New York State GHG Emissions Update

The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) includes a target for a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 1990 levels by 2030.  This post describes the latest New York State (NYS) GHG emission inventories and some implications.

This is another article about Climate Act implementation activities that I have written because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

NYS Electric Generating Unit Emissions

According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): “Emissions trading, sometimes referred to as ‘cap and trade’ or ‘allowance trading,’ is an approach to reducing pollution that has been used successfully to protect human health and the environment.”  One of the requirements for such a program is a monitoring system that consistently and accurately measures the emissions.  NYS electric generating units are in different emissions trading systems and have developed an accurate measuring system that relies on continuous emissions monitoring systems that record pollution levels that are reported to EPA. 

The only GHG monitored and reported to EPA is CO2.  In 2022 the units that report to EPA emitted 30.7 million short tons.  The NYS GHG inventory reports emissions as million metric tons and the 2022 emissions were 27.8 million metric tons.  As shown in the following table NYS emissions had been trending down until 2019 as generation from coal and oil was displaced by generation from natural gas.  The last three years the effect of the shutdown of the Indian Point nuclear generating station and the loss of its zero-emissions capacity have become evident.  Since 2019 CO2 emissions have increased 5.8 million tons or 23%.

NYS GHG Emissions

At the end of 2022 the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) released the 2022 statewide GHG emissions report (2022 GHG Report).  I published an overview post of this greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory last year that described the games played using that inventory to “prove” that there are societal benefits for the emission reduction programs needed to meet the Climate Act targets. 

New York State greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accounting it includes upstream emissions and is biased against methane.  Obviously if upstream emissions are included then the total increases but at the same time it makes the inventory incompatible with everybody else’s inventory.  There are two methane effects.  Global warming potential (GWP) weighs the radiative forcing of a gas against that of carbon dioxide over a specified time frame so that it is possible to compare the effects of different gases.  The values used by New York are compare the effect on a molecular basis not on the basis of the gases in the atmosphere so the numbers are biased.  Almost all jurisdictions use a 100-year GWP time horizon but the Climate Act mandates the use of the 20-year GWP which increases carbon dioxide equivalent values.  In addition, I believe the State is using higher emission estimates for methane production, transport, and processing.  As a result, NY GHG emission inventory estimates are nearly double values determined by other jurisdictions.

The 2022 GHG Report includes the following documents:

In order to calculate all the emissions in New York and estimate the upstream emissions it took DEC, the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) and consultants two years to produce the reports.  This article is concerned only with electricity generation especially as it relates to overall emission trends and emissions data could be used for a market-based control program. 

2020 GHG Emissions

Table ES.2 in the Summary Report presents emissions for different sectors.  Electric generation emissions are listed as electric power fuel combustion, imported electricity, and as part of imported fossil fuels.  In 2020, GHG gas emissions from electric power fuel combustion totaled 22.12 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (mmt CO2e) using a 20-year global warming potential.  Imported electricity totaled 7.81 mmt CO2e.  Fuel combustion and imported electricity emissions were primarily CO2.  The Table ES.2 imported fossil fuel value shown covers all fossil fuel used in other sectors.  I found another source that breaks out the electric upstream emissions that I used to calculate emissions.

When I first started looking at the electric sector numbers, I compared the State numbers to the emissions reported by the generating companies to EPA.  The reported 2020 EPA numbers were 24.4 mmt CO2e but the 2022 GHG Report electric sector emissions were 52.3 mmt CO2e.  The 2022 GHG Report Sectoral Report 1: Energy chapter on electricity generation does not provide much detail but references a NYSERDA report: Technical Documentation: Estimating Energy Sector Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under New York State’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act that does provide details.  I provide more details on the calculation methodology here.  The following table combines Table 28 electric sector emissions by fuel type in that document with EPA Clean Air Markets Division emissions data.  In Table ES.2 above the total imported fossil fuel emissions in 2020 were 94.08 mmt CO2e and in the NYSERDA technical documentation the upstream emissions are 21.7 mmt CO2e.  New York’s biased accounting methodology doubles electric sector emissions from the emissions reported to EPA.  The claim that upstream emissions are on the order of direct emissions is not credible.

NYS GHG Emissions Data

The 2020 GHG Report includes a sectoral report covering the energy sector.   The results section notes:

The most significant emission reduction in this report was the decrease in fuel combustion emissions in the electricity sector from 1990 to current by over 60%. This is related to the transition away from fuels with higher combustion emissions to those with lower combustion emissions; as natural gas usage has increased, the use of coal and petroleum fuels such as residual fuel oil has declined. As described in NYSERDA (2022a), the emissions from the extraction, processing, transmission, and distribution of these fuels have not followed the same pattern.

I also evaluated the data used in the report.  It is available along with just about everything else at the NYS data website. This is part of the Open NY initiative described as:

Open NY is the award-winning initiative of policies, programs and tools that provide public access to digital data for collaboration and analysis. Empowering the public and government with data for the digital age.

Everything may be there but it is not easy to use.

The data used in the 2020 GHG emissions report are available.  I have developed a spreadsheet (documentation) that simplifies the use of the data for more refined evaluation. 

One finding in my evaluation is that there are changes in the total emissions reported relative to last year’s inventory.  The spreadsheet lists all the differences.  Importantly there is a difference between the regulatory Part 496 1990 baseline emissions of 409.78 million metric tons and this inventory that says 1990 emissions were 404.26 and last year’s baseline emissions were 402.54.  Recall that Part 496 determines the 2030 emissions limit, 245.87 million metric tons and 2050 emission limit, 61.47 million metric tons as percentages of the baseline.  At some point DEC will have to address these differences.

Another interesting result is the distribution of emissions by economic sector as shown in the following figure.  Overall emissions have been going down since the mid-2000’s.  The electric sector reductions have been the primary cause.  As noted previously electric sector emissions were decreasing over time until 2019 but started increasing since then.   

Projected 2021 and 2022 NYS GHG Emissions

In order to determine where NYS stands relative to the 2030 target currently, it is necessary to combine the EPA and NYS datasets.  The 2020 GHG Report notes that the pandemic shutdowns affected 2020 emissions.  In order to project 2021 emissions, I used the average of the years 2016-2020 for all sectors except electricity and for 2022 I used the average of 2017-2021 excluding 2020. 

Because the electric sector emissions include upstream and imported electricity emissions, I had to do something more refined.  The direct emissions used the EPA reported emissions.  The upstream and imported electricity emissions are in Table 28: electric sector emissions by fuel type of the  NYSERDA (2022a) technical documentation.  I took the average of the 2019 and 2020 data for the imported component.  The upstream emissions are related to the direct emissions.  I assumed that relationship was equal to the ratio of the 2019 and 2020 average EPA emissions to the out-of-state upstream emissions.  Using these assumptions, I project that the 2022 emissions increase to levels not seen since 2018.

Discussion

The Climate Act includes a target for a 40% reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 1990 levels by 2030.  The NYS Part 496 1990 baseline emissions are 404.26 mmt CO2e.  The total 2020 NYS emissions were 344.85 mmt CO2e which is a 15% reduction from the baseline.  The 2030 limit is 245.9 CO2e which will require a further 29% reduction.

I looked at alternative emission reduction trajectories to get to the 2030 limit.  The following table estimates the emissions needed to meet the targets from starting points in 2018 to 2022.  Using the observed 2020 emissions noted above would require a 2.96% reduction per year.  Using the projected 2021 emissions (381.00 mmt CO2e) the annual reduction rate would be 3.94%.  Similarly, for 2022 because the emissions have gone up the annual reduction rate would have to be 4.52%.  Even if the 2022 emissions turn out to equal the 2020 emissions the annual reduction rate would have to be 3.59%.

Because of the variation of weather-related fuel usage GHG emissions have quite a bit of interannual variability (on the order of 3%).  My impression is that the annual reduction rates required to meet the 2030 target will be a significant challenge.  It is not clear what will happen if anyone of many issues causes delays in the implementation compliance trajectory.

There is another aspect of these data that is relevant with respect to the proposed cap and invest program.  The electric generating sector has developed a verifiable emissions reporting system that provides compliance data two months after the end of the year.  That system uses traceable direct measurements.  The 2020 GHG emissions report that represents the “official” compliance reporting by the DEC takes two years to produce.  It uses fuel use data, emission factors, and many assumptions in a process that is anything but open and transparent.  There have been three iterations of NYS GHG emission inventories and the historical data has changed in each subsequent iteration.  That approach does not meet the EPA emissions trading system recommendation for a timely, consistent, and accurate emissions reporting system.

Conclusion

There are a few takeaway points with these data.  The EPA electric generating unit emissions for 2022 increase over past years because of the NYS decision to shut down 2,000 MW of zero-emissions generating capacity at Indian Point.  Clearly, if the net-zero transition is to succeed then maintaining and expanding the state’s nuclear resources is necessary.  The data also show that the emission reduction trajectory is ambitious and, I believe, unlikely to be met.

The Climate Act GHG emission reporting requirements double the electric sector emissions over the direct measurements used by EPA.  The reporting system developed for EPA gets the results in two months but the reporting system used to generate the Climate Act GHG emissions takes two years. One of the arguments used by the Climate Action Council to justify the proposal for a cap and invest market-based control program was that the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) trading system was a successful model that could be used.  RGGI uses the EPA reporting data to provide timely, consistent, and accurate data for compliance requirements.  There is no favorable comparison between the EPA system and the Climate Act reporting system.  The reality that the NYS GHG emissions reporting data are incompatible with any emissions trading system is just one of the practical problems that the cap and invest proposal must address before it can be implemented.

The Climate Act and Gas Stove Bans

Mention of a ban on gas stoves recently caused a national uproar.   Closer to home the New York State Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (CLCPA) implementation plan calls for zero-emission equipment, including stoves, in new and existing buildings.  When pressed about New York’s plans Governor Hochul said “”I know it’s a concern because a lot of people are misrepresenting what this is all about”.  I think the misrepresentation is on the part of the Hochul Administration,

I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 275 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The Climate Act established a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric gride with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was revised in 2022 and the Final Scoping Plan  was approved on  December 19, 2022. 

There are multiple aspects of a ban on gas stoves that I have wanted to address.  Fortunately, most of the points I wanted to make have already been made so this post is more of an overview of other work than original effort on my part.

Childhood Asthma and Gas Stoves

The initial reason for the recent uproar about gas stoves was a study published in an open-source journal called Population Attributable Fraction of Gas Stoves and Childhood Asthma in the United States (Gruenwald et al., 2022).  The sound bite takeaway from the study was that gas stoves are responsible for 12.7% of childhood asthma in the US.  I don’t have a lot of faith in any study that claims an air pollution association with asthma rates but was not relishing trying to develop an analysis.

Blair King writing on his blog did a masterful job eviscerating the claims in the paper.  In brief, the study was based upon a 2013 paper that used old data from the 1980’s and 1990’s.  The analysis was done using a 70-year-old statistical tool called PAF which is widely used in epidemiological studies.  However, the tool breaks down when multiple risk factors (confounding variables) are present.  For asthma, there are no fewer than seven risk factors so the analytical tool becomes useless.  I recommend reading his article but the conclusion nails the issue:

To conclude, I can only restate that the Gruenwald et al paper seems to have some clear challenges that would typically preclude it from consideration in a policy-making process.

  • Its underlying data is of low statistical power.
  • Its conclusion is directly contradicted by more recent studies with significantly greater statistical power. and
  • It relies on a statistical tool that is considered invalid in situations with confounding variables yet it is being used to analyze an association that is absolutely rife with confounding variables.

Put simply, this is not the study I would rely on to make a major policy change that will affect millions of people and will cost billions to implement. As to its conclusion: are 12.7% of childhood asthma cases in the US attributable to cooking with natural gas? Based on the points above, that conclusion is almost certainly not the case.

This isn’t the first time that a study that is weak science is used as an argument for sweeping policy changes.  What did surprise me is how quickly the story raced through the media.  Robert Bryce explained how that happened in his post The billionaires behind the gas bans.  I highly recommend that you read the whole thing but I present some highlights below.

He explained that he started looking into a new organization called the Climate Imperative Foundation in late 2021 when he read a story that the new group has a planned budget of $180 million annually over five years for a total of $900 million.  When he investigated the source of the money, he discovered that two of the  most recognizable names on the six-person board are Silicon Valley venture capitalist John Doerr and Laurene Powell Jobs, the widow of late Apple CEO Steve Jobs. Forbes magazine estimates that Doerr has a net worth of $12.7 billion. Forbes puts Jobs’ net worth at $17.7 billion. Unsurprisingly Bryce found that most of the money is coming from Doerr and Jobs.

His article explains why the emergence of the Climate Imperative Foundation is important:

First, it shows that the effort to “electrify everything” and ban the use of natural gas in homes and businesses – and that includes gas stoves — is part of a years-long, lavishly funded campaign that is being bankrolled by some of the world’s richest people.

Second, despite numerous claims about how nefarious actors are blocking the much-hyped “energy transition,” the size of Climate Imperative’s budget provides more evidence that the NGO-corporate-industrial-climate complex has far more money than the pro-hydrocarbon and pro-nuclear groups. Indeed, the anti-hydrocarbon NGOs (most of which are also stridently anti-nuclear) have loads of money, media backing, and momentum. As can be seen in the graphic below, the five biggest anti-hydrocarbon NGOs are now collecting about $1.5 billion per year from their donors. (All data is from Guidestar.) That sum is roughly three times more than the amount being collected by the top five non-profit associations that are either pro-hydrocarbon or pro-nuclear.

Third, banning the direct use of natural gas in homes and businesses may be worse for the climate. You read that right. Burning gas directly allows consumers to use about 90% of the energy contained in the fuel. Using gas indirectly — by converting it into electricity and then using that juice to power a heat pump, stove, or water heater — wastes more than half of the energy in the fuel. That point was made by Glenn Ducat, in his excellent new book, Blue Oasis No More: Why We’re Not Going to “Beat” Global Warming and What We Need To Do About It. Ducat is a Ph.D. nuclear engineer who worked at Argonne National Lab, as well as at two electric utilities. He explains “Burning natural gas by residential commercial and industrial customers is at least twice as efficient and emits about half as much CO2 as processes that use electricity produced from fossil fuels. Converting process-heat applications to electricity before the electricity grid is completely carbon-free will increase CO2 emissions.” (Emphasis in the original.)

In the interest of full disclosure, I note that the New York plan is to eventually use electricity from zero-emissions sources.  However, there are life-cycle energy use issues with wind, solar and energy storage that mean the Climate Act transition does not reduces CO2 as much as it claims because of the efficiency of burning  natural gas directly for heating, cooking and hot water.

Bryce documents how the efforts to demonize gas stoves has rolled out since 2020.  One of the authors of the 12.7% asthma paper is employed by the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) which has published other articles that make the same claims.  He provides other evidence that this paper doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. 

He went on to investigate where RMI gets their funding. 

Some of it is coming from Amazon billionaire Jeff Bezos. In 2020, the Bezos Earth Fund gave RMI $10 million, which the group said will be used to “reduce GHG emissions from homes, commercial structures, and other buildings, enabling RMI to increase its current work with a coalition of partners in key states. The project will focus on making all U.S. buildings carbon-free by 2040 by advocating for all-electric new construction…”

Bezos also has provided $100 million grant to the National Resources Defense Council.  The Sierra Club is getting funds from Michael Bloomberg’s Bloomberg Philanthropies, including $500 million to the Beyond Carbon project.  His article clearly shows that the narrative that the fossil and nuclear industries are providing massive money to funding disinformation while the noble NGOs struggle to find enough money to counter their claims is false. 

Bryce makes two final points:

The first is the hypocrisy of billionaires funding efforts to slash hydrocarbon use while they are consuming staggering amounts of hydrocarbons. According to a 2020 article in Vanity Fair, Michael Bloomberg owns eight houses in New York state alone, and “he also reportedly owns several properties in London, Florida, Colorado, and Bermuda.” Thus, Bloomberg may own a dozen houses. How many of those houses have gas stoves? I’ll make a wild guess and bet that it’s more than one. Oh, and according to Vanity Fair, while he was mayor of New York, Bloomberg “was known to spend weekends” at his house in Bermuda, “traveling back and forth on private jets.” And what is fueling those private jets? I’m guessing here, but it’s probably not organic quinoa.

The final bit of hypocrisy at work here is the regressive nature of the gas bans. Indeed, it’s clear that banning natural gas will mean higher costs for consumers. Last March, in the Federal Register, the Department of Energy published its annual estimate for residential energy costs. It found that on a per-BTU basis, electricity costs about 3.5 times more than natural gas. It also found that gas was, by far, the cheapest form of in-home energy, costing less than half as much as fuels like kerosene, propane, and heating oil.

That means that efforts to ban natural gas are, in practice, an energy tax on the poor and the middle class. During a recent interview, Jennifer Hernandez, a California-based lawyer who represents The 200, a coalition of Latino groups that has sued the state over its climate policies, told me that “Natural gas is the last source of in-home affordable energy. And these climate extremists can’t stand it.”

The Scoping Plan and All-Electric Homes

Governor Hochul has been pushing back on the notion that her Administration is coming after residential gas stoves.  The final thing I wanted to address was the Scoping Plan strategies for buildings particularly as they relate to electric appliances.  Table 11 (page 183) from the Scoping Plan Chapter on Buildings explicitly says adopt standards for zero-emission equipment.  Clearly that precludes gas stoves at some point.

James Hanley from the Empire Center wrote a great explanation of the truths of the Scoping Plan and the gas stove ban.  I reproduce his post in its entirety below:

Governor Hochul is pushing back against the fear that she’s coming after homeowners’ gas stoves. She insists that she’s not, and that she’d “like to deal in the truth here because a lot of that isn’t getting out.”  

Fair enough, so let’s deal with that truth. 

First, it’s true that Hochul didn’t recommend a gas stove ban in her 2023 State of the State address. While she did say she wants to “prohibit the sale of any new fossil fuel heating equipment by no later than 2030 for smaller buildings, and no later than 2035 for larger buildings,” she made no mention of prohibiting the sale of other fossil fuel appliances – stoves, hot water heaters, and clothes dryers. 

But the Governor’s silence on those appliances doesn’t settle the issue, and any suggestion that it does violates her urging that we “deal in the truth.” 

The truth is that the Climate Action Council’s Scoping Plan explicitly recommends banning sales of fossil-fuel fired hot water heaters in 2030 and fossil-fuel fired clothes dryers and stoves in 2035.  

The truth is that this Scoping Plan is the roadmap that the state legislature and all state agencies are supposed to follow to implement the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA). 

The truth is that the Governor or her successor(s) could follow up this year’s recommendations for action in future years, or the legislature could on its own. 

The truth is that the Department of Environmental Conservation is supposed to make rules implementing the CLCPA and could begin the regulatory rule-making process to ban these appliances without the Governor’s direct prompting. 

And the truth is that advocates of eliminating all fossil-fuel equipment from New York’s economy are not going to give up in despair just because the Governor didn’t – at least not yet – advocate every recommendation from the Scoping Plan. 

There’s another, less visible truth, as well. The goal of anti-fossil fuel activists is to continually reduce the use of natural gas until the pipeline distribution system becomes economically unsustainable. The Scoping Plan has a whole chapter discussing the “strategic downsizing” of the gas system. And while the goal of making it economically unsustainable is not made explicit, it is the foreseeable result of this downsizing strategy.  

The more homes that are forced or incentivized to switch to all-electric, the fewer gas customers there are left to cover the cost of maintaining this large distribution system. That will put cost pressure on those remaining gas customers, forcing more of them to switch to electricity. That puts further cost pressure on the remaining customers, and so on, until maintaining the system is no longer financially sustainable. 

With this long-range strategy, no explicit ban is even necessary.  

This will not affect propane stoves and appliances, of course, because they are not fed by a pipeline system. So they may get at least a temporary reprieve. But they are clearly targeted by the Scoping Plan and anti-fossil fuel activists as well.  

In brief, while it’s true that Hochul did not propose a ban on replacement fossil fuel-powered appliances in this year’s State of the State address, there is plenty of time between now and 2035 for her, a successor, or the DEC to act in conformity to the recommendations set out in the state’s CLCPA Scoping Plan. Even if they don’t act to enact an explicit ban, the Scoping Plan lays out of goal of diminishing the infrastructure for gas delivery.  

So don’t believe those who are now naysaying the idea of a gas appliance ban. Gas and propane users will need to organize effectively to make their voices heard if they are to prevent a forced transition to electric appliances. 

For the record the Scoping Plan Chapter on Buildings on page 190 states the following for residential applications:

These zero-emission standards across a range of equipment types should apply starting in the years noted below.

2030: Adopt zero-emission standards that prohibit replacements (at end of useful life) of residential-sized equipment used for the combustion of fossil fuels for heating and cooling and hot water. The standards beginning in 2030 should regulate equipment sized to typically serve single-family homes and low-rise residential buildings with up to 49 housing units.

2035: Adopt zero-emission standards that prohibit replacements (at end of useful life) of fossil fuel appliances for cooking and clothes drying.

Discussion

It has been said of the Scoping Plan that “The plan is a true masterpiece in how to hide what is important under an avalanche of words designed to make people never want to read it”.   I have spent most of last year trying to interpret what is important and can confirm that statement.  It is a political document intended to push the agenda of the Hochul Administration which is apparently to pander to the emotional needs of the constituency that believes that there is a climate crisis and an easy and painless solution.  There are enormous ignored tradeoffs associated with the complete transformation of the energy system that has been built up over one hundred years to one with zero-emissions in the 27 years to 2050.  Nothing is as simple as portrayed in the Plan or the politician’s descriptions of what is going to happen. 

The biggest problem with the Scoping Plan is that it does not address any of the many “what if?” questions.  Consider the electrification of home cooking appliances in this regard.  I believe that the overarching what if question related to all-electric homes is what if there is an ice storm.  During an extended wintertime blackout, a gas or propane stove can be used for cooking and for limited heating.  An all-electric home without electricity has nothing. Those differences could mean a life or death situation.

Richard Ellenbogen mentioned some transition issues in a letter:

Additionally, if you ban the sale of gas ranges, what happens if your existing gas range breaks.  Do you have to rewire your home to install a new stove and then buy all new pots to work with an inductive cook top?  What are you supposed to do for cooking while you wait a month for an electrician to install a service that can cost thousands of dollars depending on the existing service?  I have a breaker panel within thirty feet of the stove in my house and my house has an existing 400 amp service which is far larger than most will.  Even if I had to switch ranges, it would cost at least $2000 for the electrical work, excluding patching and painting of the holes needed to run the cable, just to run the service.  That is beyond the cost of the range.  Inductive cook tops, which are safer and use less energy, are three times the cost of a gas range, independent of the $400 set of pots and pans that will work with it.   If the existing service and breaker panels were inadequate, you can add $6000 to that figure, at least.  What if you live in a high-rise apartment and the board or building management doesn’t have the funds to rewire the entire building when your stove breaks?  The gas range in my daughter’s apartment needed replacing.  We had a new one installed for $750, delivered.  Not that we could have installed an electric range anyway because the electrical service wasn’t there, but an equivalent inductive range started at $2000 and went up from there.  $2400 with pots and pans.  That was two years ago.

Finally, the effect of the billionaire funding sources should not be ignored.  Anyone associated in any way with the fossil fuel industry is portrayed as a shill such that their work should be disregarded as propaganda.  Because funding sources are a legitimate concern, I maintain that it is important to understand the source of anyone’s funding.  To say that an organization that gets its funding from a donor with a specific agenda is not exactly the same situation as a fossil fuel shill is naïve.  In both cases it does not mean that the results are wrong but that they must stand up on their merits.  (By the way that is the reason that my posts typically include references.)  In this instance the claims of significant health impacts of gas stoves do not withstand scrutiny so the publicized studies do not warrant banning their future use.

Conclusion

The Hochul Administration’s war on natural gas and propane is irrational.  While methane does have a more potent impact on the greenhouse effect than carbon dioxide in a molecular comparison, in the atmosphere methane does not have anywhere near the effect of carbon dioxide.  The atmospheric residence time is on the order of 12 years so methane does not build up in the atmosphere.  Furthermore, there is a large body of evidence showing that the claimed health impacts of methane combustion are weak.  Those fundamental flaws destroy the rationale to eliminate the use of natural gas and propane as planned in the Scoping Plan. 

On the other hand, there are significant benefits for the use of natural gas and propane. It is cheaper.  It is energy dense and can be transported easily so when it is combusted in a modern high efficiency appliance you get a lot of bang for the buck with relatively small impacts.  I suspect that many New Yorkers appreciate its dependability relative to electricity.  It allowed my family to survive two extended blackouts and I am not sure what we would have done without it.

I have found that New York’s emissions are less than one half of one percent of global emissions and that the average increase in global emissions is greater than one half of one percent.  In other words, even if we eliminate our emissions, the increase in global emissions will replace our reductions in less than a year.  That does not mean we should not do something but it does mean that we can and should take the time to be sure that the things we mandate do not do more harm than good.  Until such time that the Hochul Administration is held accountable to answer the what if questions not addressed in the Scoping Plan it is likely that the transition to net-zero will do more harm than good.

The politicians who are downplaying the idea of a gas appliance ban are just kicking the can down the road to be somebody else’s problem.  Someway or somehow every building in New York State is going to be electrified to the maximum extent possible according to the Scoping Plan.  Gas and propane users must make their voices heard if they are to prevent a forced transition to electric appliances. Please contact your elected officials and tell them we must have full accountability before a mandated transition.

New York Energy Storage Roadmap – Cost Projections Part 2

On December 28, 2022, the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) and the New York State Department of Public Service (DPS) filed New York’s 6 GW Energy Storage Roadmap (Roadmap) to the Public Service Commission (PSC) for consideration.  I previously gave an overview of the Roadmap and looked at the way the costs were projected.  In this post I give my estimate of the costs.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 270 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

New York Energy Storage Plan

The NYSERDA Energy Storage in New York web page gives an overview of New York’s plan:

In 2019, New York passed the nation-leading Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act), which codified some of the most aggressive energy and climate goals in the country.

6,000 MW of Solar by 2025

70% Renewable Energy by 2030

9,000 MW of Offshore Wind by 2035

100% Carbon-free Electricity by 2040

85% Reduction in GHG Emissions from 1990 levels by 2050

3,000 MW of Energy Storage by 2030, further increased to 6,000 MW of Energy Storage by 2030 by Governor Kathy Hochul

In my previous post I pointed out that the press release for the Roadmap claimed that “the roadmap will support a buildout of storage deployments estimated to reduce projected future statewide electric system costs by nearly $2 billion”.  The state’s modeling predicts that it will cost $0.46 per month per electricity bill and the trade press has jumped on that cost as less than the cost of a slice of pizza.

I showed that Roadmap costs are misleadingly presented relative to incremental revenues: “For the proposed bulk storage procurement program, program costs are calculated as the incremental revenue, on top of revenue that storage assets can realize through commercial operation in the existing energy markets, that would allow such assets to reach their cost of capital.”  If the state were to be open and transparent, the total expected capital costs, the revenue costs, and how they expect energy storage to get paid would be presented so that readers could understand the incremental revenue.  I have come to believe that the obfuscation of the actual costs is deliberate because the numbers are so large that the public backlash would be immense.

Cost Estimates

I have written in the past that every aspect of the net-zero transition that I have evaluated has turned out to be more complicated, uncertain, and nuanced than has been portrayed by the proponents of net-zero transitions.  This calculation is no different.  On the face of it you just figure out the capacity (MW) needed or the energy generation (MWh) needed and the multiply those values by a published cost estimate. 

I am not going to discuss all the ambiguities I tried to reconcile but will give an example of one.  In order to estimate the electric resources needed to power the zero-emissions electric grid in 2040 sophisticated modeling is required.  The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultant provided that evaluation for the Scoping Plan for the net-zero transition plan required by New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).   The New York Independent System Operator did modeling for its 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook evaluation.  I looked at five of the scenarios they modeled: NYISO Outlook Scenario 1: Industry data and forecasts, NYISO Outlook Scenario 2: Assumptions aligned with Integration Analysis, Integration Analysis Scenario 2: Strategic Use of Low-Carbon Fuels, Integration Analysis Scenario 3: Accelerated Transition from Combustion, Integration Analysis Scenario 4: Beyond 85% Reduction

There are substantial differences in the methodology used for the energy storage estimates between the two approaches.  Table 1 lists the capacity (MW) and generation (GWhr) projections for the present and 2040 for the five scenarios.  Note that the storage capacity estimates are roughly the same but the generation estimates are different.  The NYISO generation is at least 13,414 GWhr in 2040 but the Integration Analsis generation is negative, so the methodologies are different.  Energy storage generation can represent two different things: the amount of electricity stored say over a year or the amount of electricity that can be stored all at once, the storage capacity.

Table 1: NYISO Outlook Study Scenarios and Integration Analysis Mitigation Scenarios

I believe that both analyses use total stored electricity for their energy storage estimates.  David Wojick recently used the storage capacity approach to estimate energy storage costs.  His approach simply takes:

  • a reasonable period of no wind and solar, say 3 days or 72 hours, and
  • a reasonable average demand on renewables over that period, say 35,000 MW, and
  • multiply them to get 2,520,000 MWh of required storage
  • which at $700,000 per MWh equals $1,764,000,000,000

Given the issues with the energy storage generation different interpretation, I chose to use Energy Information Administration overnight capital costs (2021$/kW) in the comments I submitted on the Draft Scoping Plan to make a cost estimate.  This approach does not include operating and maintenance (O&M) costs, the expected lifetime of the energy storage devices, and how the lifetime would vary depending on how it is used.  My estimate of the overnight cost to develop the resources needed to transition to a zero-emissions electric system in 2040 are generally consistent with the Scoping Plan Appendix G Figure 48 net present value of system expenditures.  Table 2 lists those costs for all five scenarios.  This approach estimates a cost three orders of magnitude less than the costs projected by Wojick.  The big difference is that both NYISO and NYSERDA include a zero-carbon firm resource or dispatchable emissions-free resource (DEFR) that can satisfy the need for extended periods of high load and low renewable energy resource availability thereby reducing the energy storage needed.

The NYISO 2021-2040 System Resource Outlook explained that to achieve a zero-emissions grid, DEFRs must be developed and deployed throughout New York.  The following Figure 38 from the Roadmap illustrates the problem.  The difference between cost estimates emphasizes why this resource is needed.  The ultimate problem of any electric system that relies on intermittent wind and solar is that there are periods when they are not available.  It turns out that the weather systems that cause light winds are large and affect all of New York at the same time and solar resources are lower in the winter when days are short and the sun is lower in the sky.  In other words, all the renewable resources in the state can go very low at the same time.  Just figuring out what the worst case of renewable resource availability is a major problem and both modeling groups agree that something besides batteries is needed.  The Outlook noted that “While essential to the grid of the future, such DEFR technologies are not commercially viable today” and went on to point that research and development efforts are needed to identify the most efficient and cost-effective technologies that can be deployed.  Needless to say, it is risky to depend on a resource that is not currently commercially viable that makes such a difference between costs.

Discussion

The Hochul Administration claims that “the roadmap will support a buildout of storage deployments estimated to reduce projected future statewide electric system costs by nearly $2 billion”.  The key point is that nowhere does the Roadmap document total costs. The fair question is what are the projected future statewide electric system costs?  Moreover, I showed previously that Roadmap costs are presented relative to incremental revenues: “For the proposed bulk storage procurement program, program costs are calculated as the incremental revenue, on top of revenue that storage assets can realize through commercial operation in the existing energy markets, that would allow such assets to reach their cost of capital.”  It is impossible to check the validity of that statement without full disclosure of all these cost components.

This analysis compares future statewide electric system costs for energy storage.  The simplest approach estimates that energy storage necessary to provide electricity when wind and solar resources are unavailable could be as much as $1.7 trillion.  NYISO and NYSERDA used more sophisticated analyses to refine how much backup was needed.  The overnight capital costs for the batteries, and only the batteries, for five different scenarios ranges from $13 to $15 billion.  There are a host of other factors that could raise those estimates.  The approach used by NYSERDA and NYISO relies on DEFR technologies that increase the cost to provide backup when wind and solar resources are unavailable totals between billion $187 and $349 billion but provide massive savings relative to any approach that does not include that kind of resource.  It is clear that whatever approach is used, that the Hochul Administration claim of “savings” of $2 billion is insignificant relative to the total costs which are at least two orders of magnitude larger.

Conclusion

The Roadmap has been presented to the Citizens of New York as a sales spiel.  The public heard that the costs of energy storage were only $2 billion and that the cost to ratepayers would be less than the cost of a slice of pizza.  The costs that ratepayers will ultimately pay is much, much higher.  The shell game manipulation of costs demonstrates that the Hochul Administration goal is hide the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars under so many different programs and subsidies to make it intentionally impossible to capture the total costs to consumers.  The true “Total Cost” of the Climate Act will be hidden forever from the public by design. 

My thanks to David Wojick for his review and comments.  Any errors in this analysis are my responsibility.

New York Energy Storage Roadmap – Cost Projections

On December 28, 2022, the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) and the New York State Department of Public Service (DPS) filed New York’s 6 GW Energy Storage Roadmap to the Public Service Commission (PSC) for consideration.  This post gives an overview of the roadmap and an initial assessment of the cost assessment methodology.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

New York Energy Storage Plan

The NYSERDA Energy Storage in New York web page gives an overview of New York’s plan:

In 2019, New York passed the nation-leading Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act), which codified some of the most aggressive energy and climate goals in the country.

  • 6,000 MW of Solar by 2025
  • 70% Renewable Energy by 2030
  • 9,000 MW of Offshore Wind by 2035
  • 100% Carbon-free Electricity by 2040
  • 85% Reduction in GHG Emissions from 1990 levels by 2050
  • 3,000 MW of Energy Storage by 2030, further increased to 6,000 MW of Energy Storage by 2030 by Governor Kathy Hochul

Energy storage will play a crucial role in meeting our State’s ambitious goals. Storage will help to integrate clean energy into the grid, reduce costs associated with meeting peak electric demands, and increase efficiency. Additionally, energy storage can stabilize supply during peak electric usage and help keep critical systems online during an outage.

The Roadmap proposes a comprehensive set of recommendations to expand New York’s energy storage programs to cost-effectively unlock the rapid growth of renewable energy across the State and bolster grid reliability and customer resilience. If approved, the Roadmap will support a buildout of storage deployments estimated to reduce projected future statewide electric system costs by nearly $2 billion, in addition to further benefits in the form of improved public health as a result of reduced exposure to harmful fossil fuel pollutants.

The Roadmap proposes the implementation of NYSERDA-led programs towards procuring an additional 4.7 GW of new storage projects across the bulk (large-scale), retail (community, commercial and industrial), and residential energy storage sectors in New York State. These future procurements, combined with the existing energy storage already under contract with the State and moving towards commercial operation, will allow the State to achieve the 6 GW goal by 2030.

Keep in mind that New York’s net-zero by 2050 plan is and always has been a political initiative developed by a small group and foisted upon the state by the emotion-driven innumerates of the New York Legislature.  Accordingly, the release of the Energy Storage roadmap warranted a press release from the Governor:

Governor Kathy Hochul today announced a new framework for the State to achieve a nation-leading six gigawatts of energy storage by 2030, which represents at least 20 percent of the peak electricity load of New York State. The roadmap, submitted by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority and the New York State Department of Public Service to the Public Service Commission for consideration, proposes a comprehensive set of recommendations to expand New York’s energy storage programs to cost-effectively unlock the rapid growth of renewable energy across the state and bolster grid reliability and customer resilience. If approved, the roadmap will support a buildout of storage deployments estimated to reduce projected future statewide electric system costs by nearly $2 billion, in addition to further benefits in the form of improved public health because of reduced exposure to harmful fossil fuel pollutants. Today’s announcement supports the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act goals to generate 70 percent of the state’s electricity from renewable sources by 2030 and 100 percent zero-emission electricity by 2040.

One phrase in this paragraph is the reason I wrote this post. It says “the roadmap will support a buildout of storage deployments estimated to reduce projected future statewide electric system costs by nearly $2 billion”.  I will show that what it really means is that we think we can claim that the costs will be nearly $2 billion dollars less than the astronomical total cost that we don’t admit to the public because it won’t reflect well on the narrative of the state’s Climate Act.

Chapter 3: Role of Storage Targets

New York’s 6 GW Energy Storage Roadmap (Roadmap) explains that “energy storage has the potential to play a critical role in supporting a deeply decarbonized New York electricity grid, through its ability to integrate large quantities of variable renewable energy and provide reliable capacity to meet growing peak demand”.  

The document describes the role of energy storage.  Note that the emphasis is on short-term storage for intra-day requirements for the 6 GW by 2030 target.

Figure 5 illustrates the role of energy storage in shifting generation to meet load, based on Roadmap analysis of the New York electricity system under portfolios consistent with the Climate Act. On days with excess solar, the modeled battery storage system charges from excess solar power concentrated in the middle of the day. Battery storage then helps the system to maintain reliability in events when load is high, and overnight when wind generation is low. Alternately, on low renewable output days, storage can charge from other resources, including imports, and reduce the need for more expensive firm resources.

Figure 5. Energy Value: Storage Dispatch in Modeled Analysis of the New York Electric System in 2040

The Roadmap document claims that it is appropriate to increase the energy storage deployment target of 3 GW by 2030 to 6 GW.  It states:

The analysis performed for this Roadmap (see Section A.1 in Appendix A) estimates that deployment of 6 GW of storage by 2030 will yield an estimated $1.94 billion (net present value) in net societal benefits to New York, due to increased delivery of renewable energy and reduced reliance on other more expensive firm capacity resources. These benefits reflect the value of avoided electricity system expenditures. Further societal benefits, not quantified here, would include improved air quality in communities impacted by fossil generation.

Furthermore, the analysis highlights the opportunity to leverage federal incentives to build out most of the expected 2040 storage deployments earlier, given that these credits could phase down as early as 2032. This Roadmap analysis finds that nearly all the 12 GW of storage chosen in the modeling is deployed by 2035, to meet system needs and maximize cost-effectiveness by capturing the federal Investment Tax Credit. Figure 6 illustrates these analytical findings, indicating that the projected 2040 quantity of 12 GW could be fully deployed as early as 2035 in order to maximize this opportunity. This context underscores the importance of an increased 2030 target of 6 GW in order to position New York to pursue such an accelerated opportunity.

Figure 6. Statewide Battery Storage Capacity Targets and Storage Deployment to Meet System Needs

Appendix A Storage Capacity Expansion Analysis

Appendix A documents the analysis conducted for the Roadmap.  It turns out that the analysis is basically the 2022 updated Integration Analysis for the revisions to the Scoping Plan.  The Appendix summarizes the approach but often refers to the Appendix G Scoping Plan documentation for specifics.  My experience with that reference information is that it is not nearly as comprehensive as implied by this document.

NYSERDA relies on Energy and Environmental Economics (E3) for the modeling analyses that provide the basis for the Roadmap.  E3 has a capacity expansion model, RESOLVE, and loss of load probability model, RECAP.  RESOLVE “optimizes long-term generation and transmission investments subject to reliability, technical, and policy constraints.”  RECAP performs “loss-of-load probability simulations to determine the reliability of resource portfolios and the contribution from each resource within it.”   The models “develop least-cost electricity generation portfolios that achieved New York’s Climate Act goals with the new 6 GW storage by 2030 target and meet New York’s long term energy needs.”  However, note that these models simplify the New York generating system so they do not do as good a job projecting the future system as the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) models.

The E3 modeling for the Integration Analysis was used to estimate loads and costs starting in 2020.  That means that it is possible to check the model predictions against observations.  The Roadmap states: “Current costs are about 10% higher than those assumed in the 2018 Storage Roadmap and about 40% higher than that assumed in the 2021 Integration Analysis”.  In my opinion a 40% difference in cost over a few years does not lend any credibility to costs out to 2050.

The Roadmap notes reasons for the energy storage cost projection differences:

Over the past year, supply chain constraints, material price increases, and increased competition for battery cells have driven up the cost of energy storage technologies, particularly lithium-ion batteries. Many of the drivers of cost increases are expected to persist until at least 2025. These cost increases may impact the cost of any new programs designed to procure storage to be installed by 2030. In addition to cost increases, difficulties in the timely completion of interconnection processes, high interconnection costs, and downward pressure on capacity revenue create a challenging environment through the development and operational lifecycle of a storage project. Financial support will therefore be crucial for the state to achieve the 3 GW and 6 GW deployment goals.

One of my major concerns with the Scoping Plan projections was the overly optimistic projections of energy cost reductions which I believe were used to claim lower costs of the net-zero transition.  Despite the failure to project current costs in the 2021 Integration Analysis, the Roadmap doubles down saying that “Cost declines are assumed to begin in 2025 as manufacturing capacity expands, and benefits of scale and innovation are realized”.  The document does not explain why the concerns noted above are going to turn around so quickly or, for that matter, why given global competition for the same rare earth metals necessary for the energy storage won’t see those conditions persist for many years.

Appendix B: Storage Program Cost Analysis

This Appendix “summarizes the inputs, assumptions, and analysis methodology underpinning the estimates of incremental program costs associated with achieving the proposed 2030 target of 6 GW of short-duration storage”.   The Roadmap states:

The total cost of these proposed procurement programs is estimated at between $1.0 billion and $1.7 billion. This equates to an estimated increase in customer electric bills of 0.32% – 0.54% (or $0.34 – $0.58 per month for the average residential customer) on average across New York for the 22-year period during which these programs would make payments to awarded projects. The range of these projections reflects future uncertainties, most notably those associated with energy and capacity prices.

The way this is written it suggests that the energy storage costs will be manageable because it will only be at most $0.58 per month.  However, Appendix B states:

For the proposed bulk storage procurement program, program costs are calculated as the incremental revenue, on top of revenue that storage assets can realize through commercial operation in the existing energy markets, that would allow such assets to reach their cost of capital. This methodology is broadly consistent with that applied to cost studies under the Clean Energy Standard.66 Key assumptions and inputs include the costs of storage projects, the estimates of market revenue available to them, available federal incentives and the cost of capital.

This approach is disingenuous at best.  They are not providing all the program costs only the costs above what they think an energy storage owner will have above the expected “incremental” revenue.  That incremental revenue has to be paid by someone and that someone is the ratepayers of the state.  As I understand it the “incremental revenues” are composed of at least the subsidies that are being proposed for energy storage that are like renewable energy credits.  Those subsidies are not paid for in the NYISO’s wholesale energy market but are buried in utility rate cases.  Moreover, it is not clear if the Roadmap includes energy storage specific wholesale energy market payments as other “incremental” revenue.  In any event, the insinuation that the energy storage cost is only going to be “between $1.0 billion and $1.7 billion” is clearly misleading and inaccurate.

Conclusion

There is a lot to unpack in the Roadmap and I will follow up with future posts.  Even at first glance there are issues.  Not only does the study rely on the poorly documented Integration Analysis as its basis but it also replicates its shell game con for hiding the true costs.  In the Scoping Plan costs are compared to a Reference Case that includes already “incremented programs” and in this Roadmap costs are presented relative to “incremental revenues”.  In both instances the result is a deceptive cost estimate that does not include all the costs for the citizens of New York.

It gets worse.  The continued increase in subsidized resources in the NYISO’s wholesale energy market will on average suppress market prices which will result in the need for larger subsidies to make renewable developments viable.  Gresham’s Law of Green Energy is named after Sir Thomas Gresham, a 16th-century British financier who observed that “bad money drives out the good.”. In this context  subsidized renewable resources will drive out competitive generators, lead to higher electric prices, reduce economic growth, and likely lead to the need to subsidize competitive generators who provide critical resources but are no longer viable.  Finally, keep in mind that almost all project development costs are funded through NYSERDA non-recourse loans. In open capital markets that is the most expensive money there is to finance. 

The Roadmap claims “the roadmap will support a buildout of storage deployments estimated to reduce projected future statewide electric system costs by nearly $2 billion”.  The only reductions are relative to very high projected costs.  It appears that the Hochul Administration goal is hide the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars under hundreds of programs and subsidies making it intentionally impossible to capture the total costs to consumers.  The true “Total Cost” of the Climate Act will be hidden forever from the public by design. 

New York’s Climate Act Scoping Plan Process Template

This post was first published at Watts Up With That.

The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) Scoping Plan framework for the net-zero by 2050 transition plan has been under development for the last two years.  A meeting of the Climate Action Council to vote on the Draft Final New York State Climate Action Council Scoping Plan

will be held on Monday, December 19, 2022, at 1:00 p.m.  This post describes my overview impression of the process and the likely outcome of the vote.  I think it is relevant outside of New York because it gives a template for implementing a net-zero transition program.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will outline how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric grid with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040.  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies.  That material was used by staff from various State agencies to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council is required to finalize the Scoping Plan by the end of the 2022 so this meeting will meet that requirement.  If anyone has a masochistic desire to view the meeting, details are available at the Climate Act meetings and events page.

Legislation enacting net-zero targets by 2050 are political ploys catering to specific constituencies.  The prime narrative of the Climate Act is featured on their web page:

Our Future is at stake and that’s why New York State is committed to the most aggressive clean energy and climate plan in the country. Each of us has a role in protecting our communities and ensuring a sustainable future for every New Yorker. If we each do our part, we’ll lower harmful emissions in the air we breathe while transforming New York’s economy, creating new jobs, and building more resilient communities.

The authors of the Climate Act legislation believed that meeting the net-zero target was only a matter of political will.  I believe that any similar legislation will follow the script used in New York.  Despite the apparent objectivity of the implementation framework, it is just is a façade. The Climate Act established the Climate Action Council to direct the development of the Scoping Plan.  It consists of 22 members that were chosen by ideology not expertise.  There are 12 agency members: all appointed by the Governor, and 10 at-large members: two non-agency representatives appointed by the Governor, three representatives appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly, one representative appointed by the minority leader of the Assembly, three representatives appointed by the Temporary President of the Senate, and one representative appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.  Not surprisingly, the legislation passed when both the Senate and Assembly were controlled by the Democratic party so all but two Council members are slanted one way.  The upcoming vote on the Scoping Plan must pass by a super majority of 15 votes but it is purely a formality because of the makeup of the Council.  The only question is whether anyone will cast a symbolic “no” vote for approval.

Public Comments

Similar programs will make a big deal about public participation.  The Council has bragged about their stakeholder process noting that the comment period was longer than required.  The Climate Act public comment period covered six months and included eleven Public Hearings where 700 people spoke.  Approximately 35,000 comments were received but around 25,000 comments were “potentially the same or substantially similar”, i.e., form letters.  That left on the order of 10,000 unique comments.  It was obviously impossible for the Council members to read them all so agency staff had to read, categorize, and summarize all the comments. That filter certainly shaped the response to the comments because they got to pick and choose which comments received attention.

Agency staff presentations to the Council described themes of the comments with very little specificity.  There was clear bias in the theme presentations – anything inconsistent with the narrative was disparaged, downplayed, or ignored.  I recently noted that the Climate Action Council treatment of stakeholder comments basically ignored anything that conflicted with the narrative of the Climate Act.   I suspect that any similar program will also have a phony public participation process.

There is another problem I believe will be common with other initiatives.  The Council emphasis was on the language in the Draft Scoping Plan and not on any technical issues.  I spent an inordinate amount of time evaluating technical issues associated with the Integration Analysis this year and prepared a summary that described all my comments.  No comments associated with Integration Analysis technical methodology or errors were discussed at any of the Climate Action Council meetings and it is not clear that the Council members are even aware that specific integration analysis issues were raised.  I have no illusions that my comments were necessarily important but the fact that technical comments from organizations responsible for the New York electric grid were also ignored is beyond troubling. 

What’s Next

The political motivation for the Climate Act was we must do something to address the existential threat of climate change. In the political calculus the important thing was to establish a politically correct target and ignore implementation details.  In New York the biggest missing piece was how to fund all the necessary components of the net-zero transition.   When something similar comes to your state watch the bait and switch between supporting legislation that is subject to voter disapproval and agency regulation which is more or less at the whim of the Administration.

Next year the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) will promulgate enforceable regulations to ensure achievement of the Statewide GHG emission limits. The regulations will be based on the Scoping Plan framework. The Plan does not include a feasibility analysis so it is not clear how regulations can be promulgated when the implementation risks to reliability, affordability, and the environment are unknown.  When questions arose about those nasty little details came up at Council meetings the response by the leadership was that the Scoping Plan was just an outline and those issues would be addressed later.  I fully expect that when the regulations are discussed in the public consultatin process the nasty little details will be ignored because the Hochul Administration will say the Scoping Plan is a mandate of the legislation.  The circular argument can only end badly.

Conclusion

The New York Scoping Plan approval vote will be on December 19.  I predict that the vote will be overwhelmingly in favor of approving the Plan.  Each council member will be given the opportunity to make a statement when they vote.  I predict those statements will be laden with emotion and likely fact-free. I also predict that if the ideologues continue control the implementation process then  costs will sky rocket, that there will be a catastrophic blackout that causes death and destruction, and that blanketing the state with wind mills and solar panels will cause significant environmental harm. 

I will publish an update with the highlights of the meeting when they post the link to the meeting recording. 

Champlain Hudson Power Express Construction Begins

Richard Ellenbogen and I have been corresponding about Governor Hochul’s announcement that the Champlain Hudson Power Express transmission project has started construction. According to the press release this “accelerates progress to achieve New York’s goal of 70 percent of electricity statewide from renewable sources by 2030 on path to a zero-emission grid”. Unfortunately, Richard and I agree that there is more to the story than appears on the surface.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 250 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that it will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.”  The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the control strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. The Climate Action Council states that it will finalize the Scoping Plan by the end of the year.  I maintain that there are two underlying issues with the Climate Action Council approach for the transition plan: the Draft Scoping Plan does not include a feasibility analysis and the Council has not developed an implementation plan.

The ultimate problem for the future electric grid that is dependent upon wind and solar are weak when the load peaks in the winter because space heating is electrified.  Wind lulls can reduce wind resources for days and solar resources are inherently low availability because the days are shorter, the sun is lower in the sky, and areas downwind of the Great Lakes are obscured with lake-effect clouds. The experts responsible for electric system reliability at the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) and the New York State Reliability Council (NYSRC) both highlighted (here and here) the importance of Dispatchable Emissions-Free Resources (DEFR) to address future winter-time wind lulls in their Draft Scoping Plan comments.  The Draft Scoping Plan also includes DEFR as a necessary component of the future grid to address this problem.  I am particularly concerned that the Hochul Administration has not confronted the feasibility of DEFR.  What options are there, how likely are they to be available when needed to meet the schedule of the Climate Act and how much will they cost should be a priority but the Council has essentially ignored the challenge and has not responded to NYISO and NYSRC comments.  Furthermore, if an implementation plan was in place, it could encourage zero-emissions resources availability during future winter-time wind lulls, for example by discouraging utility-scale solar development where lake-effect snow is heavy.

Champlain Hudson Power Express

The Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) project is a 339-mile underground transmission line capable of bringing 1,250 MW from the Province of Quebec to Astoria Queens in New York City.  According to the press release it “accelerates progress to achieve New York’s goal of 70 percent of electricity statewide from renewable sources by 2030 on path to a zero-emission grid.  It also is touted as bringing zero-emissions hydro electricity from Hydro Quebec directly into New York City so it can displace fossil-fired generating units. 

I have published two previous articles about the project.  The first described the residential cost impacts of the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) contracts with H.Q. Energy Services (U.S.) Inc. (HQUS) for the CHPE project.  A year ago on November 30, 2021 Governor Hochul announced that the finalized contract for CHPE was awarded as part of the Tier 4 Clean Energy Standard that is intended to increase the penetration of renewable energy into New York City.  My focus was on Department of Public Service petition: “The costs of program payments for the purchase of Tier 4 Renewable Energy Credits from the projects are projected as $5.9 – $11.6 billion, equating to an estimated increase in customer electric bills of 2.1 – 4.1% (or $2.08 – $4.08 per month for the average residential customer) on average across the State for the 25-year period of the Tier 4 contracts.”  This is one of the few admissions of potential costs by the Hochul Administration.  I estimated that if those costs represent subsidies needed for all the Integration Analysis renewable resources that the annual ratepayer cost increase range would between $168 and $359 for the average residential customer. 

The second article described the comments submitted by Nuclear New York to the Department of Public Service on the Tier 4 contracts.  Their comments pointed out that the contract payment formula treats CHPE like baseload power sources but without actually getting baseload service:

Quebec and NYC often experience the same weather. Consequently, CHPE will deliver electricity during low or moderate demand periods. But Hydro Quebec will keep all power at home during grim winter weeks, such as on January 22 of this year: Exports to ISO-NE (the New England grid) were reduced to the contracted minimum, and, instead of exporting power to New York, Quebec needed to import power from New York. On really cold days in the Northeast, NYC will get no power via CHPE and will again rely on fossil-fueled “peaker plants”. Yes, CHPE will get paid little for their electricity in the wholesale market if they fail to serve NYC in times of most desperate need. However, New Yorkers are still going to pay plenty for the Renewable Energy Credits generated during “nice weather” hours.

The lack of an implementation plan directly relates to this problem.  As noted above the ultimate problem is getting as much zero-emissions electric energy as possible in order during the low renewable resource periods that are also expected to the highest load periods.  Without an implementation plan in place, New York State committed to paying CHPE for capacity that is not guaranteed when we need it the most. 

Implementation Issues

Three implementation issues concern me: the schedule, the costs, and jobs.

One of the most challenging aspects of the Climate Act is the schedule.  As part of their planning responsibilities the New York State Independent System Operator (NYISO) recently released the  2022 Reliability Needs Assessment (RNA) that highlighted this concern concluding “while there is not an immediate reliability need, changes in the economy, new generation technology, extreme weather and policy drivers are creating challenges for the future grid that may require actions to avoid interruptions in electric service.”  NYISO specifically referenced the CHPE project in the RNA findings:

The summer reliability margins improve in 2026 with the scheduled addition of the Champlain Hudson Power Express (CHPE) connection from Hydro Quebec to New York City but reduce through time as demand grows within New York City.  While CHPE will contribute to reliability in the summer, the facility is not obligated to provide any capacity in the winter. The NYISO is expected to be a winter peaking system in the next decade as vehicle fleets and buildings electrify.

While transmission security within New York City is maintained through the ten-year period in accordance with current design criteria, the margins are very tight and decrease to approximately 50 MW by 2025. With the addition of CHPE project in 2026, the margin improves but reduces to near 100 MW by 2032.

The reliability margins within New York City may not be sufficient even for expected weather if the CHPE project experiences a significant delay.

Richard Ellenbogen and I share this concern.  Richard described the project timeline.  The project was proposed in 2011 and the PSC authorized it on 4/18/13.  It has been 11.5 years since it was proposed, 9.5 years since it was authorized, and construction just started a year after the funding contract was signed.  The likelihood of additional delays seems high.

The Draft Scoping Plan does not include detailed control strategy costs but from what I have been able to ascertain, it is clear that the potential costs are minimized.   The record of this project reinforces my concerns.  Ellenbogen points out that the CHPE website has an entry from 11/1 noting that financing for the $6 billion project had been obtained but it was originally $2 billion when it was proposed ($2.65 billion in 2022 dollars). That cost is 2.3 times the original cost.  We agree that these projects are rarely ever completed on budget and with all the issues with supply chains and worldwide inflation I think this one will not be completed anywhere near the budgeted cost.

The Hochul press release said “the clean energy line is an example of how officials in the state are working to “confront climate change challenges and energy challenges together, in the meantime, creating great jobs for a cleaner, healthier New York.”  It is notable that the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority press release for the construction start announcement emphasized a “major project labor agreement”:

The construction of this green infrastructure project, which begins following the execution of a major union labor agreement between the developer and New York State Building and Construction Trades, is expected to bring $3.5 billion in economic benefits to New Yorkers while creating nearly 1,400 family-sustaining union jobs during construction.

I recently addressed the State’s Clean Energy Industry Report and its handling of these “great” jobs.  One point overlooked by Hochul is that while there may be “1,400 family-sustaining union jobs during construction” the number of permanent jobs is miniscule.  Furthermore, the project will provide 1,250 MW of power to New York City but this is a fraction of 2,000 MW of power lost due to the shutdown of Indian Point.  That shutdown meant the loss of over 1,000 permanent union jobs.  While this project may “confront climate change challenges and energy challenges together” it does not replace the loss of Indian Point that was more effective in that regard.

Conclusion

I agree that this line is needed to maintain New York’s electric grid reliability and that the start of construction is encouraging.  However, there are associated reliability and affordability feasibility concerns.  The latest NYISO RNA report emphasizes that there could be reliability problems if there are further delays to completion of this project.  The Climate Act transition plan schedule is ambitious and the Council has not considered a “Plan B” if there are unavoidable implementation delays for any of the components of the plan.  This project is expensive equating to an estimated increase in customer electric bills of 2.1 – 4.1% (or $2.08 – $4.08 per month for the average residential customer) for just one component of the total resources needed.  The Climate Action Council has not disclosed the total expected costs of the Integration Analysis transition plan or expected ratepayer impacts.

In addition to the feasibility issues this project exposes failures of the state’s lack of an implementation plan. The biggest challenge for the future zero-emissions electric grid is the winter-time lull when renewable resources are low.  This project is not obligated to provide any capacity during those periods.  Consequently, it is likely that more DEFR will be required. Unless the Hochul Administration comes to its senses and starts encouraging the development of the only scalable proven dispatchable emissions-free resource, nuclear power, this increases the risk that DEFR won’t be available as planned because the alternative technologies are speculative at this time.

Initial Impression of Climate Action Council Response to Public Comments on Transportation

The Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) has a legal mandate for New York State greenhouse gas emissions to meet the ambitious net-zero goal by 2050.  The comment period for the Draft Scoping Plan that outlines how to meet that goal recently ended.  The last two meetings of the Climate Action Council have offered some insights into the plans to address those comments.  I am not encouraged by what I have seen so far.

Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that they can afford to and not be unduly burdened by the effects of environmental policies.  I submitted comments on the Plan and have written extensively on implementation of New York’s response to that risk because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that this supposed cure will be worse than the disease.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  They were assisted by Advisory Panels who developed and presented strategies to the meet the goals to the Council.  Those strategies were used to develop the integration analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants that tried to quantify the impact of the strategies.  That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment at the end of 2021. Since the close of the public comment period in early July staff has been updating the Integration Analyses and working through the comments to provide the Council with summaries for their review.

In this article, I will describe the response to the Transportation sector comments relative to the comments I submitted on this sector.  I submitted two comments on electric vehicles.  I noted that the Integration Analysis is making assumptions about future zero-emissions transportation implementation strategies without providing adequate referenced documentation.  The other comment addressed electric vehicle costs.  I also submitted a comment on high-speed intercity passenger rail transportation that is relevant to the September 13, 2022 Climate Action Council Presentation that will be the focus of this article.

Transportation Comments Response

The discussion of Transportation Summary Themes at the September 13, 2022 Climate Action Council meeting included “Several commenters suggested investments in rail infrastructure, to connect cities and move freight”. 

The staff recommendations stated that few changes in response to public comments were needed.  Relative to the railroad theme they noted that: “Emphasize that improving intercity passenger rail service, including High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail transportation, and strengthening the freight rail system is an important component of New York State’s economic future and environmental sustainability.”

I submitted a comment on high-speed intercity passenger rail transportation that is ignored in this response.  The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), in cooperation with the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) completed the Empire Corridor Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in 2014 to “evaluate proposed system improvements to intercity passenger rail services along the 463-mile Empire Corridor, connecting Pennsylvania (Penn) Station in New York City with Niagara Falls Station in Niagara Falls, New York.” This is the primary reference for Draft Scoping Plan Scenario 4 high speed intercity passenger rail transportation upgrades.

I evaluated the transportation sector vehicle miles traveled difference between Scenarios 2 and 3 compared to Scenario 4 due to rail passenger improvements.  Note that this basically proposed the development of a dedicated high-speed rail corridor between Buffalo and Albany.  The Draft Scoping Plan claims that “Incremental reductions from enhanced in-state rail aligning with 125 MPH alternative detailed in Empire Corridor Tier 1 Draft EIS” will provide a reduction of 200 million light duty vehicle miles at a per unit cost of $6 per mile or $1.2 billion.  I estimated that the only valid cost for the difference between the rail alternatives is $8.4 billion and that it would only provide a vehicle mile reduction of 64.7 million miles. 

Discussion

There are multiple issues associated with the presentation response to comments.  At the previous meeting the State acknowledged that they had not worked their way through the comments submitted as attachments.  My comment was submitted as an attachment so it is possible that it has not even been reviewed yet.  In my opinion, the only way to make detailed comments is through an attachment so I think many of the substantive comments may not have been evaluated yet.

It is not clear whether this presentation was only meant to be an overview of the comments received.  Alternatively, it could represent the entirety of the discussion of the comments for each of the sectors (Transportation, Agriculture and Forestry, Land Use, Local Government, and Waste) discussed. My specific comment was not mentioned and it is not clear if this was because they have not reviewed it yet or whether it was inconvenient for them to respond.  If this is supposed to be the final word on the comments for each of these sectors then it is clear that the stakeholder public comment process is just window dressing and that no meaningful revisions will be incorporated.

At one point the Council promised to provide all the comments for public review.  Of course, the odds that the comments will be provided in format that enables it to be evaluated easily is another thing.  I believe all the comments should be available by topic in a searchable formatted document.

I believe my specific comment has to be addressed on two levels.  On the first level, I identified a problem with their numbers.  Shouldn’t they have to respond to that error?  While it might not rise to the level where an explicit Climate Action Council decision is needed, I do think the Council has to decide what level of high-speed intercity passenger rail transportation improvements they are recommending. The response to this topic at this meeting “Emphasize that improving intercity passenger rail service, including High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail transportation, and strengthening the freight rail system is an important component of New York State’s economic future and environmental sustainability” is just a bunch of words devoid of meaningful comment.

I also noticed a bias in the comment descriptions.  For example, “Generally, there was strong support for electrification policies in the draft plan” compared to “Some commenters expressed concern over the costs of electrification, particularly in rural communities and for larger vehicles” inappropriately indicates the rates the level of support based on numbers.  The value of a comment is the quality of the argument not the number of people who submitted the argument.  The statement “Several detailed comments supported the development of renewable and/or low-carbon fuels, while many commenters expressed opposition, describing such fuels as a ‘false solution’ “ is particularly problematic because it suggests that no matter how strong the technical argument, if enough ideologues using slogans oppose it that the Council is going to side with the slogans. 

Conclusion

I am not surprised that my comments were ignored.  However I am terrified that the Council may ignore the comments submitted by the New York Independent System Operator and the New York State Reliability Council.  There was no mention of any need to reconcile the Integration Analysis with the recent NYISO 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook report.  The projections are significantly different and the citizens of New York deserve to have them reconciled clearly and transparently.  It is entirely inappropriate for the state to be committed to go down a transformational energy policy path based on the work of unelected bureaucrats who are not responsible for keeping the lights on without incorporating the input of the state’s experts who are responsible.

The Latest from the Experts on New York’s Climate Act Implementation

This article was first published at Watts Up With That

I have published two previous articles about New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) analyses related to New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act).  This post describes what I believe is an important new analysis of the future of New York’s electric system.

New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) Act establishes a “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act.  Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that efforts will make a positive impact at an affordable level.  My analysis of the Climate Act shows that the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that the transition to an electric system relying on wind and solar will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The implementation plan for New York’s Climate Act “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 is underway.  The Climate Action Council has been working to develop plans to implement the Act.  Over the summer of 2021 the New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultant Energy + Environmental Economics (E3) prepared an Integration Analysis to “estimate the economy-wide benefits, costs, and GHG emissions reductions associated with pathways that achieve the Climate Act GHG emission limits and carbon neutrality goal”.  Integration Analysis implementation strategies were incorporated into the Draft Scoping Plan when it was released at the end of 2021.  Since the end of the public comment period in early July 2022 the Climate Action Council has been addressing the comments received as part of the development of the Final Scoping Plan that is supposed to provide a guide for the net-zero transition.

Unfortunately, the Climate Action Council has not confronted reliability issues raised by New York agencies responsible for keeping the lights on.  The first post (New York Climate Act: Is Anyone Listening to the Experts?) described the NYISO 2021-2030 Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP) report (appendices) released late last year.  The difficulties raised in the report are so large that I raised the question whether any leader in New York was listening to this expert opinion.  The second post (New York Climate Act: What the Experts are Saying Now) highlighted results shown in a draft presentation for the 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook that all but admitted meeting the net-zero goals of the Climate Act are impossible on the mandated schedule.  This article describes the “For discussion purposes only” draft of the 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook report described in the previous article.  While there may be minor changes to the document itself, I am comfortable saying that the major findings will not change substantively.

System and Resource Outlook Summary

The Executive Summary makes the point that the Climate Act is driving changes to the generating system, the transmission grid and the demand landscape.  As a result, this “leads to re-thinking how and where electric supply and storage resources evolve, and how to efficiently enable their adoption to achieve energy policy targets”.  The summary goes on to note:

This 2021 – 2040 System & Resource Outlook (the Outlook), conducted by the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) in collaboration with stakeholders and state agencies, provides a comprehensive overview of potential resource development over the next 20 years in New York and highlights opportunities for transmission investment driven by economics and public policy in New York State. The Outlook together with the NYISO’s 2021-2030 Comprehensive Reliability Plan (CRP) represent the marquee planning reports that provide a full New York power system outlook to stakeholders, developers, and policymakers.

The Outlook examines a wide range of potential future system conditions and enables comparisons between possible pathways to an increasingly greener resource mix. By simulating several different possible future system configurations and forecasting the transmission constraints for each, the NYISO:

  • Projected possible resource mixes that achieve New York’s public policy goals while maintaining grid reliability;
  • Identified regions of New York where renewable or other resources may be unable to generate at their full capability due to transmission constraints;
  • Quantified the extent to which these transmission constraints limit delivery of renewable energy to consumers, and;
  • Identified potential opportunities for transmission investment that may provide economic, policy, and/or operational benefits.

There are many potential paths and combinations of resource and transmission builds to achieving New York’s climate change requirements. As the current power system continues to evolve, evaluating a multitude of expansion scenarios will facilitate identification of common and unique challenges to achieving the electric system mandates New York State has set for 2030 and 2040. A thorough understanding of these challenges will help build a path for investors and policymakers to achieve a greener and reliable future grid efficiently and cost effectively. Through this Outlook several key findings were brought to light:

Four potential futures are evaluated to best understand the challenges ahead. A Baseline Case evaluates a future with little change from today. A Contract Case includes approximately 9,500 MW of renewable capacity procured by the state and evaluates the impact of those projects. Finally, a Policy Case postulates and examines two separate future scenarios that meet New York policy mandates.

Energy planning analyses such as this work normally evaluate different scenarios of the future by comparing them to a business-as-usual scenario.  In this instance the business-as-usual scenario does not include any of New York’s climate initiatives.  On the other hand, Climate Act Draft Scoping Plan analyses were perverted to “prove” the desired conclusion that the benefits were greater than the costs by comparing future scenarios against a reference scenario.  The Integration Analysis used a semantic trick to claim that some de-carbonization costs (such as de-carbonizing transportation costs) necessary to meet Climate Act targets did not have to be included in the comparison scenario because the electric vehicle conversion legislation was already “implemented”.  That approach took legitimate implementation costs out of the projections.  Of course, this also makes comparison of the NYISO work relative to the Draft Scoping Plan problematic.

The second estimate of the future in the Resource Outlook considered only those projects currently under contract:

Through an annual request for proposals, NYSERDA solicits bids from eligible new large-scale renewable resources and procures Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) and Offshore Renewable Energy Certificates (ORECs) from these facilities. This Outlook included approximately 9,500 MW of new contracted renewable resources, including 4,262 MW of solar, 899 MW of land-based wind, and 4,316 MW of offshore wind. The addition of these resources to the existing system representation provides insights regarding their impact on system performance in the future.

The Outlook report noted the following Key Takeaways for the contracted renewables scenario:

The pace of renewable project development is unprecedented and requires an increase in the pace of transmission development. Every incremental advancement towards policy achievement matters on the path to a greener and reliable grid in the future, not just at the critical deadline years such as 2030 and 2040. In general, resource and transmission expansion take many years from development to deployment.

Coordination of project additions and retirements is essential to maintaining reliability and achieving policy. Coordination of renewable energy additions, commercialization and development of dispatchable technologies, fossil fuel plant operation, and staged fossil fuel plant deactivations over the next 18 years will be essential to facilitate an orderly transition of the grid.

Many more renewable resources have to be developed to meet the overall Climate Act net-zero goal by 2050 and the interim 2040 goal of “zero-emissions” electricity generation.  The NYISO analysis looked at two Policy Case scenarios that meet those targets:

Scenario 1 utilizes industry data and NYISO load forecasts, representing a future with high demand (57,144 MW winter peak and 208,679 GWh energy demand in 2040) and assumes less restrictions in renewable generation buildout options.

Scenario 2 utilizes various assumptions consistent with the Climate Action Council Integration Analysis and represents a future with a moderate peak but a higher overall energy demand (42,301 MW winter peak and 235,731 GWh energy demand in 2040).

Both scenarios project a blend of land-based wind, offshore wind, utility-scale solar, behind-the-meter solar, and energy storage will be needed to meet the CLCPA policy mandates through 2035. There are significant differences between these scenarios and the equivalent Draft Scoping Plan mitigation scenarios.  One of the big differences is the magnitude of a new generating resource called “dispatchable emission-free resources” (DEFRs):

These resources represent a proxy technology that will meet the flexibility and emissions-free energy needs of the future system but are not yet mature technologies that are commercially available (some examples include hydrogen, renewable natural gas, and small modular nuclear reactors). As more wind, solar, and storage plants are added to the grid, dispatchable emission-free resources must be added to the system to meet the minimum statewide and locational resource requirements for serving system demand when intermittent generation is unavailable.

The report warns:

Both scenarios include significant DEFR capacity by 2035, but it is important to note that the lead time necessary for development, permitting, and construction of DEFR power plants will require action much sooner if this timeline is to be achieved.

As part of the analysis the NYISO considered what would be needed if the DEFR capacity is not developed. They found that “The exclusion of DEFRs as a new technology option, while enforcing the retirement of fossil generators via the zero-emission by 2040 policy, exhausts the amount of land-based wind built and results in the replacement of 45 GW of DEFR capacity in Scenario 1 with 30 GW of offshore wind and 40 GW of energy storage.”  They also noted that the alternative did not address ancillary service requirements needed for the transmission system.

The Outlook report noted the following Key Takeaways for the Policy Case Scenarios:

Significant new resource development will be required to achieve CLCPA energy targets. The total installed generation capacity to meet policy objectives within New York is projected to range between 111 GW and 124 GW by 2040. At least 95 GW of this capacity will consist of new generation projects and/or modifications to existing plants. Even with these additions, New York still may not be sufficient to fully meet CLCPA compliance criteria and maintain the reliable electricity supply on which New York consumers rely. The sheer scale of resources needed to satisfy system reliability and policy requirements within the next 20 years is unprecedented.

To achieve an emission-free grid, dispatchable emission-free resources (DEFRs) must be developed and deployed throughout New York. DEFRs that provide sustained on-demand power and system stability will be essential to meeting policy objectives while maintaining a reliable electric grid. While essential to the grid of the future, such DEFR technologies are not commercially viable today. DEFRs will require committed public and private investment in research and development efforts to identify the most efficient and cost-effective technologies with a view towards the development and eventual adoption of commercially viable resources. The development and construction lead times necessary for these technologies may extend beyond policy target dates.

As the energy policies in neighboring regions evolve, New York’s imports and exports of energy could vary significantly due to the resulting changes in neighboring grids. New York is fortunate to have strong interconnections with neighboring regions and has enjoyed reliability and economic benefits from such connections. The availability of energy for interchange is predicted to shift fundamentally as policy achievement progresses. Balancing the need to serve demand reliably while achieving New York’s emission-free target will require continuous monitoring and collaboration with our neighboring states.

The important findings in the report led to the following recommendations:

Future uncertainty is the only thing certain about the electric power industry. From policy advancements to new dispatchable emissions-free resource technology innovation and ultimate development, the system is set to change at a rapid pace. Situational awareness of system changes and continuous assessment are critical to ensure a reliable and lower-emissions grid for New York. The Economic Planning databases and models will be continually updated with new information and the Outlook study will be improved and performed on a biennial basis.

To meet the minimum capacity requirement in 2040, at least 95 GW of new emission-free resources, including approximately 9.5 GW of new renewable resources, will be required to come on-line. Furthermore, to fully achieve the emission-free grid target by 2040, even more resources will likely be needed along with transmission to deliver the clean power to consumers. The scope of the additional renewable resource need is both substantial and unprecedented. Compared to the 2.6 GW capacity entering service in the past five years while New York experienced a net loss of approximately 2.2 GW, the installation rate in the next 20 years must increase significantly to achieve state law climate change requirements. State agencies should consider releasing a more detailed procurement schedule for renewable resources to guide the long-term system planning and provide clarity to the market.

Discussion

I noted earlier that I was comfortable saying that the major findings in this draft report will not change substantively when it is finalized.  I base that mostly on the fact that the NYISO Market Marketing Unit has reviewed the draft.  As part of their market monitoring responsibilities Potomac Electricreviewed the document relative to implications to New York’s de-regulated electric markets.  If you are interested in that particular aspect of electric system planning, I suggest checking out the memo.  For the rest of us, I only note that they state: “The 2021 Outlook is a major improvement to NYISO’s previous planning studies and provides important insights on the potential impacts of state policies on the NYISO system.”

More importantly, what about the Climate Action Council?  Unfortunately, as I pointed out before the Climate Action Council has not confronted reliability issues raised by New York agencies responsible for keeping the lights on.  In a series of meetings over the next couple of months the Council will have to address the Draft Scoping Plan comments made by the NYISO and the New York State Reliability Council that raised reliability concerns.  I hope. without any supporting evidence, that the Integration Analysis team is working with the NYISO planning staff to reconcile the differences between this analysis and theirs.

In the meantime, there are vocal members of the Climate Action Council that deny the existence of any implementation issues associated with a renewable energy resource dependent electric system.  At the May 26, 2022 Climate Action Council meeting Council members described their impressions of comments made at the public hearings.  I have prepared an overview summary of all the comments made during the Update on Public Hearings and Comments agenda item and wrote an article highlighting relevant comments.  In this regard, Paul Shepson Dean, School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences at Stony Brook University talked about mis-representation at 23:39 of the recording:

Mis-representation I see as on-going.  One of you mentioned the word reliability.  I think the word reliability is very intentionally presented as a way of expressing the improper idea that renewable energy will not be reliable.  I don’t accept that will be the case.  In fact, it cannot be the case for the CLCPA that installation of renewable energy, the conversion to renewable energy, will be unreliable.  It cannot be.

Robert Howarth, Professor, Ecology and Environmental Biology at Cornell (starting at 32:52 of the recording) picked up on that theme.  He said that fear and confusion is based on mis-information but we have information to counter that and help ease the fears.  He stated that he thought reliability is one of those issues: “Clearly one can run a 100% renewable grid with reliability”.   Obviously, these views are at odds with this report.

There is one other point.  In addition to the reliability concerns of the net-zero transition I am very concerned about affordability.  The Draft Scoping Plan has avoided any mention of ratepayer impacts to date.  The NYISO projection methodology has that information because it is inherent in the models. It is a shame that it is not being reported.

Conclusion

This is an important report for New York but I also believe that there are ramifications for other net zero transition programs.  These findings must be reconciled with the Draft Scoping Plan projections for the future generating system.  The leadership of the Climate Action has repeatedly punted the responsibility for a feasibility study down the road as somebody else’s problem. This report highlights multiple feasibility concerns that must be addressed to have any hope of this working.  I believe that it shows that implementation on the schedule proposed will prove impossible.  The report also highlights the need for implementation planning.  Currently there is no plan for siting renewable resources where they are needed for the future system and this shows that it must be done.

With respect to other net-zero transition programs I think the discussion and implications of the dispatchable emissions-free resource are of interest.  The analysis shows that in order to minimize the storage and renewable over-build requirements this resource could be a better choice.   However, the report notes that DEFRs such as hydrogen, renewable natural gas, and small modular nuclear reactors are not commercially viable today. “DEFRs will require committed public and private investment in research and development efforts to identify the most efficient and cost-effective technologies with a view towards the development and eventual adoption of commercially viable resources.”  There is that nasty planning and feasibility is necessary component again.

NYISO Offshore Wind Profile Development

The implementation plan for New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 is underway.  I think the biggest problem confronting any net-zero transition effort is matching variable wind and solar generation with load at all times.  This post describes an effort by the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) to address that problem for offshore wind resources.  It is a great start but needs to be expanded for other sources of renewable generation and for as long a period as possible.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act.  Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that efforts will make a positive impact at an affordable cost.  Based on my analysis of the Climate Act I don’t think that will be the case as proposed.  I believe that the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that the transition to an electric system relying on wind and solar will do more harm than good.  I am a retired meteorologist who started working for Niagara Mohawk in 1981 and have continued to work in the New York electric generating industry continuously since then.  Over that time, I have been involved in many energy planning activities that included meteorological components. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act established the Climate Action Council who is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  They were assisted by Advisory Panels who developed and presented strategies to meet the goals.  Those strategies were used to develop the Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants that quantified the impact of the strategies.  That analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021 and will be finalized in 2022. 

Renewable Resource Adequacy

I called the renewable resource adequacy problem the ultimate problem for the Climate Act as early as September 2020.  On August 2, 2021, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) held a Reliability Planning Speaker Session to describe New York’s reliability issues to the advisory panels and Climate Action Council.  All the speakers but one made the point that today’s renewable energy technology will not be adequate to maintain current reliability standards and that a “yet to be developed technology” will be needed.  A recent article by David Wojick at PA Pundits International titled Unreliability Makes Solar Power Impossibly Expensive does a great job describing how renewable resource availability affects reliability.  I adapted his work to New York to analyze the impact on the Draft Scoping Plan.

There are serious problems when extreme weather affects the grid.  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) report on the February 2021 cold weather outages in Texas and the South Central United States described the event, the impacts and made recommendations.  According to the report this event was the fourth cold-weather event in the last ten years to affect bulk electric system reliability.  Cold weather caused problems that required rolling blackouts to avoid system instability and even worse problems for the electric grid.  Given that the weather conditions that caused these problems occurred recently I am taken aback that resources were not devoted to preventing re-occurrence.  Among the many recommendations two are relevant: “improving near-term load forecasts for extreme weather conditions” and additional study of “potential effects of low-frequency events on generators in the Western and Eastern Interconnections”.

In order to address this renewable resource variability problem, it is necessary to determine the worst-case meteorological conditions affecting wind and solar availability.   As long as the NYISO and other agencies responsible for electric system reliability understand the worst-case renewable availability conditions they can plan to prevent low availability impacts.  I submitted comments on the Draft Scoping Plan’s treatment of wind and solar resource availability and concluded that it was inadequate in this regard. I recommended that the State undertake a more comprehensive analysis of wind and solar availability to serve as input for future reliability planning.  I have also been trying to get the NYISO and New York State Reliability Council to consider the recommendations I made for a comprehensive availability analysis.  So far, I have not had any success getting a response.

Offshore Wind Power Profile Study

Despite my personal lack of success I was encouraged that the NYISO started a project in July to address offshore wind profile development.  In particular, they plan to develop wind power estimates for the New York offshore wind development areas that will estimate resource availability for a 20-year period.  I am going to highlight some of the slides in the presentation by DNV describing their work for the NYISO ICAP/MIWG/PRLWG Meeting on September 07, 2022.  Note that all the slides are copyrighted to either NYISO or DNV and are labeled as draft for discussion purposes only.  I am including a couple of slides to show what should be done on a more comprehensive basis for the Final Scoping Plan.

In my opinion, the critical consideration is the frequency, duration, and severity of periods when wind and solar resources are in “droughts” or low resource availability.  I described several recent applicable papers in my comments describing analyses to estimate the frequency and duration of periods with those conditions.  In order to provide a robust estimate of the wind and solar availability during worst case conditions I believe it is necessary to analyze as long a time period of historical meteorological data as possible. Fortunately, meteorological reanalysis descriptive data generated by modern weather forecast models but using observed data from decades ago is available for this application. This is exactly what DNV is proposing to do.

The DNV project description slide explains that they will use the historical data to generate detailed wind maps using a weather forecast model.  This output is combined with their model that projects wind energy output as a function of wind speed.  They are going to model wind energy production for seven potential development areas off Long Island and New Jersey.

The weather model slide describes their approach.  They are going to use a forecast model that takes historical data and calculates wind speed and direction on an hourly basis.  The inputs for their modeling include not only the observed meteorological data but also surface characteristics and surface temperatures.  Note that the model inputs extend far beyond the offshore wind study area.

The presentation also includes slides on wind power modeling, wind turbine power curve output, and describes their validation analyses.  They also described four different aspects that cause reductions in power output in their analysis.  At some point I should compare their assumptions with those used in the Draft Scoping Plan.  In order to minimize wake effects DNV is proposing 1 nautical mile spacing which seems higher than I have noticed elsewhere.

Discussion

I think that this analysis is a great start.  I only have one concern relative to the scope of work.  As far as I could tell the meteorological input data is available back to 1980.  However, this project only goes back to 2000.  I think it would be better to evaluate the 1980 to 2000 data specifically looking for wind droughts.  I know there was a huge ozone episode in August 1988 that had to include very light winds.  I have no idea how that period compares to “normal” but we won’t know because this analysis does not cover that period. 

This analysis is entirely appropriate for the offshore wind resource.  However, it does not address the onshore wind and solar resources.  The same type of analysis has to be done for those resources covering not only the entire state but also the area where New York could expect to import power.   Ideally, the ERA5 global reanalysis data base that goes back to 1950 should be used in the analysis to find the worst-case conditions.  It is not necessary to determine the renewable power output over the entire period and region.  Once the worst cases are identified then a power output model can be applied to those periods to determine how the electric system can be setup to avoid bulk electric supply disruptions. 

It is my professional opinion that until this comprehensive renewable energy resource evaluation is completed that New York State will unnecessarily risk catastrophic blackouts.  Because the worst-case resource availability is associated with the coldest or hottest periods, the loads are highest and the need to prevent blackouts most acute.

Climate Act Avoided Cost of Gas Working Group

There is an immense amount of work that needs to be done to implement New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Climate Act) “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050.  It is very difficult to grasp all the different ways that this transition is going to affect all New Yorkers.  Despite the lack of a reliability and affordability feasibility analysis an army of government bureaucrats are developing transition plans to change our energy choices assuming that everything will work out.  This article talks about just one of those efforts.

I have written extensively on implementation of the Climate Act.  Everyone wants to do right by the environment to the extent that efforts will make a positive impact at an affordable dollar cost.  Based on my analysis of the Climate Act I don’t think that will be the case.  I believe that the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy outstrip available renewable technology such that the transition to an electric system relying on wind and solar will do more harm than good.  The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act established the Climate Action Council who is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that will “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda”.  They were assisted by Advisory Panels who developed and presented strategies to meet the goals.  Those strategies were used to develop the Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants that quantified the impact of the strategies.  That analysis was used to develop the Draft Scoping Plan that was released for public comment on December 30, 2021 and will be finalized in 2022.  At the same time this process is underway various state agencies are already implementing regulations for the transition.  The problem is that the Scoping Plan is just a guide and does not include a reliability feasibility analysis or any affordability specifics about the costs for the transition.  Couple that with the fact that many New Yorkers are unaware of the Climate Act much less its implications suggest to me that this that public blowback will be immense when the realization of what is required becomes obvious.

Gas Planning Procedures

In order to explain what is going on I will provide background information for this example.  The New York State Department of Public Service (DPS) Case 20-G-0131 – Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Gas Planning Procedures “seeks to establish planning and operational practices that best support customer needs and emissions objectives while minimizing infrastructure investments and ensuring the continuation of reliable, safe, and adequate service to existing customers.”  The Background for the order instituting the proceeding follows with my explanations:

Gas utilities in several regions of New York State have recently claimed supply constraints that may prevent them from accepting applications for new firm service. LDCs have invoked moratoria on new service connections in some locations, leading in some cases to customer hardships. In resolving the moratorium invoked by KEDNY and KEDLI, the Commission-adopted settlement requires those LDCs to develop a “Long-Term Capacity Report” to address the long-term capacity constraints affecting their operations.

This refers to gas utility load distribution company (LDC) issues.  A footnote to this section explains that:

On January 17, 2019, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Edison) notified the Commission of a moratorium on new firm gas service in most of Westchester county, commencing March 15, 2019. Beginning November 2018, The Brooklyn Union Gas Company d/b/a National Grid NY (KEDNY), serving Brooklyn and parts of Queens, and KeySpan Gas East Corporation d/b/a National Grid (KEDLI) (collectively, National Grid) began informing large applicants for new service that National Grid would be unable to provide firm service unless a pending supply project was approved. As of May 15, 2019, National Grid stated that it would not fulfill applications for new firm service connections, or requests for additional firm load from existing customers on Long Island, including Queens and Brooklyn. Based on a settlement adopted and approved by the Commission, National Grid ended its moratorium as of November 26, 2019. Case 19-G-0678, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to investigate Denials of Service by National Grid, Order Adopting and Approving Settlement (issued November 26, 2019); Case 19-G-0678, supra, Confirming Order (issued December 12, 2019). Additionally, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation (NYSEG) has declared a moratorium on new gas customer attachments in the Town of Lansing, in Tompkins County in February 2015.

In other words, there have been examples where people who want to hook up to natural gas have not been allowed to get service.  This is the crux of the gas transition problem.  The net-zero transition to natural gas alternatives means that at some point the choice to use natural gas will no longer be an option.  The Background goes on:

These circumstances demonstrate that conventional gas planning and operational practices adopted by natural gas utilities have not kept pace with recent developments and demands on energy systems.  Gas utilities need to learn from recent experience and adopt improved planning and operational practices that enable them to meet current customer needs and expectations in a transparent and equitable way while minimizing infrastructure investments and maintaining safe and reliable service. Additionally, planning must be conducted in a manner consistent with the recently enacted Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA).

Implicit in this is that customer choice will have to be limited.  I do not believe that many New Yorkers understand that this transition is coming at them.  The Background notes:

Moratoria can create adverse customer impacts, as they prevent at least some applicants from receiving firm gas service. Some types of development projects can utilize viable alternatives to firm gas service, if they are practically available. Others, however, may have more difficulty without firm gas service. Additionally, reliance on alternatives can have emission impacts. Reduced emissions impacts may result where the alternative to gas is efficient use of clean electricity, while increased emission impacts may result where the alternative to gas is oil or propane.

If viable alternatives were available, and by that, I mean affordable above all, then applicants would be choosing them willingly.  I published a post describing the comments on the Draft Scoping Plan submitted by a small manufacturer in Rochester who replacing equipment that is powered by natural gas now would cost over a million dollars and said that his company could not afford that conversion.  I will quote one last paragraph from the Background:

Given these potential impacts, the public interest demands that gas utilities provide information to and communicate with customers in a way that promotes effective customer planning, reduces confusion, and avoids inequities or the appearance of inequities. Similarly, the public interest demands that gas utilities provide information to and communicate with the Department, with other government entities and agencies, and with stakeholders, so as to promote effective planning and best consideration of alternatives, thus benefiting costs, emissions, and economic development.

What this means is that the DPS and gas utilities in the state are grappling with a tradeoff between providing safe and reliable natural gas to existing and new customers at the same time the Climate Act net-zero transition calls for the natural gas system to be shut down or transitioned to use something other than natural gas.  A presentation at a recent meeting of the Avoided Cost of Gas Working Group offers some insight into the practical considerations that Albany bureaucrats are starting to deal with and are completely unknown to most natural gas consumers despite the public interest in this topic.

Avoided Cost Working Group First Meeting

On July 6, 2022 the Avoided Cost Working Group (ACWG) met for the first time.  The presentation described the purpose of the group in the following slide.  The Benefit Cost Analysis Framework Order required Department of Public Service staff to develop a white paper on benefit cost analysis.  That process did not address gas industry issues.  This workgroup is supposed to provide the Commission with a report describing recommended calculations and specific elements for each LDC, which will then be issued for comment from stakeholders.

The BCA white paper included the following list of benefit and costs components to be included in the framework.  The workgroup will be adjusting the calculations for the gas industry but there are no plans for changes to the list.

The first meeting discussed the plan to address four main topics.  They want to determine the avoided bulk system costs for the gas commodity, the costs necessary to meet peak loads and pipeline capacity costs.  Another topic is avoided distribution costs for the high, medium, and low-pressure components of the pipeline system.  There has been much discussion about the use of renewable natural gas and they want to determine what qualifies for that label.  The final topic is the subject of leaks in the system.  As monitoring technology has improved more leaks have been found and this has been a point of contention on the Climate Action Council.

Avoided Cost Working Group Second Meeting

The second meeting of the ACWG on August 4 included two presentations.  The first presentation from the DPS staff discussed the typical non-pipelines alternatives process.  This is another of the Climate Act magical solutions where an existing fossil-fuel service can supposedly be replaced by an alternative that will not affect reliability or affordability.  National Grid provides a summary of the approach:

Non-Pipeline Alternatives (NPA) is the inclusive term for any targeted investment or activity that is intended to defer, reduce, or remove the need to construct or upgrade components of a natural gas system, or “pipeline investment.”

These NPA investments are required to be cost-effective compared to the infrastructure investment and are required to meet the specified gas system need.  An NPA can include any action, strategy, program, or technology that meets this definition and these requirements.

Some technologies and methodologies that can be applicable as an NPA investment include demand-side measures, such as demand response, sewer heat recovery, advanced controls strategies, new business models, energy efficiency or electrification. Additional technologies may be feasible as a demand-side NPA. NPA projects can include these and other investments individually or in combination that meets the specified need. A benefit-cost analysis (BCA) will be used to determine the cost-effectiveness of the NPA project.

In my opinion there are a lot of assumptions and biases that can skew the NPA study to prove whatever the utility wants and, in order to survive and make their earnings targets, that will be what the PSC wants.  The Administration’s response to public input leans to whatever constituency the Administration wants to please rather than what is best for the majority or the strength of adverse comments.

The DPS presentation outlined the process for a NPA study, reviewed the list of benefit and costs components and presented a list applicable to the natural gas system.  I don’t think there is anything particularly controversial or, frankly, of interest to the general public.

The second presentation by staff from New York State Energy Research & Development (NYSERDA) and their consultant Energy + Environmental Economics (E3)  described the work done to date in the Integration Analysis and Draft Scoping Plan.  They gave an overview of the Avoided Cost of Gas (ACG) framework developed by E3 for NYSERDA and DPS in 2020,  provided insights into other “Future of Gas” projects E3 has contributed to since 2020 , and presented key similarities and differences with the ACG framework.

The following slide is an overview of the approach.  E3 has set up a model that quantifies avoided costs that will be used to eventually justify the transition of New York’s natural gas system to net-zero consistent with the Climate Act.  At this time the framework has only focused on business-as-usual and has not been used to examine the impacts of the Climate Act.  It quantifies the following avoided costs:

  • Upstream supply costs
  • Leakage rates and other losses
  • “Peak gas” value
  • Local avoided infrastructure costs
  • Avoided GHGs (methane and CO2)

The presentation describes the ACG framework approach.  The following slide explains what the avoided costs results tell us.  The costs include installation, program and fuel costs.  The benefits include avoided utility costs and the alleged benefits of avoided greenhouse gas emissions.  Noticeably absent, in my opinion, is consideration of added costs to customers.  For example, the aforementioned small manufacturer in Rochester uses natural gas because it is the best alternative for his processes.  Any alternative is going to add costs not included.  In my case, I value natural gas because it is extremely reliable.  In the 41 years I have lived in my home there never has been a natural gas outage.  There were two long duration electric blackouts including one due to an ice storm that we survived because I can provide electricity to my furnace and keep the house warm.  This approach ignores these impacts and benefits.

The presentation goes on to discuss cost shift analyses in the next slide that will “help understand longer term ratepayer impacts”.  At this point transition complications start to become evident.  If the utility avoided costs lead to bill savings, then no cost shift occurs.  The slide explains that if customer bill savings are higher than avoided utility costs, a cost shift is likely to occur.  In that case the first adopters make out by saving money but the ‘remaining’ ratepayers have to cover more system costs and will see their costs rise.  It may be that avoided utility costs could be higher than customer bill savings so an “inverse cost shift” is likely to occur where ‘remaining’ ratepayers see bill decreases.  However, the slide concludes that “With more customers switching to electrification, there is risk of significant cost shift” because “embedded costs will need to be collected from a smaller customer base”.

The next slide explains what the consultants want you to know about the avoided cost results.  The avoided costs outputs show the monetized utility costs plus the carbon costs.  They claim that significant non-monetized utility value may result from NPA projects but the examples shown are pretty weak in my opinion.   They also claim that additional environmental value may also result, beyond what is captured by the social cost of carbon metric all the while ignoring that those costs are buried in the New York version of the social cost of carbon metric.  Finally, they note that the avoided cost framework does not consider potential cost avoidance related to embedded system costs of existing infrastructure.

Of particular interest is the example given.  After a long description of the values of the BCA approach for non-pipeline alternatives the thumb on the scale is evident.  Even though the example NPA found a negative benefit cost ratio the utility went ahead and did it anyway!  The BCA approach includes many value judgements despite its quantitative output.  At the end of the day the State and the utility made more value judgements to justify going ahead to implement an alternative to adding natural gas infrastructure.  The cited the following reasons.  They claim that it will increase local reliability but that does not consider the fact that the natural gas system is much more reliable than the electric system.  Going ahead may be consistent with Climate Act goals but that criterion suggests that all this is window dressing.  The third rationale is that it “Supports Joint Proposal goal of no net increase in gas utilization”.  I believe this is a specific component in the utility’s rate case settlement.  If true it is incontrovertible proof that New York utilities are forced to meet specific Administration goals to get rate case approval.  The final rationale is that it “supports local environmental advocacy”.  This is blatant acknowledgement that political appeasement of a preferred political constituency is a consideration in development considerations and that any pretense that the methodology that is supposed to be used is just a sham.

The next slide describes the inter-relationships of cost shift impacts.  I want to emphasize the two final points on the slide.  There is a possibility that a “’feedback loop” may develop that could drive gas costs higher.  In my opinion that kind of feedback is to be expected.  It is telling that they admit that customer impacts may be inequitable without a transition strategy and that it will disproportionally affect those unable to switch away from gas (renters and low-income customers).  So much for the environmental justice advocacy component of the Climate Act.

The presentation goes on to argue that a structured transition could help to mitigate these impacts.  E3 presented results of an analysis for a similar transition program in Massachusetts.  I am not going to discuss these results in this post.  The bottom line is that they believe that the better approach going forward is to target customer transitions rather than just transitioning natural gas customer use as their appliances age out. 

The following slide discusses the factors that affect the feasibility of the transition conversion away from natural gas.  I think this is important particularly because this kind of discussion is not included in the Draft Scoping Plan.  First there is a concession that the transition to “targeted electrification or networked geothermal hinges on several factors”.  Because the natural gas system is inter-connected there are limitations on which segments that can be removed “without adversely affecting the safety, reliability or other operational parameters of the system”.  Not surprisingly the consultant analysis keeps the customer satisfied by claiming that cost savings are achievable.  However, the slide mentions two caveats relative to customer choice.  If voluntary conversions are proposed “all consumers served by part of the gas system would need to accede to losing gas service”. The caveat is that the scale of the project drives the likelihood that there will be holdouts: “It may be possible to find 5 customers who are all willing to switch, 500 is likely a different matter.” The other alternative is to force customers to switch.  In that case: “Barring widespread shifts in consumer preferences, the nature of LDCs’ obligation to serve existing customers may need to change, with implications for customer choice.”  The second main point is that this feasibility analysis notes that there will likely be additional costs of decommissioning not captured in the analysis.

The slide also includes a highlighted section that asks the question “What do you need to “believe” in order for gas system conversions or cost avoidance to be achieved?”  In order for this this to be feasible then the conditions described above have to be met.  The other aspect is that “High levels of upfront planning and high levels of constructability & workforce availability” are needed.  A study from Palo Alto Utilities also notes there will likely be workforce issues related to decommissioning work.  That is a career with a built-in end date so training people for a short career might be a problem.  Given that all of these conditions have to be met to achieve the goal I am skeptical that it will be successful.

Finally, the presentation described an alternative approach to the avoided cost framework.  The Climate Act transition is a mandated large-scale customer transition described in a “Future of Gas” framework.  The avoided cost of gas framework appears to me to be better suited for smaller scale transition components.  Like it or not New York is stuck with a larger scale transition.  The alternate framework evaluates long-term revenue requirement implications for such a transition, considers geographical constraints, considers long-term implications of large-scale customer transitions and can evaluate long-term cost shifts in the absence of regulatory measures.  The presentation concludes that ca ombination of these two approaches may be useful.

Discussion

I have always maintained that a fundamental flaw in the Draft Scoping Plan is that it is just a guide and does not include a reliability feasibility analysis or any affordability estimate of the costs for the transition.  The point of this article is that the extraordinary effort necessary for New York State to transition to net-zero is underway without that information.  Despite the recognized need that providing public information is appropriate, there are many activities going on that are necessary for the transition but are proceeding without significant public oversight.  In the first place there are so many components to the transition that no individual or outside organization can follow them all.  Notice and documentation of the activities are buried in the DPS DMM: Matter Master that is not user-friendly even to professionals who follow these actions.  Even if someone manages to find out about an activity and tracks down the description of the activity, trying to decipher what is in the jargon-filled reports is a challenge.  They may be able to claim that there is publicly available information but reality is different.

This article described the transition activities of one aspect of the net-zero transition.  In order to meet the net-zero transition targets major changes to the natural gas distribution system are needed.  The Avoided Cost Working Group is trying to force fit the natural gas transition analysis into the same framework as was used for the electric system benefit cost analysis.  The NYSERDA consultants have suggested that it may be necessary to also include another approach and it remains to be seen whether that will be considered.  I get the impression the emphasis is on getting it done rather than taking the time to get it right.

Most importantly, it is clear that there are feasibility issues to the natural gas net-zero transition.  The Scoping Plan is only intended to provide a framework for the transition but what if that framework isn’t feasible?  With regards to the natural gas transition, the Draft Scoping Plan insinuated that the transition would occur as the appliances aged out.  In other words, at some date owners would not be able to replace their broken appliances with a natural gas-fired option.  However, it appears that the ACWG is considering options to transition certain segments of the network and is grappling with how to deal with the practical issues associated with that approach.  I doubt very much that this will be the only situation where the Scoping Plan implied implementation approach does not past muster as a viable methodology.

I am also troubled by the overt manipulation of the analytical techniques to make them consistent with the Climate Act narrative.  The framework analysis depends on a model that is large, includes many value judgements, and has so many variables that it can provide any answer that the Climate Action Council wants.  For example, I believe that the modeling approach ignores the benefits of natural gas options and does not include the costs to replace it with other less reliable and affordable options which makes the transition conversion more beneficial than it actually will be.  This bias is also evident in the application of the benefit cost analysis methodology.   An example is given where the NPA calculation did not project that the benefits would out-weigh the costs.  Nonetheless the utility went ahead and chose that option anyway.  At some point the public has to ask what is the point of all this if you modify the rules to get the answer you want anyway.

Conclusion

The background for the DPS order for this effort states that “public interest demands that gas utilities provide information to and communicate with customers in a way that promotes effective customer planning, reduces confusion, and avoids inequities or the appearance of inequities”.  There is no way that is happening at this time and all indications that it will not occur until it is too late for meaningful public input and the possibility of changing anything significant.

The Administration is controlling the implementation approach for the Climate Act’s net-zero transition.  A fundamental assumption in the Climate Act is that this transition is only a matter of political will and there are people involved in this process that actually believe that is the case.  This approach over-simplifies the problem and the solution.  The lack of a detailed reliability and affordability feasibility analysis kicks the problem down the road.  State agencies are rushing ahead to implement plans and regulations for the transition without taking into account this risk.  Moreover, the analyses and processes for the implementation are biased and even if the results suggest that implementation now is premature, decisions are being made consistent with the narrative and not reality.  I cannot believe that this won’t end badly.