Category: Climate Act

New York State GHG Emissions Trends

This is my 400th article on the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero transition.  It seems appropriate to look at where the state stands relative to the time when I started writing these articles and the Climate Act targets.  This summary supplements the progress status summary described by Francis Menton and the generation trend status prepared by Nuclear New York by looking at Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions.

I have followed the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act)  since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written 400 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation.  Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned.  Many aspects of the transition are falling behind, and the magnitude of the necessary costs is coming into focus.  When political fantasies meet reality, reality always wins.

Nuclear New York – Generation Trends

In a press release on January 8, 2024 Nuclear New York, “Independent Advocates for Reliable Carbon-Free Energy” explained that “four years since passing the Climate Act, New York struggles to replace shuttered clean energy “.  Their release stated (foot notes removed):

In 2023, nuclear power was once again the largest single source of clean energy in New York State. Electricity generation from this carbon-free source totaled 27.6 terawatt hours (TWh), up 2.7% over 2022. Nuclear covered 18.1% of the state’s total electricity demand (including behind-the-meter “rooftop” solar generation), and amounted to 42.7% of in-state clean electricity.

Hydro, the second largest source of carbon-free power, recovered 2.1% in 2023 to 27.2 TWh, covering 17.9% of demand. These two ‘firm clean’ generation sources provide on-demand power regardless of the time of day or weather.

Despite increasing deployed wind capacity in 2022 by 13% over 2021, generation from this source declined 3.9% in 2023 over 2022 to 4.7 TWh, demonstrating the perils of relying on weather-dependent renewable energy. New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) does not report grid-connected solar as a separate category, given its currently minuscule contribution to the generation mix. However, rooftop solar generation increased 18% to 5.2 TWh, covering 3.4% of demand.

New York’s electricity demand declined by 4.8 TWh over 2022 (-3.1%), which enabled the state to reduce net imports by 4.3 TWh. In-state fossil fuel combustion decreased by 2.3 TWh, but remained 11.0 TWh (21%) above 2019 levels, when clean energy generation peaked.

Updates on the March to the New York Great Green Future

Francis Menton’s update on the net-zero transition asks the question where are we and responds:

The Manhattan Contrarian Energy Storage Report of December 1, 2022, led off by sounding a clear alarm: getting electricity from intermittent wind and solar well past 50% of total generation would require enormous quantities of energy to be stored, with technical requirements, including duration of storage, well beyond the capability of any battery currently existing or likely to be invented any time soon. Essentially, if fossil fuels are to be eliminated, there is only one realistic possibility for meeting the storage requirements: hydrogen.

In mid-2023, the New York Independent System Operator, to its credit, recognized the problem — although it buried that recognition deep in a report when it should be shouting about the problem from the rooftops. From NYISO’s Power Trends 2023 Report, revised August 2023, page 7, starting in the middle of a paragraph and without any emphasis:

“[T]o achieve the mandates of the CLCPA, new emission-free generating technologies with the necessary reliability service attributes will be needed to replace the flexible, dispatchable capabilities of fossil fuel generation and sustain production for extended periods of time. Such emission-free technologies, either individually or in aggregate, are not yet available on a commercial scale.“

With hydrogen as the only possible such “emissions-free generating technology,” how much would hydrogen cost as the solution to this problem, particularly if one follows the hypothesis that it must be created without any use of fossil fuels? My Report, page 14, noted that existing commercial production of this so-called “green” hydrogen was “negligible,” leaving no good benchmark for understanding what the costs might be. As a substitute, I ran some rough numbers based on cost of wind and solar generators to make the electricity and efficiency of the electrolysis process. The result was a very rough estimate that this “green” hydrogen would cost “somewhere in the range of 5 to 10 times more” than natural gas (page 17).

Well, now some new precision has come into view. In July 2022 the UK government launched what it calls its First Hydrogen Allocation Round (HAR 1), to obtain bids and award contracts to produce this so-called “green” hydrogen using wind power. The process took a while, but here from December 14, 2023 is the announcement of the first round of contract awards. Excerpt:

“Following the launch of the first hydrogen allocation round (HAR1) in July 2022, we have selected the successful projects to be offered contracts. We are pleased to announce 11 successful projects, totalling 125MW capacity. HAR1 puts the UK in a leading position internationally: this represents the largest number of commercial scale green hydrogen production projects announced at once anywhere in Europe. . . . The 11 projects have been agreed at a weighted average strike price of £241/MWh.“

£241/MWh? At today’s exchange rate of 1.27 $/£, that would be $306/MWh. Prices of natural gas are generally quoted in $/MMBTU rather than per MWh, but here is EIA’s latest Electricity Monthly Update, dated December 21 and covering the month of October 2023. It gives natural gas prices in the per MWh units. The “price of natural gas at New York City” is given as $11.32/MWh. That would make the price that the UK has just agreed to pay to buy this “green” hydrogen stuff approximately 27 times what we can buy natural gas for here in New York to obtain the same energy content.

And that $306/MWh is just for the hydrogen. It includes nothing for the massive new facilities (underground salt caverns?) to store the stuff, for a new pipeline network to transport it, and for a new collection of power plants to burn it.

Electric Generating Unit Emission Trends

Electric generating units report emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency Clean Air Markets Division as part of the compliance requirements for the Acid Raiin Program and other market-based programs that require accurate and complete emissions data.  The 2023 emissions data submittal date was January 31 and I downloaded the data the next day.  Something has changed in the data access system so I could not check to see if all the facilities reported on time.  If some facilities had to ask for a delayed submittal this could mean that the totals are lower that actual emissions.

The following table lists the emissions since 2009 when the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative started.  Emissions of CO2, SO2, and NOx are down dramatically over this period.  The primary reason is that the fracking revolution made the cost of natural gas so cheap relative to other fuels that every facility that could convert to natural gas did so.  New York banned the use of coal in 2021 which forced the retirement of the remaining coal plants.  The state still has some facilities that primarily burn residual oil but those run infrequently.  The takeaway message is that the fuel switching options are no longer available so future reductions will only come as zero-emissions resources displace facilities burning fossil fuels.

The following graph shows the emission trends.  Note that I divided the CO2 emissions by 1,000 so that all the parameters would show up on the same plot.  The impact of the closure of the Indian Point nuclear facility mentioned in the Nuclear New York presentation is clearly shown as CO2 rose over the last three years until the 2023 emissions started down.  Importantly that could be mostly due to weather variations and not necessarily the addition of the renewables shown above.

New York State GHG Emission Trends

A relevant question is where we stand in regards to the Climate Act mandate for a 40% reduction from a 1990 baseline in GHG emissions by 2030.  Unfortunately, that is not easily answered in sufficient detail to be able to figure out what is going on.

The regulation setting the 1990 baseline emissions values that form the basis for the 2030 40% reduction and the 2050 85% reduction was promulgated in 2020.  It sets the limits

§ 496.4 Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emission Limits

(a) For the purposes of this Part, the estimated level of statewide greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 is 409.78 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, using a GWP20 as provided in Section 496.5 of this Part.

(b) For the purposes of this Part, the table below establishes statewide emission limits for the year specified, as a percentage of estimated 1990 statewide greenhouse gas emissions of 60 percent and 15 percent, respectively, measured in millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent gas using a GWP20 as provided in Section 496.5 of this Part.

YearStatewide greenhouse gas emission limit (in million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent)
2030245.87
205061.47

The Regulatory Impact Statement for the regulation included a table that breaks down the 1990 emissions by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sectors and gases.  As shown below there is not much of a breakdown.  Note that all the rest of the emissions will be reported as the CO2 equivalents so you do not need to worry about the component gases.

According to the 2023 Statewide GHG Emissions webpage “The Climate Act requires the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to issue an annual report on statewide greenhouse gas emissions, pursuant to Section 75-0105 of the Environmental Conservation Law.”  The most recent report covering the years 1990 through 2021 was released in late December 2023. The following reports were released at that time:

I extracted summary data from each of the sectoral reports to provide some idea of where New York stands relative to the 2030 targets in the following table.  The Part 496 1990 column lists the regulatory baseline numbers.  The estimated emissions in the 2023 Statewide GHG Emissions are listed for 1990, 2005, and the last five years.  I list the sector 2030 targets (40% of 1990 emissions) and the percentage reduction necessary to meet the targets. 

The first thing that pops out is that the 2023 inventory has a different estimate for 1990.  GHG emission inventories require indirect estimates of many of the emission sources and the assumptions regarding the emission factor that estimates emissions with an activity and the activity rate.  This is a fundamental problem with emission factors and means that for full transparency all the emission factors and associated activity levels should be clearly documented.

The second thing of note is that none of the IPCC sectors are even close to the 2030 targets.  The Scoping Plan’s quantitative assessment in the Integration Analysis essentially is a list of control strategies, presumed control efficiencies, and expected emission reductions that when added up meet the limits.  That assessment was poorly documented, contains inconsistencies with similar New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) analyses, and there has never been any response to comments about inconsistencies and other issues identified in the Scoping Plan comments.  There is no feasibility analysis to determine if those targets can be met with any assurance.

I tried to analyze the data used for the 2023 Statewide GHG Emissions.  Those data are available for download from Open Data NY.  This is another instance where it is not easy to break down the components of the IPCC sectors to determine if it is realistically possible to meet the 2030 targets because state agencies do not provide consistent data.

The Regulatory Impact Statement for Part 496 included Table 4 that broke down fuel combustion GHG emissions within the IPCC energy sector.  Because I used the dataset itself, I picked the sector categories that I believe match the Table 4 categories.  Note that I did not include fuel combustion from petroleum refining in the table because I could not find categories that I thought matched it.  The following table lists the results for the last ten years and compared the 2021 emissions to the 2030 target. Fuel combustion in the electric and industrial sectors are already lower than the equivalent 2030 targets.  On the other hand, transportation and fuel combustion in the commercial and residential sectors will require significant reductions to meet the targets. 

Is that feasible?  Consider what is needed for just one parameter.  To determine if the transportation fuel combustion reductions are feasible, the expected reductions per gasoline vehicle must be estimated.  Miles per gallon and the annual mileage need to be estimated for a range of users and locations so that a reasonable estimate of state-wide fuel use can be estimated.  Once you know that then you can determine how many zero-emissions vehicles must be deployed.  Is that estimate realistic?  That is not all because zero-emissions vehicles also require charging infrastructure and that affects the distribution infrastructure. It is easy to say the model projections meet the 2030 targets but the range of parameters that can be tweaked is so large that any pre-conceived answer can be produced. 

I also put these data in a graph.  I am not sure it adds much value, but I spent enough time on it that I don’t want to waste the effort.  The overall trend suggests that it might be possible to meet the targets if, and only if, the historical rate of emission reductions can be replicated.  Given that the electricity and industrial sectors have achieved the greatest reductions but have no readily available additional reductions, I am not optimistic. 

Conclusion

The 400 articles I have written on the Climate Act all lead to the same result.  When you look at the numbers as shown in this post, the enormity of the challenge is clear. Paraphrasing Francis Menton:

No person looking at these charts would ever conclude that New York has spent the past five years embarked on a crash program to replace fossil fuels with wind and solar. That process is going absolutely nowhere.

Climate and Energy Fantasy and Tyranny

Paul Driessen recently wrote an article explaining that “Models, myths and misinformation on climate drive models, myths and misinformation on energy” at Cfact,org.  It is such a good summary of the overarching issues associated with New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) that I want to present it here with some commentary.

I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 380 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation.  Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned.  Many aspects of the transition are falling behind and the magnitude of the necessary costs is coming into focus.  When political fantasies meet reality, reality always wins.

Climate and energy fantasy and tyranny

Paul Driessen is senior policy analyst for the Committee For A Constructive Tomorrow (www.CFACT.org) and “author of books and articles on energy, environment, climate and human rights issues.” He covers “climate change, energy and environmental, human rights, corporate social responsibility, sustainable development, and renewable energy issues in articles and research papers, on radio programs and college campuses, and at professional and other conferences.”

In this article he writes that “It’s mystifying and terrifying that our lives, livelihoods and living standards are increasingly dictated by activist, political, bureaucratic, academic and media ruling elites, who disseminate theoretical nonsense, calculated myths and outright disinformation.”  I have observed that they do this all the while claiming that they are “following the science”

Driessen describes the existential threat rationale and the disconnect between the narrative and historical climate change before human effects and the actual recent data since the alleged human effects started:

We’re constantly told the world will plunge into an existential climate cataclysm if average planetary temperatures rise another few tenths of a degree, due to using fossil fuels for reliable, affordable energy, raw materials for over 6,000 vital products, and lifting billions out of poverty, disease and early death.

Climate alarmism implicitly assumes Earth’s climate was stable until coal, oil and gas emissions knocked it off kilter … and would be stable again if people stopped using fossil fuels.

In the real world, climate has changed numerous times, often dramatically, sometimes catastrophically, and always naturally. Multiple ice ages and interglacial periods, Roman and Medieval warm periods, a Little Ice Age, major floods, droughts and dust bowls all actually happened – long before fossil fuels.

Data for tornados, hurricanes and other extreme weather events prove they are not getting more frequent or intense. You might argue that Harvey and Irma marked a sudden increase in major hurricanes in 2017 – but that’s only because after Wilma there’d been a record twelve years of zero Category 3-5 hurricanes.

He makes the point that if people would bother to look at the data and figure out that the headlines come from models that can be configured to get any answer desired that the reasons for the transition would evaporate:

We need to ignore the fear-mongering, look at actual historic records, and recognize that more dangerous, unprecedented calamities upward trends simply aren’t there. We need to insist that alarmists distinguish and quantify human influences versus natural forces for recent temperature, climate and weather events – and show when, where and how human activities replaced natural forces. They haven’t done so.

The only place manmade temperature and climate catastrophes exist is in Michael Mann and other GIGO computer models. These climate models are worthless for policymaking because they aren’t verified by actual measurements, don’t account for urban heat island effects, and cannot incorporate the vast scale and complexity of atmospheric, planetary and galactic forces that determine Earth’s climate.

Another over-looked point is the impacts of cold weather relative to warm weather:

In reality, people and planet are threatened far more by global cooling than warming. Even a couple degrees drop in average global temperatures would drastically reduce growing seasons, arable land, plant growth, wildlife habitats and agricultural output – especially if it’s accompanied by reductions in plant-fertilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide levels. Plants, animals and people would face starvation.

He goes on to point out that fear mongering about climate change is not the only flawed story.  The idea that there is a solution that is simple and cost-effective is equally unsound:

We’re also told ruling elites could prevent this imagined crisis by switching us to wind, solar and battery power. (They also want to eliminate cows and modern agriculture, over misplaced concerns about methane and fertilizer, but that’s another discussion.)

Build a coal, gas or nuclear power plant – and unless governments shut it down or cut off fuel supplies, the plant provides plentiful, reliable, affordable electricity nearly 24/7/365 for decades. Build a massive sprawling wind or solar installation, and you have to back up every kilowatt with coal, gas or nuclear power – or with millions of huge batteries – for every windless, sunless period.

The economic and ecological effects would be ruinous.

Driessen does a good explaining the qualities that make fossil and nuclear generating the best choice for providing power to society:

 Coal, gas and nuclear plants can be built close to electricity-intensive urban centers. Tens of thousands of wind turbines and billions of solar panels must go where there’s good wind and sunshine, far from urban areas, connected by high voltage transmission lines. In fact, for Net Zero, says the International Energy Agency (IEA), the world would need 50,000,000 miles of new and upgraded transmission lines by 2040!

All those “clean, green, renewable, sustainable, affordable” wind, solar and battery systems, backup generators, transmission lines and electric vehicles would require millions of tons of iron, copper, aluminum, manganese, cobalt, lithium, concrete, plastics and numerous other metals and minerals.

Onshore wind turbines require nine times more materials per megawatt – and offshore turbines need fourteen times more – than a combined-cycle natural gas power plant, the IEA calculates. Solar panels and EVs have the same problem.

To get these materials, billions of tons of overlying rock must be removed to reach billions of tons of ores – which then must be processed in huge industrial facilities that use mercury and toxic chemicals … emit vast quantities of greenhouse gases and toxic pollutants … and are powered by coal or natural gas. Many components for these “green” technologies are derived from oil and natural gas.

US and other Western facilities control and recycle these pollutants. Chinese and Russian facilities pay little attention to air and water pollution, workplace safety, or fossil fuel use, efficiency and emissions – yet they supply over 80% of “renewable” energy raw materials, because the West increasingly bans mining and processing and makes energy prohibitively expensive to operate mines and factories.

Pseudo-renewable energy worldwide would cost hundreds of trillions of dollars, would have to be subsidized by trillions of taxpayer dollars, and would dramatically increase electricity rates.

Ultimately, I think the public will balk at the transition when the costs become clear.  Driessen explains:

Electric vehicle, appliance and heating mandates would double or triple all these infrastructure, materials, mining and land use requirements, ecological impacts and costs.

American residential electricity prices in 2023 ranged from 10.4¢ per kilowatt-hour (Idaho) to 28.4¢ per kWh (California). British families paid 47¢ per kWh! UK factories and businesses paid up to three times what their US counterparts did. German families, factories and businesses are in the same capsizing boat.

But EU industrial leaders say energy prices must continue rising, to cover the soaring costs of the “energy transition.” If they don’t, factories, jobs and emissions will move overseas. But if they do, families will freeze jobless in the dark.

In the face of these obvious problems I often wonder why the net-zero transition has so much momentum.  I agree with Driessen’s suggestion:

What many call the Climate Industrial Complex has a monumental stake in perpetuating this situation. Collectively, its members have incredible power, control much of government and education, hold enormous financial stakes in green tech subsidies, and often censor contrarian viewpoints.

There is another troubling problem.  The plans for the energy transition simply cannot work.  When they don’t there are hints that life style changes will be mandated:

Just as ominous, if it becomes clear that the Brave New World of Net Zero Energy cannot provide sufficient affordable electricity and other necessities for modern industries, healthcare and living standards, two-thirds of America’s ruling elites favor food and energy rationing to combat climate change and retain their anti-capitalism, anti-growth agenda. It’s likely the same in Europe and Canada.

The Biden Administration and other governments are already dictating the kinds of vehicles we can drive and what appliances and heating systems we can use. They’re already exploring ways to limit the kind and size of homes we can live in, how warm and cool we can keep them, how often we can travel by air, the kinds and amounts of meat we can eat, and many other aspects of our lives.

New York State has never quantified the potential effect of their GHG emission reduction policies on the climate or admitted that New York emissions relative to other countries are insignificant:

Meanwhile, China, India, Indonesia and dozens of other countries are building hundreds of coal and gas generating units – further underscoring the insanity and futility of trying to control energy sources, quantities and emissions.

He concludes that the politicians currently in power have to be voted out to stop the transition:

This is what America’s 2024 state and national elections are about – and elections in Europe, Canada, Australia and elsewhere. The longer these elites remain in power, the more our liberties, lives and living standards will resemble life a century ago under authoritarian regimes. Vote accordingly.

Conclusion

New York’s net-zero transition is going to cause more harm than good.  Current energy system levels of reliability, affordability, and effects on the environment will be impacted negatively.  This has always been a political construct so the only way to change it is to change the politicians in charge.

Dutchess County Comments on the Central Hudson Climate Act Implementation Plan

One of my readers sent me some documents related to the implementation of New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) from the Central Hudson rate case, CASE 23-E-0418.  I asked if I could credit him for providing the material for this post but he prefers to be anonymous: “I don’t need the re-education task force tracking me down.”  This post highlights some commonsense issues related to the effects of Climate Act implementation on a utility rate case.

I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 380 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation.  Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned and many aspects of the transition are falling behind, and the magnitude of the necessary costs is coming into focus.  When political fantasies meet reality, reality always wins.

Central Hudson Rate Case

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation (Central Hudson) is a “regulated transmission and distribution utility serving approximately 315,000 electric customers and 90,000 natural gas customers in a defined service territory of New York State’s Mid-Hudson River Valley”.  On July 31, 2023 Central Hudson submitted revisions to its electric and gas rates (“Rate Case”).  It includes double-digit gas and electric delivery rate increases and the public outcry has been intense.  In this post I highlight some of the issues that affect costs that are imposed by the Climate Act.

There is a dynamic at work for all New York corporations relative to the Climate Act.  All companies know it is going to cost a lot of money, threaten reliability and will not make much of a difference to global warming.  However, not unlike the Star Trek line used by “the Borg in the series, who assimilate various cultures into their own and warn the encountered species, that ‘resistance is futile’”, companies have few options opposing the Climate Act.  If they publicly oppose the Climate Act well organized environmental organizations will claim that they are against solving the existential threat of climate change.  Recent administrations in New York have an outsized and weaponized influence on regulatory actions.  As a result, criticizing a political policy will adversely affect doing business with state agencies and very likely impact the outcome of rate cases.  There are no upsides to opposition in my opinion.

Central Hudson has done about as much as they could to educate their customers.  Their Energy in Transition webpage addressed the question: “How quickly can we transition to an energy system that protects the environment without compromising highly consistent and reliable service at a reasonable cost?”.  It describes the Climate Act, outlines Central Hudson’s position, and includes examples of what people are saying about the risks of the net-zero transition.  Also included are videos on implementation of the Climate Act and New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) videos that help New Yorkers understand the important changes and challenges ahead.  All this is accompanied by the following:

Residents and businesses should be aware of the changes that are coming and help shape the transition by contacting your state legislator or contacting the Governor’s office if you have thoughts about how these changes may affect you.

On the other hand, the balance between trying to appease politicians and providing customers with electric and gas service upon demand at a reasonable price is a challenge.  The primary point in the comments described below is that Central Hudson went too far trying to appease the State at the expense of its customers.

Climate Leadership and Sustainability Panel

In the initial submittal Central Hudson included the Direct Testimony of its Climate Leadership and Sustainability Panel (CLSP) along with exhibits.  The stated purpose of the Panel’s testimony in the Rate Case says:

Central Hudson has made substantial efforts and investments to facilitate and support New York State’s decarbonization and environmental justice objectives as established within New York State’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (“CLCPA”). The Panel will first outline the requirements of the CLCPA itself, as well as the outcomes of the Company’s facilitation and support of the CLCPA goals. The Panel will explain the need for a deferral mechanism for costs that are incurred in support of CLCPA compliance. The Panel will also present the Company’s completed, ongoing, and planned activities that are consistent with the CLCPA, including the Company’s Sustainability Strategy and Efforts; Climate-Driven Planning, Studies, and Reporting; Gas Initiatives; Electric Vehicle (“EV”) Make Ready Programs (“MRP”), Supplemental EV programs; Electrification of Central Hudson’s fleet; and the Company’s Onsite Solar Proposal. The Panel will explicitly identify the Company’s proposed CLCPA-aligned initiatives and associated recovery mechanisms within this proceeding.

Rate Cases and the Climate Act

This post highlights the Direct Testimony of Allan R. Page on behalf of Dutchess County New York:  “The primary purpose of his  testimony is to “express the concerns of Dutchess County as the concerns relate to how climate is being addressed in these rate cases.”  He founded A. Page & Associates after a 32-year career with Central Hudson.  His testimony focused on Central Hudson’s proposed expenditures to meet the requirements of the Climate Act.

In the testimony, Dutchess County gave reasons why “Central Hudson should not pursue any emissions reduction initiatives beyond what is required by state regulation” as proposed by its Climate Leadership and Sustainability Panel. The testimony expressed “concern about the overall cost of achieving state clean energy policy objectives and the impact such costs will have on customers”, stated that “emissions reduction efforts within New York State will have little impact on the global climate and that New Yorkers, including those residing in disadvantaged communities (“DACs”), may not directly benefit. For these reasons”.

I address three of the Dutchess County concerns raised: the costs and customer benefits of clean energy investments, funding for the supplemental electric vehicle programs; and the company’s onsite solar proposal.  The Direct Testimony of Allan R. Page (“Dutchess County Testimony”) and the Rebuttal Testimony of the Climate Leadership and Sustainability Panel (“Rebuttal Testimony”) documents in the Public Service Commission docket for the Central Hudson rate case proceeding were used for the following.

Clean Energy Investments

The Dutchess County Testimony describes Panel proposals that will increase costs with minimal benefits to customers.  For example, it notes that Central Hudson’s is “taking ‘significant steps’ ‘to enhance corporate focus on sustainability and incorporate climate change considerations into its operations’ while building upon ‘understanding stakeholder interests” but points that the focus “does not

come free of change” nor does it provide tangible benefits to its customers.

The Rebuttal Testimony comment summarizes the Dutchess County concerns with clean energy investments:

The Panel acknowledges Dutchess County’s concerns regarding the overall cost of achieving the CLCPA emissions reduction and clean energy goals. The future costs, as well as responsibility for those costs, are not fully understood at this time. The Company supports a balance, one where safety, reliability, and just and reasonable rates are core elements of the Company’s utility planning and operations, while the incorporation of clean energy initiatives provides support for the achievement of New York’s CLCPA targets. As Dutchess County indicates in its testimony, “Through PSC regulation and orders, balance is defined.” The Company’s clean energy investments are consistent with those included in recent Public Service Commission (“PSC” or “Commission”) orders approving utility rate plans.

The statement that “future costs, as well as responsibility for those costs, are not fully understood at this time” is absolutely true.  To the defense of Central Hudson, the Scoping Plan is no more than an outline of control strategies with incomplete cost documentation.  There has never been a feasibility analysis to determine how the strategies might work and how the costs might be assigned.  Dutchess County Testimony correctly points out that the ratepayers will be the losers as a result.

The Rebuttal Testimony responds to an estimate of total costs where they claim “Dutchess County’s testimony is inconsistent with a Company interrogatory response relating to the cost of carbon reduction”:

Dutchess County seems to have inadvertently mixed and matched parts of the Company’s response. First, the net present value of $300 billion was identified in the response as a modeling estimate in the January 2022 Climate Action Council Scoping Plan, noting that the predicted costs through 2050 that underlay that net present value calculation ranged from $594 billion to $627 billion, in 2020 dollars.

Second, our response also stated that these costs are relative to (i.e., net of) the Climate Action Council Scoping Plan Reference Case costs of $4.269 trillion, in 2020 dollars, through 2050 but we did not describe what the Reference Case includes. Absent clear definitions in the Scoping Plan documentation, we do know with certainty what comprises the Reference Case. As a result, Central Hudson neither stated nor implied that the costs in New York related to the reduction of carbon are around $4.6 trillion.

Both testimonies miss a complicating factor in the interpretation of the Reference Case results.  Contrary to usual practice the Scoping Plan baseline was a case that included “already implemented” programs.  In other words, there are some programs incorporated into the Reference Case that only exist to reduce GHG emissions.  As a result, I agree it is impossible for anyone to determine the total Climate Act costs.  Again Central Hudson ratepayers are the losers.

Supplemental Electric Vehicle Programs

Dutchess County recommended the removal of funding for the Company’s Supplemental Electric Vehicle (“EV”) Programs.  The Dutchess County Testimonial stated:

Fifth on the list of Panel proposals, deals with electrifying the Central Hudson fleet of vehicles. Certainly, as vehicles are retired and a competitive EV market exists for the replacement of similar in-kind vehicles, EV’s should be purchased. However, to prematurely replace existing functional vehicles to advance climate goals in other market sectors unfairly burdens electric customers with addressing the emission needs of other sectors of the New York State economy. The transportation sector should be pulling its fair share to address climate change. The Panel’s position that it desires to lead by example is misplaced. The example that customers desire most from Central Hudson is a high quality, reliable energy product at the lowest reasonable price.

In a victory for commonsense Central Hudson agreed to remove these programs from this proceeding.  The company and the PSC Staff agreed that sufficient funding was available within its authorized EV Make-Ready programs to conduct the additionally proposed activities.

Central Hudson Onsite Solar Proposal

The CLSP proposed the installation of solar arrays on Central Hudson offices in Catskill, Kingston. Eltings Corners, and Poughkeepsie. Dutchess County Testimony note that “Justification for the installations is that Central Hudson desires to be a “role model and leader in promoting local and carbon-free technologies.”  Some quotes from the arguments:

Central Hudson customers have been exposed to significant amounts of leadership distribution in the State of New York. If there is one area in New York State where the State can claim a significant amount of leadership distribution it is in the area addressing climate change. Electric customers are or will be on the hook for contributing billions of dollars of personal fonds to meet the State’s leadership initiatives.

……

From the current day to 2050 the State measures success through partnerships, outreach and education. and workforce and economic development. implementing the Plan produces no measurements of electric or natural gas customer cost savings, or reducing climate change threats, or reducing carbon in the atmosphere in Dutchess County.

……

To reiterate. Central Hudson’s desire to “support the state’s ambitious solar generation goals” increasing customer costs to Dutchess County customers. in order to promote partnerships, education, and development, provides no tangible Dutchess County customer benefits.

The Rebuttal Testimony responds to the question whether Central Hudson agrees with Dutchess County’s characterization of the Company’s Onsite Solar proposal as increasing customer costs without providing tangible benefits?

No.  The Onsite Solar proposal benefits customers in that it contributes to CLCPA emissions reductions targets and by setting an example, the project could encourage customers to participate in distributed generation projects, which lower their energy costs.

They did not respond to the reasons provided in the Dutchess County Testimony.  Probably because there is no reasonable response.  In my opinion, this Central Hudson program is transparent pandering to the State’s narrative. 

It is also possible that the company has looked at the long-term and thinks an energy future where everything is electrified might be good business.  That is disappointing because I believe there are plenty of technical people at the company that know that the Climate Act net-zero transition plan is impossible on the mandated schedule and very unlikely in any event.  There are too many untested components necessary for reliability and too many upgrades to infrastructure to keep it affordable.

Conclusion

I believe that low cost and reliability are overarching concerns for electric and gas ratepayers.  The Hochul Administration has been hiding the total costs of the transition throughout the process.  The other missing piece is an energy plan feasibility study that would enable Central Hudson to determine what aspects of the transition they will be expected to implement.  This uncertainty and the desire to placate the political aspirations of the Administration to improve the chances for a favorable rate case outcome ultimately impacts ratepayers negatively.  The double-digit rate increases for this Central Hudson rate case will become the norm until New Yorke voters demand the politicians back off.

There are many good points in the Dutchess County Testimony relevant to the Climate Act net-zero transition.  The following example sums up the problem:

The purpose of Dutchess County government is to serve the citizens of the County and to fulfill its fiduciary responsibilities to provide a safe clean environment promoting fulfilling life styles. In commenting on the Draft Scoping Plan, the County points out the economic pain being imposed on individuals and businesses and the extreme societal risk created by replacement of reliable, secure energy infrastructure with intermittent renewables. While affirming its support for solar and wind power the County notes that the feasibility of meeting arbitrary timing mandates is slim to none but in the process of attempting to meet those mandates the State will require that residents help fund trillions of dollars of unproven energy systems. CO2 emissions are a world-wide phenomenon and for all the pain, sacrifice, and cost the State’s contribution to the reduction in world wide emissions is miniscule. The transition required under the Plan for transportation, buildings, residences, is massive and to avoid catastrophic New York State economy collapse a modified plan is imperative.

Articles of Note January 21, 2024

Sometimes I just don’t have time to put together an article about specific posts I have read about the net-zero transition and climate change that I think are relevant.  This is a summary of posts that I think would be of interest to my readers.

I have been following the. Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) since it was first proposed and most of the articles described below are related to the net-zero transition.  I have devoted a lot of time to the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Videos

Four reasons renewables are rubbish h/t TS

New York’s climate law – how do we move forward?

New York March To The Great Green Energy Future

Francis Menton uses the work of Nuclear New York to describe the status of the New York transition to net-zero.  He concludes:

Out of 152.3 TWh of electricity produced or imported in 2023, fossil fuels continued to provide 63.3 TWh (41.5%).  Most of the imports (14.5%) are undoubtedly from fossil fuels as well.  Wind/solar/other provided just 12.1 TWh, or 7.9% of the total, barely up from about 6% in 2019.  And that’s now suddenly going to go to 70% by 2030?  Ridiculous.  Meanwhile, the big story leaps off the page, as the Nuclear New York guys emphasize in the headline.  The State forced the premature closure of two nuclear plants in 2020 and 2021, which caused the (carbon free) nuclear share of the total to drop from about 29% to only 18%; and almost all of that was taken up by two new natural gas plants, causing the fossil fuel share of the total to soar from only 34% to 41.5%.  No person looking at this chart would ever conclude that New York has spent the past five years embarked on a crash program to replace fossil fuels with wind and solar.  That process is going absolutely nowhere.

Utility Cost Allocation

Ed Reid, Jr. discusses issues associated with consumers paying for the costs of the net-zero transition.  Reid explains that the proposed electric system that depends upon wind and solar changes the cost allocation dynamics.  It is evident in New York that the money needed to just upgrade the grid are leading to marked rate increases.  I thought this was interesting:

Electric utilities earn a return on net physical plant in service (rate base). They are therefore faced with a Hobson’s Choice. Utilities could require that the intermittent renewable generation attached to their grids be dispatchable, in which case the investment in storage would be made by the renewable developers, increasing their delivered electricity costs, while the utilities” rate base and earnings potential declined as fossil generation was removed from service. Alternatively, the utilities could invest in the storage required to stabilize renewable generator output, increasing the utilities’ rate base investment and earnings potential, while accepting responsibility for increasing electricity costs.

In my opinion, renewable energy developments should be paid one rate for dispatchable power and a much lower rate if not dispatchable.  This would reveal the true cost of their electricity and hasten the inevitable backlash of the transition because it is unaffordable.

Another Take on Alarmist Motives

John Robson at Climate Discussion Nexus argues that the arguments that climate alarmism is a fraud is wrong.  In response to claims that the manipulated temperature data record is a scam he writes:

We take a very different view of al the deliberate and highly unscientific tampering with evidence. We think the zealots at NOAA, and a great many other places, are not trying to scam us with claims they secretly think are untrue. Instead, they are so utterly persuaded that their alarmist theory is right that when the data don’t fit it, as happens often, they conclude that the data must be wrong. For one thing, if they were cheating on purpose, they’d hide it better. And for another we think that after a while the perpetrators of a known fraud would tire of constantly lying. It’s easier to believe climate alarmists are wedded to a flawed theory and have constructed ingenious ways to rationalize its many failures without having to face the possibility that it might be untrue.

Fear of Climate Crisis Solved

Ron Clutz at Science Matters describes an article by John Tamny that explains the root cause of fears about global warming/climate change in his Real Clear Markets article Warming and Left Wing Professors Worry You? You Must Be Rich.  He argues that the worries about climate change come from individuals that do not have to worry about weather extremes because, in large part, fossil fuels have made their lives safer and better.  The result is that they have time to worry about less important issues.  This inability to balance risks and benefits is very frustrating to me and I agree with Tamny that it is a primary driver of the climate risk scare.

Offshore Wind Environmental Impact Assessment

I do not believe that the Hochul Administration has adequately addressed the Climate Act impacts on reliability, affordability, and the cumulative environmental impact of all the wind and solar projects necessary for the net-zero transition.  David Wojick describes the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for a combination of coming offshore wind projects and concludes that this analysis is a joke.  If you share my concerns about the impacts, please submit comments by February 27.  There is a link to submit comments here.

CO2 Effect on Climate – Miniscule

Pierre L. Gosselin writing at the No Tricks Zone has compiled a list of 160 papers that have found extremely low CO2 climate sensitivity.  The correlation between rising global temperatures and increasing CO2 concentrations does not prove causation!

What is Climate?

Professor Richard Lindzen explains that the notion that global average temperature anomaly constitutes ‘climate’ is attractive due to its simplicity.  Unfortunately, that doesn’t mean that it is correct.

Climate Act DEFR Cost Estimate

My previous post summarized the presentation given by Zachary Smith from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) describing Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR).  All credible projections for the generating resources needed for the zero emissions target in New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) include this  new category of generating resources called Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR).  It is necessary to keep the lights on during periods of extended low wind and solar resource availability.  This post uses the cost projections for recently awarded United Kingdom contracts for commercial scale green hydrogen production projects to estimate how much Climate Act DEFR might cost.

I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 380 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation.  Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned and many aspects of the transition are falling behind.  DEFR is a particularly challenging problem.  When political fantasies meet reality, reality always wins.

New York Net-Zero Transition DEFR

The presentation given by Zachary Smith summarized in my recent post gave an overview of the DEFR issue.  I am not going to repeat the descriptive information again.  For the purposes of this article, the Integration Analysis identified the need for a generating resource that could be dispatched as needed and did not have any emissions.  The placeholder technology listed in the Integration Analysis was green hydrogen.  The following table lists the projected capacity for DEFR in the NYISO the 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook and the Integration Analysis. Note that the Resource Outlook  projecta that 44,750 MW of DEFR will be needed by 2040, that the Integration Analysis Strategic Use of Low-Carbon Fuels scenario projects 17,992 MW by 2040, and that in 2019 the fossil fuel generation in the state was 26,262 MW.

The energy production projected for DEFR from the NYISO Resource Outlook and the Integration Analysis are shown in the following table.  The largest difference between the two projections is that NYISO projects that DEFR will generate ten times more energy.  It turns out that NYISO has DEFR generating 14% of the total energy in 2040 but Integration Analysis projects only 1%.  I am very disappointed that the Hochul Administration has not reconciled the two projections.

Green Hydrogen Production

Proponents of zero emissions energy sources tout the use of “green” hydrogen.  This is hydrogen that is produced using renewable energy rather than other fossil fuels or other sources.  It is recognized that over-building wind and solar is a necessary part of an electric system that relies on these intermittent sources of power.  One of the purported benefits of green hydrogen is that when the wind and solar availability is higher than the system load instead of curtailing excess wind and solar power that it could be used to power electrolyzers to create hydrogen.  That is the theory, but the reality is that no one is producing hydrogen at commercial-scale yet.

Paul Homewood writing at the Not a Lot of People Know That blog described the recent announcement that the United Kingdom’s Department of Energy Security & Net Zero awarded contracts for green hydrogen projects.  The announcement states:

Following the launch of the first hydrogen allocation round (HAR1) in July 2022, we have selected the successful projects to be offered contracts. We are pleased to announce 11 successful projects, totaling 125MW capacity.

HAR1 puts the UK in a leading position internationally: this represents the largest number of commercial scale green hydrogen production projects announced at once anywhere in Europe. This round will provide over £2 billion of revenue support from the Hydrogen Production Business Model, which will start to be paid once projects become operational. Over £90 million from the Net Zero Hydrogen Fund has been allocated to support the construction of these projects.

We have conducted a robust allocation process to ensure only deliverable projects that represent value for money are awarded contracts. The 11 projects have been agreed at a weighted average [footnote 1] strike price of £241/MWh (£175/MWh in 2012 prices). This compares well to the strike prices of other nascent technologies such as floating offshore wind and tidal stream.

The thing that caught my eye in Homewood’s article was that there were cost numbers: “The 11 projects have been agreed at a weighted average strike price of £241/MWh”.    In renewable energy contracts the government agrees to a “strike price” per megawatt-hour that the renewable energy developer will receive for its delivery of electric energy produced by the renewable energy source.  In this case electric energy from the green hydrogen source.  The previous table lists the DEFR electric energy expected so as a first cut estimate I simply multiplied the expected MWh by the strike price.  The following table shows that green hydrogen production could cost between $10.4 billion and $1.1 billion per year by 2040.  This is the annual cost and does not include any construction subsidies.

Discussion

This just represents the start of the costs for the green hydrogen DEFR support.  Making it is just part of the process.  It has to be stored, transported to where it will be used, and, if the zealots on the Climate Action Council have their way, used in fuel cells.  Each of those components adds costs.  Homewood points out two other issues: 

What is interesting is that the strike prices will be tied to changes in the market price of gas: “The subsidy will vary relative to changes in the reference (natural gas) price”.

The schemes all appear to be electrolyzers, and they all claim that only renewable electricity will be used, an absurd assumption! None of them say what they will do when there is not enough wind and solar power to meet demand – will they idle their plants, or will they carry on as usual taking whatever power the grid can supply?

That is not all.  One of the things I have wondered about is process efficiency.  When making anything the most efficient thing to do is to get the process up and running efficiently and just let it go.  Depending on variable wind and solar makes that a challenge.  Is New York’s plan going to include its own energy storage to make the process work well?   I see no realistic scenario where this will work.

Conclusion

The Climate Action Council did not fully acknowledge the necessity or the challenge of the DEFR technology.  The Department of Public Service Proceeding 15-E-0302 is intended to “identify technologies that can close the gap between the capabilities of existing renewable energy technologies and future system reliability needs, and more broadly identify the actions needed to pursue attainment of the Zero Emission by 2040 Target” directly contradicts the Council’s position.   This post suggests that the placeholder DEFR option of green hydrogen could adversely affect affordability even if viable DEFR technologies can be identified.

NYISO DEFR Summary

As part of the Department of Public Service Proceeding 15-E-0302 a technical conference was held on December 11 and 12, 2023 entitled Zero Emissions by 2040.  A  zero-emissions electric system is a key part of New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) and all credible projections for the generating resources needed for the zero emissions Climate Act target  have noted that a new category of generating resources called Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR) is necessary to keep the lights on during periods of extended low wind and solar resource availability.  This post summarizes the presentation given by Zachary Smith from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) describing DEFR.

I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 380 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation.  Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned and many aspects of the transition are falling behind.  DEFR is a particularly challenging problem.  When political fantasies meet reality, reality always wins.

Presentation

The presentation given by Zachary Smith gave an overview of the DEFR issue.  In his first slide (shown below) he gave an overview of the generating resource outlook to make the point that a large amount of new generating resources needs to be developed.  I believe that the estimates are from the 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook.  For context I have included a table that lists the capacity for the different resources for one of the Resource Outlook scenarios and one of the scenarios from the Integration Analysis.  Of particular note, both projections estimate that DEFR capacity (MW) will be similar to the amount of current fossil capacity. 

The ultimate problem for reliability in an electric system that depends on wind and solar is illustrated in the following slide from Smith’s presentation.  It highlights a 7-day wind lull when the average wind capacity is 25%.  The sum of the grey area under the curve during that period is the amount of energy (MWh) that must be provided by DEFR sources based on an analysis of historical weather data. If there are insufficient resources during a wind lull, then load cannot be met.  The consequences of that situation would be catastrophic.

In order to meet this need for dispatchable resources Smith explained that dispatchable emission-free resources (DEFRs) must be developed and deployed throughout New York:

  • As resources shift from fossil generators to zero emission resources, essential grid services, such as operating reserves, ramping, regulation, voltage support, and black start, must be available to provide New Yorkers with a reliable and predictable electric system that consumers require.
  • DEFRs will be required to provide both energy and capacity over long durations, as well as the reliability attributes of retiring synchronous generation. The attributes do not need to be encapsulated in a singular technology, but in aggregate the system needs a sufficient collection of these services to be reliable.

The NYISO must toe the political correctness line so Smith downplays the enormity of the challenge to bring DEFR on-line in the timeframe necessary to meet the arbitrary Climate Act schedule.  Smith lists the attributes needed by DEFR in his presentation.  In the following I offer my comments on his list of attributes.

Smith’s first attribute for DEFR is that it must have “dependable fuel sources that are carbon free and allow these resources to be brought online when required”.  Clearly intermittent wind and solar do not meet this fundamental requirement. 

The second DEFR attribute is that it must be “non-energy limited and capable of providing energy for multiple hours and days regardless of weather, storage, or fuel constraints”.  This is a particular concern of mine.  Wind and solar resources correlate in time and space.  In other words, when the wind is light at one wind farm in New York it is very likely that all the wind turbines are experiencing light winds.  The seven-day wind lull example in the dispatchable resources needed figure illustrates the problem.  If there are insufficient resources during that wind lull, then load cannot be met.  My concern is that I think we do not know what the worst case low renewable resource availability period is.  Until there has been more analysis done then I believe that the New York electric grid is risking catastrophe.

The NYISO operators balance generation with load constantly.  Smith describes several attributes necessary for this requirement.  DEFR must be able to “to follow instructions to increase or decrease output on a minute-to-minute basis”.  There has to be “flexibility to be dispatched through a wide operating range with a low minimum output”. Finally, DEFR must be “fast ramping to inject or reduce the energy based on changes to net load which may be driven by changes to load or intermittent generation output”. 

In addition to the attributes needed when units are operating, there are startup attributes.  DEFR must be “quick-start to come online within 15 minutes” and capable of “multiple starts so resources can be brought online or switched off multiple times through the day as required based on changes to the generation profile and load”.  Smith explains that a range or DEFR generation will likely be required so not every DEFR has to be capable of every attribute for matching load but sufficient amounts for the system requirement will be needed.

In addition to the generating requirements that cannot be supplied by wind and solar there are ancillary support services for the transmission system.  Smith describes three transmission support DEFR attributes:

  • Inertial Response and frequency control to maintain power system stability and arrest frequency decline post-fault;
  • Dynamic Reactive Control to support grid voltage; and
  • High Short Circuit Current contribution to ensure appropriate fault detection and clearance.

Smith’s presentation lists the attributes of twelve sample technologies in the following slide.  When I started working for Niagara Mohawk in 1981 utilities were responsible for providing the generation for load in their service territories.  They were proud of the diversity of their generation fleet that included coal-, gas- and oil-fired fossil, hydro, pumped storage, and nuclear.  The generation all had a dependable fuel source and only the pumped hydro was energy limited but that was not an issue because it was used so shave diurnal peak loads.  Only nuclear was not dispatchable but that did not matter because it was used for unvarying base load.  There were resources in each system to provide all the other reliability attributes.  Demand response was used sparingly but was included.

Attributes of Sample DEFR Technologies

In the future grid the insistence that all fossil fired units have to be shut down means that seven technologies that meet some of the necessary attributes will be required.  The added complexity of these technologies does not increase resiliency because wind, solar, battery and demand response are all energy limited.  Ancillary support services will be a major consideration because wind, solar and battery do not provide those services.  Just from this overview, it is clear that affordability and reliability will be challenges.

Conclusion

Smith’s presentation is an excellent overview of need, attributes, and some potential resources that meet the need for dispatchable emissions-free generation.  Any suggestion that some combination of these resources are not needed is simply wrong.  Unsaid is the relative difficulty trying to develop these resources to meet the Climate Act net-zero transition schedule.

Implicit Renewable Energy Subsidies

There are two fundamental drivers for New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act – the presumption that there is an existential threat from climate change and that the transition away from greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting energy sources requires no new technology and will be cheaper because the wind and sun energy is free.  I disagree with both positions.  This article addresses the cost fallacy based on a new analysis at the Cato Institute.

I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 380 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation.  Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned and many aspects of the transition are falling behind.  When political fantasies meet reality, reality always wins.

Cato Report

Travis Fisher described the high cost of offshore wind policy.  He argues that eventually political support for offshore wind will have to confront the costs:  “Recent polling suggests that just 38 percent of Americans are willing to increase their energy costs by $1 per month to address climate change.”  He goes on to show that offshore wind will cost much more.

He makes a compelling case that “offshore wind mandates are bad public policy because they simply cost too much and would not be economically viable without taxpayer support”.  He also points out that there are significant environmental impacts.  He explained that the political targets are coming to grips with these issues:

In contrast to the ease and simplicity of issuing aspirational offshore wind plans, policymakers are now confronting the reality that offshore wind faces many obstacles. The second half of 2023 brought story after story of canceled or renegotiated contracts for offshore wind. BP and Equinor canceled their contract with the state of New York; Ørsted canceled two large projects in New Jersey; and developers in Massachusetts canceled four projects totaling 2,400 MW of offshore wind.

Unfortunately, the politicians have not adjusted their policies:

With such high electricity prices, one might expect political leaders to attempt to reduce the burden of the energy costs their constituents pay. Instead, policymakers in these states have insisted on mandating offshore wind, which will invariably increase electricity rates and impose a higher federal spending and tax burden on the country. There are several ways of looking at the cost of electricity from specific resources, such as wind off the East Coast of the United States. Unfortunately, offshore wind is expensive by every measure.

The reason for this post is Fisher’s explanation of different ways of looking at the cost of electricity.

One way to subsidize offshore wind is through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Levelized Revenue of Energy (LROE).  Fisher explains:

PPA prices are a generous way to examine the cost of offshore wind. They are the price paid by the offtakers of the energy from offshore wind projects—PPAs do not explicitly show the full cost paid by retail electricity consumers and taxpayers. These contract prices are usually expressed in wholesale units of dollars per megawatt‐​hour ($/​MWh).

As one example, the Vineyard Wind project off the coast of Massachusetts has a levelized PPA price of about $98/​MWh (escalating from a lower base price to a higher final price at the end of a twenty‐​year contract). As the National Renewable Energy Laboratory explained in 2019:

“This LROE estimate for the first commercial‐​scale offshore wind project in the United States appears to be within the range of LROE estimated for offshore wind projects recently tendered in Northern Europe with a start of commercial operation by the early 2020s. This suggests that the expected cost and risk premium for the initial set of US offshore wind projects might be less pronounced than anticipated by many industry observers and analysts.”

Other operational projects, like the South Fork project in New York, don’t advertise the PPA price but have stated that “the power from South Fork Wind … will cost the average ratepayer between $1.39 and $1.54 per month when it starts operating.” (Recall that fewer than 40 percent of Americans are willing to spend $1 monthly to address climate change.)

In short, PPA prices tend to put the cost of offshore wind projects in the best light.

The State of New York has not admitted that even these best-case costs “do not compare well to clearing prices in wholesale markets”.  Comparison to current prices shows that the PPA costs are much higher.

The second way to look at the cost of electricity is through the Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE).  Fisher describes the parameter:

LCOE is a common measure of the cost of electricity from a given class of resources. LCOE boils down construction and operating costs into a single cost estimate (in dollars), divided by the energy output of the plant over its lifetime (in watt‐​hours). Hence the familiar unit of dollars per megawatt‐​hour. LCOE is a straightforward way to get a sense of the levelized (or averaged‐​out) cost of a standalone power plant.

According to recent LCOE estimates from EIA, the unsubsidized cost of offshore wind exceeds $120/​MWh and is among the most expensive generation resources. The consulting firm Lazard also publishes LCOE estimates that have become common reference points. In the latest Lazard research, the LCOE for offshore wind ranged between $72/​MWh and $140/​MWh.

Fisher notes that if the LCOE parameter is used then “offshore wind compares favorably to the highest‐​cost natural gas generators ($115–221/MWh) but not to the lowest‐​cost renewables ($24–75/MWh for onshore wind and $24–96/MWh for utility‐​scale solar photovoltaics [PV]).”  However, this parameter only considers the cost of the generating capacity.

Fisher explains that the there is a third way to look at the cost of electricity: the Full Cost of Electricity (FCOE) and Levelized Full System Cost of Electricity (LFSCOE).  He notes that:

Recently, scholars have expanded the LCOE model to include spillover costs that are borne by other generators on the system. To remedy the analytical shortcomings of LCOE, the FCOE approach zooms out and considers the all‐​in cost of the entire electricity system. This is the appropriate measure to use when judging society‐​wide costs because the full system costs are ultimately borne by retail ratepayers (and by taxpayers when subsidies are involved, as they are today).

The most important element of FCOE that is missing from LCOE is the cost to the rest of the system of intermittent output. Intermittent or “non‐​dispatchable” generation always requires backup and balancing help from controllable or “dispatchable” resources to satisfy total electricity demand; however, the cost of making other resources fluctuate their output to accommodate intermittent generation—by backing down in times of high intermittent production and ramping up in times of low intermittent production—is not captured in LCOE estimates.

A group of authors who favor using the FCOE of solar PV and onshore wind said, “LCOE is inadequate to compare intermittent forms of energy generation with dispatchable ones and when making decisions at a country or society level.”

Fisher quotes a description of the (LFSCOE):

The LFSCOE are defined as the costs of providing electricity by a given generation technology, assuming that a particular market has to be supplied solely by this source of electricity plus storage. Methodologically, the LFSCOE for intermittent or baseload technologies are the opposite extreme of the LCOE. While the latter implicitly assume that a respective source has no obligation to balance the market and meet the demand (and thus demand patterns and intermittency can be ignored), LFSCOE assume that this source has maximal balancing and supply obligations.

For our purposes what does that mean for costs?  Fisher explains

Under the LFSCOE assumptions, the cost of onshore wind in Texas is approximately seven times higher than its LCOE (an LFSCOE of $291/​MWh compared to an LCOE of $40/​MWh). The details of applying an LFSCOE to offshore wind would only be slightly different from applying it to onshore wind. Specifically, offshore wind has a slightly higher capacity factor than onshore wind (about 43 percent versus 34 percent in 2018, according to the International Renewable Energy Agency’s 2019 “Future of Wind” report). However, offshore wind is still an intermittent resource, meaning its LFSCOE is higher than its LCOE.

Conclusion

While the focus of this analysis was on offshore wind the differences between the three ways of looking at electricity costs is applicable to onshore wind and solar too.  The FCOE and LFSCOE methods of calculating electricity costs are much better approaches for estimating the total costs. When using those parameters the costs of renewables are much more expensive than current electricity prices.  In addition, those parameters do not incorporate the cost of the dispatchable emission-free resource that credible New York analyses project are necessary for an electric system that eliminates fossil-fired generation. 

Proponents of the net-zero transition disparage fossil fuel subsidies but the explicit and implicit subsidies for wind and solar far exceed them.  The Levelized Full System Costs of Electricity calculates the implicit subsidies necessary to integrate wind and solar into the electric system.  Fisher concludes:

Policymakers need to understand the full costs of their actions and come back to the shore. The American people simply don’t want to pay more for energy—not in their electricity bills and not in their tax bills.

Someday Scrooge Will Say No

Richard Ellenbogen recently sent an email to his distribution that highlighted an inevitable problem with New York State’s net-zero mandate of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  The plan is to electrify everything possible using renewable energy.  That brings up the problem that the local electric distribution system is not up to the task so it is likely that electric use could be limited at times in New York’s future.

Ellenbogen is the President [BIO] Allied Converters and frequently copies me on emails that address various issues associated with the Climate Act.  I have published other articles by Ellenbogen and a description of his keynote address to the Business Council of New York 2023 Renewable Energy Conference Energy titled: “Energy on Demand as the Life Blood of Business and Entrepreneurship in the State -video here:  Why NY State Must Rethink Its Energy Plan and Ten Suggestions to Help Fix the Problems.” I recently described his presentation on New York’s Energy Transition that is a detailed explanation why the State’s quest for zero emissions electricity generated by wind and solar is doomed to failure.

There are only a few people in New York that are trying to educate people about the risks of the Climate Act with as much passion as I am but Richard certainly fits that description.  He comes at the problem as an engineer who truly cares about the environment and how best to improve the environment without unintended consequences.  He has spent an enormous amount of time honing his presentation summarizing the problems he sees but most of all the environmental performance record of his business shows that he is walking the walk.  

Climate Act Overview

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan.  After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan recommendations were finalized at the end of 2022.  In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation and legislation.  Ellenbogen’s discussion describes one of the issues that was not addressed in 2023.

Record Christmas Lights

Ellenbogen described a home in Union Vale, NY where the residents set the world record for most lights in a residential Christmas display with 720,420 lights in the display.  He provided links describing the the record lights from the New York Times:

I cannot get around the Times paywall so I could not see those articles but found a relevant story at Good Morning America that includes a video.

Ellenbogen writes:

Independent of any issues raised in the article, the following comment by a neighbor stands out.

Bernadette and William Burke, who love to watch the show from their hot tub, but for years could not use their washing machine or dishwasher while the lights were on. Mr. Gay said the problem was resolved when the electric company put the Gay house on its own transformer.

He estimated the power requirements:

Below is a table of power consumption of various Christmas bulbs. Using a back-of-the-napkin calculation, the display probably draws about 75 – 100 KVA.   Most utility transformers in residential areas are sized between 70 KVA and 150 KVA.  Below are photos from a NYSERDA report that I wrote in 2010 for the reactive power project I did for them.  Note that a transformer used to support five buildings in a Garden Apartment complex had a capacity of 150 KVA and a transformer for two buildings had a capacity of 75 KVA.  Both of these transformers operated near their capacity on a hot summer day and would far exceed that capacity with widespread installation of heat pumps.

Ellenbogen compared the power consumption of the display to heat pumps and car charging that are components of the Scoping Plan outline of control strategies to meet the Climate Act mandates:

The three heat pumps in my home will draw about 22 KW at peak load for 250,000 BTU of heat transfer in heating mode (1000 watts per ton  COP=3.52 ).  The power draw in cooling mode is about 60 % of that (600 watts per ton  COP=5.86 ).  We also have gas furnaces with an output of 400,000 BTU that will operate on extremely cold days or will operate if there is an issue with the heat pumps.

My car charges at a peak load of 14,000 watts.  I have seen loads of 38,000 watts on the power monitor at my house when I am charging the car during the winter.  When I built my house, I had a 400 amp 3phase service installed.  It can deliver 144 KVA ( 144,000 watts) at peak load and the transformer across the street is 150 KVA.  Most newer homes might have a 200 amp single phase service (40 KVA) and older homes will have a 100 amp or 150 amp service (20 – 30 KVA).

Discussion

Ellenbogen argues that the fact that a neighbor was impacted by a large load by a neighbor has ramifications when everyone has to increase their electrical requirements:

The point is that if the utility system can’t support a Christmas display, even a large one, and allow the neighbors to wash their clothes at the same time, how is it going to support the massive load of heat pumps and vehicle charging that is being mandated.  That combination will far exceed the demand of a Christmas light display.  As I have mentioned previously, every transformer in the state is going to have to be replaced or have their service upgraded as occurred at the home in the article.  The problem is that there is an acute transformer shortage along with a shortage of electricians and utilities are worried about having a sufficient number of transformers to recover after a bad storm, let alone having enough to rebuild the entire system.

Also note that the GMA piece on the record light display mentioned that the owners claim that their electric bill is only $300.  New York utilities are installing smart meters that will eventually enable them to charge customers different rates at different times of the day.  The idea is that they will increase rates to incentivize customers to reduce use during peak load periods.  In the all-electric future the peak load will be in the early evening when homeowners get home from work and turn on appliances.  I would not be surprised at all if the costs for the massive display might increase so much that they would be unable to afford the costs even with LED lights.

Although the utilities claim that customers will not lose control of their electric use, I suspect that is also inevitable because of the scale of the problem.  As a result, someday Scrooge will say no you cannot have a record light show.

Conclusion

Ellenbogen said he was going to send a magic wand to the Public Service Commission to help them with the Climate Act transition because they are going to need all the help that they can get.  I agree with his conclusion: “Since math and science have been thrown out the window in New York State, we might as well turn to the occult.”

New Year’s Resolution – Methane Response

Happy New Year!

I wrote an article for Watts Up With That  that described my New Year’s resolution: I resolve that when I hear anyone say that methane is more potent than carbon dioxide because the radiative forcing produced is greater, I will say that is only true in the laboratory on a dry molecular basis.  In the atmosphere, where it counts, methane is not nearly as potent.  I had hoped to get feedback and recommendations and I was not disappointed.  This post provides the rationale for my resolution.

I have followed the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 380 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Rationale

I have heard the methane scare story everywhere but my primary concern is New York.  As part of New York’s Climate Act methane is irrationally disparaged as part of the war on natural gas.  The rationale used always revolves around the potency of methane relative to CO2.  I believe that the preponderance of information shows that the argument is incorrect.  I have developed a page that consolidates reasons why methane should not be vilified and updated it based on comments made.  The following summarizes my rationale.

Clyde Spencer explained that changes to radiation effects occur on a molecule-by-molecule basis in the atmosphere in an article titled The Misguided Crusade to Reduce Anthropogenic Methane Emissions.  The Climate Act tracks emissions by weight.  In the atmosphere CO2 is more than two orders of magnitude more abundant than CH4 on a molecular basis. The Climate Act uses the global warming potential that estimates the mid-range, long-term warming potential of CH4 is 32 times that of CO2.  However, that equivalence is for equal weights of the two gases!  Using a molecular basis (parts per million-volume mole-fraction) to account for the lighter CH4 molecule reveals that the annual contribution to warming is a fraction of that claimed for CO2.  Methane emissions on a molecular basis are increasing at a rate of 0.58% of CO2 increases.   Therefore, changes in methane emissions have insignificant effects.

Several commenters pointed out that that methane and water vapor affect the same area of the spectrum of outgoing radiation thus reducing the effect of any changes in methane concentrations. .Rud Istvan explained that:

Methane is a potent GHG in the lab because the lab uses a standard dry atmosphere.  I”n the real world methane’s two main infrared absorption bands (at about 3.5 and 8 microns) are completely overlapped by two of the several broader and much stronger water vapor absorption bands, specifically those from about 2.5-4 and 6-9 microns. In a world averaging about 2% specific humidity, any methane effect is literally swamped by water vapor effect.

Cyan quantified the effect of the spectral overlap “Water vapor reduces the potency of methane by about 82 percent at 80%RH. At 46% RH (from the US Standard Atmosphere) the reduction is less, at 75%.”

Andy May’s excellent summarization of Wijngaarden and Happer’s important paper “Dependence of Earth’s Thermal Radiation on Five Most Abundant Greenhouse Gases” takes a slightly different approach.  He explains that the greenhouse effect of methane is not only related to the effect on longwave radiation itself but also the concentration in the atmosphere.  Because the atmospheric concentration of methane is so small doubling concentrations change the “outgoing forcing by less than one percent”.  In other words, doubling emissions or cutting emissions in half of methane will have no measurable effect on global warming itself. A comment by “It does not add up” pointed out that Wijngaarden and Happer also produced a separate paper concentrating specifically on methane.

Ralph B. Alexander describes another molecular consideration ignored in the Climate Act.  Each greenhouse gas affects outgoing radiation differently across the bell-shaped radiation spectrum   One of the reasons that CO2 is considered the most important greenhouse gas is that its effect coincides with the peak of the bell shape.  On the other hand, the effect of CH4 is down in the tail of the bell shape.  As a result, the potential effect of CH4 is on the order of only 20% of the effect of CO2.

The residence time of the two gases is different.  Methane only has a lifetime of about 10-12 years in the atmosphere.  The “consensus” science claim is that 80% of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions are removed within 300 years.  (Note however that there are other estimates of much shorter residence times.) This means that CO2 is accumulating in the atmosphere.  CH4 is converted to CO2 and is then counted in the monthly CO2 measurements as part of the CO2 flux.  Because methane does not accumulate the same way as CO2 it should be handled differently.  However, the Climate Act doubles down.  Climate Act authors claimed it was necessary to use 20-year global warming potential (GWP) values because methane is estimated to be 28 to 36 greater than carbon dioxide for a 100-year time horizon but 84-87 greater GWP over a 20-year period.

Conclusion

The Climate Act uses explicit language to magnify the accounting for methane emissions that make the use of natural gas more expensive.  Last spring I described legislation that was proposed and endorsed by the Hochul Administration that would have changed the accounting to be consistent with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the Environmental Protection Agency, and most other jurisdictions.  The climate activist community went nuts and the legislation never progressed. 

The problem is that I show here that the basis for their indignation is flawed as I point out in my resolution.  Methane does not have greater impacts than carbon dioxide and should not be treated as mandated by the Climate Act.  My recent article about righteous risks noted that the activists who push the evil methane narrative are driven more by moral idealism than pragmatic concerns.  In this instance, their demand for different treatment means that the proposed New York Cap-and-Invest program cannot join other jurisdictions because the emissions accounting will be different.  New York will have to develop all the infrastructure and regulations for its program on its own.

New York RGGI Operating Plan Amendment 2024

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a market-based program to reduce emissions from electric generating units.  This post describes my comments on the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) Operating Plan Amendment (“Amendment”) for 2024. 

The Amendment describes the plans to use the RGGI proceeds in the next several years.  Although supporters of RGGI claim that it is a successful model to emulate, my comments explain the implications of the actual results not only to the RGGI program but also for the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  There are no substantive changes in this regard since I submitted comments on last year’s operating plan.  What has changed is my tolerance for the perfunctory responsiveness of NYSERDA to stakeholder comments. 

I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception.  I blog about the details of the RGGI program because very few seem to want to provide any criticisms of the program.   I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 370 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Factsheet). It has been a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector since 2008.  New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021 but has since withdrawn and Pennsylvania has joined but is not actively participating in auctions due to on-going litigation. According to a RGGI website: “The RGGI states issue CO2 allowances which are distributed almost entirely through regional auctions, resulting in proceeds for reinvestment in strategic energy and consumer programs. Programs funded with RGGI investments have spanned a wide range of consumers, providing benefits and improvements to private homes, local businesses, multi-family housing, industrial facilities, community buildings, retail customers, and more.” 

NYSERDA Operating Plan Amendment

NYSERDA designed and implemented a process to develop and annually update an Operating Plan which summarizes and describes the initiatives to be supported by RGGI auction proceeds.  On an annual basis, the Authority “engages stakeholders representing the environmental community, the electric generation community, consumer benefit organizations and interested members of the general public to assist with the development of an annual amendment to the Operating Plan.”

The draft Amendment explains that New York State invests RGGI proceeds to support comprehensive strategies that best achieve the RGGI greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals pursuant to 21 NYCRR Part 507.  The programs in the portfolio of initiatives are designed to support the pursuit of the State’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals by:

  • Deploying commercially available energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies;
  • Building the State’s capacity for long-term carbon reduction;
  • Empowering New York communities to reduce carbon pollution, and transition to cleaner energy;
  • Stimulating entrepreneurship and growth of clean energy and carbon abatement companies in New York; and
  • Creating innovative financing to increase adoption of clean energy and carbon abatement in the State.

The draft Amendment notes that the initiatives described represent program activity proposed for the 2024 Operating Plan. The funding levels for each program include previously approved and the amounts proposed for FY24-25 through FY26-27. 

This post summarizes the comments I submitted on the proposed Operating Plan Amendment.  Given the obvious disdain that NYSERDA has for public stakeholder input I did not expend the level of effort I did last year. My comments rely heavily on last year’s analyses and are separated into two main parts.  The first repeats my 2023 evaluation that described the observed New York State (NYS) emission reductions from the electric sector since 2000.  The Plan needs to focus its efforts and put more emphasis on programs that directly, indirectly, or potentially reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) from the electric generating units affected by RGGI.  Failure to do so will cause problems achieving the Climate Act 2030 mandates to produce 70% of electricity from renewable sources and increasing energy efficiency from 2012 levels by 23%.  The second section offers my comments on the specific programs in the 2024 Amendment.  Finally, I document the poor public stakeholder engagement process. To address that I copied the Board in my submittal so that I could be sure that they at least had the opportunity to see my comments.

Comment Summary

I think the ultimate problem in the Amendment is that RGGI proceeds are used to support too many Climate Act programs outside of the electric sector. RGGI is an electric sector emissions reduction program, so it is inappropriate to use the auction proceeds for any program that will not materially decrease emissions directly or indirectly through energy efficiency reductions.  There are multiple programs in the amendment that do not meet those criteria.  Those mis-allocated funds should be transferred to programs that do affect emissions.

RGGI supporters claim that the RGGI funds have played a meaningful role in the observed emission reductions at RGGI sources, but that claim is exaggerated.  The historical emission trends of NYS electric generating units (EGU) provide valuable insight for future emission strategies.  I found that between 2000 and 2021 New York EGU emissions have dropped from 57,114,438 tons to 28,546,529 tons, a decrease of 50%.  NYS EGU CO2 emissions were 35% lower in 2022 than the three-year baseline emissions before RGGI started.  However, I showed that emissions have dropped primarily because coal and oil fueled generation has essentially gone to zero.  Natural gas has increased to cover the generation from those fuels but because it has lower CO2 emission rates New York emissions have gone down.

According to Table 2 in Semi-Annual Status Report through December 31, 2022, the cumulative annual net greenhouse gas emission committed savings are 1,725,544 tons through the end of 2022.  That is 9.5% of the observed reduction of 16,196,531 tons since the three-year baseline before the start of RGGI. I conclude that the primary reason for the observed electric sector emission reductions in New York was due to fuel switching.

These observations are relevant for the future of EGU emission reductions required for RGGI and the Climate Act. Fuel switching is no longer an option in New York.  Coal is no longer used and oil emissions from the RGGI affected sources are as low as they are going to get without retirement of oil-fired sources.  The average CO2 emissions reduction per year from RGGI investments has been 95,716 tons since 2013.  New York Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program specifies an annual reduction of RGGI allowances of 880,493 per year starting in 2022 and continuing to 2030.  That reduction is nearly ten times more than the reductions from RGGI auction proceed investments.  The Climate Act is going to require even more emission reductions.  Electric generating unit owners and operators have no options available for additional emission reductions other than reducing their operating times.  It is incumbent upon NYSERDA to invest RGGI funds to incentivize and subsidize carbon-free generation and reduce energy use so that the RGGI sources can reduce operations and not jeopardize system reliability.  If the sources are unable to reduce operations safely, then the Climate Act targets will be jeopardized.

In the second section of the comments, I evaluated the Amendment programs.  The comments describe program investments for six categories.  The first three categories cover programs that directly, indirectly or could potentially decrease RGGI-affected source emissions.  Those programs total 33% of the investments.  I also included a category for programs that will add load that could potentially increase RGGI source emissions which totals 24% of the investments.  Programs that do not affect emissions are funded with 35% of the proceeds and administrative costs total another 8%.  Because there is inadequate documentation, my categorizations are estimates.  Even if those estimates were refined, I believe this represents an improper allocation of resources.

In order to address the need for strategies that can displace RGGI-affected source generation the RGGI Operating Plan Amendment needs to reevaluate priorities.  NYSERDA must verify that other investments will provide the necessary reduction in RGGI-affected source emissions in order to justify spending more than half the RGGI proceeds on programs unrelated to RGGI emissions.  My comments on specific amendments recommended that most of the unrelated programs not be funded.

I only had specific comments on one proposed program. The Climate Act is pushing the envelope of zero-emissions technology, so the Scoping Plan Implementation Research program is certainly appropriate.  I recommend that this program fund projects for dispatchable emissions-free resource DEFR) requirements and the question of wind and solar resource availability during winter doldrums.

Stakeholder Process

I have been involved with stakeholder comments for regulatory proceedings in New York since 1981 and the NYSERDA engagement process is the least responsive.  Before the turn of the century, New York agencies asked questions early in the process, were receptive to comments received, and valued input from subject matter experts no matter their affiliation.   After 2000, that dynamic started to shift – agencies did not seek input from subject matter experts as much and there was less and less response to comments.  Recently the comments I submit ,and comments from industry in general, are submitted knowing that a substantive response is unlikely.

I think there are two reasons for this attitude change.  The first is simply the political emphasis on all decisions.  Over the years I have become friends with people in the regulatory agencies and privately they admit that all decisions are ultimately made based more on politics than technical feasibility.  The political appointees only hear what they want to hear from the agency technical staff.  The second reason is a shift away from pragmatic science-based approaches.  I recently posted an article about Righteous Risks and the Climate Act that describes the introduction to a series of articles by David Zaruk that characterizes the new approach.  He defines righteous risks as the “threat of harm to societal well-being arising from a value-based approach that filters facts and data with an ethical perspective.”  The problem with this approach is that “decisions are influenced by what is perceived as ethical rather than what is rational or scientific.”

There is another dynamic with respect to stakeholder comments for NYSERDA programs.  New York has always had a strong commitment to research and development.  Before de-regulation of the electric and gas industry utilities were required to fund R&D programs themselves with oversight from state agencies.  After de-regulation the funding commitment for R&D remained but state agencies, primarily NYSERDA, gained complete control.  It did not take long for the politicians to glom onto this pot of money for their own ends.  The stakeholder process has become a perfunctory obligation rather than an opportunity for improvement.  Without the threat of independent research by the utilities NYSERDA arrogantly assumes that they are the only subject matter experts that matter and don’t need input from anyone other than those chosen by politicians to further their aims.  

The final stakeholder process dynamic is that the State uses RGGI proceeds as a slush fund.  In the most egregious example, Governor Patterson diverted $90 million of the RGGI revneues for budget deficit reduction in 2009.  In 2018, Environmental Advocates of New York released a report that found that the Cuomo Administration was more circumspect, they simply supplanted costs associated with existing programs that pursued the State’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals.  Not to be outdone by the Administration, the Legislature passed the Electric Generation Facility Cessation Mitigation Program and diverted $69 million from RGGI proceeds to provide property tax relief for local governments and school districts facing a loss of revenue attributed to the closure, temporary or otherwise, of a power plant.  I have no doubts whatsoever that many of the RGGI-funded programs under the Hochul Administration continue this sorry tradition in one way or another.  I submitted these comments knowing that money talks and that the chance of reallocating money in the state bureaucracy has a vanishingly small chance of happening no matter how rational or scientific the arguments for change.

NYSERDA Stakeholder Responsiveness

The NYSERDA Use of Auction Proceeds website states:

Similar to other programs that NYSERDA administers, stakeholder input is important to us. On an annual basis, the Authority engages stakeholders representing the environmental community, the electric generation community, consumer benefit organizations and interested members of the general public to assist with the development of an annual update to the Operating Plan. NYSERDA seeks feedback on the design and implementation of programs described in the Operating Plan to help us maximize the effectiveness of RGGI funded programs.

In reality it is apparent that NYSERDA does not take this obligation seriously.  A proper stakeholder process demonstrates appreciation of the obligation by responding to the comments.  There must be some indication that someone read them, considered the points made, and took the stakeholder input into account.  The 2023 Operating Plan amendment process showed no sign of that.

Last year I spent a lot of time preparing detailed comments on the 2023 Operating Plan Amendment. 

The NYSERDA Planning Committee approved the 2023 RGGI Operating Plan at their January 25, 2023 meeting.  The proposed revisions to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Operating

Plan was presented to the Committee by John Williams, Executive Vice President for Policy and Regulatory Affairs. His opening statement reflects the perfunctory nature of the approval and includes the only acknowledgement and response to stakeholder comments:

Thank you Shere and everybody. We’ll move this one along pretty quickly. We’re here with our

annual routine RGGI approval process. So the, the Members have received both the three year

plan that we’re proposing as well as a memo of summarizing all that. Just some high points here

for awareness. You know, we did engage our annual process to come up with our proposal and

present that to stakeholders. And on December 12th we held a webinar for receipt of stakeholder input on that. So some participation there and some exchange of thoughts happening at that December 12th webinar. The proposal was also open for written public comments through January 6th, and we did receive a couple of comments there. The proposal you have was you know, does take those public feedback into account.

It is very easy to say the proposal takes public feedback into account but there is no available documentation explaining what feedback was included, what feedback recommendations were excluded, or why those decisions were made.  In fact, there is no indication of how feedback was addressed.  If they were serious, NYSERDA staff would prepare a report that lists all the points made in the comments with recommendations on how they should be handled for management review and approval.  Williams’s response mentions a memo but there is no indication of what it included, and it is not available as part of the record.  I think that it should be part of the record and that it should contain the summary of stakeholder comments and the NYSERDA responses.

This year’s stakeholder process actively discouraged public involvement.  The Amendment and meeting announcement were posted on December 1.  The Operating Plan Stakeholder Meeting was held on December 8, 2023.  The opportunity to join the meeting by phone or webinar required the use of a password that was not provided. There is no indication in the meeting recording that any participant figured out that nobody outside of NYSERDA joined the webinar. The video of the 12/8/23 meeting was not put online until December 15, 2023. To NYSERDA’s credit a separate webinar to offer the public an opportunity to ask questions on December 20.  However, they only allocated a half an hour.  I submitted questions before the webinar and time ran out before they responded to all of them.  The video recording of the Q&A meeting was provided on 12/27/23.  Comments were due by the close of business on December 29, 2023.  Expecting meaningful comments two weeks after the posting of the video with the Christmas holiday in between is not realistic.  In fact, it seems to be a deliberate attempt to squelch input.

Given the lack of responsiveness to those comments and the dismissive approach taken to the stakeholder process this year I saw no value in spending as much time on this operating amendment as I did last year.  I did not update all the analyses to use the most current data.  In order to be sure that the NYSERDA Board members had at least had the opportunity to see my comments I copied them in my submittal.

Conclusion

The State of New York has consistently allocated RGGI auction proceeds inconsistent with the stated goals of the program.  As long as emissions were going down then this impropriety had no impact on RGGI program goals.  The emission reduction low-hanging fruit are gone and now cost-effective and efficient emission reductions are needed.  The failure of the 2024 RGGI operating plan to recognize this need could very well mean that the Climate Act emission reduction targets will not be achieved.  It gets worse because the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program that is supposed to be developed in 2024 will include compliance limits.  If state investments do not produce emission reductions consistent with the NYCI limits then the only compliance option could be to stop emitting to produce electricity. In other words, the stakes have been raised and NYSERDA has not caught on.

The regulatory review stakeholder process is a game.  In my retirement it has become a hobby of mine to continue my involvement with the Climate Act regulatory proceedings.   Given the change in attitudes at state agencies I respond to requests for comments knowing full well that if I am lucky, I will get some indication that someone read the comments, but I expect nothing else.  I persevere because I consider my submitted comments a marker.  When this inevitably all blows up the record will show that they had been warned.  Unfortunately, the odds are that the ideologues pushing these policies will have moved on to a new grift so they will never be held accountable.