is to electrify everything primarily using newly developed wind and solar resources.  According to the NYISO 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook there were 1,985 MW of land-based wind and 2,148 MW of solar in 2019.  The Draft Scoping Plan spreadsheet Appendix G: Annex 2: Key Drivers and Outputs projects that in 2040 when all the electricity in New York must be zero emissions that there will be 12,242 MW of land-based wind and 43,342 MW of solar.  I documented that the solar projects in the Article Ten queue in 2020 averaged 9.3 acres of equipment area per MW.  Using that estimate of land required, the Draft Scoping Plan mitigation scenarios would require over 900 square miles of solar equipment. 

This post explains why the state’s response to the impact of the land needed for these developments is too little and too late to prevent serious issues. I have written enough articles on solar siting issues that I have setup a page that summarizes them all.  Given the massive amount of projected utility-scale solar generation capacity required to meet Climate Act goals the rush to develop solar projects could easily lead to the permanent loss of significant amounts of prime farmland that will hurt farming communities and endanger Climate Act strategies to sequester carbon in soil. Solar developers argue that a landowner gets revenue when a solar project is developed.  However, when land is taken out of production it will reduce farm jobs and the economic activity may be improved during construction but once the facility is operational there are very few economic benefits to essential local businesses.  Furthermore, taking the land out of production may make other farmers who have been renting that land to make their operations viable will not be able to support investments made in facilities, livestock, or equipment.  

State Actions to Protect Farmlands

First, let me describe New York’s inaction.  In a recent post describing the Climate Action Council’s transition plan approach I explained that there are already serious land use issues because there is no implementation plan in place.  Because there is no policy regarding utility-scale solar siting requirements relative to prime farmland the developers are thumbing their noses at the Department of Agriculture and Markets.  The Department has a policy in place to protect prime farmland but developers claim that there is “no statutory or regulatory support” for the policy so it can be ignored. The Hochul Administration permitting authorities have apparently placed renewable development as the highest priority without any assessment of the impacts identified by its regulatory agencies. 

On December 12, 2022 Governor Hochul announced that “a special working group of state agencies and agricultural community stakeholders will collaborate to support New York farmers and help boost the agricultural industry”. The press release stated that “This working group will be critical to tackling several challenges within New York’s agricultural industry, and my administration will continue to work with farmers to address their needs and reimagine farming in our state.”  The press release explains that:

The Task Force will initially focus on, but not be limited to, the following topics:

  • Transportation – address challenges involving the movement of agricultural commodities and products while understanding the needs for investment in roads, bridges and other vital infrastructure to bring products to market.
  • Labor – identify and build the next generation of farmers and farmworkers to support a diverse industry with the skills and workers required to operate modern farms.
  • The environment – address and remove obstacles to capital investments in manure management, on-farm energy production, and the transition to alternative fuel sources that limit the ability of some farms to meet the State’s climate goals and become carbon neutral.
  • Housing for workers – increase worker housing to provide workers with a safe living environment that is close to farms and assures for sustained and daily production.
  • Taxation – provide clearer guidance on property tax administration and improve access to existing tax relief programs.
  • Farmland protection – review existing programs and identify ways that the State can ensure that productive farmland remains accessible, in production, and continues to feed New Yorkers.
  • Expand procurement – of local food products by various state agencies to build local food supply chains and better connect with New York farms.

On December 6, 2022 Senate bill (S8889A) to create the Agricultural and Farmland Viability Protection Fund was signed.  It will bolster efforts to protect agricultural land from being permanently removed from farming to make way for solar development.  The press release for this states:

Currently, all solar projects receiving funding through NYSERDA’s NY-Sun incentive program that site projects on active farmland must pay a penalty, which currently goes into the State’s General Fund. S8889A-Hinchey requires that all penalty money collected be deposited instead into the new Agricultural and Farmland Viability Protection Fund and allocated to state and local farmland protection programs.

I apologize but I am not going to get into the details of this legislation.  I applaud the intent to get the money where it should logically go to try to redress the problem.  However, it does not seem likely that it will be much help to a farmer who lost the land he needed and was renting to a solar developer that can afford to pay more.  Furthermore, NY-Sun is the state’s initiative to expand distributed solar so this law does not cover the utility-scale solar projects that are my primary concern.

The most frustrating thing is that a solution is readily available.  Last December I described a webinar hosted by New Yorkers for Clean Power (NYCP) and Alliance for Clean Energy NY (ACENY) entitled “What’s the Deal with Renewable Energy & Agriculture?” that discussed the compatibility of renewable energy and agriculture in New York State.  One part of the solution discussed during the presentation could be the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority Agricultural Technical Working Group.  This group released an interim final report last May that described “strategies to integrate renewable energy sources into working landscapes with minimal impact on agriculture, including the need for more research; the potential for financial incentives; and proposed tools for State and local governments”.  Protection of prime farmland is a prime component of this report.

Incredibly it gets even more tone deaf in New York.  The NY-Sun program is New York State’s initiative to encourage distributed generation solar. The projects participating in the NY-Sun program are “typically five MW alternating current or smaller, and do not fit the definition of a Major Renewable Energy Facility”.  The interim final report notes that:

On April 19, 2022, the Public Service Commission approved the Roadmap, charting a path towards achieving an expanded goal of at least 10 gigawatts of distributed solar by 2030 and continues the NY-Sun program. NY-Sun Commercial/Industrial (C/I) projects located in an agricultural district must comply with AGM’s Solar Construction Guidelines. If the project utilizes over 30 acres of MSG 1-4, it is required to make Agricultural Mitigation Payment to the fund administered by NYSERDA. Since being implemented, these requirements have already demonstrated their effectiveness. In 2021, all 50 distributed solar projects subject to these requirements, totaling 1,037 acres of affected area, have committed to avoiding and minimizing impacts to important agricultural lands in consideration of the solar layout and complying with the Solar Construction Guidelines.

The bottom line is that there is a solar siting policy that addresses my concerns in place but only for the small solar projects.  Since I started tracking solar development project approvals late last year, a total of five applications have been approved for a total of 1,120 MW.  The total project areas cover 14,812 acres and the project footprints total 5,728 acres.  Despite the best efforts of Department of Agriculture and Markets staff to prevent the loss of Prime Farmland, the area that will be unavailable for farming in these projects totals 3,920 acres or 26% of the combined project areas.  This is bad enough but all three Draft Scoping Plan mitigation scenarios call for over 40,000 MW of solar development and there are no protections.

Conclusion

Hochul’s press release for the special working group included statements of support from New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets Commissioner Richard A. Ball; New York Farm Bureau President David Fisher; Brian Reeves, President of the New York State Vegetable Growers Association; Tonya Van Slyke, Northeast Dairy Producers Association Executive Director; Jim Bittner, owner of Bittner Singer Orchards and Interim Director of the New York State Horticulture Society; and Jeffery M. Fetter, President of Scolaro Fetter Grizanti & McGough, P.C. and Chairman of the Business and Tax Practice and Agricultural Services Groups.  If these people truly care about the agricultural sector, then they should demand a moratorium on utility-scale solar developments until a responsible solar siting policy is put in place for utility-scale solar development. 

The moratorium would be lifted when the special working group develops policy recommendations. At a minimum that utility-scale solar developments should adhere to the Department of Agriculture and Markets goal for projects to limit the conversion of agricultural areas within the Project Areas, to no more than 10% of soils classified by the Department’s NYS Agricultural Land Classification mineral soil groups 1-4, generally Prime Farmland soils, which represent the State’s most productive farmland.  It would be best if the same farmland protection criteria contained in the Public Service Commission distributed solar Roadmap were applied to all solar projects.

I have met people affected by these huge utility-scale solar projects.  It is so frustrating that their concerns and the viability of neighboring farms are being ignored when there are protections in place for smaller solar projects when the solutions are in place for small projects.  I wonder why and the only thing I can think of is that money talks. 

Climate Action Council Affordability Lost Opportunity

The Climate Action Council is responsible for the framework of the New York Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) transition plan to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050.  I recently published an article explaining why I think that they have failed to address key overarching issues. This post illustrates my specific concerns related to affordability based on a more thorough review of the Climate Action Council’s discussions.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will outline how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. In my recent article I provided a detailed explanation of the plan for the rest of the year and described the lost opportunities for the Council to provide meaningful guidance for the rest of the transition plan implementation.  I will only provide highlights here.

The meeting presentation for the 5 December 2022 Climate Action Council meeting described the remaining steps for 2022.  That meeting was the last chance for any desired revisions to the Scoping Plan draft. The last draft will be circulated the week of December 12 and the Council will vote on it on December 19, 2022.  Next year the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) will promulgate enforceable regulations to ensure achievement of the Statewide GHG emission limits. This is a very ambitious schedule and it will be hampered by the fact that the Scoping Plan is only a framework.  It does not include a feasibility analysis so it is not clear how regulations can be promulgated when the implementation risks to reliability, affordability, and the environment are unknown. 

In my previous article I noted that I was very disappointed by the Climate Action Council response to comments.  There is no sign that the Hochul Administration considered the comment period as anything but a bothersome obligation that had to be fulfilled.  It was certainly not considered an opportunity to improve, correct, or clarify the Scoping Plan.  Because there were over 10,000 unique comments submitted, the Administration used Agency staff to review the comments.  Staff organized the comments into themes for presentation to the Council.  Summaries of public comments by theme were presented to the Council at five meetings this fall.  That is a tremendous amount of information that I have just started looking at in detail.

Affordability Discussion

In my previous article I argued that the Hochul Administration’s leadership on the Climate Action Council inappropriately catered to the ideological biases of the members and, as a result, focused on relatively minor details at the expense of significant overarching issues.  I described example issues associated with the lack of response to my personal comments and the lost opportunity to provide meaningful guidance for issues associated with reliability, affordability, and cumulative environmental impacts.  My over-riding concern is that conditional guidance is necessary for safe regulatory implementation.  This post addresses more detailed issues associated with affordability and provides some insight into the Hochul Administration’s response to public comments.

The discussion of the public stakeholder comments had four components.  The meeting presentations had slides that described the public comment themes.  An Agency staff person gave an overview of those slides and then explained the Agency staff recommendations to modify the Scoping Plan draft to address those themes.  The final component of this review of public comments was a discussion with the Climate Action Council members.

I am going to limit this affordability discussion to the electric system chapter of the Draft Scoping Plan although I know that the reliability issue was discussed elsewhere.  The Electricity feedback discussion came up at the 10/25/22 Climate Action Council Meeting.  The following slide is the primary instance where affordability is mentioned. 

In her presentation on the themes, Jessica Waldorf described the summary electricity themes developed by Agency staff using this slide as part of the presentation.  My general impression of the summaries to the Council is that there was clear bias in the theme presentations – anything inconsistent with narrative was disparaged, downplayed, or ignored.  In this example, even though affordability was the lead issue in the summary theme slide it was not mentioned in her overview.  She summarized phasing out fossil fuel power generation infrastructure without mentioning affordability.  The consistent narrative of the Hochul Administration is that the Climate Act transition does not have any affordability issues and it was ignored here.  Administration priorities such as the bitcoin mining ban and the reuse of fossil plant sites were highlighted. According to the minutes:

Phasing out fossil fuel power generation infrastructure, including a ban on bitcoin mining and reusing existing fossil fuel power plant sites for battery storage or low-carbon fuel networks, support and opposition to nuclear generation, and continuing the Tier 2 program to support existing hydropower and renewables to ensure baseline renewable generation.

To her credit the description of the Staff recommendations for changes to the draft Final Scoping Plan did address affordability as the Minutes note:

The responsible and equitable phase out of fossil fuel generation facilities by adding and clarifying text regarding the potential repurpose of fossil fuel generation facilities, coordinating with the New York State Reliability Council and the New York State Independent System Operator in the reliability planning process, prioritizing the retirement or repurposing of fossil fuel generating facilities in Disadvantaged Communities, and maintaining energy affordability and reliability during decarbonization.

On the other hand, the slide used for the presentation put affordability as the last topic.

The final component of the Climate Action Council public comment discussion is Agency Staff response to comments from Climate Action Council Members.  Affordability was the first topic raised.  According to the minutes:

In response to an inquiry from Dr. Shepson as to the definition of “energy affordability”, Ms. Waldorf responded that the Gas System Transition Subgroup defined it to be consistent with NYS Public Service Commission policy which ensure that consumers don’t suffer from more than 6% of their income on their energy burden.

In response to a comment and inquiry from Raya Salter regarding energy affordability, believing that using the word “maintaining” is a misnomer given her belief that New York is among the most expensive energy cost states, and whether the Inflation Reduction Act opportunities have been considered to reduce energy affordability burdens, Ms. Waldorf responded that the recommendations do address the possibility of price volatility, including the potential for federal funding to mitigate price volatility. Mr. Mas noted that the final Integration Analysis will include references to the potential opportunities from the Inflation Reduction Act within each of the sectors. Ms. Salter noted the importance of keeping equity and justice at the center of the price volatility considerations.

Affordability Lost Opportunity

In my previous post about the Climate Action Council’s lost opportunities to responsibly lead the process, I noted that every jurisdiction that has tried to implement a similar transition plan has seen significant price increases of electricity (see the following figure)  The missing piece in the affordability presentation and the apparent direction of the final Scoping Plan is completely ignoring the possibility that the costs of the transition could be so high that the implementation on the Climate Act mandated schedule may not be feasible.  My comments raised the concept that implementation should be conditional.  If the transition exceeds the affordability, reliability, and environmental impact thresholds determined by the Council that re-assessment at least is appropriate.  In my opinion this decision could extend to a full stop on the transition until the technology catches up with the ambition.

In my previous article I said that the Climate Act Council should have discussed affordability but reviewing the documentation that came out after I had drafted the article, they did discuss it.  However, the discussion was inadequate because it missed the main point.

Dr. Shepson asked the appropriate question: what does “energy affordability” means in quantitative terms.  Waldorf responded that the Gas System Transition Subgroup defined maintaining energy affordability to be consistent with New York State Public Service Commission (PSC) policy which ensures that consumers don’t suffer from more than 6% of their income on their energy burden. Raya Salter said “maintaining” is a misnomer because she believes that New York is among the most expensive energy cost states, so “It is not affordable now.”

As has been the case with every aspect of the Climate Act transition I have looked at in detail, this is more complicated and has implications beyond the pronouncements from the authors of the Scoping Plan.  The PSC Energy Affordability Policy (EAP) states: “an energy burden at or below 6% of household income shall be the target level for all 2.3 million low-income households in New York” per Case 14-M-0565, Order Adopting Low Income Program Modifications and Directing Utility Filings, p. 3 issued May 20, 2016.  Department of Public Service Proceeding, Case 14-M-0565 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers, sets up a Percentage of Income Payment Plan.  In the New York plan funding is provided to low-income households such that their energy burden is kept at or below 6%.  The relevant problem is that there is an upper limit on program funding.  If electricity costs increase too much than that limit will be exceeded and more people will have energy burdens exceeding the 6% of household income policy goal.

Shepson and Salter almost got to the main point but fell short.  It is not sufficient to just reference the PSC Energy Affordability Policy.  The Climate Action Council should have discussed the implications of the metric and whether it is appropriate for this application.  The discussion should have addressed the following.  It is not clear whether all low-income households comply with that metric now.  What is the status of the funding relative to the upper limit on program funding?   If in the future that metric is exceeded then what?  There also is a presumption that energy poverty is only a problem with lower income households but the numbers affected are tied to the definition of an acceptable energy burden.  The Council should have discussed these over-arching issues and current state policies explained to the Council.  I also believe that the State should track the status of energy poverty burden current status numbers.  It is not available as far as I can tell on the Open NY website that is the supposed repository of all New York quantitative data. 

I submitted the following comment on the Draft Scoping Plan that addressed these issues.  Apparently, it did not rise to the level where it was a theme that should have been addressed.

Because there are limitations to existing technology the Final Scoping Plan must incorporate conditions based on reliability and affordability.  The Climate Action Council should define the criteria for reliability and affordability and then establish conditions incorporating those criteria.  For example, a recent legislative proposal included a requirement for state agencies to identify policies to ensure affordable housing and affordable electricity (defined as electricity costs no more than 6% of a residential customer’s income) for all-electric buildings.  Alternatively, Addressing Energy Poverty in the US offers other possible criteria:

“According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the average energy burden for low-income households is 8.6%. That is three times higher than for non-low income households, which is about 3%.  And according to the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy at University of Pennsylvania, more than one-third of US households are experiencing “energy poverty,” having difficulty affording the energy they need to keep the lights on and heat and cool their home.” 

Once the Council has established the appropriate affordability metric and the current status of that metric has been determined, then a condition using the metric can be established.  For example, if the criterion is that the average energy burden cannot increase above the average and the Integration Analysis projects that a certain mitigation strategy could lead to an increase above the average then that strategy should not be implemented until the costs come down or a subsidy can be set up to prevent exceeding the criterion.

Ultimately, I believe the Council should have spent more time discussing what the quantitative measure of affordability should be.  It is not clear when, at the end of 2021, there were 1.267 million utility accounts in arrears totaling $1.7 billion whether the PSC Energy Affordability Policy is working and how well it represents the current state of utility costs.  Raya Salter is correct saying there is a problem now and even maintaining current levels is unacceptable.

I believe that the Council should establish an affordability metric and provide status information.  If the costs exceed some acceptability threshold that they define, then I believe there should be a response.  I believe that the tremendous costs of the Climate Act transition will exceed any reasonable threshold for acceptability.

I am also disappointed that the Council did not work with the Climate Justice Working Group on the topic of affordability for those least able to afford energy price increases.  For all the social justice concerns addressed why wasn’t prevention of regressive energy price increases on disadvantaged communities a priority.  The poor will be hit hardest by any energy price increase and there was nary a peep of concern.  There should have been a push to provide the energy poverty metric determined by census tract so that any disproportionate impacts on disadvantaged communities could be tracked and addressed.

Conclusion

The affordability issue is a prime example of the Hochul Administration’s failure to address any issues raised that are inconsistent with their narrative.  In this case the narrative is that the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of action and that cost impacts to will be small and manageable.  This flies in the face of the results at all other jurisdictions that have tried to implement something similar. 

I am disappointed that my comments on affordability did not rise to the level of a theme whereby they warranted a mention in the Agency Staff presentation on public comments received.  More concerning is that the concerns of the Climate Action Council members were given short shrift.  Shepson and Salter almost got to the core issue that there are “what if” questions related to the 6% PSC policy but in the rush to meet the deadline they got an answer that was not responsive.  The Stafff answer does not address how to quantify reliability vis-à-vis the PSC policy and does not necessarily address the on-going problem of energy affordability.

Climate Action Council Lost Opportunities

The last several years I have spent an inordinate amount of time evaluating the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) and its legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050.  Over the past two years I have watched with disbelief as the folks charged with developing the framework for the transition used their positions to push their personal agendas at the expense of the people of New York.  Rather than addressing fundamental overarching issues, the Council has been bogged down arguing about emotional issues and details.  This post describes the lost opportunities for the Council to improve, correct, or clarify the Scoping Plan so that the transition to net-zero will result in an affordable and reliable energy system with minimal adverse environmental impacts.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will outline how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council is required to finalize the Scoping Plan by the end of the 2022. 

The meeting presentation for the 5 December 2022 Climate Action Council meeting described the remaining steps for 2022.  The meeting discussed any final desired revisions to the draft of the Final Scoping Plan.  One slide notes that the “Co-Chairs of the Council may make non-substantive, editorial or grammatical changes deemed necessary for clarity or accuracy of the Scoping Plan (e.g., correcting footnotes) prior to its publication”.  They plan to share the Executive Summary the week of December 5 and the final version of the Scoping Plan for voting will be circulated the week of December 12.  Voting is scheduled for December 19, 2022.  The final Scoping Plan will be submitted to the Governor, the speaker of the Assembly, and the Temporary President of the Senate and made available to the public shortly after the voting meeting on December 19 on the Climate Act website.

In 2023 the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) will promulgate enforceable regulations by the end of the year to ensure achievement of the Statewide GHG emission limits. That process will include public workshops and consultation with the Climate Action Council, the Environmental Justice Advisory Group, the Climate Justice Working Group, representatives of regulated entities, community organizations, environmental groups, health professionals, labor unions, municipal corporations, trade associations and other stakeholders.  At least two public hearings and a 120-day public comment period must be provided. Only after this extensive stakeholder process concludes is DEC authorized to propose the 2024 Implementing Regulations.

This is a very ambitious schedule and it will be hampered by the fact that the Scoping Plan is only a framework.  It does not include a feasibility analysis so it is not clear how regulations can be promulgated when the risks to reliability, affordability, and the environment are unknown.  Without that information a regulated schedule for transition components runs the risk of unacceptable impacts.  There are already obvious issues associated with the lack of an implementation plan.  Finally, the cumulative environmental impact statement mandated by state law has not been updated to incorporate the latest estimates of the resources necessary for the net-zero transition.  This post will address these three lost overarching opportunities for the Climate Action Council.

Climate Action Council

The Climate Act established the Climate Action Council to develop the Scoping Plan.  It consists of 22 members that were chosen by ideology not expertise.  There are 12 agency members and 10 at-large members: two non-agency representatives appointed by the Governor, three representatives appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly, one representative appointed by the minority leader of the Assembly, three representatives appointed by the Temporary President of the Senate, and one representative appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.  The upcoming vote on the Scoping Plan must pass by a super majority of 15 votes.  Note that the Governor has 14 appointees on the Council: all the agency heads and two direct picks.

I am very disappointed by the response to comments.  The comment period ran from the beginning of the year to early July, but it was treated as an obligation not as an opportunity to improve, correct, or clarify the Scoping Plan.  If they were serious about addressing comments then the process would have been on-going from the start of the year.  Staff should have been reviewing comments as they came in and categorizing them.  For example, some comments addressed specific non-controversial problems such as typographical errors.  Others addressed specific methodological issues in the Integration Analysis.  Because those had a direct bearing on the veracity of the Draft Scoping Plan they should have been summarized and responses developed for Council review and consideration.  Instead, the staff presented the Council with summaries of the themes of the comments submitted.

The political theater of the public comment period included eleven Public Hearings where 700 people spoke.  Approximately 35,000 comments were received but around 25,000 comments were “potentially the same or substantially similar”, i.e., form letters.  That left on the order of 10,000 unique comments and it was obviously impossible for the Council members to read them all.   As a result, agency staff had to read, categorize, and summarize all the comments.  It appears that agency staff who were charged with reading them did not start in earnest until the end of the comment period so the very real issues associated with processing got short shrift.  Publicly all I saw was presentations to the Council that listed themes of the comments with very little specificity and it is not clear if other documentation was available to the Council.  There was clear bias in the theme presentations – anything inconsistent with narrative was disparaged, downplayed, or ignored.  No comments associated with Integration Analysis methodology or errors were discussed at any of the Climate Action Council meetings and it is not clear that the Council members are even aware that specifc integration analysis issues were raised. 

I think that the Hochul Administration decided early on to treat stakeholder comments only as an obligation.  At one of the Council meetings, it was stated that all comments would be “acknowledged” and they promised to make the comments available to the public.  During the last attempt to develop a New York Climate Plan the State provided a copy of all the comments and a response to each one of them.  I am sure that the State will argue that they were overwhelmed by 10,000 unique comments but on the other hand they are proposing to completely change the energy system of the state and commit New Yorkers to higher costs and significant reliability risks.  I thought that they would do something similar to the previous program but there is no sign that is the case.  The comments are not even publicly available at the same time the revised draft of the Scoping Plan has been finalized.  It is a slap in the face to all the people who submitted comments that it appears that there will be no acknowledgement of their concerns until the Scoping Plan is completed.  What better way to say “we don’t care and you don’t matter.”

Lost Opportunities

Regrettably, the Climate Action Council actions over the last 12 months have concentrated on specific political narratives.  The Hochul Administration’s narrative is appeasement of the constituencies that view as their political base.  For example, in the presentations on comments received, specific comments raised by the Climate Justice Working Group were addressed.  There was no similar acknowledgement of comments from the New York Independent System Operator on the vitally important electric grid.  The revisions to the Draft Scoping Plan appear to be more reflective of the issues raised by the ideologues on the Council than anything submitted by stakeholders.  The staff presentations describing stakeholder comments were quick to acknowledge numbers that supported the ideological narrative and were quicker to disparage anything that did not even if there were many comments making the point.

The result is that the focus of the Council has been on specifics, and only parts of the specifics, but not overarching issues.  This section will describe the lost opportunities for my three major concerns: reliability, affordability, and environmental impacts.

Reliability

One of the more frustrating aspects of the last year is the presumption of expertise by some Climate Action Council members who have no relevant background or experience on topics on which they confidently preach.  Astoundingly, when it comes to electric grid reliability, they have gone so far to state anyone who disagrees with them is a mis-informer.   For example, Paul Shepson, Dean, School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences at Stony Brook University, (starting at 23:39 of the 26 May 2022 Council meeting recording said:

Mis-representation I see as on-going.  One of you mentioned the word reliability.  I think the word reliability is very intentionally presented as a way of expressing the improper idea that renewable energy will not be reliable.  I don’t accept that will be the case.  In fact, it cannot be the case for the CLCPA that installation of renewable energy, the conversion to renewable energy, will be unreliable.  It cannot be.

Robert Howarth, Professor, Ecology and Environmental Biology at Cornell, starting at 32:52 of the recording) picked up on the same issue.  He said that fear and confusion is based on mis-information but we have information to counter that and help ease the fears.  He stated that he thought reliability is one of those issues: “Clearly one can run a 100% renewable grid with reliability”, although he did admit it had to be done carefully. 

Two quotes from a recent New York Independent System Operator presentation directly contradict them: “Significant uncertainty is related to cost / availability of Dispatchable Emissions Free Resource (DEFR) technologies, as well as regulatory definition of ‘zero-emissions’ compliant technologies” and “Some scenarios do not represent realistic system performance but are helpful in identifying directional impacts and sensitivity to key variables”.  I have explained that is as close as a technical report can come to saying this won’t work as you can get without actually saying it.  For more information about the required but currently unavailable DEFR technologies see my DEFR page.

The recently released NYISO 2021-2040 System Resource Outlook also warns:

DEFRs that provide sustained on-demand power and system stability will be essential to meeting policy objectives while maintaining a reliable electric grid. While essential to the grid of the future, such DEFR technologies are not commercially viable today. DEFRs will require committed public and private investment in research and development efforts to identify the most efficient and cost-effective technologies with a view towards the development and eventual adoption of commercially viable resources. The development and construction lead times necessary for these technologies may extend beyond policy target dates.

I recently gave a presentation describing my skeptical concerns about the Climate Act.  I wrote it as if I were trying to persuade folks like Shepson and Howarth that there are legitimate reliability concerns.  In my blog post summary of that presentation, I described the basics of the electric grid making the point that our electric grid system has taken decades to reach the current reliability levels using resources that can be dispatched as needed.  A system that relies on wind and solar needs DEFR to provide the operators with an option to match load when it is needed the most.  I believe that all the experts who are responsible for electric reliability are concerned that a plan that relies on any technology that is not commercially viable today to replace resources by 2040 has significant inherent risks. 

I am disappointed that the Hochul Administration did not make it clear that debating reliability arguments were beyond the scope of the Council.  They should have accepted the input of the organizations responsible for electric grid reliability that warn there are issues.  Rather than debating whether there are risks, the Climate Action Council should have been discussing what they should be doing about that risk.  The biggest question is whether any reduction in reliability standards is acceptable in order to meet the Climate Act transition to net-zero targets.  Most of the expert concern revolves around the aggressive schedule.  The Council should have discussed whether a conditional schedule based on the availability of DEFR might be necessary and made recommendations for the criteria that should be used to determine whether that is necessary.

Affordability

If the Hochul Administration would bother to ask the public about the Climate Act I suspect the first question that the public wants answered is how much is this going to cost?  It is amazing that the only information provided to the Council and public was the claim that the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of action based on various versions of the following figure.  There is no documentation for the expected specific costs and emission reductions of the control strategies proposed so very little meaningful critiques are possible. The Council should have demanded better documentation than what was provided.

My comments eviscerating their claim that the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of action is the most egregious example of irresponsible replies to stakeholder comments.  I made verbal comments at the Syracuse Draft Scoping Plan public hearing on April 26 and submitted written comments that explained why the costs of inaction are greater than the costs of action claim based on this figure are misleading and inaccurate.  I followed up later with a more detailed explanation in another submitted written comment. There is no way that the reviewers of the written comments or the members of the Council that were present at the Syracuse can say that they were not aware of my comments.

I am sure that they were ignored because they destroy the narrative.  The claim is misleading because the values shown are relative to the Reference Case rather than a Business-as-usual case that is usually used in these analyses.  The Reference Case includes the Statewide zero-emissions vehicle mandate among other things because it is “already implemented.”  Does anyone really believe that the zero-emissions vehicle mandate is anything but a necessary component of the Climate Act costs?  Excluding that program alone means that $700 billion in costs are not included in the costs for the Climate Act shown in the figure.  Furthermore, the benefits incorrectly count the societal benefits of avoided carbon emissions multiple times.  The claimed $235 to $250 billion in those benefits should be no more than $60 billion. If just those two “tricks” are corrected then the costs far exceed the benefits.

Obviously, this is a basic underlying presumption of the Draft Scoping Plan that the Council should have discussed.  My claims should have been described and the authors of the Integration Analysis should have been held accountable to explain why they did what they did and why they disagree with my arguments.  Only then could the Council discuss and decide whether this claim is appropriate. 

There is a bigger problem however.  Every jurisdiction that has tried to implement a similar transition plan has seen significant price increases of electricity.  The Climate Act Council should have discussed affordability.  If the costs exceed some threshold, then I believe there should be a response.  It is up to the Council to define that affordability threshold. The NY REV Energy Affordability Policy intends to limit energy costs to no more than 6% of income as per the 2016 order from the Public Service Commission. The Council should have determined where the State stands with respect to this metric now. I have tried multiple times to find where the state stands relative to this or any other energy poverty metric but have been unable to find it.  The Council should have demanded that this metric be made readily available so that it can be tracked as the transition plan progresses.  Then their discussion could have turned to the “what if” question if the metric gets worse what should be done.

I am also disappointed that the Council did not work with the Climate Justice Working Group on the topic of affordability for those least able to afford energy price increases.  For all the social justice concerns addressed why wasn’t prevention of regressive energy price increases a priority.  The poor will be hit hardest by any energy price increase and there was nary a peep of concern.  There should have been a push to provide the energy poverty metric determined by census tract so that any disproportionate impacts on disadvantaged communities could be tracked and addressed.

Environmental Impacts

The complete lack of concern relative to the cumulative environmental impacts of the massive amounts of wind, solar, and energy storage required for the net-zero transition is another disappointment. On September 17, 2020 the Final Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (SGEIS) for the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act was released.   I estimated that the Draft Scoping Plan calls for at least 497 more onshore wind turbines, 493 more offshore wind turbines and 602 more square miles covered with solar equipment than was considered in that cumulative impact statement.  In addition, the environmental impacts of battery energy storage were not addressed and it is impossible to project the impacts of the environmental impacts of the dispatchable emissions-free resource that it included in the capacity projections because a technology has not been specified.  I commented that an updated impact statement that addresses all these issues is necessary but this topic was not mentioned as a theme at Council meetings.

The Climate Action Council should have considered whether thresholds for unacceptable cumulative environmental impacts are appropriate.  I believe that without addressing this problem that it is likely that the environmental impacts from the massive wind and solar resource developments will have far worse impacts than anything that can be ascribed to climate change caused by New York emissions but this issue was never discussed.  For example, I project that at least 216 Bald Eagles could be killed every year when there are 9,445 MW of on-shore wind.  There were 426 occupied bald eagle nest sites in New York in 2017.  I am not a wildlife biologist but those numbers indicate to me that there will be major threats to the survivability of Bald Eagles in New York.  I recommended that the Final Scoping Plan include proposed thresholds for unacceptable environmental impacts like this but the comment was never mentioned as a theme at the Council meetings.

There is another environmental impact aspect that I think the Council should have addressed.  I have written enough articles on solar siting issues that I have setup a page that summarizes them all.  I became aware of the particular issues of utility-scale solar development on agriculture after I had a couple of people contact my blog describing issues that they had and suggested that I look into the issue.  The problems that they raised are real, the solutions are available, but in the rush to develop as many renewable resources as quickly as possible, the Hochul Administration has dropped the ball on responsible utility-scale solar development.  Given the massive amount of projected utility-scale solar generation capacity required to meet Climate Act goals the rush to develop solar projects could easily lead to the permanent loss of significant amounts of prime farmland that will hurt farming communities and endanger Climate Act strategies to sequester carbon in soil. 

I submitted a comment to the Council in March calling for a moratorium on utility-scale solar siting in March but that too has been ignored.  Since I started tracking solar development project approvals last year, a total of five applications have been approved for a total of 1,120 MW.  The total project areas cover 14,812 acres and the project footprints total 5,728 acres.  Despite the best efforts of Department of Agriculture and Market staff to prevent the loss of Prime Farmland, these projects were approved and the prime area lost for farming in these projects totals 3,920 acres or 26% of the combined project areas.  This is bad enough but all three Draft Scoping Plan mitigation scenarios call for over 40,000 MW of solar development so imagine how much more prime farmland will be lost if nothing changes.  The Climate Action Council should have addressed this issue and decided whether responsible solar siting guidelines similar to the policy option roadmap for the proposed 10 GW of distributed solar development should be instated.  As a result of Hochul Administration inaction there will be significant and irreplaceable loss of prime farmland and damage to farming communities across the state.

There is another aspect of this that the Council should have addressed.  The New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets (AGM) “discourages the conversion of farmland to a non-agricultural use”.  With respect to utility-scale renewable energy projects, “The Department’s goal is for projects to limit the conversion of agricultural areas within the Project Areas, to no more than 10% of soils classified by the Department’s NYS Agricultural Land Classification mineral soil groups 1-4, generally Prime Farmland soils, which represent the State’s most productive farmland”.  The latest solar development permit application that was approved included this response to AGM concerns:

In addition, no statutory or regulatory support is cited for AGM’s proposed 10% or less Prime Farmland soil conversion “goal” that “the production of food is more essential than the generation of [renewable] electricity,” or that soil classifications 1-4 should be avoided, even if it means interfering with the development of a renewable facility contracted to sell renewable energy credits to NYSERDA. The Certificate Conditions conserve and protect agricultural lands; it is the responsibility of AGM, and not private solar developers, to encourage the development of farming. That charge cannot be used to thwart the renewable energy goals of the State.

While Council members spent time arguing over their personal agenda issues out-of-state developers are coming into the State throwing up as much renewable energy as possible completely disregarding the New York regulatory agencies charged with protecting the State’s larger issues.  The Hochul Administration has apparently placed renewable development as the highest priority without any assessment of the impacts identified by its regulatory agencies.  The Council should have discussed whether the agencies will be allowed to do their jobs and protect the interests of the state as a whole or will be muzzled and ignored all in the name of the Climate Act.

There is one final point that I raised in comments that the Council has apparently never addressed.  New York’s contribution to global emissions of greenhouse gases is too small to expect that there will be any measurable improvement to the alleged effects of climate change on New York.  Moreover, as shown in the following graph New York’s emissions have been consistently less than the global increase in emissions since the early 1990’s.  I found that New York’s emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and that the average increase in global emissions is greater than one half of one percent.  In other words, even if we eliminate our emissions the increase in global emissions will be replace them in less than a year.  Considering this information, Why is not a conditional and measured transition approach warranted?  Why didn’t the Council consider these tradeoffs.

Conclusion

 I spent a lot of time preparing comments on the Draft Scoping Plan trying to improve, correct, and clarify it so that the transition to net-zero will more likely result in an affordable and reliable energy system with minimal adverse environmental impacts.  I have seen absolutely no sign that the Hochul Administration ever had any intention of making changes to the Scoping Plan framework for the future energy system based on comments that ran contrary to their politically driven agenda.  There are no indications that any of my comments made it past the agency staff screening step to reach the Climate Action Council membership for consideration.

The Climate Action Council revisions to the Draft Scoping Plan has focused on details and ignored overarching issues.  If the Council were truly doing its job, they would be working with the New York Independent System Operator and the New York State Reliability Council to determine if the current reliability standards are adequate or must modified for the future electric grid.  If the Hochul Administration was truly worried about disadvantaged communities they would have required the Council to recommend an energy poverty metric and would have set up a clear and transparent tracking system for it at the census tract level.  If Co-Chair of the Council and DEC Commissioner Basil Seggos took his responsibility for the environment seriously, he would have had a cumulative environmental impact statement completed that addressed the Integration Analysis projected renewable resource development levels and had the Council discuss environmental impact acceptability thresholds.  If Co-Chair of the Climate Action Council and President of the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority Doreen Harris wanted her organization to provide objective information and analysis, the issues I raised relative to the misleading and inaccurate cost benefit analysis would have been addressed by the Council. If Council member and Commissioner of the Department of Ag and Markets Richard Ball truly cared about New York farms he would have demanded a responsible solar siting policy for utility-scale solar development that protects prime farmland.

The Hochul Administration’s treatment of the stakeholder comments has been an insult to anyone who took the time to develop comments.  This does not portend well for the public consultation process mandated for next year.  Unfortunately, the ultimate issue is that if the zero-emissions electric grid plan is inadequate because the Council ignored critical issues raised by stakeholders, people will freeze to death in the dark.

Investment of RGGI Proceeds Report for 2020

Normally I publish an annual analysis of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) annual Investments of Proceeds update soon after the release of the report but I was busy preparing comments on the New York Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act so this update is very late. This is the fifth installment of my annual updates on the RGGI proceeds report.  This post compares the claims about the success of the investments against reality.  As in my previous posts I have found that the claims that RGGI successfully provides substantive emission reductions are unfounded.

I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception.  I blog about the details of the RGGI program because very few seem to want to provide any criticisms of the program. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Factsheet). It has been a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector since 2008.  New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021 and Pennsylvania has joined but is not actively participating in auctions due to on-going litigation. According to a RGGI website: “The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances which are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs. Programs funded with RGGI investments have spanned a wide range of consumers, providing benefits and improvements to private homes, local businesses, multi-family housing, industrial facilities, community buildings, retail customers, and more.” 

The latest investment proceeds update was released in May 2022.   The Investment of RGGI Proceeds in 2020 report tracks the investment of the RGGI proceeds and the benefits of these investments throughout the region. According to the report, the RGGI states invested $196 million in 2020 auction proceeds and expect lifetime benefits of the RGGI investments made in 2020 to include $1.9 billion in lifetime energy bill savings and 6.6 million short tons of CO2 emissions avoided.  The report breaks down the investment categories as follows:

  • Energy efficiency makes up 35% of 2020 RGGI investments and 53% of cumulative investments. Programs funded by these investments in 2020 are expected to return about $1.2 billion in lifetime energy bill savings to more than 56,000 participating households and over 700 businesses in the region and avoid the release of 4.6 million short tons of CO2.
  • Clean and renewable energy makes up 18% of 2020 RGGI investments and 14% of cumulative investments. RGGI investments in these technologies in 2020 are expected to return over $600 million in lifetime energy bill savings and avoid the release of more than 1.7 million short tons of CO2.
  • Beneficial electrification makes up 11% of 2020 RGGI investments and 3% of cumulative investments. RGGI investments in beneficial electrification in 2020 are expected to avoid the release of 177,000 short tons of CO2 and return nearly $90 million in lifetime savings.
  • Greenhouse gas abatement makes up 5% of 2020 RGGI investments and 8% of cumulative investments. RGGI investments in greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement in 2020 are expected to avoid the release of more than 160,000 short tons of CO2 and to return over $51 million in lifetime savings.
  • Direct bill assistance makes up 19% of 2020 RGGI investments and 16% of cumulative investments. Direct bill assistance programs funded through RGGI in 2020 have returned over $37 million in credits or assistance to consumers.

There was a change in these categories in this report relative to previous reports.  This is the first version of this report which includes beneficial electrification as its own investment category.  In previous versions of this report, investments in beneficial electrification programs were included within the other major investment categories.

Emissions Reductions

In my previous articles on the Proceeds reports, I have argued that RGGI mis-leads readers when they claim that the RGGI states have reduced power sector CO2 pollution over 50% since 2009. In the following table, I list the 9-state RGGI emissions and percentage reduction from a three-year baseline before the program started in 2009.

I have argued that the implication in the 50% claim is that the RGGI program were primarily responsible for the observed reduction even as the economy grew (Figure 1 from the report).

I believe that their insinuation that RGGI was primarily responsible for the emission reductions is wrong.  The following table lists the emissions by fuel types for these nine RGGI states.  It is obvious that the primary cause of the emission reductions was the fuel switch from coal and residual oil to natural gas.  This fuel switch occurred because it was economic to do so.  I believe that RGGI had very little to do with these fuel switches because fuel costs are the biggest driver for operational costs and the cost adder of the RGGI carbon price was too small to drive the use of natural gas over coal and oil. 

I believe that the appropriate measure of RGGI emissions reductions is the decrease due to the investments made with the auction proceeds so I compared the annual reductions made by RGGI investments.  The biggest flaw in the RGGI report is that it does not provide the annual RGGI investment CO2 reduction values accumulated since the beginning of the program.  In order to make a comparison to the CO2 reduction goals I had to sum the values in the previous reports to provide that information. 

The following table lists the annual avoided CO2 emissions generated by the RGGI investments from previous reports.  The accumulated total of the annual reductions from RGGI investments is 3,658,696 tons while the difference between the three-year baseline of 2006-2008 and 2020 emissions is 65,079,196 tons.  The RGGI investments are only directly responsible for 5.6% of the total observed annual reductions over the baseline to 2020 timeframe! 

Although proponents claim that this program has been an unqualified success I disagree.  Based on the numbers there are some important caveats to the simplistic comparison of before and after emissions.   The numbers in the previous paragraph show that emission reductions from direct RGGI investments were only responsible for 5.6% of the observed reductions.   In a detailed article I showed that fuel switching was the most effective driver of emissions reductions since the inception of RGGI and responsible for most of the reductions.

Benefits

Table 1 from the report lists two benefits of 2020 RGGI Investments: emission reductions and energy bill savings.  Energy bill savings derive from investments in energy efficiency savings and other efforts that directly reduce costs to consumers.  These energy saving benefits typically account for total savings over the lifetime of the project investment.  RGGI does the same thing with the CO2 emission reductions but I think that is misleading because the emission reduction metric is annual emissions and not lifetime emissions. 

Emission Reduction Cost Efficiency

There is another aspect of this report that is mis-leading and after arguing with RGGI and New York State about the issue, I have concluded that the deception is intentional.  In particular, I believe that a primary concern for GHG emission reduction policies is the cost effectiveness of the policies and I have argued that this report should provide the information necessary to determine a cost per ton reduced value for control programs for comparison to the social cost of carbon.  If the societal benefits represented by the social cost of carbon for GHG emission reductions are greater than the control costs for those reductions, then there is value in making the reductions.  If not, then the control programs are not effective.

Recall that RGGI provides lifetime CO2 emission reductions but I think that is misleading because it suggests that the emission reduction cost efficiency of the investments is the total investments divided by the lifetime benefits of those benefits.   For example, dividing the 2020 investments of $196 million by the lifetime avoided CO2 emissions yields a value of $29.  The Biden administration is re-evaluating the social cost of carbon values but for the time being has announced an initial estimate of $51 per ton and this suggests that RGGI investments are cost effective relative to the social cost of carbon.

However, the social cost of carbon value is calculated for an annual reduction of one ton.  In particular, the social cost of carbon is an estimate, in dollars, of the present discounted value of the benefits of reducing annual emissions by a metric ton. (Note that my numbers do not include the relatively small conversion to metric tons for a proper comparison to the social cost of carbon.) In order to calculate the CO2 emissions reduction efficiency consistent with the social cost of carbon, the proper estimate is the total investments since the start of the program divided by sum of the annual emission reductions.  The problem is that the RGGI reports do not provide that total and instead only provide the sum of the annual lifetime CO2 avoided emissions.

The Proceeds reports always include a caveat that the states continually refine their estimates and update their methodologies, but the annual numbers are not updated to reflect those changes.  Ideally to get the best estimate of the annual numbers the RGGI states should provide the revised annual numbers for each year of the program. Because that is not the case, I have had to rely on the original annual numbers provided in previous editions of the report.  As noted previously, I sum the values in the previous reports to provide that information as shown in the Accumulated Annual Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Benefits Through 2020 table.  The accumulated total of the annual reductions from RGGI investments is 3,658,696 tons through December 31, 2020. The sum of the RGGI investments in the previous table is $2,991,215,917 over that time frame.  The appropriate comparison to the social cost of carbon is $2.991 billion divided by 3,658,696 tons or $818 per ton reduced. 

Conclusion

The 2020 RGGI Investment Proceeds report tries to put a positive spin on the poor performance of RGGI auction proceeds reducing CO2.  The alleged purpose of the program is to reduce CO2 from the electric generating sector to alleviate impacts of climate change.  Since the beginning of the RGGI program RGGI funded control programs have been responsible for 5.6% of the observed reductions.  The report does not directly provide the numbers necessary to calculate that estimate which I have come to believe is deliberate.  When the sum of the RGGI investments is divided by the sum of the annual emission reductions the CO2 emission reduction efficiency is $818 per ton of CO2 reduced.  I conclude that RGGI is not an effective CO2 emission reduction program.

Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act Zero Risk Motivations

The last several years I have spent an inordinate amount of time evaluating the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) and its legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050.  As the implementation outline for the transition to a net-zero evolves I have been struck by the number of people involved with the transition that insist on reducing their perceived priority risks to zero.  That is the antithesis of a pragmatic approach and I have tried to understand where those folks are coming from.  This post describes some recent articles at the Risk Monger blog that address the motivations of those who want zero risks.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background and Risk Management

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council states that it will finalize the Scoping Plan by the end of the year.  Climate Action Council meetings have included discussions about revisions to the Draft Scoping Plan that emphasize the need for zero risk that is the opposite of a pragmatic approach to the risks of climate change.

I addressed risk management for the Climate Act in August 2020.  That article and this one relies on work done the Risk Monger, a blog “meant to challenge simplistic solutions to hard problems on environmental-health risks”. The author of the blog, David Zaruk, is an EU risk and science communications specialist since 2000, active in European Union (EU) policy events and science in society questions of the use of the Precautionary Principle. He is a professor at Odisee University College where he lectures on Communications, Marketing, EU Lobbying and Public Relations. In my opinion, he clearly explains the complexities of risk management and I recommend his work highly. 

Zero Risk Motivations

Zaruk has argued that the Precautionary Principle, a strategy to cope with possible risks where scientific understanding is incomplete, has led many to rely on the idea that to be safe we have to eliminate all risks as a precaution.  Zaruk explains that the problem is that policy-makers and politicians have confused this uncertainty management tool with risk management.  In the August 2020 article I described his analysis and conclusion of the failures of risk management of the COVID-19 response.  While fascinating on its own, it also provides a cautionary tale relative to New York’s energy policy and implementation of the Climate Act. 

This article describes some of his recent work and its relevance to the Climate Act implementation process.  Over the last couple of months, he has published four relevant articles that I will summarize below:

THE Science, THE Environment, THE Climate… Abusing the “The” in Risk Issues

This article makes the point that the definite article has been “abused by activists needing definite truths to win policy debates on complex problems.” When someone describes, for example, “The” science they are claiming certainty on issues that are anything but certain. Zaruck writes:

Improperly using “the” in front of an abstract noun is part of a game to claim authority, isolate dissenters, simplify an issue and close dialogue. In declaring: “This is the science on XYZ” an activist is attempting to own the issue and shut down any discussion or analysis. In a policy framework where there may be uncertainty or grey areas, imposing a “the” provides a wedge between others’ false opinions and “the” truth. It is staking a claim to colonise a debate. Interestingly, it cannot be applied to issues that don’t allow for simplification or are too broad and complex. We do not speak of “the” food or “the” health without qualifications.

In reality, science is a continuous process where hypotheses are constantly challenged and confirmed.  Zaruk notes that it refers to “a process – a method – not some body of truth”.  When Climate Act proponents invoke “the” science, they are referring to is a consensus view.  Zaruk notes that arguing consensus is “a politicized pronouncement of the state of scientific research” and points out that “A consensus abhors sceptics (ostracizing them as deniers)”.  In reality a scientist must always be skeptical.

Zaruk addresses the definite article related to the environment:

When it is used with a definite article, it implies that the environment is a place … perhaps where biodiversity is being “stored”.  Is it in some location, outside of urban areas, in “nature”? But nature is a proper noun (personified in Mother Nature). As a construct, “the” environment appears to be in peril since we are being told how we can save it by polluting less, using natural products, having fewer children… Saving “the” environment means we all get to go to some Shangri-La, living longer and more harmoniously with nature. With simple views comes simplistic polarisation: natural = good (part of “the” environment); synthetic = bad (part of man).

Oversimplifying humankind in the world relative to nature turns issues into a simple dichotomy. Good vs. bad. safe or unsafe, or us-vs-them. He notes that: “For them, industry, corporations, conventional farmers… are against the environment and they are for it.”  In reality, however the environment is everywhere and affects everything in a complex, unpredictable manner. He explains that activists are playing a divide and conquer approach for their own interests.  He notes that:

Worse, hard-core activists have separated the environment from humanity and potentially beneficial technological solutions. In other words, the only way to “save” the environment is to keep humans away from “it”, to stop doing what we have been doing and let it heal itself (see Charles Mann’s The Wizard and the Prophet). These misanthropes welcome any environmental events as fuel for their hatred but their anti-technology solutions are simply “failure by design”.

He also addresses the climate consensus:

But what is a consensus and what does it mean? Formally, a consensus is anything above 50% but that lacks political impact. 100% agreement is impossible but as close to 100% is desirable. Certain scientific facts are rarely disputed and widely accepted (Newton’s laws are not considered theories, certain human limitations are self-evident…) but it is not so much whether a position has been tested and retested, but that the scientific method is a mindset: Always be prepared to question and re-evaluate. By arguing for a consensus – “the” science – the scientific method is being suppressed by some political interest.

If we spoke outside of the definite article – not of “the” science, “the” environment or “the” climate but of scientific issues on environmental concerns and climate evolutions, such transcendence would not be possible. Our discourse would shift from the dogmatic beliefs to pragmatic solutions and ridiculous conclusions would be rightfully challenged. This is not something that activists would want and we have not taken much notice of their linguistic deception.

Zaruk concludes:

I suppose what gets to me the most about these manipulative ideologues making claims on behalf of “the” truth (on subject matters which most science-minded people are struggling to find pragmatic solutions to complex problems) is their sanctimonious moral elitism. That their righteous condemnations were built on an illegitimate consensus, arbitrary divisions, linguistic deceptions and simplification just adds to their hypocrisy. They are pompous zealots cloaked and choked in their own false piety and any respect or trust they will have manufactured from their manipulative wordplay will be short-lived.

The Industry Complex (Part 1): The Tobacconisation of Industry

This essay is the first chapter of his analysis of the vilification of industry by activists that don’t want to weigh the benefits, risks, and costs of alternatives.  He notes that in Europe industry lobbyists are just going through the motions and have given up on the policy process.  This is also evident in New York.  All of the electric generating companies and delivery companies know that there are major challenges associated with the net-zero transition but have not stood up and publicly rebuked the current plans.  The New York Independent System Operator and the New York State Reliability Council have carefully fashioned their comments and reports to not offend the Hochul Administration’s pursuit of what the experts know very likely won’t work on the schedule proposed. 

Zaruk explains that the tactic of not strongly engaging in the policy process will only work for so long before it is too late to salvage their business.  The electric utility companies are going along with all the risks hoping someone will speak up and demand accountability.  For their part they continue their public sustainability campaigns supporting doing something about climate change and keep their concerns about the transition buried in industry comments that no one reads and the Climate Action Council ignores.  The ultimate question is will be anyone be willing to be the bad guy?

This essay explains how the policy process that has been corrupted by activists demonizing industry will eventually cause problems. Zaruk notes that corporations “do not consider the ramifications – that the constant media assault, reputation, and trust destruction and political denormalization of industry are an existential threat.”  In New York the utility companies publicize their sustainability programs and their own net-zero plans and seem to think that the public will embrace their actions and not treat them like Big Tobacco pariahs.  Unfortunately, Zaruk argues that is not the case.

In Europe Zaruk points that that:

The last decade has seen a rather audacious move by activist NGOs (and some policymakers particularly in Brussels) to ostracise most industries from the public policy dialogue process, create public revulsion and denormalise companies as stakeholders and social actors. This proved to be a successful strategy during the war on tobacco and many of their campaign tools are now simply being copy-pasted to other industries. Some, particularly in the financial industry, have bought into the activist campaigns and are courting public favour by considering a degrowth strategy or a capitalism reset. But can such a beast seriously hide its stripes?

This is exactly what has happened with the Climate Action Council.  Of the 22 members on the Council only two represent industry interests and their input is constantly disparaged.  More importantly, the Hochul Administration has ignored industry expert concerns about all the technical challenges of the net-zero transition.  The Scoping Plan drafts may refer to reliability a lot but there hasn’t been any suggestion that reliability concerns might slow the schedule.

Zaruk describes the concept of industry vilification:

I came across the word “tobacconisation” while reading an American activist conference report, Establishing Accountability for Climate Change Damages: Lessons from Tobacco Control, masterminded by Naomi Oreskes, the Union for Concerned Scientists and the Climate Accountability Institute in 2012 in La Jolla, California. This meeting of lawyers, activists and scientists argued that the tobacco industry lobby did not capitulate in the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement because of the science, regulatory restrictions or public outrage. They gave in because of the insurmountable financial costs of endless waves of tort litigation that threatened to wipe out the industry. So the La Jolla Plaintiff Playbook was to take that same strategy and apply it to the petroleum industry – to destroy public trust and then litigate the hell out of oil companies for damages due to climate change until they either go bankrupt or change their business model.

Zaruk describes three key activist tobacconisation strategies being applied against most industries.  The first is adversarial regulation.  This is a strategy where regulatory scientists effect change not through the democratic policy process but through the courts. With respect to the Climate Act at least the legislation was passed by the state legislature, albeit it was written by activists and I doubt that very few supporters understood the risks, costs, and challenges. 

The second strategy is to limit communications and ban advertising.  Activists have a key role in this playbook to raise public outrage against targeted companies.  With respect to the Climate Act, they are aided by a compliant media that parrots the main talking points without any challenges.  If anyone dares to suggest anything that does not hew to the narrative then the activists demean those remarks and smear the speaker.  Zaruk explains that “they need to ostracise the company or industry and exclude them from any role as a societal actor.”

The final strategy is public outrage trumps bad science.  Zaruk describes it as follows:

Public outrage against Big Tobacco meant that poor science (on the health risks of second-hand smoke or vaping) could be glanced over with little scrutiny in the policy process. People were fed up with the industry and just wanted to believe the research claims were accurate.

Opportunistic public officials wanting to play to the loud activist mobs need simply reach for the precautionary safety pin to gain favour without any risk of data or evidence interfering with this strategy. For policymakers, it is a no-brainer to play the precaution card (demanding that the substance is proven with certainty to be 100% safe prior to acting) rather than lock horns with angry activist groups with friends in the media.

Zaruk describes three approaches to fight the zero-risk mentality.  He suggests: “demand a White Paper articulating a rational strategy on the use of the precautionary principle within a clear risk management process.”  His primary concern is the EU policies but New York is following the same approach.  He states that “the hazard-based policy approach has to branded for what it is: irrational.”

His second approach is to call out the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that drive much of this policy.  They “break rules, act without respect for moral principles (unlike industry, very few NGOs have an ethical code of conduct that guides their behaviour) and ignore evidence and data in their campaigns.”  This is problematic with respect to the Climate Act because there are members of the Climate Action Council and the advisory panels who are from prominent climate activist NGOs.

Finally, he points out that the rules of engagement need to apply to all. There is evidence that the NGOs actively supporting the Climate Act have had access to material not available to all.  In no small part that is probably because some Council members are from these NGOs.  The end result is that the regulatory process has become biased.

The Industry Complex (Part 2): The Hate Industry

Zaruk’s second essay on the industry complex describes the business of demonizing industry.  He says:

The last two decades of relentless anti-industry attacks in the media, cinema and policy arenas have taught industry actors to be quiet in public, but they should not be ashamed of what their innovations and technologies have brought to humanity. We are living longer with a better quality of life, direct access to better food while feeding a growing global population, enjoying amazing personal communications devices, travelling faster and safer and accessing information in seconds. But all we hear about industry in the public sphere is resentment and animosity. This is the “Industry Complex.”

Zaruk describes one of the ironies of the professional hatred of industry.  He notes that:

Most of the people throwing brown beans at artwork or spray painting corporate offices are from a privileged class that have never experienced want. The tragic consequence of such “altruistic” zealot demonstrations is that the victims from the policy decisions they are forcing through are the most vulnerable in society, and will never be heard.

In New York primary funding for the ideological war on natural gas comes from trust funds controlled by the ultra-rich who have never experienced work.  I think one of the problems with the privileged and ultra-rich classes is that they have very little experience dealing with real-world problems associated with making things work.  For example, people who have not done much gardening may want to ban pesticides but they haven’t had a bug infestation wipe out a crop.  They have no experience with the fact that reality bats last.

Zaruk points out that the definition of industry has expanded beyond manufacturing.  In particular:

 “Industry” is now an umbrella term referring to any capitalist venture that may involve risk, inequity, and unequal access to markets. This definition makes targets because of shared social justice tenets of anyone associated taking risks. All perceived problems are blamed on “industry” all the while ignoring all the benefits derived from their activities.  The vilification of fossil fuels is a perfect example.  Despite the fact that all metrics show improvements in all quality-of-life metrics with increased use of fossil fuels, their continued use is attacked.

Zaruk gives an example of violence in France related to farming practices and states:

We can’t simply brush these people off as confused and frightened Luddites. Opportunistic activists have twisted reality, converting fear and uncertainty into a dangerously powerful political force. As one commentator on BFM decried: “This is the collapse of rationality “. Not only do they believe their hateful bullshit, they are relentlessly spreading it with a missionary zeal via an unaccountable social media propaganda tool (while the rest of us remain tolerant or uninformed).

This is entirely apropos of the ideologues pushing the net-zero transition in New York.  They can say just about anything and get away with it.  Activist organizations claim that the public is in favor of net-zero but the question is whether that support is limited to a loud minority of activist ideologues? Will the majority be heard when they lose their jobs while their energy and food costs go through the roof?  I have always thought that would be inevitable conclusion but as long as people only listen to what they want to, then they will likely not speak up or place blame incorrectly.

Zaruk explains that many irrational policy decisions are justified by activist anti-industry objectives.  For example, consider the European decisions to shut nuclear reactors even though there is an energy crisis looming.  Zaruk notes that:

In the face of an energy crisis, ecologists are holding firm in Germany and Belgium against keeping some nuclear reactors from being decommissioned arguing that such a move would be supporting big business. Greenpeace claimed shutting down these reactors would give energy production back to the people. Renewables like wind and solar have the image of small, locally produced energy (from nature), enjoying a virtuous halo that belies the big companies making these technologies or managing the big wind parks and solar farms.

I believe that Zaruk’s conclusions of the European solution is consistent with what is happening in New York relative to the net-zero transition.  He notes:

These decisions are not based on issues of cost, efficiency, and benefits, but only on an ideology built on the hatred of industry. Thus, the pro-renewables and pro-organic policies dominating the European Commission Green Deal strategy are not based on facts or research but ideology. They are, in a word, irrational.

The Industry Complex (Part 3): A Return to Realpolitik

In this essay Zaruk argues that it is time for regulators to “start doing their job: making the hard decisions and managing risks rather than promising a world of zero risk to a public that has come to expect simple solutions to complex problems.”  He argues that it is time for a return to Realpolitik: “making the best choices from a finite list of options and circumstances rather than continuing the current approach of false promises that someone else will have to pay for”.

Zaruk explains the concept of Realpolitik:

It is not a new concept. The term “Realpolitik” was in use several decades before Bismarck (commonly referred to as the father of Realpolitik). It was developed by Ludwig von Rochau who tried to introduce Enlightened, liberal ideas, post 1848, into a political world that was embedded in less rational cultural, nationalistic and religious power dynamics (much like the green dogma pushing many Western political spheres today). Realpolitik is often best understood by what it is not: it refers to decisions not made solely on issues of ideology and morality. In other words, Realpolitik refers to pragmatic decisions based on best possible outcomes and compromises (something done when leaders have to face unpleasant realities). Ideologues can easily ignore scientific facts when imposing their power but Realpolitikers will follow the best available science while appealing to reason.

He explains that in Europe as in New York, politicians shutdown nuclear facilities to placate the loud, activist minority but did not consider “pragmatic alternatives or a rational transition plan.” He said “a Realpolitiker would not have shut down the nuclear power stations until the energy transition was safely achieved.”  It gets worse in New York because the Department of Environmental Conservation is proposing regulations that require existing fossil-fired generating plants to consider compliance with the Climate Act as part of their operating permit extensions.  It is possible that they could shut down those facilities before alternatives consistent with the Climate Act are operating.

Zaruk argues that “we should aim for safer rather than safe.”  He points out:

Safer is something risk managers in industry measure and continually strive for while safe is an emotional ideal that cannot be measured or, for that matter, reached. We will never have safe, but we can always strive for safer. This is where a more pragmatic, Realpolitik approach would be more successful than any arbitrary risk aversion.

Realpolitik accepts that a perfect world is a pipe dream. Freed from the shackles of seeking the totally safe, they get to work on risk management, reducing exposures to as low as reasonably possible (achievable) and making the world (products, substances, systems…) better – safer. They seek a world with lower risks for more people, not zero risks for all people. We need to turn away from the fundamentalist activist mindset and adopt a more industrial, scientific approach (as seen in product stewardship): of continuous improvement, constant iteration, and technological refinement.

Conclusion

Zaruk provided a good summary of his work and if you replace Brussels with Albany, it is apropos to New York:

It is patently clear industry actors in Brussels cannot continue to do what they have been doing. Brussels has far too many activists with special interests solely dedicated to seeing industry and capitalism fail. They have money, passion and limited ethical constraints as they execute their objectives with missionary zeal. This series on the Industry Complex has tried to show how anti-industry militants have worked to destroy trust in all industries (excluding them from the policy process and equating the word “industry” with some immoral interpretation of lobbying) and using the same tactics that worked with the decline of the tobacco industry. Using the emerging communications tools to create an atmosphere of fear and hate, these activists have successfully generated a narrative that the only solution to our problems is to remove industry, their innovations and their technologies. And their solutions are getting even more extreme (with, for example, 6000 environmental militants recently attacking an irrigation pond project on a farm in France for being too “industrial”). Policymakers, perceiving these loud voices as representative, have adopted the path of virtue politics rather than Realpolitik (of policy by aspiration and ideology rather than practical solutions relying on the best available evidence).

The Climate Act and the transition plan embodied in the Draft Scoping Plan is full of examples where the perceived risks of fossil fuels are comprehensively addressed but none of the risks of the proposed alternatives are addressed.  The most glaring Climate Act example is the requirement that the full life cycle and upstream emissions associated with fossil fuels must be considered to eliminate those risks.  Those considerations are not applied to wind, solar, and battery technologies.  The benefits of the current energy system are ignored and the risks of the net-zero future system minimized.  This approach will not work out in the best interests of New York.

Champlain Hudson Power Express Construction Begins

Richard Ellenbogen and I have been corresponding about Governor Hochul’s announcement that the Champlain Hudson Power Express transmission project has started construction. According to the press release this “accelerates progress to achieve New York’s goal of 70 percent of electricity statewide from renewable sources by 2030 on path to a zero-emission grid”. Unfortunately, Richard and I agree that there is more to the story than appears on the surface.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that it will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the control strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council states that it will finalize the Scoping Plan by the end of the year.  I maintain that there are two underlying issues with the Climate Action Council approach for the transition plan: the Draft Scoping Plan does not include a feasibility analysis and the Council has not developed an implementation plan.

The ultimate problem for the future electric grid that is dependent upon wind and solar are weak when the load peaks in the winter because space heating is electrified.  Wind lulls can reduce wind resources for days and solar resources are inherently low availability because the days are shorter, the sun is lower in the sky, and areas downwind of the Great Lakes are obscured with lake-effect clouds. The experts responsible for electric system reliability at the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and the New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC) both highlighted (here and here) the importance of Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR) to address future winter-time wind lulls in their Draft Scoping Plan comments.  The Draft Scoping Plan also includes DEFR as a necessary component of the future grid to address this problem.  I am particularly concerned that the Hochul Administration has not confronted the feasibility of DEFR.  What options are there, how likely are they to be available when needed to meet the schedule of the Climate Act and how much will they cost should be a priority but the Council has essentially ignored the challenge and has not responded to NYISO and NYSRC comments.  Furthermore, if an implementation plan was in place, it could encourage zero-emissions resources availability during future winter-time wind lulls, for example by discouraging utility-scale solar development where lake-effect snow is heavy.

Champlain Hudson Power Express

The Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) project is a 339-mile underground transmission line capable of bringing 1,250 MW from the Province of Quebec to Astoria Queens in New York City.  According to the press release it “accelerates progress to achieve New York’s goal of 70 percent of electricity statewide from renewable sources by 2030 on path to a zero-emission grid.  It also is touted as bringing zero-emissions hydro electricity from Hydro Quebec directly into New York City so it can displace fossil-fired generating units. 

I have published two previous articles about the project.  The first described the residential cost impacts of the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) contracts with H.Q. Energy Services (U.S.) Inc. (HQUS) for the CHPE project.  A year ago on November 30, 2021 Governor Hochul announced that the finalized contract for CHPE was awarded as part of the Tier 4 Clean Energy Standard that is intended to increase the penetration of renewable energy into New York City.  My focus was on Department of Public Service petition: “The costs of program payments for the purchase of Tier 4 Renewable Energy Credits from the projects are projected as $5.9 – $11.6 billion, equating to an estimated increase in customer electric bills of 2.1 – 4.1% (or $2.08 – $4.08 per month for the average residential customer) on average across the State for the 25-year period of the Tier 4 contracts.”  This is one of the few admissions of potential costs by the Hochul Administration.  I estimated that if those costs represent subsidies needed for all the Integration Analysis renewable resources that the annual ratepayer cost increase range would between $168 and $359 for the average residential customer. 

The second article described the comments submitted by Nuclear New York to the Department of Public Service on the Tier 4 contracts.  Their comments pointed out that the contract payment formula treats CHPE like baseload power sources but without actually getting baseload service:

Quebec and NYC often experience the same weather. Consequently, CHPE will deliver electricity during low or moderate demand periods. But Hydro Quebec will keep all power at home during grim winter weeks, such as on January 22 of this year: Exports to ISO-NE (the New England grid) were reduced to the contracted minimum, and, instead of exporting power to New York, Quebec needed to import power from New York. On really cold days in the Northeast, NYC will get no power via CHPE and will again rely on fossil-fueled “peaker plants”. Yes, CHPE will get paid little for their electricity in the wholesale market if they fail to serve NYC in times of most desperate need. However, New Yorkers are still going to pay plenty for the Renewable Energy Credits generated during “nice weather” hours.

The lack of an implementation plan directly relates to this problem.  As noted above the ultimate problem is getting as much zero-emissions electric energy as possible in order during the low renewable resource periods that are also expected to the highest load periods.  Without an implementation plan in place, New York State committed to paying CHPE for capacity that is not guaranteed when we need it the most. 

Implementation Issues

Three implementation issues concern me: the schedule, the costs, and jobs.

One of the most challenging aspects of the Climate Act is the schedule.  As part of their planning responsibilities the New York State Independent System Operator (NYISO) recently released the  2022 Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) that highlighted this concern concluding “while there is not an immediate reliability need, changes in the economy, new generation technology, extreme weather and policy drivers are creating challenges for the future grid that may require actions to avoid interruptions in electric service.”  NYISO specifically referenced the CHPE project in the RNA findings:

The summer reliability margins improve in 2026 with the scheduled addition of the Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) connection from Hydro Quebec to New York City but reduce through time as demand grows within New York City.  While CHPE will contribute to reliability in the summer, the facility is not obligated to provide any capacity in the winter. The NYISO is expected to be a winter peaking system in the next decade as vehicle fleets and buildings electrify.

While transmission security within New York City is maintained through the ten-year period in accordance with current design criteria, the margins are very tight and decrease to approximately 50 MW by 2025. With the addition of CHPE project in 2026, the margin improves but reduces to near 100 MW by 2032.

The reliability margins within New York City may not be sufficient even for expected weather if the CHPE project experiences a significant delay.

Richard Ellenbogen and I share this concern.  Richard described the project timeline.  The project was proposed in 2011 and the PSC authorized it on 4/18/13.  It has been 11.5 years since it was proposed, 9.5 years since it was authorized, and construction just started a year after the funding contract was signed.  The likelihood of additional delays seems high.

The Draft Scoping Plan does not include detailed control strategy costs but from what I have been able to ascertain, it is clear that the potential costs are minimized.   The record of this project reinforces my concerns.  Ellenbogen points out that the CHPE website has an entry from 11/1 noting that financing for the $6 billion project had been obtained but it was originally $2 billion when it was proposed ($2.65 billion in 2022 dollars). That cost is 2.3 times the original cost.  We agree that these projects are rarely ever completed on budget and with all the issues with supply chains and worldwide inflation I think this one will not be completed anywhere near the budgeted cost.

The Hochul press release said “the clean energy line is an example of how officials in the state are working to “confront climate change challenges and energy challenges together, in the meantime, creating great jobs for a cleaner, healthier New York.”  It is notable that the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority press release for the construction start announcement emphasized a “major project labor agreement”:

The construction of this green infrastructure project, which begins following the execution of a major union labor agreement between the developer and New York State Building and Construction Trades, is expected to bring $3.5 billion in economic benefits to New Yorkers while creating nearly 1,400 family-sustaining union jobs during construction.

I recently addressed the State’s Clean Energy Industry Report and its handling of these “great” jobs.  One point overlooked by Hochul is that while there may be “1,400 family-sustaining union jobs during construction” the number of permanent jobs is miniscule.  Furthermore, the project will provide 1,250 MW of power to New York City but this is a fraction of 2,000 MW of power lost due to the shutdown of Indian Point.  That shutdown meant the loss of over 1,000 permanent union jobs.  While this project may “confront climate change challenges and energy challenges together” it does not replace the loss of Indian Point that was more effective in that regard.

Conclusion

I agree that this line is needed to maintain New York’s electric grid reliability and that the start of construction is encouraging.  However, there are associated reliability and affordability feasibility concerns.  The latest NYISO RNA report emphasizes that there could be reliability problems if there are further delays to completion of this project.  The Climate Act transition plan schedule is ambitious and the Council has not considered a “Plan B” if there are unavoidable implementation delays for any of the components of the plan.  This project is expensive equating to an estimated increase in customer electric bills of 2.1 – 4.1% (or $2.08 – $4.08 per month for the average residential customer) for just one component of the total resources needed.  The Climate Action Council has not disclosed the total expected costs of the Integration Analysis transition plan or expected ratepayer impacts.

In addition to the feasibility issues this project exposes failures of the state’s lack of an implementation plan. The biggest challenge for the future zero-emissions electric grid is the winter-time lull when renewable resources are low.  This project is not obligated to provide any capacity during those periods.  Consequently, it is likely that more DEFR will be required. Unless the Hochul Administration comes to its senses and starts encouraging the development of the only scalable proven dispatchable emissions-free resource, nuclear power, this increases the risk that DEFR won’t be available as planned because the alternative technologies are speculative at this time.