A couple of months ago I wrote that the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) needs to be revised. Unfortunately, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) approved amendments to Part 242 CO2 Budget Trading Program that is consistent with the RGGI Third Program Review but are at odds to changes since the completion of the amendment implementation process. This post explains why I think this action was short-sighted and incorrect.
Dealing with the RGGI regulatory and political landscapes is challenging enough and agency retribution is enough of a threat that affected entities seldom see value in speaking out about fundamental issues associated with the program. I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception and have no such restrictions when writing about the about problems with the RGGI program. I have worked on every cap-and-trade program affecting electric generating facilities in New York including RGGI, the Acid Rain Program, and several Nitrogen Oxide programs, since the inception of those programs. I also participated in RGGI Auction 41 successfully winning allowances and holding them for several years. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Background
RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Factsheet). It has been a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector since 2008. New Jersey was in at the beginning, dropped out for years, and re-joined in 2020. Virginia joined in 2021, withdrew in 2024, and rejoined effective July 1, 2026, and Pennsylvania considered joining but has since decided not to join. RGGI includes a provision for regular reviews. The Third Program Review was completed in July 2025. It strengthened the regional CO₂ emissions cap through 2037, with steeper reductions from 2027 to 2033 and a lower rate thereafter. New York was required to align their regulations with the updated Model Rule by January 1, 2027.
It appears that DEC approved amendments that made the NY carbon trading rule consistent with the Model Rule to meet this alignment requirement. However, I believe that there were significant changes to the RGGI and New York landscape that should have been considered. As a result DEC should push for an immediate start to a Fourth Program Review.
Timeline
The public comment period for the proposed revisions to 6 NYCRR Part 242 and associated regulations began on December 10, 2025, and closed on February 17, 2026. DEC held two virtual public hearings in February 2026 to take testimony on the proposal. On June 23, 2026, the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) Board approved companion revisions to its 21 NYCRR Part 507 CO2 Allowance Auction Program regulation so that the auction rule would align with the Part 242 amendments. On August 5, 2026, DEC and NYSERDA jointly announced that they had finalized the regulations, with the amendments taking effect January 1, 2027.
In other words, over the eight months between the close of the comment period and final adoption, DEC had every opportunity to reconsider the proposal in light of events that undercut the analytical basis it had relied on. Instead, the final rule that emerged in August is, in every respect that matters, the same rule that was proposed in December – a rule based on modeling and assumptions that had already been superseded by the time it was finalized. That is my problem with this rulemaking. It is not that DEC failed to follow the Model Rule. It is that DEC treated an evolving policy and market landscape as if it did not exist.
Factors not Considered
Since the draft amendments were finalized, there have been several significant changes to the NYS regulatory landscape that DEC’s response to comments does not meaningfully grapple with.
The State Energy Plan was finalized after the close of the comment period. DEC’s responses to comments repeatedly lean on the State Energy Plan (SEP) Additional Action case as evidence that the proposed cap trajectory is “consistent” with the SEP and is “on a pathway to zero emissions by 2040.” IPPNY comments noted that the SEP’s Additional Action case assumed the Climate Act’s zero-emissions target would be reached by 2045, not 2040 – a five-year gap that DEC’s response does not reconcile, beyond restating that the cap trajectory is “on a pathway to zero emissions by 2040.” That raises an obvious problem: the SEP itself was still being finalized while this rulemaking was underway, and DEC cannot simultaneously treat the SEP as settled, authoritative support for its cap trajectory while the SEP was not yet final policy. You cannot borrow credibility from a document that was still being written.
The May 2026 budget bill changed New York’s underlying emission reduction requirements. In Part VV of the budget bill, the Legislature substantially rewrote the Climate Act’s statutory GHG accounting and planning provisions. As I described in more detail when the bill passed, the budget bill revisions to the CLCPA replaced the hard 40% by 2030 reduction requirement with a directive that DEC adopt regulations by December 31, 2028 to achieve a 60% by 2040 reduction “to the maximum extent feasible and cost effective.” That relaxes the statutory pressure to adopt an allowance allocation trajectory consistent with “zero emissions” by 2040. The Sabin Center’s white paper on the 2026 climate law changes reached a similar conclusion, describing the amendments as a retreat from the original Climate Act framework. I had made this same point in 2023 when the cap-and-invest program first showed up in a budget bill – the Legislature has repeatedly used the budget process to quietly rewrite the Climate Act’s substance rather than debate it as standalone legislation. The Part 242 amendments adopted in August, however, do not reflect any of this. DEC finalized a New York-specific allowance budget as though the emission reduction requirement that supposedly justifies it had not changed at all.
Second quarter 2026 auction prices jumped significantly, making consumer impacts a real and immediate problem, not a hypothetical one. The RGGI allowance clearing price jumped 40%, from $24.99 in the March 11, 2026 auction to $35.00 in the June 3, 2026 auction. All the original containment reserve allowances available for 2026 had already been exhausted by the March auction. I laid out the consumer cost implications of that price jump when the results came out. Direct allowance purchase costs to New York consumers were already running around $700 million a year at 2025 average prices, and would rise to well over $1.1 billion a year if the $35 price persists. DEC has not acknowledged that when the wholesale electric market cost adder created by RGGI-obligated generators bidding in their allowance costs is included, the plausible statewide consumer burden runs into the $1.8 to $3.2 billion range depending on which generating technology sets the marginal price. A meaningful share of that embedded cost becomes windfall revenue for generators that have no RGGI compliance obligation of their own and never flows back to ratepayers through any investment program. None of that was reflected in the cost impact analysis DEC relied on to finalize this rule, because that analysis predates the price spike. DEC’s responses to comments statd that “the average residential, commercial, and industrial consumer of electricity is anticipated to see no significant change in their bills as a result of this rule making” – a conclusion drawn from modeling that has already been overtaken by events on the ground. (See my RGGI Quarter 2 2026 Auction Results post for the full analysis.)
Taken together, these three developments describe a rulemaking that was adopted on autopilot. The SEP that DEC cites as validation was not yet final when the comment period closed. The statutory emission reduction targets that supposedly justify the cap trajectory were rewritten by the Legislature while the rule was pending. And the auction market that DEC’s affordability conclusions depend on moved sharply against ratepayers before the ink was dry. Any one of those developments would be reason enough to pause and take another look. All three together are as close to a mandate for reconsideration as a rulemaking record is ever going to hand you, and DEC did not take it.
Bottom Line
DEC had a genuine opportunity, between the close of the comment period in February and final adoption in August, to reconsider a rule whose analytical foundation had visibly eroded out from under it. The State Energy Plan it cites as validation was not final when the rule was proposed. The statutory emission reduction requirements the cap trajectory is supposed to serve were rewritten by the Legislature in May. The auction market whose stability underpins DEC’s “no significant change in bills” conclusion jumped 40% in June. And three separate, technically sophisticated stakeholders – EEANY, IPPNY, and NYISO – laid out in detail why the cap trajectory, the reliability safeguards, and the affordability assumptions in this rule do not hold up, all before DEC finalized it anyway. DEC’s answer to all of it, in substance, is that the Cost Containment Reserve and the allowance bank will probably be enough, and that a Fourth Program Review will start by 2028. That is not a rebuttal. It is an acknowledgment, buried in the response-to-comments document, that the critics are right and the fix has been deferred to a review that has not even started yet. DEC should have paused this rulemaking and pushed for the Fourth Program Review immediately. Instead, New York is locked into a cap trajectory built on a foundation that DEC’s own record shows was already out of date the day it was adopted.
Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York 