Category: Climate Act

New York 10GW Solar Roadmap’s Disconnect from Reality

New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has a legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050 and has included specific renewable energy deployment targets.  On December 17, 2021 the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and New York State Department of Public Service Staff (DPS Staff) released “New York’s 10 GW Distributed Solar Roadmap: Policy Options for Continued Growth in Distributed Solar” that proposes a pathway to achieve a goal of 10 GW of distributed solar deployment by 2030.  This post addresses the solar policy options related to agricultural protection and land use in that document and what is actually happening to agricultural land as a result of New York’s poor planning.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability and affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York, and cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Executive Summary in the New York’s 10 GW Distributed Solar Roadmap: Policy Options for Continued Growth in Distributed Solar document describes the plan:

The current 6 gigawatt (GW) NY-Sun distributed solar program target is nearly achieved, with more than 93 percent of the target either completed or at an advanced stage of development.1 As called upon by New York State Governor Kathy Hochul during Climate Week 2021, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and New York State Department of Public Service Staff (DPS Staff) have analyzed the current distributed solar market in New York State and found that costs and NYSERDA-provided incentives have declined over time, while a thriving solar market has created approximately 12,000 jobs in New York. Together, these facts demonstrate the success of the NY-Sun program in transforming New York’s distributed solar industry. Additionally, NYSERDA directed further analysis of future revenues, costs, and market support mechanisms needed for distributed solar development beyond the 6 GW target.

Informed by this analysis, NYSERDA and DPS Staff developed this Distributed Solar Roadmap (Roadmap) to propose a pathway to achieve 10 GW of distributed solar deployment by 2030. With the current 6 GW by 2025 goal nearly achieved, the Roadmap explores various options for setting incentive levels to achieve the expanded NY-Sun goal of an incremental 4 GW (Incremental 4 GW Target). These options include various procurement structures, pricing models, and funding mechanisms

The press release bragging about the new framework to achieve at least 10 GW of distributed solar by 2030 included the following statement by Rory M. Christian, CEO of the Department of Public Service:

“I would like to thank Governor Hochul for her ardent support, encouraging the development of and access to solar energy in New York State. The roadmap that has been developed provides New York with the tools it needs to accelerate the transition to a clean-energy economy and meet our critically important climate goals.”

Since the NY-Sun initiative was launched, NYSERDA has worked closely with local governments, agricultural communities, other state agencies, and a wide range of stakeholders to ensure that projects are developed and sited in a manner that fully considers land use and are advanced in close collaboration with local stakeholders and agricultural communities. NYSERDA will extend its ongoing technical assistance for all municipalities in the state to assist localities in aligning solar development with local priorities. In addition, projects sited in New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets’ designated Agricultural Districts must follow Guidelines for Agricultural Mitigation for Solar Energy Projects and will be subject to an additional review process with the NYSDAM, as well as with local agricultural boards. Those projects that exceed 30 acres of impact to prime agricultural soils will be subject to mitigation fees.

Agricultural Protection and Land Use

This section lists the contents of Section III.a.4 Agricultural Protection and Land Use.   In my opinion, if the policy is employed as they claim, then it should offer protection to prime farmland and local farming communities from distributed solar project development.

Farmland protection and the maintenance of a vibrant agricultural economy are important State policy goals. New York State recognizes the importance of collaboration between the agriculture and clean energy sectors as a critical part of the State’s overall decarbonization strategy. NYSERDA works in close coordination with the Department of Agriculture and Markets (NYSAGM) and other stakeholders to responsibly support the development of renewable energy projects. In the 2019 NY-Sun Expansion Petition, NYSERDA described the interaction of distributed solar with agriculture in New York:

“The majority of projects in [the Upstate C/I] market sector are expected to be ground-mounted arrays ranging between 5 MW and 7.5 MW in size, which occupy approximately 20 – 25 acres of land, typically on rural properties that are leased or sold to the solar developer by the landowner. Notably, this includes properties that are currently used, or could potentially be used for, agricultural production. While NYSERDA expects that the total agricultural acreage utilized for distributed solar projects will remain modest as compared to total farmland in New York State, through its implementation efforts, NYSERDA will act to ensure that negative impacts to farmland and the State’s agricultural economy are avoided and minimized, and where they are unavoidable, mitigated. NYSERDA, working with partner agencies and stakeholders, has already taken multiple actions along these lines and will pursue additional actions under an expanded NY-Sun program.” (This section is from the NY-Sun Petition, p. 21.) 

In the subsequent two years, NYSERDA and NYSAGM have continued to work in partnership to put in place requirements for solar projects to minimize impact to farming and agricultural soils.  (These requirements include, inter alia: complying with New York State Agriculture and Markets Law; submitting appropriate notices to NYSAGM and local Agricultural and Farmland Protection boards; executing a copy of the Guidelines for Solar Energy Projects – Construction Mitigation for Agricultural Lands document published by NYSAGM; and making a Mitigation Fund payment or committing to other mitigation measures where impacted agricultural soils exceed 30 acres.) These requirements have already demonstrated their effectiveness: In 2021 to date, all 50 distributed solar projects subject to these requirements, totaling 1,037 acres of affected area, have committed to avoiding and minimizing impacts to prime soils in consideration of the solar layout. For 48 of these projects, all unaffected portions of the farms hosting the solar projects, a total of 3,385 acres, will remain in agricultural production. Many of the farmers hosting projects on a portion of their land report that the steady lease revenue from the solar projects has enabled them to continue farming on most of their property despite challenging agricultural economic pressures.

This Roadmap foresees the existing requirements being extended to distributed solar projects developed through the Incremental 4 GW Target. The State’s Agricultural Technical Working Group (A-TWG), an independent advisory body convened by NYSERDA early in 2021, will continue to serve as the primary forum for stakeholder and interagency collaboration on policies and practices pertaining to distributed solar and agriculture.  Guidance provided by the A-TWG and the New York State Farmland Protection Working Group will continue to inform agricultural preservation and mitigation requirements and practices going forward. NYSERDA also continues to provide and expand resources to landowners and local governments through the New York State Solar Guidebook and direct technical assistance.

Utility-Scale Solar Reality

Assuming that these numbers are correct, then I applaud the efforts of NYSERDA and NYSAGM.  There is a major problem however.  The majority of these distributed solar projects are “expected to be ground-mounted arrays ranging between 5 MW and 7.5 MW in size, which occupy approximately 20 – 25 acres of land”.  The reality is that a large fraction of the projected solar generation capacity will be utility-scale solar facilities that are much larger and have bigger impacts than the developers admit.

For example, consider two utility-scale solar projects, the Trelina Solar Project and Garnet Energy Center

That are both being developed by NextEra Energy Resources. According to NextEra, Trelina will have 80 MW of solar capacity located on 418 acres within a 1,067-acre project area.  Garnet is a 200-megawatt solar project with 20 megawatts of energy storage with a project area of 2,288 acres and facility area (area within in project fence line) of 1,054 acres. Both projects have Article Ten applications and Michael Saviola, an Associate Environmental Analyst with the New York State Department of Agriculture & Markets (“Department”) submitted testimony describing the nature and extent of potential impacts of the projects on agricultural land.

Saviola’s prepared testimony responded to the question whether the projects had been “sited to avoid and/or minimize impacts to land uses within the Study Area and Project Area to the maximum extent practicable”.  For Trelina his testimony noted that “the Department finds the Applications proposed siting is not consistent with the Department’s siting policy because it will occur on more that 10% of active farmland classified as Prime Farmland”. It goes on to explain that “the Department estimates that greater than 68% of the of the limits of disturbance includes the conversion of farmland classified as Prime Farmland Soil”.  While the application claims that solar panels will cover 325 acres, the testimony shows that “areas located outside of fenced areas will likely become fallow or orphaned as a result of screening requirements and setbacks” and this “will eliminate crop production on much more than 325 acres of agriculture lands for a minimum of 30 years -worth of crop yields from some of the most productive farmland soils in the State”. The application claims that there will be temporary impact to agricultural land and farming, but the testimony argues that “a 30-year loss of the production of crops, livestock and livestock products constitutes a permanent conversion to a nonagricultural use.”  Finally, even though a decommissioning plan has been prepared, the testimony states: “there is virtually no reasonable assurance that the project will be decommissioned and that the full resumption back to agricultural use will be reestablished.”

Saviola’s testimony for Garnet was very similar.  The conclusion is the same: “the Department finds the Applications proposed siting is not consistent with the Department’s siting policy”.  In this instance almost 30% of the project will be on active farmland classified as Prime Farmland.  His testimony explains that “the Application update states that the project will occupy nearly 1,000 acres of land to generate up to 200 MW of electricity, however, areas located outside of fenced areas will likely become fallow or orphaned as a result of screening requirements and setbacks”. Nearly three times as much land will lose crop production on “agricultural lands for a minimum of 30 years-worth of crop yields from some of the most productive farmland soils in the State”. The same points about temporary claimed impacts and decommissioning assurances were made.  His testimony concludes: “It is the Department’s opinion that the facility will result in or contribute to a significant and adverse disproportionate agricultural impact upon the local farming community. They have not avoided, offset or minimized agricultural impacts to the maximum extent practicable using verifiable measures”.

Despite the recommendations of the Department, on November 30, 2021 the New York State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment granted approval to Trelina Solar Energy Center to build and operate the 80-megawatt solar farm.  According to a state press release, the Siting Board’s decision “follows a detailed review and robust public participation process to ensure that the solar farm meets or exceeds all siting requirements”.  Clearly, the fact that the Department of Agriculture and Markets finding that the project was not consistent with their siting policy belies that claim.

The Garnet Energy Center Article Ten public comment period is open until May 1, 2022.  While Saviola’s testimony is similar for both cases it is not identical.  The Department requested information from NextEra and documented the responses.  In general, NextEra’s response to questions simply repeated statements in the already submitted materials.  The testimony notes that in response to a question about agricultural co-utilization: “The Applicant indicates that they have not considered incorporating agricultural co-utilization as part of the Project. They indicate that there is not sufficient space for co-utilization.” Saviola goes on to say he does not agree with this response: “There is ample space inside the fence for agricultural activities such as sheep grazing, apiary incorporation and pollinator species, and small-scale grass hay production, nor have they demonstrated any reduced impacts to agriculture from the increased density of the panels. The Applicant should work with hosting farmers to explore dual-use, or agrivotalic projects.”

NY-Sun Disconnect from Reality

As quoted earlier the State’s press release about the release of the framework was all praise.  It claimed that NYSERDA has worked closely with local governments, agricultural communities, other state agencies, and a wide range of stakeholders to ensure that projects are developed and sited in a manner that fully considers land use and are advanced in close collaboration with local stakeholders and agricultural communities. In the future, they state that “projects sited in New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets’ designated Agricultural Districts must follow Guidelines for Agricultural Mitigation for Solar Energy Projects and will be subject to an additional review process with the NYSDAM, as well as with local agricultural boards.”  The problem is that those initiatives only address distributed-solar projects.

Table 1 lists projected future New York State solar generating capacity for the Reference Case, Scenario 1 that represents recommendations by the Advisory Panels and Scenarios 2-4 that represent Integration Analysis mitigation scenarios.  The mitigation scenarios were constructed so that the Climate Act targets could be achieved.  Unfortunately, the Draft Scoping Plan does not document how much of the solar capacity is expected to come from distributed solar projects and how much from utility-scale projects.  Assuming half is utility-scale solar that means we can expect 32.3 GW of industrial solar installations in Scenario 2. Two utility-scale projects are discussed in this article and they have average 5.26 MW per acre of fenced area covered with panels.  Using that estimate, Scenario 2 utility-scale solar project solar panels will cover 170,000 acres or 266 square miles in 2050.  The Department testimony explains that considering only the fenced area impacts underestimates the amount of land that actually be lost to most agricultural uses.  The reality is that the impacts for utility-scale solar project will dwarf the land taken up by distributed solar projects (much of which is sited on buildings)  in NY-Sun and there are no equivalent farmland protections for massive utility-scale projects under development.

Table 1: Mitigation Scenarios Solar Capacity (MW)

Integration Analysis – Key Drivers and Outputs (updated December 29, 2021)

 2020202520302035204020452050
Reference Case2,5928,20113,64414,38714,66114,94219,956
Scenario 12,5928,20116,95425,58240,34350,12762,463
Scenario 22,5928,20118,85228,99443,43253,08964,621
Scenario 32,5928,20116,76228,62541,42049,04260,604
Scenario 42,5928,20118,06029,84141,62353,45065,210

Discussion

I submitted comments on March 17 to the Garnet Energy Center Article Ten application docket contending that the project should follow responsible solar siting guidelines.  In my post describing the comment submittal I argued that responsible siting guidelines based on the American Farmland Trust report, the state’s policies for distributed solar described above in the 10GW Solar Roadmap and the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority’s Agricultural Technical Working Group analyses will likely eventually be used to form the basis of a state-wide policy for utility-scale solar development.  Without those policies in place, it is inappropriate to allow projects like the Garnet project to proceed.  Obviously, the fact that the Department of Ag & Markets testified that “the facility will result in or contribute to a significant and adverse disproportionate agricultural impact upon the local farming community” demonstrates that the project is inconsistent with the NY-Sun’s commitment to responsible solar development.

Given the magnitude of the potential impacts to prime farmland I also submitted a comment to the Climate Action Council recommending that they impose a moratorium on the development of utility-scale solar projects until permitting requirements have been established for responsible solar siting and protection of prime farmlands.  I said that even though the Department of Agriculture and Markets has policies on solar energy projects, the Article Ten Trelina Solar Project was approved despite the fact that it did not adhere to that policy.  I argued that, at a minimum, all utility-scale projects should adhere to those policies.  A moratorium would not only protect communities and farmland but it would also help meet Climate Act goals.  Using the Draft Scoping Plan solar projections and land use estimates for solar projects in the Article Ten queue in 2020 suggest that the smallest Scoping Plan scenario solar equipment area covered will be 266 square miles.  Moreover, there are Climate Act considerations.  The law has a “net-zero” target by 2050 that requires 15% sequestration.  One of the strategies to meet that target is soil carbon management.  Taking productive farmland out of production hinders that goal. 

Conclusion

New York’s 10 GW Distributed Solar Roadmap: Policy Options for Continued Growth in Distributed Solar document outlines a policy approach for responsible distributed solar siting.  I have no argument with their approach or their results.  However, there is a major problem.  The majority of these distributed solar projects are “expected to be ground-mounted arrays ranging between 5 MW and 7.5 MW in size, which occupy approximately 20 – 25 acres of land”.  There are no similar guidelines in place for the larger utility-scale projects.  Even though the Draft Scoping Plan does not specify how much projected solar generation capacity will be distributed as opposed to utility-scale, it is clear that massive amounts of land will be required for utility-scale development. 

In December 2021 the State announced that NY-Sun projects are developed and sited in a manner that fully considers land use and are advanced in close collaboration with local stakeholders and agricultural communities.  However, in the same month the Trelina Solar Project was approved despite the fact that the Department of Ag & Markets testified that “the proposed siting is not consistent with the Department’s siting policy because it will occur on more that 10% of active farmland classified as Prime Farmland”.  There are numerous initiatives underway to ensure that the solar developments necessary to meet the Climate Act goals are sited in a responsible fashion.  However, projects that inconsistent with those guidelines are being developed and will remove “agricultural lands for a minimum of 30 years-worth of crop yields from some of the most productive farmland soils in the State”.  It is time for a moratorium on these developments until that guidance is in place.

Status of Garnet Energy Center Application

Last year I was contacted by one of the organizers of Conquest Against Industrial Solar and since then I have been following the Article 10 application of the Garnet Energy Center.  This post describes the latest filed documents in the case that I used as the basis for a comment on the project.

My primary concern with this project is how it relates to the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act. In particular, I believe that the massive resouces that have to be devoted to diffuse and intermittent renewable energy development will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Trelina Energy Center

There is another utility-scale solar project being developed near the Garnet project.  Late last year the New York State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment (Siting Board) granted approval to build and operate the Trelina Solar Project, an 80 megawatt (MW) solar farm in the Town of Waterloo, Seneca County that is being developed by NextEra Energy Resources, the same company that is developing the Garnet Energy Center.  I published an article about the approval process and noted that despite the fact that the New York Department of Agriculture and Markets (Ag & Markets) testimony clearly demonstrated that the project did not meet the Department’s siting policies the project was approved.

As part of the regulatory analysis of the project Michael Saviola, an Associate Environmental Analyst with Ag & Markets submitted prepared testimony on the Trelina Solar Project application.  His testimony made a compelling case against the project.  In response to the question “What Department policies are subject to the proceeding”, he responded (Line 20, page 6):

As previously mentioned, The Department discourages the conversion of farmland to a non-agricultural use. However, to support the New York State’s CLCPA initiatives, the Department has developed a siting policy supportive of solar development efforts on agricultural lands if (his emphasis added) the proposed projects are properly sited on lands other than the State’s most productive farmland. The Department’s goal is for projects to limit the conversion of agricultural areas within the Project Areas, to no more than 10% of soils classified by the Department’s NYS Agricultural Land Classification mineral soil groups 1-4, generally Prime Farmland soils, which represent the State’s most productive farmland. Soils classified with the soil groups 5-10 are identified as having soil limitations. The only responsible position the Department can take to stay true to the 7 AML Article 25-AA §300 and to support the NYS CLCPA renewable energy initiative is to ensure the preservation of agricultural areas involving soils classified as soil groups 1-9 for the production for food and fiber, as well as not object to proposed development on lesser productive soils, i.e. agriculture lands comprised on classified mineral soil groups 5-10.

The overall Project Area is 1,067 acres and “only approximately 44.4 percent will be used for Project Components within a fenced area of approximately 418 acres to generate 79.5 to 80 MW of renewable energy”.  Note, however, that the testimony notes that “The Department’s goal is for projects to limit the conversion of agricultural areas within the Project Areas, to no more than 10% of soils classified by the Department’s NYS Agricultural Land Classification mineral soil groups 1-4, generally Prime Farmland soils, which represent the State’s most productive farmland.”  The testimony also notes that “The Department estimates that greater than 68% of the of the limits of disturbance includes the conversion of farmland classified as Prime Farmland Soil”. 

The application argues that the project only disturbs 4.9% of all the prime farmland in the Town of Waterloo and presumably would argue that means they meet the intent of the Department policy.  The problem with that is there is no master plan for development and no assurances that other more responsibly sited facilities could not be constructed in the Town of Waterloo that would raise the town total over the 10% goal of the Department.  The Ag and Markets testimony also argues against the claims that only 10.05 acres will be permanently disturbed.  The testimony explains that 474.1 acres will be permanently disturbed because “as long as NYS incentives for the development of renewable energy exists, the complete decommissioning of solar electric energy generation, and full resumption to agricultural use is not likely to occur”.

I concluded that the press release describing the Siting Board’s decision statement that the process “follows a detailed review and robust public participation process to ensure that the solar farm meets or exceeds all siting requirements” is demonstrably false. 

Ag & Market Solar Energy Project Policies

On March 10, 2022 Michael Saviola submitted prepared testimony on the Garnet Energy Center application.  As before his responsibility was “to determine if the Project as proposed follows the Department’s Guidelines for Agricultural Mitigation for Solar Energy Projects.”  This section provides some background on Ag & Market/Department policies.  He notes that the Department of Ag and Markets does not have an opinion on the need for utility-scale solar generation but (Page 6, line 3):

The Department discourages the conversion of farmland to a non-agricultural use. This effort is in accordance with Section 4 of Article 14 of the 2018 New York State Constitution, which provides for the conservation of agricultural lands, as well as NYS Agriculture and Markets Law (AML), Article 25-AA, §300, which more specifically states:

“It is, therefore, the declared policy of the state to conserve, protect and encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural land for production of food and other agricultural products. It is also the declared policy of the state to conserve and protect agricultural lands as valued natural and ecological resources which provide needed open spaces for clean air sheds, as well as for aesthetic purposes.”.

After acknowledging that the Department is aware of the Climate Act and supports the general initiative, the testimony goes on to state that these projects are permanent installations (Page 6, line 20):

The Department will continue to discourage the conversion of agriculture land to a non-agricultural use.  Prior to large-scale solar development, the Department has not been associated with PSL 22 Article 10 cases that constitute large, long-term conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses. Commercial wind generating facilities generally allow for farming activity to continue once the project is in-service. In comparison, the solar industry arguably eliminates the ability to perform normal viable agricultural operations within, and potentially immediately surrounding the facility. This constitutes a long-term conversion to a non-agricultural use. Due to increasing NYS energy goals encouraging renewable energy development, we see no reason facilities will not be upgraded and re-leased to maintain the growing or static renewable energy demand, in this case, 35 years from energization. The Department further asserts that as long as NYS incentives for the development of renewable energy exists, the complete decommissioning of solar electric energy generation, and full resumption to agricultural use is not likely to occur. 

In response to the question “What Department policies are subject to the proceeding”, he responded (Line 17, page 7):

As previously mentioned, The Department discourages the conversion of farmland to a non-agricultural use. However, to support the New York State’s CLCPA initiatives, the Department has developed a siting policy supportive of solar development efforts on agricultural lands if (his emphasis added) the proposed projects are properly sited on lands other than the State’s most productive farmland. The Department’s goal is for projects to limit the conversion of agricultural areas within the Project Areas, to no more than 10% of soils classified by the Department’s NYS Agricultural Land Classification mineral soil groups 1-4, generally Prime Farmland soils, which represent the State’s most productive farmland. Soils classified with the soil groups 5-10 are identified as having soil limitations. The only responsible position the Department can take to stay true to the 7 AML Article 25-AA §300 and to support the NYS CLCPA renewable energy initiative is to ensure the preservation of agricultural areas involving soils classified as soil groups 1-9 for the production for food and fiber, as well as not object to proposed development on lesser productive soils, i.e. agriculture lands comprised on classified mineral soil groups 5-10.  Additionally, the Department requires the Applicant to follow Department Guidelines for constructing solar facilities in agricultural lands. Draft Certificate Condition 47 and 95 identifies the Applicant’s agreement to comply with Department’s Guidelines entitled Solar Energy Projects – Construction Mitigation for Agricultural Lands (Revision 10/18/2019), specifying construction mitigation techniques intended to protect and restore agricultural soil resources. Furthermore, the Applicant has agreed to consult with the Department for any potential deviation from the Guidelines to develop applicable construction and restoration alternatives.

In response to the question: What are the primary agricultural impacts associated with the construction of a commercial solar energy generation facility on agricultural lands the testimony states: (Line 16, page 8)

The construction of a commercial solar energy generation facility within agricultural land constitutes a long-term impact and permanent conversion of farmland to an industrial (non-agricultural) use. The development of solar arrays and ancillary facilities (including panels, panel racking, transformer/inverter equipment pads, access roads, security fencing, substations, energy storage options, operation and maintenance facilities, planted visual screening areas, etc.) makes it infeasible to continue farming on viable agricultural land within the Project area. Furthermore, the location of project-related infrastructure- panel spacing and alignment in agricultural fields create obstacles that the farm operator will have to avoid during numerous types of agricultural equipment operations; including, but not limited to, cultivation, seeding, nutrient recycling, weed management, harvest, etc. The difficultly created by the obstacles forces the farm operator to abandon use of the field.

Impacts to agricultural lands remaining outside of the security fencing also has a high likelihood to become abandoned and/or orphaned. More specifically, these generally narrow areas outside the fenced facility are created by development limitations (municipal setbacks, buffers, etc.) and limit the conduct of mechanized farming. The scenarios cited above create narrow strips of land that although may be available to some agricultural producers are unattractive for most commercial farm operators, as they are inefficient to harvest crops due to the limitations of acreage and maneuverability for modern mechanized farming equipment. These “indirect” impacts often result in the loss of additional farmland which, in turn, result in a decrease in mechanized farming efficiency leading to a reduction in the production of crops, livestock and livestock products necessary for food production and security.

On page 10 line 8, the testimony asks the question How does the siting of commercial solar project-related infrastructure impact agricultural operations?

There are several potential impacts. Farms demand a certain acreage to meet their business, long-term staffing, and environmental objectives and to remain viable. If leased land is abruptly lost to another use, such as a solar installation, the farm will grow and market less produce, grains, forages, and livestock products; may have to downsize and lay-off employees; and could be challenged to have adequate acreage for proper manure nutrient recycling. Such changes may force the farm to close. As in other sectors, farmers seek improvements to management and efficiency to remain competitive and viable. Larger, more efficient tillage, planting, crop management, and harvesting equipment is one example of how farmers have adapted to remain viable and more productive. Often, this equipment can include two pieces of harvesting or tillage equipment pulled by a single tractor. As the size of the farming equipment has increased over the years, the turning radius for the equipment has also increased. The location of access roads and other project-related infrastructure in an agricultural field creates an obstacle which the farm operator has to avoid during field planting and harvesting operations. Placement of project-related infrastructure in agricultural fields can result in a loss of productive acreage as well as a decrease in field operation efficiency or viability with the larger planting and harvesting equipment because of the increased turning radii required. Depending on the location of project-related infrastructure, primarily solar arrays and access roads, the loss of acreage available to farming, and the loss of farming efficiency or farm viability can be significant and, in some cases, devastating to farms and for food production.

Garnet Energy Center

The Garnet Energy Center is a proposed 200-megawatt solar project with 20 megawatts of energy storage located in the town of Conquest in Cayuga County, N.Y.  NextEra Energy Resources is also developing this project.  According to the July 2021 Proposed Array Layout the project area is 2,288 acres and the facility area (area within in project fence line) is 1,054 acres.  The fenced area encloses the solar arrays, inverters, energy storage modules and the project substation. 

On Page 12, line 18 of Saviola’s testimony he addresses the question “Does the facility layout follow the Department’s Solar Guidelines and does it align with the Department’s siting policy?”

In general, access roads should follow field edges and the solar arrays should not be sited in a manner in which agricultural areas become orphaned as described in my testimony above. Additionally, the Department finds the Applications proposed siting is not consistent with the Department’s siting policy because it will occur on almost 30% of active farmland classified as Prime Farmland (Generally, Mineral Soil Groups 1-4) within the proposed project. The Application update states that the project will occupy nearly 1,000 acres of land to generate up to 200 MW of electricity, however, areas located outside of fenced areas will likely become fallow or orphaned as a result of screening requirements and setbacks. This will eliminate crop production on nearly 1,000 acres of agricultural lands for a minimum of 30 years-worth of crop yields from some of the most productive farmland soils in the State. While the Applicant describes the impact to agricultural land and farming, in general, as temporary, a 30-year loss of the production of crops, livestock and livestock products constitutes a long-term conversion to a nonagricultural use and a long-term loss of food production. Although a decommissioning plan has been prepared, there is virtually no reasonable assurance that the project will be decommissioned and that the full resumption back to agricultural use will be reestablished.

As if this is not enough the testimony goes on to respond negatively to NextEra’s response to questions.  For example, “True long-term impacts include the approximate 30 plus year loss in the production of crops, livestock and livestock products as a result of project-related components being constructed inside the fence. Nearly 1,000 acres of farmland will be taken out of production.” (Page 14 line 5).  On Page 15, line 18 agricultural co-utilization is discussed: “The Applicant indicates that they have not considered incorporating agricultural co-utilization as part of the Project. They indicate that there is not sufficient space for co-utilization.” And goes on to say he does not agree with this response: “There is ample space inside the fence for agricultural activities such as sheep grazing, apiary incorporation and pollinator species, and small-scale grass hay production, nor have they demonstrated any reduced impacts to agriculture from the increased density of the panels. The Applicant should work with hosting farmers to explore dual-use, or agrivotalic projects.  Similarly, the response to questions about subsurface drainage systems was eviscerated. 

On page 19, line 18 comes this: “It is the Department’s opinion that the facility will result in or contribute to a significant and adverse disproportionate agricultural impact upon the local farming community. They have not avoided, offset or minimized agricultural impacts to the maximum extent practicable using verifiable measures”.

Responsible Solar Energy Siting

There are other efforts that define what is needed to site utility-scale solar projects to minimize impacts.  In December 2021 New Yorkers for Clean Power (NYCP) and Alliance for Clean Energy NY (ACENY) co-hosted a workshop “What’s the Deal with Renewable Energy & Agriculture?” that discussed the compatibility of renewable energy and agriculture in New York State and  all the speakers advocated responsible solar development that minimizes the loss of prime farmland.  Three other examples follow.

The Saviola testimony describes a document on responsible siting of utility-scale solar development:

The American Farmland Trust published a study in February 2022 on smart solar siting on farmland in New York State. This study was completed with input from, and collaboration with, advisory members from government and non-governmental organizations, solar industry advocates, not-for profit land trusts, solar developers, and academia. The study was conducted to develop smart solar strategies to meet climate goals while supporting its agricultural economy and future food security. The report reveals trends that show that good quality farmland has been a first-choice site for solar development. As in with this proceeding here. The lowest hanging fruit. The study strongly recommends against siting solar infrastructure on prime farmland or farmlands comprised of Mineral Soil Groups 1-4 and to site infrastructure on marginal lands. The Study also indicates that farmers are interested in agrivotalics. The Study concludes by stating that the choices we make today about where and how solar projects, particularly large-scale facilities, are sited on active farmland will make a difference to rural economies and influence our ability to farm and grow food in New York to feed ourselves and reap environmental benefits now and into the future.

In addition to this testimony there has been progress on other initiatives for responsible solar siting that should be considered in the Garnet permit proceeding.  The New York’s 10 GW Distributed Solar Roadmap: Policy Options for Continued Growth in Distributed Solar document includes a section on  Agricultural Protection and Land Use (Section III.a.4):

Farmland protection and the maintenance of a vibrant agricultural economy are important State policy goals. New York State recognizes the importance of collaboration between the agriculture and clean energy sectors as a critical part of the State’s overall decarbonization strategy. NYSERDA works in close coordination with the Department of Agriculture and Markets (NYSAGM) and other stakeholders to responsibly support the development of renewable energy projects. In the 2019 NY-Sun Expansion Petition, NYSERDA described the interaction of distributed solar with agriculture in New York:

“The majority of projects in [the Upstate C/I] market sector are expected to be ground-mounted arrays ranging between 5 MW and 7.5 MW in size, which occupy approximately 20 – 25 acres of land, typically on rural properties that are leased or sold to the solar developer by the landowner. Notably, this includes properties that are currently used, or could potentially be used for, agricultural production. While NYSERDA expects that the total agricultural acreage utilized for distributed solar projects will remain modest as compared to total farmland in New York State, through its implementation efforts, NYSERDA will act to ensure that negative impacts to farmland and the State’s agricultural economy are avoided and minimized, and where they are unavoidable, mitigated. NYSERDA, working with partner agencies and stakeholders, has already taken multiple actions along these lines and will pursue additional actions under an expanded NY-Sun program.” (This section is from the NY-Sun Petition, p. 21.)” 

In the subsequent two years, NYSERDA and NYSAGM have continued to work in partnership to put in place requirements for solar projects to minimize impact to farming and agricultural soils.  (These requirements include, inter alia: complying with New York State Agriculture and Markets Law; submitting appropriate notices to NYSAGM and local Agricultural and Farmland Protection boards; executing a copy of the Guidelines for Solar Energy Projects – Construction Mitigation for Agricultural Lands document published by NYSAGM; and making a Mitigation Fund payment or committing to other mitigation measures where impacted agricultural soils exceed 30 acres.) These requirements have already demonstrated their effectiveness: In 2021 to date, all 50 distributed solar projects subject to these requirements, totaling 1,037 acres of affected area, have committed to avoiding and minimizing impacts to prime soils in consideration of the solar layout. For 48 of these projects, all unaffected portions of the farms hosting the solar projects, a total of 3,385 acres, will remain in agricultural production. Many of the farmers hosting projects on a portion of their land report that the steady lease revenue from the solar projects has enabled them to continue farming on most of their property despite challenging agricultural economic pressures.

Finally, the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority Agricultural Technical Working Group is working on a “Smart Solar Siting“ scorecard to encourage responsible siting of renewables on agricultural land. The scorecard lists five area to avoid:

  • Avoid prime agricultural soils
  • Farmland in active cultivation
  • Forested land
  • Wetlands
  • Grass lands

Conclusion

In my opinion, the American Farmland Trust report, the state’s policies for distributed solar and the Agricultural Technical Working Group analyses will eventually be used to form the basis of a state-wide policy for responsible siting of utility-scale solar development.  In the meantime, it is inappropriate to allow projects like the Garnet project to proceed. 

The Garnet Energy Center permit decision will be a litmus test to see if the State is going to protect farming communities.  I believe that the testimony clearly demonstrates that the proposed project is inappropriate because “the facility will result in or contribute to a significant and adverse disproportionate agricultural impact upon the local farming community”.  Ag and Markets testimony for the Trelina project was similarly negative but that got approved.  At a minimum the project approval should be delayed until guidelines for responsible utility-scale solar development are available and I submitted comments to the docket to that effect.  If the Siting Board ignores the Ag and Markets testimony and the clear need to wait for guidelines, then it will be clear that the State is not going to protect farming communities.

The Climate Act and the Astoria Gas Turbine Power Replacement Project

The implementation strategy for New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is being finalized by the Climate Action Council  in 2022.  Because the schedule is so ambitious state agencies have been making decisions based on what they think will be in the implementing regulations even before regulations are promulgated and the transition strategies are finalized.  This post documents comments I submitted on the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) decision to deny the NRG Astoria Gas Turbine Power Replacement Project Title V Permit Application and a similar comment to the Climate Action Council submittal portal.  This turns out to be another example of the state putting the Climate Act cart before the horse without regard for the ramifications of the action.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability and affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York, and cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

I am a retired air pollution meteorologist with over 40 years-experience analyzing the relationship between air quality and environmental standards.  I submitted comments based on my familiarity with the NRG Astoria Gas Turbine facility, the role of the facility as a provider of necessary peaking power, and the history of various attempts to re-power it since NRG Energy purchased the facility. Before I retired from NRG in 2010, I was responsible for compliance with the NOx RACT averaging plan and worked with a couple of re-powering applications.  Although I had no involvement whatsoever in the latest re-powering plan, I think my background is unique.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  The Climate Act requires the Climate Action Council to “[e]valuate, using the best available economic models, emission estimation techniques and other scientific methods, the total potential costs and potential economic and non-economic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse gases, and make such evaluation publicly available” in the Scoping Plan. Starting in the Fall of 2020 seven advisory panels developed recommended strategies to meet the targets that were presented to the Climate Action Council in the spring of 2021.  Those recommendations were translated into specific policy options in an integration analysis by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants. 

The integration analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021. The public comment period for the Plan was recently extended to mid-June. The Council will consider the feedback received as it “continues to discuss and deliberate on the topics in the Draft as it works towards a final Scoping Plan for release by January 1, 2023”.  Once that is complete the Energy Plan will be revised to set the state’s energy policies. The goal of the Energy Plan process is to “map the state’s energy future by showing how the state can ensure adequate supplies of power, reduce demand through new technologies and energy efficiency, preserve the environment, reduce dependence on imported gas and oil, stimulate economic growth, and preserve the individual welfare of New York citizens and energy users”.

NRG Astoria Peaking Generation

The proposed project is described by NRG as follows:

NRG is taking measures to fight climate change while minimizing costs and maximizing benefits to New York through the Astoria Replacement Project (the Project). The Project is expected to replace 50-year old power generators in 2023 with state-of-the-art technology reducing the total generating capability of the site and lowering on-site peak air emission rates by up to 99% per hour, while continuing to provide reliable power to New Yorkers when they need it most. This critical infrastructure project will be constructed at no cost to taxpayers or ratepayers. The Project modifies a previously proposed configuration, which was fully approved by the state. In support of New York’s leading efforts to fight climate change, the Project will use technology that can be fully converted to zero-carbon fuel in the future.

In 1999, NRG acquired the 15-acre Astoria Gas Turbines site from Con Edison, which is situated within a larger 300+ acre complex. This complex has hosted electrical generation, transmission, distribution and associated energy activities since the 1890s and remains exclusively a major electric generating and manufacturing complex. In 1999, the site consisted of 33 gas turbine units with total generating capacity of 646 MW. In 2010, NRG proposed to replace the units with a 1,040 MW combined cycle facility. NRG’s modified 2020 Project proposes to replace the 24 remaining units with a single new state-of-the-art simple cycle GE combustion turbine generator having a total generating capability of 437 MW.

Policy Issues

There is a problem because the State of New York is making decisions based on how they believe the Climate Act implementation plan will work before it is complete.  For example, the Department of Environmental Conservation proposed policy to deal with air permit applications is based on compliance with the Climate Act scoping plan which is still a draft.  I posted an article describing my comments that argued that the guidance should be revised to incorporate electric system reliability considerations.  My comments showed there are reliability concerns related to existing electrical generators so the guidance must not preclude continued operation of existing units.  I also argued that DEC should not prevent operators from developing modern generating units that are more reliable than the existing aging units.  Finally, I explained the State has to consider the mandate for safe and adequate electric service as well as the Climate Act requirements. 

I described the DEC’s proposed policy to incorporate Climate Act considerations into air permitting policy before implementing regulations were promulgated as putting the cart before the horse.  Incredibly last year DEC rejected permits for the Danskammer Energy Center and Astoria Gas Turbine Power Project replacement generating facilities because they were inconsistent with the Climate Act.  Clearly, making that decision before a policy was developed was putting the cart before the horse was purchased.  In any event that decision precipitated lawsuits from the developers of both facilities.  I missed the opportunity to comment on the Danskammer permit but did submit comments for Astoria. 

Reliability Comments

I was able to develop a set of comments very quickly because of previous work.  With regards to reliability concerns I essentially re-packaged my comments submitted on the DEC guidance document. 

I noted that the rejection of the permit application is especially troubling because in the DEC’s “Notice of Denial of Title V Air Permit” for the Astoria Gas Turbine Power Project (DEC ID: 2-6301-00191/00014), DEC rejected the use of both hydrogen and renewable natural gas (RNG) as a 2040 compliance mechanism.  The rationale was because the DEC labeled them “speculative” and “aspirational”.  However, the Draft Scoping Plan’s placeholder for a dispatchable, emission-free resource is hydrogen.  Governor Hochul’s recent State of the State address proposes that New York position itself to compete for nearly $10 billion in federal funding for green hydrogen R&D under the federal infrastructure bill.  Obviously, it is in the state’s best interest to preserve the option to use hydrogen in the future.  In the meantime, the options to supplant the dispatchable energy from those facilities with energy storage and renewable energy alternatives are no less “speculative” and “aspirational”.  DEC’s decision to reject the permit on this basis is a serious threat to reliability.

A key component of my comments is that there is a Public Service Commission mandate that overrides the Climate Act requirements.  Public Service (PBS) CHAPTER 48, ARTICLE 4, § 66-p. Establishment of a renewable energy program (4) states:

The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program.

I interpret that to mean that the Climate Act has to meet the obligation to not impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service (i.e., reliability).  DEC’s focus on meeting the Climate Act targets in its rejection of the Astoria permit ignores this obligation.

The DEC decision letter claimed that “the Project would be inconsistent with or would interfere with the attainment of the Statewide greenhouse gas (GHG) emission limits established in Article 75 of the Environmental Conservation Law (ECL)”.  Because DEC was unable to satisfy elements required by Section 7(2) of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act” the application was denied. However, it seems to be a stretch to claim that the permit has to be denied when the only current regulations associated with the Climate Act specify the GHG emissions targets.  Nothing has been promulgated to specify how the State will meet those limits so I believe it is premature to speculate how future regulations could impact the application.

Air Quality Impacts

The DEC decision letter noted that DEC reviewed information submitted by Astoria, including in the initial Title V air permit application as well as supplemental materials provided in response to requests for additional information, the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement prepared for the Project, and over 6,600 public comments received from individuals or organizations during the public comment period.  In my opinion, the 6,600 public comments were a primary driver for the decision because I believe most of them argued that the continued operation of the facility was an environmental justice issue.  Unfortunately, the basis for that claim is weak.

The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) “provide public health protection, including protecting the health of ‘sensitive’ populations such as asthmatics, children, and the elderly”.  According to the EPA nonattainment/maintenance status summary, there are multiple counties In New York that do not attain the NAAQS for ozone and New York County does not meet the coarse particulate matter standard.  Note that all of New York State meets the inhalable particulate NAAQS.  All the other pollutants are in attainment.  My career is based on the presumption that air quality that meets the NAAQS is acceptable.

Despite the fact that New York City is in attainment for inhalable particulates, this pollutant is used as a rationale for shutting down peaking power plants because of claims that reducing inhalable air quality impacts is beneficial.   For example, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s (DOHMH) Air Pollution and the Health of New Yorkers report is often referenced in this regard.  The DOHMOH report concludes: “Each year, PM2.5  pollution in [New York City] causes more than 3,000 deaths, 2,000 hospital admissions for lung and heart conditions, and approximately 6,000 emergency department visits for asthma in children and adults.”  These conclusions are for average air pollution levels in New York City as a whole over the period 2005-2007 of 13.9 µg/m3.

At this time, New York State energy and environmental policy is more about optics than facts.  Nowhere is this more apparent than the recent spate of opinion pieces, reports, and policy proposals related to peaking power plants and the alleged health impacts of inhalable particulates.  In 2020 the PEAK Coalition released a report entitled: “Dirty Energy, Big Money” that has been used by environmental justice organizations to vilify all New York City’s peaking power plants, including the Astoria Gas Turbines.  I have described this work in three posts on my blog Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York.  I published a post that provided information on the primary air quality problem associated with these facilities, the organizations behind the report, the State’s response to date, the underlying issue of environmental justice and addressed the motivation for the analysis.  The second post addressed the rationale and feasibility of the proposed plan to replace these peaking facilities with “renewable and clean energy alternatives” relative to environmental effects, affordability, and reliability.  Finally, I discussed the  Physicians, Scientists, and Engineers (PSE) for Healthy Energy report Opportunities for Replacing Peaker Plants with Energy Storage in New York State that provided technical information used by the PEAK Coalition.

In my comments I showed that the 2018-2020 average PM2.5 concentration was 7.4 µg/m3 which is substantially lower than the DOHMOH goal of reaching 10.9 µg/m3.  All the inhalable particulate health impact projections are based on epidemiological models that have not been validated.  If they are correct, then because inhalable particulate levels have come down uniformly across the country then there should be significant observed health benefits.  Until such time that the projected health impacts are validated with observed data, I remain skeptical.

Furthermore, even if you accept the inhalable particulate health benefit premise, I don’t think that the arguments made by activists makes a convincing case that the peaking power plants are the primary driver of environmental burdens on neighboring communities.  The ultimate problem with this approach is that the peak unit justification relies on environmental burdens from ozone and particulate matter air quality impacts.  However, ozone is a secondary air pollutant and the vast majority of ambient PM2.5 from power plants is also a secondary pollutant.  As a result, there is a lag between the time emissions are released and creation of either ozone or PM2.5. That means that the peaking power plants do not create the air quality impact problems alleged to occur to the environmental justice communities located near the plants.  In fact, because NOx scavenges ozone the peaker plants reduce local ozone if they have any effect at all.  DEC knows this and the fact that they don’t acknowledge it does not reflect well on their scientific rigor.

Conclusion

The comments I submitted on the Astoria permit application argued that the Climate Act has the obligation to not impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service.  DEC’s denial of the Astoria Gas Turbine Title V application because it: ”Does not demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act”  is at odds with that mandate.

DEC’s transparent appeasement of the many commenters who submitted comments based on misleading air quality impacts from the grey literature PEAK Coalition “Dirty Energy, Big Money” report is ill conceived.   The alleged health impacts are all due to secondary ozone and inhalable particulates.  Because they are secondary pollutants they are not formed until they have been transported away from the immediate neighborhoods that Peak Coalition claims are affected.  Unfortunately, there is no currently available technology that has been proven at the scale necessary that can replace fossil-fired generation in New York City reliably and affordably.  With all due respect to the environmental justice organizations like the Peak Coalition, they have no reliability or affordability responsibilities so their priorities differ.  If reliability and affordability are not prioritized it could easily result in an electric system that does not maintain current standards.  More importantly, those issues impact disadvantaged communities more than other communities so they should be the over-arching priority.

The bottom line is that New York State should be grateful that someone is willing to come in and provide an interim solution that will guarantee New York City electric system reliability standards are maintained. All that DEC needs to do is to add a permit condition that makes it clear that the operating certificate will be pulled if certain conditions are met.  If technology is proven available to replace the proposed Astoria Replacement Project on the Climate Act schedule, then the facility gets shut down at that time.  If it turns out that the “zero-emissions” technology solution is hydrogen combustion in a turbine designed to burn that fuel as well as natural gas as proposed by the applicant, then the facility can continue to operate with that fuel.  It is not clear how DEC can reconcile throwing away these reliability options when there is no other option available.

I concluded that the Climate Action Council should develop criteria for schedule implementation. A collective crossing of fingers that a new technology will maintain existing standards of reliability and affordability is inappropriate. In this instance, DEC’s decision to disapprove two proven interim solutions eliminates reliability options when there is no other commercially proven option available.  The Scoping Plan should establish the milestones and conditions that have to be met before any existing technology is dismantled. 

Scoping Plan Cost Obfuscation

New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has a legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda” and voted to release the Draft Scoping Plan late last year.  I recently posted an article describing my fruitless search for cost number documentation that would enable me or anyone else to evaluate their cost claims.  This post describes an egregious example of hiding the true costs of the Scoping Plan.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability and affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York, and cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Act requires the Climate Action Council to “[e]valuate, using the best available economic models, emission estimation techniques and other scientific methods, the total potential costs and potential economic and non-economic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse gases, and make such evaluation publicly available” in the Scoping Plan. Starting in the Fall of 2020 seven advisory panels developed recommended strategies to meet the targets that were presented to the Climate Action Council in the spring of 2021.  Those recommendations were translated into specific policy options in an integration analysis by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants.  The integration analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021. The public comment period extends through at least the end of April 2022. 

I have been working my way through the massive draft document preparing comments on issues that I see.  I have assessed the claimed benefits which was relatively easy because there was a relatively adequate amount of documentation.   However, the cost documentation is very poor.  I have explained that the only description of the net direct costs is a bar chart without a breakdown of the cost components.  This article addresses a nuance to the net direct costs presented in the Draft Scoping Plan.

Net Direct Cost Information

In my latest assessment of direct costs in the Draft Scoping Plan I documented what information was provided for stakeholder assessment of costs.  Starting on page 80 the Draft Scoping Plan section 10.3 Key Benefit-Cost Assessment Findings describes costs.  However, the technical documentation is in Appendix G: Integration Analysis Technical Supplement.   On page 64 of Appendix G, Section I, the text describes the cost metrics included in the Draft Scoping Plan:

The integration analysis includes calculations for three different cost metrics: Net Present Value (NPV) of net direct costs, annual net direct costs, and system expenditure.

        • NPV of Net Direct Costs: NPV of levelized costs in each scenario incremental to the Reference Case from 2020-2050. All NPV calculations assume a discount rate of 3.6%. This metric includes incremental direct capital investment, operating expenses, and fuel expenditures.
        • Annual Net Direct Costs: Net direct costs are levelized costs in a given scenario incremental to the Reference Case for a single year snapshot. This metric includes incremental direct capital investment, operating expenses, and fuel expenditures.
        • System Expenditure: System expenditure is an estimate of absolute direct costs (not relative to Reference Case). Estimates of system expenditure do not reflect direct costs in some sectors that are represented with incremental costs only. These include investments in industry, agriculture, waste, forestry, and non-road transportation.

In my article I explained that the net direct costs represent the total costs of all the mitigation actions minus all the costs of a reference case.  Appendix G notes that “redirecting investment away from status quo energy expenditures and toward decarbonization is key to realizing the aims of the Climate Act” but that overlooks that their estimate of status quo expenditures is already $2.7 trillion.  At the time I found no discussion what was included in the $2.7 trillion estimate.

Draft Scoping Plan that Describes the Reference Case

In order to better understand what is included in the reference case I looked for the term.  This section lists the results of a word search of the Draft Scoping Plan document for the term “reference case”.   In the main body of text there were some references but the substantive information was in Appendix G.

Appendix G, Section I page 8 and 83:

Together, the benefits of avoiding economic impacts of damages caused by climate change and the improvements in public health total $400 – 420 billion. Realizing these benefits will require an incremental investment over the 30-year transition of approximately 10 percent in additional spending, or $290 – $310 billion, in addition to redirecting the approximately $2.7 trillion in expected system spending under the reference case towards New York’s low carbon future.

Appendix G, Section I page 12 there is a footnote for Figure 4: Gross Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Mitigation Scenario, without any accompanying text, presumably the caption for the figure.

6 The Reference Case is used for evaluating incremental societal costs and benefits of GHG emissions mitigation. The Reference Case includes a business as usual forecast plus implemented policies, including but not limited to federal appliance standards, energy efficiency achieved by funded programs (Housing and Community Renewal, New York Power Authority, Department of Public Service, Long Island Power Authority, NYSERDA Clean Energy Fund), funded building electrification, national Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards, a statewide Zero-emission vehicle mandate, and a statewide Clean Energy Standard including technology carveouts. For more details see Chapter 5.3.

Appendix G, Section I page 66:

When viewed in from a systems expenditure perspective (Figure 48), the NPV of net direct costs for Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 are moderate, ranging from 11-12% as a share of the NPV of reference case system expenditures ($2.7 trillion). Because significant infrastructure investment will be needed to maintain business as usual infrastructure within the state irrespective of further climate policy, redirecting investment away from status quo energy expenditures and toward decarbonization is key to realizing the aims of the Climate Act.

Appendix G, Section I page 68:

Net direct costs are measured relative to the Reference Case, but system expenditures are evaluated on an absolute basis. System expenditures increase over time as New York invests in infrastructure and clean fuels to meet Climate Act emissions limits. As a share of overall system expenditures, costs are moderate: 9-11% in 2030 and 25-26% in 2050 relative to current estimated expenditure levels.

Appendix G, Section I page 76 in the title to Figure 56 there is a reference to footnote 49:

49 The costs presented represent the costs relative to a Reference Case with equivalent levels of electrification loads, and as a result are not directly comparable to the electric sector costs presented in the economy-wide analysis, in which costs are measured relative to a Reference Case with Reference loads.

Aside from similar statements on pages page 78, and 83 of Appendix G, Section I that is all the results for the search on “reference case”.

Discussion

One of the arguments in the discussion of costs and benefits is that the realizing these costs only represents an “incremental investment over the 30-year transition of approximately 10 percent in additional spending, or $290 – $310 billion, in addition to redirecting the approximately $2.7 trillion in expected system spending under the reference case”.  In my original analysis of these costs, I mentioned that it is important to understand exactly what is included in the reference case in order to accept this statement.  However, no explanation is prominently featured in documentation.

However, when I searched the document for the term “reference case” there was some information, buried in a footnote reference to a figure caption that was missing.  It states that “The Reference Case includes a business as usual forecast plus implemented policies, including but not limited to federal appliance standards, energy efficiency achieved by funded programs (Housing and Community Renewal, New York Power Authority, Department of Public Service, Long Island Power Authority, NYSERDA Clean Energy Fund), funded building electrification, national Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards, a statewide Zero-emission vehicle mandate, and a statewide Clean Energy Standard including technology carveouts.”  This exposes the scam.  Cynic that I am I suspect that someone, somewhere intended to completely delete the caption for this figure so that the damning footnote would not be available.

Why is this so egregious?  Recall that the presented net direct costs are relative to the reference case.  If the reference case costs are higher by including mitigation efforts that are required to meet the Climate Act targets this approach perverts the numbers presented.  Energy efficiency is a critical component of the mitigation strategies and this statement says we are going to include those costs in the reference case.  Electrification of buildings is another key component and “funded building electrification” costs are in the reference case.  The last two items take the cake however.  The authors of the Integration Analysis have slipped the costs for the statewide zero-emissions mandate and Clean Energy Standard into the reference case so that those costs do not show up as net direct costs of the Climate Act.

If this is on the up and up then the projected benefits, which are also allegedly relative to the reference case, should exclude the emission reductions and associated benefits for energy efficiency programs and building electrification that are already funded, the statewide zero-emissions mandate, and the Clean Energy Standard.  That may be the case but it is impossible to tell because the only numerical description of the net direct costs is a bar chart without a breakdown of the cost components.

Conclusion

I certainly could have mis-interpreted these numbers and normally when my evaluation shows significant differences from someone else’s work that is my first thought.  However, this finding fits a consistent pattern of over-estimated benefits and under-estimated costs in the Integration Analysis. 

The claimed benefits for the avoided cost of GHG emissions range between $235 and $250 billion, but I have shown that the Integration Analysis incorrectly calculates avoided GHG emissions benefits by applying the value of an emission reduction multiple times.  If that error is corrected then the total benefits range from negative $74.5 to negative $49.5 billion.  

It is very difficult to verify Draft Scoping Plan cost numbers because of the lack of documentation, but in two instances I have projected costs inconsistent with the Plan.  I evaluated the projected costs for residential retrofits to electric heating.  I estimated in the Draft Scoping Plan the entire building sector component cost is $230 billion relative to the reference case.  I calculated that just the residential retrofit heat electrification costs range between $259 billion and $370 billion using one methodology and between $295 billion and $370 billion using a different methodology. In the other analysis I estimated the costs and benefits of upgraded rail transportation.  The draft scoping plan claims a reduction of 200 million light duty vehicle miles at a per unit cost of $6 per mile or $1.2 billion between Scenarios 2 and 3 and Scenario 4.  I estimate that the only valid cost for the difference between the scenario rail alternatives is $8.4 billion and that it would only provide a vehicle mile reduction of 64.7 million miles. 

Were it not for this consistent pattern I would be reluctant to label this egregious example of hiding the true costs of the Scoping Plan as a deliberate attempt to obfuscate direct costs.  However, the lack of documentation, the complete absence of reference case details  and contrived way they present the cost numbers convinces me that this is deliberate.  In order to “prove” that the Climate Act benefits out-weigh the costs they have deliberately cooked the books.

The rebuttal for my claim is for the Climate Action Council to provide complete and transparent documentation.  It would be best if the Council would host an expert analysis session where the costing methodology used could be explained and the public could be given the opportunity to provide questions beforehand.  Obviously, this post could provide a number of those questions.  While it would not be possible to address all the sectors in such a session this format could provide answers to the cost projections most impactful to New York residents.  Residential electrification and personal transportation head that list.

There is a massive disconnect between the costs projected in the Draft Scoping Plan any by other authors.  Earlier this year I compared costs estimated in the Scoping Plan with costs in an article by Ken Gregory that is a critique of a report  by Thomas Tanton “Cost of Electrification: A State-by-State Analysis and Results”.  Tanton estimated that the New York overnight cost for a net-zero economy is $1.465 trillion.  Gregory’s estimate for net-zero consistent with the Climate Act is $18.2 trillion.  Until such time that the Climate Action Council produces documentation that enable independent verification of their estimates, I believe the actual costs will be consistent with these higher estimates.

Scoping Plan Renewable Energy Resource Availability Analysis

New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has a legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  This post describes comments I submitted to the Council about the inadequate analyses of renewable energy resources in New York.  It is important to get this right because the availability of renewable energy resources informs the basis of resource adequacy planning.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability and affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York, and cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Act requires the Climate Action Council to “[e]valuate, using the best available economic models, emission estimation techniques and other scientific methods, the total potential costs and potential economic and non-economic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse gases, and make such evaluation publicly available” in the Scoping Plan.  The integration analysis developed by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021. The Scoping Plan has to be finalized by the end of 2022 and a recent meeting discussed issues that need to be addressed to meet that schedule.

New York’s unprecedented transition to a zero-emission electric generating system means that the system will be heavily dependent upon wind and solar resources.   Because those resources are intermittent it is imperative that New York energy planning determine the frequency and duration of periods when wind and solar resources are low.  This article summarizes comments that I submitted on the problem, describes analyses that address this issue completed elsewhere, and recommends that New York agencies develop an appropriate study centered on New York.

Problem

The comments included a description of New York blackouts and the responses made to prevent reoccurrences.  I believe that, despite the best efforts of those responsible for the reliability of the electric grid, the transition to an electric power system that relies on intermittent wind and solar resources introduces so many changes that it will be impossible to anticipate them all.  As a result, grid resilience will decrease and blackouts are inevitable.   For example, consider that a team of researchers from the University of Nottingham recently addressed the effect of renewable energy resources on power grid stability.  The abstract from the paper states:

Contemporary proliferation of renewable power generation is causing an overhaul in the topology, composition, and dynamics of electrical grids. These low-output, intermittent generators are widely distributed throughout the grid, including at the household level. It is critical for the function of modern power infrastructure to understand how this increasingly distributed layout affects network stability and resilience. This paper uses dynamical models, household power consumption, and photovoltaic generation data to show how these characteristics vary with the level of distribution. It is shown that resilience exhibits daily oscillations as the grid’s effective structure and the power demand fluctuate. This can lead to a substantial decrease in grid resilience, explained by periods of highly clustered generator output. Moreover, the addition of batteries, while enabling consumer self-sufficiency, fails to ameliorate these problems. The methodology identifies a grid’s susceptibility to disruption resulting from its network structure and modes of operation.

My comments included a description of the Texas blackout of February 2021.  Ultimately the reason for the blackout was poor planning.  When the people of Texas needed electric power the most the generating resources available were unable to meet those needs.  In order to prevent the same thing from happening in New York it is necessary to provide sufficient energy at all times.

Reliability planning in the past relied on dispatchable generating resources.  The Climate Act future electric generating system will rely on intermittent renewable wind and solar that is not dispatchable.  Energy storage resources are needed to cover periods when wind and sun energy is not available to provide dispatchable electricity.  The problem is that we have to know what the worst-case renewable resource availability is in order to size the energy storage resources correctly.

Last year I described issues related to this as the Climate Act’s ultimate problem. Although there have been analyses that have identified winter wind lull periods are a problem, I do not believe that they addressed this analysis correctly because they used relative short periods as the basis for their projections.  As far as I can tell the Integration Analysis did not even consider the same period for wind and solar resources in their analysis.  As a result, I believe the Draft Scoping Plan projections for the amount of resources during these periods is incorrect.

Proposed Analysis

In order to do this right, the critical consideration is the frequency, duration, and severity of periods when wind and solar resources are in “droughts” or low resource availability.  I described several recent applicable papers that estimate the frequency and duration of periods with those conditions using a meteorological reanalysis data base.  In this approach historical observations are re-analyzed using current weather forecast models.  The first step in developing a weather forecast is to incorporate meteorological observations to setup the weather maps that are the starting point for weather forecast calculations.  That component of the models is used to develop weather maps for the observations and the forecast component is used to provide hourly data until the net observation period.

In order to provide a robust estimate of the wind and solar availability during worst case conditions it is necessary to analyze as long a time period of historical meteorological data as possible. The ERA5 global reanalysis data base generated using this reanalysis technique provides hourly estimates of a large number of atmospheric, land and oceanic climate variables. The data cover the Earth on a 30km grid and resolve the atmosphere using 137 levels from the surface up to a height of 80km. That information is then used to estimate the availability of hourly wind and solar resources for any area of the globe.

Last fall I described a paper that included an approach that might work for an analysis centered on New York.  Since then, I have been in touch with the author and I am not confident that using these data would be provide invaluable information. 

In my comments I strongly recommended an analysis in New York using the complete (1950 to present) ERA5 meteorological database to determine the frequency and duration of renewable resource droughts in order to estimate the appropriate worst case.  The goal of the project would be three-fold:

  • Determine historical intensity, frequency, duration and seasonality of wind and solar droughts in New York;
  • Identify co-occurrence of wind and solar droughts with high demand periods (heating/cooling degree days); and
  • Interpret the droughts and high demand periods: seasonal, weather regimes, interannual variability (e.g. El Niño-Southern Oscillation), multi-decadal climate regimes, and trend associated with global warming

Conclusion

I have submitted comments in various proceedings and have tried to work behind the scenes to get this analysis completed because I don’t think it is possible to adequately project the renewable resources necessary to keep the lights on when needed most without this information.  I submitted these comments to get on the record again that this work has to be done to ensure that sufficient renewable energy generation and energy storage is developed to prevent blackouts.

New York Climate Action Council Plan for 2022

New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has a legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda” and voted to release the Draft Scoping Plan late last year.  After a two-month hiatus the Council finally got around to having a meeting to discuss the plan for 2022 on March 3, 2022 (recording here).  This post describes my thoughts about the meeting and plan.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability and affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York, and cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Act requires the Climate Action Council to “[e]valuate, using the best available economic models, emission estimation techniques and other scientific methods, the total potential costs and potential economic and non-economic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse gases, and make such evaluation publicly available” in the Scoping Plan.  The integration analysis developed by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021. At that time, the Climate Action Council stated that the public comment period would extend through at least the end of April 2022 and would include a minimum of six public hearings. This meeting outlined their plans for 2022.

March 3, 2022 Meeting

The meeting followed the usual routine of all previous meetings.  After the formal welcome, roll call, and consideration of the previous meeting minutes, the co-chairs take the floor to blame any recent unusual weather on climate change (slow couple of months because there were no examples this time), to brag about what a great job they are doing with the implementation process, highlight anything the Governor proposed related to the climate recently (in this case the State of the State annual address), and highlight any related project awards.

My primary interest was the overall goals and objectives discussion starting at 23:50 of the video.  There was a discussion of the proposed 2022 activities & schedule, a debate about the outstanding topics that required further deliberation, an agreement about the decision-making process and a conversation regarding public engagement.

2022 Schedule 

The activity and schedule overview discussion starting at 25:41 in the recording was disappointing.  The proposed plan is for three phases.  From the start of the year through the end of April they proposed to gather information.  From May to August the information there will be a discussion and deliberation phase.  Over the rest of the year the final scoping plan will be drafted and finalized.  This is disappointing because there is no iterative component.  There is no chance for stakeholders to ask questions and respond to their answers.

In addition, there is no opportunity for the Council to ask stakeholders about their comments. If, for example, the Council ever gets around to reading the comment I submitted on February 1 where I argue that the claims that the benefits are greater than the costs are wrong, I believe that claim should be addressed and not ignored. There was no indication in the discussions that this situation would ever arise which pretty much suggests to me that this process is just going through the motions and substantive issues raised in comments will simply be ignored.  It that is not the case and they do respond to substantive issues like whether the benefits may not be greater than the costs, then I think I should be given the chance to rebut whatever hand-waving argument they contrive to claim I am wrong. 

The next slide (25:41 in the recording) presented the plan for Council meetings and supporting activities) It is encouraging that the expert topical input includes the opportunity for experts to provide input and feedback on topics of interest and for representatives of key sectors and industries to provide targeted feedback on topics of interest.  However, there is a problem because throughout the implementation process to date, only one side of the transition challenge has been heard. The Council members who spoke at the meeting are missing this point.  I will discuss this concern more later.

Climate Justice Working Group feedback was the subject of the next slide (30:12 in the recording). In my opinion the Climate Action Council has placed an inappropriate level of focus on this feedback.  There is a Public Service Commission mandate that should be the first priority.  Public Service (PBS) CHAPTER 48, ARTICLE 4, § 66-p. Establishment of a renewable energy program (4) states:

The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program.

I interpret that to mean that the Climate Act has to meet the following obligations:

  • It cannot impede the provision of safe and adequate electric service (i.e., reliability)
  • It cannot impair existing obligations and agreements and I assume they mean existing contracts
  • It cannot cause a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program (i.e., affordability)

The Council’s focus on meeting the targets and placating the Climate Justice Working Group ignores these obligations.  With all due respect to the Working Group, they have no affordability and reliability responsibilities so their priorities differ and could easily result in a Scoping Plan that does not address those obligations adequately.  More importantly, reliability and affordability issues impact disadvantaged communities more than other communities so they should be their priority too.

The next slide addressed public input (33:27 in the recording).  The Climate Action Council is required to hold six in-person hearings across the state but they proposed to add one more public hearing and two virtual public hearings.  However, I am very disappointed with the proposed hearings approach because I think that substantive issues raised won’t get recognized.  They apparently plan to follow the same approach to public input as was used for the advisory panels input.  In particular, they plan on three-hour hearings and to limit speakers to two minutes which is insufficient time for anything meaningful.  Instead it is about enough time for a speaker to say that they are in favor or not in favor of the plan.  Ultimately this approach means the Council is simply going through the motions for the public input requirement of the Climate Act.

The concept that the Council would hold meetings to solicit expert input was a feature in the presentation.  However, there was no recognition that the Council might want to invite speakers to participate in a Council meeting if their comments raised issues not addressed in the Draft Scoping Plan.   

Another issue related to the public comments is how they will be handled.  It was mentioned that there already have been over 1,000 comments submitted to the portal.  The following slide says that “Council to consider the full set of public comments after the comment period closes” (discussed at 34:20 in the recording) but it is silly to wait to start to evaluate the comments until the end of the comment period.  Clearly staff has to be organizing the comments and there was mention that the Council will have access to the NYSERDA web system to see the comments.  I think that the comments should be publicly available after they are reviewed for acceptability and not held from the public until the end of the public comment period.  The comments should be sorted regarding relevance to specific chapters, issues, or form submittals expressing generic support or lack of support.

The proposed schedule and meeting locations for the public hearings was discussed starting at 35:30 in the recording.  Staff pointed out that adding other meeting locations beyond the six mandated in the Climate Act means that the comment period is going to be extended 30 days until the end of May.  Nonetheless Council members suggested additional public hearings in Nassau/Queens, Yonkers/Westchester, Southern Tier and Mid-Hudson areas.

There was a long discussion about the timing, content, and format of the in-person and virtual meetings. 

The next slide (1:12:55) discusses the Integration Analysis plans for 2022.  The authors not that “priority topics can be addressed by focused sensitivity analysis”, but also mentions that there isn’t much time to able to do additional research based on feedback. 

This reinforces my argument that the feedback from already submitted public comments and others submitted before the end of the public comment period should be evaluated and considered on an on-going basis.  The slide says that the analyses needed will “need to be finalized within the second quarter of 2022”.  Three potential areas of inquiry are mentioned in the slide:

  • Continued assessment of impacts of electrification, heating system configuration, and magnitude of building shell efficiency investment on key output metrics (e.g., system peak, cost)
  • Impacts of expanded uncertainty range of electric distribution system cost
  • Further alignment of benefit cost framework with net GHG emissions accounting in Statewide GHG Emissions Report

While I don’t disagree with these areas of inquiry, I am disappointed that the words feasibility, reliability, and affordability are not mentioned.  In my opinion the Draft Scoping Plan does not address those concepts adequately. The fact that they are not menti0ned suggests that the authors of the Draft Scoping Plan think they are covered.

The next slide (1:14:50) describing 2022 activities discusses the finalization of the Scoping Plan.  It just fits the finalization into the schedule.  After this slide was presented, there was an opportunity for comments and discussion (starting at 1:17:00).  Carolyn Ryan pointed out the time to discuss public comments is going to be limited so it will be difficult to incorporate public comment.  Sarah Osgood pointed out that there have been 1100 to 1200 comments submitted already.  She said that they would be summarizing them as quickly as possible as they come in and consider how to present them to the Council for consideration.  At 1:20:50 Gavin Donohue made the first mention of reliability.  He said that he hoped that expert engagement would include this topic. 

Topics and Process

According to the next slide (1:24:30), equity and climate justice “are overarching lenses to apply consistently to all topic areas”.  That sums up the framework of Climate Act implementation as it stands.  In any rational take on implementation, reliability and affordability should be the overarching lenses applied to all topic areas.  Isn’t it obvious that this is the cornerstone to equity and climate justice because an unaffordable and unreliable energy system will impact those least able to pay the most?  Incorporating those social justice issues as part of the need for an affordable and reliable system is the appropriate approach but I fear it is not on the agenda.

Three topics were discussed that “require more deliberation” starting at 1:27:02.  All of these issues were raised by members of the Climate Action Council.  In order to meet the Climate Act mandates the natural gas system has to be replaced and this is the first topic.  Some Council members have interpreted the law to preclude the use of combustion entirely so the “potential applications of advanced fuels” topic addresses this issue.  If it is not necessary to consider technological feasibility then adding another layer of untried technology at the scale necessary may be appropriate but someday, someone has to point out that eliminating combustions has risks.  Chapter 17, Economy-Wide Strategies of the Draft Scoping Plan addresses comprehensive policies that price GHG emissions. 

In the process for supporting council decision-making slide (starting at 1:30:33) several suggestions were made.  Given that there are unresolved issues even before the public comment period started a process is an obvious need.  There is no question that additional input and support to the Council are needed.  During the meeting they talked about subgroups developing recommendations for particular topics.  My concern is that the topics chosen will be based on the biases of Council members rather than on the feasibility of the proposed transition without adverse impacts on reliability and affordability.

Starting at 1:47:00 the three identified topics were discussed in detail.  This particular discussion was so relevant that I am going to make it the subject of another post.

The last substantive slide (2:46:20 in the recording) addressed the decision-making process itself and particularly how they will address “consensus”.  I think the statement “Consensus requires that there has been a good faith effort to find a package of recommendations that meets the most important interests of Council members” sums up my over-arching concern about the Council.  In particular the interests of some of the more vocal Council members are ideological rather than logical.  I keep mentioning affordability and reliability feasibility concerns because those ideologues are ignoring those critical concerns.  Given that every other jurisdiction that has tried to implement some similar transition to emissions-free energy systems has run into problems with affordability and reliability ignoring them in this instance is a recipe for disaster.  Of course, when that happens it will be somebody else’s fault.

Discussion

There are some over-arching points to be made regarding the 2022 Climate Action Council plans for this year.  The first issue is logistical.  The outlined plan does not place enough emphasis on starting to address comments received as soon as possible.  I believe the process of summarizing, categorizing, and disseminating comments should start immediately so that the Council can determine if there are substantive issues that need to be addressed.  If the Council makes it clear that the sooner a substantive issue is raised, the more time they will have to address it, then I think stakeholders will realize it is in their best interests to get comments in as soon as possible rather than waiting until the comment period closes.

I was disappointed that reliability and affordability were not at the top of the list of issues that need to be addressed in 2022.  It appears that climate justice and disadvantaged communities are higher priorities despite the massive impacts of higher costs and unreliable power on those least able to afford higher costs and blackouts.  That point of emphasis reinforced my concern that for many on the Council the green energy transition is more about political pandering to specific voting blocs than addressing climate change in a rational way.

Finally, the Council appears to be tone deaf to the need to hear both sides of substantive issues.  For example, Dennis Elsenbeck at 1:44:58 bias notes that we “use the word bias all the time”.  He goes on to argue that there is bias in this entire process but then claims that “You deal with bias by having an unbiased facilitator”.  In the discussion of combustion avoidance his suggestion is that the Council should hear from experts like Plug Power on the topic of fuel cells.  According to their website, Plug Power is the “leading provider of clean hydrogen and zero-emission fuel cell solutions that are both cost-effective and reliable”.  There is zero chance that any presentation they give to the Council is going to suggest in any way, shape, or form that fuel cells are not the answer with no downsides.  If all the presentations to the Council are from subject matter experts that have a bias towards their technology, then an unbiased facilitator will not be needed because there is only one side presented.  It is time to open up the discussion and make sure that the pros and cons of all implementation topics are heard.  For example, at 29:40, Sarah Osgood mentioned having a presentation on district heating systems.  If this is done then they should not invite just the advocates for those systems but people who can describe potential issues with this approach.

Conclusion

The scope and schedule of the Climate Act transition to a “zero-emissions” energy system is so daunting that a full accounting of the risks to reliability and affordability cannot hope to be adequately addressed in the time frame available.  Nonetheless, I had hoped that the Council would consider the inconvenient issues as well as the convenient issues.  The plan for the electric system transition relies on technology that does not exist.  Any responsible implementation plan would incorporate specific technological and cost conditions in the schedule for this massive transition to ensure that the technology needed is available before the existing system is dismantled.  The Integration Analysis has not confronted this reality and the Council appears blissfully unaware of this risk  The public comment period is supposed to afford stakeholders the opportunity to raise concerns about the viability of the proposed plan relative to issues like this.  However, the plans outlined at this meeting suggest that the public comment requirement will be treated as a formality rather than an opportunity for meaningful issues to be raised and considered.  I do not see how this will end well.

Integration Analysis Transportation Incremental Benefits Associated with Scenario 4

New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has a legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050. The Climate Action Council has released for public comment the Draft Scoping Plan that outlines the implementation plan for the Climate Act. The document is huge as it covers all aspects of New York’s energy system.  This post looks at one minor component of the Scoping Plan’s mitigation scenarios to determine if the numbers presented are reasonable.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available technology such that it will adversely affect reliability and affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York, and cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Act requires the Climate Action Council to “[e]valuate, using the best available economic models, emission estimation techniques and other scientific methods, the total potential costs and potential economic and non-economic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse gases, and make such evaluation publicly available” in the Scoping Plan.  The Integration Analysis developed by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021.

The Integration Analysis developed four scenarios to compare with a reference case that describes the New York energy system without the Climate Act.  The first scenario is based on Advisory Panel inputs but did not meet the Climate Act targets.  According to Appendix G, Integration Analysis Technical Supplement, Section I, page 13:

Transformative levels of effort are required across all sectors, and scenarios include high levels of electrification including Scenario 2, which also incorporates strategic use of low-carbon fuels. Scenario 3 pushes harder on accelerated electrification to meet the emission limits using a very low-bioenergy and low-combustion mix of strategies. Scenario 4 pushes beyond 85% direct reductions in 2050 by including use of some low-carbon fuels, examining very high VMT reductions, and assuming high (but also highly uncertain) levels of innovation in the waste and agriculture sectors. The Council expressly seeks feedback on the components of these scenarios of which detailed information can be found in the sector strategies portions of the sectoral chapters in this draft Plan.

This article describes only one component of the strategies.  Make no mistake there is so much information presented and the documentation is so marginal that it is impossible to evaluate all the components in any detail.  For this article I am going to address one aspect of the transportation sector plan. The addendum to this article consolidates relevant information in Appendix G, Integration Analysis Technical Supplement, Transportation in Section I starting on page 35 where the components of the transportation sector scenarios are described.

Transportation Component Comment

The mitigation scenarios reduce transportation emission by reducing the miles traveled by vehicles, adoption of zero-emission vehicles, electrification of non-road sectors, and targeted low-carbon fuel use. Reducing energy consumption means that GHG emissions are reduced within the transportation sector.

When I evaluate a regulatory proposal my first step is to try to reproduce the proposal’s numbers so that I can verify that the assumptions used are reasonable.  Even though I limited myself to just the transportation sector there still are far too many aspects to consider them all.  The scenarios proposed to reduce vehicle miles traveled using smart growth, expanded public transit, telework and demand management programs but all of those strategies are broader than I want to deal with at this time.  I considered discussing the suggestion that there could be a “small role for electric aviation in decarbonizing short distance flights by 2050, and hydrogen aviation to decarbonize medium distance flights”.   The claim that “hydrogen and electric aviation displace 47% of remaining aviation fuel demand in Scenario 4” sets off my BS detector but I chose instead to use a different claim in this article to see if the numbers can be trusted.

In this example I will address the enhanced transit & mobility claims related to the Scenario 4 alternative “Incremental reductions from enhanced in-state rail aligning with 125 MPH alternative detailed in Empire Corridor Tier 1 Draft EIS”.  In particular, I am only going to address the rail improvements measure shown in Table 11 of Appendix G: 200 million light duty vehicle miles can be reduced relative to Scenarios 2 and 3 at a per unit cost of $6 per mile.

57 Moving Cooler: http://www.reconnectingamerica.org/assets/Uploads/2009movingcoolerexecsumandappend.pdf, accessed November 2021

Empire Corridor Draft 1 Tier EIS: https://railroads.dot.gov/environment/environmental-reviews/empire-corridor, accessed November 2021

EU Hydrogen Aviation Study:

https://www.fch.europa.eu/sites/default/files/FCH%20Docs/20200720_Hydrogen%20Powered%20Aviation%20report_FINAL%20web.pdf, accessed November 2021

58 Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 include 9 billion LDV miles reduced in 2050 relative to Reference scenario, from enhanced transit and mobility; telework and travel demand management; smart growth and mode shifting to biking/walking; No $/mile cost was assessed for tranche of VMT reduction achieved in Scenarios 2-3. Table above shows incremental investment relative to Scenarios 2-3

Table 11 documents transportation-related incremental costs associated with Scenario 4.  It claims that the per-unit cost is $6 per mile and that 200 million light duty vehicle miles will be reduced relative to Scenarios 2 and 3 in 2050.  The plain reading of this is that the 200 hundred million light duty vehicles miles reduced will cost $6 per mile or $1.2 billion.  The basis of the claim is the “Empire Corridor Draft 1 Tier EIS” which is an analysis of improvements that could be made to railroad passenger service in New York.

Empire Corridor Rail Passenger Improvements

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), in cooperation with the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) completed the Empire Corridor Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in 2014 to “evaluate proposed system improvements to intercity passenger rail services along the 463-mile Empire Corridor, connecting Pennsylvania (Penn) Station in New York City with Niagara Falls Station in Niagara Falls, New York.”  The components of the EIS include the following:

Completing an EIS always takes a long time but the fact that the FRA anticipates publishing the final report in 2022, eight years after it was completed suggests that there were issues.  For this evaluation the point is that there were four alternatives considered to upgrade railroad service from New York City to Niagara Falls.  There were two alternatives to raise passenger train speeds to 90 mph between Albany and Buffalo and one to raise passenger train speeds to 110 mph that all use the existing right-of-way.  The fourth alternative would raise the passenger train speeds to 125 mph but that would require the development of a “new electrified (with overhead catenary), two-track, grade-separated high-speed rail corridor of 283 miles between Albany/Rensselaer Station and a new Buffalo station”.  The following table highlights the differences between the alternatives. 

According to Appendix G, Scenario 4 would get additional vehicle miles traveled reductions by using the “125 MPH alternative detailed in Empire Corridor Tier 1 Draft EIS”.  As this document is the sum total of the documentation a certain degree of guessing is required to deduce what that means.  Although never mentioned it seems likely that Scenarios 2 and 3 use Alternative 110 from the Empire Corridor EIS to project reductions in vehicle miles traveled and using the “125 MPH alternative detailed in Empire Corridor Tier 1 Draft EIS” appears to provide incremental improvements.

It is possible to check the projected numbers.  Table 11 claims that “200 million light duty vehicle miles will be reduced relative to Scenarios 2 and 3 in 2050” at a per unit cost of $6 per mile.  Recall, however, that I previously interpreted this to mean that the 200 hundred million light duty vehicles miles reduced will cost $6 per mile or $1.2 billion.  The capital cost difference between Alternative 110 ($6.3 billion) and Alternative 125 ($14.7 billion) is $8.4 billion, far more than that per unit cost. 

There is another possible check.  Exhibit 6-7 in the Empire Corridor EIS estimates the annual reductions in auto trips in 2035 for the different alternatives.  Assuming that using the “125 MPH alternative detailed in Empire Corridor Tier 1 Draft EIS” means that the proposed improvement is the difference between the 110 and 125 alternatives, then that means that 307,475 autos are diverted from highways. 

In order to estimate the vehicle miles traveled reduction from the estimate of 307,475 autos diverted from highways, the distribution of where the passenger boarded and exited is needed.  Exhibit 2-21 provides that information for 2009.  I have an issue with these data.  In particular, while the total appears consistent with the numbers in the rest of the document it is worrisome that the origin and destination numbers match exactly.  I interpret this table to state that 320,155 people boarded trains in New York to go to Albany reading down the first column to New York City then across to the third column under the heading Albany.  For the people going from Albany to New York City read down the trip origins column to Albany and then over to the second column for New York City.  I believe it is highly unlikely that exact number of people going from Albany to New York City and vice-versa would be identical.  Furthermore, the fact that the station pairs in all instances are the same means that there is an issue with the numbers.  Because I don’t expect that there would be a big difference between the numbers and the total is consistent, I have ignored this issue.

Unfortunately, there is no similar breakdown of boardings for the alternatives.  Exhibit 6-6 does break down total ridership by alternative in 2035.

My spreadsheet Empire Corridor Data uses the information from these three tables and the distances between the stations listed along the Empire Corridor (Markets tab) to estimate the vehicle mile traveled reduction expected in 2035 if the 125-mph alternative is implemented rather than the 110-mph alternative.  I assume that the relative ridership between stations remains the same as that shown in Exhibit 2-21 and that the diversion from highways estimates are proportional to the passenger boardings.  The difference in auto trips diverted from highways between the 110-mph alternative (177,603) and the 125-mph alternative (485,078) is 307,475.  The number of diverted auto trips for each station is proportional to the station boardings per station in 2009 multiplied by 307,475 divided by the total number of boardings in 2009 (932,801).  The vehicle mile traveled reduction is the number of trips per station pair times the distance per station pair.  The sum of the distances for all these diverted trips is 64.7 million miles in 2035.  The Table 11 projected number of light-duty vehicle miles traveled is 200 million miles in 2050.  Even though the dates are different I think it is clear that the numbers, and therefore the methodology, are incompatible.

There are a couple of ways to interpret these discrepancies.  It could simply be that my interpretation of the Scoping Plan total costs and mileage reductions for this strategy are incorrect.  On the other hand, I think it is more likely due to a methodology difference.  Due to the lack of documentation, it is impossible to determine how the Integration Analysis estimated the costs and mileages.  I suspect, but cannot prove, that the Integration Analysis assumed some sort of a relationship between railroad passenger investments and vehicle mile reductions based on the results of the Empire Corridor EIS.  Unfortunately, the existence of a relationship does not mean that you can estimate benefits for anything other than the total costs of the alternative.  The cost difference between the 110-mph alternative and the 125-mph alternative is $6.3 billion and diverts 307,475 auto trips away from the roads to the trains.  It is not appropriate, for example, to assume that an investment of $3 billion would divert half as many trips but I think that something along those lines was done.

Conclusion

Without herculean effort by many people over a long period it is impossible to evaluate all the cost-benefit claims in the Draft Scoping Plan.  It is not only that there are many components to the New York energy system but the lack of documentation means that a large part of the analysis is trying to guess how the numbers were generated.  The only alternative is to evaluate a few discrete components and to see if the estimates are reasonable.

This analysis evaluated the transportation sector vehicle miles traveled difference between Scenarios 2 and 3 relative to Scenario 4.  The Draft Scoping Plan claims that “Incremental reductions from enhanced in-state rail aligning with 125 MPH alternative detailed in Empire Corridor Tier 1 Draft EIS” will provide a reduction of 200 million light duty vehicle miles at a per unit cost of $6 per mile or $1.2 billion.  I estimate that the only valid cost for the difference between the rail alternatives is $8.4 billion and that it would only provide a reduction of 64.7 million miles.  While my estimate is for 2035, consistent with the Empire Corridor evaluation, and the Draft Scoping Plan is for 2050, I don’t think there is any question that the numbers are inconsistent.

Every time I have dug into the numbers, for example residential heating retrofit electrification, the Draft Scoping Plans numbers are not a reasonable estimate compared to my work. I have consistently found that the Scoping Plan costs estimates are biased high and the benefits proposed are biased low.  I conclude that there is little reason to trust the cost estimates in the Draft Scoping Plan because of the issues I have found.

All indications at the March 3, 2022 Climate Action Council meeting were that the plan for public involvement will simply going through the motions.  For example, there is no provision for the kind of discrepancy documented here to be reconciled as a result of public comments.  This example is trivial and has no major bearing on Climate Act implementation.  The terrifying prospect is that the issues associated with reliability raised at last summer’s Reliability Planning Speaker Session could possibly be treated the same, that is to say ignored.  Those issues must be addressed or the result could lead to people freezing to death in the dark.

Climate Act Upstream Emissions

The Draft Scoping Plan that outlines the implementation strategy for New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has been released for public comment by the Climate Action Council. This article discusses the implications of the Climate Act requirement to consider upstream emissions from fossil fuels imported into New York.  I believe that only considering the impacts of fossil fuels and not the impacts of “clean” energy development is biased and hypocritical.

If you are more interested in a video that addresses the point of this article there is an option.  Ron Clutz at Science Matters provides a post with a link and excerpted transcript to a video prepared by Deutsche Welle News, the German international broadcaster.  He explains:

The theme is described by adding a bit to the title: The Price of Green Energy Will Destroy Us.  The message is not about the exorbitant expense so much as the destruction of the world’s environment in order to save it.  The imagery in the video is compelling.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability and affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York, and cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  The Climate Act requires the Climate Action Council to “[e]valuate, using the best available economic models, emission estimation techniques and other scientific methods, the total potential costs and potential economic and non-economic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse gases, and make such evaluation publicly available” in the Scoping Plan. Starting in the Fall of 2020 seven advisory panels developed recommended strategies to meet the targets that were presented to the Climate Action Council in the spring of 2021.  Those recommendations were translated into specific policy options in an integration analysis by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants.  The integration analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021. The public comment period extends through at least the end of April 2022, and will also include a minimum of six public hearings. The Council will consider the feedback received as it “continues to discuss and deliberate on the topics in the Draft as it works towards a final Scoping Plan for release by January 1, 2023”.  Once complete an updated Energy Plan will guide New York’s energy policy going forward.

The Draft Scoping Plan “Key Milestones and Implementation Steps To-Date” is on page 21 and states (my emphasis added):

This draft Scoping Plan and recommendations outline measures and other State actions to ensure attainment of the statewide GHG emission limits and net zero emission goal. The statewide GHG emission limit rulemaking is the first regulatory action to implement the Climate Act, the foundation for multiple components of the Climate Act, and critically important for successful implementation of the Climate Act. DEC promulgated 6 NYCRR Part 496 that established the two statewide GHG emission limits called for in the Climate Act: a limit for 2030 that is equal to 60% of 1990 GHG emission levels and a limit for 2050 that is equal to 15% of 1990 emission levels. Specifically, using a 20-year global warming potential (GWP) and including upstream emissions from fossil fuels imported into New York as required by the Climate Act, the statewide GHG emission limit for 2030 is 245.87 million metric tons (MMT) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), and the statewide GHG emission limits for 2050 is 61.47 MMT CO2e. DEC, in consultation with NYSERDA, continues to update the inventory of GHGs and will publish the annual statewide GHG emissions report that reflects these updates.

This article concentrates on the significance and utter hypocrisy of the implications of “including upstream emissions from fossil fuels imported into New York as required by the Climate Act” into the Climate Act implementation process. 

Zero Emissions

The Climate Act is hypocritical.  Throughout the Draft Scoping Plan electricity generated by wind and solar resources and the energy storage systems required to cover for the intermittency of those renewable resources is referred to as “zero” emissions.  Of course, there are no emissions when these resources generate electricity.  However, in the Climate Act accounting framework fossil fuel generation includes not only direct emissions but also any upstream GHG emissions attributable to the extraction, transmission, and use of fossil fuels or electricity imported into the State.  The development of wind, solar, and energy storage resources on the scale necessary for the Climate Act certainly have environmental and emissions impacts for extraction of the rare earth metals necessary for those technologies, the construction of the massive number of structures needed, and the disposal of the enormous quantities of wind turbine blades and solar panels at the end of their useful lives.  This article summarizes references to these issues that I have documented on my “Clean” Energy Environmental Issues page

Paul Driessen summarizes my concerns in the Real Climate Crisis where he argues that the ecological destruction and human death tolls of the green energy transition is worse than the purported impacts of climate change.  He states:

They would require mining on scales unprecedented in human history, much of it by slave and child laborers, and nearly all using fossil fuels – bringing massive habitat and wildlife losses, air and water pollution, and horrific human health and safety problems. But since most of the mining, ore processing and manufacturing will occur in other countries, far from the USA, politicians and promoters of climate crisis can say this “alternative energy” is “clean and green.”

Rare Earth Metals

The EIA special report, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, is the most comprehensive global study to date on the central importance of minerals such as copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt and rare earth elements in a secure and rapid transformation of the global energy sector.   The report explains that:

The types of mineral resources used vary by technology. Lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese and graphite are crucial to battery performance, longevity and energy density. Rare earth elements are essential for permanent magnets that are vital for wind turbines and EV motors. Electricity networks need a huge amount of copper and aluminum, with copper being a cornerstone for all electricity-related technologies.

The reason this is an issue is because the clean energy technologies require more of these materials.  The report notes that:

A typical electric car requires six times the mineral inputs of a conventional car, and an onshore wind plant requires nine times more mineral resources than a gas-fired power plant. Since 2010, the average amount of minerals needed for a new unit of power generation capacity has increased by 50% as the share of renewables has risen.

The following graphic shows the increases needed.

 

French journalist and documentary filmmaker Guillaume Pitron has been following the global trade in rare earth metals. Unfortunately, mining these materials come with heavy environmental and social costs. Mining generates massive amounts of polluted wastewater, which left untreated, poisons crops and makes people sick. Guillaume documents these issues in his 2018 book “Rare Metals War’. Recently his work was summarized in the article Toxic secrets behind your mobile phone:

Above all, our dependence on rare metals brings two very big problems. The first is that mining, refining and recycling them is immensely polluting, thereby giving the lie to the idea that our increasingly digital and electricity-powered life is greener than one reliant on fossil fuels.

Second, one country – China – has a near stranglehold on the production and supply of rare metals. The Beijing government is not just seeking to control the metals found in its lands but also to control the production of rare metals wherever they are found on the globe. It has used barely credible chicanery to position itself as the sole supplier. It’s as if Saudi Arabia, which holds the world’s largest oil reserves, took it upon itself to control the reserves of the 13 other main petroleum-exporting countries.

The fact is that the European Union and the United States have little leverage to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine because they rely on Russia for the fossil fuels necessary to keep the lights on, homes heated, and transportation systems operating.  It seems obvious to me that it is imprudent to set up an energy system that is entirely dependent upon another nation whose interests may not be in our best interests.

Mark Mills’ Mines, Minerals, and “Green” Energy: A Reality Check paper from the Manhattan Institute picks up on the same themes: 

This paper turns to a different reality: all energy-producing machinery must be fabricated from materials extracted from the earth. No energy system, in short, is actually “renewable,” since all machines require the continual mining and processing of millions of tons of primary materials and the disposal of hardware that inevitably wears out. Compared with hydrocarbons, green machines entail, on average, a 10-fold increase in the quantities of materials extracted and processed to produce the same amount of energy.

This means that any significant expansion of today’s modest level of green energy—currently less than 4% of the country’s total consumption (versus 56% from oil and gas)—will create an unprecedented increase in global mining for needed minerals, radically exacerbate existing environmental and labor challenges in emerging markets (where many mines are located), and dramatically increase U.S. imports and the vulnerability of America’s energy supply chain.

Renewable Waste Disposal

Because the quantity of materials needed for wind turbines and solar panels is so much larger and those machines have shorter life expectancies, the inevitable result will be a waste disposal problem.  Consider wind turbine waste disposal.  They are so big that they have to be cut up and because they were designed to handle strong winds they cannot be “crushed, recycled or repurposed”.   As a result, the sheer volume of material is an issue.

Robert Bradley describes a Harvard Business Review article, The Dark Side of Solar Power, that concludes that “given the current very high recycling costs, there’s a real danger that all used panels will go straight to landfills”.  Bradley excerpts some passages from the article:

      • Economic incentives are rapidly aligning to encourage customers to trade their existing panels for newer, cheaper, more efficient models. In an industry where circularity solutions such as recycling remain woefully inadequate, the sheer volume of discarded panels will soon pose a risk of existentially damaging proportions.
      • The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)’s official projections assert that “large amounts of annual waste are anticipated by the early 2030s” and could total 78 million tonnes by the year 2050. That’s a staggering amount, undoubtedly. But with so many years to prepare, it describes a billion-dollar opportunity for recapture of valuable materials rather than a dire threat. The threat is hidden by the fact that IRENA’s predictions are premised upon customers keeping their panels in place for the entirety of their 30-year lifecycle. They do not account for the possibility of widespread early replacement.
      • The industry’s current circular capacity is woefully unprepared for the deluge of waste that is likely to come. The financial incentive to invest in recycling has never been very strong in solar. While panels contain small amounts of valuable materials such as silver, they are mostly made of glass, an extremely low-value material. The long lifespan of solar panels also serves to disincentivize innovation in this area.
      • The direct cost of recycling is only part of the end-of-life burden, however. Panels are delicate, bulky pieces of equipment usually installed on rooftops in the residential context. Specialized labor is required to detach and remove them, lest they shatter to smithereens before they make it onto the truck. In addition, some governments may classify solar panels as hazardous waste, due to the small amounts of heavy metals (cadmium, lead, etc.) they contain. This classification carries with it a string of expensive restrictions — hazardous waste can only be transported at designated times and via select routes, etc.
      • The same problem is looming for other renewable-energy technologies. For example, barring a major increase in processing capability, experts expect that more than 720,000 tons worth of gargantuan wind turbine blades will end up in U.S. landfills over the next 20 years. According to prevailing estimates, only five percent of electric-vehicle batteries are currently recycled – a lag that automakers are racing to rectify as sales figures for electric cars continue to rise as much as 40% year-on-year. The only essential difference between these green technologies and solar panels is that the latter doubles as a revenue-generating engine for the consumer. Two separate profit-seeking actors — panel producers and the end consumer — thus must be satisfied in order for adoption to occur at scale.

Conclusion

Andy West’s statement about another aspect of net-zero policies is equally applicable to the Climate Act mandate to consider upstream fossil fuel emissions while ignoring the impacts of “zero” emissions environmental impacts: “Ardent belief in cultural fairy-stories creates a pretty effective blindfold against glaring truths”.  The Climate Act’s war on fossil fuels is based entirely on the popular belief that climate change is an existential threat.  Authors of the law incorporated every opportunity to inflate the impact of fossil fuels and ignored any negative ramifications.  It is evident that there are significant issues associated with the materials necessary for the clean energy transition.  The Climate Act ignores them in a blatant example of hypocrisy.

NY Business Council Climate Act Scoping Plan Overview

The Draft Scoping Plan outlines the implementation strategy for New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has been released for public comment by the Climate Action Council. The NY Business Council recently published a summary of the Draft Scoping Plan that I think is an excellent overview of the Plan. 

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability and affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York, and cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  The Climate Act requires the Climate Action Council to “[e]valuate, using the best available economic models, emission estimation techniques and other scientific methods, the total potential costs and potential economic and non-economic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse gases, and make such evaluation publicly available” in the Scoping Plan. Starting in the Fall of 2020 seven advisory panels developed recommended strategies to meet the targets that were presented to the Climate Action Council in the spring of 2021.  Those recommendations were translated into specific policy options in an integration analysis by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants.  The integration analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021. The public comment period extends through at least the end of April 2022, and will also include a minimum of six public hearings. The Council will consider the feedback received as it “continues to discuss and deliberate on the topics in the Draft as it works towards a final Scoping Plan for release by January 1, 2023”.  Once complete an updated Energy Plan will guide New York’s energy policy going forward.

The NY Business Council is the “voice of business and employers in New York State Representing 3,500 business of all sizes, in all sectors Including nearly 100 local chambers and business groups”.  At a recent webinar Ken Pokalsky referenced a summary of the Draft Scoping Plan that he prepared.  I asked for permission to publicize his summary and this post is the result. 

The summary of thescoping plan points out that the document and supporting documents “amount to more than 1,000 pages and provide significant details on the Climate Action Council’s analysis and recommendations. It explains that “Some sections, i.e., transportation and buildings, provide specific recommendations and timelines for action” and that “Others, including sections on the electric power and natural gas sectors, and on industry, provide far less in the way of a detailed implementation plan.”

The distinction between the sections is an important point.  In order to be a credible basis for the Energy Plan’s roadmap for “providing clean, reliable, and lower-cost energy to all New Yorkers” the State has to prove that it is feasible.  While the transportation and building sector sections provide more detail it is barely sufficient for a feasibility analysis. There clearly isn’t anything approaching a feasibility analysis for the electric power and natural gas sectors.  I believe that this is partially due to the complexities of the electric and gas sectors.  Unfortunately, a main driver of policy is the political calculus to incorporate social and environmental justice concerns.  As a result, appeasing those interests is over-riding technological feasibility concerns.

Benefits and Costs

The following lists the benefits and costs presented with my indented and italicized comments.

  • The plan discusses the range of adverse impact caused by climate change and asserts that climate change will be affected by the actions proposed in the scoping plan.

Pokalsky recently gave a presentation at the Real Cost of New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act webinar.  My post on the webinar made the point that technical feasibility of wind, solar, and energy storage should be a primary concern but only one of six presenters raised that point because it is politically incorrect to argue the point.  Pointing out that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change technical reports don’t agree with the range of adverse impacts listed in the Draft Scoping plan and that the state has never quantified the effect of any New York GHG emission reduction program on global warming itself is even more of a politically incorrect argument.

 In addition to reducing the impacts of climate change, it recognizes that the state will need to adapt to risks that cannot be avoid.

I agree.

 While the report provides few specifics on the cost of implementation measures, it reports on macro-level models of the cost and benefits of multiple compliance scenarios, each of which projects that benefits will significantly outweigh implementation costs, with benefits including public health benefits from improved air quality Improvements in air quality, increased active transportation, and “energy efficiency interventions” in homes generating health benefits ranging from approximately $165 billion to $170 billion. However, this analysis compares the costs of implementing this state specific scoping plan with benefits, including estimates of avoided economic damage from climate change at up to $250 billion, benefits that would require actions beyond those proposed in this scoping plan to achieve.

I have shown that the health benefits claimed exaggerate the projected values, that the estimates of avoided economic damages from climate changes are manipulated to be 5.4 times higher than other jurisdictions, and, despite all the biased calculations, the benefits are not greater than the macro-level cost estimates unless the benefits of reductions are counted multiple times.  If only that error is corrected the total benefits range from negative $74.5 to negative $49.5 billion instead of positive net benefits ranging from $90 billion to $120 billion.

 The scoping plan applies an analytic framework that projects approximately $140 billion in annual New York State energy system expenditures, including capital expenditures and fuel costs, representing 8.9 percent of gross state product. A significant share of that amount, including $30 billion of $50 billion in fuel costs, leaves the state. In part, the economic impact study discusses the effect of redistributing these annual expenditures to achieve the state’s renewable energy and energy efficiency objectives.

In the absence of detailed cost numbers, it is difficult to comment on the analytic framework for costs.  This is a good description of what is available.

 Public health benefits from reduced GHG emissions will include those related to heat, flooding and food, water, and vector-based diseases, and will result in indirect benefits from the reduction of emissions of GHG co-pollutants including particulates and various toxic emissions.

The heat, flooding, food, water and vector-based disease benefits are associated with the social cost of carbon calculations.  I have prepared a white paper on these alleged benefits for anyone who wants to get into the technical details.

  • The scoping plan focuses significantly on historic disparate impacts on disadvantaged communities. Throughout the document, the scoping plan references recommendations of the Climate Justice Work Group (CJWC) and the extent to which they were not adopted by the Climate Action Council.

This is an important point that I have not addressed in my work yet.

  • The plan asserts that it establishes “the country’s – and perhaps even the planent’s – strongest GHG emission reduction and clean energy requirements,” and it will serve as a model for other jurisdictions.

At the end of the day, I believe that this is the only benefit of the plan.  New York’s politicians will have bragging rights.  Of course, the owners of the Titanic had bragging rights on their maiden voyage too.

 The scoping plan will result in a cleaner environment and a more competitive economy, and will support new jobs, new businesses, and new economic opportunities. (The CAC also issued a report on projected job creation resulting from CLCPA implementation.) It contains several recommendations for retraining workers displaced by CLCPA mandates, and for offsetting any adverse economic consequences on communities impacted by the loss of facilities. It recognizes that CLCPA implementation will require an expanded, trained workforce, and supports measures such as project labor and community workforce agreements on CLCPA-related projects.

This is a primary concern for the Business Council.  I have not addressed this in my work yet and given the amount of material will more than likely defer to the Business Council’s opinion.

  • It recognizes the potential impact of emission leakage due to actions that increase the cost of energy, reduces the reliability of energy, or increase the cost of GHG emissions, and recommends some approaches, including credits for early action and targeted incentives.

This is another topic I have not addressed.  Based on my work with Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative emissions leakage I am pretty sure that leakage is inevitable but that the numbers can be manipulated to make it look like less of an issue.

Conclusion

The Business Council memo is intended to provide an overview of the most significant energy-related proposals impacting major sectors of the New York State’s economy. It does an excellent job in that regard.  The memo points out that “Most businesses will be impacted by the recommendations of multiple sector-specific proposals”. The Business Council urges its members to review the scoping plan and get involved with their internal comment development process.  I recommend that all New Yorkers review the plan and comment too.

Air Permit Applications and the Climate Act

The implementation strategy for New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is being finalized by the Climate Action Council  in 2022.  Because the schedule is so ambitious the Council has been pushing for the implementation of policies even before the strategies are finalized.  This post addresses the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) proposed policy DAR-21: The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act and Air Permit Applications that is supposed to establish the procedures staff will use to review permit applications with respect to the Climate Act.  This turns out to be another example of the Climate Act putting the cart before the horse.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that it will adversely affect reliability and affordability, risk safety, affect lifestyles, will have worse impacts on the environment than the purported effects of climate change in New York, and cannot measurably affect global warming when implemented.   The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  The Climate Act requires the Climate Action Council to “[e]valuate, using the best available economic models, emission estimation techniques and other scientific methods, the total potential costs and potential economic and non-economic benefits of the plan for reducing greenhouse gases, and make such evaluation publicly available” in the Scoping Plan. Starting in the Fall of 2020 seven advisory panels developed recommended strategies to meet the targets that were presented to the Climate Action Council in the spring of 2021.  Those recommendations were translated into specific policy options in an integration analysis by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants.  The integration analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021. The public comment period extends through at least the end of April 2022, and will also include a minimum of six public hearings. The Council will consider the feedback received as it “continues to discuss and deliberate on the topics in the Draft as it works towards a final Scoping Plan for release by January 1, 2023”.  Once that is complete the Energy Plan will be revised to set the state’s energy policies. The goal of the Energy Plan process is to “map the state’s energy future by showing how the state can ensure adequate supplies of power, reduce demand through new technologies and energy efficiency, preserve the environment, reduce dependence on imported gas and oil, stimulate economic growth, and preserve the individual welfare of New York citizens and energy users”.

The Proposed Policy DAR-21: The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act and Air Permit Applications describes “the content of analyses required by the Division of Air Resources (DAR) pursuant to the requirements of Section 7(2) of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA). Chapter 106 of the Laws of 2019”. It further describes “the procedures staff in DAR will follow when reviewing those analyses for conformance with the requirements of the CLCPA”. Finally, this policy “establishes the types of air pollution control permit actions required to prepare an analysis as part of the permit application process”.

My Comments

I submitted comments on the proposed rule.  My main concern is that if DEC refuses to permit individual existing air permit applications without considering whether the facility is needed for reliability then problems could occur.  Importantly, DEC has no such responsibility so they should work with the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) to cover this concern.

The policy document outlines the requirements for analyses developed “pursuant to Section 7(2) of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) in support of air pollution control permit applications”. The document notes that the CLCPA went into effect January 1, 2020 (Chapter 106 of the Laws of 2019). It also notes that the CLCPA also establishes a Climate Action Council that is given three years (by January 1, 2023) to finalize a Scoping Plan providing recommendations for meeting those limits, and requires the DEC to promulgate regulations on GHG emission sources within four years (by January 1, 2024) that will ensure those limits are met. I commented that this policy is putting the cart before the horse. It is inappropriate to require analysis before regulations are promulgated simply because no standards have been established.

Ultimately the problem with the guidance document can be traced back to the CLCPA presumption that a transition to net-zero can be accomplished by 2050 if only there is political will. The reality is that there are enormous technological challenges particularly for the mandated schedule. As a result, there is a gaping hole in the Scoping Plan because it does not include a feasibility plan for the specific technology and schedule that the Climate Action Council proposes. It is not clear to me when and how the organizations responsible for electric system reliability will review and sign off on an implementation plan. Until that happens it is inappropriate for DEC to put any limitations on fossil-fired generation.

My comments argued that it is obvious that there are serious limitations with existing technology and the aggressive schedule. The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 2021-2030 Comprehensive Reliability Plan is the most recent reliability study in New York. It states:

Moving to 2040, the CLCPA requires generation to be emission-free. The Climate Change Study looked at 100 x 40 (emission-free electric grid by 2040). It noted the significant amount of dispatchable resources that would be needed to meet that goal but did not describe the technology that would be able to provide a dispatchable resource, instead choosing to refer to generic dispatchable, emission-free resources. Not surprisingly, the Climate Change report found that a similar amount of dispatchable resources as the RNA case would be needed to maintain reliability under baseline assumptions. However, under CLCPA assumptions, the amount of dispatchable emission-free resources needed increases to over 32,000 MW in 2040, approximately 6,000 MW more than the total fossil-fueled generation fleet on the grid in 2021. The Climate Change Study noted that the current system is heavily dependent on existing fossil-fueled resources to maintain reliability and eliminating these resources from the mix “will require an unprecedented level of investment in new and replacement infrastructure, and/or the emergence of a zero-carbon fuel source for thermal generating resources” (emphasis added). The Climate Change Study did note that while the amount of installed capacity (MW) of dispatchable resources is significant, the amount of energy generated (MWh) required from such resources would likely not be significant, with the percent of total energy being in the range of 10% ― 20% range depending on the penetration level of intermittent resources.

This guidance and the Draft Scoping Plan don’t consider one component of the CLCPA. The Public Service Commission mandate in Public Service (PBS) CHAPTER 48, ARTICLE 4, § 66-p. Establishment of a renewable energy program (4) that states:

The commission may temporarily suspend or modify the obligations under such program provided that the commission, after conducting a hearing as provided in section twenty of this chapter, makes a finding that the program impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service; the program is likely to impair existing obligations and agreements; and/or that there is a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections that the commission determines is related to the program.

Given that the Energy Plan has to consider the provision for safe and adequate electric service, and it will not be prepared until 2023, it is premature for DEC to pick any winning or losing technologies in this guidance or any other permitting decisions for that matter. I recommended that the effective data be made contingent upon the completion of an Energy Plan that meets PBS Chapter 48, Article 4, § 66-p. Establishment of a renewable energy program requirement for safe and adequate electric service. Because reducing emissions is so dependent upon electrification the electric service criterion is a good surrogate for all permitting activities covered by the guidance.

There is another aspect of NYISO) 2021-2030 Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP) report that the guidance should consider.  My comments highlighted some risk factors that threaten electric system reliability in the report.  The CRP states:

As generators age and experience more frequent and longer duration outages, the costs to maintain the assets increase. These costs may drive aging generation into retirement. A growing amount of New York’s gas-turbine and fossil fuel-fired steam-turbine capacity is reaching an age at which, nationally, a vast majority of similar capacity has been deactivated. As shown in Figure 11, by 2028 more than 8,300 MW of gas-turbine and steam-turbine based capacity in New York will reach an age beyond which 95% of these types of generators have deactivated. 

The impact of the unavailability of system resources can readily be seen through tipping point evaluations. While transmission security within New York City (Zone J) is maintained through the ten-year period in accordance with design criteria, the margin would be very tight starting in 2025 and would be deficient beginning in 2028 if forced outages are experienced at the historical rate, as shown in Figure 12. Transmission security within Long Island (Zone K) is also maintained through the ten-year period, with the slimmest margin in the first few years as shown in Figure 13. If forced outages are experienced at the historical rate the Long Island margin would be sufficient through the study period.

My comments pointed out that using history as a guide, there will be forced outages from these old generating resources.  Obviously not renewing permits will exacerbate this problem.

Replacement Permit Applications

Obliviously, DEC has rejected permits for new replacement generating facilities that addresses this risk factor.  This was outside the scope of the guidance document but is important for readers to understand. In the DEC’s “Notice of Denial of Title V Air Permit” for the Danskammer Energy Center (DEC ID: 3-3346-00011/00017) and its “Notice of Denial of Title V Air Permit” for the Astoria Gas Turbine Power Project (DEC ID: 2-6301-00191/00014), the DEC rejected the use of both hydrogen and renewable natural gas (RNG) as a 2040 compliance mechanism because the DEC labeled them “speculative” and “aspirational”. However, the Scoping Plan’s placeholder for a dispatchable, emission-free resource is hydrogen. Governor Hochul’s recent State of the State address proposes that New York position itself to compete for nearly $10 billion in federal funding for green hydrogen R&D under the federal infrastructure bill. Obviously, it is in the state’s best interest to preserve the option to use hydrogen in the future. In the meantime, the options to supplant the dispatchable energy from those facilities with energy storage and renewable energy alternatives are no less “speculative” and “aspirational”.   In my comments I argued that the proposed guidance must incorporate a process similar to that used for the Peaker Rule (6NYCRR Part 227-3) whereby the NYISO works with DEC to ensure reliability issues are addressed for any permit application affecting electric generation viability.

Conclusion

The zeal of the State of New York to implement the Climate Act before the plan is complete is endangering the security of the electric grid.  In particular, there are many generating units in the state and New York City in particular that are nearing the end of their useful life. I submitted comments arguing that the DAR-21 Guidance must be revised to incorporate electric system reliability considerations.  Firstly, as shown above there are reliability concerns related to existing electrical generators.  The guidance must not preclude continued operation of existing units.  Secondly, DEC should not prevent operators from developing modern generating units that are more reliable than the existing aging units.  Even if the state plans to shut down all fossil-fired units by 2040 the owners know that and it can be addressed with a permit condition.  Finally, the Energy Plan has to consider the provision for safe and adequate electric service at the same time that the Draft Scoping Plan is proposing the use of currently unavailable technology.  For all three reasons it is premature for any DEC application to limit, shut down or prevent upgrades at existing electrical generation facilities.