Balancing the risks and benefits of environmental initiatives
Author: rogercaiazza
I am a meteorologist (BS and MS degrees), was certified as a consulting meteorologist and have worked in the air quality industry for over 40 years. I author two blogs. Environmental staff in any industry have to be pragmatic balancing risks and benefits and (https://pragmaticenvironmentalistofnewyork.blog/) reflects that outlook. The second blog addresses the New York State Reforming the Energy Vision initiative (https://reformingtheenergyvisioninconvenienttruths.wordpress.com). Any of my comments on the web or posts on my blogs are my opinion only. In no way do they reflect the position of any of my past employers or any company I was associated with.
I have been so busy lately with net-zero transition implementation issues that I have not had time to put together an article about every relevant post I have read. This is a summary of posts that I think would be of interest to my readers.
I have been following the. Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) since it was first proposed and most of the articles described below are related to the net-zero transition. I have devoted a lot of time to the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Robert Bryce describes a court case which could have implications to New York:
Last month, the Ninth Circuit denied the city of Berkeley’s petition to re-hear its case after the city’s ban was ruled illegal last April. The January 2 ruling has national implications and is an enormous loss for the electrify everything movement, the lavishly funded campaign that seeks to ban natural gas stoves, water heaters, and other gas-fired appliances in the name of climate change.
He explains the history of gas bans and the dark money subsidizing the campaign then goes into the details of the case. He concludes with reference to New York State because there is a similar case under consideration here.
On October 12, Jorgenson filed suit on behalf of a group of plaintiffs, including propane dealers, homebuilders, and plumbers. In a press release, Jorgenson’s firm said the “The drastic step of requiring ‘all-electric’ new buildings despite an already-strained electric grid stands at odds with the public’s need for a reliable, resilient, and affordable energy supply. New York’s gas ban is preempted by federal law, is contrary to the public interest, and harms plaintiffs and the members they represent.”
If Jorgenson prevails in New York, and she should, the next stop on the litigation is the U.S. Supreme Court, which should weigh in and declare that the electrify everything effort, is, as Jorgenson says, “contrary to the public interest.”
Parker Gallant summarizes what each generation source actually cost Ontario ratepayers/taxpayers to see if the claims that wind and solar are cheap are true. He found:
The only energy source cheaper than natural gas is hydro. Natural gas, hydro, and nuclear are all cheaper than wind and solar.
Tom Shepstone notes that the American Gas Association has put up a nice web page illustrating the numerous reasons why “natural gas has quickly become the indispensable energy source for America’s energy system.”
You may have heard about this recent court decision:
As many of you already know, a Washington, DC jury today found the Defendants (Mark Steyn and Rand Simberg) liable for defamatory speech and reckless disregard of provable facts. Putting aside the monetary damages, the real damage done by this case is to every American who still believes in the First Amendment.
The precedent set today, and as alluded to by Justice Alito when the case was petitioned before the U.S. Supreme Court, means that disagreement and/or criticism of a matter of public policy — the founding principle of this country — is now in doubt. And should you choose to give voice to any dissent, you can be brought before a jury, held responsible, and fined.
I recommend Judith Curry’s two articles on the science behind the claims and Dr. Mann’s behavior towards her. In short his science deserved ridicule and the man has no ethics.
On February 15, 2024 Governor Hochul announced $200 million in utility bill relief for 8 million New Yorkers. The press release quoted her as saying “Energy affordability continues to be a top priority in my clean energy agenda and this utility bill credit is just one of many actions New York is taking to reduce costs for our most vulnerable New Yorkers.” This post shows how some of the numbers given can be used to put implementation costs for the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) into context.
I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 400 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Overview
The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies. After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation. Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned and many aspects of the transition are falling behind. In addition, the magnitude of the necessary costs is coming into focus despite efforts to hide them. A political reckoning is inevitable in my opinion.
Press Release
This section quotes the press release and includes my comments.
The introduction outlines the rebate plan:
Governor Kathy Hochul today announced that the New York State Public Service Commission adopted a $200 million New York State energy bill credit to be administered by the large electric and gas utilities on behalf of their customers. The energy bill credit is a one-time credit using State-appropriated funds to provide energy bill relief to more than 8 million directly metered electric and gas customers. With today’s action, more than $1.4 billion has been or will be made available to New York consumers to help offset energy costs in 2024.
The rebate totals $200 million and gives a one-time credit to 8 million directly metered electric and gas customers. Ry Rivard in the February 16 edition of Politico Pro NY & NJ Energy notes that “The money, which will be spread across eight million electric and gas customers, amounts to roughly a one-time bill credit of about $24.”
Hochul provides the rationale for the rebate:
“Every New Yorker deserves affordable and clean energy, which is why I fought to secure additional funds to provide financial relief for hardworking families,” Governor Hochul said. “Energy affordability continues to be a top priority in my clean energy agenda and this utility bill credit is just one of many actions New York is taking to reduce costs for our most vulnerable New Yorkers.”
In Albany there are always working groups, advisory councils, and other committees set up to deflect blame and/or claim benefits. In this instance the Energy Affordability Policy working group, “a group of stakeholders that included the most prominent consumer advocacy groups in the state” made the recommendations. The press release states:
The program, proposed by the Energy Affordability Policy working group, provides that the $200 million appropriation included in the FY24 State Budget will be allocated to customer accounts through a one-time credit within roughly 45 days of the utilities receiving budget funds. This utility bill relief builds on several other key energy affordability programs administered by New York State, including $380 million in energy assistance program (EAP) funding for consumers through utilities, $360 million in Home Energy Assistance Program (HEAP) funding, $200 million in EmPower+ funding through the State Budget, over $200 million in ratepayer funding to provide access to energy efficiency and clean energy solutions for low-to -moderate income (LMI) New Yorkers through the Statewide LMI portfolio and NY Sun, and more than $70 million annually through the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP).
The Department of Public Service (DPS), in consultation with the Energy Affordability Policy working group, was tasked with designing a utility bill relief program related to the costs of utility affordability programs in recognition of energy commodity cost increases and the costs of utilities’ delivery rate increases. The working group considered multiple proposals over several months to effectuate the desired relief. The majority of the working group agreed to the staff proposal after several key modifications and recommended the PSC implement a one-time energy bill credit that would primarily benefit residential and small business electric and gas customers.
The Energy Affordability Policy working group is made up of leading consumer groups and advocates, municipalities, relevant state agencies, and utilities in New York.
Ry Rivard explains that the PSC was asked to divvy up the money in a few different ways:
New York City, for instance, urged the commission to provide different credits to gas customers depending on whether they used gas to heat their homes or just for cooking. And AARP, among others, argued the bill credits should be targeted to people who need the help most.
Ultimately, the PSC went with a simple, rough and ready way that gets money out the door quickly and just in time to help reduce winter heating bills: divide the money available by the number of customers.
A large section of the press release was devoted to congratulatory statements and descriptions of other ways the Hochul Administration wants to help:
PSC Chair Rory M. Christian said, “We applaud Governor Hochul for continuing to address the high cost of utility bills in New York State head on. While global commodity price volatility and utility delivery rate requests for increases, the Governor’s new and innovative energy affordability initiatives are coming at exactly the right time.”
Public Utility Law Project (PULP) Executive Director and Counsel Laurie Wheelock said, “PULP extends our sincere gratitude to Governor Hochul and the State Legislature for the allocation of a historic $200 million in the FY 2023-24 State Budget to address energy affordability. PULP and other stakeholders, including the Department of Public Service, Joint Utilities, and fellow consumer advocates, worked together to put forward a proposal that would provide relief to customers. The Commission’s decision today underscores a shared commitment to find ways to aid all New Yorkers, including our most vulnerable households, facing rising utility costs and volatile electric and natural gas prices. As we celebrate this milestone, PULP remains committed to identifying and advocating for additional measures to ensure energy is affordable in 2024 and beyond.”
In addition to the energy bill credit funds and EmPower+, New York State programs offer funding and technical assistance that can assist homeowners, renters, and businesses manage their energy needs. This includes:
Apply for HEAP: As of November 1, applications were being accepted for the Home Energy Assistance Program (HEAP) which can provide up to $976 to eligible homeowners and renters depending on income, household size and how they heat their home (e.g., family of four with a maximum monthly gross income of $5,838 can qualify). For more information visit NYS HEAP.
Energy Affordability Program/Low Income Bill Discount Program: This program provides income-eligible consumers with a discount on their monthly electric and/or gas bills, as well as other benefits, depending on the characteristics of the particular utility’s program. New Yorkers can be enrolled automatically if they receive benefits from a government assistance program. For more information, they should visit their utility website or links can be found at DPS Winter Preparedness.
Community-based Service Programs: Service organizations and local community agencies provide financial aid, counseling services and assistance with utility emergencies. New Yorkers can contact organizations like the American Red Cross (800-733-2767), Salvation Army (800-728-7825), and United Way (2-1-1 or 888-774-7633) to learn more.
Receive a customized list of energy-related assistance in the State: New York Energy Advisor can help income-eligible New Yorkers locate programs that help them spend less on energy and create healthier and more comfortable spaces. With New York Energy Advisor, consumers answer simple questions and get connected with energy-saving offers in New York State. Sponsored by NYSERDA and utilities, qualified New Yorkers can get help paying utility bills, receive special offers on heating assistance, and more.
EmPower+: Income-eligible households can receive a home energy assessment and no-cost energy efficiency upgrades through the EmPower+ program, administered by NYSERDA. Get more information about the program, including information on how to apply at https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/EmPower-New-York-Program.
Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP): Administered by New York State Homes and Community Renewal, WAP provides income-eligible households with no-cost weatherization services. Rental properties can also be served, though there are additional requirements for owners of rental properties. For more information on WAP, including how to apply, visit https://hcr.ny.gov/weatherization-applicants.
The press release ends with a bragging reference to the Climate Act. Not mentioned here is how the Climate Act initiative will affect consumer costs. It is the same oft-repeated drivel seen before so I will not comment here.
New York State’s Nation-Leading Climate Plan
New York State’s nation-leading climate agenda calls for an orderly and just transition that creates family-sustaining jobs, continues to foster a green economy across all sectors and ensures that at least 35 percent, with a goal of 40 percent, of the benefits of clean energy investments are directed to disadvantaged communities. Guided by some of the nation’s most aggressive climate and clean energy initiatives, New York is on a path to achieving a zero-emission electricity sector by 2040, including 70 percent renewable energy generation by 2030, and economywide carbon neutrality by mid-century. A cornerstone of this transition is New York’s unprecedented clean energy investments, including more than $40 billion in 64 large-scale renewable and transmission projects across the state, $6.8 billion to reduce building emissions, $3.3 billion to scale up solar, nearly $3 billion for clean transportation initiatives, and over $2 billion in NY Green Bank commitments. These and other investments are supporting more than 170,000 jobs in New York’s clean energy sector as of 2022 and over 3,000 percent growth in the distributed solar sector since 2011. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve air quality, New York also adopted zero-emission vehicle regulations, including requiring all new passenger cars and light-duty trucks sold in the State be zero emission by 2035. Partnerships are continuing to advance New York’s climate action with 400 registered and more than 100 certified Climate Smart Communities, nearly 500 Clean Energy Communities, and the State’s largest community air monitoring initiative in 10 disadvantaged communities across the State to help target air pollution and combat climate change.
Discussion
In this section I will put some context around these numbers: rebate totals $200 million and gives a one-time credit to 8 million directly metered electric and gas customers which “amounts to roughly a one-time bill credit of about $24.” In my opinion it is disappointing that this rebate apparently is being given to everyone and not limited to those who can least afford high energy costs. I calculated the rebate as function of the number of household percentiles. Using 7.5 million households as the state total and dividing by the $200 million rebate gives $26.67 per household. If only half the households are eligible for the rebate the $200 million is divided by 3,375,000 the rebate goes up to $53.33. The numbers quoted earlier are different simply because a different number of households was used.
Last year legislation mandated that auction funds from the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program be allocated to the Consumer Climate Action Account (CCAA) as part of the overarching investment framework established for the New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) program A recent webinar on plans for NYCI noted that the first 37% of revenue generated by NYCI auctions is “set aside for the affordability accounts, the Consumer Climate Action Account, the industrial small business climate action account and administrative expenses.” The Consumer Climate Action Account itself is supposed to get 30% of the revenues. Recall that 2030 total revenue is “estimated to be between $6 and $12 billion per year” so the Consumer Climate Action Account should get between $3.3 and $1.5 billion in 2030.
The amount of CCAA rebates to individual households is a function of the set-aside and the number of households eligible for the rebate. I previously found an overview of New York household income at Statistical Atlas that I used to estimate income percentiles and number of households at different levels in the following table. Note that the total number of households from this source is slightly different than what was used before. The NYCI webinar presentation stated that there will be no benefit for households in the top 20% which according to the table corresponds to an income exceeding $126,900. There are six million households under that threshold which means that around 1.5 million households in the top 20% of income will get no benefit. Low-income households are those below $35,000 and there are 2.3 million households in that category. There are 2.1 million households above $35,000 but below $75,000. Middle income is identified as the income band that contains the median annual household income in NYS, i.e., $50-75,000 for the purpose of the NYCI analysis. That leaves 1.6 million households with income between $75,000 and $126,900.
The following table lists the CCAA rebates for the four income categories described above. I assumed that the rebates would be assigned across the income categories included for the two NYCI revenue categories ($6 to $12 billion). If the auction revenues are distributed only to low-income households with incomes less than $35K, then each household will get between $774 and $1547 per year. At the other end of the range where every household with incomes less than the 80th percentile gets an equal share then the CCAA rebate will be between $300 and $600. I think it is more equitable to focus benefits on the lower brackets. The lower table apportions the rebates so that the upper bracket gets 20% while the lower two brackets each get 40%. In this example, rebates range from $225 to $619 per year.
Hochul’s press release noted “Energy affordability continues to be a top priority in my clean energy agenda and this utility bill credit is just one of many actions New York is taking to reduce costs for our most vulnerable New Yorkers.” This program is a $200 million appropriation coming from some never mentioned pot of money in the 2024 budget. This utility bill relief builds on several other key energy affordability programs administered by New York State: $380 million in energy assistance program (EAP); $360 million in Home Energy Assistance Program (HEAP) funding; $200 million in EmPower+ funding through the State Budget; over $200 million in ratepayer funding for energy efficiency and clean energy solutions for low-to -moderate income (LMI) New Yorkers; and more than $70 million annually through the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP).
The hypocrisy of this press release is astonishing. It claims a total of $1.41 billion for programs that help with energy affordability. Today energy affordability is affected by the energy policy of the Hochul Administration and in the future those costs will increase much more. The Administration has never quantified how these investments will affect global GHG emissions. My analysis has shown that while there is interannual variation, the five-year annual average increase in global GHG emissions has always been greater than 0.79% until the COVID year of 2020. I also found that New York’s share of global GHG emissions is 0.42% in 2019 so this means that global annual increases in GHG emissions are greater than New York’s total contribution to global emissions. Anything we do will be supplanted by emissions elsewhere in less than a year. In that context, it is appropriate to ask whether the Climate Act transition plan is appropriate because it is forcing over a billion dollars to help reduce the cost impacts of the transition. Eventually all this money must come out of the pockets of New Yorkers for no quantifiable benefit to global emissions.
Conclusion
The Hochul Administration has never admitted how much households can expect to pay to implement the Climate Act net-zero transition plan. The plan is to electrify as much energy use as possible. That means we will be required to electrify home heating, cooking, and hot water as well as moving to electric vehicles. Recent electric rate cases have included double digit increases needed so support the Climate Act transition. I have no doubt that the costs of the transition for households will far exceed these rebates described in the press release. I urge all New Yorkers to demand an open and transparent accounting of the costs so we can all decide if we are willing to foot the enormous bills coming our way. There is no way the State can rebate its way to prevent those who can least afford the regressive increases in energy prices to not be adversely affected.
Mark Sertoff, a science/technology educator, occasionally sends me information. This post describes his comments on the Long Island Power Authority’s (LIPA) Integrated Resource Plan “where they want to replace fossil generation with mythical wind, battery and solar power.”
Integrated Resource Plan Comments
I have lightly edited Mark’s comments and added some references.
LIPA’s plunge into wind and solar power replacing reliable, cost-effective, clean fossil generation is the path to energy disaster. Through decades of solid engineering and execution, Long Island has developed the most reliable and economical above ground power distribution system in New York State. The defective initiative to wind and solar generation will leave Long Island with seriously unreliable and costly power.
Wind and solar work about 20% of the nameplate capacity. They need battery backup, which is very expensive, requires rare earths mined in unfriendly countries with child labor that creates environmental pollution in refining. Existing storage technology only lasts a few hours when a week may be required. To top it off the batteries have safety issues because they can explode and burn in unquenchable fires emitting toxic fumes. Europe tried wind and solar with massive problems in reliability and cost so is reopening fossil generation plants. Germany, the former industrial powerhouse of Europe, is losing its industrial base due to high energy costs.
There are significant environmental impacts. Wind turbines in the marine environment have drastically shorter lives and kill land and sea birds. Solar panels are negligibly recyclable and require rare earths sourced from unfriendly foreign countries via child labor and create copious pollution in fabrication while being barely recyclable. There are mountains of scrap wind turbine blades now that can’t be recycled. Marine wind turbines in construction and operation have caused the deaths of many whales along the East Coast. Machine gun sonar, pile driving, and sub sonic rotor vibrations injure and disorient sea mammals leading to beaching and ship collisions. Solar panels have such low energy density that habitats are destroyed to install solar when conventional generation would make many times more reliable power in a fraction of the land area at lower per-watt cost.
There are questions about the renewable energy business model. No wind or solar generation would be viable without government taxpayer subsidies. That says it all. It’s a defective business and energy plan. If it were a real upgrade, the market would support it without subsidies.
Finally, there is no climate crisis. This “crisis” is based on defective UN climate computer models. Thousands of scientists around the world concur. The greenhouse gas effect is real, but it is only one of many different drivers of climate. We experience cyclical weather in decadal, century, and millennial cycles and we do not understand those natural cycles well. It is likely that those cycles are the primary drivers of the observed changes in global temperatures observed and that the greenhouse effect has a minor impact, Certainly nothing that warrants the proposed changes to our energy system.
Conclusion
I published this because it is a concise summary of the myriad issues associated with New York’s net-zero obsession. It cannot end well and won’t make a difference.
To her credit Susan Arbetter, the host of Spectrum News Capital Tonight program, has tried to expose viewers to issues related to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act). Unfortunately, she allows speakers from the Hochul Administration to constantly conflate extreme weather with climate change and misleadingly claim that the costs of inaction are more than the costs of action. In this post I comment on her February 12 interview with Basil Seggos on the climate transition.
I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 400 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Overview
The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies. After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation. Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned and many aspects of the transition are falling behind. In addition, the magnitude of the necessary costs is coming into focus despite efforts to hide them. A political reckoning is inevitable in my opinion.
Seggos Interview: Climate transition will be ‘the toughest thing we ever do’
The video of the interview is available but I am going to concentrate on two paragraphs from the cover story on the Capital Tonight webpage:
The cost of the doing nothing on climate will far outweigh the cost of a climate transition for New York, according to state Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) Commissioner Basil Seggos, who addressed concerns on Capital Tonight.
“I just want to make sure viewers are clear. People are already paying for the impacts of climate change. That is a certainty. We spent $36 billion to recover from Superstorm Sandy,” Seggos said. “We see a $55 billion bill, potentially, if we don’t do the right things in New York, just on adaptation over the next 10 years.”
The political slogan “the cost of the doing nothing on climate will far outweigh the cost of a climate transition” is repeated as often as possible by representatives of the Hochul Administration. It is a deeply flawed argument for multiple reasons.
It is misleading because it refers to the costs in the Scoping Plan that do not include the costs of “already implemented” programs that exist solely to reduce GHG emissions. In other words, it does not include all the costs to reach net zero Climate Act targets only the costs of programs started after the Climate Act itself. The two biggest programs not included in the cost side of the slogan are the Zero-emission vehicle mandate (8% LDV ZEV stock share by 2030) and the Clean Energy Standard (70×30), including technology carveouts: (6 GW of behind-the-meter solar by 2025, 3 GW of battery storage by 2030, 9 GW of offshore wind by 2035, 1.25 GW of Tier 4 renewables by 2030). These programs, among others, are listed in Section 5.3: Scenario Assumptions in New York State Climate Action Council Scoping Plan Appendix G: Integration Analysis Technical Supplement Section I page 130.
The ”cost of doing nothing” does not include benefits of GHG emission reductions. The basis for the benefits are described in the Scoping Plan Costs and Benefits white paper documents. The actual numbers in that document have been updated since its release. The Plan describes health benefits due to improvements in air quality but observed improvements in recent years are 16 times greater than those projected for the Climate Act. If the State can show that the health benefits projected have been observed comparable to those observed then these benefits are supportable but there has never been any attempt to validate the estimates.
The benefits include a couple of tenuous estimates. The first is for “active transportation”. The active transportation health theory claims that as people are forced out of their personal vehicles some will switch to walking and biking. Those activities are healthier so there is a benefit. The increased active transportation benefit of $39.5 billion is based on a first-order approximation based on state-wide numbers but the benefits will likely only occur in certain areas. As a result, the benefit estimate is far too high. The second is for energy efficiency interventions benefits in low- and middle-income homes. The majority of the health benefits claimed are the result of “non-energy interventions”. The Climate Act intends to transform the energy sector so it is disingenuous to claim health benefits not directly related to energy efficiency programs themselves. Of the $8.7 billion in benefits claimed $3 billion is due to reduction in asthma-related incidents resulting from better ventilation not directly due to energy efficiency. The $2.4 billion in benefits from reduced trip or fall injuries and reduced carbon monoxide poisoning benefits are non-energy interventions and should not be claimed as benefits for GHG emission reduction programs.
The final reason that the slogan is flawed is the biggest. There are issues with the benefits for the societal avoided cost of GHG emissions known as the social cost of carbon or value of carbon. The values used are determined by a wide range of value judgements and economic projections. The Climate Act manipulates emissions to increase benefits and uses a lower discount rate than current Federal guidance resulting in societal benefits of GHG emission reductions that are 4.5 times higher for 1990 emissions and 5.4 times higher for 2019 emissions than other jurisdictions. The largest manipulation of these benefits is caused by incorrect guidance for calculating benefits. In particular, the benefits of reductions are counted multiple times. If only that error is corrected the total benefits do not outweigh the projected costs.
Another Climate Act narrative tactic is to claim that people are already paying for the impacts of climate change. Seggos said “We spent $36 billion to recover from Superstorm Sandy” implying that climate change was responsible for those costs. The difference between weather and climate is constantly misunderstood by Climate Act proponents that make this simplistic argument.
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Ocean Service “Weather reflects short-term conditions of the atmosphere while climate is the average daily weather for an extended period of time at a certain location.” The referenced article goes on to explain “Climate is what you expect, weather is what you get.” Seggos consistently claims that extreme weather is proof of climate change but the interview showed he has no meteorological expertise whatsoever. More than once when described implementation challenges he stated that the state is facing trade winds but the appropriate term is head winds.
If, in fact, Superstorm Sandy was connected to climate change then the weather over extended periods of time should show increased hurricane activity and there should be a trend in disaster losses. Roger A. Pielke, Jr, specializes in tracking these parameters so I checked his work.
He posted information in June 2022 on hurricane trends on Atlantic hurricane activity. He noted that:
1. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in its latest report, concluded that there remains “no consensus” on the relative role of human influences on Atlantic hurricane activity.
Here is what the IPCC says exactly:
“[T]here is still no consensus on the relative magnitude of human and natural influences on past changes in Atlantic hurricane activity, and particularly on which factor has dominated the observed increase (Ting et al., 2015) and it remains uncertain whether past changes in Atlantic TC activity are outside the range of natural variability.”
One reason for the inability to unambiguously attribute causality to Atlantic hurricane activity is the large interannual and interdecadal variability.
Pielke, Jr. argues that in order to assess disaster loss trends ”it is necessary to normalize disaster losses by taking into account changes in exposure and vulnerability.” He explains that:
The UN Sendai Framework recommends looking at disaster losses as a proportion of GDP as a method of normalization.
Since 1990, the toll of disasters as a proportion of the global economy has gone down from about 0.25% of GDP to less than 0.20%. That is good news and indicates progress with respect to the goals of the Sendai Framework.
Some quick questions and answers.
Can we conclude from this data that climate change is making disasters more frequent or costly? No
Can we conclude from this trend that climate change signals are not detectable in trends in various extreme events? No
What can we say about climate change by looking at this graph? Nothing
What about those journalists and campaigners who claim that economic losses from disasters indicate the detection and attribution of trends in extreme weather? They are wrong
How would we know if disasters are becoming more costly due to climate change? Follow this methodology
Needless to say the Scoping Plan ignored these recommendations and observations when it justified the Climate Act. It is also obvious that these inconvenient results are routinely ignored by apologists for the Climate Act.
There is one final aspect of the slogan “the cost of the doing nothing on climate will far outweigh the cost of a climate transition” that needs to be considered. The implication is that New York’s investments for the climate transition will make a difference. I recently updated my post Climate Act Emission Reductions in Context that documented how New York GHG relate to global emission increases. I found CO2 and GHG emissions data for the world’s countries and consolidated the data in a spreadsheet. There is interannual variation, but the five-year annual average has always been greater than 0.79% until the COVID year of 2020. The Statewide GHG emissions inventory came out in December but the comparable GWP-100 data that I used from Open Data NY through 2021 are not available. This analysis relies on last year’s data. New York’s share of global GHG emissions is 0.42% in 2019 so this means that global annual increases in GHG emissions are greater than New York’s total contribution to global emissions. Our actions will have no effects on the next superstorm because the increase in annual global emissions are greater than our total emissions. Implying other wise is disingenuous.
With all due respect to Commissioner Seggos, his cost benefit rationale for the Climate Act transition or his claim that climate change is affecting costs now do not stand up to scrutiny. Consider that the largest benefit claimed is based on counting benefits multiple times. If I managed to lose five pounds and keep it off for five years I cannot claim that I lost 25 pounds but that is what the basis for the slogan is doing. The IPCC science directly contradicts the insinuation that hurricane trends are outside the range of normal variability.
Conclusion
Seggos claimed that the climate transition will be ‘the toughest thing we ever do’. I think it might be the worst thing we ever do. The Climate Act transition plan is poorly documented, results are obfuscated, and there are no transparent cost estimates. As a result, I do not believe that the Hochul Administration has made a persuasive case that the transition is feasible with regards to affordability and reliability. I am disappointed that the media does not call them out on this.
Dennis Higgins passes on his commentaries associated with New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act). I asked his permission to present his status analysis of the transmission system components of the Climate Act net-zero transition that was published in AllOtsego. I also became aware of a puff piece claiming all is well by Basil Seggos, co-chair of the Climate Act’s Climate Action Council that provides the State’s story. Comparing the two pieces I don’t see how this will end well.
Dennis taught for just a few years at St Lawrence and Scranton University, but spent most of my career at SUNY Oneonta, teaching Mathematics and Computer Science. He retired early, several years ago, in order to devote more time to home-schooling his four daughters. (Three will be in college next year and the youngest opted to go to the local public school, so his home schooling is ending this June.) Dennis and his wife run a farm with large vegetable gardens. They keep horses and raise chickens, goats, and beef. He has been involved in environmental and energy issues for a decade or more. Although he did work extensively with the ‘Big Greens’ in efforts to stop gas infrastructure, his views on what needs to happen, and his opinions of Big Green advocacy, have served to separate them.
The game plan for the Climate Act public narrative is to point to a recent weather event and claim that is proof of climate change. The difference between weather and climate is never acknowledged and there has never been any estimate of how much Climate Act implementation will affect the alleged weather impacts. Seggos follows the script:
As made clear by the recent storms that ravaged many Long Island communities, time is running short to comprehensively address the flooding, erosion, and regional economic damage being wrought by increasingly common extreme weather events. We are witnessing the impacts of the climate crisis in real time, both here in New York and across the planet. It’s time for bold action at every level of society.
The next item in the usual script is to tout some new effort and its alleged benefits. That is the primary purpose of this article:
With the ongoing leadership of Governor Kathy Hochul, New York State is taking sweeping actions to reduce the many sources of greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change. And in her recent State of the State Address and 2024-25 Executive Budget, Governor Hochul proposed a suite of actions to address climate change’s effects – including $435 million for initiatives to support long-term resiliency projects and protect communities across the state.
The funding will help create a new ‘Resilient & Ready Program’ with resources for low- and moderate-income households experiencing flood damage to assist with necessary repairs in the aftermath of storms, as well as improvements to prevent future damage.
The Governor also proposes a ‘Blue Buffers’ Voluntary Buyout Program to compensate residents in communities most vulnerable to flooding so they can relocate to another area with lesser flood risk. This not only saves taxpayer dollars when inevitable flooding occurs, it spares households the tangible and emotional losses that come with each rising tide and record rainfall.
Supported with $250 million from the $4.2 billion Clean Water, Clean Air and Green Jobs Environmental Bond Act, Blue Buffers would first educate property owners on the benefits of relocating homes and businesses regularly affected by high water, sea-level rise, and storm surges, and then partner with willing sellers on projects that could be eligible for buyouts. Purchased properties then revert to becoming permanently protected as open space, serving as a buffer against future flooding and benefiting the resiliency of the surrounding community.
Building on past investments, Governor Hochul is bolstering New York’s efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change with new proposals to repair aging flood control projects and remove hazard dams. The Governor also directed an update of Coastal Erosion Hazard Area maps essential to the protection of beaches, dunes, and bluffs that maintain and enhance flood resilience, and to overhaul building codes design to create higher standards for resistance to wind, snow, and temperature extremes.
As many Long Islanders know, since Superstorm Sandy, New York aggressively stepped-up efforts to boost targeted investments for critical infrastructure, flood-proofing, shoreline restoration, and disaster response. The response included ongoing work with federal and local partners to use every tool at our disposal.
The recent U.S. Army Corps of Engineers determination of eligibility for the process to assess, fund, and repair their damaged coastal projects on Fire Island, as requested by the Governor and Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), is welcome news. It is one of many projects that DEC will continue to help implement to protect homes, critical infrastructure, and shorelines.
Climate change is here. With the ongoing cooperation and collaboration of Long Islanders, New York’s comprehensive approach to adaptation and resiliency will help ensure the Empire State is prepared for the gathering storm.
As far as I can tell the only way for the State to meet the Climate Act targets is magical game-changing technology. I do not see anything in these projects that makes me think that these programs are game changers. Another component of the narrative is to never discuss the status of the transition and the component programs. The question whether the existing programs are having any sort of an effect are not mentioned and no issues associated with recently proposed programs are ever addressed.
Flawed Energy Plan Moves Forward
On the other hand, Dennis Higgins’s article Flawed Energy Plan Moves Forward in AllOtsego takes a critical look at one new effort. This one is associated with transmission development.
Legislation proposed in Albany would create “RAPID,” a new department in the Office of Renewable Energy Siting to accelerate transmission buildout. Per megawatt-hour—amount of energy moved—those new lines will be very expensive. We must build full nameplate transmission for wind, which has a capacity factor under 25 percent. Solar has a capacity factor of under 14 percent: Although full capacity generation might occur mid-day in summer, much of the rest of the time solar yields little or no energy. Transmission for hundreds of solar and wind resources represents a lot of expensive wire to buy and install and maintain; wire which will need to be run across private land; wire that mostly will move nothing at all.
With each of New York’s staggering missteps in decarbonization efforts, we reflect on the mess we’re in. ORES itself has stalled out in efforts to site intermittent resources. Solar and wind builders cancelled contracts late last year when the state would not simply award them more money. They are rebidding, and the state will make new, more expensive, awards. Upstate communities are pushing back at the state’s efforts to locate solar and wind projects where local laws say “no” to industrial development.
New York gets about 20 percent of its baseload energy from hydroelectric on the St. Lawrence and Niagara rivers. Solar and wind currently account for about 7 percent of total state electricity. The fast approaching 70-by-30 goal in the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act requires that 70 percent of the state’s electricity come from renewables. In other words, 50 percent of the state’s capacity must come from solar and wind. The state must multiply all the installed solar and wind built over the last 20 or more years by seven- or eight-fold in the next six years. Hochul has no ruby slippers and no magic wand, so press releases can safely be ignored. The 70-by-30 CLCPA goal is not going to happen.
Still, the state has decided lack of transmission must be the culprit. Let’s take a closer look at some of the problems with the state plan.
In its 20-year “Outlook” report, the grid operator NYISO detailed transmission constraints across Long Island, the Southern Tier and Finger Lakes. These will prevent energy moving from intermittent resources to downstate through this decade, and maybe the next. Can we fix the state plan by building high-voltage lines over rural New Yorkers’ objections to support energy resources that may never exist?
In its 2023 Power Trends, NYISO indicated that most—70 percent, or about 17,000 megawatts—of the state’s fossil-fuel capacity will need to be available after 2030. NYISO has already determined that peakers, which CLCPA says must be shut down, will need to be kept online. The storage projected in state planning, a hundred times the largest lithium-ion battery on earth and costing many billions of dollars, if fully charged, would not power New York City for a day. Alberta Canada, like Texas, recently issued energy alerts to its citizens as it discovered that wind power does not work well when it is very cold. Of course, solar generates almost nothing in the winter. Assuming we could get anyone in Albany to listen, is there some sort of broader lesson in all this?
California—following the same wacky blueprint New York is using—has had 20 years to build out its solar and wind assets, including transmission lines to move generated energy. California gets twice the electricity from every panel that New York could hope to get. California has deserts to site intermittent resources and transmission, while New York must sacrifice its farmland and forest. California exports solar to Nevada at a loss to avoid curtailment, yet still dumped something like three terawatt-hours of energy in 2023, enough to keep the lights on in New York City for a week. California has struggled to reduce reliance on fossil fuels: It has built new gas plants and still needs to import coal-fired electricity to ensure reliability.
The 2015 Mark Jacobson publication—which was in part the model for New York’s energy plan—was soundly debunked by about two dozen climate scientists two years before the CLCPA was enacted. The Jacobson paper is nevertheless a sort of bible to the Big Greens. As noted in MIT’s technology review, that paper “contained modeling errors and implausible assumptions that could distort public policy and spending decisions.” Consequently, the CLCPA and the resulting scoping plan, following similar flawed analysis, have already led to “wildly unrealistic expectations” and “massive misallocation of resources.”
“Jacobson and his coauthors dramatically miscalculated the amount of hydroelectric power available and seriously underestimated the cost of installing and integrating large-scale underground thermal energy storage systems…They treat U.S. hydropower as an entirely fungible resource. Like the amount [of power] coming from a river in Washington state is available in Georgia,instantaneously… )“
Following this flawed plan, it always looks like there is a transmission problem, since the grid is not one big copper plate.
In fact, no new energy solution or gigantic storage mechanism is needed at all. New York only needs to look around the world at those places that have successfully decarbonized their grids. New York only needs to look in the mirror: the downstate grid is over 90 percent “dirty,” powered by gas and oil. Upstate is over 90 percent emission free, and like those large economies that have cut fossil-fuel use, it is powered by hydro and nuclear.
But don’t tell Albany: New York is intent on pursuing an expensive land-hungry plan which we already know will fail.
Discussion
The Hochul Administration is not addressing the implementation issues associated with their Climate Act net-zero transition. Instead, we get a barrage of slick announcements claiming that we have to do something and here’s a whole new pile of “something” that we think might work, will appeal to the constituencies that demand action, and likely provide political payola to some politically connected constituency.
Dennis Higgins provides the other side of the story. He describes numerous issues with the transition and relates them to the fundamentally flawed Jacobsen/Howarth transition plan. The fact is that if New York State is serious about de-carbonizing the electric grid nuclear power must be part of the solution. Dennis advocates for that position but to little avail. Without a commitment to nuclear this will never work.
Conclusion
Higgins noted that his piece was incomplete: “The mess is so big you can’t say it all — fiscally irresponsible/unsound engineering and, already failed where it’s been tried.” He noted that he did not have the space to make the point that RAPID will give developers authority to use eminent domain for transmission. He thinks that this is something we all need to push back on with local and state elected reps.
I agree with Dennis that “New York is intent on pursuing an expensive land-hungry plan which we already know will fail.” He speaks to reality and in the end reality always wins.
On February 6, 2024 the PEAK Coalition sponsored a webinar entitled “Replacing NYC’s Peaker Plants With Clean Alternatives: Progress, Barriers, and Pathways Forward” that follows up on their recent report: Accelerate Now! The Fossil Fuel End Game 2.0. There are disconnects between the findings of that report and the first webinar of this year’s New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) Program stakeholder engagement process: The Role of Cap-and-Invest (slides and webinar video) and the material presented at the Department of Public Service Proceeding 15-E-0302 technical conference held on December 11 and 12, 2023 entitled Zero Emissions by 2040.
I did not intend to write so much about this topic but Pragmatic Environmentalist the Baloney Asymmetry Principle came into play. Alberto Brandolini has explained that: “The amount of energy necessary to refute BS is an order of magnitude bigger than to produce it.” My apologies for the length.
I have followed the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 380 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Overview
The PEAK coalition has stated that “Fossil peaker plants in New York City are perhaps the most egregious energy-related example of what environmental injustice means today.” The influence of this position on current New York State environmental policy has led to this issue finding its way into multiple environmental initiatives. I have prepared a summary of this issue for this blog that explains why the presumption of egregious harm is based on selective choice of metrics, poor understanding of air quality health impacts, and ignorance of air quality trends. The page documents my concerns based on my extensive experience with air pollution control theory, implementation, and evaluation over my 45+ year career as an air pollution meteorologist. Before I discuss their latest report and the webinar I provide some background information from the Role of Cap-and-Invest webinar and the Zero Emissions by 2040 technical conference.
Relevant “Role of Cap-and-Invest” Webinar Findings
I explained in my post on this webinar that the “Current Emissions” section of the webinar set the stage for the webinars that covered emissions and costs. One of the primary points made was that inhalable particulate (PM2.5) emissions are primarily from non-peaking power plant sources. The following slide shows that “Individually controlled (permitted) stationary sources, including electric generation units, large industrial sources, and large commercial and institutional sources represented approximately 4% of the total.”
The next slide in the webinar described the sources that create inhalable air pollution burdens in New York. It points out that:
Individually controlled (permitted) stationary sources yield a minority of the air pollution emissions in New York.
In 2020, electric generation units represented 8.5% of non-wood fuel combustion PM25 emissions in NY, and other permitted sources represented approximately 3.5%.
Area and mobile sources dominate, which means that individual stationary source-focused policy is important but doesn’t address the bulk of sources.
The webinar slides also explicitly address power plant emissions in New York. The next slide addressed electricity sector emissions. It states that:
Existing policies will go a long way to addressing sources of emissions in the electric sector.
RGGI, the Clean Energy Standard, and other programs will substantially reduce the use of fossil fuels for our electricity needs.
The Peaker Rule will ultimately retire the most polluting plants in New York. 35 peaking units representing 955 MW have already retired and an additional 265 MW are expected to retire in 2025.
NYCI cannot be designed to compel the closure of individual generators, and pricing may not reduce the use of peaking facilities.
Relevant Zero Emissions by 2040 Technical Conference Findings
Unfortunately, the Public Service Commission has not announced availability of a recording of the Zero Emissions by 2040. technical conference held on December 11 and 12, 2023 so details are still not available. I published a summary of the presentation given by Zachary Smith from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) describing a new category of generating resources called Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR) that are needed to keep the lights on during periods of extended low wind and solar resource availability. It is important to note that the meteorological conditions that cause the low wind and solar resource availability also are the same that cause the highest load peaks. As a result, DEFR will eventually be needed to replace peaking power plants.
I think the ultimate problem for reliability in an electric system that depends on wind and solar is illustrated in the following slide from Smith’s presentation. It highlights a 7-day wind lull when the average wind capacity is 25%. The sum of the grey area under the load curve during that period is the amount of energy (MWh) that must be provided by DEFR sources based on an analysis of historical weather data. Note that the load curve peaks during the low wind and solar resource availability drought. If there are insufficient resources during a wind lull, then electric load cannot be met, and a blackout will occur.
Zachary Smith included a slide (shown below) that describes the generating resource expected for the Climate Act to make the point that a large amount of new generating resources needs to be developed. Note that in both scenarios the amount of DEFR required (purple column) is on the order of the current existing fossil capacity (orange column).
New York City has the densest concentration of urban power plants in the US, impacting the health of 750,000 New Yorkers and increasing the cost of electricity for all utility customers.
The PEAK Coalition — UPROSE, THE POINT CDC, New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYC-EJA), New York Lawyers for the Public Interest (NYLPI), and Clean Energy Group (CEG) —aims to end long-standing pollution from fossil fuel peaker power plants and the negative effects on New York City’s most climate-vulnerable people.
In a new report, the PEAK Coalition documents progress made since the coalition was founded and examines the steps taken by state, city, utility, and energy industry stakeholders to hasten or delay the shift from polluting power plants to clean, zero-emissions alternatives. The report, “Accelerate Now! The Fossil Fuel End Game 2.0“, details evidence of encouraging progress, with 700 MW of the city’s peaking capacity fully retired and announced plans for the retirement of an additional 3,300 MW before 2040, representing nearly two-thirds of the city’s fossil peaking capacity. However, the transition has not progressed at the pace needed to protect the health of environmental justice communities and meet the state’s climate goals. More than 75 percent of the city’s dirty and inefficient fossil peaker capacity may remain online and operating beyond 2025, when stricter peaker plant emissions limits are intended to take full effect. In this webinar, hosted by CEG for the PEAK Coalition, report authors will discuss the negative impacts these power plants are having on surrounding communities, highlight progress and barriers impeding the speed of the transition, and recommend pathways forward to accelerate the transition from peaker plants to clean alternatives.
Below I describe some of the points that the author saw fit to highlight and compare this work to the NYCI webinar and DEFR conference.
Disclaimer
This document is a perfect example of grey literature. Grey (or gray) literature is defined by the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions as “…literature that is not formally published in sources such as books or journal articles.” “This can include information such as government reports, conference proceedings, graduate dissertations, unpublished clinical trials, and much more.“ The key point with respect to grey literature is that anyone using must independently check the analysis. If the data, methodology, and results are not transparently available, then the results should be questioned.
It is troubling to me that references to previous reports from the Peak Coalition have not recognized that the work did not fully disclose the data, methodology, and results, was not peer-reviewed, or disclose that it was not endorsed by the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). In that regard it is interesting that a new disclaimer section is included in this report that states:
This document is for informational purposes only. The authors make no warranties, expressed or implied, and assumes no legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information provided within this document. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of funders or any of the organizations and individuals that have offered comments as this document was being drafted. The authors alone are responsible for the contents of this report. Before acting on any information, you should consider the appropriateness of the information to your specific situation. The information contained within is subject to change. It is intended to serve as guidance and should not be used as a substitute for a thorough analysis of facts and the law. The document is not intended to provide legal or technical advice.
It would be interesting to know why this was added because it clearly expresses my concerns with its contents.
Highlights of the DocumentFossil Fuel End Game 2.0
Most of the technical aspects of this document I have already addressed in previous posts. The PEAK Coalition report entitled: “Dirty Energy, Big Money” describes the original analysis designed to vilify all New York City peaking power plants. I described that work in three posts. I published a post that provided information on the primary air quality problem associated with these facilities, the organizations behind the report, the State’s response to date, the underlying issue of environmental justice and addressed the motivation for the analysis. The second post addressed the rationale and feasibility of the proposed plan to replace these peaking facilities with “renewable and clean energy alternatives” relative to environmental effects, affordability, and reliability. Finally, I discussed the Physicians, Scientists, and Engineers (PSE) for Healthy Energy report Opportunities for Replacing Peaker Plants with Energy Storage in New York State that provided technical information used by the PEAK Coalition.
For this article I am going to respond to some of the highlighted sections in the report. For example, one of the big issues in the Dirty Energy, Big Money report is highlighted:
Analysis of capacity payments found that an estimated $4.5 billion in ratepayer dollars flowed to the owners of the city’s fleet of peaker plants over a decade. These exorbitant payments to peaker plant owners make electricity from New York City’s fossil fuel peaker power plants some of the most expensive power in the country.
This is a good example of poor understanding of the role of peaking power plants by the PEAK Coalition. These facilities operate for a small percentage of the time (typically less than 5%) but fulfill a critical reliability support function. They only run during peak load periods when insufficient generation resource adequacy could lead to a blackout. The power market pays the highest prices during peak load periods in part because these facilities must get support for all their annual operating costs during the limited periods. The Coalition does not acknowledge the tradeoff that without the peaking units, there will be blackouts.
The Peak Coalition narrative relies on emotion. There is a specially highlighted section entitled: “Peakers and a Legacy of Community Harm: A Story from the Bronx” written by Victor Davila, Community Organizer, THE POINT CDC; He writes:
The people of the South Bronx share a universal trauma. Whatever the particulars of their life circumstances, every child growing up in the South Bronx is acutely aware that the city does not care about them. The moment they step outdoors, it is clear that their neighborhoods are unimportant to the city. The infrastructure reflects historical scorn for their existence. The Bronx burned for a decade in the 1970s and 1980s, and city officials stood by and watched. Landlords set fire to buildings for insurance, and in reaction, local legislators slashed fire department funding to the Bronx in the hopes of driving residents out.
But thanks to the strength of community members, the spirit of the Bronx was able to resist the decade of fire; however, since then its infrastructure has continued to slowly choke the health of its residents.
There is no question that there has been disproportionate harm to disadvantaged communities (DACs), but the emotional implication of this text is that it has been the result of a deliberate action by outsiders. Never mentioned in the Peak Coalition reports is that there have been marked improvements in air quality and that most DACs are in compliance with most National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Instead, the report highlights asthma effects: “In the Hunts Point neighborhood of the Bronx, one in every three children and one in every four adults suffer from asthma.”
The number of confounding variables associated with asthma is very large including things like smoking and indoor air quality. One inconsistency never reconciled by the Peak Coalition is why asthma rates are increasing at the same time air quality is improving.
Another highlighted section notes that: “In 2022, 7 percent of the electricity produced in upstate New York came from oil and fracked gas, whereas more than 95 percent of electricity produced in and around New York City came from oil and gas plants.”
This is another example of a poor understanding of the electric system and tradeoffs associated with the peaking units. Upstate load is near the hydro projects on the Niagara and St Lawrence Rivers and four nuclear power plants so oil and gas is not needed as much as in the City where these same groups cheered on the closure of 2,000 MW of zero-emissions nuclear power. In addition, there are specific reliability rules for in-city generation limit the amount that can be transmitted into the City. The rules were added because insufficient in-city generation caused the 1977 blackout. Lightning strikes abruptly reduced the amount of generation transmitted into the city and the in-city power plants were unable to ramp up load in time to prevent the blackout. The quick start capability of many of the peaking units is a service that must be replaced before all units can retire.
Progress to Date Chapter
The Peak Coalition admits that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) has recently adopted the so called “Peaker Rule” that sets more stringent ozone season NOx emissions limits for simple cycle and regenerative combustion turbines that will eventually phase out old, inefficient, and relatively dirty units. A highlight points out that: “Replacing and retiring these older fossil units could reduce 1,849 tons of NOx emissions on some of the highest ozone days of the year, with its biggest impact felt in nearby communities.”
A point of clarification is that the tonnage refers to the annual total emissions not daily totals. It is also important to note that the emission limits include specific reliability provisions that affect implantation timing. The units can only be retired if the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) signs off that they will not be needed for resource adequacy.
A prominent argument in this report is summarized in this highlight: “Despite the Peaker Rule taking full effect, New York City may still have more than 75 percent (4,591 MW) of its fossil peaking capacity online and operating in 2025.” The tradeoff between keeping these units online and operating and their contribution to keeping the lights on is not emphasized.
Generating Company Plans
From what I can see, the advocates representing the Peak Coalition will be satisfied with nothing less than zero-emissions. The report addresses each company that has power plants in New York City and includes the following quotes from the highlights in each section:
“We remain steadfast in our fight for an emissions-free future for Asthma Alley residents and all New Yorkers in line with New York’s climate goals.” – Daniel Chu
“Can NYC become the first city in the nation to have all its peaker plants replaced? We believe we can—especially if we follow the visionary direction established by the New York State Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act.” – Eddie Bautista
I think there is a disconnect between what the Peak Coalition thinks this represents and the electric market itself. The report sums up Eastern Generation plans as follows:
In June 2022, the PSC approved Eastern Generation’s permit to build a 135-MW energy storage system at the Astoria Generating Station facility. In a statement about the approval, Eastern Generation again noted that the company is planning to submit applications for additional storage projects at Gowanus and Narrows, totaling 350 MW of energy storage capacity across the two sites. Eastern Generation has submitted a deactivation notice to NYISO for the 16-MW peaker at the company’s Astoria facility; however, the Peaker Rule does not apply to the three 60-year-old steam turbines at the site. It is unclear whether the development of battery storage at the site will result in the retirement of these peaking units, which have a combined capacity of 943 MW.
Under the existing market dynamic, Eastern Generation is proposing to redevelop its assets at the Gowanus, Narrows and Astoria Generating Station locations. In a de-regulated market developers like Eastern Generation make development decisions based on the market situation which currently favors energy storage assets. Importantly, they have no responsibilities for system reliability. On the other hand, the NYISO must ensure that sufficient resources are available.
There is an important technical qualifier for this discussion that needs to be clarified. All of the numbers provided in the quoted section refer to the instantaneous electric power available from the facilities or the capacity as rated in MW. Consumers pay for energy used per month in kWh. The NYISO resource adequacy planning is also primarily concerned with electric energy in MWh which is 1000 kWh. The existing capacity at the Eastern Generation facilities totals 1,915 MW of nameplate capacity and they can run 24 hours a day during extreme load conditions so can produce 45,960 MWh of energy. The proposed energy storage capacity is just 350 MW and current energy storage lasts only four hours, so the total energy production is a paltry 1,400 MWh or 32 times less potential available energy than the existing facility. The lower energy availability is not Eastern Generation’s problem but is the crux of the NYIOSO resource adequacy concerns for New York City.
I don’t think the Peak Coalition understands the implications of the difference between capacity and energy. The report states:
“These findings support previous reports put out by PEAK—that battery storage could replace
the operations of each individual NYPA peaker power plant in NYC, coupled with clean renewable energy sources on the grid, by 2030”. – Eddie Bautista
Next, I will review the report’s section on transition challenges that provides the support for this statement.
Challenges Impeding the Transition
Supporters of the Climate Act maintain that the net-zero transition is only a matter of will. The introduction for this chapter notes that “market barriers, regulatory obstacles, and other challenges have slowed progress and threaten the state’s ability to meet its climate mandates.” There is no indication that the challenge identified previously, or the issues raised at the Public Service Commission technical conference have been considered in the analysis.
The report correctly notes that as sectors reduce their GHG emissions by electrification the inevitable result is increasing demand. The report downplays the effect.
However, increased electrification also represents an opportunity to shift and shape demand in new ways. The timing of EV charging is often flexible, with most vehicles just sitting around most of the time. This creates an opportunity to shift charging to times when demand is lower and renewable generation is plentiful. Many high-power building loads, such as heating and cooling, can also be automatically adjusted to shift the majority of electricity demand to non-peak times while maintaining comfortable temperatures for occupants.
In my opinion, the biggest problem with all the net-zero technology solutions proposed including these, is that they don’t work all the time. EV charging is “often” flexible, but during the coldest periods charging does not work as well so EV owners are going to want to charge when electric heating demand is highest. The opportunity to shift charging to times when “renewable generation is plentiful” ignores the intermittency problems with renewables in general and the worst-case high load and low availability conundrum. Shifting heating and cooling loads to non-peak times presumes that consumers will lose control of their ability to choose their comfort levels. Details matter for these claims!
The report argues that virtual power plants are a potential solution. A highlighted section notes:
Unlike nearby states that have implemented statewide customer battery storage programs to meet peak demand, New York has yet to realize the important role that virtual power plants can play in reducing reliance on fossil peaker plants.
The implication that New York is not considering this option is incorrect. I am very pessimistic about the technology but I could be convinced otherwise if the Department of Public Service Proceeding 15-E-0302 that is addressing the technology determines that it is feasible. Until then claiming that this technology is a suitable replacement for existing peaking power plants is premature.
The report addresses reliability with another highlighted section:
“UPROSE, alongside the PEAK Coalition, is deeply concerned by the NYISO Reliability Report. Emergency rooms get full, and the work and school day is interrupted because of the health impacts our communities have suffered from peaker plant pollution for too long. The 2025 energy reliability gap highlights the urgent need for a swift transition to clean, equitable energy solutions like renewable generation and storage. We urge the state to act decisively in accelerating this transition and ensuring environmental justice for the most vulnerable.” – Elizabeth Yeampierre
There are two problems with this characterization. The first is the mistaken idea that no new technology is needed for the net-zero transition. The Climate Act Integration Analysis, the NYISO resource adequacy evaluations, and the Department of Public Service Proceeding 15-E-0302 all argue otherwise because they point to the need for new DEFR.
The other problem with this is the emotional argument that peaker plant pollution is the root cause of the alleged health effects. The “Role of Cap-and-Invest” webinar confronted this misconception and dismissed the claim. The analysis found that “Individually controlled (permitted) stationary sources, including electric generation units, large industrial sources, and large commercial and institutional sources represented approximately 4% of the total”; for inhalable air pollution burdens in New York “Area and mobile sources dominate, which means that individual stationary source-focused policy is important but doesn’t address the bulk of sources”; and “Existing policies will go a long way to addressing sources of emissions in the electric sector.” The point that “individual stationary source-focused policy is important but doesn’t address the bulk of sources” explicitly contradicts the idea that focusing on peaker power plants will have a discernible effect. In fact, it could have a negative effect by mis-allocating resources to a lower impact problem.
The reliability section also includes this highlight:
All of New York City’s projected load growth and peak demand needs could be reliably met, hour-by-hour, with the right mix of renewables, short-duration battery storage, and efficiency.
This is another statement that contradicts the Integration Analysis, NYISO resource adequacy analyses, and the Department of Public Service Proceeding 15-E-0302 that all conclude that DEFR is needed for a reliable electric system.
In 2023 delays in renewable energy development due to supply chain issues, interest rate increases, and contract negotiations have slowed the pace of renewable developments that could be used to displace the peaking units. A statement from the POINT CDC, UPROSE, and NYC-EJA highlights their concerns with renewable energy economics:
Significant delays for critical renewable energy projects disproportionately impact the health and well-being of communities suffering from fossil fuel power generation. More years of poor air quality will only exacerbate poor health outcomes for Black and Brown communities, and other communities of color. It is also a lost opportunity for a Just Transition for places like Sunset Park and Hunts Point, where offshore wind projects may be a transformative opportunity to ensure that communities most impacted by pollution can grow and flourish under a new green re-industrialization.
The report does not make specific recommendations how this can be resolved but says “These unforeseen interruptions and economic uncertainties must be addressed by the state to ensure that fossil peaking resources are still able to retire on time or even ahead of schedule.” I suspect that this is easier said than done.
The report admits that there are challenges to replacing the peaking power plants in New York City.
In addition to limited space for large-scale renewable energy and energy storage development within the city, New York City has some of the strictest building codes and zoning regulations in the country. These stringent regulations add cost and complexity to the development of solar and energy storage and the implementation of building efficiency measures. Fire department setback and clearance requirements limit the availability of rooftop space for solar panels, and energy storage fire code regulations continue to prevent lithium-ion batteries from being installed indoors, severely curtailing commercial storage development.
The report suggests that these regulatory constraints rather than the limited space and higher in-city development costs are the reason that in-city buildout of clean energy resources in New York City has lagged the rest of the state. I disagree with the suggestion in the report that the “perceived” safety concerns should be revised to accelerate development because I think safety risks are more significant than the report acknowledges and the other factors affecting in-city generation will still slow development relative to the rest of the state.
The section titled “False solutions” epitomizes the single-minded devotion to the demand for zero emissions. The idea that compromise and tradeoffs might lead to a pragmatic lower emissions solution is not acceptable to the ideologues because there still would be some emissioins. The highlight for this section states:
Misguided support for polluting false solutions, such as burning blue or green hydrogen and RNG in power plants, has served as an unnecessary distraction that threatens the state’s ability to achieve its emissions goals mandated by the Climate Act.
False solutions is a commonly used slogan to vilify any technology that does not comport with zero-emissions dogma. Although there are emissions associated with hydrogen combustion and renewable natural gas there are benefits for their use. The placeholder technology for DEFR in the Climate Act Scoping Plan is green hydrogen but it is not commercially viable currently. On the other hand, the technology to burn it in combustion turbines to generate electricity is viable. The ideologues demand that the hydrogen be used in fuel cells which is another technology not in commercial use at the scale needed. This ideological demand makes the DEFR challenge using hydrogen for nthe net-zero transition that much more difficult.
Furthermore, the motives of those who suggest more practical solutions are questioned. Even the widespread support for an analysis of DEFR is characterized as a fossil fuel lobbying effort:
However, at the request of the Independent Power Producers of New York, a trade group representing owners of the state’s fossil fuel power plants, the PSC has initiated a process to “examine the need for resources to ensure the reliability of the 2040 zero-emissions electric grid mandated by the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act” and is seeking input on how to define zero-emissions, including whether the definition should include green hydrogen.
The highlight for that section notes:
Fossil fuel interests and legacy power plant and pipeline owners continue to push for ways to continue operating existing infrastructure and perpetuate reliance on fossil fuels.
The fact is that until we have suitable replacement technology premature retirement of fossil fuel infrastructure risks serious impacts. The perspectives described are not conducive to developing sound energy policy. As a result, I am not going to bother describing the Peak Coalition’s ideas for a path forward.
The final highlighted section states:
The clean energy transition does not mean sacrificing the reliability of the electric grid, and ensuring the reliability of the grid should not mean sacrificing the health and well-being of New Yorkers.
This is a slogan from biased ideologues who do not understand the complexities of the electric system. I have no doubt that premature shutdown of peaking power plants without acceptable DEFR technologies available will adversely affect the reliability of the electric grid.
Discussion
There are disconnects between the Peak Coalition Fossil Fuel End Game 2.0 report and the findings of the NYCI webinar “The Role of Cap-and-Invest” and the material presented at the Department of Public Service technical conference Zero Emissions by 2040. The rationale that peaking power plants are responsible for all the health effects claimed by the Peak Coalition is contradicted by the DEC/NYSERDA analysis reported in the webinar. The reality is that other emission sources are a much more likely source of health effects. The report states that all the technology necessary is available which contradicts the webinar and PSC proceeding on DEFR and casts aspersions on the motives of the organizations responsible for reliability.
The importance of the PSC proceeding should not be underestimated. The Integration Analysis and all the projections by the NYISO pointed to this need and the Public Service Commission recognized that there are fundamental unanswered questions that need to be addressed. DEFR is a recognized response to the problem that the meteorological conditions that cause the low wind and solar resource availability also are the same that cause the highest load peaks. The Peak Coalition report does not recognize that until adequate DEFR technologies are available and deployed it would be inappropriate to retire any more of the peaking power plants.
It is very frustrating that the environmental justice advocates do not prioritize prevention of blackouts as much as the organizations responsible for reliability. Victor Davila, Community Organizer, The Point CDC claimed that “The Bronx burned for a decade in the 1970s and 1980s, and city officials stood by and watched”. The picture of Davila on the staff page for the The Point CDC looks like he is younger than 46 so has no firsthand knowledge of the impact of the 1977 blackout which included fires in the Bronx.
The impact of the 1977 blackout was felt long after the lights came back on: The blackout cost the city more than $300 million, both directly and indirectly. In neighborhoods affected by burning buildings or looting, the recovery process was lengthy—in some places, it took years to recover. And the blackout led Con Edison to “move[] to avoid the mistakes that led to the blackout, adding sophisticated monitoring equipment and modifying the flawed procedures that drew public acrimony and thousands of lawsuits, some still unsettled,” according to a New York Times article from 1987.
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In some places—perhaps most memorably, Bushwick and parts of the Bronx—the extended power outage led to looting and instances of arson.
The effects of an extended blackout are immediate, acute, and, in my opinion, a greater threat to disadvantaged communities than peaking power plants. The Peak Coalition Fossil Fuel End Game 2.0 report does not adequately account for the complexities of the New York City electric system. Zach Smith’s presentation on DEFRs at the PSC technical conference outlined the need for this resource. There was a panel discussion that addressed other relevant issues, but the recording is not available. One point made was that the location and capacity of generating resources matters. Given the spatial power density of the peaking power plants relative to the proposed energy storage solutions the possibility that they cannot be replaced cannot be dismissed.
Conclusion
Peak Coalition members passionately want the best the communities that they represent. I do not think that electric energy policies that risk reliability and, affordability for that matter, are properly prioritized in their report. The complete focus on peaking power plants is simply not in the best interest of the communities that they purport to represent.
Nonetheless, appeasing these environmental advocacy organizations is a priority for the Hochul Administration. Unfortunately, I do not think that the ideologues will ever be satisfied with anything less than their demands. Their demands are incompatible with a reliable electric system. It will be fascinating to see how this plays out.
I have been following the. Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) since it was first proposed and most of the articles described below are related to the net-zero transition. I have devoted a lot of time to the Climate Act because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good. The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Videos
Energy and Illusions: Power density – Lots of resources going in, not much energy coming out means a resource that is never going to work
Isuru Seneviratne from Nuclear New York suggested a video series that I also highly recommend.
This 5-piece docu-series as ESSENTIAL as we advocate for climate policies that do not disproportionately harm the poor. It’s a riveting wake-up call made by independent thinkers who dig deep beneath the gaslighting that goes on from Enron to German “Greens.”
Juice: Power, Politics, And The Grid is a five-part documentary series produced by two Austin-based filmmakers, Tyson Culver and Robert Bryce, that follows the success of their first film: Juice: How Electricity Explains the World, which is now available on streaming platforms around the world.
The series takes viewers from Texas to Tokyo to expose the perils facing our electric grid. It shows how we can improve the reliability of our most important energy network and address climate change by embracing nuclear energy.
Juice: Power, Politics & The Grid features interviews with top thought leaders, including historian Patty Limerick, political scientist Roger Pielke Jr., journalist Michael Shellenberger, civil rights leader Robert Apodaca, World Nuclear Association director Sama Bilbao, Sacramento County Sheriff Jim Cooper, Canadian nuclear activist Chris Keefer, author Meredith Angwin, former IEA director Nobuo Tanaka, Campaign for a Green Nuclear Deal founder Madi Hilly, and many others.
While offering a sober assessment of the challenges facing the $5 trillion-per-year global electricity business, the series concludes with a hopeful look at the future — and the future of climate change — by featuring the activists who are helping fuel renewed interest and investment in nuclear power here in the U.S. and around the globe.
Electric Vehicles
I have planned to put together a post on electric vehicles for weeks but did not get around to it. This post at Irina Slav’s substack Irina Slav on energy summarizes most of the points I wanted to make in my planned article better than I would have done. She sums up the issues:
In a commentary piece for MarketWatch earlier this month, former White House director of economic policy Todd G. Buchholz compared EVs to electric bread makers, arguing that, just like bread makers, EVs are a fad that will eventually fade.
“The 1990s bread-machine fad never benefited from public subsidies, government mandates or furious discounting to gain market share. If it had, perhaps it would have continued for a few more years,” Buchholz wrote, going on to quote President Dwight Eisenhower as saying that “you don’t lead by hitting people over the head: That’s assault, not leadership.”
Another topic that I have been meaning to address is the current state of offshore wind.
Bud’s Offshore Energy (BOE) “Energy Production, Safety, Pollution Prevention, and More” delves into the details of offshore wind development. He recently reviewed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries North Atlantic Right Whale and Offshore Wind Strategy. His key takeaways:
The document effectively summarizes the dire state of the North Atlantic Right Whale.
The BOEM/NOAA strategy is to monitor and further assess the impacts.
The need for mitigation will be determined through collaborative processes.
This industry-friendly strategy contrasts sharply with the restrictive operating requirements proposed for the more speculative Rice’s whale expanded area in the Gulf of Mexico.
He describes the status of the Right Whales:
NARW status (pages 7-14):
Roughly 237 NARWs have died since the population peaked at 481 in 2011, exceeding the potential biological removal (PBR) level on average by more than 40 times for the past 5 years (Pace III et al. 2021).
Human-caused mortality is so high that no adult NARW has been confirmed to have died from natural causes in several decades (Hayes et al. 2023).
Most NARWs have a low probability of surviving past 40 years even though the NARW can live up to a century.
There were no first-time mothers in 2022.
About 42% of the population is known to be in reduced health (Hamilton et al. 2021)
A NASEM study confirmed that offshore wind has the potential to alter local and regional hydrodynamics
“Effects to NARWs could result from stressors generated from a single project; there is potential for these effects to be compounded by exposure to multiple projects.” (p. 14)
I cannot imagine any scenario where a species this stressed will survive when hundreds of massive wind turbines are built across the migration routes. See the figure showing where the turbines will be built and the whales are for March.
David Wojick describes three events affecting offshore wind development. Last year a number of developers cancelled their contracts to provide offshore wind power but now the first to come back to the trough seeking more money was approved in New Jersey. Wojick expects that other states will follow that lead. On the other hand a major new lawsuit has just been filed. He explains that the suit alleges that the” Federal agencies that have quickly issued the offshore wind permits have simply ignored the destructive environmental effects. This is especially true for the collective impact of combinations of nearby projects.” New York has similarly ignored the cumulative environmental impact of the proposed resources for the Climate Act. Finally, he notes that “One of the plaintiffs is the Save the Right Whale Coalition. Here, the narrow issue is the threat posed by enormous offshore wind development to the severely endangered North Atlantic Right Whale.” He includes a link to “a good picture of one of the unbelievably huge monopiles driven into the sea floor to hold up an offshore wind turbine generator” that shows what the whales are up against. Imagine the energy needed and noise created when these monstrosities are driven into the sea floor.
The mad rush to offshore wind will not just affect whales. Craig Rucker writing at Cfact describes the stress on commercial fisherman. He points out issues observed elsewhere and the lack of analysis before development occurs here.
This assessment deserves more attention and when the Climate Act implementation issues settle down I will return to this “scientific investigation into how climate change is affecting the communities, ecosystems, infrastructure, and industries of the Empire State.” If you are looking for an unbiased analysis of climate change in New York look elsewhere.
Without even looking hard this finding sets baloney alarms off:
Summary Finding 4: Sea level along New York State’s coastline has risen almost 1 foot in the past century and is projected to increase by another 1 to 2 feet by midcentury. Sea level rise will make chronic flooding more common in low-lying coastal neighborhoods, lead to intrusion of salt water into groundwater and freshwater coastal ecosystems, and yield more destructive storm surge during coastal storms. Coastal communities will benefit from planning and design that accounts for future sea levels.
They say that one foot in the past century has been observed. They are claiming that 1 to 2 feet additional sea-level rise will occur in half a century. For that to happen the sea level rise rate must at least double. There is no indication of such an accelerated sea-level rise rate. They have no shame hyping the most extreme estimates for climate models.
Ed Reid, Jr. writing at Right Insight does a nice job summarizing reasons why the fantasy that “intermittent renewable generation combined with electricity storage provides a reliable energy system at lower energy cost than the predominantly fossil fueled energy system it would replace.” He explains:
This fantasy is a complete and utter fraud, since those promoting it know that the generation technology they are promoting is intermittent and that the storage that they suggest would be required to overcome this intermittency and provide a reliable energy grid is inadequate, extremely expensive and unsuitable for the application.
Thomas Shepstone points out that proponents of the net-zero transition don’t want a discussion. Jo Nova brings it all together in an excellent post at her site titled “One third of UK teenagers think climate change is deliberately exaggerated.” She describes a perfect example of this in a recent article in the left-wing Guardian. The article claims that arguments that “climate solutions do not work, climate science and the climate movement are unreliable, or that the effects of global heating are beneficial or harmless” should be banned.
In January 2023 I wrote an article describing Dr. Robert Howarth’s statement supporting his vote to approve the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) Scoping Plan. Roger Pielke, Jr. recently did an interesting piece on the Biden Administration decision to halt the permitting of the continued expansion of U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) export capacity that featured a link to Howarth and his position on methane. It provides more evidence that a “Professor of Ecology & Environmental Biology” is unqualified to be considered an expert on methane emissions. His misleading guidance adversely impacts the New York Cap-and-Invest program.
I have followed the Climate Act since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 400 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Overview
The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies. After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation. Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned and many aspects of the transition are falling behind, and the magnitude of the necessary costs is coming into focus.
Howarth and the Climate Act
Howarth takes pride in his role in the Climate Act. I previously explained that the statement of Robert W. Howarth, Ph.D., the David R. Atkinson Professor of Ecology & Environmental Biology at Cornell University was very illuminating relative to the motives of the Climate Act authors. He reiterated his claim that he played a key role in the drafting of the Climate Act, developed the methane requirements, and credited one politician for getting the Act passed:
Assembly Person Steven Englebright was hugely instrumental in the passage of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act that established the Climate Action Council. I thank him for his leadership on this, and particularly for his support of the progressive approach on greenhouse gas emissions that is a central part of the CLCPA. I originally proposed this to Assembly Person Englebright in 2016, and he enthusiastically endorsed and supported it through multiple versions of the bill that finally led to passage of the CLCPA in 2019. In this accounting for greenhouse gases, a major government for the first time ever fully endorsed the science demonstrating that methane emissions are a major contributor to global climate change and disruption. Further, in passing the CLCPA New York recognized that consumption of fossil fuels (and not simply geographic boundaries) is what matters in addressing the climate crisis. New York wisely banned the use of high-volume hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) to develop shale gas in our State. But since the time of that ban, the use of fossil natural gas has risen faster in our State than any other in the Union. Methane emissions from this use of shale gas are high, but much of that occurs outside of our boundaries in the nearby states of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. Through the CLCPA, the citizens of New York are taking responsibility for these out-of-state emission caused by our use of fossil fuels, particularly for fossil natural gas. The way to reduce these emissions is to rapidly reduce our use of fracked shale gas.
Unfortunately, Howarth’s influence on Climate Act implementation also extended into the Climate Action Council. As a member of the Climate Action Council, Howarth was considered a subject matter expert and most members unquestioningly accepted whatever he said. This deference to his concerns is also apparent in the Integration Analysis and Scoping Plan. In my previous article I explained why many of his claims were not supportable.
Methane
At the time the Climate Act was written it incorporated unique emissions accounting requirements that elevate the importance of methane to Climate Act compliance. In particular, the Climate Act specifies that the global warming potential (GWP) must be calculated over a 20-year time horizon. The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describing time horizons and the GWP[1] notes:
“The GWP has become the default metric for transferring emissions of different gases to a common scale; often called ‘CO2 equivalent emissions’ (e.g., Shine, 2009). It has usually been integrated over 20, 100 or 500 years consistent with Houghton et al. (1990). Note, however that Houghton et al. presented these time horizons as ‘candidates for discussion [that] should not be considered as having any special significance’. The GWP for a time horizon of 100 years was later adopted as a metric to implement the multi-gas approach embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and made operational in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The choice of time horizon has a strong effect on the GWP values — and thus also on the calculated contributions of CO2 equivalent emissions by component, sector or nation. There is no scientific argument for selecting 100 years compared with other choices (Fuglestvedt et al., 2003; Shine, 2009). The choice of time horizon is a value judgement because it depends on the relative weight assigned to effects at different times.”
Howarth and others argued that it was necessary for the Climate Act to use 20-year global warming potential (GWP) values because methane is estimated to be 28 to 36 greater than carbon dioxide for a 100-year time horizon but 84-87 GWP over a 20-year period. Because of these high potentials they assumed that meant that the effect of methane on expected warming would be significant.
I have noted that this irrational obsession with methane that is incorporated in the Climate Act is inappropriate. The fundamental flaw with the basis for vilifying methane is that it is based on selective choice of the science and ignores inconvenient aspects of radiation physics which indicate that the laboratory measurements of global warming potential do not translate to the atmosphere where it counts.
LNG Export Terminal Pause
I originally was going to include this link in my fortnightly “Articles of Note” post but decided to elevate it into a focused post because of a reference to Howarth. Roger Pielke, Jr did an interesting piece on the Biden Administration decision to halt the permitting of the continued expansion of U.S. liquified natural gas (LNG) export capacity. He describes the activist rationale for the LNG export expansion halt “included in a letter to President Biden from a group of activists, including the University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Mann and Stanford’s Mark Jacobson”:
Taken together, if all U.S. projects in the permitting pipeline are approved, they could lead to 3.9 billion tons of greenhouse gas emissions annually, which is larger than the entire annual emissions of the European Union. A forthcoming study by Cornell University climate scientist Robert Howarth shows that, even in the best-case scenarios, LNG is at least 24 percent worse for the climate than coal. Increasing LNG exports will mean increased extraction of fossil fuels and climate pollution and directs us away from a renewable energy future.
[1] Reference: Myhre, G., D. Shindell, F.-M. Bréon, W. Collins, J. Fuglestvedt, J. Huang, D. Koch, J.-F. Lamarque, D. Lee, B. Mendoza, T. Nakajima, A. Robock, G. Stephens, T. Takemura and H. Zhang, 2013: Anthropogenic and Natural Radiative Forcing. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
Pielke, Jr. writes that this policy decision raises three concerns.
“The Biden Administration made a decision before producing the evidence on which such a decision is supposed to be based.
The Biden Administration decision ignores the “geopolitical and security implications of the decision”.
Finally, there appears to be no consideration of the economic impacts of the decision.
I recommend reading the article in its entirety.
The reason I turned this into a focused post is because Pielke, Jr. included a previously unknown to me reference regarding Howarth. His quote from the activist letter mentions a forthcoming study by Howarth which Pielke, Jr. described as follows:
The study referenced above suggesting that LNG is worse than coal in terms of greenhouse gas emissions is by Robert Howarth of Cornell University, and is both contrary to a broad scientific consensus on this issue and a lone outlier.
Of particular interest is the footnote associated with the “lone outlier” label. Pielke, Jt. states:
The story behind the new Howarth study is for another day. I’ll just note here that in 2012 Howarth told a reporter that he was performing anti-fracking research for hire — The reporter explained: “In an interview, Howarth told me his goal was to make the anti-fracking movement mainstream and fashionable. He said he met with the Ithaca-based [Park] foundation two years ago, agreeing to produce a study challenging the conventional wisdom that shale gas is comparatively clean…Howarth hired an aggressive PR firm, the Hastings Group, to promote his politicized viewpoint.”
This is smoking gun evidence that New York’s unique characterization of methane and Climate Act policy requirements is based on the politicized and financially advantageous work of a for hire scientist.
Discussion
On January 23, 2024, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and the New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) hosted the first webinar of this year’s New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) Program stakeholder engagement process. One of the points made in the first webinar was that under Governor Hochul’s direction, New York’s cap & invest program will incorporate these guiding principles:
Affordability. Craft a program to deliver money back to New Yorkers to ensure energy affordability
Climate Leadership: Catalyze other states to join New York, and allows linkage to other jurisdictions
Creating Jobs and Preserving Competitiveness: Protect existing jobs and support new and existing industries in New York
Investing in Disadvantaged Communities: Ensure 35%+ of investments benefit Disadvantaged Communities
Funding a Sustainable Future: Support ambitious clean energy investment
There are ramifications of the reliance on Howarth’s work for the first two principles: affordability and climate leadership links to other jurisdictions.
Last spring I described a Climate Act Revisions Kerfuffle when the Hochul Administration floated the suggestion to revise the emissions accounting methodology to use the Global Warming Potential over 100 years instead of 20 years because of a concern with cost. Climate Action Council co-chairs Doreen Harris and Basil Seggos argued that:
“First and foremost, the governor is trying to maintain New York’s leadership on climate. It’s a core principle that she brought into office and we have been carrying that out for several years,” said Seggos.
But Gov. Hochul instructed both the DEC and NYSERDA to look at the affordability of Cap & Invest.
“We began running the numbers on that, based on some of the metrics being used by Washington state and some of our own, and revealed some…potentially extraordinary costs affiliated with the program,” Seggos explained. “So that’s really what this is. It isn’t a focus necessarily on methane itself, or any particular pollutant. It is how do we implement the CLCPA in a way that doesn’t put extraordinary costs on the pockets of New Yorkers.”
The climate activist organizations went ballistic and the Administration bowed to the pressue. Activists claimed:
“When Governor Hochul tried to sneak in a fossil-fueled methane accounting method that would gut New York State’s Climate Act during the final push of budget negotiations, New York’s climate and environmental justice movement responded swiftly and powerfully. NY Renews is proud to stand with a movement that stopped—for now—changes to New York’s progressive 20-year methane accounting method as written in law.”
When considering emission sources only within New York State and using a GWP100, CO2 is a much greater component of total emissions (Figure 3). The main difference is the CLCPA’s focus on shorter-lived methane and HFCs, which appear much larger using the 20-year GWP, although the actual mass of these emissions has not changed. The other key difference between the accounting frameworks is out-of-state emissions. Over time, New York State has imported more natural gas and has exported more waste. Methane is a major source of emissions for both the natural gas system and waste management.
In 2021 total GHG emissions were 367.87 million metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent using the Climate format (GWP-20) and to the best of my review of the data (it does not appear to match Figure 3) the GWP-100 total is 214.4 million metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent. If the allowance costs per ton for NYCI remain the same, then costs to the state will be 72% higher using the Howarth inspired accounting.
The second Hochul principle is “climate leadership” which is described as “catalyze other states to join New York and allow linkage to other jurisdictions”. I think it is a heavy lift to catalyze other states to join New York if most of the rest of the world is using a different accounting system, particularly when the rationale for that approach does not stand up to scrutiny. I know that it will likely be impossible for New York to link to the California/Quebec and Washington cap-and-invest programs. The different accounting methodology is a high hurdle and when combined with the upstream emissions accounting with the potential for double counting, it just won’t happen.
Conclusion
With all due respect to Dr. Howarth, it is appropriate to consider why a “Professor of Ecology & Environmental Biology” is qualified to be an expert on methane emissions. Combined with the revelation that he set out to “make the anti-fracking movement mainstream and fashionable” in conjunction with the Park Foundation, the motives for his methane obsession suggest his analyses are biased to get a particular answer. The State of New York has failed to rein him in so reconciling the inconsistencies with his pseudo-science and Hochul’s principles is a problem of their own making. It matters to all New Yorkers because it will increase costs directly and indirectly because links to other jurisdictions could make the allowance market stronger and cheaper.
On January 26, 2024 the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and the New York Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) hosted the third webinar (slides and recording) of this year’s New York Cap-and-Invest (NYCI) Program stakeholder engagement process. I described the first webinar “The Role of Cap and Invest” in an earlier post. This post presents my initial impressions of the third webinar of the series, “Preliminary Scenario Analyses”, with particular emphasis on the projected costs.
I have followed the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written over 380 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Overview
The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies. After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation. Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned. Many aspects of the transition are falling behind, and the magnitude of the necessary costs is coming into focus. When political fantasies meet reality, reality always wins.
Cap-and-Invest
The Climate Action Council’s Scoping Plan recommended a market-based economywide cap-and-invest program. The program works by setting an annual cap on the amount of greenhouse gas pollution that is permitted to be emitted in New York: “The declining cap ensures annual emissions are reduced, setting the state on a trajectory to meet our greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements of 40% by 2030, and at least 85% from 1990 levels by 2050, as mandated by the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act).” In addition to the declining cap, it is supposed to limit potential costs to New Yorkers, invest proceeds in programs that drive emission reductions in an equitable manner, and maintain the competitiveness of New York businesses and industries. The stakeholder engagement process will refine the proposal over the next several months, DEC will and NYSERDA will propose regulations by summer, and the final rules are supposed to be in place by the end of the year.
The reality is different particularly because the proposal changes components that have worked in other jurisdictions and environmental activists want to remove certain components that have made similar programs work in the past. The proposed regulations keep many of the necessary features but still make changes that threaten viability. Further background information is available at my carbon pricing initiative page.
Preliminary Scenario Analysis Webinar
The slides and recording for the webinar are available. Note that in the following text there are links to sections of the webinar recording corresponding to specific topics.
The entire webinar was scripted. Each presenter read their remarks and it even appeared that the responses to questions were vetted. Vlad Gutman-Britten (NYSERDA) read the script that gave an overview of the webinar outline. The goal of this webinar was to describe the preliminary scenario analysis that projects how the NYCI allowance market will operate, present expected costs to households, and describe potential benefits of associated emission reductions. I focus on the costs to households in this post.
NYCI Modeling
The preliminary scenarios analysis relies on econometric models. The presentation was pretty vague on exactly which models were used and who did the work. It appears that it relies heavily on the analyses done for the Scoping Plan. If that is true then note that there was no suggestion that those analyses had been updated since they were done in 2022.
To give context for the cost results I briefly describe the modeling. The analyses must project allowance supply and demand. Gutman-Britten described the following slide that gives an overview of the analysis approach.
Allowance supply is based on the statewide greenhouse gas emissions cap:
The cap was defined by interpolating between 2025 starting point emissions (described subsequently) and the 2030 emissions limit, and then interpolating between 2030 and 2050 limits. The modeling employs non-linear interpolation, with gradual reductions at first followed by acceleration to the target year. The cap is economywide covering all sectors. The State would retire allowances for all non-obligated emissions.
In general, the allowance budget represents the allowable number of tons for each year of the emissions cap. However, the NYCI proposal treats different sectors of the economy differently to address distinctions between the sectors. To appease particular political constituencies, specific exemptions to all or part of sector allowance requirements have been incorporated into the proposed plan.
The modeling analysis balances the cap with expected emissions to estimate allowance demand for each sector. All the obligated entities will be required to “surrender emissions allowances following a three-year compliance period, the first one being 2025-2027.” For each ton emitted they must submit one allowance. The modeling estimates the expected emissions based on “technology pathways”. I think this technological jargon hides the fact that feasibility is not incorporated into these modeling results.
The final aspect of this modeling is financial sector participation: “The model assumes that “the financial sector participates in the market freely by arbitraging on changes in the price of allowances.” This is an aspect of the modeling where I think theory is not fully aligned with what actually happens in a market-based pollution control program.
The point I wanted to make in this summary of the modeling is that all these projections are subject to enormous uncertainty. There are many aspects of each energy sector transition that are subject to interpretation and the biases of the modelers. As a result, it is easy to get results that coincide with the pre-determined outcomes consistent with the political narrative.
At this time, the modeling analyses for the auction project that 2030 total revenue is “estimated to be between $6 and $12 billion per year ($4-8 billion available for investments).” Sparse details for this calculation were provided and I was not able to reproduce those numbers.
Household Costs
The projected costs from the modeling analysis are included for three scenarios described by Gutman-Britten in the following slide. The analysis modeled three different price ceiling trajectories. The price ceiling value represents the allowance price that triggers a safety valve that would make additional allowances available “for buyers until demand is fully met limited to actual emissions.” The scenarios “follow similar paths but have different price levels for each one.” No explanation was provided justifying the initial price ceiling for each scenario or the timing of the jump step in allowance prices in 2027.
I have always maintained that the primary concern of the general public is Climate Act costs. This presentation does not provide comprehensive cost estimates. In the following table I list the ceiling prices by year for the different scenarios and the corresponding gasoline cost adder as an example of potential costs. According to the US Energy Information Administration, 17.86 lbs of CO2 are emitted per gallon of finished motor gasoline which means that 112 gallons burned equals one ton.
At first glance the 2025 gasoline price adder is not that large. However, the market price for allowances has always been noticeably higher at the start of all allowance trading programs. The uncertainty of a new program lead to higher prices that typically fall back as the program matures. I think the actual price adder at the start of the program will be higher. The other notable feature is the step change increase in 2027. The values listed in 2027 are comparable to the California/Quebec and Washington program allowance prices so I think those prices are more reasonable for eventual New York prices. I suspect there is a connection between the proposed low ceiling prices through 2026 and the 2026 gubernatorial election year that explains the timing of the step change in 2027.
Last year legislation mandated that funds be allocated to the Consumer Climate Action Account (CCAA) as part of the overarching investment framework established for NYCI. As noted in the following slide and explained by Guttman-Britten the first 37% of revenue generated by NYCI auctions is “set aside for the affordability accounts, the Consumer Climate Action Account, the industrial small business climate action account and administrative expenses.” The Consumer Climate Action Account itself is supposed to get 30% of the revenues. Recall that 2030 total revenue is “estimated to be between $6 and $12 billion per year” so the Consumer Climate Action Account should get between $3.3 and $1.5 billion in 2030.
In the summary of the modeling overview Gutman-Britten read the script claiming that NYCI has the ability to effectively manage total costs:
Initial analysis shows that millions of households would break even after NYCI, especially lower income and low energy use households.
Although some households, especially high fossil fuel users, are likely to have residual costs after benefits, total cost impacts may be managed for a very large percentage of households.
In addition to driving emission reductions, NYCI investments are an essential affordability strategy. The program’s support for EV, heat pump, transit, and other related incentives and programs reduces cost exposure for households across New York, with a growing share receiving more benefits than costs.
The analysis relies on the 30% of revenues allocated to the CCAA to offset much of the cost. Insufficient detail was provided in the webinar to evaluate those claims and if the past is any guide there will never be sufficient documentation to verify them. In my opinion this modeling was designed to get specific answers consistent with the Hochul Administration narrative.
Household Impacts
James Wilcox read the script for the Household Impacts discussion. His presentation emphasized the point that these estimates were illustrative examples and not a formal proposal. The following slide is an overview and makes the point that these results are “focused on the impact of NYCI on affordability for low and middle- income households”. Those households are defined as follows:
Low income is identified as all income bands entirely below 60% of state median annual household income, i.e., below $35,000 for the purpose of this analysis.
Middle income is identified as the income band that contains the median annual household income in NYS, i.e., $50-75,000 for the purpose of this analysis.
The illustrative benefit design flow chart from the key assumptions slide deserves more discussion especially because if you are like me these numbers have no context. I found an overview of New York household income at Statistical Atlas that included two graphs. I combined data from the income percentiles and webinar income distribution graphs in the following table. The webinar assumes that there will be no benefit for households in the top 20% which according to the table corresponds to an income exceeding $126,900. There are six million households under that threshold which means that 1.5 million households in the top 20% of income will get no benefit. Low-income households are those below $35,000 and there are 2.3 million households in that category. There are 2.1 million households above $35,000 but below $75,000. Middle income is identified as the income band that contains the median annual household income in NYS, i.e., $50-75,000 for the purpose of the NYCI analysis. That leaves 1.6 million households with income between $75,000 and $126,900. No information for expected benefits was provided for this last category. Left unsaid was how the CCAA funds are distributed across these categories.
I have not been able to find a reference for the expected CCAA monthly distribution. The household numbers can be used to guess at the distribution. Previously I noted that the CCAA should get between $3.3 and $1.5 billion in 2030. According to this table about six million households are eligible for a CCAA distribution so if every eligible household gets the same share, then the monthly distributions will range between $45 and $21 per month.
The script for the household impacts by type, location, and income slide described the monthly program net impacts for the first year of the program. The title “monthly program net impact” says that the values are netted out from something, but it is not clear what. It is likely that these are net relative to the costs less the CCAA benefit. It is also possible that the values are relative to the Reference Case. However, the Reference Case includes the costs of New York City Local Law 97 and the advanced clean car rule among other things. It is not clear how those could be separated out in the analysis. The net impact costs table is excerpted below.
This is a busy slide that describes the monthly net cost impacts. The rows list the regions (NYC, Downstate, and Upstate) including the low- and middle-income household categories. There are four categories of columns. The first column covers households that use gasoline vehicles and heat with fossil fuels. The second column covers households that use gasoline vehicles but use “green” electric heating. One of the unexplained details is whether using electricity for heating was limited to heat pumps or includes resistance heating. The third column is households that do not use gasoline vehicles but use fossil heating. Another detail is whether hybrid vehicles that are not zero-emissions vehicles are considered green. The fourth column is for the small number of households that do not use gasoline vehicles or fossil heat. Within each of those four columns the results for the three allowance scenarios are shown.
The script explanation for the first column stated that:
Depending on the household income level and the part of the state, the cost may range. From as little as $12 a year to up to $180 with net impacts lower under Upstate scenarios B and C.
Infuriatingly, the script description describes annual benefits, but the graph lists monthly values. For example, the Scenario A monthly net cost impact ranges from $1 per month ($12 a year) for Downstate, Low Income to $15 per month ($180 per month) for Upstate, Middle Income. Inconsistent nomenclature makes it difficult to figure out exactly what is proposed.
The script narrative is that as people transition away from fossil fuels people will be financially better off. In the rightmost column for both green alternatives the Scenario A monthly benefits range from $11 to $28 per month or $132 to $336 per year. Presumably this represents an incentive to convert but it is left unsaid whether converting to an EV and a heat pump will cost less than this program benefit.
The script for this concludes that “It’s essential to remember that NYCI investments will be designed to move state households from the right column to the left column.” This appears to be a mis-statement because the left column is all fossil and the right column is all “zero-emissions” so the goal should be opposite direction. The narrative also argues that revenues raised will provide support for households to electrify their homes and cars and the CCAA rebates will be an additional incentive.
Wilcox provides a couple of more slides that break out the household impacts. The following is the second slide that describes the Upstate “middle-income household journey” to decarbonized nirvana as envisioned by this modeling. For a household with two internal combustion vehicles and a home that is not weatherized and uses gas heating the slide describes two decarbonization scenarios: moderate and increased decarbonization. The graphs list the NYCI program impact per month (Real $ 2022) for the net program impact faced by household; increases cost due to NYCI; the surplus benefit; decreased cost for efficient appliances, weatherization, switching one of two cars to an electric vehicle and switching to a heat pump; and program impact covered by differentiated distribution.
I cannot say that I can fully explain these household impacts values. The script states:
This household sees an initial net cost. The consumer climate action account offsets approximately two thirds of the total NYCI impact.
The increase in NYCI price is $78 which I assume is the total NYCI impact. The sum of the net program impact faced by household ($15) and program impact covered by differentiated distribution ($28) is $43 and that is about two thirds of the total NYCI impact. But the graph states that the net program impact is $15. I cannot figure out what the program impact covered by differentiated distribution represents. Recall that if every eligible household gets the same share the monthly distributions will range between $45 and $21 per month in 2030 but the 2025 estimated revenues were not provided.
The graphic and the script describe the household journey:
However, under a moderate decarbonization journey where this household installs efficient appliances, weatherizes their home, and switches one of the 2 cars to an EV.
They nearly break even. Facing a small net cost of $2 after receiving an illustrative consumer climate action account benefit.
The graphic claims that efficient appliances save $7 a month, weatherizing the home saves $10, and switching one of the 2 cars to an EV saves $36 for a total of $53 in savings per month. In 2030 the sum of the net program impact faced by household ($2) and program impact covered by differentiated distribution ($66) is $68. In this instance the differentiated distribution is described as the “illustrative consumer climate action account benefit” but that estimate is at odds with my calculated CCAA benefits of around $45 per month. This is another inconsistency that I cannot explain.
The script goes on to say:
Again, in addition to NYCI offering direct support for energy affordability, program revenue can be used to reduce the cost to households of investments like residential heat pumps and EVs.
This is an addition, and this applies to both slides to support from federal programs to the Inflation Reduction Act.
While others will see some costs that the consumer climate action count helps to manage. However, taking even moderate steps to decarbonize by 2030 leads to surplus benefits in nearly every region and income level analyzed, while taking increased measures leads to significant surplus benefits across all regions and income levels analyzed.
I have not been able to reproduce these claims. Note that the claim that there are “surplus benefits in nearly every region and income level analyzed” ignores the fact that the 1.6 million households with incomes lower than the no-benefit threshold and above the middle-income $75K threshold are not addressed in their presentation of results.
Wilcox summarized the cost impact results in the following slide. The script says that this “illustrative distribution of the Consumer Climate Action Account shows that millions of households break even due to NYCI, especially low-income households and those that rely on clean energy like EVs, transit, and heat pumps.” These are average values. The distribution of impacts that would describe costs for those households that do not have the option for EVs, transit, and heat pumps is not available. The summary claims that the “Consumer Climate Action Account has the potential to manage impacts for a very large percentage of households in New York” but does not quantify that percentage. The modeling analysis notes that the building and transportation sector modeling was custom built. Optimistic implementation assumptions can easily be used to torture the data into the result desired. Without complete documentation I do not think that the results are credible, so I am reserving judgement on these claims.
Discussion
I have always maintained that the primary concern of the general public is Climate Act costs. As far as I can tell the Hochul Administration deliberately hid those costs in the Scoping Plan and that politically motivated approach is apparent in this webinar.
The Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago did a poll in early 2023 poll with “the Associated Press–NORC Center for Public Affairs Research” explored Americans’ attitudes on climate change, their views on key climate and energy policies, and how they feel about electric vehicles and the policies to encourage them. The following chart from that report shows that 38% would be willing to pay an additional $1 a month for a fee to combat change and only 21% would be willing to pay $100 a month.
This webinar talked about a single component of the total cost of the net-zero transition. When NYCI starts auctioning allowances the price of energy is guaranteed to go up. The Upstate “middle-income household journey” states that households in that category will pay at least $73 a month before the rebates are applied. The rebates are subject to the whim of Albany politicians, so the rebate amounts are not guaranteed. In addition, the electric bill supply costs are not included in these modeled costs. I recently discussed the Central Hudson revisions to its double-digit gas and electric delivery rate increases. The public outcry has been intense and the costs described here are in addition to the rate case costs. There is insufficient documentation available to determine exactly what costs were included in the heat pump and electric vehicle examples given.
The Energy Policy Institute poll described above found that less than a third of respondents were willing to pay even $10 a month. The willingness to pay at other levels in the poll shows that less than a third are willing to pay as little as $10 a month for a carbon fee. Little wonder that the true costs are a closely guarded secret.
The Climate Action Council’s Scoping Plan has been described as a “true masterpiece in how to hide what is important under an avalanche of words designed to make people never want to read it.” Similarly, the modeling analysis portrayal in this webinar uses an avalanche of technical jargon and impressive sounding phrases to suggest credibility and discourage questions. In reality, all the modeling relies on guessing how society will react to incentives and regulations using parameters that can lead to wildly different results depending upon the biases of the model developer. John von Neumann allegedly summed up the problem with parameters stating that “With four parameters I can fit an elephant, and with five I can make him wiggle his trunk”[1]. In other words, he could develop a mathematical model that described an elephant simply by fudging the parameters. In this instance the model parameters produce the politically correct result that people will, for example, switch to electric vehicles in response to the incentives but don’t account for the many people who have weighed the pros and cons of an electric vehicle and decided never.
Conclusion
“A goal without a plan is just a wish.”, Antoine de St. Exupery. The Scoping Plan should properly be called the Scoping Goals because there is no plan. There has been no accountability for proving that the control strategies proposed are feasible on the schedule mandated by the Climate Act and that the costs of all the components of the energy system that must be changed to achieve the net-zero transition will maintain current standards of affordability. It is just wishing.
This is my 400th article on the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero transition. It seems appropriate to look at where the state stands relative to the time when I started writing these articles and the Climate Act targets. This summary supplements the progress status summary described by Francis Menton and the generation trend status prepared by Nuclear New York by looking at Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions.
I have followed the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) since it was first proposed, submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan, and have written 400 articles about New York’s net-zero transition. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other organization I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.
Overview
The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction in GHG emissions and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. It includes an interim 2030 reduction target of a 40% reduction by 2030 and a requirement that all electricity generated be “zero-emissions” by 2040. The Climate Action Council (CAC) is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible using zero-emissions electricity. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan outline of strategies. After a year-long review, the Scoping Plan was finalized at the end of 2022. In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations were supposed to be implemented through regulation, PSC orders, and legislation. Not surprisingly, the aspirational schedule of the Climate Act has proven to be more difficult to implement than planned. Many aspects of the transition are falling behind, and the magnitude of the necessary costs is coming into focus. When political fantasies meet reality, reality always wins.
Nuclear New York – Generation Trends
In a press release on January 8, 2024 Nuclear New York, “Independent Advocates for Reliable Carbon-Free Energy” explained that “four years since passing the Climate Act, New York struggles to replace shuttered clean energy “. Their release stated (foot notes removed):
In 2023, nuclear power was once again the largest single source of clean energy in New York State. Electricity generation from this carbon-free source totaled 27.6 terawatt hours (TWh), up 2.7% over 2022. Nuclear covered 18.1% of the state’s total electricity demand (including behind-the-meter “rooftop” solar generation), and amounted to 42.7% of in-state clean electricity.
Hydro, the second largest source of carbon-free power, recovered 2.1% in 2023 to 27.2 TWh, covering 17.9% of demand. These two ‘firm clean’ generation sources provide on-demand power regardless of the time of day or weather.
Despite increasing deployed wind capacity in 2022 by 13% over 2021, generation from this source declined 3.9% in 2023 over 2022 to 4.7 TWh, demonstrating the perils of relying on weather-dependent renewable energy. New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) does not report grid-connected solar as a separate category, given its currently minuscule contribution to the generation mix. However, rooftop solar generation increased 18% to 5.2 TWh, covering 3.4% of demand.
New York’s electricity demand declined by 4.8 TWh over 2022 (-3.1%), which enabled the state to reduce net imports by 4.3 TWh. In-state fossil fuel combustion decreased by 2.3 TWh, but remained 11.0 TWh (21%) above 2019 levels, when clean energy generation peaked.
Updates on the March to the New York Great Green Future
The Manhattan Contrarian Energy Storage Report of December 1, 2022, led off by sounding a clear alarm: getting electricity from intermittent wind and solar well past 50% of total generation would require enormous quantities of energy to be stored, with technical requirements, including duration of storage, well beyond the capability of any battery currently existing or likely to be invented any time soon. Essentially, if fossil fuels are to be eliminated, there is only one realistic possibility for meeting the storage requirements: hydrogen.
In mid-2023, the New York Independent System Operator, to its credit, recognized the problem — although it buried that recognition deep in a report when it should be shouting about the problem from the rooftops. From NYISO’s Power Trends 2023 Report, revised August 2023, page 7, starting in the middle of a paragraph and without any emphasis:
“[T]o achieve the mandates of the CLCPA, new emission-free generating technologies with the necessary reliability service attributes will be needed to replace the flexible, dispatchable capabilities of fossil fuel generation and sustain production for extended periods of time. Such emission-free technologies, either individually or in aggregate, are not yet available on a commercial scale.“
With hydrogen as the only possible such “emissions-free generating technology,” how much would hydrogen cost as the solution to this problem, particularly if one follows the hypothesis that it must be created without any use of fossil fuels? My Report, page 14, noted that existing commercial production of this so-called “green” hydrogen was “negligible,” leaving no good benchmark for understanding what the costs might be. As a substitute, I ran some rough numbers based on cost of wind and solar generators to make the electricity and efficiency of the electrolysis process. The result was a very rough estimate that this “green” hydrogen would cost “somewhere in the range of 5 to 10 times more” than natural gas (page 17).
Well, now some new precision has come into view. In July 2022 the UK government launched what it calls its First Hydrogen Allocation Round (HAR 1), to obtain bids and award contracts to produce this so-called “green” hydrogen using wind power. The process took a while, but here from December 14, 2023 is the announcement of the first round of contract awards. Excerpt:
“Following the launch of the first hydrogen allocation round (HAR1) in July 2022, we have selected the successful projects to be offered contracts. We are pleased to announce 11 successful projects, totalling 125MW capacity.HAR1 puts the UK in a leading position internationally: this represents the largest number of commercial scale green hydrogen production projects announced at once anywhere in Europe. . . . The 11 projects have been agreed at a weighted average strike price of £241/MWh.“
£241/MWh? At today’s exchange rate of 1.27 $/£, that would be $306/MWh. Prices of natural gas are generally quoted in $/MMBTU rather than per MWh, but here is EIA’s latest Electricity Monthly Update, dated December 21 and covering the month of October 2023. It gives natural gas prices in the per MWh units. The “price of natural gas at New York City” is given as $11.32/MWh. That would make the price that the UK has just agreed to pay to buy this “green” hydrogen stuff approximately 27 times what we can buy natural gas for here in New York to obtain the same energy content.
And that $306/MWh is just for the hydrogen. It includes nothing for the massive new facilities (underground salt caverns?) to store the stuff, for a new pipeline network to transport it, and for a new collection of power plants to burn it.
Electric Generating Unit Emission Trends
Electric generating units report emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency Clean Air Markets Division as part of the compliance requirements for the Acid Raiin Program and other market-based programs that require accurate and complete emissions data. The 2023 emissions data submittal date was January 31 and I downloaded the data the next day. Something has changed in the data access system so I could not check to see if all the facilities reported on time. If some facilities had to ask for a delayed submittal this could mean that the totals are lower that actual emissions.
The following table lists the emissions since 2009 when the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative started. Emissions of CO2, SO2, and NOx are down dramatically over this period. The primary reason is that the fracking revolution made the cost of natural gas so cheap relative to other fuels that every facility that could convert to natural gas did so. New York banned the use of coal in 2021 which forced the retirement of the remaining coal plants. The state still has some facilities that primarily burn residual oil but those run infrequently. The takeaway message is that the fuel switching options are no longer available so future reductions will only come as zero-emissions resources displace facilities burning fossil fuels.
The following graph shows the emission trends. Note that I divided the CO2 emissions by 1,000 so that all the parameters would show up on the same plot. The impact of the closure of the Indian Point nuclear facility mentioned in the Nuclear New York presentation is clearly shown as CO2 rose over the last three years until the 2023 emissions started down. Importantly that could be mostly due to weather variations and not necessarily the addition of the renewables shown above.
New York State GHG Emission Trends
A relevant question is where we stand in regards to the Climate Act mandate for a 40% reduction from a 1990 baseline in GHG emissions by 2030. Unfortunately, that is not easily answered in sufficient detail to be able to figure out what is going on.
The regulation setting the 1990 baseline emissions values that form the basis for the 2030 40% reduction and the 2050 85% reduction was promulgated in 2020. It sets the limits
§ 496.4 Statewide Greenhouse Gas Emission Limits
(a) For the purposes of this Part, the estimated level of statewide greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 is 409.78 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, using a GWP20 as provided in Section 496.5 of this Part.
(b) For the purposes of this Part, the table below establishes statewide emission limits for the year specified, as a percentage of estimated 1990 statewide greenhouse gas emissions of 60 percent and 15 percent, respectively, measured in millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent gas using a GWP20 as provided in Section 496.5 of this Part.
Year
Statewide greenhouse gas emission limit (in million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent)
2030
245.87
2050
61.47
The Regulatory Impact Statement for the regulation included a table that breaks down the 1990 emissions by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sectors and gases. As shown below there is not much of a breakdown. Note that all the rest of the emissions will be reported as the CO2 equivalents so you do not need to worry about the component gases.
According to the 2023 Statewide GHG Emissions webpage “The Climate Act requires the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) to issue an annual report on statewide greenhouse gas emissions, pursuant to Section 75-0105 of the Environmental Conservation Law.” The most recent report covering the years 1990 through 2021 was released in late December 2023. The following reports were released at that time:
I extracted summary data from each of the sectoral reports to provide some idea of where New York stands relative to the 2030 targets in the following table. The Part 496 1990 column lists the regulatory baseline numbers. The estimated emissions in the 2023 Statewide GHG Emissions are listed for 1990, 2005, and the last five years. I list the sector 2030 targets (40% of 1990 emissions) and the percentage reduction necessary to meet the targets.
The first thing that pops out is that the 2023 inventory has a different estimate for 1990. GHG emission inventories require indirect estimates of many of the emission sources and the assumptions regarding the emission factor that estimates emissions with an activity and the activity rate. This is a fundamental problem with emission factors and means that for full transparency all the emission factors and associated activity levels should be clearly documented.
The second thing of note is that none of the IPCC sectors are even close to the 2030 targets. The Scoping Plan’s quantitative assessment in the Integration Analysis essentially is a list of control strategies, presumed control efficiencies, and expected emission reductions that when added up meet the limits. That assessment was poorly documented, contains inconsistencies with similar New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) analyses, and there has never been any response to comments about inconsistencies and other issues identified in the Scoping Plan comments. There is no feasibility analysis to determine if those targets can be met with any assurance.
I tried to analyze the data used for the 2023 Statewide GHG Emissions. Those data are available for download from Open Data NY. This is another instance where it is not easy to break down the components of the IPCC sectors to determine if it is realistically possible to meet the 2030 targets because state agencies do not provide consistent data.
The Regulatory Impact Statement for Part 496 included Table 4 that broke down fuel combustion GHG emissions within the IPCC energy sector. Because I used the dataset itself, I picked the sector categories that I believe match the Table 4 categories. Note that I did not include fuel combustion from petroleum refining in the table because I could not find categories that I thought matched it. The following table lists the results for the last ten years and compared the 2021 emissions to the 2030 target. Fuel combustion in the electric and industrial sectors are already lower than the equivalent 2030 targets. On the other hand, transportation and fuel combustion in the commercial and residential sectors will require significant reductions to meet the targets.
Is that feasible? Consider what is needed for just one parameter. To determine if the transportation fuel combustion reductions are feasible, the expected reductions per gasoline vehicle must be estimated. Miles per gallon and the annual mileage need to be estimated for a range of users and locations so that a reasonable estimate of state-wide fuel use can be estimated. Once you know that then you can determine how many zero-emissions vehicles must be deployed. Is that estimate realistic? That is not all because zero-emissions vehicles also require charging infrastructure and that affects the distribution infrastructure. It is easy to say the model projections meet the 2030 targets but the range of parameters that can be tweaked is so large that any pre-conceived answer can be produced.
I also put these data in a graph. I am not sure it adds much value, but I spent enough time on it that I don’t want to waste the effort. The overall trend suggests that it might be possible to meet the targets if, and only if, the historical rate of emission reductions can be replicated. Given that the electricity and industrial sectors have achieved the greatest reductions but have no readily available additional reductions, I am not optimistic.
Conclusion
The 400 articles I have written on the Climate Act all lead to the same result. When you look at the numbers as shown in this post, the enormity of the challenge is clear. Paraphrasing Francis Menton:
No person looking at these charts would ever conclude that New York has spent the past five years embarked on a crash program to replace fossil fuels with wind and solar. That process is going absolutely nowhere.