New York State Sen. Peter Harckham argues that New York’s Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act). will reduce high utility rates “if we let it.” He blames today’s affordability crisis entirely on fossil fuel volatility, dismisses nuclear as a “fantasy,” and claims that if we just double down on renewables and distributed solar, families will see “real, predictable savings.” He is wrong on all three counts.
I am convinced that implementation of the Climate Act net-zero mandates will do more harm than good if the future electric system relies only on wind, solar, and energy storage because of reliability and affordability risks. I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 600 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone. I acknowledge the use of Perplexity AI to generate an outline and draft for this post.
Overview
The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. It includes an interim reduction target of a 40% GHG reduction by 2030. Two targets address the electric sector: 70% of the electricity must come from renewable energy by 2030 and all electricity must be generated by “zero-emissions” resources by 2040.
In a recent post I described several initiatives that have led Governor Hochul to suggest that the timeline for the Climate Act electric sector goals needs to be revised. Apparently, the proposed changes are part of the budget negotiations and there is very little information describing exactly what the Governor has proposed. The most disappointing thing to me is that Climate Act proponents like Harkham refuse to acknowledge that there are any issues that cannot be resolved by doubling down on current policies.
The opinion piece by Harkham is mal-information. Media Defence defines mal-information as information that is based on reality, but it is used to inflict harm on a person, organization or jurisdiction like New York. Given the status of the Climate Act, it is necessary to refute the opinion piece because what he claims bears little resemblance to what the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA), the Public Service Commission (PSC), the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), and even the State Energy Plan are now saying.
Affordability Crisis: Not Just Fossil Volatility
Senator Harckham correctly notes that in 2025 more than 1.3 million New York customers were over 60 days behind on their bills, with arrears approaching $1.8 billion. Where we part company is the explanation.
Harckham says these customers are struggling only because of the “fossil fuel status quo” and “future green energy targets” are not to blame. I addressed this in my “New York Climate Act Affordability Status” article. But the arrears crisis is occurring while Climate Act implementation is driving up both utility and economy‑wide energy costs. In recent rate cases approved between March 2025 and January 2026, residential electric bills at the major utilities increased markedly, and that was before most Climate Act capital spending shows up in rates. The PSC’s own staff “Second Informational Report” on Climate Act costs found that CLCPA‑related program impacts already account for 4.6% to 10.3% of 2023 residential electric bills—numbers I consider conservative given the political pressure to minimize cost estimates.
And we are still at the front end of the cost curve. As Kris Martin from NY Solar Divide pointed out, only a small fraction of Climate Act expenses has hit bills so far; the bulk will land in the next 5–10 years as offshore wind, large‑scale solar, school‑bus electrification, and other mandates scale up. So no, this is not just a “fossil fuel” affordability problem. It is also a policy‑driven cost‑loading problem, and the state’s own documents say so.
What NYSERDA and the State Energy Plan Actually Show
If the Climate Act were really a path to lower bills, NYSERDA and the State Energy Plan (SEP) would show that clearly. They don’t.
The 2025 State Energy Plan admits that “current renewable deployment trajectories are insufficient” and that external constraints “continue to impede progress,” concluding that the Climate Act schedule is effectively impossible to meet. It also estimates that achieving the Climate Act goals will require about $120 billion per year in energy system investment through 2040—roughly $1,282 per month per household when you levelize those costs.
NYSERDA’s Energy Affordability analysis underlying the plan is even more revealing. The public‑facing fact sheets emphasize that electrification might lower operating energy expenses for some households. But when you examine the data tables and include the levelized capital cost of mandated equipment, the picture changes dramatically. For a representative upstate moderate‑income gas‑heated household, NYSERDA’s own numbers show that replacing fossil systems and vehicles with the required “zero‑emission” alternatives adds about $594 per month in 2031 compared to a conventional replacement path—a 43% increase in total energy‑related costs. That is roughly $7,000 per year in additional costs that the glossy brochures don’t emphasize.
In other words, once you include what it actually costs to buy the heat pumps, envelope upgrades, and EVs that the mandates require, the Climate Act is not a bill‑cutting program. It is a massive, regressive cost shift onto households that Albany has never honestly explained.
Reliability: The Cost of Ignoring NYISO
Harckham frames the debate as a simple choice between “low‑cost” renewables and “volatile” fossil fuels. He never mentions grid reliability, even though NYISO has been warning for years that Climate Act timelines and technology assumptions are pushing the system toward unacceptable risk. NYISO’s 2024 Reliability Needs Assessment shows statewide resource margins declining so quickly that by 2034 there is no surplus left without additional development. A 2025 Short‑Term Assessment of Reliability identified a Zone J (New York City) reliability need as early as summer 2027, requiring peaker units scheduled for retirement to be retained. There has already been a net loss of dispatchable capacity—NYISO’s 2025 Power Trends notes that since the Climate Act passed, 4,315 MW of capacity have retired while only 2,274 MW of mostly intermittent resources have been added, a net loss of about 2,041 MW.
These reports also point out that Climate Act planning assumes timely completion of critical transmission projects like Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) if this slips, New York City’s reliability margins become “deficient.” And their studies show that high penetrations of wind and solar require more operating reserves, new reserve products, and far more total installed capacity, including firm, zero‑emission resources that do not yet exist at required scale.
None of that shows up in Harckham’s breezy claim that renewables are “the cheapest new power source.” A system that must rely increasingly on emergency procedures, backstop contracts, and delayed environmental rules to keep the lights on is not a low‑cost system.
The “Cheapest Renewables” Talking Point
Harckham leans heavily on Energy Information Administration data and asserts that a kWh of solar is “consistently” cheaper than electricity from gas or nuclear. I have addressed this “cheap renewables myth” at length. Project‑level levelized cost of energy (LCOE) comparisons ignore the system‑wide costs that NYISO must actually manage:
- Backup and firming capacity to cover multi‑hour ramps and multi‑day renewable droughts.
- New transmission to move remote resources to load centers.
- Storage sized to reliability needs, not just to smooth daily solar output.
- Curtailment and overbuild required as penetration rises.
At low penetration, subsidized wind and solar can appear cheap on paper. At high penetration, the cost of keeping the system reliable at all hours rises sharply, and those costs are socialized through rates and surcharges.
Nuclear: New York Policy Disaster
Harckham dismisses nuclear as a “fantasy” for bill relief, citing the long and expensive Vogtle expansion in Georgia. That is a convenient example, but ignores New York’s misguided nuclear policy Cheered on by Harckham, New York chose to close Indian Point, a major source of zero‑emission, dispatchable power located near the New York City load center, and then tried to cover both that loss and growing demand with a mix of imports, gas, and promised future renewables. Emissions went up in the short term, and reliability margins tightened.
The fastest way to raise both emissions and costs is to shut down existing nuclear plants and then pretend that nuclear is irrelevant to affordability. New York State has not provided clear and transparent cost estimates for the Climate Act transition using renewables or an alternative approach using nuclear as the base load source. As a result, it is simply false to claim that nuclear has no role in cost containment, especially if the alternative is building a massive overbuilt, weather‑dependent system plus long‑duration storage that does not yet exist commercially at scale.
Distributed Solar and the “$1 Billion” Promise
Harckham touts a Synapse Energy Economics study for the Accelerate Solar for Affordable Power Act, claiming “an estimated $1 billion in annual savings for ratepayers” by raising distributed solar goals and reforming interconnections. I don’t doubt that a modeling exercise can produce that figure under optimistic assumptions. But New York’s record with these programs is that system‑level “savings” often mask who pays and who benefits.
Net metering and Value of Distributed Energy Resource credits shift revenue shortfalls onto non‑participants. Interconnection and distribution upgrade costs are socialized. Program administration and incentives are funded via surcharges. Those costs show up in the bills of the very households already in arrears. Unless a study rigorously accounts for these rate‑base effects and distributional impacts, a headline “$1 billion in savings” can easily mean $1 billion in shifted costs, not genuine relief for the typical customer. Furthermore, I recently showed that the distributed solar failed to provide any meaningful energy during last winter’s extreme weather. I doubt that the long-term costs will be cheaper if all the expenses necessary to support the system when solar is unavailable are included.
What PSL §66‑p(4) Is There For – And Why It Matters Now
One thing Harckham does not mention is that the Legislature itself anticipated a situation where Climate Act implementation might threaten affordability and reliability. Public Service Law §66‑p(4) explicitly authorizes the PSC to temporarily suspend or modify Renewable Energy Program obligations if it finds that the program:
- Impedes the provision of safe and adequate electric service,
- Is likely to impair existing obligations, and/or
- Is associated with a significant increase in arrears or service disconnections.
Two recent petitions—one from Independent Intervenors (including me), and one from the Coalition for Safe and Reliable Energy—ask the PSC to hold a §66‑p(4) hearing based on precisely these concerns. On January 28, 2026, the PSC issued a notice soliciting comments on whether Renewable Energy Program targets should be suspended or adjusted. That is not routine housekeeping. It is a legal acknowledgment that the current trajectory may be incompatible with safe, adequate, and affordable service. The fact is that New York has never done a feasibility study proving that transitioning the electric system to depend on renewables will work.
Conclusion: Stop Pretending, Start Reviewing
Harckham urges New Yorkers to “reject misinformation” and “double down” on the Climate Act to lower bills. But the state’s own data tell a different story:
- NYSERDA’s cap‑and‑invest modeling shows steep fuel price increases and thousands of dollars per year in added household costs.
- Energy affordability analysis shows a 40+% increase in energy‑related costs for a representative upstate family once capital is included.
- The State Energy Plan projects $120 billion per year in system investment, about $1,282 per month per household on a levelized basis.
- NYISO warns of declining reliability margins, dependence on a few critical transmission projects, and a technology gap for firm, zero‑emission resources.
- More than 1.3 million households already owe nearly $1.8 billion in arrears.
This is not what an affordable transition looks like.
Reconsidering the Climate Act’s timelines and mandates does not mean abandoning climate goals. It means using the tools the Legislature provided—especially PSL §66‑p(4)—to align ambition with reality, ensure that reliability is not sacrificed, and prevent climate policy from becoming an uncontrolled energy tax on working families.
New Yorkers were promised a “clean, resilient, and affordable” energy future. Now that NYSERDA, NYISO, the Comptroller, and the Attorney General’s office have all signaled serious cost and feasibility issues, the responsible course is not to “double down” on slogans, but to require a transparent §66‑p(4) hearing on whether the Renewable Energy Program is compatible with safe, adequate, and affordable service.
That is the conversation we should be having—not whether critics are guilty of “misinformation” for reading the state’s own numbers aloud. It is frustrating that misinformation claims are grounded on information that is based on reality, but it is incorrect that it inflicts harm on the state.
Conclusion
Since the promulgation of the Climate Act we now know we must address what we have learned. New York’s affordability crisis is being exacerbated by Climate Act‑driven costs, not just fossil volatility. NYSERDA and the State Energy Plan show large household cost increases once capital is included, not bill reductions. NYISO’s reliability warnings reveal that a high‑renewables system without firm backup is neither cheap nor risk‑free. Claims that renewables are “the cheapest power” ignore system‑wide costs, rate‑base effects, and reliability needs. Finally, PSL §66‑p(4) exists as a safety valve and should be used now to review and, if necessary, modify Climate Act obligations.
Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York 