Pragmatic Environmentalist of New York

New York Sea-Level Rise Projection Methodology Update

This article describes my response to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) request for comment on its proposed method for development of updated projections of sea level rise along New York State’s tidal coast. The proposed methodology is consistent with the one-sided science in the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act). In this case, however, DEC will actually respond to the comments received.

When DEC adopted the Projected Sea-level Rise regulation in February 2017 I was still working and had not started this blog but I did review the initial projections for sea-level rise. So this is a follow up to my earlier work. I have been following the Climate Act since it was first proposed. I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 300 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

The “Request for Pre-Proposal Comment” document included a background description of the proceeding:

On September 22, 2014, Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into law the Community Risk and Resiliency Act, Chapter 355 of the Laws of 2014 (CRRA). CRRA is intended to ensure that decisions regarding permits regulated by the Uniform Procedures Act and certain expenditures and facility-siting regulations consider future physical risk due to climate change, including sea level rise. Among other things, CRRA amended the New York State Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) to require DEC to adopt regulations establishing science-based State sea level rise projections and to update those projections at least every five years (ECL § 3- 0319). Pursuant to this requirement, DEC adopted 6 NYCRR Part 490, Projected Sea-level Rise¹ in February 2017 and is now seeking comment related to the required update.

The announcement for the pre-proposal request for comments stated:

Pursuant to the Community Risk and Resiliency Act, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) is preparing to update the official New York State sea level rise projections as codified in 6 NYCRR Part 490, Projected Sea-level Rise. DEC requests pre-proposal comment on its method for development of updated projections of sea level rise in New York State’s tidal waters. Pre-proposal comments should focus on the method DEC has proposed for development of projections and the resulting projections, and not on application of those projections in regulatory, planning, funding or other decision-making processes. DEC will consider all comments received on its proposed methodology and projections in preparing its final proposed projections for the update to Part 490.

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and an interim 2030 target of a 40% reduction by 2030. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric gride with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan. After a year-long review the Scoping Plan recommendations were finalized at the end of 2022 but there was no compilation of responses to comments received. In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations are supposed to be implemented through regulation and legislation. Note that there is no explicit link between the Climate Act and the projections for sea-level rise in Part 490. However, I was struck by the overt bias towards extreme values in the proposed methodology that is entirely consistent with the rationale of the Climate Act.

Proposed Methodology Comments

The “Request for Pre-Proposal Comment” document described the proposed methodology to project future sea-level rise:

In its Part 490 update, to ensure consistency in its regulatory and other programs, DEC intends to maintain the projection format used in the original Part 490 regulation. That is, the express terms will provide low, low-medium, medium, high-medium and high projections for three tidal regions of the State, as defined in the original regulation. However, the 2020s projections will be replaced by projections for the 2030s. Projections for the 2050s, 2080s and 2100 will be included, as in the original regulation. As discussed below, DEC proposes to include projections for the year 2150 in the updated regulation and to include a very high projection that reflects a potential low-probability, high-consequence rapid ice melt (RIM) scenario.

I refer readers to the “Request for Pre-Proposal Comment” document for a full description of the proposed methodology. My comments addressed two aspects of the proposal: how well did the earlier projections do compared to observed sea-level rise since 2017 and whether the choice of the sea-level rise scenarios covers the full range of the possible projections of sea-level rise.

My background includes extensive air quality model development and model verification experience. As a result, I strongly believe that model predictions should be compared to observations whenever possible. In this case, the Battery sea-level rise monitoring site, which has the longest record in New York State, can be compared to the previous projections . According to the documentation:

The mean sea level (MSL) trend at The Battery, NY, USA is +2.91 mm/year with a 95% confidence interval of ±0.08 mm/year, based on monthly mean sea level data from 1856 to 2023. That is equivalent to a change of 0.95 feet in 100 years. (R‑squared = 0.839)

Figure 1 from SeaLevel.info lists the monthly data and the calculated trend.

Figure 1: Mean Sea Level at The Battery, NY, USA (NOAA 8518750, 960-121, PSMSL 12)

I compared the observed data with the DEC Part 490 Table 2 projections from 2017 and the proposed projections for this update. I downloaded the seasonally-adjusted monthly MSL data from NOAA in CSV format and calculated five-year average MSL and trend values. Figure 2 plots those values and the Part 490 Table 2 2025 projections from the 2017 regulation and the 2035 Projections in the proposed methodology. The low projection made in 2017 for the 2020’s is comparable to the last 5-year average observed data but it appears that the trend will still be lower than the projection. None of the other projections or the 2035 projections using the proposed methodology are credible relative to the observed sea-level rise.

Figure 2: Observed 5-Year Average Battery Sea-Level Rise and Part 490 Table 2 2025 Projections from 2017 and 2035 Projections in the Proposed Methodology

My understanding of the goal is that DEC wants to ensure that the sea-level projections cover the full range of possible futures that planners should consider. In that case, then it is obvious that a projection based on extrapolation of the existing trend should be included. It is easy to do that for the Battery location and the Montauk site also has historical data that can be used. If the goal is to address flooding in the upper reaches of the Hudson River, for example in Albany/Troy, it gets more complicated. In that case, rainfall flooding (as in 1984) should be included. Albany tidal influences are regulated by the Sea Level at the Battery and rainfall flooding is not considered in sea level rise estimates.

My comments also addressed my model verification background concerns. I pointed out that there is another aspect of the comparison between the projected sea-level rises in the current Part 490 and the observed sea-level rise show in Figure 2. Weather forecasting skill evaluations use two naïve forecasts: persistence and climatology. If a forecaster does consistently make a maximum temperature forecast for tomorrow that is better than simply assuming tomorrow’s maximum temperature equals todays and the average climatological temperature, then the forecaster has no skill. The difference between the observed sea-level rise and the projections does not suggest a skillful forecast using the previous methodology. The projections for the proposed methodology suggest an even greater sea-level rise than the previous methodology so I think they are even less likely to be skillful.

My comments also addressed DEC’s choice of three of the seven sea-level rise scenarios from IPCC AR 6 projections that are readily available. According to the “Request for Pre-Proposal Comment” document:

To provide for consideration of a range of possible futures, including potential for low-probability, high-consequence sea level rise scenarios associated with rapid melt of land-based ice, DEC proposes adoption of projections based on a blending of projections associated with three illustrative scenarios:

SSP2-4.5 – consistent with Paris Agreement Nationally Determined Contributions

SSP5-8.5 – medium confidence – additional amplifying feedback mechanisms

SSP5-8.5 – low confidence – includes some rapid ice melt

It is disappointing that DEC proposes to use two illustrative scenarios that rely on the widely debunked SSP5-8.5 emission scenarios. I referenced a recent “primer” by Roger Pielke, Jr. that describes the out-of-date scenarios of the IPCC. He explains why the scenario is “obviously, undeniably implausible”:

All of RCP8.5, SSP5-8.5 and SSP3-7.0 assume that the world is going to massively increase consumption of coal in the future. The scenarios project that we will replace natural gas with coal, we will replace nuclear with coal, we will replace wind and solar, we will even chose to abandon gasoline for cars and use coal-to-liquid as fuel. If that sound ridiculous — it is!

My comments recommend that at least one of the SSP-8.5 scenarios be replaced with SSP2-3.4 which Pielke suggests represents a “central scenario based off of current trends and near-term projections”. I argued that failure to include a plausible emissions scenario means that the Part 490 projections do not represent the full range of projected sea-level scenarios.

Discussion

As noted by DEC the CRRA amended the New York State Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) to require DEC to adopt regulations establishing science-based State sea level rise. My comments noted that I am disappointed with the overt apocalypse bias in the Part 490 projection methodology proposed and used in the previous assessment. In both cases, DEC has chosen to hype the worst-case (“low probability, high consequence) projections by selectively choosing the scenarios that further the narrative of an existential climate crisis. I don’t think science-based regulatory proceedings should selectively choose scenarios to bias results. It is inappropriate on one hand to invoke the IPCC “science” as the ultimate rationale for the projections, but then invoke “expert judgement” to maximize the projections by claiming that IPCC did not provide sufficient rigor. I believe the result is a set of projections that do not provide representative sea-level rise projections for planning purposes.

Conclusion

The proposed methodology guarantees that Part 490 projections of sea-level rise for New York State’s tidal coast will over-estimate potential planning requirements. The proposed methodology provides biased estimates of sea-level rise through the selective choice of IPCC sea-level rise scenarios that are based on an unlikely emissions future. I recommended in my comments that the projections include one that extrapolates the observed trend of sea-level rise and one of the IPCC SSP-8.5 emission scenarios be replaced with the SSP2-3.4 emission scenario.

It will be interesting to see how DEC responds to the suggestion to include reasonable lower bound estimates of sea-level rise. Although DEC typically responds the responses can simply be thank you for your thoughts. That acknowledgement is more than I received for any of the extensive comments I submitted on the Climate Act Scoping Plan so at least I will know that someone read them.

One final note, this is the start of this proceeding. It will be interesting to see how they address the application of the projections in regulatory, planning, funding or other decision-making processes. At that time I expect more parties to participate in the process. Stay tuned.

NYS Climate Act Town Hall in Poughkeepsie on May 18 2023

Betsy Cashen wrote to let me know that her local group (website is neighbors2neighbors.net) has planned an educational event in Poughkeepsie, NY on Thursday, May 18th, 2023 from 7-9pm. She asked me to share the meeting notice with anyone in the area who may be interested in learning more about the Climate Act.

Organizers

The group organizing the meeting represents Columbia County residents who want to create a resilient community by informing our neighbors and asking questions. Some of the questions of concern:

Why the sudden push to ban the appliances we use to cook and heat our homes?
How feasible and reliable is it to heat our homes with expensive and vulnerable electricity made with fossil fuels?
Why blanket our best farmland with solar panels?
Why is New York State overriding home rule?
Why insist there is consensus when there isn’t?
Why does the State insist there is only one answer to a problem?

My impression is that they are trying to reach out to the Climate Smart Communities (CSC) program supports I described that program earlier this year. It is supposed to help local governments take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a changing climate. The questions raised point out that the ‘Climate Smart’ slogan is great marketing but doesn’t seem all that smart.

Meeting Announcement

This is a follow up to a meeting held on February 16, 2023 (video here). There will be three speakers: James Hanley, Sara Traberman, and Bobbie Ann Cox, followed by Q&A. Key points that will be covered by the speakers and why it’s important for all stakeholders– local & county officials, Climate Smart task force members, and the general public- to attend:

The NYS Climate Act and CAC Scoping Plan is a “Lose-Lose” for upstate towns and counties
The “all electric” mandates are infeasible and present a health and safety danger to all New Yorkers
Permitting process for solar and wind farm developers renders local laws, codes, and master plans irrelevant and inconsequential
Part N in the 2023 NYS Budget provides an 80% property tax break to solar/wind developers leaving towns and counties to make up the revenue shortfall
Proper environmental impact reviews are not conducted and represent significant danger to habitats, waterways, farmland
No decommissioning or recycling plan or process for solar panels or EV batteries at end of useful life
Who pays for the hazardous waste disposal of solar panels and EV batteries?
The CAC Scoping Plan feigns to have included input from an advisory committee representing local and county governance; however, the committee did not include anyone currently holding a public office.
Local elected officials and their constituents must have a say in how solar and wind projects will be implemented in their towns and counties. Join us to learn more and ask questions at the Climate Act Town Hall on Thursday, May 18th, 2023 7-9pm at Faith Assembly of God, 25 Golf Club Lane, Poughkeepsie.

Speakers: Dr. James Hanley, Empire Center for Public Policy – empirecenter.org

Sensible Solar for Rural New York – sensiblesolarny.org

Bobbie Anne Cox, Esq. Uniting NYS – unitingnys.com

The meeting will be held on Thursday, May 18th, 2023, from 7-9pm, at Faith Assembly of God,

25 Golf Club Lane, Poughkeepsie, NY

The flyer announcement notes:

When the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA–aka The Climate Act) passed in 2019, few New Yorkers even knew what happened. Albany legislators set extreme, unrealistic targets for carbon reductions without specifying how those goals would be accomplished. That would be left to an appointed Climate Action Council (CAC). In December 2022, the CAC submitted its final plan to the Governor and legislature for implementation. Plans to force people to convert to electric homes, water heaters, cars, stoves, and buildings or face substantial surcharges and carbon taxes will backfire. We can’t afford tens of thousands of dollars in new costs! Nor do we want the electric grid to become even more unreliable, or see electric rates soar. The details of the CLCPA/Climate Act raise huge concerns, and you owe it to yourself to learn more, and make your voice heard!

What we don’t know can hurt us.

Comment

If I were not 3.5 hours away from the meeting I would attend. I encourage readers to pass this on to anyone in the mid-Hudson Valley because I agree with their concerns. Most New Yorkers are still unaware of the magnitude of the changes and costs required to implement the mandated transition to net-zero by 2050. I have been following the Climate Act since it was first proposed and have written over 300 articles about it. I am convinced that the Hochul Administration does not understand the magnitude of the changes, the risks to reliability, the impacts on affordability, and the environmental impacts of the wind and solar resources that they propose to use. The Scoping Plan is a list of control strategies but there hasn’t been a feasibility analysis to prove that it will work. Worse, there is no implementation plan. There are virtually no limitations on the deployment of utility-scale solar and as a result I estimate that over 6,000 acres of prime farmland will be covered by solar panels by projects approved to date. Unless the Hochul Administration gets its act together this will continue unabated.

Climate Act Offshore Wind New Uncertainty

This is a short post that illustrates my observation that any every component of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) net-zero transition plans are more uncertain, more complicated, and likely more expensive than admitted by the Hochul Administration. This example concerns off-shore wind development.

I have been following the Climate Act since it was first proposed. I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and have written over 300 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Act established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and an interim 2030 target of a 40% reduction by 2030. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric gride with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan. After a year-long review the Scoping Plan recommendations were finalized at the end of 2022. In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations are supposed to be implemented through regulation and legislation.

The authors of the Climate Act included some arbitrary renewable energy development requirements. The offshore wind mandate is 9,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035. This is a big component of the capacity (10%) and energy produced (16%) in the Integration Analysis projections for the 2035 energy mix. By 2040 the projections increase offshore wind capacity to between 12,675 MW and 15,358 MW and the energy produced to over 20% of the total GWhr. On the other hand the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 2021-2040 System & Resource Outlook does not add any additional offshore wind after the 2035 goal.

I believe the attraction of offshore wind for Climate Act proponents is its capacity factor. The annual capacity factor equals the actual observed generation (MWh) divided by maximum possible generation (capacity (MW) times the 8,760 hours. Offshore wind turbines are supposed to have capacity factors of over 45% which is more than double the Integration Analysis projection for solar capacity factors. The high capacity factor is possible because there are no wind speed reductions due to rough terrain and the plan is to build huge turbines. The U.S. Department of Energy says the cost of offshore-wind power has fallen by more than 50% since 2014, thanks largely to increasing scale. Turbine output depends on the area of the circle swept by the blades and wind speed, which is stronger higher up. That means fewer turbines, and less raw material, for the same amount of power

How Big is Too Big?

The impetus for this post was two items that came across my desk on the same day. A trade press outlook for New York renewable energy development claimed that the 132-MW South Fork Offshore Wind Project, being developed by Ørsted A/S and Eversource Energy, will start operations in 2023. According to the facility website: “South Fork Wind brings unparalleled experience to Long Island. The 132 MW offshore wind farm will address East Hampton’s energy needs, producing enough clean energy to power 70,000 homes. When complete, the 12 turbines will be out of sight from East Hampton beaches. Construction started in early 2022.” Dividing 132 MW by 12 turbines finds that they are building 11 MW turbines.

The second article How Big is Too Big for an Offshore Wind Turbine by Ed Ballard included the following figure that shows that offshore wind turbines are getting bigger over time. It appears that the South Fork Wind 11 MW turbines will equal the forecast average turbine size in Europe. However, the article points out there is a problem with these large turbines.

In particular, a renewable-energy insurance provider has reported “ that component failures in turbines with 8-megawatt capacity or greater occur on average after just over a year.” According to their experience that compares with over five years for turbines of 4-to-8 megawatts. The insurer, GCube, owned by Japan’s Tokio Marine HCC, report was based on its claims data and information from other market participants. The company says it has insured more than 100 gigawatts of renewables assets since the 1980s.

Ballard writes:

Some problems reflect the rapid introduction of new models. Losses from defective materials or workmanship, electrical failures and gearbox failures are rising, GCube said. Other issues show how larger turbines are testing the industry’s supply chain. Some 55% of claims involved turbines of 8 megawatts or more and occurred during the construction phase, reflecting the difficulty of handling them, GCube said.

The average claim size has increased from 1 million pounds, worth approximately $1.25 million, in 2012, to over $7 million. GCube said that is down to the cost of parts and repairs on larger systems. Only a few of the vessels that install turbines can handle the largest ones, and diverting them for repair jobs is expensive.

Discussion

The Integration Analysis provided the quantitative support for the Scoping Plan control strategies. However, the Scoping Plan just provides a list of possible strategies that the Integration Analysis modeling claims provides the emission reductions necessary to meet the Climate Act net-zero transition targets. The State’s analysts have yet to do a feasibility analysis that shows how all the component pieces will work together and evaluates the timeline. The ultimate problem is that even a feasibility analysis is dependent upon projections of future resource development using new technologies. The problem described here is one of the lessons learned that I think are difficult to incorporate into a feasibility analysis projection but will have significant impacts.

There are a couple of offshore wind ramifications. I doubt that the cost of insurance was included in the cost projections for offshore wind development buried in the Integration Analysis modeling and I am certain that there was no documentation explicitly listing what costs were included in the offshore wind projections. I suspect that increased insurance costs were not included in the developer plans. More importantly, the big attraction of offshore wind turbines that are larger than 10 MW was the high capacity factor. If there are component failures and issues making repairs, then the capacity factor benefits will be wiped out. That affects the energy production estimates which in turn affects the amount of capacity needed to keep the lights on.

Conclusion

South Fork Wind expects to come on line in 2023. The failure rate of the 11 MW turbines being installed hasn’t been publicly considered by the developer or the Hochul Administration. I am sure when South Shore Wind comes on line and starts producing power that there will be press releases claiming that this is proof that the net-zero transition is on target. If there are component failures that news will be buried. Worse, the startup of offshore wind generation will be used to argue that existing fossil fired power plants can be shut down despite the unknown reliability performance of this new technology.

New York Gas Stove Ban – Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning?

New York State recently banned the use of natural gas from most new buildings that was described as: “a major win for climate advocates, but a move that could spark pushback from fossil fuel interests”. I have been following New York’s net-zero transition plan for years and there are some interesting aspects associated with the “major win for climate advocates”.

Climate Act Background

New York’s official website for the Climate Act promotes the strategies in the Scoping Plan including a fact sheet describing the plans to decarbonize New York’s buildings. It includes the following:

Adopt Zero-Emission Codes and Standards: More efficient, zero-emissions equipment for heating and cooking is increasingly available. That makes replacing existing equipment and appliances with cleaner and healthier alternatives an easy choice for New Yorkers. New construction projects will be required to install zero-emissions equipment in 2025 for single-family and low-rise buildings and in 2028 for high-rise and commercial buildings.

The Scoping Plan includes specific recommended strategies for the buildings sector. The relevant theme, “Adopt Zero-Emission Codes and Standards and Require Energy Benchmarking for Buildings”, included three strategies:

B1. Adopt Advanced Codes for Highly Efficient, Zero-Emission, and Resilient New Construction
B2. Adopt Standards for Zero-Emission Equipment and the Energy Performance of Existing Buildings
B3. Require Energy Benchmarking and Disclosure

The text states:

In existing buildings, the best opportunity for energy improvements is during routine home and capital improvements and when HVAC equipment is retired from service. Since the useful life of HVAC equipment ranges from 15 to 30 years, seizing the opportunities to electrify

buildings by 2050 requires near-term action.

Electrification and efficiency improvements in existing buildings present a larger challenge of sheer scale. The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), DEC, and New York State Department of State (DOS) should work together to adopt regulatory requirements that will bring about the end of fossil fuel combustion in buildings by prohibiting replacement of fossil fuel equipment at end of useful life, coordinated with action taken by the PSC and New York State Department of Public Service (DPS) to regulate gas utilities and with New York State Department of Labor (DOL) and the Office of Just Transition to promote workforce development. Building performance standards also will compel efficient operation of buildings and capital investments in high-performance building envelopes and efficient HVAC systems.

New York Legislation

As noted previously the plan for 2023 is to promulgate new regulations and pass new legislation to implement the Scoping Plan recommendations. New York’s strange political process includes an annual legislative self-made crisis in which legislation is held hostage to the annual budget. On May 2, over a month past the April 1 due date, the Legislature and Administration finally passed the budget bill that included the gas stove ban that got so much attention. The point of this article is that there were interesting aspects of the budget discussions this year that have bigger implications than the passage of the ban.

In my opinion, and certainly the belief of the climate activists, the Scoping Plan is pretty clear that fossil-fueled equipment is to be banned outright. Indeed, the legislation prohibits installation of “fossil-fuel equipment and building systems” in newly constructed buildings seven stories or less, except new commercial or industrial buildings over 100,000 ft²on or after 12/31/25, and for all other buildings on or after 12/31/28”. However, the prohibition does not apply to :

The repair, alteration, addition, relocation, or other changes to pre-existing buildings
The fossil-fuel prohibition shall exempt equipment and systems used for emergency back-up power and standby power; manufactured homes, and building used as a manufacturing facility, commercial food establishment, laboratory, car wash, laundromat, hospital, other medical facility, critical infrastructure, agricultural building, fuel cell system, or crematorium.
To the “fullest extent feasible”, fossil-fuel equipment and building systems in such buildings are to be limited to areas where a prohibition is infeasible, and such areas must be “electrification ready”, except for those serving manufacturing or industrial processes. Emissions from allowed use must be minimized. “Financial considerations shall not be sufficient basis to determine physical or technical infeasibility.”
The Energy Code shall exempt new building construction that requires new or expanded electric service, pursuant to §31.1 of the Public Service Law, when electric service cannot be reasonably provided by the grid.

When the ban on natural gas in new construction was first announced there was intense pushback. Apologists and the Governor were quick to point out that the ban only affected new construction and that nobody was coming to take away existing natural gas appliances. However, the Scoping Plan recommendations make it clear that the plan is to eventually ban the replacement of most existing fossil-fired infrastructure. Furthermore, the original language did not include all the caveats that ended up in the final bill described above. I interpret that to mean that the reality is that accommodations have to be made to pass Climate Act implementing legislation.

Emissions Accounting

The New York political theater starts with the Governor’s State of the State address in early January that outlines her legislative agenda for the year. This is followed by specific legislative proposals from the Administration, Senate, and Assembly. This year the initial budget bills from the Governor, Senate and Assembly included significant policy aspects related to the Climate Act that did not get included in the final budget bill but the debates are instructive.

For example, sometime during this process there was a revelation that prompted a specific legislative proposal to modify the emissions accounting because of excessive costs. Climate Action Council co-chairs Doreen Harris and Basil Seggos explained that:

“First and foremost, the governor is trying to maintain New York’s leadership on climate. It’s a core principle that she brought into office and we have been carrying that out for several years,” said Seggos.

But Gov. Hochul instructed both the DEC and NYSERDA to look at the affordability of Cap & Invest.

“We began running the numbers on that, based on some of the metrics being used by Washington state and some of our own, and revealed some…potentially extraordinary costs affiliated with the program,” Seggos explained. “So that’s really what this is. It isn’t a focus necessarily on methane itself, or any particular pollutant. It is how do we implement the CLCPA in a way that doesn’t put extraordinary costs on the pockets of New Yorkers.”

It seems astounding to me but it does appear that someone in the Administration finally started really looking at the potential costs of the Climate Act. When the first auction of allowances for the Washington state program produced costs higher than expected, DEC and NYSERDA ran the numbers and the results were a reality slap to the Administration. The response was to propose a change to the unique emissions accounting scheme used in the Climate Act.

In order to maximize the purported harm of natural gas use the Climate Act specified the use of global warming potential over 20 years rather than over 100 years as used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United States government, and every other jurisdiction (since its implementation the state of Maryland has also begun to specify GWP-20). The result is that the number of tons of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions are increased and when that emission total was multiplied by the closing price of the Washington state auction the result was “extraordinary costs”.

In one word the response by climate activists to this legislation was “meltdown”. For example, NY Renews, a coalition of over 300 environmental, justice, faith, labor, and community groups that bills itself as the “force behind the nation’s most progressive climate law” had this to say:

S6030/A6039 is part of a larger pattern of attacks by the fossil fuel industry that threaten to sabotage New York’s nation-leading climate law, the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, and roll back hard-won standards for accurately accounting for the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions, particularly methane. If passed, the bill would change how the state measures methane and carbon dioxide emissions, pave the way for polluting corporations to emit without consequence, and harm the health and well-being of frontline community members who live, work, play, and pray in neighborhoods across NYS.

NY Renews unequivocally opposes the inclusion of this bill in the state budget and any deal that would include it. We’re calling on the state legislature to uphold the Climate Act as written into law and reject amendments that would threaten its power to protect and prepare New Yorkers facing the worst effects of the climate crisis.

In response to the outcry the Administration backed down from the proposal. They claimed that it distracted from the importance of passing the budget bill. Nonetheless, Seggos said “The fundamental takeaway is it’s full steam ahead for cap and invest with the climate action rebate and any other elements we’ll take up as soon as we can.”

Discussion

The reason that I am encouraged rather than discouraged by the enacted gas appliance ban on new construction is that a couple of issues came up that will have to be addressed. The political approach to punt difficult problems down the road can only work so long.

The initial blowback to the gas stove ban prompted the Administration to propose legislation that gradually eliminates fossil fuel-burning heating equipment from nearly all New York buildings, consistent with the Climate Action Council plan, but takes less aggressive steps to reduce the use of gas stoves. The proposed changes:

Dec. 31, 2025: Prohibit all equipment (including stoves) that burn fossil fuels in new construction of single-family homes or apartment buildings of three stories or less.
Dec. 31, 2028: Prohibit all fossil fuel-burning equipment (including stoves) in new construction of commercial buildings and multifamily structures of four stories or more.
Jan. 1, 2030: Prohibit installation of heating or hot water equipment (but not stoves) in any single-family home or apartment building of three stories or less.
Jan. 1, 2035: Prohibit installation of fossil fuel heating or hot water systems (but not stoves) in any commercial building or larger multifamily structure.

The final legislation only addressed the first two components. The Administration apparently hopes that the Scoping Plan recommendation to mandate electrification when existing fossil-fired appliances reach their end of life can be made palatable if gas stoves are exempted. I think that is naïve because so many people appreciate the resiliency and capabilities of fossil-fueled furnaces and hot water heaters too. When the legislation to implement a prohibit in-kind replacement of existing appliances comes up, I believe there will be intense blowback.

The final budget bill also included legislation for distribution of the proceeds from a cap and invest auction. I don’t see an easy path for the Administration to walk back their statements that the auction will result in extraordinary costs. They are on record saying the costs are unacceptable so how do they reconcile that?

Conclusion

At the start of the year the idea that the government is coming for your gas stove was dismissed as a right wing conspiracy:

NYT: “No One Is Coming for Your Gas Stove Anytime Soon”
Time: “How Gas Stoves Became the Latest Right-Wing Cause in the Culture Wars”
Salon: “Rumors of a gas stove ban ignite a right-wing culture war”
MSNBC: “No, the woke mob is not coming for your gas stove.”
AP News: “FACT FOCUS: Biden administration isn’t banning gas stoves”
The Washington Post: “GOP thrusts gas stoves, Biden’s green agenda into the culture wars”

However, New York’s Climate Act implementation demonstrates that a net-zero transition requires such a ban. It is not going to be possible to put off a debate about personal choice options and the advantages of fossil fuel for residential use because the New Yorkers who are blissfully unaware of this aspect of the Climate Act will demand to be heard.

The other aspect of this relates to the cap and invest program and the costs of the program. The Hochul Administration narrative is that the costs of inaction for the net zero Climate Act transition outweigh the costs of action but that statement is misleading unless they issue a caveat that the costs in the Scoping Plan do not include the costs of “already implemented” programs. My analyses of costs have found that there are other significant “already implemented” program costs (for example the costs of transportation electrification) and that means that the Administration claim does not include all the costs to transition to net-zero. It gets worse because as far as I can tell the Integration Analysis does include the benefits of already implemented programs while it excludes the costs. In order to get the desired result, the State analyses have a thumb pressing down on one side of the scale and the other thumb is pushing up the other side of the scale. I don’t see how the Administration can avoid a meaningful discussion of the costs that they admit are extraordinary.

CNN described the New York State ban on the use of natural gas from most new buildings as “a major win for climate advocates, but a move that could spark pushback from fossil fuel interests”. Advocates refuse to acknowledge the possibility that fossil fuel interests could align with the interests of the majority of New Yorkers who appreciate and value the resiliency and affordability of our existing fossil-fueled infrastructure. The proposed wholesale shift to unwanted technology without proper accounting of costs will be under intense scrutiny this year. I do not see how the Hochul Administration can avoid an open debate about the implications of the Climate Act for all New Yorkers.

Guest Post: Energy and Climate Content in the Budget Bill

I have been meaning to write a post about the energy climate content in the recently enacted state budget bill. Keith Schue prepared summary and graciously consented to let me post his work.

Keith has a master’s degree in engineering and worked in the private sector for fourteen years in hardware design. Before moving to New York, he was employed with the Florida Chapter of The Nature Conservancy on issues relating to the impacts of human development and infrastructure on ecosystems. He has been engaged in New York energy policy since 2010, and currently volunteers as a technical advisor for New York Energy & Climate Advocates. He has provided technical input on the federal Clean Power Plan, NYS Energy Plan, NYS Clean Energy Standard, NYS Scoping Plan for climate action, industry regulations, legislation, and various projects.

Unjust State-Mandated Appraising of Solar/Wind Projects

Part N within the Revenue budget bill mandates the use of an appraisal model that shortchanges communities by preventing local governments from receiving adequate tax revenue for the solar/wind projects forced upon them. It also explicitly interferes with active litigation filed by several towns which had argued that the model was developed in violation of the State Administrative Procedures Act (SAPA). Part N exempts the state model from SAPA with a back-dated effectivity, thereby rendering the litigation mute. This blatant disregard of home rule and due process was strongly opposed by numerous communities, contributing to growing unrest among upstate residents in both parties.

NYPA Authorization to Build Renewable Projects

Over the past few years, an ecosocialist far-left subset of climate activists have pushed for legislation requiring the government, through the New York Power Authority (NYPA), to build renewable energy projects. This has been based on a mistaken belief that the biggest problem facing the state is that solar/wind projects are simply not being built fast enough. However, those who understand energy realize that the biggest obstacles to solar/wind are system-related (transmission, storage, & reliable firm generation). Although there are ways that NYPA could help address these system-level issues, advocates of the Build Public Renewable Act (BPRA) have been myopically focused on the CLPA’s “renewable” quota. Various unintelligible versions of the BRPA were proposed. So eventually, succumbing to pressure, the Governor proposed her own version in this year’s budget. While still focused on the buildout of solar/wind, her bill was more sensibly written, granting NYPA authority without allowing it to be hijacked by ideological interests. Her proposal also established a Renewable Energy Access and Community Help (REACH) program to assist people within disadvantaged communities by providing bill credits tied to renewable energy generation.

The governor’s bill became the template for legislation adopted, but several changes were made to accommodate advocates of the BPRA. A requirement was added to prepare a biannual strategic plan tied to the state’s renewable energy targets, developed with input from various groups and subject to public comment. The benefits of REACH were targeted to low and middle-income people. Labor benefits were added, as well as a requirement to use mostly domestically made components–although this can be waived if doing so would cost more (which is likely). The legislation also requires that NYPA shut down the “small natural gas plants” (peakers) that it owns by 2030 (actually sooner than Hochul had proposed). But as pointed out in analysis by Fred Stafford, NYPA’s peakers are actually less polluting than many of those downstate which are privately owned. So, this could ironically benefit private power producers while increasing pollution. The legislation partially addresses this by allowing NYPA peakers to continue operating if more than “de minimis” emissions would otherwise occur in disadvantaged communities. But emission rates could still increase generally. New York will likely learn the hard way that a plan focused on intermittent solar/wind results in more use of peaker plants, not less. (Note: Stafford identifies himself as a socialist–which I am not–but I respect his technical prowess and understanding of energy.) The legislation also provides $25 Million in funding to the Dept of Labor for programs to help workers transition into renewable energy jobs.

Importantly, since NYPA is a state authority, it does not pay taxes. Therefore, any solar/wind projects that it builds will generate zero property tax revenue for local governments. The legislation vaguely says that NYPA’s strategic plan should consider ways of minimizing negative tax revenue impacts on municipalities and PILOT agreements, but nothing specific is actually required. Based on “willing seller” language, it appears that NYPA cannot use eminent domain to acquire property for renewable projects. But this is not so for transmission and a lot more will be needed to support a renewable buildout.

Electrification of Buildings

As covered by the media, there has been significant public uproar over building electrification mandates, heat pumps, and the possible banning of gas stoves. Apparently, the governor and legislature believe they have addressed this by limiting such mandates to NEW buildings. After 2025, new buildings 7 stories or less in height would be prohibited from installing fossil fuel equipment. After 2028, this prohibition would apply to new buildings generally. However, the legislation also includes a number of exceptions, such as for large commercial, restaurants, industry, manufactured homes, car washes, laundromats, hospitals, back-up generators, and critical infrastructure. Exceptions may also be granted by the PSC if adequate grid service is not reasonably available (which could be in a lot of places). For existing buildings, fossil fuel equipment can be used and replaced with new fossil fuel equipment indefinitely, for now.

In addition, the legislation requires that NYPA prepare decarbonization action plans for 15 of the highest-emitting state-owned facilities by January 2026, along with annual progress reports starting in 2025. Decarbonization would be required “to the extent practicable” and there does not appear to be a clear requirement for when such efforts must be complete. For this, decarbonization is defined as eliminating on-site combustion of fossil-fuels and co-pollutants except for back-up emergency generators and redundant systems, providing heating and cooling with thermal energy from non-combustion sources, and to the greatest extent feasible producing on-site electricity from renewables.

No Cap & Invest Program in Budget

The Climate Action Council recommended that the state create a Cap & Invest program (a version of Cap & Trade) to systematically reduce greenhouse gas emissions from sources statewide over time. Essentially, this involves setting a statewide cap on total emissions that gets reduced every year. Then emission allowances are auctioned off to emitters, with proceeds invested in various climate initiatives. The Governor and legislature included versions of Cap & Invest legislation within their respective budget proposals. However, no Cap & Invest legislation made it into the final budget. . DEC claims that it does not actually need legislative authority to create a Cap & Invest program, but this could depend on the extent of the program implemented. Cap & Invest was a major recommendation of the Climate Action Council, so it is unclear what will happen next. It may still be considered during the legislative session.

Creation of a Climate Action Fund

The budget creates a Climate Action Fund for the purpose of helping to compensate for the increased cost to New Yorkers of implementing climate action. The fund is divided into three different accounts: a Consumer Climate Action Account (at least 35%); an Industrial Small Business Climate Action Account (up to 3%); and a Climate Investment Account (at least 67%), with the last one having particular focus on disadvantaged communities. The legislation also requires that a Climate Affordability Study be prepared by January 2024 on the appropriate distribution and use of such funds. In the Governor’s proposal, money for the Climate Action Fund was to come from proceeds of a Cap & Invest program. But since no such program exists yet, it is unclear how the fund will be supported.

Comments on RGGI Third Program Review

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a carbon dioxide control program in the Northeastern United States. One aspect of the program is a program review that is a “comprehensive, periodic review of their CO2 budget trading programs, to consider successes, impacts, and design elements”. This post described the comments I submitted on the third program review process that is underway.

I have been involved in the RGGI program process since its inception. I blog about the details of the RGGI program because very few seem to want to provide any criticisms of the program. RGGI is a market-based emissions market program similar to what has been proposed for the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act. I have written over 300 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Background

RGGI is a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. According to RGGI:

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia to cap and reduce power sector CO₂ emissions.

RGGI is composed of individual CO₂ Budget Trading Programs in each participating state. Through independent regulations, based on the RGGI Model Rule, each state’s CO₂ Budget Trading Program limits emissions of CO₂ from electric power plants, issues CO₂ allowances and establishes participation in regional CO₂ allowance auctions.

Proponents tout RGGI as a successful program because participating states have “cut carbon pollution from their power plants by more than half, improved public health by cutting dangerous air pollutants like soot and smog, invested more than $3 billion into their energy economies, and created tens of thousands of new job-years”. Others have pointed out that RGGI was not the driving factor for the observed emission reductions. My latest evaluation of RGGI results found that the investments from RGGI auction proceeds were only directly responsible for 5.6% of the total observed annual reductions over the baseline to 2020 timeframe and that those investments reduced emissions at a rate of $818 per ton of CO2. I conclude that RGGI successfully raised money but has not provided cost-effective emission reductions or has had much to do with the observed CO2 emission reductions in the electric generating sector of the NE United States.

Third Program Review

One aspect of the program is a program review that is a “comprehensive, periodic review of their CO2 budget trading programs, to consider successes, impacts, and design elements”. On March 29, 2023 RGGI Inc. and the participating states gave an update on the status of the third program review. The presentation gave an overview of the program, explained how the review process works, described state activities, and described the electric sector analysis. Meeting materials are available:

The description of the program review update (video here) used the following slide. The process is initiated by the states defining revised goals and ambitions which kicks off technical modeling and analysis and a public stakeholder process. If you have questions about the process this is a good overview.

The meeting described the current modeling considerations, explained the approach and assumptions, and asked for comments on specific aspects of the modeling. My comments relate to the modeling analyses. David Coup from NYSERDA described the modeling analysis (video starting at 11:52) using the following slide. The presentation explained that the program review modeling is concerned with the regional cap trajectory, Cost Containment and Emissions Containment Reserves changes, and adjustments for banked allowances.

This round of modeling must contend with the “fluidity of state participation” which translates to what to do about Pennsylvania and Virginia. Pennsylvania participation is “still in effect” but it is still in litigation so there is a major uncertainty relative to the modeling. Virginia is going to cease participation at the end of 2023 and they have told RGGI that their participation should not be included in the modeling. The emissions from these two states are a significant portion of the current inventory so participation affects the potential for regional emission reductions. In 2022 Pennsylvania emissions were 42.5% of the total CO2 emissions of all RGGI states and Virginia was another 13% as shown below. From the standpoint of potential emission reductions note that Pennsylvania still had a significant amount of coal in 2022 and also note that the recently announced retirement of Homer City will result in a 2% reduction of overall RGGI emissions.

There are two other factors that complicate this modeling effort. The presentation noted that “climate and complementary energy policies will dramatically impact electricity load”. In other words, the primary decarbonization strategy for buildings and transport is electrification which will necessarily increase load. In addition, the decarbonization timeline for the electricity sector in states vary. Those timelines are primarily based on aspirational goals rather than a feasibility analysis to determine how fast wind and solar resources must be deployed to displace existing electric generation to make the mandated emission reductions. The presentation recognized that the implementation of offshore wind deployment and grid-scale battery storage deployment, duration, and supply as factors that add challenges and uncertainty to modeling the decarbonization transition.

In order to address these issues, they are looking at different ways of dealing with the uncertainty by developing “assumption sets based on load forecasts and availability of low-emitting generation” and various allowance supply scenarios. They think that adding cases will cover the range of outcomes given current electricity-sector developments and that the “results will inform development of potential policy cases”. While I appreciate the thought, I am concerned that political pressures will preclude any cases that don’t fit the narrative that political timelines will mandate development as needed to meet the schedules.

The load forecast and availability of low-emitting generation discussion (video at 21:20) provides the modeling framework. As shown in the slide below they are considering three assumption sets ranging from “procured” clean energy and energy forecasts in line with Independent System Operator baseline estimates to two levels of additional clean energy and load growth. Their definition of procured is that the project is “under contract”. This is a good example of my concern about the schedule because projects under contract may still be abandoned due to several reasons. My main concern is that the timelines have major implications. An increasingly large percentage of future EGU emissions reductions is only possible if clean energy deployment displaces fossil generating facilities because there are no other options left. There are significant uncertainties associated with clean energy development because of supply chain issues and the need for extensive supporting infrastructure.

Four specific questions for input from stakeholders were posed (video at 30:19)

How comfortable are you with the assumptions that have been included?
Are there other assumptions that need to be included in these scenarios?
Is there anything that we can do to improve the understanding of the differences between the cases?
For which scenarios are stakeholders most interested in seeing results for further Program Review consideration?

My comments addressed two of these questions: How comfortable are you with the assumptions that have been included and are there other assumptions that need to be included in these scenarios?

Fifth Compliance Period Status

One of my concerns about the assumptions included is that there are other uncertainties not included. In my initial comments on the Third Program Review my overall recommendation was to make no changes and see how the RGGI allowance market plays out the transition to the unprecedented emissions trading situation in which the majority of the RGGI allowances are held by entities who purchased allowances for investment rather than compliance purposes.

My comments described in detail my latest analysis of allowance holdings and emissions confirms compliance entities will have to obtain allowances from non-compliance entities to meet compliance obligations at the end of 2023. At the end of the fourth quarter of 2022 the RGGI Market Monitoring Report Q4 2022 noted that there were 231 million allowances in circulation. The report noted that approximately 148 million of the allowances in circulation (64 percent) are believed to be held for compliance purposes. I estimate that there were 176.6 million allowances in circulation at end of March 2023 and that approximately 89.8 million allowances (51%) were held for compliance purposes. I estimated the allowance status at end of the 2021-2023 compliance period as 224.9 million allowances in circulation before allowances are surrendered for 2023 emissions with 105.8 million allowances held for compliance purposes. Assuming that 2023 emissions would be equal to 2022 emissions for all the RGGI states including Pennsylvania means total emissions will be 193.3 million tons. That means 87.5 million allowances must be obtained from non-compliance entities for compliance and that the next compliance period will start with an allowance bank of only 31.6 million.

Those two unprecedented concerns are not included in the modeling assumptions. In the fifth compliance period ending December 31, 2023 the compliance entities are going to have to use allowances now held by non-compliance entities and in the sixth compliance period the allowance cap is going to be binding. I define a binding cap as one chosen arbitrarily without any feasibility evaluation. The environmental community has demanded a binding RGGI cap for years and it looks like they are going to get their wish in the 2024-2026 compliance period. My comments stated that these issues should included in the “are there other assumptions that need to be included in these scenarios?” question posed at the March 29 meeting. Given the importance of these uncertainties I expanded on my concerns.

Non-Compliance Entities

Based on the evaluation described above I estimate that compliance entities will be required to obtain allowances for compliance from non-compliance entities. In my opinion, it is reasonable to expect that the non-compliance entities that own allowances for investment purposes will expect a premium for their allowances because they know that the penalties for an out of compliance affected source are severe. This is unprecedented and no one knows what will happen so it is reasonable to see what happens before there are any decisions regarding changes to the allowance allocation trajectories.

There is another non-compliance entity issue. In previous comments I pointed out that at least one non-governmental environmental entity has purchased allowances and “will be retiring these allowances so that no power plant can use them to emit greenhouse gas”. I suggested that this ownership entity should be included as a new category in the Potomac Economics market monitoring reports and that a surrender account be established for individuals and organizations that want to use RGGI allowances for offsetting purposes. The recommendation was ignored so we are left to hope that the Potomac Economics market monitoring report non-compliance entity category has at least 87.5 million allowances that will be available for compliance purposes.

Observed Emission Reductions to Date

There is another uncertainty associated with future emission reductions. In my previous comments, I showed that fuel switching from coal and residual oil to natura gas has been the primary CO2 reduction methodology to date. Of particular importance to the future program is that the potential for future fuel switching is limited outside of Pennsylvania. The following table lists CO2 emissions for each state by primary fuel type. The retirement of the coal-fired Homer City facility was recently announced and that facility was responsible for 2% of 2022 emissions. If Pennsylvania joins RGGI as a full-fledged member and coal retirements from its facilities occur in the future the current reduction trajectory is feasible. If those conditions do not occur then the only way to produce reductions is by displacement with zero-emissions generating sources. Eventually, investments in zero-emissions resources will be the only method for reducing affected source emissions.

One of my problems with the RGGI cap and invest program is that while it is supposed to be a pollution control program in which the auction proceeds are invested in emission reduction strategies, the proceeds have not prioritized emission reductions. In my previous comments I noted that the total of the annual reductions claimed by RGGI in their annual Investments of Proceeds updates since 2009 is 2,818,775 tons while the difference in annual emissions between the baseline of 2006 to 2008 compared to 2019 emissions is 72,908,206 tons. Therefore, the RGGI investments are only directly responsible for less than 5% of the total observed reductions since RGGI began in 2009. (Note that I did an update for information through 2020 that did not change these findings.)

Binding Cap

Another uncertainty not included in the issues raised at the March 29 meeting is the binding cap. I define a binding cap as one chosen arbitrarily to meet some emission reduction target without considering the feasibility of emission reductions necessary to meet that target. The problem that advocates apparently do not understand is that CO2 control is different than other pollutants because there are no cost-effective controls available for existing facilities. Instead, CO2 reductions at electric generating facilities require development of zero-emissions resources to displace the need for electric energy output at affected sources. If the energy from those zero-emissions resources is insufficient to replace affected source generation, then the only compliance alternative left is to stop running. Unplanned outages due to a lack of allowances could lead to reliability issues.

The binding cap must be considered in the context of the reason for the observed emission reductions and the impact of inefficient RGGI proceeds for reductions. I recommended that assumptions addressing the binding cap issues need to be included in the RGGI scenarios. The RGGI states all have various CO2 emission reduction mandates that rely on electrification of other sectors. This will necessarily increase load at the same time the deployment of low-emitting generation will be the primary emission reduction methodology. EPA cap and trade programs such as the Cross State Air Pollution Rule established caps based on technological evaluation of control options. The RGGI reduction trajectory was established based more on arbitrary decarbonization timelines than a deployment schedule supported by a feasibility analysis. The modeling for this program review must include modeling analyses that consider the zero-emissions deployment schedules. Sensitivity analyses that consider delays to the deployment of wind and solar resources should also be included.

Conclusion

The March 29 meeting raised the important point that there are new uncertainties that need to be incorporated in the assumptions used for the modeling analyses associated with the third program review. My comments raised additional issues that add uncertainty and should be considered too.

RGGI asked “how comfortable are you with the assumptions that have been included.” Because future reductions will rely more heavily upon displacement of affected source energy production by wind and solar at the same time emission reductions in other sectors rely on increased electrification, I am particularly concerned about the load forecasts and availability of low-emitting generation assumptions. The impact of future load growth and the schedule for low-emitting generation deployment should be considered in the modeling at least by sensitivity analyses.

RGGI also asked if there are other assumptions that need to be included in these scenarios? The RGGI presentation noted significant uncertainties. I believe that two other uncertainties need to be considered. My analysis of the status of emissions and allowances shows that compliance entities will have to depend on allowances from the non-compliance entities for the fifth compliance period ending this year. That analysis also shows that when the sixth compliance period starts in 2024 there will be an extremely small allowance bank. I believe that these added uncertainties need to be addressed in the modeling for this program review.

The potential problems associated with a cap on allowances that forces affected sources to comply by not operating is an unrecognized issue. If an overly stringent cap results in an artificial energy shortage, then it will not reflect well on the RGGI states.

Climate Act Cap and Invest in the Budget Bill

New York’s strange political process includes an annual legislative self-made crisis related to the budget which is just coming to a conclusion. This year the initial budget bills from the Governor, Senate and Assembly included significant policy aspects related to the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) that did not get included in the final budget bill but there are still some less impactful legislative proposals in the final draft I have seen. This post addresses the allocations for the proposed cap and invest program.

Climate Act Background

Cap and Invest Overview

As part of the Hochul Administration’s plan to implement the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act), a market-based pollution control program called ‘’cap and invest” was proposed earlier this year in legislation associated with the budget. The Assembly budget bill does not include any cap and invest provisions other than mandates for the use of the revenues collected. This overview gives context for those provisions.

The Climate Act Scoping Plan identified the need for a “comprehensive policy that supports the achievement of the requirements and goals of the Climate Act, including ensuring that the Climate Act’s emission limits are met.” It claimed that the policy would “support clean technology market development and send a consistent market signal across all economic sectors that yields the necessary emission reductions as individuals and businesses make decisions that reduce their emissions” and provide an additional source of funding. The authors of the Scoping Plan based these statements on the success of similar programs but did not account for the differences between their proposal and previous programs. The Assembly budget bill Part TT proposal is similarly flawed.

The cap and invest proposal is a variation of a pollution control program called cap and trade. In theory, placing a limit on pollutant emissions that declines over time will incentivize companies to invest in clean alternatives that efficiently meet the targets. These programs establish a cap, or limit, on total emissions. For each ton in the cap an allowance is issued. The only difference between these two programs is how the allowances are allocated. The Hochul Administration proposes to auction the allowances and invest the proceeds but, in a cap-and-trade program, the allowances are allocated for free. The intent is to reduce the total allowed emissions over time consistent with the mandates of the Climate Act and raise money to invest in further reductions.

The Environmental Protection Agency administers cap and trade programs for sulfur dioxide (SO₂) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) that have reduced electric sector emissions faster, deeper, and at costs less than originally predicted. In the EPA programs, affected sources that can make efficient reductions can sell excess allocated allowances to facilities that do not have effective options available such that total emissions meet the cap. Also note that EPA emission caps were based on the feasibility of expected reductions from addition of pollution control equipment and a schedule based on realistic construction times.

However, there are significant differences between those pollutants and greenhouse gas pollutants that affect the design of the proposed cap and invest program. The most important difference is that both SO₂ and NOx can be controlled by adding pollution control equipment or fuel switching. Fuel switching to a lower emitting fuel is also an option for carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions but there are no cost-effective control equipment options. Consequentially, CO₂ emissions are primarily reduced by substitution of alternative zero-emissions resources. For example, in the electric sector replacing fossil-fired units with wind and solar resources. The ultimate compliance approach if there are insufficient allowances available is to limit operations.

New York State is already in a cap and invest program with an auction for CO₂ emissions from the electric generating sector. Although significant revenues have been raised, emission reductions due to the program have been small. Since the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative started in 2009, emissions in nine participating states in the Northeast have gone down about 50 percent, but the primary reason was fuel switching from coal and residual oil to natural gas enabled by reduced cost of natural gas due to fracking. Emissions due to the investments from the auction proceeds have only been responsible for around 15 percent of the total observed reductions.

The Hochul Administration has not addressed the differences between existing market-based programs and the proposed cap and invest program. Although RGGI has provided revenues, the poor emission reduction performance has been ignored despite the need for more stringent reductions on a tighter schedule to meet the arbitrary Climate Act limits. The Hochul Administration has not done a feasibility analysis to determine how fast the wind and solar resources must be deployed to displace existing electric generation to make the mandated emission reductions. Worse yet, the Climate Act requires emission reductions across the entire economy and the primary strategy for other sectors is electrification, so electric load is likely to increase in the future.

In late March, the Hochul Administration proposed a modification to the Climate Act to change the emissions accounting methodology to reduce the expected costs of the cap and invest program. New York climate activists claimed that the change would eviscerate the Climate Act and convinced the Hochul Administration to delay discussion of this aspect of the cap and invest proposal. This cost issue will have to be resolved in the upcoming debate over the cap and invest program.

In addition, the Hochul Administration has proposed a rebate to consumers that will alleviate consumer costs and this is included in the final budget bill. This raises a couple of issues. The market-based control program intends to raise costs to influence energy choices, so if all the costs are offset there will not be any incentive to reduce consumer emissions by changing behavior. The other issue is that the auction proceeds are supposed to be invested to reduce emissions. If insufficient investments are made to renewable resources, then deployment of zero-emission resources to offset emissions from fossil generating units will not occur.

The final issue related to the cap and invest proposal is that it provides compliance certainty but you have to be careful what you wish for. The plan is to match the allowance cap with the Climate Act emission reduction mandates. As noted previously, there are limited options available to reduce CO₂emissions. The primary strategy will be developing zero-emissions resources that can displace emissions from existing sources. That implementation is subject to delays due to supply chain issues, permitting delays, and costs as well as other reasons that the state’s transition plan has ignored. Once all the other compliance alternatives are exhausted, the only remaining option is to reduce the availability of fossil fuel and its use. Worst case could mean no fuel for transportation, electricity generation or home heating if the allowances run out.

Part TT in Assembly Budget Bill

The primary purpose of this post is to address Part TT of the Assembly budget bill. The legislation proposes to amend Section 1854 of the Public Authorities Law by adding three new subdivisions 24, 25 and 26. I will only address the new § 99-qq. New York Climate Action Fund. Proceeds from the cap-and-invest auction are intended to go to the Climate Action Fund and the legislation mandates that the revenues must not be reallocated at the whim of the Administration. It requires the comptroller to setup the “following separate and distinct accounts”:

Consumer Climate Action Account;
Industrial Small Business Climate Action Account; and
Climate Investment Account.

The accounts have mandated allocations and purposes. The Consumer Climate Action Account is allocated 30% of the revenues collected and the money “shall be expended for the purposes of providing benefits to help reduce potential increased costs of various goods and services to consumers in the state.” The Industrial Small Business Climate Action Account is allocated no more than 3% for “the purposes of providing benefits to help reduce potential increased costs of various goods and services to industrial small businesses incorporated, formed or organized, and doing business in the state of New York.” The Climate Investment Account is allocated the remaining 67% for the purposes of assisting the state in transitioning to a less carbon intensive economy.

The Climate Investment Account has three components. The first component covers “purposes which are consistent with the general findings of the scoping plan prepared pursuant to section 75-0103 of the environmental conservation law” I presume that means investments in recommended strategies to reduce GHG emissions. The second component covers “administrative and implementation costs, auction design and support costs, program design, evaluation, and other associated costs”. The third component includes “measures which prioritize disadvantaged communities by supporting actions consistent with the requirements of paragraph d of subdivision three of section 75-0109 and of section 75-0117 of the environmental conservation law, identified through community decision-making and stakeholder input, including early action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in disadvantaged communities.” Section 75-0117 states:

State agencies, authorities and entities, in consultation with the environmental justice working group and the climate action council, shall, to the extent practicable, invest or direct available and relevant programmatic resources in a manner designed to achieve a goal for disadvantaged communities to receive forty percent of overall benefits of spending on clean energy and energy efficiency programs, projects or investments in the areas of housing, workforce development, pollution reduction, low income energy assistance, energy, transportation and economic development, provided however, that disadvantaged communities shall receive no less than thirty-five percent of the overall benefits of spending on clean energy and energy efficiency programs, projects or investments and provided further that this section shall not alter funds already contracted or committed as of the effective date of this section.

Funding Allocations

I am particularly concerned with the funding allocations. Ultimately the cap and invest program is supposed to invest funds received in the recommended strategies to achieve the net-zero transition. The Climate Action Council’s Scoping Plan presumes that investors will make fund all the infrastructure necessary to reduce GHG emissions consistent with the Climate Act targets. However, unless subsidies are available, I do not think there will be sufficient private investment to develop all the necessary infrastructure. This legislation does not recognize this challenge.

The following table breaks down the allocations. The Consumer Climate Action Account is a gimmick. The state proposes to quietly take money on one hand and then turn around and loudly give some of it back on the other hand. Who gets what and has anyone bothered to figure out if the giveback makes anyone whole for the costs? The Industrial Small Business Climate Action Account is intended to appease the companies that will inevitably end up paying more to be less competitive. The Climate Act is supposed to rectify climate and environmental justice inequities and the offered solution is a 40% investment in affected communities. In the following table I assumed that the 40% would come out of the climate investment account. New York is already in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) cap and invest program. In Fiscal Year 22-23, the RGGI operating plan costs for program administration, state cost recovery and the pro rata costs to RGGI Inc for things like auction services and market monitoring comprised 10.9% of the total expenses. I assumed those costs only relate to the Climate Investment Account. That leaves 49.1% for this account. Those are the Climate Investment Account revenues that can be invested in the infrastructure necessary to subsidize the infrastructure requirements for the net-zero transition.

Discussion

I support the intent of the proposed legislation to prevent using the revenues raised in the cap and invest auction for purposes other than its intended use. In the past, RGGI revenues have been overtly transferred to balance the budget and, as far as I am concerned, RGGI revenues are still used to cover inappropriate costs. However, the proposed legislation still undermines the GHG emission reduction potential of the cap and invest program.

In the previous table I broke down the allocations in the Climate Investment Account relative to the total revenues generated. When you apportion the 67% allocation to the Climate Investment Account between the three categories it does not appear that the authors of the legislation have accounted for the challenge of implementing the infrastructure necessary to make the reductions necessary. The administrative component will account for 7.3% of the total revenues. The investments in the disadvantaged communities are necessary to protect those least able to afford the inevitable increased cost of energy. However, the results from the NY RGGI funding status report indicate that energy efficiency, energy conservation, and other indirect emission reduction strategies are not very cost effective so despite revenues of 26.8% of the total I do not expect significant reductions. Most importantly, only 32.9% of the auction revenues will be available to subsidize the emission reduction strategies necessary to displace the use of fossil fuels and reduce GHG emissions.

The Hochul Administration and authors of this legislation apparently do not recognize the RGGI investment results that show that emissions due to the investments from the auction proceeds have only been responsible for around 15 percent of the total observed reductions. This is a challenge that should be a priority for investment planning. The allocation of less than a third of the total revenues shows that they don’t get it.

In addition, the Consumer Client Action account is intended to provide a rebate that will alleviate consumer costs. However, the market-based control program intends to raise costs to influence energy choices, so if all the costs are offset there will not be any incentive to reduce consumer emissions by changing behavior.

My biggest concern is the lack of recognition that the auction proceeds must be invested to reduce emissions. If insufficient investments are made to renewable resources development, then deployment of zero-emission resources to offset emissions from fossil generating units will not occur. The Scoping Plan and Integration Analysis provide no details for the total expected costs so we don’t know how much money has to be raised. The Hochul Administration has not detailed what assets are supposed to fund those costs nor provided a timeline for developing resources needed to meet the Climate Act emission reduction mandates.

Conclusion

The cap and invest proposal is a well-meaning but dangerous plan. It will increase the cost of energy in the state. If the costs are set such that the investments will produce the necessary emission reductions to meet the Climate Act targets, it is likely that the costs will be politically toxic. If the investments do not effectively produce emission reductions, then the compliance certainty feature will necessarily result in artificial energy shortage. Given all the uncertainties it is probably best to not pass any implementing legislation until there is time to discuss policy implications.

Climate Act and the Gold Book

One of the difficulties addressing the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is that there are so many numbers associated with so many aspects of the mandated transition to net zero. One problem with the numbers is that quality varies so much . There is one source of New York electric system data that is of such high quality that it is the gold standard and has been referred to as the gold book for many years. This post provides links to the latest version that came out on April 28 and provides an example of how I use the data.

Climate Act Background

Gold Book

The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 2023 Load & Capacity Data Report (also known as the “Gold Book”) is now available and has been posted on the NYISO website: 2023 Load & Capacity Data Report (Gold Book). The overview describes the contents:

In this Load and Capacity Data report (“Gold Book”), the New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”) presents load and capacity data for 2023 and future years. Energy and peak forecasts are provided through 2053 by NYISO Load Zone (referenced in the rest of this document as “Zone”) and for the New York Control Area (“NYCA”). Generating capacity is projected through 2033. The information reported in this document is current as of March 15, 2023, unless otherwise noted. The seven sections of this Gold Book address the following topics:

Historical and forecast seasonal peak demand and energy usage, and energy efficiency, electrification, and other distributed energy resources and load-modifying impacts;

Existing and proposed generation and other capacity resources; and

Existing and proposed transmission facilities.

It is particularly useful because many of the most useful tables are also provided as spreadsheets. The following supplemental materials have also been posted:
2023 NYCA Existing Generating Facilities
2023 Gold Book Baseline Forecast Tables
2023 Gold Book Higher Demand Policy Scenario Tables
2023 Gold Book Lower Demand Policy Scenario Tables
2023 Gold Book Forecast Graphs

New York Wind Resources

The capacity factor is a useful metric to understand electric generation resources. The annual capacity factor equals the actual observed generation (MWh) divided by maximum possible generation (capacity (MW) times the 8,760 hours. Table III – 2a in the NYCA existing generating facilities spreadsheet lists generating station data that can be used to calculate capacity factors for each generating facility in the state. I developed a spreadsheet that calculates the capacity factors for all the current New York State wind facilities, excerpted below. Note that these are all onshore wind facilities because no offshore wind has been developed yet.

Last year I used the Gold Book data to evaluate New York wind resources. I found that there are limitations to New York’s wind resource capability. Dietmar Detering and I have corresponded about the Integration Analysis wind resource projections. He has found that “The Integration Analysis predicts between 10,997 MW and 13,239 MW of land-based wind installed within New York by 2050, and estimates annual generation between 31,224 GWh and 37,896 GWh which corresponds to a capacity factor of about 33%. The capacity factor table shows that the maximum state-wide capacity was 28% in 2014 and was 25.1% in 2022. In order to accurately estimate how many wind resources will be needed those discrepancies need to be reconciled.

In last year’s post I discussed the results. In 2021 the lowest value was the most recent so I suggested that New York’s decreasing capacity factors could reflect the age of the fleet. However, in 2022 the capacity factor went up again. I don’t see any general relationship between the age of most of the units and capacity factor reductions except for the two oldest facilities. The Madison and Western NY facilities came on line in 2000. Given that there was no generation in 2022 for Western NY I presume that it has been retired. Madison capacity factors the last two years have been about half of the generation in previous years. As far as I can tell the Integration Analysis assumes “indefinite” expected lifetimes for energy storage, wind and solar infrastructure and assigns lifetimes to other resources despite the fact that expected renewable resource lifetimes are half that of other resources. Based on this information ignoring expected lifetimes is inappropriate.

Finally, there is another aspect of the Integration Analysis that is too simplistic. The observed capacity factors over the last ten years show quite a bit of variability between the various wind facilities and between each year. In order to provide adequate renewable energy, this variability must be considered. In particular, if the average wind capacity factors are used to project how much wind capacity is needed, then when there is a year with low wind availability there won’t be enough energy available. I have seen no indication that the Integration Analysis considered this aspect.

Conclusion

The aptly named Gold Book is the ultimate source for New York electricity system data. There is a wealth of information about New York’s load and generating resources. This post showed just one example of the usefulness of the data relative to understanding the Climate Act transition plan. Unfortunately, the Integration Analysis did not incorporate information in the Gold Book. As shown here the Scoping Plan estimates of wind resources needed apparently do not consider inter-annual variability. The capacity factor used in the analysis is more representative of an upper bound than a realistic value for planning purposes. As a result, the projected wind resources needed are lower than what will be needed to keep the lights on and the costs needed to provide the power are lower than they should be.

Climate Act Renewable Intermittency Challenge

One of the difficulties associated with describing the challenge of the Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) is that many of the concepts are difficult to describe to the general public. Tyler Duren writing at Zero Hedge published an article, The Renewable Intermittency Challenge, that did a good job introducing the challenges associated with intermittency. This post expands upon his article because I think he underestimates the difficulty of a solution.

Climate Act Background

Over many years New York electric planners have developed modeling procedures that project the resource adequacy necessary to maintain current reliability standards that keep the lights on when needed the most. The current reliability procedures were developed for generation resources that can be turned on, ramped up, ramped down, and turned off as needed, have well understood forced outage rates, and do not necessarily stop operating all at the same time. Wind and solar resources do not have any of those characteristics which makes future reliability planning much more difficult. This post looks at the problem of intermittency.

Intermittency Challenge

All quotations below are from the article The Renewable Intermittency Challenge. To be fair my criticisms of this work are based on the presumption that intermittency is a significant problem when the energy system is intended to get to a net-zero target. Author Tyler Duren introduces the challenge by giving an overview of the electric system:

The U.S. has a dynamic electricity mix, with a range of energy sources generating electricity at different times of the day.

At all times, the amount of electricity generated must match demand in order to keep the power grid in balance, which leads to cyclical patterns in daily and weekly electricity generation.

The graphic below, via Visual Capitalist’s Govind Bhutada and Sabrina Lam, tracks hourly changes in U.S. electricity generation over one week, based on data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).

It may difficult to read the summary of the renewable intermittency challenge in the previous figure. It says “Unlike conventional sources of electricity, wind and solar are variable and location-specific. This is a concern for grid operators, especially as more renewable capacity is deployed”. I agree with this description.

Duren goes on to explain that the electric load is met with three types of power plants. He describes daily load cycles and the use of these power plants. In my opinion, some peaking power plants are not normally used for daily load variations. Some of these units only are operated at times of high loads like an extended period of hot weather and high loads.

The Three Types of Power Plants

Before diving in, it’s important to distinguish between the three main types of power plants in the U.S. electricity mix:

Base load plants generally run at full or near-full capacity and are used to meet the base load or the minimum amount of electricity demanded at all times. These are typically coal-fired or nuclear power plants. If regionally available, geothermal and hydropower plants can also be used as baseload sources.

Peak load or peaking power plants are typically dispatchable and can be ramped up quickly during periods of high demand. These plants usually operate at maximum capacity only for a few hours a day and include gas-fired and pumped-storage hydropower plants.

Intermediate load plants are used during the transitory hours between base load and peak load demand. Intermittent renewable sources like wind and solar (without battery storage) are suitable for intermediate use, along with other sources.

This simplistic overview did not explain the difficulties facing a system that relies on intermittent wind and solar. In an article co-authored with Russel Schussler we explained some of the issues with peaking power when most of the energy is supplied by wind and solar.

Duren goes on to show how electricity generation meets load on an hourly basis.

Zooming In: The U.S. Hourly Electricity Mix

With that context, the table below provides an overview of average hourly electricity generation by source for the week of March 7–March 14, 2023, in the Eastern Time Zone.

It’s worth noting that while this is representative of a typical week of electricity generation, these patterns can change with seasons. For example, in the month of June, electricity demand usually peaks around 5 PM, when solar generation is still high, unlike in March.

Natural gas is the country’s largest source of electricity, with gas-fired plants generating an average of 176,000 MWh of electricity per hour throughout the week outlined above. The dispatchable nature of natural gas is evident in the chart, with gas-fired generation falling in the wee hours and rising during business hours.

Meanwhile, nuclear electricity generation remains steady throughout the given days and week, ranging between 80,000–85,000 MWh per hour. Nuclear plants are designed to operate for long durations (1.5 to 2 years) before refueling and require less maintenance, allowing them to provide reliable baseload energy.

On the other hand, wind and solar generation tend to see large fluctuations throughout the week. For example, during the week of March 07–14, wind generation ranged between 26,875 MWh and 77,185 MWh per hour, based on wind speeds. Solar generation had stronger extremes, often reaching zero or net-negative at night and rising to over 40,000 MWh in the afternoon.

Because wind and solar are often variable and location-specific, integrating them into the grid can pose challenges for grid operators, who rely on forecasts to keep electricity supply and demand in balance. So, what are some ways to solve these problems?

Duren suggests that these challenges can be solved. His suggestions will be the focus of the remainder of this post. Rafe Champion describes the issue of wind droughts that undermines the ability of these solutions to work in a system that relies heavily on wind and solar. If the renewables are only intended to augment the existing system much of the following discussion is appropriate. However, the only reason to install wind and solar is to mitigate climate change which requires a net-zero solution so I do not believe there is any reason to consider limited penetration of renewables.

Solving the Renewable Intermittency Challenge

As more renewable capacity is deployed, here are three ways to make the transition smoother.

Energy storage systems can be combined with renewables to mitigate variability. Batteries can store electricity during times of high generation (for example, in the afternoon for solar), and supply it during periods of peak demand.

Demand-side management can be used to shift flexible demand to times of high renewable generation. For instance, utilities can collaborate with their industrial customers to ensure that certain factory lines only run in the afternoon, when solar generation peaks.

Expanding transmission lines can help connect high-quality solar and wind resources in remote regions to centers of demand. In fact, as of the end of 2021, over 900 gigawatts of solar and wind capacity (notably more than the country’s current renewable capacity) were queued for grid interconnection.

Energy Storage

Duren makes a common mistake when describing the electric system. He only talks about average conditions. His description of energy storage systems only addresses daily variations: “Batteries can store electricity during times of high generation (for example, in the afternoon for solar), and supply it during periods of peak demand.” The bigger problem is that wind and, to a lesser extent, solar can also be subject to longer periods of reduced output that complicates energy storage requirements. In a net-zero electric system I believe that wind droughts are a fatal flaw because existing energy storage technology is too limited and too expensive.

Francis Menton writing at the Manhattan Contrarian described work by Bill Ponton that addressed energy storage requirements for the Climate Act transition plan over longer time periods than a day. They evaluated “Initial Report on the New York Power Grid Study” which includes the following table of how much wind, solar and storage capacity needed to meet the net-zero transition targets of the Climate Act .

Menton describes the energy storage provisions:

But far more absurd is the provision in this Report for prospective energy storage. Note the numbers in the table above — 3 GW in 2030 and 15.5 GW in 2040. As usual they leave out the duration of the batteries. But Ponton wrote to the lead author of the Report from the Brattle Group, a guy named Hannes Pfeifenberger, to get the information. Result:

I asked one of the principal authors of the NY Power Grid study report, Hannes Pfeifenberger, how did he intend to balance fluctuations in wind power and he stated that the biggest factor was 17 GW of battery storage with a maximum duration of 6-hr, totaling 102 GWh. His response is surprising. I calculated that with wind power capacity of 84 GW, there was 59,851 GWH of wind energy curtailed and 48,071 GWH of gas turbine energy used. In theory, the curtailed wind energy could be stored and then subsequently discharged to substitute for the energy provided by the gas turbines, but would require energy storage of 12,000 GWH.

102 GWh versus 12,000 GWh. So, as usual with the studies we can find for places like New York and California, they’re off on the storage requirement by a factor of more than 100.

I have tried to make my own estimates of energy storage requirements and they are the same order of magnitude as described here. The main point is that Duren does not address this problem at all.

Demand-Side Management

Simplistic evaluations of net-zero transition programs also suggest that reducing load through programs like demand-side management can be a viable solution. There are two issues. The first is that net-zero programs refer to the entire economy and emission reductions from transportation and residential heating, hot water, and cooking, rely on electrification which necessarily increases load. This is a particular problem when loads are highest. Duren writes that “Demand-side management can be used to shift flexible demand to times of high renewable generation. For instance, utilities can collaborate with their industrial customers to ensure that certain factory lines only run in the afternoon, when solar generation peaks.” There is a limited amount of load shifting possible when temperatures are coldest, electric vehicle charging and battery capabilities are lowered, and everyone needs electricity to keep warm.

Expanding Transmission Capabilities

Another favorite solution of naïve energy analysts is predicated on the concept that the wind is always blowing somewhere. Duren writes: “Expanding transmission lines can help connect high-quality solar and wind resources in remote regions to centers of demand. In fact, as of the end of 2021, over 900 gigawatts of solar and wind capacity (notably more than the country’s current renewable capacity) were queued for grid interconnection.” In general that is true and that might work for a net-zero electric system on average. Unfortunately, the coldest and hottest weather, and thus the highest load, is strongly correlated with high pressure systems that also have the lowest wind resources.

In a presentation describing my skeptical concerns about the Climate Act I addressed this problem in detail. In brief, consider the following weather map of February 17, 2021 during the period of the Great Texas Freeze. This event was associated with an intensely cold polar vortex huge high-pressure system. Remember that winds are higher when the isobars are close together. On this day there are light winds from New York to the southeast, west, and north including the proposed New York offshore wind development area. There are packed isobars in northeastern New England, in the western Great Plains, and central Gulf Coast where wind resources would be plentiful. For New York to guarantee wind energy availability from those locations, wind turbines and the transmission lines between New York and those locations would have to be dedicated for our use. Otherwise, jurisdictions in between would claim those resources for their own use during these high energy demand days. It is unreasonable to expect that this could possibly be an economic solution.

Conclusion

I liked the introduction of Duren’s article. He gives a good overview of the balancing act necessary to constantly match generating resources with the load. The graphics illustrate his points well too. He does not explicitly address net zero targets and that avoids addressing the problem that what works for today’s systems will not work when the system relies on intermittent renewables. In the context of a net-zero electric system that eliminates fossil-fired generation, I do not believe his conclusion that there are readily available solutions that address the intermittency challenge is correct.

If the future electric system has to rely on weather-dependent resources, then the question of worst-case availability has to be addressed. Analyses done to date in New York State have all shown that there are wind lulls in the winter that are difficult to address using existing energy storage technology. The Integration Analysis and the New York Independent System Operator Resource Outlook analyses of future resource requirements have both concluded that the solutions recommended by Duren are inadequate and a new dispatchable emissions-free resource (DEFR) must be developed to address the wind lull intermittency problem. The Resource Outlook notes “The lead time necessary for research, development, permitting, and construction of DEFR supply will require action well in advance of 2040 if state policy mandates under the CLCPA are to be achieved”.

In addition to the challenge of developing an entirely new resource, in order to determine the resource capabilities necessary for the worst-case, a comprehensive analysis of wind and solar resource availability is needed. If that analysis does not get the right resource availability, then there will not be enough energy available to supply everyone who needs it during the worst conditions. If either of these challenges is not met adequately, people will freeze to death in the dark.

Whale Tales and Whale Facts

On April 4, 2023 Citizens Campaign for the Environment hosted “Lunch & Learn: Whale Tales and Whale Facts”. I have published a couple of articles about whales and offshore wind development recently so I am providing this for more information. I have incorporated comments from a retired fisheries expert who was a colleague of mine and an update of all the recent dead sea mammals washing ashore along the NY/NJ coastline.

I have been following the Climate Act since it was first proposed. I submitted comments on the Climate Act implementation plan and written over 300 articles about New York’s net-zero transition because I believe the ambitions for a zero-emissions economy embodied in the Climate Act outstrip available renewable technology such that the net-zero transition will do more harm than good. The opinions expressed in this post do not reflect the position of any of my previous employers or any other company I have been associated with, these comments are mine alone.

Climate Act Background

The Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act (Climate Act) established a New York “Net Zero” target (85% reduction and 15% offset of emissions) by 2050 and an interim 2030 target of a 40% reduction by 2030. The Climate Action Council is responsible for preparing the Scoping Plan that outlines how to “achieve the State’s bold clean energy and climate agenda.” In brief, that plan is to electrify everything possible and power the electric gride with zero-emissions generating resources by 2040. The Integration Analysis prepared by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and its consultants quantifies the impact of the electrification strategies. That material was used to write a Draft Scoping Plan. After a year-long review the Scoping Plan recommendations were finalized at the end of 2022. In 2023 the Scoping Plan recommendations are supposed to be implemented through regulation and legislation. The net-zero transition plan anticipates extensive offshore wind development. The Climate Act mandates 9 GW of offshore wind by 2035 and the Integration Analysis recommends 14 GW by 2040. Note that the NYISO projection for offshore wind is 9 GW. I am particularly concerned because the state projects 14GW of offshore wind but has only attempted to address the cumulative environmental impacts of 9 GW – a more than 55 increase.

Dead Sea Mammal Holocaust

There is no question that there has been a marked increase in sea mammal deaths since 2016. Mark Sertoff compiled the following list of recent deaths and suggested that I publish it.

www.nytimes.com/…/east-coast-whale-deaths.html In all, 23 dead whales have washed ashore along the East Coast since early December, including 12 in New Jersey and New York, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration….
www.app.com/story/news/local/land-environment/... Across the Jersey Shore, 10 dead whales — mostly humpbacks — washed ashore or have been seen off the coast since Dec. 1, 2022. The strandings are part of what federal authorities are calling…
www.usatoday.com/story/graphics/2023/03/15/east... USA TODAY Since Dec. 1, 23 whales have been found dead along the Atlantic Coast, part of a trend in unusually high deaths among three whale species since 2016-2017. The National Oceanic and…
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2023/02/15/... 78 dead whales were reported in 2017, including humpbacks and right whales, and 59 in 2018, 2019, and 2020. An average of 52 whales have died each year along the coast since 2007. In 2022,…
More Number Dead Whales Nj images
www.app.com/story/news/local/land-environment/... Six dead whales washed ashore in the past 33 days across New Jersey and New York, according to the environmental group Clean Ocean Action, one of five groups who called for an investigation….
www.wshu.org/long-island-news/2023-01-11/6-dead... Six endangered whales have washed up dead on the shores of Long Island and New Jersey over the past month, an unprecedented number for this area in the last half century. These whales…
nypost.com/2023/02/13/dead-whale-washes-onto... A dead whale was found on a New Jersey beach Monday — the ninth one to wash ashore in the New York-New Jersey area since early December in what activists are calling an alarming uptick. The…
www.nj.com/news/2023/02/another-dead-whale... Since January 2016, 181 dead stranded humpback whales were reported across 13 states, including 24 in New Jersey and 35 in New York. A ship strike or entanglement with fishing gear accounted…
newjersey.news12.com/16-dolphins-dead-along-new... Eight dolphins died Wednesday after getting stranded along a beach in Cape May County. According to the Marine Mammal Stranding Center, a pod of eight dolphins became stranded on the beach on Tuesday. Two dolphins died and the other six were euthanized to prevent further suffering of the animals.
www.nytimes.com/2023/03/22/nyregion/dolphins... March 22, 2023 Eight dolphins were dead after a pod of the marine mammals washed ashore in a mass stranding in Sea Isle City, N.J., on Tuesday, the authorities said, prompting questions over…
www.npr.org/2023/03/22/1165249049 A pod of eight dolphins washed ashore in New Jersey, all of which have died, according to a local animal rescue organization. Two common dolphins, an adult and a calf were first found on a…
abcnews.go.com/US/8-dolphins-dead-after-washing... Eight dolphins were stranded on a beach in Sea Isle, N.J., on March 21, 2023. WPVI A pod of eight dolphins died after being stranded on two beaches in New Jersey on Tuesday, according to an animal rescue and rehabilitation center.
abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/officials-8-dolphins... Marine animal welfare officials say eight dolphins have died after they became stranded on a beach in New Jersey By The Associated Press March 21, 2023, 4:51 PM SEA ISLE CITY, N.J. — Eight dolphins have died after they became stranded on a beach in New Jersey, marine animal welfare officials said.
www.reddit.com/r/newjersey/comments/115mw4u/wtf... WTF is happening with dead whales and dolphins in NJ? So I just saw that 3 dolphins beached themselves and died in Sandy Hook during low tide TODAY, literally about an hour ago. This on top of the dead whales we’ve seen so far in the past few weeks and also in Long Island.
abc7ny.com/dead-dolphins-sandy-hook-bay-new... The dolphin deaths come after a surge of whales washing up in both New York and New Jersey in recent months. Since the beginning of December, there have been at least nine whale deaths.
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2023/03/21/... 1:15. Six dolphins found off the shore of New Jersey were euthanized Tuesday and another two were found dead after a pod was discovered in a “mass stranding event,” according to a non-profit …

Whale Tales and Whale Facts

As a result of all these sea mammal deaths supporters of offshore wind set up a webinar to provide their side of the story. On April 4, 2023 Citizens Campaign for the Environment hosted a virtual forum entitled Whale Tales and Whale Facts.

Since 2016, we have witnessed an increase in whale strandings and whale deaths off the coast of America’s shores. These endangered species are under threat from several sources, including ship strikes, fishing gear, plastic pollution, and climate change. Unfortunately, misinformation about whale deaths and an association with offshore wind development has led to concerns about transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy. These local wind projects are crucial to combat climate change, which is not only a threat to whales but also to marine mammals, fisheries, and our communities.

Citizens Campaign for the Environment, NY League of Conservation Voters and NY Offshore Wind Alliance hosted a virtual educational forum with whale experts from Atlantic Marine Conservation Society, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and the US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. Thank you to the almost 400 people who joined us for these great presentations and a lively Q &A. If you missed it, check out the video to learn more about the recent whale strandings and deaths, what is being done on the local, state, and federal level to protect whales.

The presentations from the virtual forum are also available: Citizens Campaign for the Environment, US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, NYS Department of Environmental Conservation, and Atlantic Marine Conservation Society.

The Citizens Campaign for the Environment (CCE) is concerned with climate change and energy policy:

CCE works at the local, state, regional, and federal level to advance solutions to the climate crisis. We advocate for comprehensive energy policies that support renewable energy (such as offshore wind and solar power) and energy efficiency, while ending our dependence on dirty, polluting fossil fuels.

In addition, Wind Works Long Island collaborated with CCE for the meeting. Wind Works Long Island is a coalition of environmental, labor, clergy, and community groups, and the force behind educating the Long Island community on the benefits of renewable energy, particularly offshore wind.

The virtual forum had “whale experts” from Atlantic Marine Conservation Society, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and the US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. They talked about the recent whale strandings and deaths, what is being done on the local, state, and federal level to protect whales.

Before the “whale experts” spoke three hosts introduced the topic. Adrienne Esposito, Executive Director, Citizens Campaign for the Environment was the moderator. She argued that there are factors (what are the factors)that have increased the number of whales close to shore and that there are causes of whale deaths that are more likely causes for the observed whale strandings and deaths. Julie Tighe, President, New York League of Conservation Voters, said that disinformation is a problem for the offshore wind industry. Fred Zalcman, Director, New York Offshore Wind Alliance, emphasized that the developers are committed to responsible offshore wind development.

I encourage interested readers to watch the video. I learned a lot and have a better understanding of the situation. However, I still have concerns. In the following I summarize my notes.

Meghan Rickard, Marine Zoologist, NYS Department of Environmental Conservation described the baseline monitoring program that the state did (video at 11:55 of the recording). She said there is no long-term data but they seem to be increasing especially in the New York Bight. The emphasis of the DEC has been on baseline monitoring but they are planning to continue to monitor. Unfortunately, she noted that the funding available is half of what was available for the baseline.

Erica Staaterman, Division of Environmental Assessment and Center for Marine Acoustics, US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) described the fisheries regulations (video starting at 26:51). She explained:

“The term take means to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal” – MMPA. In general for BOEM activities, very little lethal take is ever authorized by NOAA. NOAA is not authorizing any lethal take for offshore wind activities. NOAA fisheries can authorize incidental (unintentional) take of small numbers of marine mammals for certain activities, like offshore wind development. Two types of incidental take:

“Level A” = injury. For acoustics, this is auditory injury, i.e. permanent hearing loss. Acoustic thresholds are established by NMFS and differ by species group.

“Level B” = behavioral disturbance. For acoustics, this includes behavioral disturbance from a sound source and possibly temporary (i.e. recoverable) hearing loss. Threshold is 160 dB re 1 µPa for all species.

I found her presentation very enlightening. She explained that most of the offshore wind activities to this point are mapping the seafloor using high-resolution geophysical (HRG) sources. They are lower in energy and have key characteristics that set them apart from most other manmade noise sources. Importantly they are directional. She stated that “There is no evidence that HRG sources used by offshore wind companies could cause mortality of whales, nor any evidence that they are responsible for the recent whale strandings.” The following slide presents her conclusions.

Robert DiGiovanni, Founder and Chief Scientist, Atlantic Marine Conservation Society convinced me that this is a complicated issue in his presentation (video starting at 42:18). He explained that the environment has changed recently there are simply many more whales although inter-annual variability of whale locations makes counting the whales difficult. He said that most deaths are due to ship strikes and noted that we cannot use the experience in the European offshore wind farms to project what might happen here because whales there are different.

The question and answer session (video starting at 1:00:00) was interesting but I am not going to take the time to go over it.

Discussion

I am not a fisheries biologist do I asked a former colleague who is an expert to review this post. My takeaway was that that even though there is a correlation between the recent uptick in whale mortality and the offshore wind site characterization work that I do not disagree with the BOEM conclusion that there is no evidence that work is the cause of the recent whale strandings. However, that does not mean that this is still not an issue.

My expert reviewer said that the presentation missed a few key points:

What are the studies underway to identify and build upon the European experience given the ecosystem differences. Do they have the funding to do this work adequately. As we work to decrease the impact of vessel strikes and fishing gear do we understand what the windfarms will do to migratory patterns; feeding; prey behavior etc. Will offshore windfarm noise when the turbines become operational become a problem with new noise pollution. They failed to acknowledge NOAA research identifying chronic anthropomorphic noise as a significant issue for marine mammals.

The presentation showed that there are several reasons that the site characterization work is not a likely cause of the recent observed whale morality. Those reasons include the following: the sounds generated by the mapping equipment do not overlap much with whale hearing ranges, the sounds are intermittent, the mapping uses short pulses of sound with relatively long periods of silence, and the sounds are directional into the seafloor. The problem not addressed in this forum is that these reasons are not characteristic of offshore wind turbine construction. The BOEM is focusing their work now on construction impacts including a sound level limit for impact pile-driving, acoustic exposure tradeoffs of impact vs. vibratory pile-driving, impacts of substrate vibration/particle motion on fishes and invertebrates, and auditory recovery time for impulsive sounds. The following table shows that construction impacts overlap whale hearing ranges.

My reviewer pointed out that the lack of funds for this important effort is appalling (only $2.6 M for both the Great Lakes and Ocean). With billions allocated to green initiatives this makes no sense given the potential impacts. The real issue is what happens when construction starts on the offshore turbines with sound characteristics that are very likely to disorient the whales. The whales may not die from the cacophony of construction noise throughout the New York bight but the likelihood that the din could disorient the whales so that they could become much more susceptible to vessel strikes was not addressed in this forum.

The New York Offshore Wind Alliance claims that the developers are committed to responsible offshore wind development. It is time to stop the slogans and prove it. They should ensure that the New York whale monitoring program is fully funded and be prepared to stop development if their construction activities do adversely affect whales until such time that mitigating activities can be incorporated into their construction plans.

Given all the unknowns the rational approach would be to determine if there are adverse construction impacts before starting the development of the all the infrastructure necessary to build the offshore wind resources proposed. Clearly it is appropriate to accelerate the BOEM analyses of potential construction activities. Moreover, given the immense political pressure to develop offshore wind there should be an independent evaluation of the impact of construction activities. If that work indicates that there any adverse impacts can be mitigated then the development should be allowed to proceed.

My reviewer made some other relevant points.

The lack of funding for independent research is criminal given the enormous public tax funded budgets behind offshore wind development. In a nutshell, why race to install a tiny fraction of electrical resource of offshore wind development that will have no demonstrated impact on the global climate just to feel good or as a symbolic gesture? The Climate Act proposal for 9 GW can in no way be adequate to keep pace with current electrical demand let alone the push for electrification of everything (cars, heat, and cooling) but can have an irreversible impact on the coastal offshore environment.

We clearly have vast information concerning the impacts of terrestrial onshore wind development and operation, primarily because we are terrestrial. The terrestrial environment is comparatively extremely easy to study, we can touch, feel, measure, and observe with our own eyes. This is not so with the ocean and its biota of which we only understand a miniscule amount. We are naïve to think we can hastily dive headlong into the abyss we know so little about to develop a very limited resource when we know we cannot accurately measure the effect of this development on global climate. The use of terms such as misinformation or disinformation in the current political environment when whales are dying and people have common sense concerns is disingenuous and only leads to more distrust. The whale experts provided some valuable insight into the current knowledge of acoustic survey work and its minimal potential to be the cause behind whale deaths. Moving to actual construction should be the primary concern and this was not addressed. Additionally, the current level of funding for monitoring alone was discussed and it appears wholly inadequate for such a significant project and raises concerns that cumulative impact analysis for the proposed offshore wind development will never be sufficient to determine if there are unacceptable adverse impacts.

Conclusion

I have observed that the more vociferous/louder the criticisms made by a stakeholder the more likely that the stakeholder is guilty of the same thing. The introductions to the webinar mentioned that disinformation is a problem for the offshore wind industry. They went on to state that “these endangered species are under threat from several sources, including ship strikes, fishing gear, plastic pollution, and climate change”. They offered no proof how climate change could affect whales but their emotional attachment to that disinformation narrative that the existential threat of climate change affects everything is such that it is just presumed.

They are facing a quandary now that there is a correlation between whale deaths and offshore wind site surveys. They state that it is disinformation to claim that this correlation suggests that there are concerns about transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy. The organizers of the forum clung to the conviction that the site survey characteristics are unlikely to be the cause of the whale strandings observed to date. Based on the specific information provided by the experts who spoke I tend to agree. However, I also want to point out that their existential threat narrative is based on a similar correlation between GHG emissions and climate change. If they were willing to consider the possibility that might be similarly flawed then the fact that correlation does not necessarily mean causation could destroy the entire rationale for risking the welfare of the whales.

Ultimately the problem with the forum is that they ignored the fact that construction noises will be substantially different than the ongoing site surveys and will probably be much more extensive when the massive planned construction starts. Those differences are more likely to impact whales. Despite all the talk of responsible offshore wind development no one has offered a plan to ensure that if construction impacts are found that they will change their plans. In my opinion, it is irresponsible to continue the headlong dash to develop offshore wind resources without first determining whether the construction and operation of the massive number of wind turbines will unacceptably affect the whale’s future.

The forum did clearly inform listeners about the lack of funding for monitoring necessary to address the many concerns with massive offshore wind development to allay the concerns of the public. It is particularly galling that the offshore wind proponents who claim to be in favor of responsible offshore wind development are not stepping up to ensure that future monitoring efforts are adequate. Maybe they don’t want to know the answer if the concerns are real.